

Contents

<i>List of Tables</i>	ix
<i>List of Figures and Map</i>	x
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	xi
<i>Preface</i>	xii
<i>Foreword</i>	xiii
<i>Glossary</i>	xv
Introduction	1
Part I	
1 Development of Threat Perception	13
The Afghan crisis and Pakistan's security	13
India–Pakistan: a conflict of interest	17
Enhancement of threat in the Indian subcontinent	19
The conventional arms race	29
2 The Official Decision-Making System	35
Background	35
The 1973 White Paper on 'Higher Defence Organization'	37
Management of defense decision-making	38
The arms procurement decision-making process	50
The arms procurement funding process	53
3 Pakistan's Power Politics and Defense Decision-Making	55
Direct actors	55
Indirect actors	75
4 The Cost of Military Buildup	79
Defense: the economic burden	79
Social cost	86
5 Pakistan's Arms Suppliers	91
Pakistan–US arms transfer links: 1979–88	91
Pakistan–US arms transfer links: 1988–99	95
Pakistan–Europe arms transfer links: 1979–99	103
New sources	103
Pakistan–China links: pre-1979	105

	Pakistan–China arms transfer links: 1979–99	105
6	Military Industrial Complex	109
	Pakistan defense production: an overview	109
	Defense production for the Army	118
	Defense production for the Air Force	126
	Defense production for the Navy	130
	Research and Development establishments	132
 Part II		
7	Military Buildup Decisions, 1979–90	137
	Pakistan’s military buildup, 1979–90: an overview	137
	Arms procurement for the Air Force	139
	Arms procurement for the Army	146
	Arms procurement for the Navy	154
8	Military Buildup Decisions, 1990–99	160
	Arms procurement for the Navy	160
	Arms procurement for the Air Force	169
	Weapons procurement for the Army	175
9	Mutually Assured Deterrence: the Nuclear Option	178
	Pakistan’s nuclear option: the strategic dimension	178
	Nuclear proliferation: the domestic political perspective	183
	Nuclear proliferation: the bureaucratic perspective	185
10	Looking Ahead	190
	The need for military modernization	190
	The political scene	192
	The economic scene	195
	The strategic scene	198
	<i>Notes</i>	203
	<i>Bibliography</i>	216
	<i>Index</i>	227

Introduction

Why countries engage in military conflict, hostile relations, arms buildup, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a question that has attracted the attention of a number of analysts. Theories ranging from security concerns to the bureaucratic imperative have been expounded to explain this particular behavior. Such issues have become increasingly important, especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the threat of increase in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The literature, however, remains scant with the need for more case studies contributing to an understanding of the subject. Moreover, the general tendency in the literature is to look at defense decision-making from more than one angle. Arms procurement and nuclear proliferation need to be understood from a holistic decision-making standpoint, which has been the aim of this book. The purpose is to study Pakistan's arms procurement and military buildup decision-making. The idea was to carry out a comprehensive analysis that would be based on an examination of all those factors that contribute towards the policy-making process.

When I began work on this project, there were no such studies on Pakistan. The only other analysis on Pakistan's arms procurements, by Ian Anthony, was based on two aspects: strategic imperative and arms trade.¹ Anthony's work, in fact, was a case study on the trends of arms transfer to the Indian subcontinent describing the various categories of weapon systems supplied to Islamabad at different times. His main argument was on how a convergence of views in both the US and Pakistan regarding the communist threat to South Asia resulted in the latter obtaining arms.² From a domestic angle, Anthony basically used the traditional Richardson action–reaction model to explain Pakistan's arms procurement. According to his analysis, Islamabad has obtained

2 Introduction

arms because of New Delhi.³ He did mention the economic factors and military's role in decision-making,⁴ but this was more of a passing reference with no details of how the policy-making mechanism worked. Anthony was not the only one to use such a limited framework. The action–reaction and foreign alignment model was used by Pervaiz Cheema in analysing Pakistan's arms procurement and general defense decision-making.⁵ His main argument circulated around Pakistan's sense of threat from India and its alignment with the US that facilitated Islamabad in acquiring weapons wanted to counter a hostile New Delhi. Cheema added another angle to Pakistan's procurement debate which related to arms transfers and Pakistan's foreign alignments.

In fact, most studies on Pakistan's defense policy-making, arms procurement, nuclear decision-making, or defense spending were conducted in the 1980s and in the early 1990s. Their focus was on viewing the defense policy-making process from a conflict standpoint. For example, Deger and Sen used this methodology to examine Pakistan and India's defense expenditure. In their view, Pakistan's threat perception, which determined its defense expenditure, came solely from India.⁶ Wirsing tried to bring a certain variation to the debate by adding the military technological factor.⁷ In his view, the conventional weapons technology, later the acquisition of non-conventional defense technology by Pakistan, was based on the military technological disparity which Islamabad experienced *vis-à-vis* New Delhi. This was a perspective subscribed to by other authors as well, such as Ali, Anthony, Aronson, Cheema, Creveld, and Moshaver.⁸ The only academic work that talked about personal interests of political leaders such as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and General Zia-ul-Haq relate to Kapur's book on Pakistan's nuclear program.⁹ That book, however, predominantly presents an Indian view on the subject. This was in addition to the fact that the book focused entirely on the bureaucratic and personal imperative rather than knitting it with the strategic imperative and other elements. The limited literature on Pakistan's arms production also used the security concern framework to show why Islamabad decided to establish an indigenous weapons manufacturing industry.¹⁰ I found Mathews' paper, in which he discussed Pakistan's defense production, different and original; nevertheless, it neither talked about the relevant decision-making.¹¹ In addition, the journalistic pieces one comes across on defense decision-making in Pakistan do not present an integrated approach and do not answer all the questions as to why Islamabad engaged in an arms race with India, procured particular types of weapon systems, or chose to develop a nuclear deterrent. One comes

across similar shortcomings in the literature of a number of other developing countries.

For over fifty years after independence from the British rule, the standard explanation given for Pakistan's arms procurement and military buildup pertained to security imperative and Islamabad's concern for the threat posed by neighboring India. Again, it was India's hand seen behind internal insecurity that has plagued the country for almost the past twenty years. It must be remembered that during the 1960s, when government's misdirected policies resulted in political turmoil in the eastern wing, a similar argument was used. Yet, there were times when questionable decisions were taken. Moreover, the entire logic for insecurity, threat perception and high defense spending at the cost of socioeconomic growth had to be analysed. Was it really and purely the external threat, or were there other factors influencing government decisions, especially in the defense sector? It was vital to find some answers to these questions because external threat is the principal prominent framework that has been used to explain military buildup decisions in Pakistan and for other countries faced with a hostile neighbor. When I started working on the subject I was trapped within this traditional framework. However, a deeper analysis of a number of weapons procurement decisions made me wonder about the credibility of using the security imperative as the only explanation for the huge investment of resources that successive regimes in Pakistan have made in the defense sector. Elements such as inter-services rivalry, the influence of the political government *versus* the military establishment, the nature of domestic power politics affecting defense decision-making, and organizational and personal bias for particular programs or weapon systems were some of the factors that were almost totally excluded in earlier works.

These are some of the areas that one could find in the literature on defense procurement and defense decision-making in the developed world. Unfortunately, one could not see many examples of a schematic shift in the literature pertaining to developing countries. Until the end of the Cold War, most of the academic works on arms procurement in developing countries predominantly presented the arms transfers perspective. Researchers viewed arms acquisitions, not as an independent policy-making process taking place in the recipient states, but more in connection with what supplier states thought of them. They also looked into the strategic importance of the recipient states for suppliers that facilitated the transfers, and other angles that were based on suppliers' policies. Research on defense production was also not

4 Introduction

qualitatively very different. Having established the point that most of the Third World states were involved in indigenous weapons production owing to security, enhancement of national image, and to a certain extent, economic reasons, the focus would normally shift to technological issues. One can find interesting debate on the impact of the transfer of technology on international arms trade and other relevant issues. The schematic shift in the literature on the subject related to many of the developed countries was possible mainly as a result of better transparency of the policy-making process. This is, indeed, not a characteristic of the political and cultural environment of most developing countries, especially Pakistan. An academic work on arms procurement has never been undertaken before now because of unavailability of published sources and the military or government's resistance towards discussing such issues in the interests of public awareness within the country.

This work is now only possible because of General (Retd.) Mirza Aslam Baig, who became the Army chief after General Zia's death, changing the policy in favour of some openness about military affairs. Thus it was possible for me to discuss numerous issues with a large number of serving and retired military personnel. As an institution, I found the Army and Navy more open than the Air Force, with the large size of the Army reflecting the influence it enjoys in the country's power politics. As for the Navy, its relative openness is linked with the service's need to publicize its requirements. The PAF, on the other hand, has always had a closed culture: having the confidence that it is indispensable for national defense, the service continues to be secretive.

Indubitably, the task was not an easy one but, with access to published data by some of the international research institutions and cross-referencing the information I was provided with, it was possible for me to arrive at certain conclusions. This *perestroika*, nevertheless, was to be short-lived. Pakistan's military, unfortunately, is again almost as closed as it was at the end of the 1980s and is now accompanied by an attitude of 'denial' that does not permit the government machinery to look beyond security, external threat and secrecy. The new military government, aiming at ensuring better efficiency, progress and growth, must first shift the focus from external threat to the internal dynamics of security. This realignment of national priorities requires a major shift in the state's foreign policy planning and possible downsizing of the military establishment. Whether the armed forces would support such a course of action depends upon the military management's

ability to sacrifice short-term organizational benefits for long-term national interests.

A review of the literature on arms trade, arms production and decision-making left me searching for answers as to how to analyse arms procurement decision-making in Pakistan. One could get some answers from the arms trade literature about why suppliers such as the US, France, Britain or China gave arms to Islamabad, and find some explanations about why Pakistan decided to start indigenous weapons production. My perception while doing the literature survey, however, was that the existing studies did not provide the necessary linkage between strategy, industrial capabilities, official objectives and decision-making. Added to this, was public opinion in Pakistan; talking to different people in the country I came across two sets of views. There were those who thought that arms procurement was all about financial kickbacks and others who believed that weapons acquisition decisions were neatly tied in with the strategic needs of the country.

I couldn't completely reconcile myself to either explanation. At times, generalizations help in understanding the moods of an individual, group or society but it is an unscientific way of presenting a hypothesis. Besides, if I used one of these standpoints, there were still many questions that remained unanswered. There was also a third group that viewed defense decision-making as a process totally controlled by the military. Although it is true that the armed forces are the dominant actor, I had to be careful in applying this perception during the entire period of the present study. From 1977–88 the Army definitely controlled policy-making in the country but, after General Zia died the country started its journey back to democracy. There were frequent interruptions to civil rule and the army's attempts to destabilize the system. In addition, inter-services rivalry affected decisions. Moreover, there was the impact created by the US arms embargo imposed on Islamabad in 1990 together with the changes in Beijing's attitude towards Pakistan. My idea was to try to construct a comprehensive picture of the decision-making process taking into account all elements that contributed towards the policy-making process and its final outcome.

From a decision-making standpoint, I found the period from 1979–99 interesting for analysis. This was for three reasons: first, there was a lot going on in the military-strategic front. At the beginning of 1980 Pakistan's official threat perception had intensified with Islamabad projecting a two-front situation. There was concern about Soviet intentions of reaching the 'warm-waters' by invading Pakistan. The main threat

continued to be from India, however. In fact, policy-makers in Islamabad saw a connection between the Indian threat and the situation on Pakistan's northern border. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan coincided with an increase in tension with India resulting in both governments' adopting a more aggressive stance towards each other.

The US arms transfer to Pakistan in the 1980s that was to help Islamabad counter the Soviet threat was disturbing for New Delhi. Islamabad's arms acquisitions were viewed as destabilizing the strategic balance planned by India for the South Asian region. This resulted in the enhancement of the arms race in the region. Driven by its strategic goals, India tried to offset any advantage to Islamabad by increasing India's arms purchases and generally increasing military technological competition. Policy-makers of both countries resorted to the acquisition of conventional and non-conventional military technologies to address the growing threat. This competition precipitated the bilateral tension resulting in certain developments during this period. Several events of military-strategic significance took place, which led to more tension. Not only that, the continual increase in hostilities was encouraged in order to create the logic for a military buildup. These happenings had a bearing on the arms procurement decision-making process in both India and Pakistan.

The second reason was that this was a period when arms procurement decisions were influenced by variations in the arms suppliers' policies. The most significant were the fluctuations in Pakistan-US weapons transfer ties. Providing Islamabad with military hardware was dependent upon the 'ebb and flow' of American interests in the South Asian region. From this perspective, this period can be divided into three phases: (a) the position in 1979, (b) 1980-88, and (c) post-1988. In each phase, Washington's arms transfer policy regarding Pakistan was different depending on the priorities of American policy-makers at the time. For instance, when containing the growing power of communism was the main concern in the US, other issues such as nuclear proliferation elsewhere were given less importance. Then the American views on nuclear proliferation did not hinder arms transfer to Islamabad the way it did before 1979 or after 1988. Similarly, Pakistan's military links with China were based on a different frequency than the period prior to 1979. Although Islamabad's bilateral ties with Beijing have been more stable than with Washington, the chemistry of this link altered as well.

Third: there were rapid developments in the domestic political arena that affected the manner in which decisions were made. It was the

changes in the political scene during this period that led to the strengthening of actors other than the military who influenced decisions. A period of military rule was followed by re-introduction of democracy in 1988. Civil rule started in 1985 but it could not sufficiently anchor itself. However, this was a period when there were more instances of financial corruption in arms deals. There were cases where top civilian decision-makers approved weapon purchases for personal financial gain. The persistence of this was an inherent disincentive to the improvement of the decision-making apparatus at the middle and top management levels. The weaknesses within the system, inefficient bureaucratic control and lack of knowledge of weapon systems in the MoD were some of the reasons for increased financial corruption. These shortcomings were also the cause of the continued dearth of efficiency and transparency in the policy-making process.

In order to make the whole debate comprehensible the book has been divided into two parts. In Part I, I have tried to discuss all those factors that have a vital contribution in the policy-making process. Chapter 1 comprises an analysis of the threat perception in the South Asian region during the period 1979–99. For this I have studied the Afghan crisis as it started in 1979 and its development until 1999. The crisis is discussed purely from a Pakistani perspective: what it meant for Islamabad; what the Pakistani leadership wanted to gain from it; and the manner in which it affected Pakistan's security. This is followed by a detailed analysis of the tension between India and Pakistan. Chapter 2 contains a detailed description and analysis of the official policy-making system and process. In this chapter I have tried to present both the system and the process purely as a mechanism employed by an organization such as a government to procure military hardware.

In Chapter 3 I have discussed at length various actors involved in the policy-making process, their relationship, interests, motives and the influence they exert on decisions. The actors have been categorized into two: (a) those who have a direct link and interest in weapons acquisition, and (b) others who play an indirect role. The second type of actor was found to be deliberately strengthening the position of the military in controlling the policy-making process.

Chapter 4 presents an analysis of the cost of military buildup for Pakistan. Considering the country's economic constraints the amount that Islamabad can and chooses to spend has a direct impact not only on the war preparedness of its armed forces but also on what the government procures. From 1982–90 Islamabad's burden was shared by Washington, who had decided to extend financial support to its ally to

help it strengthen its military machinery in order to counter the Communist threat. Despite the external support, defense-spending from Pakistan's own resources tended to increase and after the arms embargo in 1990 the burden was entirely shifted to the country's economy. Successive governments have opted to maintain a high military expenditure because of the threat felt from India. In fact, this has been the pattern for the past fifty years of the country's history. In doing so, the policy-makers have shown no concern for the growth and development of the society and economy. The social underdevelopment, in fact, adds to the cost of military buildup. The strong pro-military lobby in the policy-making elite has not only discouraged any reduction in security spending but also not allowed the government to consider reducing the high percentage of financial wastage in the defense sector.

Chapter 5 discusses the policies of Pakistan's arms suppliers: the US, China, the UK, and France. Since the end of the 1950s the Pakistani military has developed an inclination towards American equipment. The manner in which Islamabad aligned its certain policies to facilitate American arms transfers during the 1980s and reasons for which the arms supply was interrupted again are discussed in this chapter. Traditionally, in the absence of American military hardware, Pakistan has looked to China, France and Britain. Beijing has always been instrumental in enhancing the quantity of Pakistan's equipment. The debate on Pakistan–China arms transfer links in this chapter looks at the subtle changes in the security links between Islamabad and Beijing.

Chapter 6 comprises an analysis of Pakistan's defense industrial complex. A description of the defense industrial infrastructure and an understanding of Pakistan's indigenous weapons production capabilities was considered necessary in comprehending some of the arms procurement decisions that were made.

Chapter 7, the first chapter of Part II, carries an in-depth analysis of numerous arms procurement decisions taken during the period from 1979–90. These decisions were related to both domestic and foreign acquisitions. Chapter 8 follows on from this and analyses decisions carried out from 1990–99. In Chapter 9 the nuclear proliferation decision-making has been studied. Although the country's nuclear program pertains to non-conventional defense, which is not the main subject of the book, the debate was included in the study for two reasons. First, the behavior of the policy-making process in this area was found to help understanding arms procurement decision-making further. Second, the development of the non-conventional defense capability

had a direct bearing on the conventional arms procurement decision-making. Particularly after 1990, when the American government imposed an arms embargo on Islamabad and when Pakistan found it difficult to fulfill its military's major weapons modernization needs, policy-makers did not panic because of their peculiar confidence in nuclear deterrence.

The concluding chapter looks at the options that Pakistan has in terms of what it wants to and what it can possibly procure. The discussion in this chapter also contains an analysis of the probable changes in the domestic decision-making environment and the political leadership's ability to consider options other than hostile relations with India that may transform military planning at a strategic level. Any change in this level would impact on plans and related decisions at the operational and tactical level as well. What all this might mean for arms procurement policy-making is addressed in this chapter.

Index

- Aeronautical Complex, Pakistan, 45, 112, 126–9, 153, 171, 173
- Afghan Air Force, 15, 140, 143
- Afghanistan
- Afghan crisis, 7, 13–17, 93, 101, 138, 156, 161
 - Afghan refugees, 15, 16
 - Soviet invasion of, 6, 13, 93
- Air defense command, 28, 63, 146, 190
- Air Force, *see* individual country entries
- Air Weapons Complex, 103, 111, 129–30, 141, 174
- Al-Zulfiqar*, 15
- America, *see* US
- Arif, K.M., Lt General, 23, 53
- Armament Research and Development Establishment (ARDE), 113
- see also* research and development establishments
- arms procurement
- Air Force, 31, 103, 139–46, 169–75
 - Army, 31, 146–54, 175–7
 - cost, 158, 161, 162, 163, 176
 - financial corruption, 5, 7, 59, 82, 159, 164, 166, 170, 176
 - from China, 24, 31, 106–8, 144, 147, 159
 - from France, 103, 169
 - from North Korea, 103, 105
 - from South Africa, 103, 174, 176
 - from the UK, 103, 163
 - from Ukraine, 103, 175–6
 - from the US, 24, 30, 31, 53, 57–8, 63, 139–43, 155
 - influence of the military, 55–69
 - Navy, 31, 34, 59, 80, 156, 190
 - negotiations with Russia, 170–1
 - political significance, 57–8, 142–3
- arms procurement system
- Air Force, 48, 50
 - Army, 48
 - decision-making process, 50–3
 - Navy, 48, 50
- Army
- influence in power politics, 5, 60–3, 74, 78, 192–5
 - see also* civil–military relations
- Army chief, 60, 61, 176
- Army Welfare Trust, 82, 84
- Bahria Foundation, 83
- Baig, Mirza Aslam, General, 4, 25, 76, 99
- growth of indigenous production, 148–53, 175
 - policy of offensive-defense, 24–5
- Bhutto, Benazir, 65, 74, 101, 146, 164, 184, 192
- see also* civil–military relations
- Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali, 2, 37, 61, 65, 67, 69, 75, 92, 99, 114, 138, 142, 143, 183, 184, 186, 187, 192
- see also* civil–military relations
- Bokhari, Fasih, Admiral, 66, 193, 194
- Brasstacks, Operation, 23–5
- Brown Amendment, 31, 99, 100, 170
- Cabinet Committee for Defense, 35, 38, 40, 42, 50, 52, 53, 72, 157, 162, 166
- CATIC, 128, 172
- CIA, 93, 102
- Chief of General Staff, 48, 112, 153, 175
- China
- military technology, 108
 - relations with India, 105–6, 201
 - relations with Pakistan, *see* Pakistan relations with China

- civil–military relations, 6–7, 37–8, 57–8, 60–3, 73–5, 184–6, 192–5
- Cold War, xiii, 3, 14, 34, 73, 91, 93, 95, 100, 138
- Command and Control
of armed forces, 37–42
- Constitution of 1973, 38, 40
Amendment, 40, 74
- cost of military buildup, 7, 79–90
- DCC, *see* Cabinet Committee for Defense
- debt servicing, 79
- decision-making
Army involvement, 37
defense, 35–8, 74
Pakistan's arms procurement, 35, 38–54, 65–6
- Defense Council
defense posture
India, 17–18
Pakistan, 64, 137, 190–201
- defense production division, 41, 42–5
- Defense Science and Technology Establishment (DESTO), 45, 132, 153
see also research and development establishments
- defense spending
burden, 84–6, 195, 198
Pakistan, 63, 72, 74
reduction, 75, 80, 88, 89, 90, 201
services' share, 80
social cost, 72, 86–90
wastage, 82, 115, 118–19, 153, 168
- economic conditions, 86, 89, 115, 189, 195–8
- exclusive economic zone (EEZ), 64, 66, 80, 164
- Fauji Foundation, 82, 83, 84
- fighter aircraft, 26, 30, 33, 62, 64, 78, 93, 94, 99, 126, 127, 139, 140–6, 168–71, 191
- financial aid donors, 90
- financial assistance from China, 105
- frigates, 131, 154, 155, 156, 157, 161, 163, 165, 166, 167, 191
- Geneva Accord, 16, 95, 101
- Gujral, Indar Kumar, 22
- Gull, Hameed, Lt General, 23, 24, 58, 76
- Haq, Mansoor-ul, Admiral, 59, 80, 161, 163, 164, 165
- Haq, Zia-ul, 2, 4, 14, 15, 20, 23, 25, 40, 48, 62, 67, 69, 70, 73, 76, 80, 82, 89, 92, 95, 100, 110, 142, 147, 148, 155, 157, 158, 164, 175, 184, 186, 194
- Heavy Industries, Taxila (HIT), 45, 120–2, 132, 175
see also military industrial complex
- Hizb-ul-Mujahideen*, 26
- Indian Air Force, 28, 30, 146, 169
- Indian defense posture, 17–18
- India–Pakistan relations, 17–34, 146, 154, 162, 169, 178, 202
conventional arms race, 2–3, 6, 29–34
nuclear competition, 178
- Indian military superiority, 29, 34, 139, 163
- International Monetary Fund, 89, 90, 197
- interservices intelligence, 46, 50, 76, 102, 167, 200
- indigenous production
Air Force, 108, 126–30
Army, 112, 118–25, 148–52
cost, 111–12
economic spinoff, 109
exports, 110–11, 118, 126, 131, 167–8
limited production, 111, 117
Navy, 130–2
self-sufficiency, 110, 152

- technological spinoffs, 110
see also military industrial complex
- Institute of Optronics, 122–3, 153
see also military industrial complex
- interservices rivalry, 3, 5, 41, 48, 77, 84, 139, 152–3, 155, 192
- Iran, 15, 94, 108, 200
- Jama'at-I-Islami*, 76, 77
see also religious fundamentalism
- Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, 26
- Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, 40, 45–8, 58, 61, 62, 73, 142, 158, 168, 192, 193
- Joint Staffs Headquarters, 48, 50, 168
- Junejo, Mohammad Khan, 74, 88, 157, 158
- Kahuta Research Laboratories, 113, 116, 125, 187, 188
 attack on Kahuta, 22–3
- Karachi shipyard and engineering works, 131–2, 165
- Kashmir, 25–9, 56, 57, 77, 100, 106, 179, 181, 182, 183, 188, 198, 199
see also India–Pakistan relations and Kargil
- Kargil, 27–9, 71, 160, 179, 181, 182, 183, 185, 190, 194, 199, 200
- Khan, AbdulQadeer, Dr, 67, 113, 125, 151, 153, 154, 179, 186, 187
- Khan, Ayub, General, 62, 92, 110
- Khan, Ishaq, 73, 74, 99
- Machine Tool Factory, 116
- Margalla Electronics, 123–4, 152, 153, 177
- Metal Industries Research and Development Corporation (MIRDC), 114
- military, *see* Air Force, Army, Navy
- Military Accountant General, 42
- military buildup, 79–90
- military industrial complex, 109–33
- military intelligence, 75–6
- military modernization, 31, 34, 57, 63, 75, 79, 88, 91, 179, 192, 195, 197, 198
- Military Vehicles Research and Development Establishments (MVRDE), 132, 133
see also research and development establishments
- Ministries
- Defense, 7, 41, 45, 52, 59, 60, 69–70, 72, 82, 84, 120, 122, 125, 130, 147, 152, 174, 177
 - Finance, 42, 53, 69, 72–3, 88, 157
 - Foreign Affairs (Foreign Office), 69–72, 167, 171, 199
- missiles, 31, 105, 108, 125, 130, 140, 146, 150, 151, 152, 154, 159, 161, 177, 180, 181, 188, 191, 201
see also research and development establishments
- modernization, *see* military modernization
- Mohajir Qaumi Movement*, 76
- Mujahideen*, 15, 16, 93, 101, 150
- Musharaf, Pervaiz, General, 62, 165, 185, 193
- National Development Complex, 129, 187, 188
- Naval aircraft, 28, 31, 34, 66, 155–6, 168
 shooting down, 29
- Naval dockyard, 130, 165
- Naval Research and Development Authority (NRDA), 112, 133, 167
see also research and development establishments
- NORINCO, 121, 175
- nuclear bureaucracy, 67–9, 188–9
- Nuclear Command and Control, 69, 180, 188, 192
- nuclear program, Pakistan, 22, 24, 58–9, 77, 98, 102, 178–89, 198
 Chinese assistance, 106

- cost, 184
- development, 186–7
- Operation Gibraltar, 27, 37
- Ordnance factories, Pakistan (POFs), 45, 46, 116, 118–20, 122, 133, 186
- Pakistan Air Force, 30, 31, 61, 63, 108, 126, 129, 143, 144, 145, 152, 159, 168, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 191
 - influence with the Army, 63–4, 169
- Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, 67, 186, 187
- Pakistan military's dependence on foreign equipment, 110, 137, 152
- Pakistan Navy
 - capabilities, 34, 191
 - influence, 64–6
- Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan, 92–3
- Pakistan's relations with China, 5, 6, 102, 105–8, 201
 - see also* arms procurement
- Pakistan's relations with US, xiii, 1, 13, 34, 71, 91–102, 152, 177, 181–2, 193, 200, 201
 - see also* arms procurement
- Pakistan security, 13–16, 98, 100
- PLA, 106, 129
- policies
 - low-intensity conflict, 25
 - towards Afghanistan, 13, 16–17, 201
 - defense, 2–3, 18–19, 58, 64–5
- Precision Engineering Complex, 116, 125
 - see also* military industrial complex
- Pressler Amendment, 95, 102, 147, 150, 160
- Reagan, Ronald, 48, 93, 94, 143, 154
- Rehman, Akhtar Abdur, Lt General, 23, 24
- religious fundamentalism, 75–7
- Research and Analysis Wing, 56
- research and development, 112–13, 116, 117, 120, 123, 132, 167, 174
- research and development establishments
 - ARDE, 133
 - DESTO, 45, 132, 153
 - MIRCD, 114
 - MVRDE, 132, 133
 - NRDA, 112, 133, 167
- Shaheen Foundation, 82
- Sharif, Nawaz, 22, 40, 56, 65, 70, 75, 89, 112, 115, 133, 162, 164, 167, 177, 184, 185, 188, 192, 193, 194, 197, 201
 - see also* civil–military relations
- Siachen glacier, 19–22
 - see also* Kashmir conflict
- Simla Agreement, 20
- Soviet Air Force, 15, 140, 143
- Soviet Union
 - breakup, 34
 - invasion of Afghanistan, 13–15, 92, 93, 101
 - relations with India, 34
 - withdrawal of troops, 15, 16, 75, 95, 98, 143
- strategic planning, 16, 23–5, 27, 138, 139, 155, 158, 160, 161, 179, 180–2, 190, 199
- submarines, 59, 103, 154, 158, 161, 162
- surveillance aircraft, 31
- Taliban*, 17, 101, 171, 200
 - see also* Afghan crisis and Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan
- tanks, 31, 71, 120, 121, 122, 147–8, 150, 175, 176
- technology transfer
 - collaboration, 112, 118, 121–2, 125, 128, 172–4
 - from China, 108, 121, 128, 130, 144–5, 147–52, 154, 172, 173
 - from France, 130, 161, 162, 165, 172
 - from Italy, 152, 166
 - from Sweden, 151, 177
 - from the US, 122, 147, 152, 154, 176
 - see also* arms procurement

- terrorism, 15, 26, 102, 200
- threat from the USSR, 14–15, 138
- threat perception, 5, 6, 13–34, 56–7, 89

- UN, 108, 182
- US aid to Pakistan, 6, 14, 91, 93–5, 137–40
- US arms embargo, 5, 14, 79, 110, 142, 169, 171, 177
- US Congress, 14, 98, 101, 147
- US policy
 - on Afghanistan, 101–2
 - on Communist threat, 14, 94–8, 140, 154
 - on nuclear proliferation, 13, 65, 92, 94–9, 151–2, 182, 200
- vendors, 116–18, 120, 122

- White paper on ‘Higher Defense Organization’, 37–8, 41, 45, 46
- World Bank, 90
 - see also* financial aid donors
- Yasoob truck project, 124–5, 154
 - see also* military industrial complex

- Zarbe Momin*, 24–5