

Contents

<i>Acknowledgements</i>	vii
Introduction: Institutionalizing Gender Equality	1
Gender Equality: A Success Story?	3
Emergence, Implementation and Impact	10
Presence, Voice and Process	12
Governance and Diversity	16
Conclusion	19
1 Equality Strategies: Quotas, Policy Agencies and Mainstreaming	21
Introduction	21
Gender Quotas	24
Women's Policy Agencies	32
Gender Mainstreaming	38
Conclusion	48
2 Making a Difference? Evaluating Impact	52
Introduction	52
Evaluating the Success of Gender Quotas	53
Evaluating the Success of Women's Policy Agencies	60
Evaluating the Success of Gender Mainstreaming	67
Conclusion	73
3 Working Together? Analysing Interrelations	76
<i>Judith Squires and Mona Lena Krook</i>	
Introduction	76
Competing Strategies	78
Complementary Strategies	81
Conclusions	86

4 Fair Representation? Quotas	88
Introduction	88
Quotas as Positive Action	91
Quotas as Group Recognition	95
Quotas as Democratic Innovation	101
Quotas as (Strategic) Essentialism?	107
Conclusion	110
5 Feminist Advocacy? Policy Agencies	115
Introduction	115
Women's Policy Agencies as Group Representation	116
The Fragmentation of the Women's Movement	120
Representing a Movement?	125
State Restructuring	129
Conclusion	134
6 Engendering Governance? Mainstreaming	136
Introduction	136
Mainstreaming as a Governance Strategy	138
Mainstreaming as the Democratization of Expertise	143
Mainstreaming as Rhetorical Entrapment	146
Mainstreaming as Democratic Participation	151
Conclusion	154
7 Future Challenges: Negotiating Diversity	156
Introduction	156
From Gender to Diversity	157
Intersectionality: Additive and Transversal	161
Diversity Mainstreaming	163
Deliberation and Diversity	170
Conclusion	175
<i>Bibliography</i>	179
<i>Index</i>	203

Acknowledgements

I am particularly grateful to Johanna Kantola and Mona Lena Krook, who together helped me to define this project. More generally, I would like to thank the participants of the ECPR Women and Politics Standing Group for providing the research network that made this book possible. As convenor of this group 2001–5 I benefited from reading the papers presented by its members at various workshops (Mannheim, Edinburgh, Granada) and general conferences (Kent, Marburg, Budapest) and exchanging ideas with the ever expanding number of scholars working on women and politics in Europe. This group provided an inspiring and supportive social and intellectual community throughout the last five years, during which time I explored the ways in which a political theorist might engage with the empirical developments in gender equality being interrogated by political scientists. Women's policy agencies, quotas and mainstreaming have each been subject to extensive scrutiny by ECPR participants and I am indebted to them all for sharing their insights with me.

I am also indebted to the participants of three other research networks, who have informed my thinking on women's policy agencies, quotas and mainstreaming. The Research Network on Gender and the State (RNGS), led by Amy Mazur, Dorothy Stetson, Joyce Outshoorn and Joni Lovenduski, generated much of the scholarship on women's policy agencies that I draw on in this book. The comparative quotas project led by Drude Dahlerup and supported by IDEA (International Democratic Electoral Assistance) brought together scholars from around the world to discuss quotas. I am indebted to the participants of this group for their wealth of knowledge on quotas, which also inform this book. Finally, the ESRC series of workshops on gender mainstreaming led by Sylvia Walby provided an invaluable forum for discussing developments with a diverse range of mainstreaming experts.

Members of the Gender and Governance Research Group in the Department of Politics, University of Bristol (Terrell Carver, Sarah Childs, Penny Griffin, Ana Jordan, Christina Rowley, Laura Shepherd, Carole Spary, Jutta Weldes and Mark Wickham-Jones) also provided a

rich, challenging and supportive intellectual environment, in which I have been able to explore this research agenda. I would also like to thank the University of Bristol for funding a semester of research leave and the Arts and Humanities Research Council for Research Leave funding, which together made the writing of this book possible; and Steven Kennedy at Palgrave Macmillan for his enthusiasm and insight.

Last, but perhaps most importantly, thanks to Abigail, Jonathan and Richard for putting up with me going off to so many conferences, being stressed when the deadline looked too tight, and preoccupied when they wanted to play.

JUDITH SQUIRES

Introduction: Institutionalizing Gender Equality

Gender equality has gained a central place on the global political agenda over the last thirty years. It is now widely assumed to be a positive ideal and its pursuit is depicted as a core requirement of social justice. Moreover, gender equality is increasingly framed as central to the realization of both modernization and economic efficiency and its achievement presented as a key to good governance. Both rights-based and utility-based arguments have converged to place gender equality high on the agenda of liberal states and organizations.

The pursuit of gender equality is now widely endorsed as a central policy goal by governments and international organizations around the world (Inglehart and Norris 2003). As a result women have gained greater access to education and labour markets and wage gaps between men and women have narrowed. Governments around the globe have also introduced institutional mechanisms to promote the advancement of women, including measures to increase women's political participation rates and to incorporate women's interests into policy-making. Parity of political participation in particular has emerged as central to both feminist gender equality campaigns and governmental gender equality directives.

This book explores the concern with parity of political participation and the resulting emergence of institutional mechanisms to promote the political equality of women, focusing on gender quotas, women's policy agencies and gender mainstreaming as three key strategies that have come to define the increasingly widespread commitment to gender equality within the political sphere.

2 *The New Politics of Gender Equality*

These three strategies focus on presence, voice and process respectively: quotas aim to secure increased numbers of women in national assemblies, policy agencies seek to improve the articulation of women's specific concerns, and mainstreaming aspires to ensure that more systematic consideration is given to gender equality issues across the policy-making agenda. The strategies clearly differ, yet while there are conceptual and practical tensions between them, they have generally been advocated as mutually reinforcing ways of securing greater political equality between women and men. Together they represent a distinctive approach to gender equality, and one that has emerged over the last three decades to become a global phenomenon.

While significant and sustained inequalities persist between men and women across the globe, the pursuit of gender equality is increasingly perceived to be a mainstream rather than a marginalized counter-cultural activity; it has been adopted as a central facet of liberal democratic discourse and espoused by leading international organizations and national governments across the globe. At the same time feminist activists have turned their attention to the state, focusing on strategies for greater inclusion within state institutions. The era when the women's movement was defined by its commitment to autonomous separatist action and informal pre-figurative politics has gone, replaced by an increasingly professionalized, state-oriented network of gender equality advocates, who enjoy much greater access to the institutions of power than most early second-wave feminists would ever have predicted.

This new politics of gender equality could be viewed as an unequivocal success story, with feminist concerns transforming mainstream institutional norms and practices. Yet feminist norms and practices have themselves been transformed in the process. The desire to render the pursuit of gender equality compatible with wider policy objectives and existing institutional practices has encouraged feminist actors to adopt utility-based arguments in order to justify greater gender equality, and technocratic processes in order to promote it. This has, almost inevitably, had the effect of marginalizing rights-based gender equality arguments and sidelining more democratic participatory approaches to its pursuit. As this tendency intensifies, the earlier focus on 'voice' is gradually disappearing and a twin-track approach to gender equality emerging, in which 'presence' and 'process' come to function as indicators of parity participation. This book explores the emergence of this twin-track strategy in which governments seek to secure both increased numbers of women in decision-making bodies and greater attention to gender equality in the policy-making process.

Gender quotas have emerged as the central strategy for securing increased numbers of women in national parliaments, generating extensive debate on the pros and cons of a 'politics of presence' (Phillips 1995). More recently gender mainstreaming has emerged as the central strategy for ensuring the inclusion of a gender equality perspective in policy-making, generating debate on the pros and cons of what we might call a 'politics of process'. Where the former gender equality strategy focuses on female parliamentarians and works with numerical indicators, the latter focuses on gender experts and takes the effective implementation of process, such as gender impact assessments, as an indicator of success. Both adopt formal empirical indicators, which render gender equality measurable, but tend to foreclose debate regarding its conceptualization. While there are clear gains to be had from this twin-track strategy, there is also a danger: the earlier feminist emphasis on participatory democracy seems to have lost ground in this new politics of gender equality.

Gender Equality: A Success Story?

Are these developments to be viewed as an unqualified success for gender equality advocates? It is possible that structural change and socio-economic developments, rather than feminist activism, have ushered in this new gender regime, which is simply different from, rather than more equal to, previous regimes. Indeed, this new gender regime is clearly compatible with high levels of inequality in relation to categories other than gender. While gender inequality has apparently decreased, class-based and North–South inequalities have ominously increased; income gaps within societies in many parts of the world have grown, as has the gap between the developed and less-developed regions (Murphy 2003:4).

Of the various egalitarian movements that have campaigned for social change over the last thirty years, the women's movement is frequently viewed as one of the most successful. Yet egalitarian social movements have long been argued to play an important role in facilitating the consolidation of the institutions of governance that allow the economy to be productive (Polanyi 1975). It is therefore entirely possible that the demands of the women's movement have been conceded more readily than those of other social movements simply because they are more consonant with those of the prevailing economic order. To the extent that women have demanded inclusion within existing institutions – educational, economic and political – they have generally found, in the last thirty years, these institutions to be, at least rhetorically, responsive.

Whether this greater inclusion in turn facilitates the transformation of these institutions, as many feminists have hoped, is as yet less evident.

Alert to the dangers of assimilation, the women's movement largely insisted on its autonomy during the 1970s and focused on cultural change rather than on influencing states. Nineteenth-century feminists in western liberal democracies had campaigned for the right to vote and to stand in elections, concentrating on formal equality before the law. However, once secured, these formal rights failed to generate the increased equality of outcome that many had anticipated, leading to a rise in alternative forms of activism during the 1960s and 1970s, with many women organizing outside of state structures in such things as women's peace movements and ecology movements (Millett 1970; Mies and Shiva 1993; Morgan 1970). During the peak of the second-wave movements there were a large number of protest strategies adopted, including spontaneous action, well-organized campaigns of sit-ins, marches and demonstrations, such as the 'Reclaim the Night' actions in England and West Germany in 1977, in Italy in 1978. All these forms of political protest were 'movement events', working outside the formal mechanisms of procedural politics. The women's movement aspired to be open to all, non-hierarchical and informal. Issues of participatory democracy became central, with great attention paid to organizational practice (Pateman 1970).

However, for many the experiences of the radical participatory democracy of the women's movement became paradoxical (Phillips 1991). The emphasis on participation was too demanding for those who were juggling many other demands on their time, and the lack of representative structures raised serious questions of accountability. The absence of formal structures often worked to create an insularity which left many women feeling excluded and silenced. By the 1980s many feminists became again more centrally concerned with the importance of mainstream politics, working to increase the numbers of women present within parties and legislatures, and to pursue policies in the interests of women.

The 1980s and 1990s saw women's issues introduced onto the agendas of diverse social and political groups and institutions, and as feminist activists entered into trade unions, political parties and state bureaucracies the women's movement increasingly engaged with these institutions and feminist attention expanded to incorporate these areas (Banaszak *et al.* 2003:21). Gradually feminist activism adopted a more state-oriented stance (Walby 2002), and the form of political engagement adopted by gender equality advocates shifted from separatist autonomous groups to greater engagement with the state (Chappell 2000, 2002, 2002a; Elman 2003; Kantola 2006).

There are various explanations as to why feminist engagements with the state should have increased in recent years, the most significant of which focus on economic development, political opportunity structures and ideational change. Economic development arguments highlight the extent to which industrialization, urbanization and the growth of an educated middle-class correlate with increased feminist activism. Greater education and labour-force participation have generally been accompanied by higher levels of political participation (Matland 1998), with a minimum level of development being needed to create the conditions in which political opportunity structures and ideational change can begin to have an effect. Within developed countries the shift from Fordist to neoliberal production processes influenced women's political participation rates.

Where the Fordist gender order, which entailed mass production and a stable working class with a nuclear family supported by a male breadwinner and women's unpaid domestic labour institutionalized the family wage (McDowell 1991), the abandonment of Keynesian policies led to reductions in the social welfare services that sustained the male breadwinner model. Many women were propelled into the labour market from economic necessity, signalling a shift in the 'gender regime' from one based on women's domestic confinement to one in which women are present in the public sphere (McDowell 1991; Walby 1997). However, while this process of restructuring has given middle-class women greater access to the labour market and public office, it has also entailed the degradation of the labour market position of many men, and increased the 'double-burden' on working-class women. Nonetheless, the overall growth in female employment intensified women's demands on the state given that the policy priorities of women in paid employment focus on the provision of public services, and led to an increase in women's public participation in the institutions of governance (Lovenduski 2005).

Political opportunities increased with women's growing employment, as women gained not only in terms of economic resources, but also in terms of access to public institutions such as trade unions, which make demands on government, and national parliaments. However, increased economic resources have not always resulted in greater political equality for women, signalling that political institutions and political culture also contribute to the low levels of women's participation in politics (Inglehart and Norris 2003:130). With the recognition that institutional factors mattered, feminist activists devoted increasing attention to electoral systems and party politics (Lovenduski 2005), leading to increases in the number of women elected to national assemblies (Ballington and Karam 2005; Squires and Wickham-Jones 2001). To the extent that the women in national assemblies hold distinct women-friendly policy

priorities and manifest a commitment to representing women's interests (Childs 2004a; Mateo Diaz 2005), their increased presence encourages further feminist engagement with the state, which is progressively viewed as open to feminist demands.

In addition to this turn to the state, the informal local organizational structures of 1970s feminism were gradually augmented by activism beyond the borders of nation-states, making strategic use of global communication technologies, and the United Nations women's world conferences to network on an international level (Mendoza 2002:296). Feminists pursuing gender equality goals have made extensive use of transnational links, using the support of international organizations and other (often more powerful) states to put pressure on their own government, in what is known as the 'boomerang effect' (Keck and Sikkink 1998). International treaty commitments have been widely deployed by transnational and local activists to pressurize national governments to conform to international norms by improving national institutional support for the advancement of women. Feminists have also used transnational networks to learn from local struggles elsewhere in the world and to benefit from the organizational support offered by transnational feminist activists. Egalitarian activists have used non-governmental forums to share ideas and expertise, thereby developing a transnational leadership cadre which promotes international learning among gender equality activists. These developments facilitate the creation of new spaces and institutions in which egalitarian aspirations can be affirmed, and so offers new political opportunities that feminists have been quick to exploit.

As a result of these developments state feminism and transnational feminism have emerged as important complements to the social movement feminism that characterized the 1970s. The women's movement has pursued its goals by using intergovernmental institutions and transnational conferences to put pressure on national governments to introduce legislative changes and institutional reforms. While the diversification in the sites and modes of engagement led inevitably to the fragmentation of the movement, causing many commentators to suggest that feminism is in abeyance, the gains secured at the state and transnational levels suggest that this development might better be understood as a change in the repertoire and form of feminist activism, rather than a decline (Walby 2002:534).

Finally, alongside increased economic development and improved political opportunities, comes ideational change whereby traditional attitudes to women's political leadership have become increasingly egalitarian, particularly in post-industrial societies (Inglehart and Norris

2003:29–48), while radical, oppositional anti-state forms of feminism have gradually been eclipsed by gender equality advocates who are committed to framing their demands within, rather than against, the dominant policy paradigms. As traditional attitudes become more egalitarian and as the nature of feminist discourse shifts, away from one of oppression and liberation towards one of human rights and economic efficiency, feminism becomes reframed as an ‘inclusionary rather than an anti-system discourse’ (Walby 2002:546).

Ideational change has affected not only the extent of support for egalitarianism, but also the way in which gender equality is conceptualized. Within post-industrial countries gender equality strategies tended to shift their focus during the 1980s from questions of redistribution to issues of recognition and representation (Fraser 1995). The first phase of second wave feminism expanded the boundaries of political contestation, beyond socio-economic redistribution, to focus on housework, sexuality and reproduction, whilst continuing to presuppose the key features of the welfare state, and thereby attempting to ‘engender’ the social imaginary by widening the politics of redistribution (Fraser 2007; Okin 1989; Pateman 1988). Yet with the rise of neo-liberalism came a growing scepticism about the basic idea of egalitarian redistribution (Armstrong 2003; Phillips 1999) and the emergence of identity politics, which frequently appear to valorize cultural difference rather than promote economic equality (Barry 2001). While feminists found that they were unable to make significant headway against injustices of political economy (Fraser 2007), concerns about mis-recognition and under-representation found a more receptive audience. This led to a ‘parting of the ways between political and economic concerns’ (Phillips 1999:1), which eroded attention to class inequalities while increasing the profile of campaigns for women’s political equality. Indeed, many political approaches appeared to jettison concern with economic issues altogether (Phillips 1999: 14–15). This prioritization of political over economic equality further allowed gender equality struggles to be cast as inclusionary rather than anti-system, tending to underplay the extent to which severe economic inequality diminishes access to conventional politics.

One can interpret this new politics of gender equality in two ways, one sceptical the other more hopeful. The first reading stresses that the normalization and institutionalization of a governing neo-liberal economic paradigm has contributed to political disenchantment and disengagement, privileging a largely technical set of devices for managing an open economy that de-democratizes policy-making (Hay 2004:502). Given this, state gender equality mechanisms and policies, which have been actively

promoted since the 1980s by the international organizations that oversee neo-liberal governance, might best be understood as part of the de-democratization and co-optation of a women's movement that had previously privileged informal social movement politics outside the state. The coincidence of the normalization of neo-liberalism and the emergence of feminist engagements with the state suggest that these recent feminist strategies may be more complicit in the pursuit of neo-liberal agendas than its feminist advocates have liked to acknowledge. The narrow focus of, and technocratic tendencies within, these strategies is emphasized in this reading, working against the depiction of their emergence as a straightforward success for the global feminist movement.

The second reading, by contrast, suggests that this preoccupation with the loss of democratic politics and changing conception of equality obfuscates the contestation at the heart of the neo-liberal project, in which marginalized groups actively engage in the process of negotiating the emerging concepts and practices that define neo-liberal governance (Larner 2005). From this perspective, the emergence of state gender equality strategies as a central feature of neo-liberal governance suggests that feminist ideas and actors have successfully negotiated a proactive agenda-setting role, capitalizing on the new possibilities for democratic engagement opened up by technocratic governance and state restructuring (Oustshoorn and Kantola 2007) and deploying arguments of economic efficiency to successfully put gender equality considerations onto the policy agenda (Himmelweit 2002). Here feminists active in transnational networks are argued to have used the spaces opened up by a global regime of free trade to engage in politics in new ways (Eschle 2001; Hobson *et al.* 2007). The claim that the normalization of neo-liberalism led to political disenchantment and disengagement is therefore modified in light of the feminist experience of transnational activism and global achievement during this period. This reading therefore offers a more positive account of the new political opportunities offered up by neo-liberal governance.

Making effective use of these changed economic conditions, new political opportunities and altered equality norms, feminists have made increasingly challenging demands of state institutions, insisting that more women be present in state institutions, that the policy agenda be extended to take women's interests into account more systematically than had previously been the case, and that a gender equality perspective be introduced into the policy-making process (Breitenbach, *et al.* 2002). This three-stage dynamic of engagement echoes various other feminist projects, which have generally followed

a common pattern of 'adding women in', 'extending the boundaries', and 'reconceptualising the core concepts' (Squires 1999, see also Pateman 1989:2).

Following this dynamic, feminist engagements with the state have taken three key forms: gender quotas, which aim to increase women's participation rates in national assemblies, thereby adding women in and focusing attention on *presence*; women's policy agencies, which create new institutional machineries within the state in order to extend the state's remit to incorporate additional feminist concerns, thereby extending the boundaries of the state and focusing on *voice*; and gender mainstreaming, which subjects the policy-making process to scrutiny from a gendered perspective in order to develop new policy perspectives that avoid structural gender bias, thereby reconceptualizing the core concepts and focusing on *process*. This book explores these three moments of the feminist engagements with the state, evaluating the merits – and pitfalls – of each.

The two most recurrent pitfalls of gender equality strategies are those of *assimilation* and *essentialism*. Throughout the last thirty years feminists have attempted to negotiate the tension between the pursuit of equal treatment and the recognition of difference, oscillating between demands for inclusion into existing institutions according to existing norms, and an assertion of the limitation of these institutions and norms, which have frequently been formulated such that they structurally disadvantage women. Where pursuit of equal treatment generates a strategy of inclusion, the assertion of difference embraces a strategy of reversal (Squires 1999). The concern about a strategy of inclusion is that it may all too easily lead to assimilation, with women being integrated into existing (male-defined) institutions, which remain unaltered by their presence. The concern about a strategy of reversal is that it may all too frequently entail essentialism, with specific identities and interests being attributed to women, thereby perpetuating common sense notions of natural sex difference. Where the former legitimizes assimilatory processes and policies, the latter reproduces essentialist assumptions and stereotypes that were themselves a product of gender unequal institutions and norms. The twin dangers of assimilation and essentialism have haunted the feminist pursuit of political equality, leading many gender equality advocates to argue for a third strategy: one of displacement, which aims to transform the norms and institutions themselves such that they allow for a more equal engagement. Any evaluation of quotas, policy agencies and mainstreaming should therefore be concerned to assess the extent to which they manage to be transformatory while avoiding the pitfalls of assimilation and essentialism.

Emergence, Implementation and Impact

The three political equality measures considered here have been widely adopted throughout the world in a surprisingly short period of time. Gender quotas, first introduced in Western Europe in the 1970s within political party candidate selection processes, have now been introduced in over eighty countries globally, with legislation requiring gender quotas becoming widespread in Latin America and Africa during the last decade. So rapid has been the recent uptake of quota policies in relation to women's candidate selection that commentators suggest that 'quota fever' has affected the world (Dahlerup 1998). Women's policy agencies, introduced following the United Nations World Conference on Women in Mexico City in 1975, have now been established in over 165 countries in a similarly rapid global diffusion of a second gendered democratic policy innovation. Meanwhile, gender mainstreaming, which emerged following the 1995 United Nations conference in Beijing, has been swiftly taken up by supranational institutions, international development agencies, and national governments, and is now also considered to be 'an international phenomenon' (Walby 2005). In light of the widespread adoption of these measures, gender equality within the political arena appears to have become a priority for international organizations and national governments, with these three particular political equality measures becoming part of the process by which states symbolize their commitment both to social justice and to economic modernization.

The three strategies have generally been adopted where a cohesive women's movement has mobilized in their favour; international organizations have put pressure on national political elites to act; political elites have perceived strategic advantages in supporting the measures; and transnational feminist actors have offered expertise in terms of effective adoption and implementation. They have been implemented most enthusiastically in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries by parties of the left which have been experiencing declining support in a period of neo-liberalization and have been keen to appeal to the female electorate in order to enhance their electoral fortunes; and in non-OECD countries by political elites concerned to demonstrate their commitment to women's rights to international funding bodies as a symbol of their embrace of modernization and democratization. Within OECD countries in which domestic rather than international norms remain central, the uptake of the measures has varied, both in frequency and form, with existing citizenship models shaping national responses to demands for greater gender equality in the political sphere (Krook *et al.*

2006). In non OECD countries where international norms have a greater impact, the three measures have most often been introduced from 'above' rather than 'below', either challenging rather than extending existing citizenship norms and practices or operating at a rhetorical level only.

Evaluations of the impact of these measures, usually undertaken by feminist political scientists and gender equality advocates, generally seek to determine whether the mechanisms increase women's participation in and access to political decision-making, and/or transform the policy agenda such that it better represents women. This gives two basic indicators of success, with 'descriptive representation' being used to give a quantitative measure of gender-balance in decision-making, and 'substantive representation' being used to give a qualitative measure of gendered perspectives being included in policy-making. Each of the three strategies offers a different form of political inclusion. Women's policy agencies are judged in terms of both descriptive and substantive representation, aiming to bring 'femocrats' into the state bureaucracy in order to work for women's advancement (Eisenstein 1996; Yeatman 1990). Gender quotas are judged primarily by their ability to secure women's descriptive representation by increasing the number of women in legislatures, though they are also additionally judged by their ability to improve women's substantive representation by female parliamentarians acting for women. Gender mainstreaming is judged primarily in terms of its ability to facilitate women's substantive representation by introducing a gender perspective into the policy-making process.

Evaluations of the success of the three measures in relation to the criteria of descriptive and substantive representation indicate that their rate of adoption has generally been more impressive than has been their impact on women's representation – either descriptive or substantive. Quotas have had a dramatic effect on women's descriptive representation in certain instances, but not uniformly so. The implementation of quotas has been erratic; the impact frequently underwhelming. They have been shown to be most effective in increasing women's descriptive representation where there is a proportional representation electoral system and political parties are supportive, owing either to political will or to effective regulations. The impact of quotas on women's substantive representation has proven hard to measure, with studies focusing on differential attitudes, voting behaviour and issue specialization. Most studies have found that where quotas lead to increased descriptive representation, female parliamentarians have introduced different values, issue priorities and political behaviour. However, the use of differential behaviour as an

indicator of success underplays the possibility that issue convergence between genders around new policy priorities may be a more effective indicator of impact.

Women's policy agencies have been shown to improve women's access to decision-making arenas and help realize women's movements' demands in policy-making, but have failed to do so as frequently as they have succeeded. Success has been most likely where the women's movement is cohesive in relation to its demands, where the policy issue in question is a high priority for women's organizations, and where there is a good 'fit' between the approach of the mainstream policy actors of the given policy area and the women's movement's actors. The features of the women's policy agency itself, including scope, type, proximity, administrative capacity, leadership and policy mandate, does not appear to correlate with effectiveness in substantive or descriptive representation, though an unclear mandate appears to be a central obstacle to success.

The impact of gender mainstreaming on women's substantive representation has proven to be extremely difficult to determine, with the effective production of sex disaggregated statistics and implementation of gender impact assessments generally being used as indicators that a gender perspective is being introduced into the policy-making process. An expansion of the range of actors involved in the policy-making process via institutionalized consultation practices has also been used as an indicator of increased substantive representation. Among the assessments of the three political equality mechanisms, evaluations of mainstreaming have generated the least conclusive evidence regarding effective implementation, with many studies finding that its impact is limited to rhetorical change only.

Presence, Voice and Process

While much of the scholarly literature on the emergence, implementation and impact of three political equality strategies treats them as distinct mechanisms, frequently omitting consideration of the other two, gender equality practitioners have generally perceived them to be complementary. Quotas and mainstreaming in particular are increasingly treated as partner measures for the empowerment of women through politics. There is clearly a logic to this in that quotas and mainstreaming engage separate groups of actors and pursue different types of goals: mainstreaming requires that policy-makers take gendered effects into account when drafting legislation but does not require that policy-makers be

women, while quotas promote women to the ranks of policy-makers, but do not compel them to consider gender when proposing public policy. Where quotas address the problem of descriptive representation, mainstreaming addresses that of substantive representation. Together, in principle, they promise to secure greater gender equality within political processes.

However, the differences between the two mechanisms may suggest contestation rather than complementarity. The conceptual framing of mainstreaming and quotas is quite different, with distinct notions of equality, representation, gender and politics underpinning each. In relation to equality, gender quotas are defended as a form of positive action, while gender mainstreaming is frequently depicted as embodying an approach to equality and 'goes beyond' both equal treatment and positive action. Mainstreaming therefore has the potential to be used as a means of repudiating and abandoning positive action measures, including women's policy agencies and gender quotas. In relation to representation, advocates of quota policies frequently endorse the link between descriptive and substantive representation, arguing that women-friendly policy originates with female legislators, while gender mainstreaming unravels the link in order to prioritize the pursuit of gender equality rather than the representation of women. In relation to gender, the focus on 'gender', rather than 'women', in mainstreaming acknowledges the relevance of men's lives to gender-equality policies, thus empowering male bureaucrats and legislators in mainstreaming debates, so removing the 'epistemic privilege' apparently granted to female policy-makers in quota policies. Finally, in relation to politics, quotas focus on the vertical distribution of power within party and parliamentary structures, while mainstreaming focuses on the horizontal flow of initiatives across departmental boundaries within state bureaucracies.

While there are conceptual differences between the mechanisms, in practice a combination of the mechanisms might be argued to allow for a more complex understanding of equality policies, in which equal treatment, positive action and mainstreaming each have a role; a more flexible and sophisticated conception of gender, which retains a focus on women as a group; a more subtle understanding of representation, in which descriptive and substantive representative claims can be disentangled; and a wider definition of politics that includes both parliamentary and policy arenas. Consideration as to how the three mechanisms might work together may be fruitful, especially as a coherent strategy embracing all three mechanisms might serve to address some of the concerns raised about each of the mechanisms when viewed in isolation.

For instance, arguments for gender quotas focus attention on gaining access to the institution of parliament, which may delimit wider concerns about gender equality. They also generally appeal to the notion that female representatives will be well placed to represent the interests of women thereby tending to depict women as having unified interests and so obfuscating the differences among women. These quota problems are particularly acute precisely because many advocates anticipate that quotas will lead both to the improved substantive representation of women and to the greater democratization of existing political practices. However, it may be that these expectations are misplaced, and might be more appropriately redirected to women's policy agencies and gender mainstreaming respectively. Were quotas to be viewed 'simply' as a legitimate means of ensuring that a fair number of female candidates get integrated into the existing political structures, and as only one of three mechanisms for engaging in the political sphere, the concerns about essentialism and assimilation might well diminish. Rather than attempting to defend the claim that women's presence alone will lead to improved substantive representation and the greater democratization of existing political practices, gender equality advocates could then make more measured claims about the likely impact of quotas, while paying more attention to the need to complement this mechanism with the other available political equality mechanisms, namely women's policy agencies and gender mainstreaming.

Women's policy agencies, by contrast, are frequently argued to give the women's movement greater access to state bureaucracies. Yet the idea of a singular, coherent movement looks increasingly strained. Women's policy agencies may actively constitute a less than representative depiction of women's interests in order to claim a legitimate representative function, while appealing to professionalized feminist NGOs which adopt an increasingly technocratic mode of operation, as a surrogate for citizen-based democratic participation. In this way women's policy agencies may also manifest the problems of both essentialism and assimilation, reifying the voice of the women's movement while adopting technocratic modes of governance. These problems are particularly acute when women's policy agencies claim to speak on behalf of a movement, making a representative claim that is rarely grounded in mechanisms of authorization or accountability. Where women's policy agencies are regarded more directly as 'feminist advocacy' bodies, promoting specific interests via professionalized policy networks, these problems diminish in that they are no longer viewed primarily as representative bodies and need not therefore be judged in these terms.

Meanwhile, the limitation of gender mainstreaming appears to be that, in practice, it becomes a technocratic process reduced to a series of

procedures, such as impact assessments, that eschew both political participation and normative contestation in their reliance of professionalized expertise and evidence-based indicators. Moreover, mainstreaming frequently embraces not only neo-liberal techniques of governance but also marketized economic goals that construe gender equality in an integrationist rather than transformatory manner, relying on utility-based rather than right-based frames of analysis that are ultimately concerned with efficiency rather than equity. Nonetheless, mainstreaming processes do offer new opportunities for bureaucratic interventions that privilege evidence-based policy-making and so empower those ‘gender experts’ able to articulate their perspectives in these terms, enabling them to speak to all policy issues rather than only to those traditionally considered to be gendered.

The positive potential of mainstreaming may therefore resonate with claims that neo-liberal forms of governance have given way to a new form of governance based on trust and collaboration (Newman 2001, 2006; Rhodes 1994, 1996, 2000). This form of governance relies on professionalized ‘social entrepreneurs’ who network with community activists and promote change through a process of brokerage (Larner and Craig 2005:405). Together, the strategic brokers within women’s policy agencies and social entrepreneurs within women’s NGOs have created powerful new forms of governance designed to improve the social integration of women. This has clearly empowered many women politically, but it has also ‘governmentalized’ their professional functions and political ambitions. In this way, this process-based politics may complement the presence and voice of the other two strategies, but when decoupled from them swiftly becomes a technocratic rather than democratic strategy.

Although many advocates of gender mainstreaming have stressed its participatory function, allowing women’s perspectives to be taken into account in the policy-making process, mainstreaming practices actually rely on technocratic data collection and impact assessments carried out by professionalized gender experts. The growing tendency to promote a twin-track equality strategy based on presence and process therefore raises concerns, in that voice is marginalized. Together these gender equality strategies held out the theoretical promise of transformation, yet in practice they frequently appear to be surprisingly complicit with current modalities of governance. The very processes of destabilization and displacement favoured by feminists advocating a transformatory approach to gender equality (Squires 1999), appear vulnerable to new forms of articulation with neo-liberal governance (Newman 2006). Collective struggles for recognition and citizenship rights come to be

viewed as part of an 'old' form of politics that is no longer compatible with current practices of governmentality. Meanwhile, a reassertion of voice, in the form of a defence of women's policy agencies, raises renewed concerns about essentialism, which look increasingly vulnerable in the context of the growing concern with diversity and multiple equality strands.

Governance and Diversity

The two most striking challenges now facing gender equality strategies are the reconfiguration of state practices to embrace technocratic modes of governance, and the widespread embrace of 'diversity' as a governmental priority (Benhabib 2002; Liebert 2003). From the late 1990s onwards the 'separate strands' approach to equality – in which sex, race, disability, age, sexuality and religious equality were pursued independently – has gradually been replaced by a more integrated concern with 'diversity'. This places gender equality within a wider equalities framework and demands that gender equality advocates consider other inequality stands and the intersections between them.

These two developments resonate in different ways with the twin concerns that have haunted the three political equality measures under consideration, namely: whether the mechanisms designed to facilitate women's increased political equality lead to the assimilation of women into existing political systems, rather than the transformation of those systems; and whether the mechanisms rely on essentializing notions of women and the women's movement, which fail to recognize a more complex social diversity. While the emergence of a technocratic mode of governance appears to accentuate and entrench concerns about assimilation, the emergence of 'diversity' as a central policy problem appears, by contrast, to confront and unsettle concerns about essentialism. Whether the emergence of a multiple equalities agenda will help feminists to avoid assimilation and essentialism, or will simply accentuate the tendency to retreat into one or the other, is yet to be seen.

The challenge posed by the embrace of technocratic modes of governance requires feminists to engage more directly with theories and practices of participatory democracy than has been common in recent years. The growing feminist preoccupation with the mainstreaming mechanisms reveals a turn away from a focus on democratic participation and towards a focus on the implementation of gender-equality policy measures as mechanisms of governance. While the latter is clearly

important, it is crucial to maintain a commitment to the former, for without inclusive deliberation as to what gender equality entails – and therefore what form gender-equality policies should take – the pursuit of gender equality can itself become an exclusionary process, undertaken for considerations of utility rather than justice and so privileging particular productive forms of gender identity over others (Mohammad 2005). To mainstream a gender equality perspective is not necessarily to democratize the state (Rai 2003). Future feminist political practices need to be attentive not only to fostering modes of governance that take the pursuit of gender equality as a policy goal, but also to ways of facilitating a more inclusive democratic debate as to what gender equality comprises.

There are various possible indicators of inequality, including life expectancy and physical health, bodily integrity and safety, educational access and attainment, access to paid work, rates of pay, political empowerment, and being treated with dignity (Robeyns 2003:76–86). Deciding what we measure is a political process with political consequences, such that access to the process by which the relative importance of these indicators is determined will correlate with the adoption of remedies that most directly reflect one's own particular egalitarian concerns (Okin 2003; Young 2001). In this way, conceptions of equality can be seen to be constitutive, generating equality policy frames that privilege certain concerns whilst obscuring others (Bacchi 1999). Pursuing one form of equality may serve to displace another from the political agenda. For this reason scholars have attempted not only to pluralize the measures of inequality (Sen 1992), but also to stress the importance of democratic deliberation in constructing these measures (Armstrong 2006; Robeyns 2003:69). This suggests that critical public discussion, or democratic deliberation, is vital to the conceptualization of gender equality.

Because the meaning of equality is contested, it is vital that marginalized groups are able to take part in the formulation of equality norms, rather than simply being the objects of policies thought by privileged minorities to be equitable. As a result, there is a strong normative presumption within much of the recent theoretical writing on marginalized groups that these groups need to be present in deliberative bodies in order that their perspectives can be voiced and taken into account when formulating public policies (Benhabib 1996; Young 2000; Phillips 1995; Williams 1998). This insight politicizes the formation of equality policies, and links it to the question of political inclusion. The demand for greater political participation is thus both a demand for greater political equality in its own right, and a demand for greater access to the process by which wider equality norms are determined. For this reason

democratic participation needs to be understood as a constitutive part of the pursuit of equality itself. Moreover, this participation should not be viewed in an unduly narrow and restricted way in terms of parliamentary elections only, but should embrace the messy processes of participatory democracy (Sen 2004).

The concern, which underpins the more detailed interrogation of gender equality strategies in the following chapters, is that the growing focus on presence and process is being achieved at the expense of a commitment to voice, producing an increasingly de-politicized and technocratic approach to gender equality that marginalizes precisely this messy process of participatory democracy. While each of the three political equality mechanisms has strengths when considered as specific elements in a multi-faceted approach to political empowerment, what remains lacking from this package is a more deliberative engagement with citizens. Here gender equality advocates could usefully engage with other attempts to revitalize existing democratic practices, particularly deliberative innovations such as citizen's juries, deliberative opinion polling and consensus conferences, and direct-democracy innovations including referenda (Elster 1998; Fishkin 1991, 2000; Saward 1998, 2000; Smith 2005).

These innovations are motivated by a desire to increase and deepen citizen participation in the political decision-making process. They offer a potentially beneficial element of direct democratic engagement, currently lacking from the three political equality measures promoted by gender scholars and practitioners. Where both party politics and standard techniques of consultation tend to attract citizens who already have a strong political interest, deliberative approaches bring together a cross-section of the population so that all citizens have an equal opportunity to participate. The deliberations amongst diverse citizens may therefore generate conceptualizations of gender equality that are more sensitive to diversity amongst women and to the gender equality perspectives of subordinate men than has previously been the case. Such deliberative mechanisms could further complement feminist engagements with the state, addressing the recurrent concern regarding assimilation by unsettling the technocratic process of governance.

However, these mechanisms would entail relinquishing a focus on women as a group at a time when an exclusive gender equality focus is under threat. Feminist interventions in the state currently face a profound new challenge in the form of other equality considerations. The international institutions and national governments that have been relatively receptive to gender equality mechanisms are increasingly concerned to

promote anti-discrimination in relation to other equality considerations also. Those state institutions that have proven willing to promote gender equality are now seeking to challenge discrimination on grounds of age, disability, religion and belief, ethnicity and sexual orientation and gender, and to do so in a more integrated manner than previously was the case (Squires 2007).

The emergence of multiple inequalities agendas presents new challenges for feminists. It has raised anxieties that gender equality considerations will be marginalized, and even undermined, by the pursuit of other equality claims, especially those of religion (Skjeie 2007). It is suggested that increased attention to the ways in which other structures of inequality intersect with those of gender (Crenshaw 1991) may incrementally lead to an undifferentiated celebration of diversity lacking in critical purchase *vis-à-vis* structural inequalities (Woodward 2005). On the other hand, this development may allow for greater sensitivity to intersectional or multiple discrimination issues (Hankivsky 2005; Squires 2005; Yuval-Davis 2005).

On a practical level the emergence of 'diversity' considerations on the policy agenda has led many states to merge women's policy agencies into generic equalities units, and to use mainstreaming as a process for considering multiple equality strands rather than gender alone (Squires 2006; Verloo 2006). The challenge posed by the recent embrace of diversity agendas requires feminists to engage more directly with theories and practices of intersectionality than has been common in recent years. If the twin-track endorsement of presence and process looks worryingly technocratic, a simple endorsement of greater voice for women via a robust defence of existing women's policy agencies will not suffice given the growing move to replace them with equality agencies. It may indeed be the case that the twin-track approach to the promotion of gender equality, in the form of the increased presence of women and the adoption of more gender-sensitive processes, has resulted in higher levels of assimilation than many advocates would have hoped, but the scope for bringing 'voice' back in will need to be re-conceived to acknowledge the differences among women and the intersections between multiple forms of inequality.

Conclusion

The new politics of gender equality is more state-oriented than the earlier forms of informal activism that characterized the women's movement in the

1970s. The pursuit of gender equality has become a mainstream rather than an anti-system project, and – in the process – has increasingly been framed in relation to utility-based concerns of efficiency in addition to (and sometimes rather than) rights-based concerns of social justice. Parity of political participation has gained a central place within gender equality projects, pursued by three distinct equality strategies which focus on presence, voice and process respectively. In recent years the emphasis on the importance of voice, secured by women’s policy agencies, has dwindled, with a commitment to a twin-track policy that privileges presence and process increasingly coming to dominate. Each of the strategies is prone in various ways to the problems of essentialism or assimilation. The problem of assimilation is accentuated by the growth in increasingly technocratic modes of governance, while the problem of essentialism is unsettled by the growing concern with diversity and multiple equality agendas. The danger inherent in these developments is that gender equality becomes subsumed within, or marginalized by, a technocratic pursuit of equality conceived in a manner that lacks sensitivity to the specificity of gender inequalities. Yet, there are also opportunities to be grasped in relation to the greater access to policy-making processes created by new forms of governance coupled with a greater sensitivity in current policy frames to issues of intersectionality.

In order to address these issues, and to draw out the practical and theoretical contributions made by these political equality measures, this book documents the emergence, implementation and impact of quotas, women’s policy agencies and gender mainstreaming (Chapters 1 and 2). It considers the relation between the mechanisms (Chapter 3), and the strengths and weaknesses of each of the political equality measures (Chapters 4, 5 and 6), focusing on the recurrent problems of assimilation and essentialism. It evaluates their potential for transforming political institutions and agendas rather than simply integrating women into them, and their ability to empower women politically without simultaneously reifying them. Finally, it reflects on the emerging challenges facing these gender equality measures, focusing on the likely impact of ‘diversity’ agendas for gender mainstreaming practices in particular (Chapter 7).

Index

- accountability 14, 60–6, 100–1, 105,
111–12, 117, 121, 141, 159
- affirmative action 83, 88, 91–101, 112,
158
see also positive action
- Alvarez, Sonia 36, 60, 124, 131–2, 149
- assimilation 4, 8, 9, 13–20,
55–7, 110–11, 132–8, 147, 156, 175
- Bacchi, Carol 17, 77, 81,
86–7, 93, 110, 132,
143, 149–50
- Beijing Platform for Action 10, 21, 37–9,
42, 46–7, 65, 77, 82, 124, 137, 148
- bureaucracy 11, 34, 53
- bureaucratic 15, 33, 39–41, 66,
69, 83, 117, 127, 131, 137–8, 140–1,
145, 151–5, 166, 170–1, 175–6
see also expert-bureaucratic
- candidates, parliamentary 14, 24–7, 74,
91–3, 100–1, 107–10
- CEDAW 38, 65, 88
- Chappell, Louise 4, 33, 60,
77, 97
- Childs, Sarah 6, 27, 54, 58, 79, 97–9,
102, 108, 112
- citizens 18, 100, 103, 118, 132–4, 139,
153, 171–5
- citizenship 10, 15, 27–8, 31–2, 91, 102–3
- civil society 34, 38, 41, 53, 65–6, 74, 79,
83, 87, 113, 115–16, 119, 129–32,
138, 145, 153–5, 169,
174–5
- class 3–4, 7, 31, 107–8, 119, 122–4, 128,
161–4
- co-optation 8, 35–6, 43, 57, 61, 64, 90,
145, 147
- cultural differences
see difference
- Dahlerup, Drude 10, 25–6, 28,
30–2, 53–5, 58, 77–8, 110
- deliberation 16–18, 97–101, 109, 113,
121, 166, 170–7
- democracy 3–4, 16–17, 22, 27, 29, 50,
81–9, 101–6, 111–13, 166–78
- democratic innovation 51, 91, 101–6,
132, 169–70
- democratic participation 151–4
- democratization 8–10, 13,
27–31, 36, 56, 65–6, 91, 111, 143–6
- descriptive representation 11–13, 22–4,
32, 52–9, 60–1, 70–6, 87–9, 96–101,
106–9, 118
- development
agencies 42–6, 65,
82–4, 164
economic 5–6, 23–4, 29–31, 44–5
neo-liberal 131, 138, 149
sustainable 49–50
- devolution 72, 95, 130
- difference
differences between women 13, 19,
90, 107–8, 120–7, 136, 150, 161–2
'making a difference' 52–74, 89, 99,
102, 112
recognition of group 7–9, 88, 94–6,
163
sex 9, 44, 58–9, 89, 104, 110, 146
- disability 16, 19, 122, 157, 163–6
- discrimination
anti-discrimination 18, 93, 147
multiple 156–70
positive 78, 91–6, 101, 165
sex 27, 65, 108, 113, 128

- diversity 15–20, 115–19, 120–9, 156–78
 mainstreaming 163–78
- economic productivity 30, 146, 148, 152, 159, 168
- electoral systems 5, 54–6, 95, 103, 112–13
- empowerment 12, 16–17, 23, 28–35, 54–5, 82–3, 122, 127, 146
- equal opportunities 24, 40–6, 112, 164
- essentialism 8–20, 60, 86, 90, 106, 107–14, 134, 138, 156, 168, 175
- ethnic minority 105–8, 128–9, 160–1
- ethnicity 18, 106, 119, 157
- European Commission 158, 164
- European Union 21–2, 42, 46, 157
- evidence-based policy-making 14, 41, 83, 137, 142, 143–5, 155, 170
- exclusion 16, 44, 79–80, 99, 106, 149, 162, 177
- expert-bureaucratic 41, 66, 69, 138, 151–3, 166, 170–1
- expertise 5, 10, 14, 34, 41, 44, 84–5, 131–4, 143–51, 152–4, 170–3
- feminism
 minority 122
 state 6, 33, 116, 120, 125–9, 133
 transnational 6, 123–4
- femininity 102, 111, 133
- femocrats 10, 33, 47, 53, 74, 84, 117, 120, 127, 134, 169
- fragmentation (of the Women's Movement) 115–19, 120–5
- framing 146–51
- Fredman, Sandra 92–4, 97, 149
- gender budgeting 68
- gender impact assessments 3, 11, 68–9, 74, 142, 151
- gender machinery 33, 78
- gender mainstreaming
see mainstreaming
- gender quotas
see quotas
- globalization 31, 123
- Goetz, Anne Marie 34, 36, 44, 46, 66, 77, 79, 117, 145–6, 149, 177
- good governance 1, 29, 36–7, 48, 51, 141–2, 159
- governance
 engendering 136–55
 multi-level 49–50, 129–30
 neo-liberal 5–8, 15–19, 51, 140–2, 176–7
- group representation 24, 78, 82, 96–8, 104–5, 115–20, 131–4
- homogeneity 101, 110, 118
- Htun, Mala 29, 55–6, 98, 103, 105–6, 113
- human rights 6, 21, 72, 88, 127
- ideas 5, 7, 31, 34, 47–53, 60–1, 111, 152, 161
 'politics of ideas' 80, 86
- identity 96–8, 105, 108, 118–19, 122–5, 133–4, 145, 162–3, 166–7, 169
- individualism 92, 103, 109
- inequality 15–19, 39–40, 93–6, 131–4, 151–5, 157, 162–70
- interests
 of political elites 32, 35–6, 48, 51–2, 71
 women's 13–14, 22–3, 39, 41, 74–9, 89–90, 96, 106, 111–13, 116, 118, 120–3, 129–35
- intersectionality 19, 107–8, 110, 122, 157, 161–70
- justice 22–4, 28–30, 52, 88–96, 111, 148, 159–60, 177–8
- Kantola, Johanna 4, 8, 77, 116, 126
- knowledge 41, 47, 83, 118–19, 122, 124, 140, 143–6, 155, 163–4
- Krook, Mona Lena 10, 25, 27–8, 31–2, 53–5, 76–87, 99, 103, 109
- labour market 1, 4, 133, 150
- legitimacy 23, 36, 92, 109, 129, 141, 148–9, 159, 172–3
- Lombardo, Emanuela 41, 43, 77, 83, 157
- Lovenduski, Joni 5, 54, 57–8, 60, 62, 63, 77, 93, 96–7, 104, 125

- Mackay, Fiona 42, 69, 72, 78, 95, 102, 164, 167
- mainstreaming 38–48, 67–73, 78–81, 81–86, 136–155, 163–75
- Mansbridge, Jane 24, 89, 95–100, 109, 119
- Mateo Diaz, Mercedes 6, 31, 53–4, 58–9, 97, 112, 148
- Mazey, Sonia 67, 69, 167
- Mazur, Amy 33–4, 36, 38, 48, 53, 60–3, 77, 84, 118
- Meier, Petra 27, 31, 56, 109
- minorities 17, 31, 91, 105, 108, 128
- modernization 1, 10, 23–4, 29, 48, 72, 133, 168
- motherhood 133–4
- national legislature 21, 25–6, 54–7, 74, 99, 103–5, 116
- neo-liberalism 7–8, 51, 138–40, 149, 176
- non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 14, 37, 116, 124, 131–2, 141–6, 153–5, 160–70, 177
- Norris, Pippa 1, 5–6, 22–3, 29–30, 54–5, 58
- Oustshoorn, Joyce 8, 50, 60, 62, 77, 116, 131
- parity 19, 22, 31, 79, 103, 104
French law 56–7, 109
- Phillips, Anne 3–4, 7, 17, 22, 24, 32, 54, 57, 80, 89, 93–6, 101, 104–5, 109–10, 117
- Pitkin, Hanna 98–9
- pluralism 105, 109
- political parties 4, 11, 21–9, 35, 56, 103–5, 108, 114, 123, 126, 129
- positive action 12–13, 22, 26, 39, 43–5, 78, 80–7, 91–5, 101–13, 136–7, 165, 169
- presence 2–3, 6, 9, 12–19, 41, 54, 58, 64, 72–6, 79–81, 83–6, 91, 96–9, 101–6, 111–12
- quotas 24–32, 53–60, 77–9, 85–7, 88–114
- race 15, 122, 124, 157–9, 163–6
- Rai, Shirin 17, 26, 36–7, 38, 48, 60, 77–8, 107–8, 178
- recognition 7, 9, 15, 44, 51, 67, 88–90, 95–101, 122, 154, 160
- redistribution 7, 67, 95, 139
- Rees, Teresa 42–4, 46, 53, 70, 77, 80–5, 136–7, 163, 165–9
- representation
see descriptive representation
- Research Network on Gender Politics and the State (RNGS) 60–4
- reserved seats 105–6, 112–13
- rhetorical entrapment 146–51
- rights
minority rights 31, 160
rights-based arguments 1–2, 6, 15, 19, 34, 111–12, 126–7, 148, 157
UN Declaration of Human Rights 21, 88
women's rights 10, 29, 43, 72, 84, 89–90, 97–8, 132, 160
- Saward, Michael 18, 116–18, 129
- Sawer, Marian 33–4, 60–4, 73, 97, 131
- sexuality 7, 16, 119, 122, 124, 163, 166
- Shaw, Jo 41–2, 141, 147–8, 157–8, 161–6
- Smith, Graham 18, 171–4
- social movements 3, 37, 50, 121, 153
- state feminism 6, 33, 116, 120–34
- state restructuring 7, 129–34
- Stetson, Dorothy 33–4, 36, 38, 48, 53, 60–3, 77
- substantive representation 10–13, 22–4, 32, 52–9, 60–1, 70–6, 78–80, 86–91, 96–101, 106, 110–111, 117–18
- technocratic 2, 7, 14–19, 43, 51, 67, 116, 134–46, 150–5, 156–77
- Teghtsoonian, Katherine 60–73, 78, 80, 139–41, 149
- transnational feminism 6, 123–4
- transversal politics 161–3, 166–75
- True, Jacqui 33–4, 37–47, 60, 71–3, 77, 80, 86, 137–9, 144, 148, 165
- United Nations 6, 10, 21–45, 76, 83, 123
- Verloo, Meike 19, 68–9, 77, 83–4, 146–7, 150–2, 157, 164–5

- Walby, Sylvia 4, 7, 9, 23, 31, 39, 77
Waylen, Georgina 36, 127, 130
Weldon, Laurel 33, 59–60, 118–21
women's interests 1–8, 22–3, 39–41,
53–9, 73–5, 116–20, 125–35,
146–7
Women's Movement 2–19, 23–38,
47–51, 60–7, 72–81, 115–34,
156–77
Women's policy agencies, 1–19, 32–8,
52–3, 60–7, 72–8, 81–7, 115–34
Woodward, Alison 19, 42, 44, 47, 80–1,
84, 151, 160–5
Young, Iris Marion 17, 92, 100, 104–10,
144, 154
Yuval-Davis, Nira 19, 122–4, 137,
161–70