

# Contents

<i>Acknowledgements</i>	x
<i>A Note on Style</i>	xi
<i>Map 1: East central Europe, c.1570</i>	xii
<i>Map 2: East central Europe, c.1721</i>	xiv
<i>Map 3: East central Europe, c.1815</i>	xvi
<i>Some Introductory Considerations</i>	xviii
<i>Habsburg Family Tree</i>	xxiv
<b>Chapter 1: The Pattern of Empire</b>	<b>1</b>
From Petty Princes to European Rulers	1
Dynastic Marriage: Its Uses and Limitations	3
Attempting an Empire	7
Ferdinand I and the Construction of Habsburg Central Europe	11
Administering an Empire	18
Religious Divisions	21
Catholics Rearm	24
Conflict in the House of Habsburg	26
<b>Chapter 2: An Empire Takes Hold</b>	<b>31</b>
The Habsburgs, Ferdinand of Styria, and the Counter-Reformation	31
Crisis, Conflict, and Dynastic Opportunity	34

The Terms of a <i>Modus Vivendi</i>	36
The Thirty Years War, Europe, and the Habsburg Borders	39
Reconquering Hungary	44
Subduing the Hungarians	53
Sealing a Hegemony	55
<b>Chapter 3: Creating a State</b>	59
A Dynasty at Risk	59
The Unlikely Empress	63
New Threats From Abroad	64
Worrisome Frontiers, 1763–80	66
Survival Through Reform, 1740–80	67
The Limits of Collaboration, 1780–90	80
Traces of the Future	86
<b>Chapter 4: Holding the Center</b>	89
Rescuing the Habsburg Monarchy from Within	89
An Old Empire and a New	95
One Dynasty, One People	102
The Dynasty Reasserts Itself	106
<b>Chapter 5: Revolution: Text and Subtext</b>	113
Some Steps Toward Recovery	113
Accumulating Grievances, 1815–48	116
Revolutions and Counter-Revolution	128
<b>Chapter 6: From One to Many</b>	139
Hints of Former Connections	139
A Culture Accessible to All	140
Accommodation to Diversity: Education, Language, and Dynastic Interest	147
From Vernacular to Particular: The Austrian Example	149
From National Language to National Culture: Italy	158
From National Language to National Culture: Hungary	161
From National Language to National Culture: Bohemia	163
The One Now Many	166

A Summary Afterword	167
<i>Notes</i>	171
<i>Bibliography</i>	194
<i>Index</i>	211

# *Chapter 1: The Pattern of Empire*

## *From Petty Princes to European Rulers*

The Habsburgs were not supposed to amount to much in central Europe. When the princes of the German Holy Roman Empire named Rudolph of Habsburg (1218–91) their king in 1273, they thought that they had a sovereign who would respect their territorial freedoms, not one who would advance his family's fortunes through his office. They badly misjudged the relatively obscure count from southwestern Germany. Though never crowned emperor, a title that the German kingship allowed him to claim and that in theory made its holder the secular champion of Christendom, he proved himself to be ambitious, energetic, and resourceful. Beating back Přemysl Otakar II (1233–78), the aggressive Bohemian king who had invaded Austria above and below the River Enns and Styria, today in eastern Austria, Rudolph endowed his family with these provinces. Rudolph's heirs added the county of Tyrol, along with an assortment of lands in southeastern Europe along the Istrian coast, to the Habsburg central European patrimony. The family also retained ancestral holdings in southwestern Germany into modern times.

Rudolph's new position brought other advantages as well. Even as he waited in Basel for news of his election, he already saw that his improved status opened the way to prestigious marriages for his daughters.<sup>1</sup> The princesses, six in all, found husbands in Bavaria twice and Brandenburg, Saxony, Bohemia, and Hungary, all of which were strategically central to the defense of Rudolph's newly acquired lands. The long-celebrated Habsburg success in marital politics has made historians sometimes forget that these alliances would never have come about unless other dynasties had taken an interest in close relationships with what would

become the house of Austria. That Rudolph's heirs through the centuries seemed to profit from these contracts disproportionately was as much an accident as the result of a plan.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, their illustrious ancestor's attentiveness to marital politics set a pattern followed consistently throughout the 600-odd years of their family's history.

The road to Habsburg preeminence in Europe, however, was neither smooth nor direct. Conspicuous beneficiaries though they were of European proprietary dynasticism (the notion that the families of rulers in some sense owned the lands they governed), Rudolph's male heirs did not use their legacies to best advantage. Well into the seventeenth century, the Habsburgs, like most German territorial rulers, divided their lands among their legitimate sons. The practice generally weakened the economic and political power of any single one of them; fratricidal quarrels over these partitions sometimes lasted for decades. The dukes of Austria – after the middle of the fourteenth century archdukes – were frequently rivals and even enemies.

Indeed, the Habsburgs emerged in 1463 as a more or less unified house only following the extinction of competing lines and a last vicious intradynastic conflict between Emperor Frederick III and his younger brother, Albrecht VI (1418–63). About the only political card the former had to play was his imperial title, conferred in 1452. Indeed, he would be the last of his line to be crowned by the pope in Rome, though, except for a brief break in the eighteenth century, members of his house would hold both titles until the empire came to an end in 1806. Frederick could be cunning: he came to very favorable terms with the papacy concerning his rights and those of his heirs to revenues from ecclesiastical establishments in Habsburg territories. He also avoided the worst vices of his age. Though he enjoyed a hearty meal, Frederick drank sparingly, a sharp contrast to many of his German colleagues. But his overall record as a ruler was dismal: he spent much of his time on the run from sovereigns more aggressive than he – King Matthias Corvinus (1440–90) of Hungary being perhaps the most bothersome – and he clearly preferred spending his intermittent bursts of energy on his collections and pseudoscientific activities rather than on governing his endangered lands.<sup>3</sup> But, episodic though his appearances in Vienna were, he showed that the Habsburg imperial court had great potential for drawing a variety of people into its orbit of power. On the lookout for privileges and patronage, local nobility as well as their counterparts from other areas of Germany found it increasingly worth their while to spend some time at Frederick's Habsburg establishment. The city changed as well. Nobles brought with

them servants, and the presence of wealth lured a motley assortment of hangers-on, so that by 1460 anywhere from 1800 to 3000 souls may have been living in and around the imperial residence, the *Hofburg*.<sup>4</sup>

Like Rudolph I, Frederick wielded his imperial title shrewdly to advance his family fortunes. It was a marriage promoted by Frederick for his only son, Archduke Maximilian (1459–1519), that gave his family major standing not only in Germany, but in Europe as a whole. Following more than ten years of negotiations between the emperor and Charles the Bold, the Valois duke of Burgundy (1432–77), Frederick manipulated the latter's quest for the imperial title and a military setback Charles suffered in Germany in 1475 into a consequential marital union. Archduke Maximilian was betrothed to the duke's only apparent legitimate heir, Duchess Mary (1457–82). The actual nuptials took place in 1477, after Charles himself died in combat at Nancy. The Habsburgs thus found themselves with a significant foothold in one of Europe's richest territorial complexes. They also had more borders to defend. The kings of France would be especially eager to recover several sections within the Burgundian patrimony that had once served as a royal French appanage, lands given by rulers to junior sons from which the latter could supposedly support themselves in a style that befitted their status.

### *Dynastic Marriage: Its Uses and Limitations*

Even in an age of unusually dynamic rulers, Maximilian stood out. An indifferent, sometimes belligerent student, he was as outgoing and reckless as his father was introverted and timid. Dislike of formal education did not keep Maximilian from becoming one of the most sophisticated patrons of art and literature of his age; his musical tastes were exquisite, and he indulged them generously. Some of Germany's finest composers and instrumentalists – Ludwig Senfl, Paul Hofhaimer, Heinrich Isaac – wrote both secular and liturgical works for him; it was Maximilian who began his family's close association with music that would make their court in Vienna Europe's center of the art by the late seventeenth century. History fired his political imagination: becoming emperor in 1493, he believed that his dynasty would rise to the eminence of the Romans, Carolingians, and Ottonians. With the imperial title went theoretical responsibility for all of Christendom; Maximilian took that charge seriously, especially when others did as well. Publications fore-

casting that the Habsburgs had come to vanquish the invading Ottoman anti-Christ began appearing around 1496. Once Maximilian recaptured Jerusalem, the Day of Judgment would be underway.<sup>5</sup>

But Maximilian was far too ambitious to await the outcome of prophecies. His Burgundian marriage was a much quicker opening to the career for which he was supposedly destined. When Mary of Burgundy died unexpectedly from a hunting accident in 1482, her husband took the opportunity to announce himself as the heir to his wife's patrimony. He now had a major foothold in western Europe, though persuading local authorities in these lands to accept his claims was a tedious and costly task.<sup>6</sup> As territorial rulers, Maximilian and generations of Habsburgs to come were only one element in the interactive machinery of government that oversaw the polities of Europe by the end of the fifteenth century. Burgundy was a conspicuous example of how troublesome this dynamic could be. Provincial estates – territorial aristocracies, high clerical officials such as bishops and abbots, and other local notables – along with powerful municipalities such as Bruges and Gent were aggressive advocates of their constitutional prerogatives and interests. They boldly criticized even the foreign policies of rulers whose military undertakings abroad became overly expensive.<sup>7</sup> King Louis XI (1423–83) of France had already lured domestic rebels to his side in nasty skirmishes with the archduke that had been going on since 1477. Maximilian and Mary had themselves added an additional complication to the situation by producing a son, Archduke Philip (1478–1506), and a daughter, Archduchess Margaret (1480–1530). Many notables of the Burgundian lands now felt even more secure in rejecting Maximilian as their territorial overlord; the Burgundian Valois line, they argued, had passed unbroken from the much-mourned Mary to her son.

Maximilian was intellectually prepared to use armed force whenever necessary against either rebellious subjects or foreign invaders. Indeed, warfare and its technologies fascinated him, and reforming the quality of German mercenary troops, the *Landsknechte*, was one of his lifetime projects.<sup>8</sup> While such ventures were expensive, he had hoped that taxes from the Netherlands would improve his finances generally. The outcome of his military efforts in the Netherlands, however, was ambiguous at best. The Habsburgs retained most of the Burgundian patrimony, but permitted important exceptions. In 1482 France reacquired the duchy of Burgundy, with Dijon as its center, as part of the two-year-old Archduchess Margaret's dowry to King Charles VIII (1470–98) in a ritual betrothal agreement attached to one of the several peaces that

temporarily lulled hostilities. Though the marriage never took place, Charles held on to the land, to Maximilian's deep fury. The province of Guelders to the north, a relatively recent acquisition of Charles the Bold, returned to autonomous status as well.

Furthermore, though the combatants began an extended armistice in 1489, the Netherlands were less prosperous. They had also to be reconciled to Habsburg rule. Major municipalities of the area had rebelled against the role Maximilian had assigned them in his fiscal plans, and he had retaliated in kind. In 1483 he had the mayor of fractious Antwerp executed. With revenues running even lower, however, the Habsburg quickly saw that such harshness would be counterproductive. His decision to accommodate his interests to those of the region's nobles and urban oligarchs set a pattern for Habsburg rule in the Low Countries and most of the other territories they acquired in the early modern era. In return for reasonable cooperation when taxes were called for, Maximilian left many of the political traditions and socioeconomic institutions of the Netherlands intact.

The losses he sustained in the Netherlands, however, and the threat of more to come – the Habsburg–Valois Wars would endure into the second half of the next century – shifted Maximilian's priorities from simply acquiring more territory to defending the perimeters of what he had. Unable to enlarge his sources of funding, he turned to creating claims for himself and his family to most of the important thrones of Europe and some secondary ones as well. His personal gains through marriage and succession agreements, in which dynasties pledged their thrones to one another should either of them die out, were actually atypical of these arrangements. More often than not, generations went by before the stipulations of these compacts became operative, and even then in compromised form. The Netherlands was only one among many political arenas in Europe where local political institutions and customs carried as much weight as did bargains that monarchs struck among themselves. Nor did cadet lines of ruling houses abandon their claims lightly. Thus, in negotiating such arrangements, Maximilian probably hoped to forestall unwanted military confrontations as much as he did to expand his holdings. Even one of his more extravagant schemes, in which the Yorkist pretender to the English throne, Perkin Warbeck (*d.* 1499), signed over his claims to France, England, and Scotland to Maximilian should the former die without legitimate male heirs, addressed the practical problem of defending the new Channel coastline of the Habsburgs.<sup>9</sup> He was also taking advantage of a very favorable diplomatic climate, for by the end

of the fifteenth century Spain, England, and Burgundy all saw France as their natural enemy.

Maximilian's pursuit of defensive marriage alliances was underway years before he accepted his Burgundian standoff in 1489 with Charles VIII. Archduke Philip had scarcely been born before his father was thinking of the infant as a husband for Anne of York, a daughter of Edward IV (1442–83) of England. The Iberian peninsula was another jumping off point for the maritime provinces of the Netherlands, particularly Portugal, to which Maximilian had a tie through his mother, Empress Eleanor (*d.* 1467), a Portuguese princess. France was to be kept from establishing any footholds here as well.<sup>10</sup>

By the last decade of the fifteenth century, anxiety about Portugal and Aragonese interests in Italy also troubled the rulers of Spain, Isabella of Castile and Ferdinand of Aragon. In 1494 Charles VIII invaded the Italian peninsula, occupying Spanish holdings and fiefs of the Holy Roman Empire alike. Ferdinand of Aragon was especially eager for tighter links with Burgundy and the empire; it was in good part his persistence that brought about the dynastic unions that placed the house of Habsburg squarely astride the west–east axis of the European continent until the beginning of the eighteenth century. In November 1495 the Castilian–Aragonese and Austrian houses committed themselves to a double marital bond which joined Maximilian's still-single daughter, Archduchess Margaret, and Ferdinand and Isabella's son, Prince Juan (1478–97); one of the Spanish rulers' daughters, Princess Juana (1479–1555), was to be the wife of Archduke Philip, known as Philip the Handsome, not so much for his appearance but for his free and easy ways.

Two years later, the imagined and the real intersected, at least for Maximilian.<sup>11</sup> An improbable series of deaths of both her elder siblings and their male offspring made Princess Juana and her husband the claimants to the Spanish crowns once King Ferdinand (1452–1516) and Queen Isabella (1451–1504) died. It was their male offspring, to the great distress of Ferdinand of Aragon, who fell heir to the massive Habsburg patrimony. The eldest, Charles (1500–58), became Charles I of Spain in 1516 and Emperor Charles V of Germany in 1519. He also retained control of the Burgundian lands that his grandfather had so ardently protected. His younger brother, Archduke Ferdinand (1503–64), gradually took over the central European holdings and responsibilities of his house after 1521.

Young Ferdinand was also part of yet another bizarrely productive marital scheme of Maximilian I, this time much closer to the Habsburg

Austrian lands. The older man's great worry here was the Jagellonian kingdom of Poland, whose rulers had for some time been trying to extend their lands westward. Maximilian insisted on his rights to the Polish province of Masovia, the homeland of his paternal grandmother. The marriage of Maximilian's granddaughter Isabella (1501–26) to King Christian II (1481–1559) of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden was designed to mount a counterweight to Poland on its Baltic front. As the French began exploring a Polish alliance to help them to encircle the Habsburgs in the east, the need to keep Hungary and Bohemia closely connected to the Habsburgs became more pressing as well. Both of the latter were elective monarchies, in which the estates of the realm formally chose their ruler, though usually from the same house until it died out. Both kingdoms had suffered episodic succession crises since the fourteenth century, compounded in Bohemia by religious civil war. Indeed, since 1471 Bohemia had had a Jagellonian ruler, Vladislav II. Feeble though he was, or perhaps for that reason, he was also chosen King Ladislav II (1456–1516) of Hungary in 1490. Maximilian concluded arrangements with Vladislav in 1491 that called for mutual succession should either line die out in the Austrian lands or in the Hungarian–Bohemian complex. The capstone of this scheme, however, fell into place with a double marriage compact in 1515 between two of his grandchildren, Archduke Ferdinand and Archduchess Mary (1505–58), with the daughter and son respectively of King Vladislav. Unlike the Spanish arrangement, Maximilian would never live to see the fruits of his central European marriage policy. It would, however, yield a bountiful harvest not too long after his death.

### *Attempting an Empire*

Maximilian himself played a relatively subordinate role in Burgundy in the last 20-odd years of his career. The estates wanted their governor to be Archduke Philip, and after 1494 the emperor complied. His attempts to exercise some supervision over the personnel in his son's government and the region's fiscal affairs were regularly frustrated. The taxable wealth of the Netherlands, therefore, was not to be his, even though he needed it desperately to cover other responsibilities. The Ottoman empire threatened to overrun the eastern borders of his Austrian patrimony; as emperor he had a host of obligations in Germany, several of which, such as maintaining internal peace and protecting imperial claims in northern Italy, required military intervention.

Maximilian attacked these issues with the mixture of flamboyance and hardheadedness he brought to his challenges in the Netherlands. Though he talked fervently about heading a vast crusade to drive the Ottoman Turks from Europe and the Mediterranean, his rhetoric had a very specific target. This was the papacy, which historically had contributed major financing to such ventures and whose support Maximilian thought would rescue him from his worst fiscal embarrassments. He also understood that lofty language was no substitute for effective government, without which he would not realize his greater goals.

The Austrian Habsburg patrimony, which had been divided in the middle of the fourteenth century, was his alone to rule after 1490, when his distant cousin, Archduke Sigismund (1427–96), ceded him the Tyrol. Around 1500 these territories taken together held between 1 and 1.5 million people. While around 80 percent of the population of the Austrian lands lived directly or indirectly from agriculture, that figure had dropped considerably from the 93 percent of 200 years earlier. Lower Austria, a comparatively wealthy region in the Middle Ages, had suffered considerably during Frederick III's wars with Matthias Corvinus of Hungary. Nevertheless, the rest of Maximilian's central European holdings at the outset of his reign were enjoying something of an agricultural boom. Even more remunerative for him were mines, which employed perhaps a quarter of his subjects. Significant veins of silver ran through the Tyrol, where a soaring population, a key indicator of economic vitality, rose from 70,000 in 1427 to around 150,000 in 1630.<sup>12</sup> A central location on the trading route over the Brenner Pass further enhanced the province's importance. Maximilian therefore protected it as intensely as he did Burgundy; to secure Tyrolean borders against Bavaria and Italy he acquired several small territories to the north and south of the region.<sup>13</sup>

To have title to such wealth was one thing; to actualize it, however, was quite another. Like many rulers of his time, Maximilian was eager to control his lands as directly as he could, a first step in gaining access to resources that could rescue him from the financial pressures that beset him. Hoping to administer both his patrimonial holdings and the fiscal affairs of the empire from Innsbruck, he took his model from the Burgundy of his late father-in-law, who occasionally calculated his revenues at a table with the treasury clerks hired for the job. From roughly 1491 to almost his death, Maximilian devoted himself in fits and starts to fashioning offices that would further efficient government and fiscal stability. By 1518, three major sectors were in place. The court council (*Hofrat*) advised him generally and was often called upon for

opinions in both local disputes and imperial ones, particularly quarrels between individual German territories. The court chancellory (*Hofkanzlei*) generated state documents and correspondence; and the court treasury (*Hofkammer*) oversaw finances. Imperial business and the affairs of the Habsburg dynastic patrimony were handled by the same personnel on a case-by-case basis.

Maximilian clung stubbornly to his visions. The estates in the Netherlands stifled any attempts to harmonize their fiscal operations with those of the empire and Habsburg Austria, and Germany stymied his efforts to create the forerunner of an imperial standing army. Nevertheless, the emperor did not abandon transterritoriality in his own holdings. His officers in Innsbruck were instructed by Burgundians, bankers from mercantile Augsburg, and Saxons and Swabians. Tyroleans themselves would be sent to Lower Austria to instruct officials there in their territorial overlord's administrative methods.

Persuading his subjects to accept tighter princely control of their lives and livelihoods was, however, exceedingly difficult. Maximilian's lands in central Europe observed a common Christianity, at least up to 1517 and the onset of the Protestant Reformation. Beyond that, however, there was little to bring them together. Each of these lands had well-developed identities and were jealous of their historical prerogatives, especially where revenues and properties were concerned. The regional influence of local estates and the aristocrats who dominated them had, if anything, expanded during the chaotic decades of Maximilian's predecessors. Should a territorial prince threaten their privileges, these men were very quick to defend them.

Estates in Austria did not welcome tutelage from Innsbruck on financial matters or other subjects. Though Maximilian left the superstructure of a centralized administration, its effectiveness was heavily qualified by the many concessions he had to make to local sensibilities. After 1502, Lower Austria had a subsidiary administration and treasury which, while theoretically subordinate to the Habsburg government in Innsbruck, kept as distant from Tyrolean oversight as it could. The estates were also accustomed to dealing with their territorial ruler personally when important financial and legal issues were at stake. Maximilian's efforts to use his officers and their subordinates as his negotiators aroused great hostility as well. The grotesque sums of money that Maximilian spent in realizing his pan-European ambitions, even in fulfilling his conventional responsibilities, antagonized a broad spectrum of his subjects, from officers of local estates to peasants, who bore the brunt of taxation.

Denied direct access to the resources of Burgundy, Germany, even his own lands, Maximilian fell back on customary taxes and tolls for cash, thereby putting himself even more at the mercy of his Austrian lands, the only place from which he drew such incomes regularly. What revenues these imposts generated, he used profligately. Over 70 percent of Maximilian's income in 1508 went to a war with Venice; armed intervention between 1508 and 1516 to uphold imperial rights in Italy forced him to mortgage almost all of his regalian incomes, anticipated duties on imports and exports, and rents from various properties. The cost of winning the support of the German electors for naming his grandson Charles V as his successor in 1519 added up to around a million gulden, much of which Maximilian borrowed from the Augsburg banking house of Fugger. Once again, the Austrian lands and their revenues served as collateral. As one of Europe's habitual borrowers and mortgagers of regalian properties, Maximilian was versed in the dangers of over-extended credit. But faced with the need to protect his borders, defend imperial prerogatives, and advance the interests of the house of Habsburg, all three of which were tightly linked in his thinking, he was in no position to internalize the fiscal discipline that his half-realized administrative reforms were supposed to promote.<sup>14</sup>

But even if Maximilian had launched his administrative agenda in less pressured times, his subjects would have been no more receptive to them. While his public never rejected him as a man – he was a master of self-presentation, personally engaging, and could offset dignity with self-deprecating humor – the intermediate authorities in the lands he ruled, in Burgundy, then in Austria, and less directly even in Germany, had little sympathy for the grander ambitions of the house of Habsburg and were willing to use whatever legal power they had to keep it within bounds. Maximilian had no alternative other than to compromise with them. Furthermore, in his own way he was just as rooted in conventional political assumptions as were the estates. Major administrative offices were created more as matters of ad hoc challenges than as part of a total concept. Burgundian centralization and the larger administrative apparatus that went with it attracted him as a means to a very specific end – improving his finances. His understanding of government remained as personal as was that of his estates. Only when his health began to fail badly in 1518 did he set up the *Hofrat* with 18 nobles and jurists from both the empire and his Austrian lands to relieve him of responsibilities that he admittedly was no longer strong enough to handle.<sup>15</sup>

Thus Maximilian had written a basic but imperfect script for the organization of a Habsburg government now charged with administering a territorial complex that extended far beyond the dynasty's medieval patrimony in central Europe. Though he preferred to leave the give and take of ruling his Austrian patrimony to the more detached management of councils staffed with his stand-ins, he continued to personalize his own role in his lands. He was the final voice of authority. He had rethought the structure through which he exercised his power, but only under the pressure of necessity. He had also made plain that the defense of that complex, along with the other titles that he held in Germany, was central to Habsburg policy. Maintaining the integrity of his borders, by wars, by alliances – marital, military, diplomatic – even by further territorial expansion, was his first priority. If cooperating with local estates and interests was the only way he could realize these goals, he was ready to do so.

#### *Ferdinand I and the Construction of Habsburg Central Europe*

The late emperor's testament ordered the division of the Habsburg Austrian patrimony between his two grandsons, Charles and Ferdinand, whose territorial position had yet to be fixed. Maximilian and Ferdinand of Aragon had discussed the younger archduke's future often, but inconclusively; the partition of the Austrian lands was solely the emperor's initiative. By 1522, however, Charles's and Ferdinand's spokesmen had agreed to assign most of the Austrian lands to Ferdinand to govern; after 1525 he held them all. Ferdinand had also been the male Habsburg beneficiary of the double marriage compact of 1515. Husband since 1521 of Princess Anna (1503–47), the daughter of Vladislav II of Hungary and Bohemia, he had entered into a rewarding union, both materially and emotionally. The Hungarian and Bohemian estates insisted that Anna's consort have princely holdings of his own, an argument that helped move Charles's advisers into allowing Ferdinand's installation as territorial ruler over most of Austria. By the time Anna died in 1547 – a devastating blow to her spouse – she had given birth to 15 children who supplied their father with more than enough resources to whet his skills as a marital politician.

Ferdinand owed his position in Austria to his grandfather, but the failures of the elder Habsburg's policies soon challenged the young archduke sorely. The fault lines running through Maximilian I's

administrative structure were opening even before the young archduke had permanently relocated to central Europe. Maximilian's incessant requests for funding, his disregard for local prerogative and custom, his willingness to mortgage some of his richest assets to 'foreigners', such as the Fuggers who were now profiting from some of his mines in the Tyrol, had enraged commoners and nobles alike in provincial estates. Discontent ran perhaps highest in Vienna and Lower Austria, in which the city was territorially embedded, and organized opposition sprang up throughout the region. The presence of key advisers from Spain and the Netherlands at Ferdinand's court irritated his new subjects even more.<sup>16</sup>

By 1525, Ferdinand had forcibly subdued his mutinous peasants and mine workers. In Vienna itself he had appointed a judicial commission that in 1522 ordered the execution of major conspirators, including the mayor, Martin Siebenbürger. From then until well into the nineteenth century, the territorial ruler of the Austrian lands had close oversight over the political life of the city. With the exception of the Tyrol after 1525, however, the provincial estates of all the Habsburg domains would resist the dynasty's control. Their position received reinforcement from two developments which, though independent in origin, intersected during the sixteenth century in central Europe and gave the Habsburg enterprise much of its peculiar character.

One was the Protestant Reformation. Spreading rapidly to the Austrian lands after Martin Luther's (1483–1546) excommunication in 1520, it came in many forms. Most important were the doctrines that Luther and his followers developed and incorporated into the Augsburg Confession of 1532. Calvinism, named after the French cleric who settled in Geneva and challenged Luther on basic issues such as the meaning of the sacrament of communion, put in an appearance somewhat later. More troublesome yet for their reluctance to engage in secular warfare were the political and spiritual radicals who have historically, though inaccurately, been gathered under the rubric of Anabaptism. Confessional diversity bespoke a divided polity and, worse yet, imperfect authority; all were anathema to Europe's rulers. Though he soon found ways of making necessary compromises with Luther's partisans who acknowledged the legitimacy of civil authority, Ferdinand was deeply uncomfortable with a sundered Christendom and would work very hard to reknit it.

His other, and more frightening, problem was the steady progress of the Ottoman Turks through southeastern Europe. Their chief line of march had followed the course of the Danube, a river that ran through

Serbia and Hungary on to Austria above and below the Enns. Carinthia and Styria to the south were frontally exposed to attack from Constantinople as well. The Ottoman offensive had been underway since the latter third of the fourteenth century; while often interrupted, it had unfailingly resumed at times when the sultan was free from problems on his other borders.

The key to keeping the Turks out of the Austrian lands was a militarily strong Hungary, which ran along most of the eastern and southeastern border of the Habsburg lands. The house of Austria had long been sensitive to the vital strategic roles of that kingdom, and of Bohemia to the north as well. No effective natural boundaries separated the three territorial complexes; the Danube, the preeminent topographical feature of the region, all but invited the invasion of Hungary or Lower Austria rather than discouraged it. Before his sudden death in 1490, Matthias Corvinus had been on the way to enlarging his realms westward at the expense of Frederick III. The Bohemian crownlands and northeastern Austria above the Enns had a seamless boundary through heavily forested but generally penetrable terrain. From King Otakar, vanquished by Rudolph I, to Hussites, followers of the early fifteenth-century Czech reformer Jan Hus (*d.* 1415), Bohemian armies had marauded in the eastern Habsburg lands.

For almost two centuries the Habsburgs had been securing their northern and eastern borders by nuptial compacts with the kings of Hungary and Bohemia and by mutual succession agreements. The latter, while rarely enforced, did address the real problem of maintaining the friendship of neighboring rulers over time. Each generation of the house of Austria from Rudolph I until Frederick III married into the royal families of those two kingdoms; one Habsburg, Albrecht V (1397–1439), did actually rule the two countries from 1437 until his death. He was followed by a posthumous son, Ladislav I (1440–57).

As long as the fundamentals of those agreements stood undisturbed, the dynasty seemed in no hurry to force its rights of succession in Bohemia and Hungary. Wishing to concentrate on western and imperial affairs, Frederick III had not pressed his claims in Bohemia when that throne briefly fell vacant in 1439.<sup>17</sup> The Habsburg–Jagellonian succession treaty of 1491 was worded to perpetuate itself, and not to accelerate a shift of power. Particular attention was paid to guaranteeing the fidelity of Hungarian regencies should a minor become king to the larger agreement. Nor, should the Habsburgs actually take over Hungary, did they want to look like conquerors. They would not enter the kingdom with an

army until they had received a proper welcome at the border from the prelates and notables of the realm. The sensibilities of the Bohemian estates were also considered: Vladislav II vowed in 1491 that he would try to win their assent to the arrangement.<sup>18</sup>

But the intrusion of the Turks into central Europe brought an element of stark urgency into Ferdinand I's relations with the two kingdoms on his eastern borders. The lands of the Crown of St. Stephen had valiantly withstood Ottoman expansion for more than a century. But those days were over by 1521. Ruling Hungary was now the feckless, even childish Louis II (1506–26), who had married Archduchess Mary, Ferdinand's younger sister. Turmoil dominated the kingdom's politics; landed magnates with enormous properties and more modest country squires struggled to influence the crown, or, in some cases, to capture it for themselves.

Ferdinand at first tried to persuade his brother-in-law to manage his resources in ways beneficial to Hungary's self-defense. Louis responded tepidly at best. All such policies, however, became irrelevant in 1526 when Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent (*d.* 1566) launched a massive invasion of central Europe which ended with the death of Louis while fleeing from a crushing defeat at Mohács in southwestern Hungary. Ferdinand lost no time in gaining the Hungarian and Bohemian crowns for himself, tasks that he completed at least formally by 1527. He had to move fast. Sigismund I (1467–1548), the Jagellonian ruler of Poland, was the uncle of the late King Louis and the erstwhile brother-in-law of John Zápolya (1487–1540). The latter was *voivode*, or duke of Transylvania, a quasi-autonomous principality of the Hungarian crown; he had been named king of Hungary by a faction of the Hungarian estates before Ferdinand's selection by yet another group. Sigismund had already hinted that he was willing to cooperate with the Turks, the last thought Ferdinand wanted in the mind of any ruler ensconced on Habsburg borders.

Thus, even with his new titles, Ferdinand's hold of his new kingdoms was initially precarious; he spent much of his life making the Habsburg position in both of these kingdoms more secure. Zápolya was subdued, though not decisively vanquished, during the summer of 1527. In the Treaty of Nagyvárad of 1538, Ferdinand acknowledged his rival's right to rule in Transylvania. Furthermore, the *voivode* had put himself under the protection of the sultan in exchange for tribute, thus giving Suleiman and his immediate successors considerable power over Habsburg policy in Hungary. Transylvania would remain a weak point in the dynasty's military defenses to the end of the seventeenth century and

even beyond. Ferdinand never would control more than the western third of Hungary; by the middle of the sixteenth century, vast portions of the central part of the kingdom would fall under the sway of the sultans in Constantinople.

Equally problematic were Ferdinand's relationships with the Hungarian and Bohemian estates. From the outset of his career, Ferdinand was acutely sensitive to the role that these bodies, particularly membership from the high nobility, played in the kingdoms. As soon as he came to the Austrian lands, he began developing contacts with leading Bohemian aristocratic families such as the Rožmitals and the Pernštejns.<sup>19</sup> Though he insisted that Bohemia and Hungary were hereditarily his through his relationship to his wife, he did allow the estates to go through the mechanics of their electoral process in both realms. In bargaining with the estates over the conditions of his rule, however, he made it plain that he would raise the issue again. Nevertheless, both sides needed one another, and, as long as the threat of Ottoman conquest was on everyone's mind, for somewhat similar purposes.

Control of Hungary was essential to Ferdinand's defense of his Austrian holdings. The Hungarians, for their part, were interested in his resources. The aristocracy, particularly its heavily propertied segment, clearly expected the Habsburgs to reconquer those parts of the kingdom lost to the Turks and, once that mission had been accomplished, restore newly freed lands to their former occupants. Such men wanted Ferdinand as their king, not for his character and talents but for his close relationship to Emperor Charles V, who they thought would contribute German resources to their cause.

In return for a crown, the new king was prepared to respond in the desired way. He, too, certainly wanted to drive the Ottoman occupation from central Hungary. Illustrious names such as Thomas Nádasdy, who campaigned actively for his election, even some who bargained with all sides in the divided kingdom, were generously rewarded with the lands that were his to distribute. The fortunes of noble families who held on to their huge estates down to the end of World War I soared in the sixteenth century. At its end the nobility in the Habsburg portion of Hungary had oversight of almost 80 percent of all peasant households in the region. Magnates continued to support private armies – something of a necessity under the constant threat of Turkish invasion – and supplying them was a profitable enterprise for landowners. Although some of the great Hungarian houses that supplied the officers of the crown had died at Mohács, Ferdinand and his successors replaced them

with other families.<sup>20</sup> Perhaps the most fortunate of all were the Esterházy, whose origins were in the country gentry but whose wealth grew to colossal proportions in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

The greatest hopes of the Hungarian nobility were, however, sadly misplaced for decades. Spanish–Burgundian concerns preoccupied Charles V far more than did the problems of central Europe, where he would go to war with Suleiman only if the Ottoman army truly threatened Germany. Such a situation seemed to be developing in 1532, and the emperor did assemble a massive force with which Ferdinand and Habsburg supporters in Hungary hoped they could begin the reconquest of the kingdom. But the sultan unexpectedly pulled back, and the emperor, to his brother's dismay, withdrew as well, thus aborting any larger enterprises.

Ferdinand, moreover, did no better when acting on his own initiative. Two campaigns in 1541 and 1542 to retake Buda and Pest on either side of the Danube ended only in entrenching Ottoman government in both places; efforts to dislodge John Zápolya's widow and son from Transylvania in the 1550s also came to naught. Habsburg failure to meet the expectations of their noble collaborators in Hungary thus left the latter always open to the blandishments of others who promised to further their goals – the dukes of Transylvania, even the sultans themselves. Outright bribery was Ferdinand's only way of retaining Hungarian loyalty, but it cost him dearly. He began complaining bitterly about the fickleness of his support early in his career, but had no alternative but to accept the situation and the dictates it imposed on him as best he could.<sup>21</sup>

Matching Ferdinand's purposes with those of the estates in Bohemia, less directly threatened by Ottoman offensives, was even harder. The kingdom had one of Europe's most diverse and developed economies and important natural resources, especially the silver mines of Jachým and Kutná Hora. The new king was very eager to get his hands on these revenues, in part to defray his expenses in Hungary. The estates, dominated by a relatively small number of landed magnates, were just as keen on controlling this wealth and their monopoly over the high administrative offices of the realm. The lethargic rule of Ferdinand's immediate predecessors had only encouraged the ambitions of these men and their families. What they expected from the Habsburg was a better government but one that respected their long-standing privileges. In return for their support, Ferdinand also had to rescue at least some of them from financial embarrassments. Lev Zdeněk of Rožmítal, the high burgrave of the

kingdom and the preeminent officer of the crown, needed around 50,000 florins to satisfy his creditors. The Šliků, another leading family, wanted Ferdinand's promise that he would not touch incomes which they drew from the royal mines at Kutná Hora. Like the Hungarians, most members of the Bohemian estates also hoped that Ferdinand's connections with Charles would supply the young monarch with funds to pay off the debts of his last two predecessors.<sup>22</sup>

Religion complicated Bohemian affairs as well. The estates wished their kings to guarantee the position of the Hussite or Utraquist church, which permitted the laity to take both the bread and the chalice at communion in both kinds and was unique to the kingdom since the fifteenth century. Ferdinand's most persistent competitor for the throne had been the Wittelsbach dukes of Bavaria, whose rigid Catholicism had ultimately worked against them in Prague. Here, too, opponent of evangelical reform though he was, Ferdinand dealt with the Bohemians very circumspectly. While he promised to protect the Utraquist faith, his construction of that confession was very narrow. He, and his immediate successors, would publicly combat inroads Luther's doctrines made in the Hussite credo, as well as offshoots of that movement, most importantly the Czech Brethren. The stance, while perhaps technically correct, did please conservative Utraquists, but practically no one else, Catholics included. It did not, however, in Ferdinand's time, provoke religious rebellion.

Even when the opportunity to alter his relationship to the Bohemian estates came his way, Ferdinand did not attack the magnate class nor the religious constitution of the realm systematically. During the 1540s, the kingdom's nobles and cities had begun to put aside traditional differences in a loose coalition against Ferdinand's relentless efforts to tax them more heavily. The situation reached crisis proportions in 1547 during the Schmalkaldic war, Charles V's military campaign against German Protestantism. As the emperor drew further eastward, many of Ferdinand's opponents in Bohemia supported the Lutheran Elector of Saxony, John Frederick. The Habsburgs, however, prevailed. Four Bohemian nobles did lose their heads for their treachery, but as a group they did not suffer. Aristocratic high officials from the crownland of Moravia were members of the court that handed out these penalties, and their political and social perspectives may have influenced these decisions. Important Bohemian magnate families, most notably the Rožmberks and the equally wealthy Pernštejns, had supported their king unwaveringly. They and other loyalists among their colleagues profited

from the land Ferdinand confiscated from the dissidents, as did those cities which remained in his camp. The heaviest penalty fell on disloyal townsmen, especially in Prague. Cities alone now shouldered three months of his war expenses; they were also obligated to pay a perpetual beer tax that generated vast future revenues for the crown. As in Hungary, Ferdinand clearly wanted more cooperative estates, not a kingdom minus estates altogether.<sup>23</sup>

### *Administering an Empire*

Though no military leader, Ferdinand, like Maximilian I, was administratively imaginative and eager to turn his ideas into tools that would give him better control over his lands. Even before he fully pacified his Austrian patrimony in the early 1520s, he had established a makeshift *Hofrat* for Lower Austria to carry on judicial and government business in his absence. He also set up a collections office, a *Raitkammer*, to gather his ordinary revenues – tolls, tariffs, income from mines and the like – in the province. By 1525, Ferdinand, having put down the most seditious elements among his Austrian subjects, was ready to reintroduce some of his grandfather's major innovations under more favorable circumstances. Presiding in his brother's stead over the German diet, a gathering of the emperor along with Germany's territorial secular and spiritual rulers and representatives of major cities, Ferdinand received a delegation from the estates of his Austrian lands themselves, who urged the young Habsburg to create a permanent *Hofrat*. They had a program of their own: to dilute the influence of Ferdinand's Burgundian and Spanish advisers, particularly that of an ambitious man named Gabriel Salamanca, who ran Ferdinand's treasury and his chancellery with little regard for the sensibilities of either greater or lesser nobility throughout the entire Habsburg Austrian patrimony. Therefore, any offices in this body were to be staffed with men of distinction, by which they meant notables indigenous to the Austrian lands like themselves. They also wanted the young archduke to bring order into his treasury and government offices generally. The price of these demands was financial aid which Ferdinand desperately needed at that moment: Suleiman the Magnificent was preparing the westward drive which culminated in the Hungarian disaster at Mohács.

Thus, his own interests as well as those of his estates dictated that Ferdinand add a chancellery and a treasury to the court council, estab-

lishing a structure fully described in his Court Executive Order (*Hofstaatsordnung*) of 1 January 1527.<sup>24</sup> Unlike the prototype of Maximilian I, it would remain in effect with only minor changes until the large-scale reform of Habsburg government undertaken by Empress Maria Theresa (1717–80) and her advisers in the eighteenth century. Ferdinand apparently also consulted a smaller advisory body, a privy council, though there is no evidence that he formally assigned it any function.

Ferdinand also granted his estates' request that he appoint natives of the Austrian lands or people closely associated with those lands as his high court and government officials. The outstanding exception was his high equerry, the Spanish poet Don Pedro Laso de Castilla, who held the position until 1548.<sup>25</sup> Nevertheless, his administrative structure, like that of Maximilian I, operated only at the will of the prince. Relations between territorial ruler and estates in the Austrian lands therefore remained tense, even competitive. Ferdinand's efforts and those of his immediate heirs to improve the administration of their lands faltered for want of large pools of administrative talent among their subjects. The need of his estates for people with the same skills in local offices made a general shortage all the worse.<sup>26</sup> But the outlines for a pattern of mutual accommodation between two constitutional entities in the Austrian lands had been drafted.

Extending this organizational model to Hungary and Bohemia was his next task once Ferdinand acquired these lands in 1526, but also a very problematic one. His informal efforts to make the political classes in these lands Habsburg partners were quite successful. Turning the young aristocrats of one's realms into courtiers was becoming a familiar technique for curbing noble independence, and Ferdinand did what he could in this vein. To help his three sons, Archdukes Maximilian (1527–76), Ferdinand (1529–95), and, somewhat later, Charles (1540–90), acquire some grasp of the languages of the peoples that they would eventually rule, he brought young noblemen from all corners of his realms to be schooled at the court. There they would babble at the Habsburgs who, in time, were to pick up what was being said and reply as best they could.

True structural integration of his lands, however, eluded Ferdinand. Initially he hoped to use the court council, the treasury, and the privy council as the highest administrative offices for all his lands. He even reserved places for Hungarians and Bohemians in the *Hofrat*. Fearing that such a move would erode the identity that gave them most of their own power and influence, the estates of his new kingdoms would not cooperate. For the rest of the sixteenth century and well into the seven-

teenth, Hungarian and Bohemian affairs were dispatched in separate chancelleries; in Bohemia local crown officers such as the high burgrave exercised extensive administrative control over the realm. Hungary's regional counties remained largely apart from direct royal authority.

Ferdinand's estates, moreover, retained substantive fiscal powers. Their agents collected revenues from even such key imposts as the Bohemian beer tax; such men did not overly bestir themselves to see that monies were delivered promptly, especially in Ferdinand's last years.<sup>27</sup> Nor did Ferdinand make much effort to restrain any of his nobilities from adding to the labor requirements of peasants and serfs in a time of rising prices for agricultural products. In 1563, a year before his death, he agreed upon petition from the estates of Lower Austria to refrain from fixing a maximum for servile labor (*Robot*) on noble domains. On regalian properties, however, a maximum of 12 days a year was to be the rule. He did ask that nobles continue to follow tradition and local custom when setting such duties, but this was more suggestion than policy. The nobles throughout the Habsburg lands would continue to have wide discretion in managing their agricultural labor force well into the eighteenth century. Serfdom as an institution would endure down to the revolutions of 1848.<sup>28</sup>

Given the military and political pressures he faced, Ferdinand's administrative compromises in Hungary and Bohemia were all but a foregone conclusion. Nevertheless, the successful refusal of Bohemians and Hungarians to join the central institutions of his government was a clear sign that the Habsburg *modus vivendi* with the notables of these lands was a work in progress in which the dynasty had yet to develop even an equal role. With the exception of the Bohemian uprising in 1547, which positioned him to exploit its tax revenues more favorably, Ferdinand was a perpetual supplicant in his own dominions, as were his immediate heirs.

Thus, the territorial complex that Ferdinand put together in central and east central Europe, while impressive in outline, was not a functional unit. Its administrative reach was too compromised, and even its expanded form after 1526 fit Habsburg purposes less effectively than had prior arrangements used to protect the Austrian lands. A real buffer state between Ottoman and Habsburg holdings, even one ruled as ineptly as Hungary, was preferable to defending yet more territory with essentially the same resources. Cooperation of local intermediary powers was in some ways far more crucial for the Habsburgs than for those whom they ruled.

Moreover, even had the privileged nobilities of the Habsburg lands been more docile, is it likely that Ferdinand and his immediate heirs

could have administered their lands any better than they did? In practice, Ferdinand I and his son Emperor Maximilian II insisted on approaching state management as personally, and therefore as inconsistently, as had Maximilian I. At his death Ferdinand I divided his lands among his sons, thereby undermining both the spirit and the letter of reforms he had worked a lifetime to establish. Furthermore, the clarity on paper of his and Maximilian II's administrative agendas lost much of their resolution as decisions were being made, especially about personnel. Whom to hire, whom to dismiss, whom to repay, whom to put off – these decisions were often shaped by the moral values of the family and the household rather than by calculations of cost and benefit which members of the dynasty understood, but did not accept as an absolute priority.<sup>29</sup> When cash flow was a problem for the government, the impoverished servant was paid because of his or her needs and not because of job performance or the importance of what they did. Household personnel and court functionaries were kept on staff only because of the financial hardship dismissal would bring to them. Salaries, even for crucial positions, were paid irregularly and were hardly commensurate to the responsibilities of the men who received them. Even though they deplored the practice, Ferdinand and Maximilian distributed huge sums of money as special grants to their employees, particularly toward the end of their reigns. Indeed, one could argue that without the financial restraint that their estates imposed on the Habsburgs in the sixteenth century the dynasty would have had no frame of reference beyond its own definition of need for evaluating the costs of political and military policies.<sup>30</sup> The house of Habsburg thus depended upon its estates not only for funds but for discipline.

### *Religious Divisions*

Ferdinand's efforts to impose a uniform administrative structure on his new lands were not the only reason for his troubles with his estates. The Protestant Reformation gave him even greater problems. Like many devout Catholics of his time, he thought that reform of the Church of Rome was needed. The process, however, had to follow the moderate lines of Christian humanists such as Erasmus of Rotterdam (*d.* 1536), whose influence was strong not only on Ferdinand, but on Charles V. Neither brother, however, wanted to break with the papacy, politically or theologically. And, once again, Ferdinand did not want to antagonize his estates any more than he had to.

Developing a religious policy to satisfy various popes, a confessionally divided central Europe, and Charles and Ferdinand's genuinely sensitive consciences was a tricky matter. As holders of multiple crowns, the Habsburgs often found themselves in situations where measures useful to them in one realm were disadvantageous in another. Estates, on the other hand, were quick to demand equal treatment when they saw something positive in procedures that their territorial ruler was following elsewhere. In dealing with Luther's reform and its offshoots, the Habsburgs would come close to undoing all that they had put together in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.

The dynasty's relationship to Germany was an important part of the problem. Since the time of Rudolph I, the house of Austria had recognized the value of the imperial crown. At the very least, Rudolph and Frederick III had shown that the prestige associated with the office opened the way for territorially strategic marriages. Though the powers of the emperor had dwindled over the centuries, he still had a few that were exceedingly important. Chief among them was his right to assign titles in Germany, confer fiefs, and enforce observation of testaments made by the empire's territorial rulers. The last of these was very important, for it allowed an emperor to resolve disputed inheritances and, in so doing, to obligate to himself families who benefitted from his decisions, at least for a while. The imperial princes were also happy to leave defense of their territorial integrity to their sovereign, since they themselves, singly or even allied, were usually unable to command the wherewithal required for such undertakings.

Nevertheless, by the beginning of the sixteenth century the locus of political authority in Germany had decidedly shifted to its many territorial rulers, some of whom commanded substantial holdings. The dukes and electors of Saxony and the electors of Brandenburg, so-called because they and five other colleges had the right to vote for the emperor after the middle of the fourteenth century, were conspicuous examples. Others had their seats on very sensitive boundaries: the lands of the Elector Palatine ran along the Rhine, making them the first in the line of march of armies leaving France. The Wittelsbach dukes of Bavaria had a history of contesting Habsburg ambitions in central and east central Europe, including the imperial succession itself.

Habsburg borders, especially after the acquisition of Bohemia, could be attacked through or from all of these territories; therefore, the dynasty had all the more reason to hang on to the imperial crown. Other rulers wanted the job. When Francis I (1494–1547) of France offered himself

as a candidate for imperial office in 1519, the entire house of Austria shuddered. The seven imperial electors voted for Charles V only upon receipt of lavish emoluments from Maximilian I, whose already frayed credit rating disintegrated completely with this new borrowing. The empire was also a potential source of significant military aid for its emperors.

The imperial diet, which spoke for both the spiritual and the secular princes of Germany as well as certain categories of cities, came together periodically with the emperor, as did a council of the electors. Spokesmen for the regional administrative districts, called circles (*Kreise*), met with him irregularly as well. All of these bodies fulfilled agreed-upon obligations slowly, if at all, and with ill-paid and unreliable mercenaries, but they could, on occasion, be generous. Even as the Germans became increasingly skeptical of requests for funding the reconquest of Hungary in the sixteenth century, they rarely refused any aid at all, especially when Ottoman armies drew uncomfortably near.

Thus, Habsburg interests mandated cooperation from both Germany's princes and estates in the Austrian lands, Hungary, and Bohemia. The Protestant Reformation strained all of these relationships to the utmost, especially after 1526. Meeting that year with the imperial diet in Augsburg and desperate for aid to counter the Turkish attack that ended with the death of Louis of Hungary, Ferdinand I agreed to allow the German princes who had adopted the Lutheran reform to require that their subjects follow suit. Catholic territorial rulers had the same privilege. Ferdinand meant this as a temporary concession – he revoked it in 1529 – pending a final resolution of the controversy by a church council, be it solely German or one called by the pope himself.<sup>31</sup>

Though this formula eased Ferdinand's immediate problem, his exchange of military aid for religious concessions set a precedent that the house of Habsburg would regret, especially after 1555 when he re-endorsed the division of Germany between Catholics and Lutherans in the Peace of Augsburg. Almost every time the dynasty faced an Ottoman offensive, appeals for aid were met with demands from one or the other of their own estates or the imperial diet for changes in religious policies. Protestants wanted greater freedoms for their creeds, Catholics wanted to preserve the status quo or to see the evangelical movements eradicated altogether. One or the other religious side always had objections to the terms of these bargains, and the network of cooperating noble elites and clerical officials that the dynasty required to further its own political and military concerns remained in a state of flux.

Estates in the Habsburg lands mobilized this strategy even when the dynasty's appeals for funds were not directly linked to imminent invasion from Constantinople. In 1568, Emperor Maximilian II extended far-reaching freedoms to Luther's followers in Lower Austria. For their part, the estates promised to take over his vast debts, many of them inherited from his father, and to support work on a creed that all of his peoples could adopt. He carefully avoided the formal establishment of an evangelical church in his Austrian lands, a concession to Catholics. Nevertheless, he opened a path that, by 1571, led him to formal recognition of the rights of Lutherans to exercise their faith in the province. Though only nobles received the privilege – cities and market towns were expressly ruled out – his action infuriated the loyal Catholics among his subjects, his Spanish relatives in Madrid, and the popes in Rome. In 1578, a similar measure was introduced in Inner Austria, made up of Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola, along with the Dalmatian lands of Gorizia, Istria, and Friuli and the port of Trieste at the head of the Adriatic, now governed by his youngest brother, Archduke Charles.

A variant of this scenario unfolded in the kingdom of Bohemia in the 1570s. Here Maximilian II was eager before his death to have the estates of the kingdom acknowledge his son Rudolph as his successor. Grievances against tax rates were mounting in the estates; spearheaded by William of Rožmberk, whose family had once looked to the Habsburgs for strong leadership, a new generation of spokesmen were asking for fiscal relief and for changes in the religious profile of the kingdom as well. Their most serious demand was for the recognition of a Lutheran-oriented wing of the Utraquist church. Maximilian resisted the introduction of a synthesized Bohemian Protestant confession which incorporated Lutheran, Calvinist, and Utraquist elements. He did, however, informally acknowledge Protestant rights to worship in the kingdom, in return for the Bohemians' recognition of his son Rudolph (1552–1612) as their next ruler.

### *Catholics Rearm*

The Peace of Augsburg of 1555 did relieve some of the tension between Luther's evangelicals and traditional Catholics in Germany, and between Emperor Ferdinand I and Maximilian II and the Protestant princes of the Holy Roman Empire. Reconciling the two confessions still seemed possible to many, the two emperors included. The accord did nothing,

however, to resolve religious problems in the Habsburg domains themselves. Neither man dared offend the large numbers of Protestants in their estates by taking the opening given them in the Augsburg formula to enforce Catholic uniformity where they ruled. Only in the Tyrol, governed until the end of the sixteenth century by the impeccably orthodox Archduke Ferdinand II (1529–95), did Catholicism remain firm. In the lands not subject to imperial jurisdiction – Bohemia since the fourteenth century and the third of Hungary that was Habsburg territory – religious pluralism prevailed as well. The upper chamber of the Hungarian royal estates remained under Catholic control because of the bishops who were entitled to seats in it.<sup>32</sup> Nevertheless, even a shared confession did not lead to consistent cooperation between Hungary's great lords and the Habsburgs. Moreover, in the eastern regions of the kingdom, especially near and in Transylvania, Calvinism, along with several smaller groups such as the Unitarians, had an important presence in the estates that caused much trouble between them and Vienna until into the eighteenth century.

The court in Vienna was, however, Catholic in name – indeed, somewhat more than that under Ferdinand I. Even as the fate of the Church of Rome in central Europe seemed ever more uncertain, he was preparing the way for its vigorous defense.<sup>33</sup> In 1551 Ferdinand brought a new order, the Jesuits from Spain, to energize the Catholic renewal to which he had always been deeply committed. He opened the University of Vienna to them immediately. They quickly installed themselves in schools throughout the Austrian provinces – Innsbruck in the Tyrol in 1562, Graz, in Styria, ten years later, and in Linz around 1600. The Jesuit University of Graz was founded in 1586. Maximilian II's attachments to Rome were far weaker, but his wife, Empress Maria, was a one-woman redoubt of Catholic orthodoxy; and her brother, Philip II of Spain, did all he could to promote her activities. She was an especially enthusiastic patroness of the Jesuits, as were a couple of Maximilian's sisters who were cloistered near Innsbruck in the Tyrol. Indeed, one of them, Archduchess Magdalene, all but bankrupted herself in her profligate support of the order. Jesuits would remain very close to the ruling house; they educated many of its members and heard their confessions well into the eighteenth century.

Organized in 1534 by St Ignatius Loyola, a one-time Spanish soldier who came to his religious vocation on the mend from a serious injury, the Jesuits quickly became missionaries and pedagogues to central Europe. In some ways they were religious modernizers: they respected the classical scholarship of Renaissance humanists and realized that they

would have to incorporate it into their own language pedagogy to win the minds and souls of their public. A Netherlander, St Peter Canisius, the first member of the company in Germany, was the author of a revised Catholic catechism sponsored by Ferdinand I. It proved to be a crucial element in the pedagogical mission of the order. They also installed themselves in a number of German universities just north of the Austrian lands – Bavaria especially – where they would play an important role in the education of young noblemen from the Habsburg lands who would later become officials of a militantly Catholic imperial court. Emperor Ferdinand II (1578–1637) was a student at the Jesuit university in Ingolstadt, the sole member of his house to receive something resembling a public education in early modern times. The Jesuits went to Hungary in 1561 where they would become central to higher education in the kingdom for the next two centuries.

The order came even earlier to Prague, where it made the church of St. Clement its headquarters in 1555. Jesuit colleges had spread to the cities of Bohemia and Moravia as well by the end of the sixteenth century. Their theater became, as it would in the Austrian provinces, the official stage of the land. Their works, often written by teachers in their schools, had a strong moral content in which the salvation of the soul was the central issue. But their presentations also had an engagingly artless quality about them, blending as they did the mythical, the historical, and the specifically biblical. Above all, they made heavy use of spectacular stage effects and dizzying interchanges between this world and the one beyond to hold the imaginations of their audiences, who came from all classes of society. The order wrote for everyone – plays celebrating the coronations of rulers, for weddings of noble families. They also matched their auditoriums to the social and political station of their viewers. When playing before the court and the nobility in Prague, they performed in the royal castle, the *Hradčany*, which looms above the city of Prague itself. When townspeople came to their plays, they came to the courtyard of their college.<sup>34</sup> Such work would be crucial both for the restoration of Roman Catholicism in central Europe and for the philosophical validation of Habsburg rule itself.

### *Conflict in the House of Habsburg*

The Peace of Augsburg could not permanently smooth relations between Catholic Habsburg emperors and German Protestant princes. The

success of Calvinism during the 1550s in the lands of Elector Palatine Frederick III (1515–76) made it ever more difficult for the house of Austria and the imperial estates to accommodate one another's interests. The Augsburg formula made no room for Calvinism, and neither Catholic nor Lutheran wanted to add it to Germany's confessional alternatives. Fearing, however, that an attack upon one Protestant confession would be a prelude to an attack upon all, Protestant electors grew exceedingly wary of Emperor Maximilian II's determination to eradicate this new direction in Christendom.

That Maximilian II was both cousin and brother-in-law of Spain's Philip II, who, as duke of Burgundy, sent a Spanish army in 1568 under the duke of Alba to quell a rebellion in the Netherlands, undermined the Habsburg position in Germany even further. Many regions of the Low Countries were technically part of the empire, and Germany's Protestant princes believed that Philip had gone to war to destroy the reformed confessions there. Philip II, a Spaniard in German eyes regardless of his Burgundian title, backed his generals even when they mobilized against German princes, particularly around Frisia, who were Calvinist sympathizers and supporters. Lutherans and Calvinists alike had talked on and off since 1562 about developing their own foreign policy, particularly toward France, where Calvinist Huguenots had also challenged the crown.<sup>35</sup> Ignoring all of Maximilian's arguments not to do so, the elector palatine funded troops who in 1568 went to the aid of fellow Calvinists in the Netherlands and of French Huguenots. The Habsburg worst-case scenario – a breaching of the empire's borders by foreign powers – appeared to be unfolding when the kings of France threatened invasion.

Cautious and consensus-driven though they were, Germany's princes were drifting even further from the Habsburg camp in the final decades of the sixteenth century.<sup>36</sup> Protestants were even more uneasy about Maximilian's successor, Rudolph II, than they had been about his father, even though that relationship had also deteriorated considerably. The new emperor had spent his formative years in Spain at the court of his uncle, and Lutherans and Calvinists expected him to favor the Catholic cause more openly than had his predecessor. It took all of Maximilian II's powers of persuasion to get the electors to accept the young man; only the three spiritual princes, the archbishops of Trier, Mainz, and Cologne, really approved of him as emperor. In truth, while Rudolph as a young man gave great public show of his Catholic orthodoxy, he was quite flexible when forced to choose between political advantage and

personal religious conviction. As was the case with Maximilian II, extremes of any kind disturbed him.

But it was the estates throughout the Habsburg lands, taking advantage of discord between Rudolph and his brothers, who turned religion into a dangerous political weapon against the house of Austria in the early years of the seventeenth century. For reasons not quite clear, Rudolph moved his court and the administration of the Holy Roman Empire from Vienna to Prague after 1583. There he became more and more preoccupied with reclusive studies that turned his establishment into a center of late humanist learning and art but marginalized him politically. Prone to the dark moods that afflicted several in his family, especially in moments of crisis, he may have tried to commit suicide in 1600.<sup>37</sup> Though Rudolph never lost his aura of dignity, the administration of his own lands and of German affairs drifted erratically into the control of advisers and other intimates.<sup>38</sup> Eagerly waiting to step in for his brother was the younger Archduke Matthias (1557–1619), a man as frenetically ambitious as the emperor was lethargic. On the lookout for a political role appropriate to his outsized self-image, Matthias persuaded Rudolph to make him governor of the two divisions of Lower Austria, Austria above and below the Enns.

From 1591 to 1606 the Habsburg lands were once again at war with the Ottoman armies. Rudolph seemed incapable of controlling troops whose rampaging in the eastern reaches of Hungary and Transylvania turned the estates of the latter into rebels. Between 1604 and 1606 they would go to war against the Habsburgs under the leadership of the duke of Transylvania, Stephen Bocskay (1557–1606). The management of the conflict and its funding fell largely to Matthias. He began his tenure in the province by intensifying efforts already underway to promote Catholicism as a way of asserting the rights of the territorial ruler. The estates were not inclined to protest too loudly. From 1595 to 1597 peasant uprisings raged throughout Austria above and below the Enns, fueled by anger over increases in forced labor requirements and the efforts of noble landlords to deprive rural workers of what few legal rights they had. The nobles, Catholic and Protestant alike, would have preferred to settle the conflict without the intervention of their territorial overlord, but in the end had no choice but to call upon him. Matthias was gratifyingly sympathetic to their cause and the punitive measures of the commander of the Lower Austrian militia, Wenzel Morakhsy, who summarily ordered the noses and ears of thousands of peasants to be cut off for their sedition.<sup>39</sup>

But to deal with the larger Turkish conflict, Matthias had to throw himself upon the mercies of various estates for extraordinary aid, thereby handing Protestants yet another opening to condition their aid on the rights to worship freely. He yielded, as had his father and grandfather before him. Moreover, where religious pluralism was the price of satisfying his personal ambitions, he gave in there as well. Given Rudolph's distant ways and rapacious army, Matthias was well situated to offer himself as an acceptable alternative to both the Austrian and Hungarian estates. In 1608, representatives of the Austrian estates met with the Hungarian royal diet in Bratislava. There, in return for permission to worship as Protestants, they announced their support for Matthias as their territorial ruler and king. With the archduke's army marching on Prague in 1609, Rudolph capitulated. He turned over the crown of St. Stephen to Matthias and the right to act as territorial ruler in Lower Austria and Moravia, one of the lands of the Bohemian crown. The Bohemian estates remained true to Rudolph, but on negotiated terms. The hapless king had to sign the Letter of Majesty in 1609 in which he recognized the religious rights of Lutherans, Calvinists, Utraquists, and, to a limited extent, even the much-persecuted Czech Brethren in the kingdom. To become king of Bohemia in 1611, Matthias not only confirmed these concessions but allowed the nobility of the realm powers they had not enjoyed since the advent of Ferdinand I. In the short time remaining to him – he died in 1612 – Rudolph would hold only the title of emperor, theoretically the greatest of his dignities, but in fact the least.

The success of these machinations clearly encouraged the estates of the Habsburg lands to regard their territorial rulers as figures to be used, even as their creatures. 'Homage belongs to him who occupies and possesses the fatherland with the will of its general representatives. . . . The people elects for itself its princes and can also reject them,' wrote George Tschernembl (1567–1626), a leading Calvinist nobleman in Austria above the Enns sometime between 1608 and 1610.<sup>40</sup> Like the Habsburgs themselves, who preferred to work with compliant estates rather than eradicate them, Tschernembl did not intend to wipe out princely rule. The terms on which he had come to think that they governed, however, were very far from the way that the Habsburgs had once constructed their role.

Religion had clearly become a serious impediment to the Habsburgs' government of their lands and all the peoples whom they ruled. As long as the sultan could be counted on to reappear from the east, Protestant nobles in the estates could manipulate their rulers in ways that made a mockery of princely authority. Equally dangerous was the failure of the

dynasty to resolve antagonism between Protestant and Catholic in its lands. While Protestantism seemed the more vital of the two confessions, the Church of Rome still had significant support. Important noble houses in the Austrian lands, Hungary, and Bohemia still remained loyal to the papacy, and the Habsburg courts themselves, especially in Inner Austria and the Tyrol, were centers of Catholic practice. Even in Vienna, there had been signs that the latitudinarian policies of Maximilian II could be reversed. Before Archduke Matthias had moved decisively to seize power for himself in Lower Austria, the bishop of Vienna, Melchior Khlesl (1552–1630), had started a vigorous program to recatholicize the city and its surrounding countryside. A resolution of the religious issue that took the faith and the interests of the dynasty into account would go far to reestablish the position of the Habsburgs in their own lands. The opportunity to do this, however, had yet to present itself.

# Index

Roman page numbers in *italic* indicate maps

*n* = endnote (indexed only for background information, not simple citations)

- Abraham A Sancta Clara, 57,  
141–2, 154
- administrative structure (of  
empire): under Ferdinand I,  
18–21; under Joseph II, 83–4;  
under Maria Theresa, 19, 68,  
74–5, 76–7; under Maximilian I,  
8–11, 18, 19
- agriculture: organization of labor,  
xx, xxii; reforms to system,  
71–3, 82, 130, 133;  
reversal/abandonment of  
reforms, 92, 97; role in  
economy, xx, 71, 113. *See also*  
peasantry
- Aix-la-Chapelle, Treaty of, 66,  
68
- Albrecht, Archduke (1559–1621),  
31
- Albrecht V of Hungary/Bohemia  
(1397–1439), 13
- Albrecht VI (1418–63), 2
- Alexander I, Tsar, 108, 111
- Alfieri, Vittorio, 160
- Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch*  
(civil code), 115, 137
- Anabaptism, 12
- Anna, Princess (wife of Ferdinand  
I), 7, 11
- Anne of York (daughter of  
Edward IV), 6
- Antwerp, 5
- Apaffy, Mihály, duke of  
Transylvania, 50, 52–3
- Apponyi, George, Count, 132
- architecture: Baroque, 158;  
religious, 56–7, 143
- aristocracy: cultural/philosophical  
interests, 144–7; increase in  
influence (post-Napoleon),  
105–6; land holdings/grants,  
37–9, 41–2; reduction of  
privileges/holdings, 84–5,  
113–14; relations with  
Habsburg rulers, 15–18, 19–20,  
28–9, 38, 43, 72–5, 79, 92–5,  
100, 119–20, 137–8, 143,  
169–70, 176*n*19, 177*n*25; role in  
socio-political system, xx–xxi,  
93, 120–2
- army, imperial: composition,  
69–70; conscription, 69, 72, 84,  
102, 104–5; funding, *see*  
taxation; war; manpower, 68,

- 79–80; provisioning, 100–1; reforms, 69, 102, 104
- Aubery, Antoine, 70
- Auersberg family, 70
- Augsburg, Peace of, 23, 24–5
- August III, elector of Saxony, 64
- Austria, *xii*, *xiv–xv*; anti-imperial activity, 119–20, 134–5; early use of name, *xix*; Habsburg rule over, 8–10; laws of succession, 61–2; political regime, *xx–xxii*; relationship with empire, 22, 99–100; rivalries within empire, 68. *See also* empire, Austrian; Inner Austria; Lower Austria; Upper Austria; Vienna
- Austrian Succession, War of, 67–8
- Balogh, Péter, 93
- banking houses, financing of imperial projects, 10, 12, 116
- Bartenstein, Johann Christoph, 68, 80
- Báthory, Stephen, 46
- Batthyány, Karl, 76
- Batthyány, Lajos, Count, 124, 136
- Bavaria, *xii*, *xiv*, *xvi*; conflicts with Austria, 8, 17; dukes of, 17, 22, 35, 38, 60; electors of, 41, 60, 64; marital alliances with Habsburgs, 41, 60; religion, 26
- Beethoven, Ludwig van, 153
- benefices, allotment of, 41–2; sale of, 42–3
- Berchthold family, 75
- Berzeviczy, Gregory, 100
- Bessenyei, György, 87–8
- Bethlen, Gábor, duke of Transylvania, 34, 47
- Bocskay, Stephen, duke of Transylvania, 28, 46–7, 48
- Bohemia, *xii*, *xiv*, *xvi*, *xviii*; administration, 35, 37–8; agriculture, 71, 72–3; anti-imperial feeling, 34–5, 64–5, 74–5, 86, 97, 128, 131–2; aristocracy, 16–18, 29, 36–8, 68, 73–4, 92, 101, 105; conquests (of neighboring territory), 1; exodus, 36; Habsburg rule/influence, *xix*, 7, 15, 16–18; language/culture, 163–6; legal system, 74–5; mining industry, 16; nationalism, 86–7, 131–2; political regime, *xx–xxii*, 19–20, 29; religion, 13, 17, 24, 29; rivalries within empire, 68; scientific studies, 164, 165–6; urbanization, *xx*
- Bonaparte, *see* Napoleon
- Born, Ignác von, 164
- Bourbon dynasty: hostilities with Habsburgs, *see* Spanish Succession, War of
- Britain, *see* England
- Bruck, Pacification of, 31, 32
- Bruges, 4
- Bucquoi, Johann Nepomuk, Count, 72, 87
- Bulgaria, 91
- Burgundy: dukes of, *see under individual names*; as French possession, 4–5; Habsburg influence in, 3, 4, 7; relations with France, 5–6
- Burke, Edmund, 101, 103
- Calvin, Jean, 12
- Calvinism, 12, 25, 27, 34, 44
- cameralism, 70–1, 95–6
- Canisius, Peter, St, 26
- Carinthia, *xii*, *xiv*, *xvi*, *xviii*, 24, 32, 71, 145
- Carniola, *xii*, *xiv*, *xvi*, 24, 71
- Casan, Jacques de, 70
- Catherine the Great, Tsarina, 91
- Catholic church: architecture/iconography, 56–7, 143, 145; Habsburg promotion of, 33–4, 35–6, 41, 57–8, 77–8; internal criticisms, 78; philosophy, 55–6, 140, 145; political influence, *xxi–xxii*; presentation, 141–5, 147–8;

- reform, 78–9, 82; relations with Habsburg monarchs, 3–4, 8, 57, 79, 82; role in empire, 140–2, 145, 168
- centralization (of state power/functions), 80, 82, 83–5; opposition/abandonment, 85–8, 90, 92–3
- Charles, Archduke (1540–90), 19, 24, 31–2
- Charles Albert, elector of Bavaria (1697–1744), 64–6
- Charles Albert of Piedmont (1798–1849), 127, 130–1, 133–4, 135
- Charles Augustus, grand duke of Saxony-Weimar (1757–1828), 91
- Charles I of Spain, *see* Charles V, Emperor
- Charles II of Spain (1661–1700), 59, 60, 61
- Charles ‘the Bold’, duke of Burgundy (1432–77), 3, 5, 8
- Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor (1500–58), 15, 17; accession, 6, 10; religious outlook, 21–2
- Charles VI, Emperor (1685–1740), 59, 61–3, 68, 70
- ‘Charles VII, Emperor’, *see* Charles Albert of Bavaria
- Charles VIII of France (1470–98), 4–5, 6
- Chotek, Rudolph, Count, 73
- Christian II of Denmark, 7
- Clement IV, Pope, 79
- clergy: role in socio-political system, xxi–xxii
- Colloredo, Francis, Count, 97
- Colloredo, Rudolf, 76
- court, imperial: composition, 2–3, 19, 33, 36, 43, 102–3; cultural life, 3, 19, 44, 81, 146, 149–50, 153; relocation, 28, 43; sale of titles, 42–3
- Croatia (-Slavonia), *xii–xiii*, *xiv–xv*, *xvi–xvii*, 52, 61–2, 77, 100, 131; separatist moves, 134, 135–6, 163
- Csokonai, Mihály, 121, 162
- culture, *see* court, imperial; theatre; *names of member states*
- Czech language, xix
- Dante (Alighieri), 159
- Daun, Leopold von, 69
- Deák, Ferenc, 123, 133
- Denis, Michael, 149
- Denmark, 39
- Dietrichstein family, 70
- Dobrovský, Josef, 165
- East Frisia, 76
- economic policy, imperial: under Ferdinand I, 20; under Francis I/II, 113, 115, 120; under Leopold II, 93; under Maria Theresa, 68–9, 70–1, 78–80; under Maximilian I, 8–11
- education: of Habsburg princ(ess)es, 19, 26, 32, 73–4, 80, 89, 96; public, 78–9, 83, 114, 115, 125, 147–9; religious, 82, 143–4, 147–8
- Edward IV of England, 6
- Eggenberg, Johann Ulrich von, 33, 37
- Eleanor, Empress (mother of Maximilian I), 6
- electors, role in empire, xviii–xix, 22
- empire, Austrian: foundation, 99–100; geographical extent, *xvi–xvii*; opposition to Napoleon, 102–6, 108–9
- Empire, Holy Roman: alliances/coalitions, 66, 108 (*see also names of individual nations*); contrasted with colonialism, xviii, xix–xx, xxii, 167–8, 170; cultural homogeneity, xix–xx, xxii, 139–47, 166; dissolution, 98–9; geographical extent, *xii–xiii*, *xiv–xv*, *xvi–xvii*, xviii, 62–3; internal differences, 9,

- 68, 166, 168; political structure, xviii–xix, 22; relationship with Austrian crown, 22; selection/installation of emperors, xviii–xix, 6, 10, 22–3, 64, 81, 88, 96, 97; trading unity, 70–4. *See also* administrative structure; economic policy; empire, Austrian
- England: colonial possessions, xviii, xix, xxi, 170; domestic politics, 67; Habsburg relations with, 5–6, 62, 70, 108–9, 133–4
- Enlightenment, philosophy of, 87–8, 102–3
- Erasmus of Rotterdam, 21
- Esterházy, Paul, 51–2, 145
- Esterházy family, 16, 53, 146
- Eugene of Savoy, Prince, 51, 56, 59, 60, 143; cultural interests, 145, 146
- Febronianism, 78
- Felbiger, Johann Ignaz von, 79, 148
- female succession, debates on, 61–2, 64–6
- Ferdinand I, Emperor (1503–64), 6–7, 11–23, 25, 29, 38, 63; administrative measures, 18–21, 45; expansion of control, 12–18; inheritance, 11; religious measures/outlook, 21–3, 32
- Ferdinand I (Austrian)/V (Holy Roman), Emperor (1793–1875), 116, 123, 124–5, 130
- Ferdinand II, Archduke (1529–95), 19, 25, 31
- Ferdinand II, Emperor (1578–1637), 41, 47, 61; accession, 31, 34; administration, 36–8, 45; background/early life, 26, 31–2, 63; military activities, 35; religious measures/outlook, 31–4, 35–6, 38
- Ferdinand III, Emperor (1608–1657), 35, 45, 50
- Ferdinand of Aragon (1452–1516), 6, 11
- Ferdinand of Naples (1810–59), 126–7
- Ficquelmont, Karl, Count, 134
- Fielding, Henry, *Joseph Andrews*, 140
- Fifteen Years War, 48
- Fischer von Erlach, Johann Baptiste, 56, 143, 158
- France: alliance with empire, 66; conflicts with empire, 7, 39, 59–60, 97, 98–9, 133–4 (*see also* Napoleon); Habsburg relations with, 3, 4–6; New World colonies, xviii, xix, xxi, 170; territorial ambitions in Germany, 40, 50, 60. *See also* French Revolution
- Francis I (Austrian)/II (Holy Roman), Emperor (1768–1835): accession, 96, 97; administration of empire, 100–1, 106–7, 114, 129, 162; economic policy, 113, 115, 120; international statesmanship, 107–10, 111–12; and Napoleonic wars, 97, 98–9; personal characteristics, 96–7, 106; reactionary views/policies, 97, 116–18
- Francis I of France (1494–1547), 22–3
- Francis Joseph, Emperor (1830–1916), 136
- Francis of Lorraine (1708–65), 63–4
- Franconia, 40
- Frederick Augustus III of Prussia (1750–1827), 109
- Frederick II of Prussia (1712–86), 80–1; territorial ambitions, 64, 65–6, 67, 74, 76
- Frederick III, Elector Palatine (1515–76), 27
- Frederick III, Emperor (1415–91), xix, 8; personal qualities, 2; political maneuvers, 2, 3, 13

- Frederick V, elector palatine/king of Bohemia (1596–1632), 34
- Frederick William II of Prussia (1744–97), 91
- freemasonry, 98
- French Revolution, 67, 87, 88, 95–6; revolutionary wars, 97, 98–9, 108; socio-political effects, 97–8, 101–2, 113, 115, 126, 169
- Frisinghelli, Francesco, 158
- Friuli, 24
- Fugger (banking house), 10, 12
- Fürstenberg, Carl Egon von, 72
- Galicia, *xii*, *xiv*, *xvi*, 135, 137, 165; political/legal system, *xxi*, 74
- Genovese, Antonio, 159
- Gent, 4
- Gentz, Frederick, 103–4
- Germany: Habsburg loss of influence, 39–40, 98–9; Habsburg possessions in, *xviii*; political system under Habsburgs, *xviii*–*xix*, 22; (post-) Napoleonic reorganization, 98–9, 102–4, 109–10; religious divisions, 23; unification, proposed, 134
- Gioberti, Vincenzo, 129
- Göbl, Peter, 37
- Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 155
- Golden Fleece, Order of, 42–3
- Goldoni, Carlo, 159–60
- Gorizia, *xiv*, 24
- Gottsched, Johann Christoph, 149–50
- Gozzi, Carlo, 159–60
- Gozzi, Gaspare, 159
- Gregory XVI, Pope, 127
- Grillparzer, Franz, 138, 155–6, 163
- Guelders (Netherlands province), 5
- Habsburg dynasty: expansionism, character of, *xviii*, *xix*, *xxii*–*xxiii*, 167–8; internal conflicts, 2, 28–30, 64–6; philosophy of government, 55–6, 170; survival, capacity for, *xxii*–*xxiii*, 61–3, 111–12, 167
- Hafner, Philip, 152
- Harrach, Frederick von, Count, 69
- Harrach family, 41, 70
- Haugwitz, Frederick William, Count, 68–9
- Haydn, Joseph, 81
- Haynau, Julius von, General, 136
- Herberstein family, 42–3, 70
- Hertzberg, Ewald von, Count, 91
- Hildebrandt, Johann Lukas von, 158
- Hofer, Andreas, 104
- Hofhaimer, Paul, 3
- Hofrat* (court council): composition, 19, 68; formation, 8–9, 18
- Hontheim, Nicholas von, 78
- Hormayr, Joseph Frederick von, 103, 164
- Hörnigk, Philip von, 70
- Hungary, *xii*–*xiii*, *xiv*–*xv*, *xvi*–*xvii*, *xviii*; anti-Habsburg activity, 49–50, 52, 54–5, 86, 91, 92–5, 120, 123–4; aristocracy, 15–16, 44–6, 47–8, 51–2, 75, 77, 86, 92–5, 100–1, 120–4, 132; demands for autonomy, 132–3, 134, 135–6; Habsburg assumption of control, 7, 13–16, 53–5; Habsburg/Ottoman conflicts over, *xix*, 14–15, 48–9, 51–2; imperial displeasure with, 71; language/culture, *xix*, 83, 100, 121, 122, 134, 135, 161–3; laws of succession, 61–2; military/political importance, 13, 20; nationalism, 87–8, 121–4, 128, 161–3; political structure, *xx*–*xxii*, 19–20, 44–6, 83, 93, 100–1, 132; religion, 57; role in Napoleonic wars, 100–1,

- 104–6; status within empire, 93, 100–1, 132; support for imperial line, 65; urbanization, xx
- Hus, Jan/Hussites, 13, 17
- Illesházy, Stephen, 46–7
- Illesházy family, 75
- imperialism, characteristics of, xviii, 168, 171–2*n*7
- industrial organizations, 118–19
- industrialization, *see* manufacturing industries
- Inner Austria, 37, 118; religious reforms, 24, 32–3
- Innsbruck (as Habsburg seat), 8–11, 33, 43
- inventions, 114–15
- Isaac, Heinrich, 3
- Isabella, queen of Denmark (1501–26), 7
- Isabella of Castile (1451–1504), 6
- Istria, *xv*, *xvii*, xviii, 24
- Italy: conflicts with Austria/empire, 8, 10, 110–11, 124–7; demands for self-government, 128, 129, 130–1, 160–1; Habsburg involvement in, 60–1, 76–7, 84, 109–10; language/culture, 158–61; manufacturing skills, 71; rebellions against local rulers, 126, 129
- James I of England, 34
- Jansenism, 78
- Jesuits, 25–6, 79, 142; theatrical presentations, 141, 143–5
- Jews, Habsburg dealings with, 43, 82, 83
- Johann, Archduke (1782–1859), 103–4, 105
- John Frederick, elector of Saxony, 17
- John Sobieski, king of Poland, 51–2
- Joseph I, Emperor (1678–1711), 39, 41, 52, 63; daughters of, 61, 64–5; death, 60, 61; military activity, 54–5, 59–60
- Joseph II, Emperor (1741–90), 41–2, 65, 66, 76; comparisons with other Habsburgs, 82, 83, 84, 88, 89, 90, 94, 106; linguistic/educational plans/ideals, 83, 148–50, 153, 156, 161, 164; long-term legacy, 85, 88, 113–14, 115, 117, 122, 125, 136; military activity, 88, 97; personal characteristics, 74, 80–1, 88, 89; reform program, 80, 81–5, 97–8, 104; relations with family members, 81, 90, 96; resistance to policies, 85–6, 88, 96
- Juan, Prince, 6
- Juana, Princess, 6
- Jungmann, Joseph, 166
- jurisdiction, *see* legal system
- Károlyi, Sándor, Count, 54
- Kaunitz family, 41
- Kaunitz (-Rietberg), Wenzel von, Count, 66–7, 69, 72, 74, 75–6, 78, 79, 81, 82, 92
- Khevenhüller, Joseph, 76
- Khevenhüller family, 42–3, 70
- Khlesl, Melchior, 30
- Kinský, Franz, Count, 164, 165
- Kisfaludy, Sándor, 161
- Klebelsberk, Count, 164–5
- Klopstock, Frederick Gottlieb, 149
- Kolowrat, Francis, Count, 97, 123, 164–5
- Kopitar, Bartolomäus, 165
- Köprülü family, 49
- Kossuth, Louis, 124, 132, 133, 135–6, 163
- Krafft, Johann Peter, 157
- Kupelweiser, Leopold, 157
- Ladislas I (of Bohemia), 13
- Ladislas II (of Bohemia), *see* Vladislav
- Lamormaini, William, 39

- landowners: exploitation of tenants/employees, xxii, 38–9, 72–3; from middle/lower classes, 117; resistance to Habsburg control, 12. *See also* aristocracy
- language(s): used in empire, xix, 46, 83, 100, 121, 139–40, 148–9, 156, 161–6; used in theater, 150–3, 155–7, 159–60
- Laso de Castilla, Don Pedro, 19
- Laudon, Gideon von, 69
- Lažanský, Prokop von, Count, 87
- legal system, reforms to, 74–5, 83
- Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm von, 146–7
- Leopold, Archduke (1586–1632), 31
- Leopold I, Emperor (1640–1705), 39, 41, 54, 63, 141; division of lands, 61; military activities, 40, 49–53, 54, 60
- Leopold II (Peter Leopold), Emperor (1747–92): accession, 88, 89, 91; contrasted with Joseph II, 89, 90, 92; difficulties with nobility, 87, 91–3; educational/linguistic policy, 148–9, 165; and French Revolution, 95–6; as grand duke of Tuscany, 89–91; management of empire, 93–5, 96, 117, 133; personal characteristics, 89
- Liechtenstein family, 37, 41, 146
- Lindemayr, Maurus, 151
- Lobkovic family, 41, 146, 177*n*25
- Lombardy(–Venetia), *xvi–xvii*, 76–7, 110; crown of, 124–5; revolutionary activity in, 129, 131
- Louis II of Hungary (1506–26), 14
- Louis-Philippe of France (1773–1850), 129
- Louis XI of France (1423–83), 4
- Louis XIV of France (1638–1715), 40, 54, 59–60, 78, 108
- Louis XVI of France (1754–93), 66, 95, 99
- Lower Austria, *xii, xiv, xvi, xviii*; anti-imperial feeling, 128–9; economy, 8, 9, 20; legal system, 74; population, 33; religion, 24, 33–4, 35–6; as scene of power struggle, 28–30
- Loyola, Ignatius, St, 25, 141
- Ludwig, Archduke (1784–1864), 123
- Luther, Martin, 12, 24, 44
- Magdalene, Archduchess (sister of Maximilian II), 25
- Magyar (language), 100, 121, 122, 134, 135, 162–3
- Mantua, Habsburg acquisition of, 60–1
- manufacturing industries, 72, 83; growth of, 114, 118–19
- Manzoni, Alessandro, 129, 160
- Margaret, Archduchess (daughter of Maximilian I), 4–5, 6
- Maria, Archduchess (1551–1608), 31–2
- Maria, Empress (wife of Maximilian II), 25
- Maria Theresa, Empress (1717–80): accession, 64–6, 96; administrative reforms, 19, 68, 74–5, 76–7, 84, 88, 104; agrarian reforms, 71–4, 75–6, 82; birth/upbringing, 62, 63–4, 68; ecclesiastical reforms, 78–9; economic policy, 68–9, 70–1, 78–9; linguistic/educational reforms, 79, 148, 164; long-term results of policies, 114; Order of, 69; personal characteristics, 63, 65, 68, 72, 88, 153; relations with children, 81, 82
- Maria Theresa, Queen (to Louis XIV), 60
- Marie Antoinette, Queen (1755–93), 66, 88, 95, 99
- marital alliances, role in dynastic success, 1–2, 3, 4–7, 13, 41

- Martini, Karl Anton von, 84  
 Martinovics, Ignatius Joseph, 98  
 Marx, Gratian von, 79  
 Mary, Archduchess (1505–58), 7, 14  
 Mary, duchess of Burgundy (1457–82), 3, 4  
 Masovia (province of Poland), 7  
 Matthias, Emperor (1557–1619), 28–30  
 Matthias Corvinus of Hungary (1440–90), 2, 8, 13  
 Maximilian, Archduke (1558–1618), 31  
 Maximilian I, duke of Bavaria (1573–1651), 35  
 Maximilian I, Emperor (1459–1519), 3–11; administrative reforms, 8–11, 18, 19, 104; as champion of Christendom, 3–4, 7–8; financial problems, 7–8, 9–10, 11–12; marriage, 3, 4; military activities, 4, 5, 7; partition of empire, 11; personal qualities/interests, 3, 10, 63; political/dynastic maneuvers, 4–7; resistance to policies, 5, 9, 10, 12  
 Maximilian II, Emperor (1527–76), 19, 32, 46, 63; administrative measures, 21; religious measures/outlook, 24, 25, 27–8, 30, 32  
 Mazzini, Joseph, 160  
 mercantilism, *see* cameralism  
 Metternich, Klemens Wenzel Nepomuk Lothar, Prince, 107–8, 130; international statesmanship, 108–12; socioeconomic policies (as chancellor), 114, 116–17, 118, 123, 126–8  
 middle classes: clashes with imperial policies, 116–17, 118–19; cultural preferences, 157; imperial dealings with/support for, 94, 96, 97, 115, 169–70; rise in influence, 115, 117, 136–7, 155; role in imperial administration, 36, 81, 84–5, 137; social organization, xxii  
 Migazzi, Christoph Anton, Cardinal Archbishop, 82  
 Milan, Habsburg acquisition of, 60–1  
 mining industry: role in imperial economy, 8; unrest among workers, 12  
 Mittrowský, Johann Nepomuk von, Count, 164  
 Mohács, Battle of, 14, 15, 18  
 Molière (Jean-Baptiste Poquelin), 151  
 monarchy (as institution): desirability, 100; elections to, xx–xxi; opposition to, 87, 128; philosophy of, 55–6, 67–8, 79, 121  
 Montecuccoli, Raimondo, 51  
 Morakhsy, Wenzel, 28  
 Moravia, *xii, xiv, xvi*, 35, 128, 132; agriculture, 71, 73; distribution of lands, 37; traditions, 147–8  
 Mottet, Armand, Count, 103  
 Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus, 153  
 Müller, Johann von, 103  
 Muratori, Ludovico, 78, 159, 160  
 Nádasdy, Thomas, 15  
 Nagyvárád, Treaty of, 14  
 Napoleon I, Emperor (of France), *xix*, 98–100, 101–2, 113, 117; cultural preferences, 157; Habsburg conflicts with, 102–6, 107, 108–9, 169; trade policy, 114  
 nationalism: literary, 150–1; political, *see under names of member states*  
 Neri, Pompeo, 89  
 Nestroy, Johann, 154, 155, 156–7, 160, 163  
 Netherlands, *xviii*, 5, 60; Habsburg relations with, 70, 71;

- manufacturing skills, 71;  
 resistance to Habsburg policies,  
 5, 9, 85, 91–2
- Nicholas I, Tsar, 136
- Nostitz, Franz Anton, 86
- Otakar II (of Bohemia), 1, 13
- Ottoman empire, *xii–xiii*, *xiv–xv*,  
*xvi–xvii*, xviii; hostilities with  
 Habsburgs, xix, 3–4, 7–8, 23,  
 28–9, 40, 48–53, 59, 88, 142,  
 167–8; invasions/control of  
 Hungary, 14–15, 34, 47, 48–9,  
 51–2; other territorial  
 maneuvers, 91; treaties with,  
 66–7
- Palacký, František, 105, 134
- Palatine, electorate, 22, 27
- Pálffy, Count (high judge), 65
- Pálffy, Fidél, Count, 97
- Pálffy, János, 54
- Palmerston, Lord, 134, 136
- pan-Slavism, 131–2
- paper currency, 113, 120
- patent law, 114–15
- Pázmány, Péter, 44, 140
- peasantry: exploitation, xxii, 9,  
 20, 44, 72–3; living conditions,  
 72, 97; measures for reform, 72,  
 73, 75–6, 82; role in  
 agricultural/social system, xx,  
 38–9, 71–2; taxation, 85; unrest,  
 xxii, 12, 28, 54, 72, 76, 85–6,  
 101–2, 123; upward mobility,  
 117. *See also Robot*
- Pelcl, Franz Martin, 86, 148–9
- Pellico, Silvio, 129, 160
- Pergen, Johann Anton von,  
 Count, 92, 94, 98
- Peter the Great, Tsar, 54
- Petőfi, Sándor, 162–3
- Pezsl, Johann, 150
- Philip II of Spain (1527–98), 25,  
 27
- Philip III of Spain (1578–1621), 35
- Philip ‘the Handsome’, Archduke  
 (1478–1506), 4, 6, 7
- Philip V of Spain/Anjou  
 (1683–1746), 59–60, 62
- philosophy, 145–7. *See also*  
 Catholic church;  
 Enlightenment; monarchy
- Pillnitz, Declaration of, 95, 97
- Poland, *xii*, *xiv*, *xvi*, xviii, 131;  
 division of, 66–7; Habsburg  
 influence in, 7; monarchy,  
 xx–xxi, 46; political regime,  
 xx–xxii
- police, ministry of, 94
- popes: funding of Habsburg  
 operations, 8, 51, 79; imperial  
 relations with, 21–2, 25, 127
- population growth/statistics, 72,  
 93, 95–6, 113; Austria/Tyrol, 8,  
 33; urban, 119
- Portugal, 6
- Pragmatic Sanction (1713), 62,  
 63; international response,  
 64
- Prague: architecture, 56;  
 defenestration of, 34; as  
 imperial capital, 28, 43;  
 industrial unrest, 118–19
- Prandtauer, Jakob, 56, 143
- Pressburg Agreement, 52
- productivity (as imperial priority),  
 81–3, 84–5, 114, 164. *See also*  
*cameralism*
- Protestantism, 12; in Germany, 67;  
 Habsburg concessions to, 24;  
 Habsburg opposition to, 17, 33,  
 67, 79; influence on imperial  
 thinking, 21–2; rejection (as  
 career move), 33–4. *See also*  
*Reformation*
- Prussia, *xii*, *xiv*, *xvi*; Habsburg  
 dealings with, 62, 64, 66–7,  
 108–10; military institutions (as  
 model), 68, 69; rivalry with  
 empire, 67, 69, 74–5, 91,  
 111–12; territorial gains, 40, 64,  
 65–6; treaties concluded with,  
 91, 95
- public buildings, styles/function  
 of, 56–7, 143

- Qualtenburg, Franz Karl Kressl von, 86–7
- Radetzky, Joseph, Field Marshal, 135, 138
- railways, building of, 116
- Raimund, Ferdinand, 154, 155, 160, 163
- Rainer, Archduke, 130
- Rákóczi, Ferenc II, 54–5
- Rákóczi, George II, duke of Transylvania, 49
- rebellion(s), 85–8, 97–8; agrarian, xxii, 28, 85–6; amnesties following, 52, 55; in Austria, 12, 28, 85, 129–30, 134–5; in Bohemia, 20, 34–5, 86–7, 97, 131–2; in Hungary, 49–50, 54–5, 86, 87–8, 98, 135–6; in Italy, 125–8, 129, 130–1, 133–4; in Netherlands, 5, 85; religious, 34–5; suppression of, 12, 28, 35, 50, 54, 98, 100, 135, 136
- reform, *see* administrative structure; agriculture; army; economic policy; *names of individual rulers especially* Joseph II, Maria Theresa
- Reformation, effect on empire, 21, 23, 29–30, 168
- Reichenbach, Convention of, 91
- religious conflicts: within empire, 13, 17, 23–30, 32–3 (*see also* Protestantism); external, *see* Ottoman empire
- roads, building of, 115
- Robot* (forced labor), xxii, 20, 73; (proposed) reforms, 52, 72, 73, 74, 75–6, 82, 130, 133
- Rothschild, Salomon, 116
- Rožmberk family, 24, 37
- Rožmítal, Zdeněk Lev, 16–17
- Rudolph I, Emperor (1218–91), 1–2, 3, 13; theatrical depiction, 155–6
- Rudolph II, Emperor (1552–1612), 24, 27–8, 29, 32, 42, 46, 63, 146
- Russia, *xvi*, xviii, 136, 142; Habsburg dealings with, 62, 66–7, 91, 108, 111; Ottoman designs on, 91; as threat to empire, 110, 111–12
- Saint Gotthard, Battle of, 49
- Salamanca, Gabriel, 18
- Salieri, Antonio, 153
- Salzburg, *xii*, *xiv*, *xvi*, 110
- Saxony, *xii*, *xiv*, *xvi*, 22, 40; electors of, 17, 64
- Schlegel, Frederick, 102
- Schönborn, Johann Philip, 40
- Schubert, Franz, 153–4
- sedition, suppression of, 85, 94, 97–8, 100, 117–18. *See also* rebellion
- Seneca, 151
- Senfl, Ludwig, 3
- Serbia, *xv*, *xvii*, 91, 92, 131
- Serényi family, 75
- serfdom, *see Robot*
- Seven Years War, 66, 70
- Siebenbürger, Martin, 12
- Sigismund, Archduke (of Tyrol), 8
- Sigismund I of Poland, 14
- Silesia, *xii*, *xiv*, *xvi*, 35, 37, 57; produce, 71; under Prussian rule, 64, 65–6, 67
- silver mines: in Bohemia, 16; in Tyrol, 8
- Sina, Simon Georg von, 116
- Sinzendorf, Georg Ludwig von, 42
- Slavonia, *see* Croatia-Slavonia
- Šlik family, 17, 42–3
- Slovenia, xviii
- Sonnenfels, Joseph von, 81, 84, 94, 149
- Spain: as colonial power, xviii, xix, 170; conflicts within Europe, 5–6, 60–1, 104; Habsburg dealings with, 59–60, 62–3
- Spanish Succession, War of, 60–1
- Stadion, Philip von, Count, 103, 104, 106, 107

- Šternberk, Kaspar, Count, 105, 164–5
- Stranitzky, Josef Anton, 152
- Stratmann, Theodor Altet  
Heinrich von, 41, 43
- Styria, *xii, xiv, xvi, xviii*, 1, 24, 32, 73, 94, 104
- succession, *see* Empire, Holy Roman; female succession
- Suleiman the Magnificent, Sultan, 14, 18
- Swabia, 40
- Sweden, 39
- Swieten, Gottfried van, 81
- Széchényi, Ferenc, Count (1754–1820), 105, 122
- Széchenyi, Stephen, Count (1791–1860), 122–4, 132, 134, 161, 163
- taxation: collection procedure, 20; exemption, 77, 86; funding of military activity, 9–10, 17–18, 68–9; resistance to, 9, 52, 69, 72, 85–6, 120
- theater, 149–58; Austrian, 150–8; Baroque, 150–1, 152, 155; Italian, 158–61; religious, 143–5, 151; vernacular, 150–3, 159–60
- Thirty Years War, 34–5, 39–40, 47, 48, 51, 57, 143, 170; socio-political effects, 34, 38, 39, 55, 163
- Thököly, Imre, 50, 52, 54
- Thurn, Matthias von, Count, 34
- trade, international, 71
- trades unions, *see* industrial organizations
- Transylvania, *xii–xiii, xiv–xv, xvi–xvii, xviii*, 44, 45, 57; anti-Habsburg activities, 14, 16, 34, 46–7, 50; languages, xix, 46; Ottoman rule/influence, xix, 14–15, 28; political regime, 46, 53
- Trautson family, 70
- Tschernembl, George, 29
- Tuce, Štěpán, *Christ the Judge*, 144
- Turkey, *see* Ottoman empire
- Tuscany, *xv, xvii*, 89–91, 96
- Tyrol, the, *xii, xiv, xvi, xviii*, 1, 8, 105. *See also* Innsbruck
- Ukraine, *xii, xiv, xviii*, 92, 131, 165; nationalism, 135, 137
- universities, *see* education
- Upper Austria, *xii, xiv, xvi, xviii*, 64; agriculture, 38; land ownership, 117; legal system, 74; produce, 71; rebellions in, 34–5, 38, 57
- urban life: reform, 83; reliance on agrarian produce, xx; social organization, xxii, 118–19
- Utraquists, *see* Hus(sites)
- Utrecht, Peace of, 60–1
- Valois, house of, 5. *See also names of individual monarchs*
- Vasvár, Peace of, 48
- Venice (Venetia), *xii–xiii, xiv–xv, xvi–xvii*; war with Austria, 10
- Vico, Giambattista, 159
- Vienna, *xii, xiv, xvi*; architectural influence, 56–7; Congress of (1814–15), 108–11; cultural life, 151–2, 153–7; as imperial capital, 30, 43, 58, 83; Legal-Political Reading Association of, 118; population, 119; revolutionary activity, 12, 129–30, 135; siege of (1683), 50–1, 108
- Vladislav (Ladislav) II (of Hungary/Bohemia), 7, 14
- Voltaire (François-Marie Arouet), 87, 162
- Vörösmarty, Mihály, 162–3
- Waldmüller, Georg, 157
- war: financing of, 9–10, 17–18, 68–9, 70, 113; socioeconomic consequences, 113, 117. *See also* army, imperial; *names of specific nations and campaigns*

- Warbeck, Perkin, 5  
 Werböczy, Stephen, 45  
 Wesslényi (Count Ferenc)  
     conspiracy, 49–50  
 Westphalia, Peace of, 39–40, 110,  
     176*n*19  
 White Mountain, Battle of, 35, 48,  
     86  
 William V, duke of Bavaria, 31  
 Windischgrätz, Albert von, Field  
     Marshal, 135, 137  
 Wittelsbach, *see* Bavaria, dukes  
     of  
*Young Tobias* (Jesuit play), 144  
 Zápolya, John, duke of  
     Transylvania, 14, 16, 46  
 Zinzendorf, Count, 106, 145  
 Zrínyi, Ilona, 54  
 Zrínyi, Miklós, 142  
 Zsitva-Torok, Peace of, 48