

Contents

<i>List of Tables and Figures</i>	ix
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	x
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	xi
1 Introduction	1
Making Globalization: Complexity, Human Agency and History	7
Plan of the Book	12
2 Towards a Theory of Global Networks	17
Manuel Castells and the Theory of Network Society	17
Evaluating Castells	21
Network Analysis, Networks as a Major Organizational Form and the Transition to Global Network Research	29
Markets, Hierarchies and Networks	32
Networks as a Distinct Organizational Form	35
Linking Network Theories with Globalization	39
Global Networks from Below	41
Are 'Global Networks' Really Global?	42
Conclusion	47
3 Methodologies of Global Network Analysis	49
Global Network Research and Social Network Analysis	49
Network Morphology	52
Using Network Morphologies	65
How Do We Know When a Global Network Exists?	
Some Quantitative and Qualitative Research Strategies	67
Research in Multiple Settings	70
Historical Sources on Global Networks	72
Conclusion	76
4 Global Network Types	77
Identifying Global Network Types	77
A Compendium of Network Types	80
Conclusion	104

5	On the Importance of Particular Persons	106
	In Search of Particular Persons	106
	Networks and Particular Persons: Some Sociological Themes	109
	The Uneasy Location of Particular Persons within Sociology	112
	Reputation and Networks: Some Introductory Issues	115
	Reputation through Global Networks of Particular Persons	118
	Friendship, Kinship and Sociability	124
	Conclusion	131
6	Global Networks and Cross-Cultural Engagement	133
	Some Introductory Issues	134
	Analysing Culture	137
	Problems with Essentialist Views of Culture	138
	Problems with Said's Critique of Orientalism	141
	Intercultural Engagement and the Place of Global Networks	143
	Intercultural Engagement and Empire	145
	Global Networks around Rabindranath Tagore	147
	The Emergence of a Global Public Sphere	152
	Beyond Elites and Leadership through Networks	161
	Conclusion	165
7	Politics and Global Networks	167
	Politics in Relation to Markets, Hierarchies and Networks	169
	Global Networks and Democracy	174
	Global Civil Society?	178
	Global Networks and Elites	183
	Global Networks, Democracy, and the Challenge of War and Conflict	187
	Conclusion	191
8	Prospects and Challenges	192
	Networks and Contemporary Society	192
	Network Challenges to State-Centric Organization	194
	Beyond a Top-down Approach to Networks	196
	What is Global about Global Networks?	197
	Methodological Glocalism	199
	<i>Bibliography</i>	201
	<i>Index</i>	221

1

Introduction

Migrants sending information back home on work opportunities in their new country of residence; scientists from around the world meeting to debate new research findings drawn from a number of university laboratories in different countries; political activists from a range of global cities planning a campaign against the poor environmental practices of a multinational company; software engineers in a number of research and development centres across the world collaborating online to develop new programmes; American counter-insurgency strategists discussing how to combat the networked Al-Qaeda organization. What, if anything, do all these hypothetical examples have in common? The answer many scholars would now give is that they are all global networks of different kinds linking sets of individuals across borders in multi-centred forms of social interconnection.

Global networks are a major feature of contemporary processes of globalization. They are evident within the daily lives of individuals and organizations, men and women, operating across national borders in spheres such as business, migration, governance, terrorism, science and the professions, the arts, and political activism. Global network phenomena include network enterprises, electronic network technology, network states, networks of political activists, and terror networks. These are involved in networked exchanges and networked conflicts, leading in more extreme cases to what some have diagnosed as 'netwars' (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1996, 2000).

For Manuel Castells, one of the leading theorists in the field, 'Networks are the fundamental stuff of which new organizations are and will be made' (Castells, 1996: 168). This is a powerful claim, which he links with the idea that we live increasingly in a network society, dominated by network businesses and a network state, both of which rely on networked technology and communications media. Castells' arguments identify global networks as key elements within social change, in the operation of power, and in the relationship between social structures and human agency. Global networks are central, in

other words, to any understanding of core issues in sociology, social science and history.

The aim of this book is to explore and assess the place of global networks in social life in more depth, drawing on Castells' work and that of a wide range of other social scientists and historians. To begin with, the study of global networks extends our understanding of what is driving social change, what kinds of social institutions are currently emerging, and how new patterns of global network organization really are. Second, global network analysis offers insights into the operation of power in global settings, focusing both on the importance of decentralized networks as distinct from centralized hierarchies, and on the different forms of economic, political and cultural power that networks articulate and organize, from waging war to worshipping God, conducting business to promoting scientific knowledge. Third, the study of global networks also illuminates the ways in which social structure and human agency operate in a global context. Human activities that take place across borders are neither driven by forces entirely out of our control, nor simply by processes of choice, consensus and democratic decision-making. Global network analysis helps us to understand why this is so, shedding light not only on issues such as unequal access to levers of power and influence, but also on the range of attempts to co-operate and share cultural practices and political commitments across boundaries and between localities, and the many challenges involved in this.

Against the background of this rich and complex set of questions, this book sets out a comprehensive approach to understanding global networks, including an assessment of the theoretical strengths and weaknesses of this new area of study, and a survey of methodologies of global network analysis. It then moves on to identify examples of the different uses to which global networks have been put, and their functions and influence. Beyond this, consideration is given to global networks across time and space, covering a range of historical epochs and a number of geographical settings across Europe, the Americas, Asia and Africa. The book also places particular emphasis on the people involved in global networks, their hopes and fears, intentions and capacities, successes and failures, drawing for these on the author's historical and cross-cultural research.

So what is covered by the term 'global networks'? One immediate indication may be found by examining the main categories revealed by 2.1 million hits registered on the Google search engine when accessed on 24 May 2006. Citations here range from businesses offering global network services to academics writing papers on global networks. At least two major types of global network are to be found here: the *technical*, as evidenced in telecommunications systems using mixtures of

satellite, cable and wireless technologies, and the *interpersonal*, involving cross-border groups such as migrants, aid workers engaging with global poverty or hunger, and professionals exchanging knowledge.

Another indicator of the emergence of global networks as a subject for scholarly analysis is the appearance of a major journal *Global Networks*, first published in 2002. Up to the very early part of the twenty-first century, comparatively little attention had been paid specifically to global networks by specialists in social network analysis. In the major survey of the field by Wasserman and Faust (1994), there is no explicit discussion of global networks, though a few examples of studies of international networks are mentioned. Nor does the four-volume compendium of research edited by John Scott, and published eight years later (Scott, 2002) expressly concern itself with networks operating on a global scale.

The new journal *Global Networks* is, then, something of a pioneer venture, drawing on some of the latest work that has emerged from the mid-1990s onwards, often of an inter-disciplinary variety and often conducted by researchers unconnected with self-styled social network analysis. The journal has featured articles on topics ranging from global elite policy groups, world city networks and transnational knowledge networks to transnational families and merchant diaspora. The social and cyber spaces these networks inhabit, construct or imagine, link together local, national, regional and global scales of activity across all continents. For the journal's editors, global networks are primarily interpersonal in character – 'the human face of globalization'.

But what exactly is meant by global networks, and why are they worthy of so much attention? Have they become prominent simply through advances in electronic communication associated with the internet, and are most global networks linking electronic machines as much as people across political and cultural boundaries? If so, this would suggest that global networks are recent in origin, and closely connected with Western initiatives in communications technology and global business. Or is this interpretation too narrow? Have networks that stretch across and between nations, regions, empires and distinct cultural zones a far longer history that implicates Asia, Africa, South America and Australasia, as much as Europe and North America? To the extent that they have, does this mean that networks are a crucial feature of social interaction, with particular functions and meanings invested in them, but varying according to the social and historical setting within which they emerge? Put another way, when and why do global networks arise; and what distinguishes networks as such from other forms of social interaction and organization?

The list of questions associated with global networks can be

extended further in a more sceptical direction. Two major challenges stand out: namely, 'What exactly is a network?', and 'What specifically is global about global networks?' The first of these questions was raised by Grahame Thompson (2004), who asked whether the proliferating discourses around global networks are simply instances of the use of a convenient metaphor for social connection rather than anything more solid. On this basis, almost anything can be seen as a network, since connections can always be found somewhere. In so far as this is the case, the term risks becoming at worst a meaningless piece of rhetoric, and at best a hyped-up and overused metaphor for any kind of social connection.

In this study we define networks as forms of multi-centred social organization that are distinct from two other major organizational types, namely markets and hierarchies. Networks involve more enduring forms of social commitment and trust than markets but are more flexible and less centralized than hierarchies. People none the less become involved with networks, for a number of reasons. Markets, for example, may not work effectively simply as impersonal mechanisms of exchange operating through price signals that reflect shifting patterns of supply and demand. Such arrangements may provide insufficient information to permit exchange, and may lack elements of trust that permit ongoing relationships between buyers and sellers over time. This is why markets often depend on business and trading networks for their success, because these help to reduce uncertainty and increase trust. Beyond this, markets may not be an adequate means of dealing with many political and cultural objectives. These include the achievement of citizenship rights, the formation and maintenance of communities, or the expression of cultural identity. Among the poorest who lack the resources to enter markets, interpersonal networks may in the absence of anything else become a means of survival.

Many social groups turn to different kinds of state or public institutions to meet such political and cultural objectives, and many of these develop centralized patterns of hierarchical organization. Citizens or members of trade unions, business organizations or political parties depend on the representation of their interests through hierarchies. This may or may not satisfy pressures from below. But even for more powerful interests, hierarchy may become too inflexible. Networks may then form in several kinds of ways. First, elites may wish to build stronger connections across the higher levels of organization and across peak organizations to better facilitate co-ordination of policy and administration through interpersonal ties. Second, organizations may shift from a more centralized model to placing a greater emphasis on networks to achieve greater flexibility and agility in meeting

challenges. Third, those dissatisfied with the hierarchical model may form alternative networks to mobilize support, resist top-down initiatives, or rely on civil society rather than the state for the satisfaction of their objectives. In later chapters of the book, examples of these general patterns are discussed.

Networks may form, as we have seen, in a variety of contexts and for a number of reasons, none of which necessarily involves cross-border activity or global reach. The extension in focus from the local and national to the global, suggests that networks are important for achieving objectives on a supranational scale that markets and hierarchies may not by themselves be able to provide.

Global markets, for example, are likely to pose even greater problems of information access and may place an even greater premium on trust between participants from different nations, cultures and religions, than do more local markets, where participants know each other. Global business and trading networks may assume increasing importance in such global contexts. Similarly, effective global environmental regulation requires effective information access and trust across political and cultural borders, requirements that neither markets nor hierarchies are willing or best able to achieve. Much pressure for regulation of this kind has come either from grass-roots networks of environmental activists, or networks of scientists debating trends or issuing warnings in relation to matters such as the hole in the ozone layer, the consequences of deforestation, or global warming.

Global hierarchies, such as those associated with multinational companies or international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) or the World Bank may seem well-placed to execute global change, but this possibility remains problematic. This is in part because they are unelected and appear very remote and inaccessible to popular concerns about what they do. But it is equally problematic in so far as the problems they tackle, such as global economic growth in the case of markets, or world peace and security or global social justice in the case of UN bodies, remain unresolved. Two consequences flow from this. One is the development of alternative global peace, human rights, and social justice networks and movements, such as Amnesty International or the World Social Forum. The other is recourse to a more networked style of operation by international organizations, such as the World Bank (Stone, 2000a).

Turning now to a second, and even more critical question, it is important to clarify 'What exactly is global about global networks'. This issue is an important one, because the exact meaning of terms such as 'global' and 'globalization' often remains ill-defined. One example is the failure to distinguish between *international* processes

that implicate nationally-centred institutions and cultural identities, and *transnational* processes that in some way stand above and beyond the nation. This problem reminds us that global network research is bound up intimately with the analysis of globalization, and in particular on the multiple scales on which contemporary life is now conducted, ranging from the 'global' through the 'national' to the 'local'.

It was once thought that to describe something as global meant that all national or local institutions and activities were becoming redundant or had already been superseded by transnational processes and organizations. Globalization, whether in the form of free trade, market deregulation or cosmopolitanism, would, so it was supposed, destroy all national or local institutions, languages and identities. Such theories of hyper-globalization are now seen as exaggerated, misleading, and altogether over-hyped (for elaboration of this argument, see Holton, 2005a). The nation-state and national identity have been affected profoundly by global processes but have not been entirely overrun, even in an epoch where much power and influence operates transnationally. This should not mean a denial of the importance of globalization. Rather, it means finding ways of taking into account the co-existence and interpenetration of the global, national and local.

What makes a network, or any other social phenomenon, 'global' is not the complete absence of any sub-global connection within it; its 'global' characteristics stem rather from the social and spatial qualities with which it is associated. Global in this sense refers to action that (a) takes place across political and cultural boundaries; (b) that creates intensive as well as spatially extensive interconnections between a range of institutions and actors; and (c) that creates transnational processes, institutions and ways of interpreting the world as a single space. None of this necessarily precludes the reproduction, persistence or re-invention of national or local spaces, processes and identities, or of networks that operate within such arenas.

Networks can operate just as easily within a local school and church, national parliament or sporting arena, and in so far as they do they would not qualify for inclusion as global networks. However, it is increasingly possible that local schools and churches will become implicated in global matters, whether through new intakes of global migrants, through involvement in world development projects, such as fair trade, or through internet activity. Meanwhile, national parliamentarians or those involved in professional sports must also come to terms increasingly with global issues, whether these are global policy matters such as trade and human rights, negotiation with globalized

media, or transfers of players. What this book helps to illuminate is the role of global networks within contexts such as these, why such networks form; what they achieve; and what implications they have for contemporary business, culture and politics.

Making Globalization: Complexity, Human Agency and History

The approach taken in this book draws extensively on a distinctive approach to globalization advanced in *Making Globalization* (Holton, 2005a). This provides an inter-disciplinary synthesis of existing social science and historical research on globalization. The approach centres on three interrelated arguments.

The first, related to *complexity*, defines globalization as a multiple set of processes rather than as a single unitary process. In contrast with approaches centring on global economic processes that are taken to be the prime movers of political, technological and cultural change, this approach sees globalization as a multiple set of processes. Globalization, in this perspective, is not a synonym for global economic power, the multinational company or free trade. These features of globalization are very important, but globalization itself is far more than that. Other types of globalization may be found in religion, where Christianity or Islam have developed a worldwide cross-border presence – in culture, where music and the visual arts have involved the borrowing and cross-fertilization of styles into transnational genres such as world music; and within politics, where non-governmental movements such as Médecins Sans Frontières and Greenpeace International have become significant features of worldwide social activism, taking direct action to redress social and economic crises that corporations and nation-states have often either resisted or been slow to address.

These examples of globalization cannot be reduced simply to consequences of economic globalization, for a number of reasons. Some examples, such as expansive religious globalization, pre-date the modern prominence of economic globalization. Others, such as the globalization of political activism, are based on values that are distinct from business values or the logic of capital accumulation. Meanwhile, the observation that religious movements of political activism often challenge or resist economic globalization, or utilize some of its technological infrastructure, does not mean that they are simply responses to it. Global network analysis is one important way of analysing all

these forms of global complexity, as will be demonstrated in later chapters of the book.

Other aspects of globalization, such as the migration of people or use of the internet and new information and communications technology, often have a far more direct connection with economic globalization. Much migration is motivated primarily by the search for work and prosperity, and in the last thirty years, an increasing proportion of such migration involves movement from poorer countries to richer ones (Castles and Miller, 1993), where greater amounts of capital are invested and increased demands for labour are hard to meet from local sources. To this extent, much cross-border migration is a feature of economic globalization. The same characteristic applies to much use of the internet and new telecommunications media, whether by businesses or by consumers. Opportunities for global advertising via the internet drive much of the provision of search engines such as Yahoo and Google, while ecommerce, whether business-to-business or business-to-consumer, is a very striking feature of the global economy.

But even in such cases, complexity remains significant. The phenomenon of population movement, for example, is often rather more than a feature of economic globalization because there are other reasons for movement, notably for refugees and displaced persons fleeing war, disease or human rights abuse. In the case of the internet and telecommunications, there are also very significant patterns of usage that are not business-driven, such as private interpersonal emails, or web-based campaigning and communication by religious and political movements. The internet itself was developed originally for a complex set of reasons of a political, military and scientific nature. These included the search for means by which political and military elites might communicate in case of a nuclear attack, the wish by scientists to keep track of complex bodies of data, and a growing sense among those developing the internet that it might have potential as a means of inter-communication among citizens as much as elites (Rosenzweig, 1998).

In both these examples, we find a complex set of linkages that include economic globalization but that are not necessarily dominated by it. And, as indicated above, global networks of an interpersonal as well as a technical kind, play a major part in both population movement and internet use. Global networks may sometimes be mediated through information technology, but are far from being dominated by it.

A second feature of the making globalization approach is the *emphasis on active human agency* in the making of globalization. In this perspective, globalization is neither a product of structural forces

beyond human involvement to which society must adapt and adjust, nor a manifestation of human progress that is inevitable or irreversible in all its elements. Nor do we live in an uncontrollable 'runaway world' (Giddens, 1999), though it sometimes seems so, especially to those who feel powerless. Rather, organizations and individuals are actively involved in the making of different aspects of globalization, both explicitly in seeking to operate across borders beyond the restrictions of national sovereignty, but also unwittingly in pursuing courses of action that tend to permeate and corrode borders and boundaries, promoting interconnection and interdependence. No one set out to produce the patterns of global inequality that the world currently exhibits. Yet equally there are many who plan and implement different ways of increasing global social welfare or global power, and even more who follow courses of action that influence such patterns, within business, international organizations, science and the professions, the larger and more powerful nation-states, and migration chains.

The relationship between global networks and power is highly relevant to questions of the scope for and limits set to human agency in a globalizing environment. Three interconnected points may be made here. The first and most obvious is that global networks, especially those involving business, political, military or scientific elites (singly or in combination with each other) may be instruments for the exercise of institutional and discursive power, involving in the former case the power of states and corporations, and in the latter, the power of sets of ideas. Networks here offer advantages of flexibility as well as effective small-group communication. Equally, however, networks may operate in a second manner, as ways of coping with or resisting power, or of articulating alternative sets of ideas from those that are dominant. This involves everything from poor migrants forming networks across borders to find work and get enough to eat, to advocacy groups seeking to challenge current policies and to transform or reform political structures. Third, inequalities may exist within networks, whatever their objectives, creating social stratification between leaders and followers, often the result of differential access to education, income and information.

A general argument to be developed more fully in this book is that global network analysis is a crucial way of charting and understanding the importance of active human agency in the making of globalization, in its complex manifestations. It is not the only way. But the network focus does enable richer, more vivid, and more elaborated links to be made between small (micro) worlds and large (macro) ones, than is available through generalized sociological formulations that speak of

structure and agency, and their interpenetration within processes of structuration.

A focus on interpersonal networks raises further questions about how human agency is to be understood. There is a rough division of labour in scholarship whereby sociologists deal primarily with sets of anonymous persons linked through social relationships such as class, gender, ethnicity, age and sexual preference, leaving it for historians, if they wish, to study particular persons in the context of broader social processes. Particular people appear fleetingly in the sociological classics, as in Karl Marx's discussion of Napoleon III, mid-nineteenth-century Emperor of France, or Max Weber's references to German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, though in the broader context of class analysis and the discussion of charismatic authority, respectively. Since then, particular persons seem often to have almost disappeared from sociological analysis.

This state of affairs is largely related to resistance to the 'Great Man' theory of history, where triumph of personality is seen as the animator of social life, to the exclusion of the social relations within which individuals are located. Many historians as well as sociologists would share resistance to this Great Man approach. It is arguable, however, that there are alternative sociological ways in which particular persons might be reinserted into the study of society and social change, ways that involve interpersonal networks. These are simultaneously social in character but composed of sets of particular persons, whose very particularity may be central to the functioning and impact of network activity. This may be because individual charisma is involved, as in Weber's references to Bismarck. But it may also be through the personal standing of particular individuals, by virtue of individual achievement, and reputation, which in turn may have intellectual, military or religious as much as political or economic roots. This projects us away from the Great Personalities of what J. R. Green (1992, xxiii) called 'drum and trumpet history', towards a broader conception of personal reputation rather than charisma in its conventional sociological reputation.

A very striking recent example of this approach is provided by Randall Collins' (1998) study of the historical development of schools of philosophy. Collins argues that the emergence of schools that endure across generations, if not centuries, cannot simply be explained in terms of ideas begetting ideas. Nor can influential philosophical ideas be seen adequately as engendered either by heroic individuals or as effects of structures or cultures. Collins sees as too abstract the argument that ideas beget ideas. This gives no account of how networks of human actors construct and mediate schools of thought.

The idea that great individuals beget ideas, however, neglects the social context in which ideas develop and become institutionalized within groups and through conflicts. This context is too fluid to be understood as the simple product of social structures or cultural traits within them, but not so fluid that it defies social patterning. This leaves the idea of networks as a most suitable way of understanding the micro-macro linkages that connect schools of philosophical knowledge stretching across cities, countries and continents, with broader social structures.

Collins' approach is both sociological and historical, and this brings us to the third characteristic of the approach to globalization outlined in *Making Globalization*. Here it was argued that any understanding of globalization required a strongly historical dimension. This *historical focus* on globalization is important for a number of reasons. In an immediate sense it allows us to evaluate and challenge the argument that globalization is a profoundly new phenomenon, a position less widely held in the mid-2000s than in the early 1990s, during the heyday of theories of hyper-globalization. While there have been many significant and radical changes in cross-border interconnections and transnational processes in recent years in areas such as communications technology, there are also very long-term historical processes at work. These are evident in cross-border trade, migration and religious expansion, in the institution of Empire as an extensive form of trans-regional political dominion, and in technology transfer. These go back centuries, and in some cases millennia. The pace and intensity of globalization may have increased, but we are not dealing with an entirely new phenomenon.

A historical focus is of more particular significance for the study of global networks. This is not simply because we may wish to explore the role of networks at earlier points in human history, but more specifically because of the impact made by the very influential theory of network society proposed by Manuel Castells (1996, 2001a). This theory maintains that while global networks have always been with us, they have become far more significant during the contemporary period. In order to establish how well grounded this judgement is, this book provides a more systematic survey of cross-border networks across history. Such networks can be located at many points in history, from the late Bronze Age, through the medieval period to more recent times (Kristiansen, 1996; Dahl, 1998; Bayly, 2004). An important feature of this survey is the inclusion of global network activity outside the modern West, notably within the Islamic world (Lapidus, 1975).

Global networks of an interpersonal kind are not new. Rather, the incentives to form networks, as well as the technologies to sustain

them, are to be found across time as well as space. This does not mean that the recent advent of global networks of a technical kind, symbolized by the internet and its applications such as email and e-business, is of minor significance. Clearly, both the scope and intensity of global networks have expanded rapidly since the mid-1980s. The main point here, however, is that there is a long history of global networks, opening up the possibility that networked societies, cultures and communities have existed in a range of social settings, and thus have much to contribute to analyses of social change, conflict and co-operation, cultural expression and cross-cultural communication.

Summing up the discussion so far, the intention of this study is to provide a systematic account of the importance of global networks to the understanding of social life. This requires attention to theoretical issues, to techniques and skills necessary to research global networks, and to the extensive body of research on global networks, prominent within sociology, but spread across many other disciplines.

Plan of the Book

Chapter 2 provides an account of leading network theories, starting with a more detailed elaboration and critique of Castells. His work is seen as a major reference point for global network analysis, but one that is stronger on theoretical speculation than empirical plausibility. It is also more persuasive for economic than political or cultural processes. Discussion then moves to alternative theoretical accounts of networks, beginning with anthropological work on small-group interconnection. This was succeeded in the late 1980s by new developments in the sociology of organizations, built around distinctions between markets, hierarchies and networks introduced earlier in this chapter.

Attention shifts in Chapter 3 to links between theory and research, through an examination of methodologies of global network analysis. This explains the different methods used to research global networks, and provides a resource for those who might wish to undertake research in this area. Two broad methodological approaches are identified. The first is a long tradition of social network analysis deriving in part from earlier work by G. Simmel on the influence of relational forms on social processes. This was taken up and developed in a quantitative direction, primarily within post-Second World War American sociology. In this tradition, network analysis is typically not global in scale. It does none the less provide ways of researching patterns of interconnection among individuals and organizations that

cross borders, as well as illuminating the ways in which micro interactions sustains social structures (Wellman, 1988).

Much emphasis is placed here on the morphology of networks; that is, on the form of interconnections within them, and on their scale, intensity and structure. Researchers in this tradition ask how many links exist between individuals across what kinds of space, whether some are more linked than others, and whether patterns of prominence and hierarchy are evident. This work lends itself to the graphical representation of networks, including the hubs and nodes around which they are concentrated, and the spokes or linkages that run between them. While developed to study relatively small-scale settings such as classrooms and local neighbourhoods, such approaches can usefully be applied to global contexts (see, in particular Anheier and Katz, 2004), exploring the ways through which micro connections sustain larger structures. A leading example here is the way in which interconnections between leading business figures drawn from different corporations, and with headquarters in a range of nations, provide a more coordinated business presence on a global scale, qualifying for the status of a global capitalist class (Carroll and Carson, 2003).

A second, more disparate, methodological approach applies qualitative methods to analyse particular instances and types of global networks. Qualitative work of this kind has typically been developed through interviews; through written sources such as diaries, letters and publications for the recorded past; and through surviving archaeological artefacts for pre-history. As with quantitative forms of social network analysis, much of this did not start out as explicitly global in focus, but has come over time to include strong cross-border elements. Qualitative analysis has addressed both issues of morphology in global network structure, and the analysis of network types.

Drawing on these two main sources of analysis, Chapter 3 provides concrete examples of how network morphology and network linkage may be represented diagrammatically. It also provides examples of the types of sources that qualitative research has drawn on, including ways of tracking particular individuals and the networks in which they participate.

In Chapter 4, attention turns to the analysis of global network types. Based on an extensive survey of existing literature, this chapter points out that there is no agreed typology of global network types. What does exist is a proliferation of explicit and implied network types. Global network activities have typically been associated either with *functional types of activity*, such as advocacy, knowledge acquisition and dissemination, migration, policy-making and business; or with *spheres of spatial operation*, such as Empires or regional forms of governance.

The chapter goes on to provide a survey of major global network types, together with the ways in which networks are able to develop multiple functions. The aim here is not to suggest that all global networks can be allocated neatly to a discrete network category. The objective is rather to demonstrate patterns in the vast and rapidly expanding volume of global network studies, and to demonstrate how some networks are so complex in their operation that they cannot simply be characterized in terms of a singular function.

In Chapter 5, the theme of global networks and particular persons is discussed in more depth. The challenge here, as already indicated, is how to reinstate particular persons in social analysis without reinstating the Great Man or Great Woman theory of history organized around the triumph of personality. This challenge is explored through discussions of personal reputation, friendship and sociability. These rely to a significant extent on networks of particular people, which often take a global form. The theoretical argument underlying this discussion draws on micro-sociology and micro-history. These are used to sustain the proposition that particular people matter in ways that have usually been obscured by excessively structural accounts of human agency.

Particular people play key roles in the setting up of networks or as brokers in relationships between networks. And particular individuals are significant wherever issues of personal standing, reputation, achievement or celebrity arise. This may be in the context of learning and knowledge, as in the case of schools of philosophy discussed above, but may also be extended further, to examples such as artistic endeavour or counter-cultural social and political activism. These themes will be discussed through studies of particular individuals and the networks within which they engaged.

A further feature of the discussion is that many global networks grow out of, or depend on, patterns of sociability, including personal relationships of intimate friendship – sometimes but not always linked with kinship. The characteristics of robustness and flexibility noted of networks depend on forms of trust and intimacy of communication. Beyond this, friendship and kinship have become models for wider forms of social network between those who start off as strangers to one another, helping to extend networks across borders and widely spread territories.

In Chapter 6, attention turns to the place of global networks in patterns of intercultural engagement, conflict and co-operation. Such networks may set out to build cultural bridges, but cultural engagement may involve conflict and resistance. In some cases this leads to separatist cultural networks, in particular where patterns of global

inequality or domination undermine the potential for intercultural co-operation.

This chapter goes on to offer a historical sociology of intercultural engagement since the mid-eighteenth century, centred on the epoch of Empire leading towards the post-colonial period. This centres on the emergence of a global public sphere. A number of detailed examples of global network linkages between particular people are outlined, based on original research. These include figures such as Rabindranath Tagore (Bengali writer and political activist), and Jomo Kenyatta (Kenyan independence leader). The argument here is that despite continuing attempts at rapprochement in global networks linking Europeans and non-Europeans, the continuing presence of colonialism ultimately rendered these incapable of full co-operation until its demise.

The chapter also examines critically the argument that intercultural engagement is largely a matter of engagements between elites, rather than wider populations who typically remain more local in focus. While cultural elites often do play a significant role, there are equally processes within which non-elite groups participate in intercultural engagement, much of which is mediated through processes of migration, travel and mass media.

In Chapter 7, the political consequences of global networks will be investigated. Discussion of this theme is interesting for several reasons. One concerns the contemporary robustness of the nation-state as a major pinnacle of political power and authority. A major question of interest here is the extent to which global networks are becoming, or can become, a major arena for political activity, and how far this challenges the nation-state? This question has become significant with the emergence of forms of global governance and regulation, and the development of global policy, advocacy and knowledge networks. An even more dramatic example of challenges to states is the argument that illegal global networks operating outside political systems, including terrorism and organized crime, may now have the capacity to pursue successful 'netwars' against even the most powerful nation-states such as the USA (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2005).

A further important question concerns the democratic potential of global networks. Many have seen such a potential in the emergence of global civil society based on non-government organization and social movements. This phenomenon has been associated with the inclusion of a wider range of voices and interests in the global political arena. Global civil society expressed through bodies such as Amnesty and Greenpeace, and meetings such as the World Social Forum, has been seen as a type of global resistance from below in

contrast to the top-down globalization of corporations and regulatory bodies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Such bottom-up initiatives are, moreover, typically associated with networked organization among activists.

The relationship between global networks and democracy is, however, a very complex one. This is partly because there are different yardsticks against which the presence of democracy may be measured. From the viewpoint of representative democracy, for example, global networks of unelected activists have little legitimacy. On the other hand, such activists can be seen as a very healthy development if assessed according to the alternative yardstick of deliberative democracy. This is because they often bring to bear a wider range of voices in political debate than is evident from within political hierarchies. In so doing, they extend the range of information and policy options available.

Beyond this, however, there are also reasons to be sceptical about the simple equation between global civil society networks and democracy (Keane, 2003; Holton, 2005a). One significant argument in favour of scepticism is that many non-governmental global networks are uncivil, organized around terrorist violence, crime and the politics of hate. Another is that many global networks are dominated by elites, whose activities lack transparency and accountability. This applies not simply to top-down initiatives of the powerful, but also to the leadership of global social movements from below

In Chapter 8, an overview of major challenges and problems in global network analysis is provided. This returns to the two key questions already identified in this introductory chapter. The first, drawing on the historical approach of this study asks 'Is modern society uniquely a network society?', and the second, arising from continuing scepticism as to the meaning and coherence of globalization, asks 'What exactly is global about global networks?'

Index

- actor-network theory, 37–9
advocacy networks, 15, 24, 36, 40–1, 81–2, 92, 104, 126, 128, 175
Afghanistan, 127, 188, 194
Africa, 2–3, 28, 36, 73, 79, 84, 89, 93, 95, 98, 144, 159–60, 180–1, 198
African-Americans, 75, 128, 149, 158–9
African Times and Orient Review, 153
air travel, 60, 68
Al Qaeda, 1, 65, 100–1, 127, 188–91, 193–4
Al-Zawahiri family, 127, 189
Alexandria, 90
Amnesty International, 5, 15, 41, 175–6, 179
ancient Greeks, 140, 143
ancient Rome, 135, 143
Anderson, B., 104
Andrews, C.F., 149–51
Anheier, H. and Katz, H., 13, 53–64, 68, 175, 187
Annan, N., 108, 126
anthropology of networks, 12, 29–30, 70–2
Appelbaum, R., 84–5, 172
Appiah, K.A., 26
Arab writers, 75
Argentina, 157, 184
Arnason, J., 142
Arquilla, J. and Ronfeldt, D., 1, 15, 65, 99
art worlds, 115–24
Asia, 2–3, 34, 36, 39, 56, 60, 79, 84, 95, 108, 110
Atlantic, 78
Aurobindo, 155–6
Australia, 56, 153
autobiography, 73
Azikiwe, N., 73
Ballantyne, A., 88
Barnes, J., 17, 30, 51
Barney, D., 22
Barry, A., 22–3, 66
Barucha, R., 108, 151
Batavia, 137–8, 144
Bayly, C., 11, 78–9, 87–8, 137, 142, 147–8
Beck, U., 45–6, 140, 174
Becker, H., 107, 116–17, 119–20
Beirut, 90
Bell, D., 44
Bennison, A., 98
Berlin, 119
Besant, A., 108, 156
Biao, X., 101–2
Bilderberg Group, 56
Birmingham Lunar Society, 107
Bishop Azariah, 98, 149
Bismarck, O., 10
blockmodel analysis, 57–8
Bloomsbury Group, 108
Bombay, 89, 153
Börzel, T., 66, 95, 171
borders, 139–40
Boston, 108, 120
Boswell, J., 125
Boulton, M., 107
Bourdieu, P., 63
Braithwaite, J. and Drahos, P., 63, 173–4
Brautigam, D., 84, 86
Brazil, 184
Brenner, N., 40
Britain, 74, 102, 120, 122, 126–7, 140, 142, 155

- bronze-age networks, 11, 78, 171
 Brygalina, J. and Temkina, A., 177–8
 Buddhism, 154–5
 Buenos Aires, 157
 Burawoy, M., 71–2
 Burt, R., 63
 business networks, 34, 56, 82–6, 104,
 161, 194–6
 Buxtons, 126, 128

 Caglar, 27–8
 Cairo, 90, 127, 135, 138, 144, 157
 Calcutta, 89, 95, 108, 120, 156
 Cambridge Apostles, 126
 Camus, Albert, 157
 Caribbean, 95
 Carroll W. and Carson, C., 56, 68, 83,
 183
 Castells, M., 1–2, 11–12, 17–29,
 39–42, 53, 70, 83, 98, 114, 164,
 192–7
 Catherine the Great, 103
 celebrity, 109, 113–8
 Central America, 27
 Chana, J., 184
 Chandler, A. and Mazlish, B., 195
 Chandra Pal, B., 149–50
 charisma, 10, 111
 Chase-Dunn, C., 175, 183
 Chattopadhyaya, Virendranath, 157
 Chechnya, 101, 189
 Chicago Boys, 184–5
 Chile, 184
 China, 75, 79, 84–6, 97–8, 102, 110,
 151, 174, 185
 Choi, J., 50, 60, 68–9
 Christianity, 7, 80, 98, 111, 123, 136,
 151, 154–5, 195
 Churchills, 183
 clans, 34–5
 Clark family, 128
 Clay, C., 102, 125
 Clifford, J., 71
 Coleman, J., 63
 Collins, R., 10–11, 91, 109–12
 colonial cities, 89
 Commission on International Labour
 Legislation, 184–5
 Committee for International
 Cooperation, 72, 160
 Conference on the African Child
 (1931), 159–60
 Constantinople, 144
 Cook, Captain, 137–9
 Cooper, F., 53, 88, 146
 cosmopolitanism, 20, 123, 133–42,
 157, 164–5, 174, 198–200
 cricket, 160–1
 cross-cultural engagement from
 below, 161–6
 cross-cultural relationships, 133–66
 Crowder, Henry, 158–9
 cultural essentialism, 138–41
 culture, analysis of, 137–45
 Cunard, Nancy, 158–9
 Curzon, Lady, 87

 Damascus, 90
 Darwin family, 126, 128
 de-globalization, 133
 de Groot, 119
 Delhi, 144
 della Porta, D., 175–6
 Detroit, 119
 Douglass, Frederick, 128
 du Bois, W., 149–50, 158
 Durkheim, E., 33–4, 123–4
 Duse Mohamed, 153–4
 Dutch East India Company, 138

 East Asia, 83
 East–West, 79, 82, 108, 134, 136–7,
 141–5, 160–1, 180–1
 see also Orientalism
 Eastern Europe, 36
 ecumenism, 75, 98
 Egyptian Labour Party, 127
 Eisenstadt, S., 190–1
 elites, 4, 9, 69, 87, 113–14, 135, 146,
 161–2, 167–91, 195–6, 199
 embeddedness, problems with
 concept, 194

- Emirbayer, M. and Goodwin, J., 31, 67, 117, 130
- empire, 11, 13, 87–9, 94–5, 122–3, 133, 141–7, 151–2
- England, 60
- entailment analysis, 60
- environmental movements, 21, 25
- Esperanto, 153
- Europe, 2–3, 56, 78–9, 91, 98, 103, 108, 110, 119, 160, 185
- European Central Bank, 104
- European Islamic Council, 127
- European Union (EU), 20, 22–3, 168, 198
- feminist networks, 43, 82, 103, 177–8
- Fenellosa, Edward, 155–6
- Ferguson, N., 167, 172
- Fiji, 57
- financial networks, 16, 38, 104, 167–8, 172
- Fisher, M., 142
- Foucault, M., 66, 141
- France, 10, 30, 52, 60, 75, 103, 123
- Frankfurt, 167
- Freyberg-Inan, A., 62–3
- Friends of the Earth, 25
- friendship, 14, 102, 124–32, 151–3
- friendship networks, 86–7, 149–51, 157, 171
- G8, 168, 175–6, 195
- Gandhi, Mahatma, 98, 149–50, 157, 159, 169
- Garvey, Marcus, 153
- Gereffi, G., 82–3
- Germany, 27, 123
- Giles, D and Maltby, J., 114
- Gilroy, P., 24–6
- Ginzburg, C., 117
- Glick Schiller, N., 45, 93, 163
- global capitalist class, 13, 43
- global care chains, 27, 101
- global cities, 19, 39–40, 50, 60, 69, 130, 144
- global civil society, 15–16, 90–1, 178–83
- global complexity, 7–8
- Global Development Network, 92
- global networks
and communications technology, 2–3, 8, 40, 79, 105, 152–3
and democracy, 16, 20, 90, 167–91
and history, 2, 11–12, 26–9, 40, 69, 72–6, 81–2, 87, 93–4, 119–29, 143–5, 184–7
definition, 6
morphology, 13, 52–67
multifunctionality, 77–8, 92, 97, 101–2
relationship with nation-states, 5–6, 44–6, 80, 82, 167–8, 191–200
typology, 13–14, 77–105
- global public sphere, 41, 152–61
- global value chain (GVC)
- globalization, 5–6, 26, 37, 39–48, 132, 135, 143–5, 167
- glocalization, 26, 46–7
- governance, 36, 66–7, 95
- Granovetter, M., 30, 33, 35, 194
- Greece, 102, 135
- Green, J.R., 10
- Greene, Graham, 157
- Greenpeace International, 7, 15
- Group of 77, 161
- guanxi*, 83–5
- Haas, P., 40, 92
- Habermas, J., 129
- Hague Congresses, 153
- Hague, The, 119
- Hamburg, 189
- Hamilton, G., 39
- Hannerz, U., 71, 134
- Harper, T.N., 41, 90, 93–5, 152–3, 158
- Hartley, A., 28
- Harvell, E., 120
- Hay, S., 108
- Hermansen, M., 142
- Hiebert, D., 164
- Hinduism, 140, 156
- historical source material 72–6, 107–8

- Hizbollah, 188
 Holton, R., 6–12, 22, 26, 39, 42, 46, 75, 89, 93, 128, 138–42, 164, 198
 Holton, S., 102–3, 127
 home town associations, 27
 Hong Kong, 87, 94
 Hopkins, A., 136, 140, 143–5
 Huntington, S., 133
 Huxleys, 126

 Ibn Battuta, 144
 Ikegami, Eiko, 180
 Imperial networks, 87–9
 India, 57, 74, 79, 83–5, 87, 89, 92–3, 97–9, 120, 122, 140–2, 149–50, 154–7, 185, 198
 Indian Ocean, 90, 153
 Indian Society, the, 120–1, 149
 inequality, 9, 87–9, 124, 145–7, 174–91
 information networks, 79, 89–91, 167
 information technology, 1–3, 8, 17–23, 38, 68, 105, 192–3
 innovation networks, 28, 83
 intellectual networks, *see* knowledge networks
 intercultural engagement, 14–5, 26, 133–66
 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 179
 International Labour Organization, 170, 185–6
 International Monetary Fund, 5, 174
 internet, 8, 18, 23, 60, 68, 89–90, 99, 114, 130, 193
 irony 51–2
 Iran, 98
 Iraq, 189
 Ireland, 154, 160
 Islam, 7, 11, 26, 42, 80, 90, 97–98, 102–3, 123, 127, 136, 142, 153, 189–90, 195, 198
 Ismail Pasha, 135
 Israel, 127
 Issawi, C., 134–7

 Istanbul, 90, 153
 italian micro-history, 117–18
 Italy, 102
 Izmir, 90

 Jacobin mode of revolutionary politics, 190
 Japan, 83, 151, 155–6, 180
 Jayawardena, K., 97, 157
 Jerusalem, 71, 144
 Johannesburg, 71
 Johnson, Dr Samuel, 107, 125
 journalists, 28, 71, 153
 Joyce, J., 107
 Judaism, 135
 Juris, J., 168, 176

 Kali worship, 155–6
 Karinty, Frigyes, 61
 Keane, J., 16, 175, 178–83
 Keats, J., 107
 Keck, M. and Sikkink, K., 24, 40, 78, 81–2, 101, 175
 Kennedys, 183
 Kenya, 82, 159–60
 Kenyatta, J., 14, 159–62
 kinship, 14, 125–32, 183
 knowledge networks, 15, 60, 78–9, 91–3, 110–2
 Knoke, D., 170
 Knorr Cetina, K., 38, 196
 Kossinets, G., 51
 Kristiansen, K., 11, 78, 172

 Lagos, 95
 Lamb, C., 107
 Lang, G. and Lang, K., 107, 118–19
 Lapidus, I., 11, 98–9
 Latin America, 27, 82, 91, 103–4, 145, 149–50, 184–5
 League against Imperialism, 159
 League of Nations, 152, 160
 League of Vagabonds, 152
 Lebanon, 188
 Lesotho, 84
 Lester, 88, 146

- letters and letter writing, 72–3,
 88–90, 103–4, 123, 149
lex mercatoria, 84–5
 Little, G., 124
 London, 19, 79, 87, 108, 120, 152–3,
 157, 163, 167
 Los Angeles, 119
- MacAulays, 126
 Macmillans, 120
 Madagascar, 52
 Mahaim, E., 186
Making Globalization, 7–11, 46
 Malay, 153–4
 Malinowski, B., 71
 Marco Polo, 144
 Marcus, G., 70–1
 Marx, K., 10, 124
 Mauritius, 84
 McDonald's, 179
 McGrew, A., 182
 Mecca, 26, 135, 144, 153
 Medan, 153
 Médecins Sans Frontières, 7
 Mediterranean, 78, 90, 98
 methodological globalism, 43–8,
 199–200
 methodological glocalism, 47–8, 78,
 199–200
 methodological nationalism, 45–8,
 199–200
 methodologies of global network
 analysis, 13, 49–76
 Mexico, 91, 184
 micro-macro links, 9–10, 13, 30
 Microsoft, 179
 Middle East, 42, 75, 98–100, 134–5,
 172, 190
 migrant networks, 27, 44, 57, 78,
 93–5, 98
 migration, 8–9, 25–7, 46, 56–7, 60,
 93–5, 130, 135, 140, 162–5
 Milgram, S., 61–2, 68, 86, 90
 Mitchell, C., 17, 29–30
 modernity, 79, 190–1
 Moreno, Jacob, 67
- Morocco, 98, 144, 189
 Müller, M., 108
 multi-sited ethnography, 70–2
 multiple spatial scales, 40, 44–8, 77,
 124, 191–200
 Murray, Gilbert, 72
- Nairobi, 159–60
 naming schemes, 74
 Naples, 167
 Napoleon III, 10
 nationalist networks, 79, 160
 Netherlands, 164
 network biography, 107–8
 network brokerage, 63–4, 98
 network cohesion, 54–5
 network definition, 4
 network equivalence, 55–8, 125
 network life-cycle, 65, 177–8
 network prominence, 58–60
 network range, 61–3
 network state, 20–3, 193–4
 networks and social movements, 53,
 175–7
 networks, markets and hierarchies,
 4–5, 32–40, 169–74, 187–8, 192–7
 networks, the ego-centred approach,
 64–5, 148
 newspapers and publishing, 41–2,
 89–90, 152–61
 New York, 19, 87
 New Zealanders, 87
 Nicaragua, 188
 Nigeria, 58, 73
 Nivedita, Sister, 121, 154–7
 Nkrumah, K., 73
 Non-Aligned Movement, 161
- Ocampo, V., 149, 157
 Okakura, K., 108, 155, 162
 Olessen, T., 90
 Oltermann, P., 107
 Open Society Foundation, 177
 organized crime, 99–100
 Orientalism, 79, 141–3
 Orientophiles, 108

- Osama bin Laden, 127, 135, 190
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 74
- Pahl, R., 124–5
 Pakistan, 188–9
 Palestine, 188
 Paris, 79, 108, 120, 152, 157–8, 167
 Parsons, T., 34, 105
 particular persons, 10–13, 106–32
 Passy, F., 176–7
 Patterson, Albion, 184
 Peking, 108
 Persia, 75, 140
 Picasso, P., 107
 Pizzorno, A., 117
 poetry, 180
 Polanyi, K., 34, 171
 policy networks, 15, 36, 66–7, 77–8, 92, 95–6, 104, 171–4
 port cities, 90–1, 95
 Portes, A., 43, 93, 163
 Powell, W., 17, 32, 35
 power, 9, 53, 58–9, 141–3, 156, 167–91
 Priestley, J., 60, 107
 professional networks, 92, 96–7, 124
 Proust, M., 107
 puritanism, 190
- Quakers, 34, 102, 126–8, 159–60
 qualitative research challenges, 69–70
- racial conflict and exclusion, 146, 158
 religious networks, 42, 79, 97–8, 155–6
 Rembrandt, 119
 Republic of Letters, 123
 reputations, 112–24
 responses to intrusion from outside:
 Herodian and Zealot, 134–5, 162
Review of Reviews, 153
 revolutionary Marxist and socialist movements, 157, 160
 Rhodes, R., 66, 95, 169
- Richard, Mirra, 157
 Robertson, R., 26, 78, 199–200
 Rojek, C., 107, 109, 113–15
 romanticism, 128–9
 Rome, 135
 Rose, R., 167, 175
 Rosenau, J., 187
 Ross, McGregor and Isabelle, 159
 Rothenstein, W., 119–21, 149–51
 Rothschilds, 167–8
 Roy, M.N., 157–8
 Royal Society of Arts, 120
 Russell, G and Tuite, C., 128–9
 Russia, 177–8
- Saddam Hussein, 189
 Said, E., 79, 141–3
 Salons, 108
 Samarkand, 135
 San Francisco, 79, 90
 Sarajevo, 135
 Sassen, S., 19, 39
 Saudi Arabia, 189
 Save the Children Fund, 159–60
 Scallen, C., 119
 Scharpf, F., 173
 schools of philosophy, 10–11
 Schultz, T.W., 184
 scientists, 60, 79, 92
 Scott, J., 2, 49–50
 Seal, Brajendranath, 149
 Sen, Amartya, 140–1
 Senegal, 58
 Senghor, Leopold, 159
 Shack/Slum Dwellers International, 179
 Shanghai, 79
 Silicon Valley, 19, 92, 97
 Simmel, G., 12, 29, 125, 128–9
 Singapore, 89, 95, 153
 Sklair, L., 69
 Skrbis, Z., 163
 Slade, Madeleine, 157
 small world, degrees of separation, phenomenon, 61–3
 Smedley, Gladys, 157, 162

- Smelser, N., 34
sociability, 107, 124–32
social capital, 63, 171
social change, 1–2, 18–22
social network analysis 3, 31–2,
49–65, 170
social spaces, 18–21
see also multiple spatial scales
sociometrics/sociometry, 30, 67–8
Soros, George, 177
South America, 3, 60
South-east Asia, 83–6
South Korea, 39
Spain, 189
spirituality, 155
Sri Lanka, 120
Stone, D., 91–2
Stravinsky, I., 107, 157
structure and agency, 1–2, 8–10,
24–31, 106–32, 197
Sudan, 71
Swahili, 153
Swedberg, R., 34
- Tabriz, 90
Tagore, Abanindranath, 120
Tagore, Rabindranath, 15, 72, 108,
120–2, 140, 147–52, 162, 198
Taiwan, 39
Taleban, 194
teacher–pupil linkages, 111–12
Tehran, 90
terrorist networks, 15, 41, 99–101,
163, 167, 187–91
theatre history, 109
theosophy, 155–6
Thompson, Edward, 149, 151
Thompson, G., 4, 17, 23, 32, 35–8, 42,
66, 83, 95, 172–3
Tokyo, 19, 71, 79, 87, 108, 156
Toynbee, A., 134
transaction costs, 32, 35
translocalism, 44–5, 93
transnationalism, 27, 39, 43–5, 93
Trevelyans, 126
Triads, 100
- Trobriand Islanders, 71
Tupia, 137
Turkey, 27
- ubuntu*, 181
Uglow, J., 107
UK, 73, 85
Union of International Associations,
68
United Nations, 186, 198
Universal Races Congress (1911), 75,
108
Urry, J., 39, 199
USA, 27, 56–7, 60, 62, 73, 83–5, 91,
119, 123, 127, 149, 153–7, 184–5,
189, 198
- Valdés, J., 184
Valentiner, W., 119
van Bode, W., 119
van Daele, J., 186
Vancouver, 164
Vandervelde, E., 186
Venice, 135
Verne, Jules, 154
Vertovec, S., 44, 93, 163
Vienna, 167
Vienna Circle, 108
Vivekananda, 154–5
Voigt-Graf, C., 56–7, 94
von Heidenstam, V., 122
- Wahhabis, 135
Wallerstein, I., 45, 78, 199
Wasserman, S. and Faist, K., 3, 31,
45, 49–50, 68
Watt, James, 107
Watts, D., 62
Weber, M., 10, 33, 37, 107, 111,
123
Wellman, B., 13, 30, 50, 53, 90
Wells, Ida B., 128
West Africa, 73, 75, 83, 153–4
White, Harrison, 31, 51
Williamson, E.O., 32–3
Witte, J., 96, 171

- Woking Mosque, 153–4
women's networks, 78, 82, 97, 101–4,
177–8
Wordsworth, W., 107
workers' rights, 185–6
World Bank, 5, 28, 92, 174, 195
World Economic Forum, 27, 56
World Forum of Civil Society
 Networks, 181
world music, 7
World Social Forum, 5, 15, 64, 187
World Trade Organization, 168, 172
World Wildlife Fund, 25, 41
World's Parliament of Religions
 (1893), 154–5
Yakuza, 100
Yeates, N., 101
Yeats, W.B., 120, 149–50
yoga, 155
Zapatistas, 90–1