

Contents

<i>List of Figures</i>	ix
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	x
<i>Notes on the Contributors</i>	xi
1 Discursive Identities/Identity Discourses and Political Power <i>Richard Mole</i>	1
Part I: Discourse and Identity	
2 A Discourse Theory of Ethnic Identity <i>Don Ellis</i>	25
3 The Tale-End of History: Literary Form, Historiography and the Danish (Post)-National Imagination <i>C. Claire Thomson</i>	45
4 'Doing Europe': the Discursive Construction of European Identities <i>Ruth Wodak</i>	70
5 Shifting Discourses: Banal Nationalism and Cultural Intimacy in Greek Television News and Everyday Life <i>Mirca Madianou</i>	95
Part II: Discourse, Identity and Politics	
6 The Power of Metaphor: Consent, Dissent and Revolution <i>Erik Ringmar</i>	119
7 Post-Liberal Anxieties and Discourses of Peoplehood in Europe: Nationalism, Xenophobia and Racism <i>Gerard Delanty and Peter Millward</i>	137
8 Talking Security? The Discourse of European Identity in the Baltic States <i>Richard Mole</i>	149

9	It's About Time: is Europe Old or New? <i>Jan Ifversen</i>	170
10	Narratives of Security: Strategy and Identity in the European Context <i>Felix Ciută</i>	190
11	Conclusion: Revisiting Discourse, Identity and 'Europe' <i>Richard Mole and Felix Ciută</i>	208
	<i>Bibliography</i>	213
	<i>Index</i>	233

1

Discursive Identities/Identity Discourses and Political Power

Richard Mole

The conduct of European politics has undergone a major shift since the end of the Cold War. The end of the nuclear stand-off between the superpowers has prompted increased integration, institutionalisation and the reconceptualisation of security, all encapsulated in the enlargement of NATO and the European Union. Freed from the constraint of the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union, European states have become more vocal in defining their national interest as much in terms of identity and culture as in terms of sovereignty and territorial integrity. As we saw in the run-up to the French and Dutch referenda on the EU Constitution, these developments have in turn provoked much debate on the relationship between Europe and the nation-state and on the potential emergence of an incipient European identity.

The recognition of identity and discourse as key factors in the conduct of European politics has thus increased significantly over the past ten to fifteen years. However, traditional theories have struggled to make sense of this new social and political landscape, as the dominant role they ascribe to material forces – such as economic and military might – undermines their explicatory strength. In response to these changes and the increased interactions between actors at the sub-state, state and supra-state levels of action, social and political theorists have begun to pay much more attention to questions of identity and discourse. The international relations of states are thus now understood by analysts to rest on ‘a shared sense of national identity, of a nation-state’s “place in the world”, its friends and enemies, its interests and aspirations. These underlying assumptions are embedded in national history and myth, changing slowly over time’ as they are challenged, reinterpreted and re-presented, *inter alia*, in political speeches, the

media, literature, history books and various forms of popular culture (Hill & Wallace, 1996, p. 8).

Prompted by this interest, this book aims to bring together specialists to examine the discursive construction of identities and analyse the impact of specific identity discourses on various socio-political issues in Europe. While most analyses of the relationship between discourse and identity have been conducted by linguists and communications scholars, this volume seeks also to show how other disciplines (literature, media, sociology, conceptual history, politics and International Relations in addition to critical discourse analysis and communications) examine the social construction of identity and meaning through discourse and their application to the study of European politics and society.

This introductory chapter sets out some of the key debates informing this analysis, examining the nature of identity, the psychology of identification, the construction of national identities and the role of discourse in their production. With the aim of theorising the link between identity and politics, the latter part of the chapter focuses on the relationship between discourse and power, demonstrating how specific discourses can be employed by power-holders to create social reality for instrumental purposes and how discourse can exist independently of actors to condition and constrain their actions by legitimising and delegitimising particular policy options.

Identities and their construction

Identity is a much-analysed concept in the social sciences and cultural studies. Since the late 1980s, rarely has an academic book or article been published in these fields without some reference to the term. Indeed, it is so often used that its meaning has now become somewhat confused. In a recent book, sociologist Rogers Brubaker identified five main uses of the concept in various academic disciplines. In the study of race, ethnicity and nationalism, for instance, identity is most often used to emphasise either objective or subjective 'sameness' among a collectivity, whereby this feeling 'is expected to manifest itself in solidarity, in shared dispositions or consciousness, or in collective action' (2004, p. 34). In psychology as well as in nationalism studies, the term is commonly understood as 'a core aspect of (individual or collective) self-hood or as a fundamental condition of social being', which 'is invoked to point to something allegedly *deep, basic, abiding, or foundational*' (ibid., original emphasis). In politics and the study of social

movements, identity is called upon ‘to underscore the manner in which action – individual or collective – may be governed by *particularistic self-understandings* rather than by *putative universal self-interest*’ (ibid., p. 33, original emphasis). This use of identity – as in ‘identity politics’ – thus seeks to conceptualise and explain social and political action with reference to the social location of the agent, either in a specific social category, such as gender, ethnicity, race, etc., or in the social structure more generally (in the market, occupational structure, etc.). Similarly, identity is invoked ‘to highlight the *processual, interactive* development of the kind of collective self-understanding, solidarity, or “groupness” that can make collective action possible’ (ibid., p. 34, original emphasis). In this sense, identity is seen as ‘a contingent product of social or political action and as a ground or basis for further action’ (ibid., p. 35). And finally, in various strands of post-modernist and post-structuralist thought, identity conveys the ‘*unstable, multiple, fluctuating, and fragmented* nature of the contemporary self’, the product of ‘multiple and competing discourses’ (ibid., original emphasis). Identity is thus defined and used in different ways depending on context. But, at its simplest, identity seeks to convey who we are or are perceived to be and the way we, as individuals or groups, locate ourselves and others in the social world. This becomes clear if we examine the psychological processes of identity-formation.

Psychologists argue that ascribing identities to ourselves and others is a natural function of the brain (Hogg and Abrams, 1998; Hogg et al., 1995; Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Turner, 1987). The world around us has few explicit lines of division and the boundaries between social entities are fluid and blurred, with the result that these ‘seemingly chaotic and unstructured stimuli’ threaten ‘to overwhelm our cognitive apparatus’ (Theiler, 2003, p. 260). Social Identity Theory argues that, faced with the task of processing this vast amount of data, human beings instinctively categorise the world around them in order to make life more predictable and understandable and, at the same time, make their ‘experience of the world subjectively meaningful’ (Hogg et al., 1995, p. 261). We categorise people into and identify ourselves and others as distinct races, nations, ethnicities, classes, character types, generations, sexualities, etc., to create order out of chaos and to help us behave in ways which are appropriate to the norms of the categories to which we or others belong. A gay, working-class Welshman will act in accordance with different norms in a gay bar, on the factory floor, on a day-trip to Oxford or at an Eisteddfod. While he may very well have colleagues who would be comfortable being kissed

'good morning' or meet Englishmen who are sympathetic to Welsh nationalism, it is easier for him to treat his workmates or the English as a single group with a single identity and set of group norms and align his behaviour accordingly. The processes of categorisation and identification are thus 'fundamental and universal' because they satisfy 'a basic human need for cognitive parsimony' (Hogg & Abrams, 1988, p. 72). To create boundaries between social categories, 'like' needs to be grouped with 'like'. We thus perceive entities we have placed in a specific category to be more similar to each other and more different from entities in other categories than they actually are. Research has shown that we tend to perceive outgroups to be even more homogeneous than in-groups (see Messick & Mackie, 1989, pp. 55–9). However, 'the cognitive divisions we impose on the world do not seem arbitrary to us but instead a reflection of seemingly objective breaks and discontinuities', facilitating the idea that the world naturally comprises bounded identity groups (Theiler, 2003, p. 260).

Identity/identification thus helps us make sense of our environment by defining our location and that of others in the social world. However, psychological theories of identity make no assumptions about 'the nature of groups, the signifiers used to demarcate group boundaries or the group norms that prevail at any given time. All these factors are socially constructed and therefore culturally specific and historically contingent' (Theiler, 2003, p. 262). While the process of identity formation is instinctive, therefore, the boundaries and content of specific identities are not 'given' but 'reflect the perceptions, priorities and aspirations of those people who have the power to both construct categories and promote them as natural or superior' (Penrose and Mole, forthcoming). These ideas lie at the heart of the constructivist approach to identity, which generally informs the contributions of all the authors in this book. But why constructivism?

Constructivism, the ontological position which posits that 'all knowledge, and therefore all meaningful reality as such, is contingent upon human practices, being constructed in and out of interaction between human beings and their world, and developed and transmitted within an essentially social context', emerged to counter various essentialist or primordial definitions of social actors as immutable and constant through time and space (Crotty, 2003, p. 42). National identity must not therefore be seen as something fixed but as something that is continually negotiated and renegotiated. To argue that the general notion of the British nation, for example, is the same now as it was under Queen Victoria is absurd. In the nineteenth century,

Britishness was defined largely with reference to the Empire and in opposition to the African and Asian peoples it governed. Today, social and political leaders go to great lengths to emphasise the multiethnic nature of Britishness. What may be a key aspect of identity in one decade may be far less salient in another. For this reason, constructivism has become the dominant approach to the study of the social world and, in particular, to the study of nations and national identities. The following section will thus examine the main points of the constructivist approach to the study of nations and national identity, before then analysing its challengers and limits.

Constructivists view nations and national identities as constructs, forged by elites to achieve various socio-political and economic objectives. To Ernest Gellner, for example, the nationalist project sought to usher in modernity and facilitate industrialisation. To achieve high levels of productivity, elites needed 'a mobile, literate, culturally standardised, interchangeable population', capable of following instructions, communicating with co-workers, understanding how to operate machinery, etc., without relying on context (1996b, p. 35). Mass, state-wide education was used to produce a standardised form of language, history and culture, out of which this population was constructed. The construction of these standardised histories and cultures used to consolidate group membership would draw on pre-existing cultural 'shreds and patches' (dead languages, invented traditions, ethnicity, etc.), although Gellner argues that any 'old shred and patch would have served as well' (*ibid.*, p. 56). The mass education project also sought to inculcate in the minds of inhabitants of a particular territory the idea that they were part of a single community with a single identity, so as to create loyal members of society whose ability to function as such would not be hampered by attachments to sub-groups within or beyond state boundaries. The success of the nationalising project is such that, where no shared identity exists, people question why those who 'define themselves differently but live side by side with them and whose solidarities they cannot rely on should be politically or economically or culturally favoured' (Schöpflin, 2000, p. 39). To Craig Calhoun the construction of national identity is thus 'a self-conscious and manipulative project carried out by elites who seek to secure their power by mobilizing followers on the basis of nationalist ideology' (1997, p. 30). This position is shared by Marxists, who argue that the feeling of commonality engendered by a shared national identity allows the bourgeoisie to project their economic interests onto those of society as a whole, suppressing class consciousness by obfuscating

conflicting class interests (see Marx & Engels, 1985, pp. 84–5). The constructivist position is compelling. The shift in understandings of German identity from ‘blood and soil’ to a more multicultural conceptualisation, for example, can only be explained with reference to constructivism. However, it is not without its challengers. Primordialists dispute the very idea conceptualisation of national identities as constructions, ethno-symbolists query the extent to which they are constructed and post-modernists/post-structuralists criticise constructivism for not going far enough.

Challengers to constructivism

For decades the debate over the essential versus the constructed nature of nations and national identities was the source of much tension in academic circles between primordialists and constructivists. The primordialist position is often the first we come across, as this is the approach taken by nationalists themselves. According to them, nations are organic communities, united by shared biology, culture and history stretching back centuries if not millennia. This approach dominated early scholarship on nationalism, which viewed nations as ‘the basic communities of history, at once ancient and immemorial’ and regarded ‘national sentiments and consciousness as fundamental elements of historical phenomena and their main explanatory principles’ (Smith, 1998, p. 18). Primordialists thus reify the nation, which they see as an essential object which can be analysed like any other scientific phenomenon (van den Berghe, 1978; Geertz, 1973). Pierre van den Berghe insists that nations must be understood as extended kin groups, the result of ‘institutionalised norms of nepotism and ethnocentrism,’ aimed at promoting cooperation and enhancing ‘inclusive fitness’ (1978, p. 405). Ethnicity can only arouse the passion needed to forge nations, he argues, if the concept of common descent is credible, and it is ‘only credible if it corresponds at least partly to reality’ (1988, p. 256). While, intellectually, this approach is now generally derided as a straw man by academics, we should not ignore the primordialist argument entirely, as social anthropologists demonstrate that most people do tend to perceive collectivities of flesh-and-blood human beings, such as nations, as essential categories (see Gil-White, 2001). Why is this? If there is general agreement among academics that nations are constructed, why do people still consider nations and national identities to be natural and ancient?

To ethno-symbolists, such as Anthony Smith, the answer lies in ethnicity. While identities may be constructed, he argues, they are not

constructed *ex nihilo*, but rather have stronger roots in pre-modern ethnic groups (what he calls 'ethnies') than many theorists today are prepared to admit. Ethnies provide the 'myths, memories, values and symbols' that invoke presumed kinship and without which the appeals of modern nationalists would fail to resonate (1986, p. 15). According to Smith, the transition from ethnies to nation could produce civic or ethnic nations depending upon the path taken. In the former case, kings and princes in pre-modern Western Europe, prompted by the need to tap the wealth of their middle classes (to fund wars, etc.), would draw the latter into 'an increasingly accented, territorialised and politicised "national" culture,' which would filter downwards and spread outwards from the ethnic core, carried by the state's military, administrative, fiscal and judicial institutions, until the lower strata and the outlying regions had been encompassed (1998, p. 193). In Central and Eastern Europe, however, 'the frontiers of an existing state and of a rising nationality rarely coincided' (Kohn, 1967, p. 457). When nationalist ideals were taken up by local intelligentsias in the nineteenth century, the latter were often isolated from both the ethnically heterogeneous aristocracy and the illiterate peasantry and were thus unable to promote a civic, territorially inclusive idea of the nation, in which all sectors of society would have a stake. As a result, they had to appeal to abstract notions of 'the people', genealogy, shared culture, myths of common descent and common ancestry, i.e. ethnicity.

While Smith does offer a sophisticated account of the formation of nations, it is unclear why we should consider ethnicity to be any less constructed than the political nation. More importantly, he does not address how specific national identities come about, i.e. how they end up in their current configuration. Why are specific aspects of ethnic cultures chosen over others in the creation of political nations? This takes us back to constructivists, for whom the answer is simple: 'The leaders of ethnic movements invariably select from traditional cultures only those aspects that they think will serve to unite the group and that will be useful in promoting the interests of the group as they define them' (Brass, 1979, p. 87). According to Eric Hobsbawm, these leaders go so far as to invent 'national' traditions so as 'to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past' and thus provides legitimacy for the present (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1993, p. 1). Flags, anthems, ceremonies, monuments, symbols and statues are all invented for the national cause – in some cases quite recently – but are presented as

elements of the nation's distant past. A number of nations were forged so recently that 'even historic continuity had to be invented, for example, by creating an ancient past beyond effective historic continuity, either by semi-fiction ... or by forgery' (ibid., p. 7). So does constructivism have all the answers? Yes and no.

While the idea that nations and identities are constructed (or even invented) is now accepted as a self-evident truth, constructivism does nevertheless leave certain questions unanswered. Firstly, why do people allow themselves to be 'manipulated' into identifying with the symbols, culture and traditions crafted by elites? Moreover, if identities are constructed, why are the groups which they invoke reified and treated as real, bounded groups with the potential for political agency? In other words, how do 'these constructs regularly elude the control of those who create them, to take on the appearance of objective, determined, facts' (Day & Thompson, 2004, p. 85)? Let us examine each of these questions in turn.

Identification and self-esteem

While the constructivist argument that elites construct national identities from above for specific instrumental purposes is persuasive, it does not explain why these identities would necessarily be accepted, indeed cherished, by society at large. As Hobsbawm reminds us, national identification 'cannot be understood unless also analysed from below, that is in terms of the assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people, which are not necessarily national and still less nationalist' (1995, p. 10). As Gellner tells us is that, once industrialisation produces standardised and homogenous high cultures 'pervading entire populations', the situation arises whereby unified cultures are 'very nearly the only kind of unit with which men willingly and often ardently identify' (1996b, p. 55). However, he does not explain why. Smith's claim that the identity and symbols of the nation resonate with society below because of their underlying roots in pre-modern cultures is unconvincing, as this does not explain why members of civic nations, such as Americans, also feel such a powerful identification with their national symbols. Were Smith correct, Italian-Americans would identify more strongly with the *tricolore* than the Stars and Stripes. Yet, his view of national identification as an innate feeling does seem to chime more with the genuine emotions we feel when we hear our national anthem or see our national team win at the Olympics than the extreme constructivist standpoint of national iden-

tity as 'false consciousness'. As is often the case, the truth lies somewhere in between. While identities can be and are used by elites for instrumental purposes, they do also meet an inherent need for meaning and self-esteem in the population below. To explain this, we must return to social psychology.

Henri Tajfel's definition of social identity as 'that part of an individual's self concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership' illustrates the fact that people prefer to have a positive self-image and see their in-group in a positive light and positively distinct from other groups (1978, p. 63). In other words, identification with positively distinct, prestigious groups is a means of establishing high self-esteem. This idea is echoed in the work of Yael Tamir, who argues that 'one of the distinctive features of membership in a constitutive community is that members view their self-esteem and well-being as affected by the success and failures of their individual fellow members and of the group as a whole' (1993, p. 96). Classifying your group as prestigious entails the assignment of positive attributes, which in turn entails choosing to compare your group with other groups in ways that reflect positively on it and by extension on yourself. Of the various groups with which one can identify, it is the nation that has come to dominate all other possible bearers of identity, as it provides 'optimal distinctiveness' in a way that no other groups do (see Brewer, 1991). Given the importance of group membership for self-definition, humans categorise themselves as much as they do others and internalise their own categorisation. As the individual becomes part of the group, the group becomes part of the individual, with the result that the achievements of the group also become the achievements of the individual. This explains why the constitutive elements of national identity find resonance with members of the national group. Contra ethno-symbolists, it is not an innate response to ethnic ties but a psychological need to feel part of a prestigious, positively distinct social group. In the event that group membership does not contribute positively to one's self-esteem, individuals can either dis-identify, seek downward rather than upward comparisons or use different axes of comparison. If your nation compares poorly with another in terms of territory but well in terms of literary heritage, you will emphasise literary heritage as the most important attribute a nation can have. Gellner's argument that any 'shreds and patches' from the nation's past would do in constructing a shared identity is thus incorrect. An identity must promote *positive* distinctiveness, not just distinctiveness.

Reification versus representation

Psychological theories also help explain the second limit to constructivism that we identified above, regarding the reification of identities and identity groups. The tendency – even among certain constructivists – to treat identity groups as ‘homogenous, internally cohesive internal groupings’ can be traced back to the psychological processes of categorisation and identification (Day and Thompson, 2004, p. 198). As discussed above, to create boundaries between social categories, ‘like’ needs to be grouped with ‘like’, with the result that entities in a specific category are perceived to be more similar to each other and more different from entities in other categories than they actually are. These cognitive divisions do not, however, appear subjective and random but objective and organic, facilitating the idea that the world is naturally made up of delimited identity groups, groups defined in terms of a reified identity, thought of as an innate aspect of self-hood that is fixed and conveys a feeling of sameness.

For the purposes of analysis, identity is better understood not as a *thing* but a *process*. As Richard Jenkins explains: ‘One’s identity – one’s identities, indeed, for who we are is always singular *and* plural – is never a final or settled matter’ (2004, p. 5; original emphasis). To argue that two Scotsmen, say, from different parts of the national homeland and different economic classes, with completely different interests and educational backgrounds, are ‘the same’ simply by virtue of the fact that they possess something called ‘Scottish identity’ is not credible. What they share is an *identification* with the symbols and collective memory of the Scottish nation. They have gone through the Scottish education system, learned of Scotland’s history and achievements and internalised its symbols. While their interpretations of Scotland’s symbols and history will certainly vary – individuals attach different meanings to symbols, while still recognising them as national – the processes of identification and internalisation enable them to ‘act as one psychological group when there is a threat to, or the possibility of enhancement of, these symbols of national identity’ (Bloom, 1993, p. 52). Thinking of ‘identity’ as ‘identification’ prevents the reification of identity in that it requires us to think not only of the identity object but also the agent making the identification and moreover ‘does not presuppose that such identifying (even by powerful agents, such as the state) will necessarily result in the internal sameness, the distinctiveness, the bounded groupness that political entrepreneurs may seek to achieve’ (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000, p. 14).

However, in this regard, academics working on nations and national identities are lagging behind their colleagues in other fields of study. Most social and economic historians have long since stopped analysing the working class as a real entity but rather treat it as a 'cultural and political idiom, as a mode of conflict, and as an underlying abstract dimension of economic structure' (Brubaker, 1999, pp. 13–14). Scholars of national identity, by contrast, tend to adopt '*categories of practice as categories of analysis*. [This] takes a conception inherent in the *practice* of nationalism and in the workings of the modern state and state-system – namely the realist, reifying conception of nations as real communities – and makes this conception central to the theory of nationalism' (ibid, p. 15, original emphasis). Brubaker insists that this is a mistake. While not disputing the existence of *nationhood*, the nation must not, he argues, be treated as a real community but as 'institutionalised form; not as collectivity but as practical category; not as entity but as contingent event' (ibid., p. 16).

To clarify this point, let us examine national identity in the USSR. While many commentators have argued that national identities survived *despite* Soviet nationality policy, it is more accurate to say that they survived *because of* Soviet nationality policy. Through the establishment of Soviet Socialist Republics, the USSR created quasi nation-states with their own territories, names, constitutions, administrations, legislatures, cultural and scientific institutions, etc. The role of the republics in crystallising and preserving nationality was not the result of the fiction of autonomy and sovereignty laid down in the Constitution but rather the institutional framework in which the centre cultivated and consolidated national administrative cadres, national intelligentsias and national languages and cultures. Furthermore, from the 1930s an individual's ethnicity became a compulsory assigned status. This system of personal nationality (based on internal passports) meant that everyone had an official ethnicity. Individuals were unable to choose their own nationality (based on language, residence or identity) but had to take that of their parents. Everyone knew their ethnic identity. There were no grey areas; the boundaries were clear. As Ronald Suny explains, 'alternative discourses of affiliation, like class or gender, were silenced', which meant 'the dominance of the national discourse defined its constituents almost exclusively as subjects of the nation, effacing the multiplicity of possible identities' (1993, p. 160). While the Soviet regime did clamp down on manifestations of *nationalism*, its nationality policy 'pervasively institutionalized ... territorial *nationhood* and ethnic *nationality* as

fundamental social categories. In so doing, it inadvertently created a political field supremely conducive to nationalism' (Brubaker, 1999, p. 17, original emphasis). What Brubaker demonstrates here is that the relationship between national identity and the invoked 'national group' is not as deterministic as most theorists believe and that identity 'can be pervasive and influential without being accomplished by discrete, specified persons or institutions' (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000, p. 16).

Brubaker's criticism of the propensity of academics – even those working within a constructivist framework – to reify the nation can be seen as part of a more general critique of the constructivist approach, which he attacks for being 'too obviously right, too familiar, to readily taken for granted, to generate the friction, force, and freshness needed to push arguments further and generate new insights' (2004, p. 3). It is only in the past ten years or so that academic attention has shifted 'from the characteristics of nations and nation-states towards a greater emphasis on national identity and identification – a move from the realm of the object to that of subjective consciousness and perception', with a particular focus on discourses, representations and social practices (Day and Thompson, 2004, p. 86–7).

The work that paved the way for the study of national identity as subjective consciousness and perception with a focus on discourses, representations and social practices was Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities*. In this path-breaking book, Anderson presents the nation as 'an imagined political community' (1991, p. 6). It is imagined as it is not possible for members of a nation, however small, to know all of their co-nationals. Nevertheless, the image of their nation lives in the mind of each of them. To Anderson, nations emerged as the result of the search for security following the Enlightenment and rationality. The possibility of imagining the nation only occurred following the decline of the pillars of pre-Enlightenment society. The first of these was the idea that 'a particular script-language offered privileged access to ontological truth, precisely because it was an inseparable part of that truth' (ibid., p. 36). The second pillar to fall was 'the belief that society was naturally organised around and under high centres – monarchs who were persons apart from other human beings and who ruled by some form of cosmological (divine) dispensation' (ibid.). The third was the 'conception of temporality in which cosmology and history were indistinguishable' (ibid., p. 36). Medieval consciousness understood history in terms of simultaneity and was kept local by the parish priest, who was the only link between the illiterate masses and God.

Following the Enlightenment, the concept of time changed from Messianic to what Anderson describes (after Walter Benjamin) as ‘homogenous empty time’, where simultaneity is ‘marked not by prefiguring and fulfilment, but by temporal coincidence, and measured by clock and calendar’ (ibid.). The decline of these three pillars changed the way people perceived the world around them and precipitated the search for a new way to bind fellowship, power and time. Yet, it was not until the advent of the printed text that people were able to conceive of themselves as belonging to an ‘imagined community’.

The development of printing in the fifteenth century resulted in 200,000,000 books being published by 1600 (ibid., p. 37). Booksellers were, of course, profit-driven and they had no qualms about publishing books in languages other than sacred Latin, a development that was intensified by the Reformation, which gave a further boost to vernacular languages. Print-capitalism established the foundations for national self-consciousness in three ways: it created unified fields of communication, standardised language and created languages of power. Most importantly, however, it enabled people ‘to think about themselves, and relate themselves to others, in profoundly new ways’ (ibid., p. 36). As Claire Thomson discusses in her chapter, the rise of the novel and newspaper ‘provided the technical means for ‘re-presenting’ the *kind* of imagined community that is the nation’ (ibid., p. 25). The simultaneous actions of fictional characters in novels or of real-life individuals in newspapers, who may be entirely unaware of each other’s existence, conjured up an imagined world in the minds of this new, large reading public, an imagined world that could be equated with that of the nation, ‘conceived as a solid community moving steadily down (or up) history’ (ibid., p 26). As Anderson explains: ‘An American will never meet or even know the names of more than a handful of his 240,000-odd [*sic*] fellow-Americans. He has no idea of what they are up to at any one time. But he has complete confidence in their steady, anonymous, simultaneous activity’ (ibid.). While Anderson has been critiqued for falling into the trap of reification, however, his work has been an invaluable springboard for post-modern or post-structuralist approaches that focus on discourse.

What post-modern and post-structuralist approaches reveal is that the relationship between national identity and the invoked ‘national group’ is not as deterministic as most theorists suggest. Identity or identification ‘invites specification of the agents that do the identifying. Yet identification does not *require* a specifiable “identifier”’; it can be pervasive and influential without being accomplished by discrete,

specified persons or institutions. Identification can be carried more or less anonymously by discourses or public narratives' (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000, p. 16). This idea is the focus of Michael Billig's *Banal Nationalism*. By 'banal nationalism', Billig refers to the 'the ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced. ... Daily, the nation is indicated, or "flagged", in the lives of its citizenry. Nationalism, far from being an intermittent mood in established nations, is the endemic condition' (1995, p. 6). With particular reference to established Western nations, which are not generally considered *nationalist*, he suggests that 'nationhood provides a continual background for their political discourses, for cultural products, and even for the structuring of newspapers. In so many little ways, the citizenry are daily reminded of their national place in a world of nations. However, this reminding is so familiar, so continual, that it is not consciously registered as reminding. The metonymic image of banal nationalism is not a flag which is being consciously waved with fervent passion; it is the flag hanging unnoticed on the public building' (ibid., p. 8). Via the concept of *deixis*, 'a form of rhetorical pointing', he emphasises the role of language and discourse in creating a sense of we-ness (ibid., p. 106). In newspapers, as Mirca Madianou elaborates in her chapter, personal pronouns continually point to the 'national homeland as the land of the reader' (Billig, 1995, p. 11). In referring to 'our country', it is clear who 'we' are, with the result that the meaning of 'we' becomes 'shared, taken-for-granted, common-sense' (Craib, 1992, p. 100; Berger and Luckman, 1967). What this simple claim reveals is that, in constructing a sense of nationhood, discourse is not just 'seen as describing a pre-existing social reality' but is rather 'a medium through which reality is *created* and the material world is given meaning' (Wennerstein, 1999, p. 274, original emphasis). In their research on Austrian identity, for example, de Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak show how 'reifying, figurative discourses continually launched by politicians, intellectuals and media people and disseminated through the systems of education, schooling, mass communication, militarization as well as through sports meetings' construct both national differences and intra-national sameness so as to make the idea of the nation real (1999, p. 153). There is no *a priori* reason why one particular definition of identity should be chosen over another. However, discourse 'constitutes and organises social relations around a particular structure of meanings' which grant certain meanings a dominant position and exclude others so as to create legitimate moral leadership and social hierarchy (Doty, 1996, p. 239), while the ultimate

success of these reifying discourses is measured by the invoked identity 'being seen as an essence' (Reicher and Hopkins, 2001, p. 222). These more post-modern or post-structuralist approaches successfully challenge the reification of nations and national identities and examine the processes by which and mechanisms through which this construction of reality is achieved. An equally if not more important task, however, is to examine the impact these reified constructions have on social and political action. As already discussed, the identity of the nation is internalised by the members of the perceived national group as part of the twin processes of categorisation and identification. As a result, this 'internalized structuring impetus ... more or less strongly influences social practices' and, in this sense, discursively constructed national identity 'can be understood both as structured result ("opus operatum") and as forming force ("modus operandi")' (de Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak, 1999, p. 156).

Discourse, identity and power

The 'forming force' of identity discourses with regard to social and political action derives from the establishment of rules and the fixing of meanings which condition and constrain political action by legitimising certain agents and policies and delegitimising certain others. What is important to stress here is that the articulation of meaning is always contingent. While discourse theorists agree with essentialists that external reality exists beyond language, they disagree that 'real objects have a *meaning* independently of the discourses in which they are constituted as objects' (Howarth, 2000, p. 112, original emphasis). The following example from Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe will make this clear:

An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of 'natural phenomena' or 'expressions of the wrath of God', depends upon the structuring of a discursive field. (2001, p. 108)

The contingency of the articulation of meaning was first identified by the Swiss structural linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, the father of modern linguistics. Prior to Saussure, linguistics had focused on the diachronic aspects of language, i.e. how language had developed over time. In his *Course in General Linguistics*, however, Saussure privileges

the synchronic features of language, whereby language is conceived as a system of related signs (1966). In this connection, each sign is made up of a signifier (a sound-image) and a signified (a concept). The word 'son' thus comprises a signifier which sounds like /sʌn/ and in written form is made up of the letters s-o-n. What was groundbreaking about Saussure's approach was his assertion that there was no *a priori* relationship between the signifier and the signified. The choice of the sound-image to designate the concept is arbitrary. The meaning of a concept is thus not determined by the word used to name it. This is not to mean, however, that the function of language is simply to assign names to concepts. According to Saussure, the meaning of concepts is fixed within the language structure 'in terms of relational and differential values' (Torfing, 1999, p. 87). The concept 'son' thus derives its meaning not from its sound-image but from its relation to the concepts 'mother', 'father' and 'daughter'. While Saussure's approach to language was subsequently criticised for its rigid structuralism,¹ his insights about the construction of meaning had a significant impact on the work of Michel Foucault, who was the first to apply an analysis of discourse to the study of society.²

Simply put, Foucault shows how discourses regulate what can be said, what can be thought and what is considered true or false, rational or irrational, legitimate or illegitimate, whereby the force of discourses 'may depend not on any particular instantiation but on their anonymous, unnoticed permeation of our ways of thinking and talking and making sense of the social world' (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000, p. 16). The particular/anonymous or subjective/non-subjective conceptualisations of discourse are evident in different stages of Foucault's writing. His earlier work refers to discourse as 'autonomous systems of rules that constitute objects, concepts, subjects and strategies, thereby governing the production of scientific statements' (Howarth, 2000, pp. 48–9). In *The Order of Things*, he demonstrates how individuals in society are constrained to act in certain ways by discursive practices that are invisible to them. He is thus interested in discourse not 'from the point of view of the individuals who are speaking, not from the point of view of the formal structures of what they are saying, but from the point of view of the rules that come into play in the very existence of such discourse' (Foucault, 2002, p. xiv). During a university lecture, both the students and the professor know how they should behave: the professor is the only one permitted to talk; students must silently take notes; the professor assigns readings, which the students must read. There is no prior discussion of their roles, no written contract between

student and professor. The professor did not formulate these rules, nor did any higher authority at the university. The 'discourse of the lecture' exists independently of both the students and the professor but constrains the behaviour of both.

In his later works – in particular, *Discipline and Punish* and *The History of Sexuality* – Foucault's understanding of discourse shifts to a more subjective and instrumental usage, whereby discourse relates to 'tactical elements or blocks operating in the field of force relations', albeit constrained by historical conditions of possibility (1998, pp. 101–2). In this sense, power and knowledge are fused in discourse, whereby the latter can be seen as 'an instrument as well as an effect of power' (ibid., 101). The instrumental use of discourse lies at the heart of the chapters by Ringmar, Mole, Ifversen and Ciuă. In *Power/Knowledge* (1980) Foucault examines the process through which knowledge is established and the role of power therein, demonstrating that 'for something to be considered a fact, it must be subjected to a thorough process of ratification by those in positions of authority' (Mills, 2003, p. 72). While Foucault himself was not interested in determining whether specific facts were true or false, preferring to analyse the processes through which these facts were established, his ideas have been used by others to demonstrate how the construction of knowledge in a particular way has serious implications for social and political action. Edward Said, for example, has shown that the representation of Indians as backward, primitive and lazy compared with the industrial West legitimised European colonisation and control of the East (1978).

Foucault's research was part of a broader academic initiative after May 1968 'to liberate subjugated knowledges from the repressive grip of the dominant ideology and challenged the traditional understanding of politics in terms of the activities of elected politicians and their administrative advisors' (Howarth and Torfing, 2005, p. 5). From the 1970s onwards, academics studying discourse sought to combine insights from linguistics with ideas and concepts from the social sciences. The first generation of discourse scholars sought to understand how language was used and organised and analysed the strategies of speakers, but their socio-linguistic and social psychological background meant that their analysis focused on semantics and paid little attention to the role of power and ideology.

Two approaches that do analyse the interplay between discourse and power and thereby theorise the link between identity and politics – albeit from different perspectives – are Critical Discourse Analysis and Discourse Theory.³ Critical Discourse Analysis, as a branch of socio-linguistics,

focuses more on the content and structure of texts, while Discourse Theory is a branch of post-structuralist political theory which analyses the hegemonic discourses in any given society that condition social and political identities and meanings. Both approaches do, however, incorporate insights from the social sciences and linguistics, respectively. Critical Discourse Analysis is defined by Ruth Wodak as being 'fundamentally concerned with analysing opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language' (2001a, p. 2). As we can see from Fairclough's description of the three stages of the Critical Discourse Analysis process (the description of the text; the interpretation of the relationship between the text and the interaction between the producer and receiver of the text; and the explanation of the relationship between this interaction and the social context), it is the text that lies at the heart of Critical Discourse Analysis (1989, p. 109). As such, its conceptualisation of discourse can be understood as the linguistic mediation of social roles and power relations determined by social structures. Here the influence of Anderson and Billig is clear.

Drawing more on the work of Foucault and Derrida, Discourse Theory is a tool for analysing the hegemonic discourses in any given society that condition social and political identities and meanings, which themselves establish the conditions of possibility for political action. It thus seeks to analyse and unpick the 'givens' in the social and political sciences with the aim of transcending 'the objectivistic, reductionist and rationalistic bias of modern social science theory' (Howarth and Torfing, 2005, pp. 3–4). Throughout history, many attempts have been made to explain 'the course of history, the structure of society, and the identities of subjects and objects' with reference to underlying essences or 'transcendental determining centres' (ibid., p. 13). For Enlightenment scholars it was Reason; for Marxists it was the economy, etc. Discourse Theory thus argues it is not enough to analyse actions and perceptions *in vacuo* but rather we must also analyse the historical conditions that allow specific actions and perceptions to be considered legitimate. Apart from their different foci on language and politics, respectively, the main distinction between Critical Discourse Analysis and Discourse Theory would appear to be that the latter rejects 'the naturalist ontology implicit in the idea that discourse is somehow determined by extra-discursive powers at the level of the economy or the state' (ibid., p. 9). In terms of the actual analysis of discourse, there is little separating the two.

The aim of this introductory chapter has been to set out some of the key debates informing the discursive construction of ethnic, national and regional identities and to map out the epistemological, methodological but also political aspects of the analysis of the way specific identity discourses – either used instrumentally by actors or existing independently of actors – define what is true and false, rational and irrational, legitimate and illegitimate and thereby condition and constrain social and political action.

Structure of the book

The aim of the book is to explore the theoretical reach and empirical pertinence of discourse and identity as a way of analysing politics and society in a number of European states, with applications ranging from the linguistic study of texts to the analysis of the impact of historical narratives and metaphors on the actions of states. As such, the book comprises two sections, which build upon one another. The first – ‘Discourse and Identity’ – presents the theoretical issues underlying the study of discourse and identity and examines the discursive mechanisms through which ethnic, national and regional identities are created and/or challenged. The second section – ‘Discourse, Identity and Politics’ – presents a range of case studies examining the impact of hegemonic identity discourses on social and political action, with specific reference to social order, xenophobia, domestic and international politics and security.

Most analyses of the relationship between discourse and identity have been conducted by linguists and communications scholars. An explicit aim of this volume, however, is to show how other disciplines (literature, media, sociology, conceptual history, politics and International Relations in addition to critical discourse analysis and communications) examine the social construction of identity and meaning through discourse and their application to the study of European politics and society. For this reason the various contributors have been selected specifically because they draw their insights from different branches of learning, use different methodologies and apply differing definitions of discourse. Nevertheless, they are united by the fact that they share an anti-essentialist ontological and an anti-foundationalist epistemological position.

In the *Discourse and Identity* section, the four contributors show how different forms of discourse (spoken language, literature, the Internet and the media) create, challenge and recast identities at various levels

of analysis: the ethnic, national and regional. **Don Ellis** analyses the discursive construction of ethnic identities, looking, in particular, at the role of communicative practices in their construction. In the following chapter, **C. Claire Thomson** examines the role of fictional narratives in the consolidation of the modern national community, examining the way in which Danish literature invites readers to reflect on the 'storyness' of national history and what this means for the nation's collective identity. Shifting the level of analysis from the ethnic and national to the regional, **Ruth Wodak** adopts a Critical Discourse Analysis approach to the process of European identity construction, examining diverse sources and forms of expression in various public and semi-public genres which interlink to form a 'nexus' of discourses on Europe. In the final contribution to the first section, **Mirca Madianou** investigates the extent to which television news influences everyday discourses about the nation and national identity. In two cases studies, she contrasts the media reporting of two events in recent Greek politics with their interpretation by viewers to determine the extent to which nationalism in the news affects viewers' discourses.

In the 'Discourse, Identity and Politics' section, the five contributions seek to challenge the dominant theories of political action – based on rational choice and the role of material forces – by demonstrating how specific discourses and discursively constructed identities are just as effective in conditioning the course of politics as economic and military might. In the first contribution **Erik Ringmar** examines the way in which political actors in Europe and Asia use metaphors as a means of creating social order and thus constraining 'illegitimate' action by the ruled against the ruler. In the following contribution, **Gerard Delanty** and **Peter Millward** examine what happens when such constraining discourses are dislocated, analysing the negative impact of the demise of the discourse of liberalism in contemporary European nation-states and the resultant increase in nationalism, xenophobia and racism. The final three chapters analyse the relationship between discourse, identity and security. **Richard Mole** examines the way in which political actors in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania employed an identity discourse predicated on the basis of European culture and values and the otherness of Russian civilisation to enhance their external security, a discourse which subsequently escaped their control and had the unintended effect of undermining social cohesion and constraining their actions with regard to policies aimed at consolidating their identity and societal security. The chapter by **Jan Ifversen** examines the impact that the assignment of new meanings to concepts

can have on social and political reality in general and to the political debates about 'Old and New Europe', more specifically. In the final chapter of the book **Felix Ciută** draws on narrative theory to examine the coexistence of two contradictory logics which have structured post-Cold War European security. He shows that a narrative reading of European security reveals the continuously reformulated relationship between security policy and national and European identity. This relationship, he argues, is essential for understanding the narrative production of the new visions of contemporary 'Europe' as well as the new visions of what 'Europe' has always been, which form the normative basis of European security.

Notes

1. For an in-depth critique of Saussurean linguistics, see Torfing, 1999, and Howarth, 2000.
2. This section can but scratch the surface of the work of Michel Foucault. In addition to the original works by Foucault (1980, 1998, 2002), see also Mills (2003) and Danaher, Schirato and Webb (2000).
3. For a more detailed discussion of Critical Discourse Analysis, see Wodak and Meyer (2001), Wodak and Weiss (2005) and Fairclough (1989). For a more detailed discussion of Discourse Theory, see Torfing (1999), Howarth (2000), Howarth and Torfing (2005) and Laclau and Mouffe (2001).

Index

- Actor, metaphor of the, 120–1
Adorno, Theodor, 146
Anderson, Benedict, 12–13, 18,
46–52, 60, 68
Anti-Semitism, 144
Argumentation strategies, 75
Asylum-seekers, 75, 141
Atlantic divide, 176
Audience studies, 96, 98, 102, 104,
115
Autocracy
metaphorical language of, 125
- Baltic States, 149–69
Banal nationalism, 14, 48, 71, 95–6,
101–2
Bauman, Zygmunt, 145
Benjamin, Walter, 13, 49–50, 52
Bhabha, Homi, 51, 54, 67, 69 n7
Billig, Michael, 14, 18, 95, 100–2
Body
metaphor of the, 121–2
Boundaries, 3, 4, 10, 34, 50, 65, 70,
71, 97, 150, 154, 159, 162, 166,
171–2
Brubaker, Rogers, 2–3, 11–12
Bruner, Jerome, 195, 206
Business corporation
elaboration of the metaphor of the,
131
metaphor of the, 122
- Campbell, David, 154, 158, 194, 198
Carr, David, 195–7, 206 n1
Castells, Manuel, 144
Castoriadis, Cornelius, 139
Categories of analysis, 11
Categories of practice, 11
Categorisation, 3–4, 6, 9, 10, 33, 34,
79, 81, 199
China
metaphorical uses in, 126, 128
Christianity, 121, 140, 182
Citizenship, 75, 79, 81, 82, 84, 139,
148, 155, 156, 159, 163, 165–6, 180
Civil society, 73, 138, 148
Civilisation, 38, 90, 149, 150, 152,
159, 161, 172, 174–8, 179–81
discourse of, 183–6
Civilising, 177, 179, 181
Closeness deficit, 73
Co-construction of identity, 74, 78,
79
Communication, 13, 25–44, 73, 79,
82, 83, 86, 96, 146
Community of values, 76, 182, 202
Congregation
metaphor of the, 123
Consent
metaphorical uses and, 120–8
Constitutionalism
metaphorical language of, 125
Constructivism, 4–6, 8, 10, 12, 152–4,
194, 203, 209–10
metaphors of, 132–3
self-organisation and, 133–4
Context-dependent, 74
see also Recontextualisation
Cooper, Robert, 175–7, 181
Copenhagen School, 153
Cosmopolitanism, 137, 143, 147, 148,
179, 180, 185–6
Crisis, 174, 179, 183
Critical Discourse Analysis, 17–18
Cultural intimacy, 112–13
Cybernetic device
metaphorical replacement and,
133–5
self-organisation and, 133–4
Cyberspace, 71, 91
Cyprus, 98–108
- Decline, 171, 173, 174, 179–81
Decoding
demotic, 102
dominant, 102

- Deixis, 14, 61, 99–102
Denmark, 45–69
Dinesen, Isak, 45, 68 n2
Discourse Theory, 17–18
Dissent, 113
 elaborations of metaphor and,
 128–31
 metaphor and, 120
 metaphorical replacement and, 132
Dugri, 40
- Education, 5, 14, 34, 35, 38, 48, 80,
158
English School, 151
Epistemic communities, 76
Equality, 47, 76, 89, 90, 122, 137, 185
Essed, Philomena, 144
Essentialism, 4, 15, 96, 107, 109, 112,
113, 159, 209
Estonia, 149–69
Ethnic codes, 26–9
Ethnic discourse, 25, 36, 41
Ethnic sub-codes, 26–9
Ethnies, 7
Ethno-symbolism, 6–7
European identity, 1, 21, 78, 79, 85, 90,
160–4, 179, 182, 186, 190–3, 195,
197, 210, 202, 204, 205, 211–12
European Union, 1, 57, 69 n1, 70, 74,
83, 89, 132, 160, 161, 163, 171,
174, 176
Enlargement, 1, 75, 83, 139, 143, 153,
181, 191, 196
Exclusion, 79, 81–2, 90–1, 93, 139,
146, 158, 159, 185
Experience, 3, 26–7, 36, 38, 53, 80
Extreme right, 141, 144, 145, 146–7
- Face-keeping device, 86, 88
Fact
 establishment of, 17, 47, 51, 55, 64,
 203
Family
 elaboration of the metaphor of,
 130–1
 metaphor of the, 123–4
Football, 142
Fortress Europe, 71
 discourse of, 180–5
- Foucault, Michel, 16–17, 171
France, 71, 135, 140, 141, 146, 170
Freud, Sigmund, 144
- Garden
 elaboration of the metaphor of,
 129–30
 metaphorical uses of, 124
Gellner, Ernest, 5, 8, 9, 47, 48
Genres, 27, 45, 49, 63, 71, 82
Geopolitics, 174, 191, 193
Geopolitical logic, 202, 203, 206
Globalisation, 75, 92, 139, 144, 145,
152, 180, 184, 211
Greece, 95–116
Group identity, 28, 68, 79
- Habermas, Jürgen, 88, 93 n3, 178–81,
185
Harmony
 as political metaphor, 126
Herzfeld, Michael, 113
Heterodynamic sub-codes, 28–9
Historiography, 45–69
Hobbes, John, 138
Hobsbawm, Eric, 7, 8
Homodynamic sub-codes, 28–9
Hybrid public space, 82
- Identification, 2, 4, 8–9, 10, 12,
13–14
Identity development, 30
Ideology, 5, 17, 26, 34, 35, 36–9, 75,
180
Imagined Communities, 12, 46–52,
60, 68
Immigration, 43, 71, 79–80, 82,
140–6
Inclusion, 79, 81–2, 90–1, 93, 158,
163
Industrialisation, 5
Intercultural communication, 29, 32,
41
Islam, 27, 37, 141, 180
Islamophobia, 146
- Japan
 metaphorical uses in, 126
Jenkins, Richard, 10

- Jews, 26, 30, 32, 40, 140, 144
 Jørgensen, A.D., 45, 46, 52–3, 56,
 63–8, 68 n1
- Kagan, Robert, 173–7, 179, 183, 188
 n11
- Knowledge, 4, 17, 25, 26–8, 32, 50–1,
 192, 194, 196, 200–1
- Latvia, 149–69
- Lefort, Claude, 139
- Legitimation, 2, 15, 17, 43, 65, 72,
 75–6, 79, 85, 94 n11, 157, 171,
 173, 183, 209–10
- Liberalism, 137–49, 178
- Lie, John, 139
- Lithuania, 149–69
- Locke, John, 138
- Machine
 metaphorical uses of, 125
- Macro structures, 33–4, 38
- Marx, Karl, 5, 18
- Meaning, 2, 3, 9, 14–16, 18, 27, 29,
 32, 41, 71, 75, 96, 108, 119,
 135–6, 157, 172, 192–201, 203,
 209, 210–11
 metaphor and, 119–20
 metaphorical elaboration and,
 128–9
 metaphorical replacement and, 132
- Metaphor
 consent and, 120–8
 meaning and, 119–20
 political elaboration of, 128–31
 political uses of, 119–36
 revolution and, 132–6
- Micro structures, 33–4, 38
- Migrants, 43, 71, 79–80, 82, 140–6
- Modernity, 5, 139, 146, 175–6
- Multiculturalism, 6, 75, 137, 140–1,
 143–4, 148, 183
- Musayara, 32, 40
- Musical performance
 metaphor of, 126
- Narrative, 37, 46–7, 49, 51, 58, 65,
 159, 172, 190–207
- Narrative shuttle, 193, 200–2, 204
- Nationalism, 138, 143, 182, 186, 188
 n16
 banal, 14, 48, 71, 95–6, 101–2
 metaphors of, 124
 theories of, 1–24, 47–8
- Nation-state, 1, 12, 55–7, 89, 93 n1,
 137–9, 141, 143, 145, 186
- Netherlands, 71, 80, 138, 140,
 145
- New Europe, 170–89
- Nexus of discourses, 71, 74, 82
- Normative power, 91, 186, 189 n24,
 190, 191
- Norway, 140
- Novel, 13, 45, 47–52, 67–8
- Old Europe, 170–89
- Orthodox civilisation, 116 n12, 123,
 149, 159–60, 164, 166
- Pillarisation, 140
- Poland, 144
- Post-modern, 3, 6, 13, 46, 154, 175–7,
 181–3
- Power, 13, 15–18, 33, 43, 73, 92,
 139, 150–1, 158, 173–8, 184,
 185–6, 188 n11, n20, 198, 199,
 202, 208, 210, 211, 212
 metaphor and, 119–20
 metaphorical elaboration and,
 128–9
 revolutions and, 135–6
- Primordialism, 4, 6
- Productive logic, 206
- Psychology of identification, 2, 8–9
- Realism, 150–1
- Realpolitik, 184, 191–3, 201
- Recontextualisation, 73
- Refugees, 109, 111–12, 141
- Reification, 6, 8, 10–15, 97, 154, 209,
 211
- Renan, Ernest, 60
- Representation, 71, 72, 74, 76, 93 n3,
 158
- Reproduction circuits, 41–2
- Republicanism, 138, 141
- Return to Europe, 163, 191, 196, 197,
 201, 204

- Revolution
 - metaphorical replacement as, 132–6
- Ricoeur, Paul, 197, 200–2
- Rumsfeld, Donald, 162, 170–1
- Russia, 123, 149–69
- Rydgren, Jens, 72, 147

- Salecl, Renata, 144
- Saussure, Ferdinand de, 16, 21 n1
- Secularism, 121, 137, 138, 141, 178
- Securitisation, 152–4, 157, 181, 182
- Security, 145, 146, 149–69, 181–2, 190–207
- Security dilemma, 150
- Self-esteem, 8–9
- Self-organisation
 - see* Cybernetic device
- Ship
 - elaboration of the metaphor of, 129
 - metaphor of the, 126–7
- Smith, Adam, 133, 138
- Smith, Anthony, 6, 209
- Social Identity Theory, 3
- Social movements, 145
- Societal security, 150, 153, 156, 157, 164–6
- Soviet nationality policy, 11
- Soviet Union, 134, 135, 149, 153, 156, 162, 165
- Strategic logic, 202, 203, 204, 206

- Strategic rationality, 191, 201, 203
- Structuration, 29, 35, 41
- Suny, Ronald, 11

- Tajfel, Henri, 9
- Team
 - metaphorical use of the idea of the, 127
- Television news, 95, 97, 98, 109, 115 n3
- Theatre
 - metaphor of the world as a, 121
- Theory of Relevance, 85
- Third Way, 145
- Tolerance, 30, 137–8, 140–1, 145
- Topoi, 71, 78, 88, 94 n10
- Turkey, 97, 99, 101, 103–5, 107, 113

- USSR, 11, 154, 155, 162
 - see also* Soviet Union
- Utilitarianism, 35, 38

- Viewers
 - analytical, 104–5
 - critical, 96, 103

- Wæver, Ole, 152–3
- White, Hayden, 51, 194–202, 206

- Zoological collections
 - metaphor of, 127–8