Contents

List of Tables vii

List of Figures viii

Acknowledgements ix

Notes on Contributors xi

Introduction: Diplomacy and Global Governance: Locating Patterns of (Dis)Connection 1
Andrew F. Cooper, Brian Hocking, and William Maley

Part I Contextual Challenges

1 Globalisation and Diplomacy 15
Iver B. Neumann

2 Global Governance: Challenges to Diplomatic Communication, Representation, and Recognition 29
Christer Jönsson

3 From Government to Governance: Transition to a New Diplomacy 39
Jan Aart Scholte

Part II Authority beyond the State

4 EU Governance and Global Governance: New Roles for EU Diplomats 63
David Spence

5 Business – Government – NGO Relations: Their Impact on Global Economic Governance 85
Raymond Saner and Lichia Yiu

6 A Twilight Zone? Diplomacy and the International Committee of the Red Cross 104
Ivan Cook and Martine Letts

7 Research Institutes as Diplomatic Actors 118
Shankari Sundararaman

Part III Targeting the Policy Arenas of Interaction

8 The New International Security Agenda and the Practice of Diplomacy 135
Shaun Riordan

9 Towards a New Architecture of Global Governance for Responding to the HIV/AIDS Epidemic 145
Franklyn Lisk

10 Family Dramas: Politics, Diplomacy, and Governance in the WTO 164
Rorden Wilkinson

11 The World Summit on Information Society and the Development of Internet Diplomacy 180
Jovan Kurbalija

Part IV Restrictive Dichotomies and Open-Ended Trajectories

12 'A Home at the United Nations': Indigenous Peoples and International Advocacy 211
Megan Davis

13 Interfaith Dialogue, Diplomacy, and the Cartoon Controversy 224
Samina Yasmeen

14 Public Diplomacy and Governance: Challenges for Scholars and Practitioners 241
Bruce Gregory

15 Stretching the Model of 'Coalitions of the Willing' 257
Andrew F. Cooper

16 On the Manner of Practising the New Diplomacy 271
Jorge Heine

Conclusion: National Diplomacy and Global Governance 288
Ramesh Thakur

References 300

Index 325

Introduction: Diplomacy and Global Governance: Locating Patterns of (Dis)Connection

Andrew F. Cooper, Brian Hocking, and William Maley

This book examines the relationship between diplomacy and global governance. While diplomacy is a well-established topic for study, global governance, conceived broadly as a pattern of transparent and inclusive processes to address complex transnational collective-action problems, is a relatively new arrival on the conceptual landscape of global politics. At first glance the two – whether interpreted as academic concepts or operational patterns – exist in separate worlds with little or no engagement between scholars of diplomacy on the one hand and of global governance on the other. And even in recent work dealing with these two areas, there is often a substantial silence about the significance or even the existence of the other (Ba and Hoffmann, 2005; Berridge, 2005). In practical terms, the functions of diplomacy and global governance can be portrayed as distinct and in opposition to one another. Thus diplomacy is sometimes viewed as a guild activity, with well-placed insiders distinguished from excluded outsiders (Henrikson, 1997; Ross, 2007). Through this lens, diplomatic skills are a type of knowledge possessed by a particular set of professionals and handed down via a long apprenticeship. Global governance, by contrast, is an open-ended way of looking at and navigating in the world, with a high degree of inclusiveness about whom and what is included in its machinery and agenda.

Any analysis of the relationship between diplomacy and global governance must look therefore at the source and significance of such disconnections: discerning the location of these barriers to communication is a pre-condition for any serious, nuanced analysis of the relationship. Furthermore, the extent of these barriers should not be exaggerated. If the starting point of this book emphasises the walls between diplomacy and global governance, the contributions to it reveal myriad points of contact between them. Nor do these emergent components of contact only signify the stretching of the conceptual imagination, although this trend is significant in itself. It is the

co-existence between diplomacy and governance on the front lines of issue-specific policy and process that is most compelling.

Why a disconnection?

The causes of the tension between diplomacy and global governance, hinted at above, need to be elaborated if the full extent of the separation is to be understood. At the most fundamental level, understanding the presence or absence of dialogue between diplomacy and governance is rooted in contrasting understandings of the nature of contemporary world politics. This point is made in greater depth later in this introductory chapter, but it is worth stressing here that the diplomacy-governance relationship rests on such disputed issues as the nature of globalisation and the role of the state in the twenty-first century. As with the more general debate on the significance or otherwise of diplomacy, this can easily become a more rarefied manifestation of key debates about the character of the discipline of International Relations, what is important within it and how it should be studied (Clark, 1999; Hocking, 1999a; Lee and Hudson, 2004; Jönsson and Hall, 2005).

More specifically, the disconnection between diplomacy and global governance is underpinned by stylistic differences (see Keohane and Nye, 2001). In form, a strong image of hierarchy, and of command and control, hangs over the world of diplomacy. In terms of intensity, the preference is for concentrating on what is doable – the choice of the possible over what is 'right'. Ends are shaped by a cautious sense of pragmatism, with acute recognition of the boundaries of action. Emotionalism, along with transparency, is subordinated to patience and discretion. The attention Sir Harold Nicolson gave to 'social trust' and keeping confidences remains highly salient (Nicolson, 1939; Drinkwater, 2005).

Global governance in contradistinction is pluralistic or multi-layered with a variety of actors in the mix (Rosenau, 1992; Muldoon, 2004: 7–10). It embraces civil society as well as the state. As Marie Claude Smouts puts it: 'First and foremost, governance places emphasis on the multiplicity and diversity of the actors' (Smouts, 1998: 84). Time sensitivity is at the core of the dynamic, with a sense of immediacy running through the entire ambit of activity. The possibilities in terms of re-shaping the agenda are limitless, with a discourse highlighting the transformative or transfigurative nature of the project. Rights and wrongs should be publicised, with offenders called out. Secrecy of negotiations – by design or by stealth – is taken to be an excuse to restrict participation and avoid opening up the parameters of discussion.

A focus on the substantive differences between diplomacy and global governance stretches the range of disconnects still further. In its essential structure, international diplomacy remains state-centric. Advocacy is performed for the advance of the 'national interest'. And state officials, if not always sent to 'lie abroad' for their country (in Sir Henry Wotton's famously-ambiguous formulation), use manipulation as a vital and ongoing component in their

tool-kit. Given this traditional attitude, there remains as well a pre-occupation in diplomacy (and among diplomats) with status in regard to representation and authority. Albeit commonly acknowledging that state officials no longer have an absolute monopoly over the negotiation of the global agenda, these actors still work to retain their relative hold on this dynamic, on the assumption they alone have the credibility and the capacity to speak and act for their national constituents.

Proponents of global governance prefer the moral high ground. Their concern is with extending the ambit of rules and regulations on a global basis. Their normative map is far more ambitious both in terms of criteria for activity and scale of coverage. The diplomatic preference for order and stability is replaced by a concern for equity and justice. The temporal timeline is re-jigged away from an instrumental concern with the here-and-now to a futuristic outlook. As one author describes it, global governance is conceived as an ongoing project that 'may well come to resemble a societal fabric through which the global system is governed' (Clarke, 2004).

Evolving connections

Yet, amidst all of these embedded disconnections, there is evidence of emergent connections taking shape between diplomacy and governance, which the academic world is sometimes slow to recognise. Diplomacy, like global governance, is a highly-contested project with a huge debate opening up about whether it is capable of undergoing change or not (Hoffman, 2003; Riordan, 2003). Many critics do see it in static terms. Indeed, Lipschutz (2004) notably depicts diplomacy as being: 'Trapped in past ways of doing things [with] no reason to think that [its] practices will change at any time in the foreseeable future.'

Other observers point alternatively to the imaginative qualities available to diplomacy. Some issue-specific areas of state-based diplomacy have taken on a just-in-time quality, pushing for advances in an expedited and often emotional fashion. In other areas, diplomacy (and diplomats) can take on the role of norm-entrepreneur with tremendous insight and consequences for the practice of governance. If still lagging behind the rules identified with a sovereignty-free world, the tone is distinctly progressive, with real possibilities for re-defining the rules in components of global regulation.

The template for these changes has been established in well-known cases such as the campaigns against landmines and for the International Criminal Court. However, as many of the contributions highlight, these cases do not exhaust the possibilities where innovation is an option (Cooper et al., 2002; Cooper, 2004; Thakur et al., 2005; Cooper, 2007). But alongside such adaptive processes, the structures of traditional state-based diplomacy are undergoing changes of which academic observers often appear to be unaware. Irrespective of how sceptical one might be regarding the motivations for

such change (after all, diplomatic services are organisational entities geared to self-preservation) it is nonetheless the case that significant changes are occurring that reflect the demands of global governance agendas.

Not least of these is the redefinition of the stakeholders, both domestic and international, with whom Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) need to engage, and the development of structures for such engagement. These embrace more traditional interlocutors such as the business community, but also a growing range of civil society organisations amongst which non-governmental organisations (NGOs) assume a major place. In organisational terms, then, there is recognition that global challenges require domestic responses on the part of the state and its agents, of which the MFA, despite challenges to its role, remains a significant part (Hocking, 1999b; Hocking and Spence, 2005). Understanding organisational change within the state and at the points where it engages with its international environments thus forms a key dimension of the spectrum of relationships between governance and diplomacy.

If diplomacy has engaged the practices of global governance by segmented design, global governance has been re-cast in a more pragmatic guise because of a number of apparent contradictions in its elevated form. In conceptual terms, global governance has fallen short of its ambitious goals with regard to transparency and accountability on a number of counts. But there has been a backlash as well in regard to its abstract orientation and/or divorce from an engagement with a concrete agenda (Murphy, 2000).

Nor has the global governance project achieved primacy in the vast majority of the policy struggles. By placing such considerable emphasis on norms and values – most notably justice and equity – the project lost its appreciation of the power dimension in world affairs. A huge gap exists between the professed goal of global governance and modes of credible operational commitment.

While it can remain tempting for the proponents of global governance to advance a maximalist approach, they are often confronted by a choice of getting something instead of missing everything. To get this something, however, requires a willingness to cut corners, to compromise, to temper strident voices and to negotiate on details – that is to say, to act rather like skilled diplomats.

Such signs of engagement – whether by design or ambiguous default – inform much of the discussion central to this book. Is such engagement intellectually viable with students of diplomacy and global governance speaking across an entrenched divide? In policy terms, what difference does such an engagement make? Are there some areas where a blending of diplomacy and governance is more viable than others? And what does a revisionist governance agenda look like on an operational basis?

Contextual challenges

A logical starting point for locating the interface between international diplomacy and global governance is in the contextual challenges they both face. A

common assumption is that the multiple and diverse forces of globalisation have thrown the practice of diplomacy into crisis (Hamilton and Langhorne, 1995: 231–245). Through one prism, globalisation can be taken to have raised the disconnection – or even the process of estrangement – between diplomacy and society to a more pronounced stage. Through another prism, many of the traditional bureaucratic advantages enjoyed by the state diplomatic apparatus have been thoroughly eroded.

Iver Neumann's Chapter 1 showcases how globalisation has accentuated the dysfunctions of diplomacy cast at least in its Westphalian image. For the de-territorialisation impulse at the heart of globalisation is a fundamental threat to the centralised, hierarchical and state-bounded ethos of modern diplomacy. Contributing to the impact of this process of change comes the sheer volume (or density) of these pressures.

This pivotal representation is juxtaposed, though, with Neumann's backward-looking glance at modes of pre-modern diplomatic behaviour. What stands out through this portrayal is the connection between these earlier diplomatic practices and current images of governance in terms of the space for a multiplicity of actors, the blurring of the domestic and the international, and the bending of sovereign representation.

Both Neumann and Jönsson pinpoint technology and information as the cutting edge of this contextual challenge. Diplomats may still prefer to use secrecy and manipulation. But their opportunities to utilise such methods have become much more circumscribed under conditions of globalisation. Advocacy by societal forces – together with investigative journalism – is therefore a trigger for a re-thinking and re-calibration of public diplomacy into more sophisticated and diverse forms.

Jönsson embellishes these themes in Chapter 2 with a particular focus on how the information technology revolution has influenced diplomatic practice. Increased resort to new communication techniques in some ways exacerbates the sense of crisis within the practice of diplomacy. Public diplomacy in its basic form uses standard branding techniques, very different from the traditional methods in which differentiated messages were aimed at different audiences. An emphasis on public diplomacy (or strategic communication) also signals the sheer complexity of current diplomatic demands, with potential concerns among both national and transnational audiences about a massive variety of policy arenas.

If the reaction of diplomacy to global governance – and to the pressures of globalisation – is becoming better understood, the adaptation of global governance to diplomatic practices has lagged behind. The global governance project is intended to counter all sorts of problems, such as those surrounding human rights and the environment. But at its core is a reaction to the neoliberal strategy of globalisation with its accelerated agenda of economic interaction, liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation (Richardson, 2001). The holistic menu presented by the global governance project is an attempt

to manage, if not reverse, the self-consciously economistic, rationalistic and homogenising thrust of the globalisation challenge – through checks on the hyper-competitive ethos and challenges to the sharp distinction between winners and losers. This may account for some of the opposition which the global governance project has encountered (see Rabkin, 2005).

The first part of Jan Aart Scholte's Chapter 3 is an artful rendition of this ambitious project of global governance. As in most general renditions, Scholte gives ample attention to the capacity of governance as a global-scale regulatory apparatus. He provides a nuanced interpretation through both his allowance for the application of this model through a wide variety of dimensions and his appreciation of the normative and technical test to implement this agenda. Still, the major source of innovation – and glue – for this book is in his willingness and capacity to examine what the role and interface of diplomacy will be vis-à-vis global governance.

Authority beyond the state

At the core of the distance between diplomacy and global governance is the issue of authority. Do state officials retain a privileged status in representative and functional terms? Or has the push towards multilevel governance raised other sites to competing status? Some of the most innovative recent work on International Relations has been driven by the significance of these very questions (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Slaughter, 2004).

The European Union's (EU) dual function in expanding the terms of diplomatic representation is innovative to the point of being sui generis. With its post-modern characteristics, the EU has legitimised the claims of a wide number of non-state actors in the diplomatic process in an unprecedented fashion. At the same time, the EU's unique form of supra-nationalism has provided its own diplomats with a degree of recognition unavailable in other regional groupings. The EU – jumping ahead to another key dichotomy assessed in this book – has traits that mark it off as both a traditional club and an evolving network.

David Spence is fully aware of the gaps within the system of EU governance, especially with respect to the problems of legitimacy in terms of the well-known democratic deficit (Keohane, 2006). Nonetheless, he is equally conscious of the enormous potential that the EU possesses for advancing a very distinctive type of global governance that may well have serious impacts beyond Europe. As Spence puts it neatly, 'Diplomats worldwide cannot remain unaffected' by these trends within the EU, 'even if they may sometimes appear unconcerned.'

Spence's Chapter 4 rehearses in finer detail a good many themes key to the emergent connection between diplomacy and global governance: the enormous strains on the Westphalian state; the focus of diplomacy on laborious, technical, and complex issues far from the traditional preserve of

state diplomats; the multi-layered look; and the deep connection between diplomacy and policy-making pertaining to regulatory activities, together with the pervasive concern with normative attributes in governance developments and diplomatic 'soft power' (see Nye, 2004b).

Whereas the EU dynamics add to the layering in an often vertically-composed inter-governmental fashion, the space opened up to non-state actors adds to a horizontal layering of diplomatic practices. As Raymond Saner and Lichia Yiu suggest, much of this activity has another form of duality affixed to it: an image of both competition and cooperation. From one angle, both business/corporate groups and NGOs lay very different claims to state officials about efficiency and legitimacy. From another angle, state and non-state actors have numerous incentives to work at least on a tactical basis with each other.

The two case studies that Saner and Yiu develop in their Chapter 5 reveal the mixed results of trying to push global governance-oriented diplomatic initiatives. One severe test continues to be the stretch in technical competence necessary for implementing these initiatives. Another pertains to how multi-stake governance/diplomacy is to be operationalised in practice with due consideration to power differentials.

New forms of competition and cooperation not only impact on state diplomats; indeed, NGOs and all non-state actors are also affected by the crowding of the field of activity. The chapter by Ivan Cook and Martine Letts (Chapter 6) analyses the manner by which the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has adapted to the dilemma of vying for public attention with other actors within the parameters of a culture that acknowledges the sensitivities of public advocacy.

A good deal of the successful adaptation by the ICRC has hinged on its own unique comparative advantage blending diplomacy and governance: its role as 'repository and guardian of international humanitarian law' with particular reference to the Geneva Conventions. The ICRC has continued to concentrate on humanitarian diplomacy, but its distinctive 'quiet' approach has morphed over the last decade. Whereas it has shied away from public campaigns in the past – most unfortunately and detrimentally to its reputation staying quiet on its knowledge of the Holocaust (Favez, 1999; Forsythe, 2005) – both the landmines and Abu Ghraib cases disclosed the extent to which the ICRC was prepared to go public. Even if a certain mythology has grown around this case, the break from its traditional ways of doing things is striking.

The novelty of the Cook and Letts chapter comes in the way that they trace the combination of altruistic and opportunistic motivations behind this change. Recognising the intersection of diplomacy and evolving rules of governance – as well as avoiding any activity that smacks of cooptation by member states – the ICRC has steered a committed albeit delicate course on issues such as campaigning against terrorism. However, Cook and Letts

position some aspects of this shift as part of a new convenient strategy on the part of the ICRC: in effect relocating itself in an increasingly challenging environment for not only policy space but also publicity and fundraising.

An excellent illustration of the intrusive quality of new actors is captured by Shankari Sundararaman's Chapter 7 on Research Institutes as Diplomatic Actors. Until recent years, the activity of this type of actor has been cast as complementary to that of state-based officials, the most common example of which is depicted as Track-II initiatives. Increasingly, though, research institutions have been recognised not as part of the mainstream but as a source of considerable innovation across a wide spectrum. In advancing positive expressions of a normative global governance agenda, research has the intrinsic ability to become 'a moral force' (Duffield, 2001: 259).

Notwithstanding these strengths, the diplomatic credentials of research institutes have been criticised for being too geographically confined to the North/West. As witnessed by Sundararaman's chapter, however, this image has become diluted. Political restrictions may still constrain the work of research institutes. But paradoxically, systemic shocks – viewed as undercutting the status of diplomacy and state diplomacy – may be a catalyst for giving added credentials to research institutes in the South generally – and as she demonstrates, in Association of Southeast Asian Nations specifically – in that these actors have a comparative advantage in 'the planning of policy initiatives based on the trends that are likely to emerge.'

Targeting the policy arenas of interaction

One of the primary boundaries in the search for connects between diplomacy and governance is an issue-specific one: the impression that the main sites for this type of interaction are in areas of 'low' policy. With this delimitation in mind, Shaun Riordan's Chapter 8 provides a valuable rejoinder. Riordan gives particular weight to the challenges imposed on state diplomats by security threats beyond the contours of state relationships. On many of these different threats, traditional modes of operation are simply ill-suited. Command and control must give way to facilitation – with diplomats nudging and cajoling a variety of non-state actors to take the lead on issues that are more readily defined through a governance framework. The timeline must also be expanded. Instead of maintaining 'short-termism' as the standard repertoire for diplomats, Riordan sees strategic creativity as the key to problem solving, not only to meet the enhanced demands but also to ease the crisis of confidence in state diplomacy.

Riordan admits that a shift along these lines is full of risks. Opening up the message and the type of messengers has the potential for reinforcing the image that the traditional diplomatic corps is in over its head in terms of an increasingly complex agenda. But for Riordan these risks go hand in hand with opportunities, as it is only through such innovative practices that the

importance of diplomacy and diplomats will be embraced through the political system.

The chapter by Franklyn Lisk (Chapter 9) provides detail of the type of site that is a centrepiece of this expanded security agenda. Elaborating on an arena to which Riordan devotes some considerable attention, Lisk's chapter examines one vital component of health security: HIV/AIDS. Both directly and indirectly this disease has a massive negative impact on security as well as social and economic governance capacity in the global South generally and southern Africa more specifically. It is arguable that on no other issue is the requirement for a new architecture of global governance more vital. Nor is there a greater demand for making the connection between governance and diplomacy more tangible and sustainable. The words uttered at a host of high-level summits through the United Nations, the G8 and others must be translated into deeds when it comes to governance regimes. This forging of a nexus along these lines is of particular import in terms of the content of the delivery from the international financial institutions and the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Rorden Wilkinson attaches a personal behavioural analogy to the pattern of disconnections/connections located in the WTO negotiations as a whole. As in private family dramas, the image of the cause and effect of WTO diplomacy and system of governance produced thereby is one in which dynamics are shaped according to a standard script. The key ingredient here is a particular process of institutional development – with a considerable asymmetry of opportunity built within – that is highly resistant to fundamental change.

Yet drama does not mean immobilisation. Wilkinson contends that even with all its many crises, the WTO has not become inert. 'Suspension' of talks leads to reflection and a return to negotiations. The question posed by Wilkinson, nonetheless, is whether or not this sort of dysfunction can continue to go on or whether there is a need and the means to break out of this family drama?

The proclivity for drama of a related kind extends to Jovan Kurbalija's exploration of the diplomatic/governance nexus at the site of the World Summit on Information Society. The diplomacy related to this issue-area clashed with sensitive areas of global governance, above all human rights and intellectual property. As in other arenas, diplomats tried to negotiate where the scope, form and intensity of the issues before them moved in unanticipated directions. The 'Internet community' provided one unique element on top of the activity by states, NGOs and the business community. E-diplomacy provides an interesting twist to the potential of virtual diplomacy.

Restrictive dichotomies and open-ended trajectories

It is easy to see established disconnects between diplomacy and governance morphing into newer, albeit more refined, forms of restrictive dichotomies.

One dividing element is the distinction between the types of audience targeted by various forms of transnational activity. Do they focus on élite or mass opinion? Is that audience at one or multiple sites? Another is the difference in styles of approach. Does it have a technical or emotional bias? And finally, in terms of the temporal conditions, does the focus have a one-off appeal or is it sustained over time? If the former, is the focus exclusively one of achieving some measure of diplomatic success? If the latter, how is this effort translated into a global governance-oriented agenda?

As in many other research projects, the circular imagery created by Keck and Sikkink (1998) is compelling. Through her examination of the manner by which Indigenous peoples have lobbied the United Nations, Megan Davis' Chapter 12 is illustrative of these powerful trends. In common with the NGO community, the main strategy has been to go around the national state and appeal to this international forum directly. On the one hand, the United Nations created attractive institutional vehicles through which Indigenous peoples could work. On the other hand, the time was ripe for this outlet as both the skills and the demands – while increasingly available – had become frustrated with using other routes of action.

In making use of the United Nations, various adjustments had to be made about what was possible versus what was right. The focus was increasingly directed towards negotiations conducted at a highly-technical level, under rather rarefied conditions in Geneva and New York. Principles remained important but so did expertise. The goal was both to score diplomatic points and to obtain reform in governance structures within member states. And patience has been a strong virtue, as much of the success of Indigenous transnational advocacy has come through the exchange of ideas and networking, not through tangible delivery.

Samina Yasmeen's Chapter 13 on the Danish cartoon controversy turns the transnational advocacy described by Megan Davis on its head. Instead of being the culmination of a long diffuse process, this episode burst out quite suddenly. Instead of pushing out into one technically-oriented United Nations forum, mass opinion was mobilised through the Muslim world. And instead of having to work awkwardly with 'like-minded' countries on the rights of Indigenous peoples, diplomats from a variety of Islamic states lent vigorous and continuous support.

A second dichotomy pushes across the boundaries from transnational advocacy to public diplomacy. Megan Davis' chapter is at one end of this spectrum with its concentration on how Indigenous peoples lobby the United Nations. No mention is made about how the states under pressure in this issue-area attempt to brand or re-brand themselves via public diplomacy. Samina Yasmeen's chapter extends this framework to include state-based diplomacy, but again this focus is largely subordinated to an analysis of the tactics and impact of this novel campaign of transnational advocacy.

In some ways, Bruce Gregory's Chapter 14 reinforces the notion of public diplomacy as simply the mirror-image of advocacy. Whereas society groups attempt to use lobbying to influence states and public opinion, states reverse the process by mobilising a variety of techniques as part of an increasingly well-publicised mode of public diplomacy to try to shape global publics.

Yet, elevating the level of discussion, Gregory demonstrates that this dichotomous approach is too rigidly dualistic. Significantly, for Gregory the pattern of public diplomacy needs to be located not just as a means of image-building by states (let alone as an instrument of propaganda), but as an instrument of global governance. Furthermore, he argues that public diplomacy is no longer the exclusive preserve of statecraft but a terrain that non-state actors have also penetrated both in tandem with, and in parallel fashion to, national governments. And he provides a number of compelling snapshots where this type of activity can be witnessed.

The open-ended trajectory of these processes is accentuated by Gregory's discussion of the power of dialogue and the logic of the network society. Both concepts break down the rigidities in thinking and action. Indeed, in an extension of Brian Hocking's own work, Gregory uses these concepts to expand on why the future of diplomacy must be associated with 'boundary spanning' as opposed to 'gate-keeping', with hierarchal-oriented diplomats adopting more flexible characteristics in such areas as knowledge-sharing (Hocking, 2005a).

In a similar fashion, Andrew F. Cooper's Chapter 15 shows both the presence of what appear to be rigid dualities and the possibility of some merger of trajectories. On first impression, there is a massive distance – or chasm – between the top-down coalitions of the willing epitomised by the US-led intervention against Saddam's Iraq, and the bottom-up coalitions as featured in the campaigns against anti-personnel landmines and for the establishment of the International Criminal Court. A good deal of Cooper's chapter is devoted to accenting these differences in criteria related to diplomacy as well as practices devoted to global governance.

While manifestations of divergent world views, however, these models of mobilisation not only interact but also blend into each with respect to intensity and some elements of form. Instead of being cast therefore as simply polar opposites, a more subtle rendition is offered.

Jorge Heine's Chapter 16 expresses the strain between rigidity and flexibility in a comprehensive number of ways. Many of these are familiar reprises with echoes from the other contributions in this volume: the push and pull of established diplomatic practices on one side and the normative development of global governance on the other side, in the context not only of the blurring of what constitutes the international and the domestic but also the challenge from globalism together with a 'rising' global South in terms of ideas as well as material wealth.

Heine reinforces the notion that a transition from the 'club' model to a networked approach is vital if the duality between diplomacy and governance is to be broken (see also Cooper and Legler, 2006), and that buying into the new flatter and more flexible model is an advance not only for the global governance project but also for the practice of diplomacy itself. Instead of redundancy – or disenfranchisement – of diplomats, such adaptive practices according to Heine open up the prospect for greater access and leverage. Amidst all the challenges commonly ascribed to an inexorable sense of decline, the future of skilful 'networked' diplomats is deemed to be a bright and sustained one.

Overall, as Ramesh Thakur's concluding chapter shows, at both the analytical and the practical level the contributions to this book reflect a transformative international order, the precise contours of which remain indistinct. In this context, the agendas of diplomacy and global governance should not – and indeed, do not – exist in separate boxes but rather serve to inform one another. It is important to recall that diplomacy – as several authors in this volume note – is not the preserve of the 'Westphalian' international order but has a pedigree that precedes it and is, equally, capable of transcending it. In doing so, however, some of the key features of the state-centred diplomatic order that have been familiar to us are being challenged by the demands of a more complex environment, which the logic of global governance seeks to address. Hence the emphasis on flexibility and adaptability of policy networks is set against the traditional hierarchical and relatively closed forms associated with diplomacy.

One conceptualisation of this changing, polycentric order is presented in terms of 'multistakeholder diplomacy', wherein the demands of tackling complex global agendas are met by the construction of processes that link actors representing differing interests and possessing distinctive skills (Kurbalija and Katrandjiev, 2006). Such experiments, however, are not without significant challenges. The 'rules' that govern the workings of the diplomatic community are rooted in sets of cultural norms and values that differ markedly from those of other stakeholders in the governance processes. The test of success, then, becomes one of establishing effective 'rules of engagement' through which the traditional norms of the corps diplomatique and those of other key stakeholders adapt to each other's demands in management of global issues. Critical to this process is an engagement of ideas and information and it is towards such an exchange that the chapters in this book make a significant contribution. For if understanding the nature and complexities of global governance is a critical task in interpreting the character of contemporary world politics, equally – as Scholte suggests at the end of his chapter – 'the study of diplomacy … has arguably never been as important'.

Index

Abu Ghraib, 7, 113, 114
Afghanistan, 53, 112, 113, 246, 266
Africa
  and debt relief, 156
  East, 174
  equatorial, 45
  and European colonialism, 294
  governance initiative in, 80
  and HIV/AIDS, 151, 157
  independent countries in, 37
  unstable states in, 125
  Southern, 9, 45, 174
  Southern Africa Development Community, 160
  Sub-Saharan, 137
  West, 283
African Union, 46, 59, 67, 160, 161
  African Peer Review Mechanism, 80
AIDS, *see* HIV/AIDS
Alatas, Ali, 228
Alliance Française, 141, 280
Al Qaeda, 111, 135, 250, 254
Amnesty International, 22, 110, 116, 263, 292, 295
Anaya, James S., 213, 220
Anderson, Kenneth, 112, 228
Annan, Kofi, 198, 211, 228, 247, 281, 296
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, 128, 280
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 8, 123, 129, 130
  ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies, 123, 125, 128–130, 132n
  ASEAN Regional Forum, 130
  and Asian Financial Crisis, 130
Australia
  delegates to ICRC, 112
  government of, 114
  and human rights, 211, 295
  and indigenous peoples, 212, 219, 221
  and international coalitions, 259
  and Kyoto Protocol, 296
  as middle power, 262
  and security cooperation, 130
Australian National University, 130
Avian Flu, 137, 138, 141
Axworthy, Lloyd, 262

Bangladesh, 164, 174
Berlusconi, Silvio, 262, 276
Bhagwati, Jagdish, 268
Blair, Tony, 259, 262
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 231, 271, 282
Brazil, 157, 164, 165, 173, 174, 193, 273
Bretton Woods Conference (1944), 58, 158
Bulgaria, 178n, 229
Bush, George H. W., 264
Bush, George W., 54, 150, 227, 257, 262, 269, 288
Buthelezi, Mangosuthu, 271

Canada
  ambassador to UN, 260, *see also* Fowler, Robert
  ambassador to US, 242, *see also* Gotlieb, Allan
  Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 26, 28n
  and diplomacy, 253, 296
  and human rights, 215
  as immigrant society, 21
  and indigenous peoples, 212, 218
  and ISAF, 266
  as low tariff country, 178n
  as middle power, 262, 285n
  Minister of Foreign Affairs, 262, *see also* Axworthy, Lloyd
  provinces in, 51
  and security cooperation, 130
Caribbean, 80, 145, 174, 217, 275, 277
Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR), 44
Chatham House, 124
Chile, 215, 216, 272, 275, 280, 283

China
and ASEAN, 52, 129
and diplomacy, 242
and Doha Round, 292
and HIV/AIDS, 145
and internet governance, 193
and landmines treaty, 117, 262
provinces in, 51
research in, 124
and trade agreements, 280
and the United Nations, 166
Civil Society Bureau, 188, 206n
Clark, Wesley, 265
Cold War, 36, 125, 141, 182, 226, 264, 293
Colombia, 53, 215
Congo, 73, 83
Cook, Ivan, 7, 22, 292
Cooper, Andrew F., 11, 12

Davis, Megan, 10
de Klerk, F. W., 271
Denham, Andrew, 124
Denmark
democratisation in, 230
and diplomacy, 26
and indigenous peoples, 218
Islamophobia in, 229
as a low tariff country, 178n
Muslims in, 232–236
Prime Minister of, 231, *see also* Rasmussen, Anders Fogh
Desai, Nitin, 186, 193, 206n
Doctors Without Borders, 246–248, 250, 255
see also Médecins Sans Frontières
Dodson, Mick, 219, 220
Doha Declaration, 152, 157

East Timor, 112, 266, 298
Economic Community of West-African States, 67, 160
Egypt, 231, 233
Europe, 20, 41, 106, 109, 111
defence policy in, 75
and diplomacy, 64, 81
Eastern, 145, 294, 299n
European Social Forum, 45
and global governance, 74
and globalisation, 67
governance in, 70
and ICRC, 109
Islamophobia in, 230, 231
and NAFTA, 28
as super-power, 82
Western, 169, 217
European Commission, 37, 56, 67, 81, 82n, 115, 150
European Community, 36, 83n
European Union, 83
Common Foreign and Security Policy, 65, 233
and diplomacy, 23
function of, 6
High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, 233
members of, 150
and regionalism, 40, 92
and the United States, 164

Falk, Richard A., 213
Fowler, Robert, 260
France, 22, 65, 73, 142, 166, 229, 267
Fulton, Barry, 242

Gates, Bill, 242
General Agreement of Trade in Services, 92, 97, 274
Geneva
and the European Union, 78
as hub of global governance, 56
and international diplomacy, 90
permanent missions in, 187
Summit in, 180, 183, 191, 196
Geneva Conventions
guidelines of, 113
and international humanitarian law, 7
principles of, 106, 114
and protocols, 107
ratification of, 107
Germany, 51, 142, 229, 246, 261, 267
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 53, 54, 149, 150
global governance, 6, 7, 9, 11, 30, 51, 52, 63, 263, 290
agencies, 56
agenda, 8, 10, 148
architecture of, 9, 154, 158
challenge of, 294, 296

global governance – *continued*
  and diplomacy, 1, 2, 5–8, 12
  and the EU, 67, 72–74, 76, 79, 81
  forms of, 82
  and globalisation, 29, 31, 48
  and international epidemics, 147, 148, 158, 162
  and international security, 135, 288
  mechanisms of, 291
  norms and practices of, 148
  organising principles of, 153
  participants in, 295
  patterns of, 37
  proponents of, 4, 290
  rules of, 7
  structures of, 76, 147, 148
  system of, 66, 67, 161
  tests of, 82
  and the UN, 78, 297, 298
Goethe Institute, 141–142, 280
Gonzales, Alberto, 114
Google, 183, 187
Gotlieb, Allan, 242
Greenpeace, 95, 292
Gregory, Bruce, 11, 57
Group of Eight, 8, 9, 147, 149
Guantanamo Bay, 113, 295
Guatemala, 215, 218
Gulf War, 264, 265

Haas, Peter, 120, 121
Haass, Richard, 258
Habermas, Jergen, 249–252
Hall, Martin, 31
HIV/AIDS (Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immuno-Deficiency Syndrome)
  affected countries, 156, 161
  as development challenge, 160, 162
  as global epidemic, 161
  and globalisation, 147
  and health security, 9
  impact of, 149
  People Living with HIV/AIDS, 160
  as public health disaster, 146
  poverty and, 156
  response to, 147, 148, 150–155, 158, 161
  spread of, 54
  and Sub-Saharan Africa, 137, 145
  as threat to sustainable development, 146
Hocking, Brian, 11, 250
Hofstede, Geert, 93
Hong Kong, 170, 174
Howard, John, 259, 262
Hu Jintao, 242
Hussein, Saddam, 226, 257

India
  and Asian crisis, 285n
  and diplomacy, 242, 288
  economic interests of, 173
  exports from, 170
  and HIV/AIDS, 145
  and landmines treaty, 262
  media in, 281
  and SEANWFZ, 130
  think tanks in, 124
  and United States, 288
  village communities in, 47
  and WTO, 164, 165, 174
Indonesia, 145, 174, 221, 226–231, 259, 273
International Chamber of Commerce, 187, 258, 262–264, 266, 267
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 7, 106, 248, 292
International Criminal Court, 3, 11, 35, 258
International Financial Institutions, 9, 97, 150, 297
International Labour Organization, 77, 94, 146, 154, 158
International Monetary Fund, 52, 87, 151, 166, 294
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 266
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, 53, 185, 190, 247
Iran, 227, 231
Iraq
  Hussein era, 257, 263
  ICRC operations in, 111, 112
  as international crisis, 268, 298
  intervention in, 11
  invasion of, 257, 259, 264, 265, 269
  invasion of Kuwait, 264
  UN troops in, 267

Israel, 21, 72, 83n, 114, 178n, 235, 262
Italy, 178n, 229

James, Oliver, 164–166
Japan
and diplomacy, 174, 242
exports from, 170
Foreign Ministry, 280
and G6, 174
G8 Summit (2000), 149
and GATT, 174
and HIV/AIDS, 150
Japan Institute of International Affairs, 130
prefectures in, 51
Jönsson, Christer, 5, 43, 65, 289

Keck, Margaret, 10, 23
Keohane, Robert, 120, 167, 280n
Khatami, Mohammad, 227, 228
Korea, South, 52, 110, 164, 165, 280
Kosovo, 83, 257, 265, 269, 298
Kouchner, Bernard, 110, 246
Kummer, Markus, 186
Kurbalija, Jovan, 9
Kuwait, 226, 236, 264
Kyoto Protocol, 54, 74, 95, 295, 296

Langhorne, Richard, 86
Lebanon, 114, 231
Leonard, Mark, 242
Letts, Martine, 7, 292
Libya, 72, 83n, 231
Lippmann, Walter, 250, 251
Lipschutz, Ronnie, 3
Lisk, Franklyn, 9, 205n

Malaysia, 47, 129, 174, 271
Mandela, Nelson, 271, 272
Manners, Ian, 73, 75
Mathews, Jessica, 248
Mauritius, 80, 178n
Médecins Sans Frontières, 110, 116n
see also Doctors Without Borders
Melissen, Jan, 243
Mexico, 174, 215, 280
Microsoft, 187, 242
Millennium Development Goals, 146, 151, 162n, 184
Miller, Leszek, 267
Modelski, George, 19
Morgenthau, Hans, 281, 291
Murphy, Craig, 167

National Endowment for Democracy (United States), 246, 248, 303
Nestlé, 94, 103n
Neumann, Iver B., 5, 269n, 291
New York, 10, 56, 78, 214, 217, 222, 223
New Zealand, 212, 215, 218, 229, 262
Nicolson, Sir Harold, 2, 277, 278, 282
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 76, 257, 265, 266
Norway, 20–24, 229, 231, 235–236
Nye, Joseph S., 75, 251, 285n

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 52, 56, 71, 89, 95, 98
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 130
Organization of the Islamic Conference, 52, 231
Ottawa Convention Banning Land Mines, 35, 108–110, 258, 260
Ottawa Process, 109, 110

Pakistan, 170, 227, 228, 233, 235
Palestine, 231
Perle, Richard, 259
Philippines, 129, 215
Powell, Colin, 246, 248, 268

Rana, Kishan, 279
RAND Corporation, 122, 143
Rasmussen, Anders Fogh, 231
Red Cross, 7, 104–106, 246
Rio Earth Summit (1992), 180, 182
Riordan, Shaun, 8, 9, 97, 135
Ronfeldt, David, 250
Rosenau, James, 245
Rumsfeld, Donald, 259, 265, 268
Russia, 46, 47, 193, 262, 265, 273

Saner, Raymond, 7
Saudi Arabia, 231, 232, 233, 236
Scandinavia, 19, 40
Scholte, Jan Aart, 6, 12, 299
Schumpeter, Joseph, 16

Seoul Forum for International Studies, 130
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, 137, 141
Sikkink, Kathryn, 10, 23
Singapore, 174, 283
Singh, Manmohan, 288
Slaughter, Anne-Marie, 248
Smouts, Marie Claude, 2
Solana, Javier, 233
South Africa
  and Brazil, 292
  and Chile, 272
  foreign policy, 271, 284n
  and HIV/AIDS, 137, 157
  government of, 92
  and indigenous peoples, 215
  and landmines treaty, 262
  President of, 271, *see also* Mandela, Nelson
  reforms in, 80
Soviet Union, 166, 265, 277
Spain, 229, 233, 267
Spence, David, 6, 37
Stone, Diane, 124, 131n
Sundararaman, Shankari, 7, 132n
Switzerland, 176, 186n, 195, 229

Talbot, Strobe, 96
Thakur, Ramesh, 12
Tharoor, Shashi, 281, 282
Thatcher, Margaret, 20
Treaty on the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, 129
Turkey, 74, 138, 228, 231, 259, 268
Tutu, Desmond, 228

Ukraine, 72, 83n, 229
United Kingdom, 65, 73, 140, 150, 171, 173, 259
United Nations, 46, 83n, 166, 275
  and business sector, 206
  and China, 242
  conferences, 35
  and the G8, 9
  and global governance, 76, 289
  and global pandemics, 146
  as humanitarian agency, 112
  and indigenous peoples, 10, 211
  reform of, 79
  relations with other multilateral organizations, 63
  summits, 180, 186
United Nations Development Programme, 77, 122, 189
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, 79, 189
United Nations University Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNUCRIS), 45
United States, 98, 111, 129, 258
  ambassadorial system, 22
  aspirations of, 73
  attacks on, 224, 227, 228
  and the Coalition of the Willing, 257, 259, 262, 264, 267
  as deterritorialised state, 18
  and diplomacy, 32, 51, 242, 244, 288, 297
  and G77, 174
  and GATT, 169–171, 175
  and HIV/AIDS, 150
  immigrants to, 17, 21
  and indigenous peoples, 212, 218
  interests of, 173
  and international security, 135
  and internet governance, 196
  lobbyist groups in, 98
  and the Ottawa Treaty to ban landmines, 109
  and the Soviet Union, 166
  and the United Nations, 298
  and the Western Alliance, 261
  and WSIS process, 188, 193
  and WTO, 164, 165

Wade, Robert, 167
Wallace, Helen, 70, 123
Walzer, Michael, 249
Watson, Adam, 15
Weber, Max, 16
Westphalian, 5, 6, 12, 36, 42, 58, 59, 66, 212
Wilkinson, Rorden, 9
Working Group on Indigenous Populations, 212, 213
World Bank
  Annual Meetings, 58
  development committee of, 151
  and IMF, 87, 169

World Bank – *continued*
  and international responsibility to protect, 294
  Parliamentary Conference on WTO, 51
  poverty reduction strategy, 156
  Resident Missions, 56
  and transnational NGOs, 96
World Council of Churches, 218
World Economic Forum, 88, 89, 95
World Health Organization (WHO), 77, 92, 145
World Summit on Information Society, 9
  process, 186
  Tunis Summit, 2005, 193
World Trade Organization (WTO), 9, 52, 85, 87, 95, 164, 166, 169
  and business sector, 187
  and Doha Declaration, 152
  and the European Union, 46
  and financial markets, 98
  and GATT, 90, 173–178
  and the International Chamber of Commerce, 187
  Parliamentary Conference on the WTO, 51
  and regional trade agreements, 45
  TRIPS Agreement, 157
  as UN Agency, 92
World War, First, 18, 136, 168
World War, Second, 122–124, 166, 168, 169, 293
World Wildlife Fund, 88, 292
Wotton, Sir Henry, 2

Yasmeen, Samina, 10
Yiu, Lichia, 7

Zapatero, José Luis, 228, 267