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1 Regionalism, Security and Development: A Comparative Perspective

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INTRODUCTION

Regionalization occurs in waves, and it is reasonable to think that each wave has its own characteristics, causes and consequences. The current wave of ‘new’ regionalism has so far been discussed mainly with regard to its impact on the patterns of trade and global welfare. This is in spite of the fact that it is often defined by its comprehensiveness and multidimensionality, ranging from regional responses to shared ecological threats to security crises. For these problems the macro-region – in a world where the established forms of multilateralism (see the parallel series on *Multilateralism and the United Nations System*, MUNS) is in a deep crisis – has to take a larger responsibility.

Can any regional policies make a positive contribution to the solution of these global problems? If so, the current wave of regionalism can be seen as ‘new’ in a qualitative and normative sense, rather than being perceived simply as a recurring protectionism, which is still the predominant view among most observers and analysts.

This introductory chapter looks into two fundamental world order values – *peace* and *development* – with special reference to the recent upsurge of a more positive interest in regionalization. Furthermore, it does this from a comparative perspective, in view of the fact that the processes of regionalization seem to be universal (albeit different) and therefore essential for understanding the emerging world order. The issue is not new, since the relevance of regional integration, or cooperation, for both peace and development has been discussed before, particularly during the first (post-war) wave of regional integration; i.e. the 1950s and 1960s. It was also the theme of volume four in this mini-series, which was devoted to case studies of security and development regionalisms, of particular relevance for peripheral regions.

The earlier discussion of the value relevance of regionalism is interesting to compare with contemporary regionalism because of the light it throws on change in the world order between, say, 1950 and 2000. In the 1950s, the idea of integration as a peace project was popular and soon became embodied in the European Coal and Steel Union (ECSU), an organization built on the hope of eternal peace, and the illusion of an equally eternal importance of coal and steel in the modern production (and military) system. This 'old regionalism' was a largely positive, but certainly not a decisive factor in the post-war world order. A decade or so beyond the year 2000 we will perhaps know if the 'new regionalism' did come to stay, or if it will turn out to be as ephemeral as the first wave, that glimmered then disappeared (having first seduced quite a few prominent social scientists at the time).

No wonder that the second wave came rather unexpectedly and took the social science community by surprise. The initial reception was, as indicated above, cool, one reason being that the old regionalism in many instances had shown a certain protectionist flavour, and the new upsurge consequently worried the largely neo-liberal community of economists who dominated the development discourse of the 1980s and early 1990s. The market-oriented multilateral order, taken for granted as inherently good, just and fair, was seen to come under renewed attack from the enemies of free trade. Nevertheless, the 'new' regionalism grew in importance, largely due to unorthodox and non-economic reasons (see Mistry's chapter 2 in volume 4).

The new regionalism is a world-wide phenomenon, much more widespread than the oft-discussed three core regional blocs. Apart from these blocs, this chapter identifies about half-a-dozen peripheral regions and as many intermediate regions between core and periphery. Regions should not be reified, however, and therefore one has to be careful with names and numbers. What is of interest here is the structural movement of regions through changing levels of regionness, with a focus on security- and-development-regionalisms.

The drawing of this new and still tentative political map of the world forms the first part of this chapter, the crucial point being that comparative analysis must take the structural positions of various types of regions into consideration. Furthermore, the process of regionalization starts at different points in time and from various levels of 'regionness', thus creating different entry points in the process of globalization (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2000).

In the second part, the focus is on regionalization of conflict and conflict management, primarily with regard to intra-state disturbances, the predominant type of tension in the world today. In all peripheral and some of the intermediate regions of the world there have been attempts at conflict resolution with a more or less significant element of regional intervention. After having provided a tentative conceptual framework of conflict management, including development regionalism as a way of preventing (or 'proventing') violent conflict, a comparative overview of the regional factor in recent conflict management is presented. The basic argument is the *close relation between the two issues of peace and development*. In any conscious effort to increase the level of regionness and thereby halt the peripheralization and marginalization of the poor regions, these two dimensions in combination may be said to constitute the engine of change.

REGIONALISM AND GLOBAL STRUCTURE

In this section I try to differentiate between different types of regions with reference to their current position in the world system. It should be kept in mind that this position is not a permanent one. Rather, one might imagine the structure in terms of different zones, between which there will be a movement of regions, rising or in decline, as a consequence of the dynamics of regionalization and globalization. It should be obvious that this attempt at classification draws on earlier dependency and world system theory, although not necessarily implying a full acceptance of this tradition (Blomström and Hettne, 1984). A rough distinction can be made between three structurally different types of regions or, more exactly, regions situated in different zones of the world system: regions in the core zone, regions in the peripheral zone and, between them, regions in the intermediate zone. How do they differ from each other? There are two basic characteristics. *The various regions are distinguished first by their relative political stability; second by their relative degree of sustained economic dynamics.*

- *Regions in the core* are accordingly coherent, politically strong, well organized at the supra-state level and, furthermore, not only economically growing in a sustained manner, but also leading in technological innovation. They organize for the sake of being

better able to control the rest of the world, the world outside their own region, and compete among themselves in exercising this influence. One important means of control is ideological hegemony, particularly in the field of economic practice. The predominant economic philosophy in the core (particularly with regard to external relations) is neoliberalism, which is also preached throughout the world, with varying degrees of conviction, as 'the only game in town'. There are, however, nuances between the capitalisms of the core. As has always been the case, the stronger economies demand access to the less developed in the name of free trade. We can thus speak of 'free-trade regionalism', although it may sound like a contradiction in terms. The basic idea here is that a regional arrangement first opens up relations among a limited number of neighbouring countries, and that this is followed by further steps in the same direction. This is the 'stepping stone' (rather than 'stumbling bloc') interpretation of regionalism with respect to its complex relation to globalization (see volume one of this series).

- *Regions in the intermediate zone* are normally linked to one or the other of the core regions, which they tend to imitate with respect to political system and economic policy. They will gradually be incorporated in the core as soon as they conform to the criteria of 'core-ness', that is, sustained economic development and political stability. In accordance with the hegemonic economic faith, the 'politics of distribution' has been thrown in the historical dustbin; praise for free trade is, nevertheless, somewhat more reserved and the tradition of interventionism greater. Typically, large and heterogeneous countries within a particular region articulate this caution, as, for instance, Brazil and Indonesia and, earlier, India. The reason for this is that an unguarded integration in the international economy usually has a differential impact on domestic regions on various levels of development, thus sharpening the unevenness and contributing to social and political tensions. The common expression used both in South-east Asia and Latin America is 'open regionalism', which means emphasis on open economies albeit with some preference for privileging one's own region, within the multilateral rules of the game.
- *Regions in the peripheral zone*, in contrast, are politically turbulent and economically stagnant. War, domestic unrest and underdevelopment constitute a vicious circle, which makes them sink

to the bottom of the system (creating a zone of war and starvation), unless counter-measures are jointly taken. Consequently, the peripheral regions have to organize in order to stop the threat of marginalization. At the same time, however, their regional arrangements are fragile and ineffective, and they must first of all tackle acute poverty and domestic conflict. Their overall situation nevertheless makes what I call 'security regionalism' and 'development regionalism' more important than the creation of free trade regimes, or even adhering to 'open regionalism', which becomes relevant only as some strength *vis-à-vis* the rest of the world has been achieved.

The predominant economic philosophy (globalism) and also the real world today present certain constraints as far as intervention in the economic system is concerned. To the extent that unrestricted free trade is practised in the periphery, it has normally to do with political conditionalities. It should objectively be inclined to be more introverted and also more interventionist. This inclination is what lies behind the protectionist ('stumbling block') interpretation of the new regionalism, which so far has proved to be exaggerated.

Let us now look at these structural levels in more empirical terms, in order to identify specific geographical areas and the extent to which there are regional organizations there to represent them. The core regions, Europe, North America and East Asia, are politically capable, regardless of whether that capability is expressed in the form of a formal regional organization or not. So far only one of the three core regions has clearly aspired to build such an organization, namely the European Community (EC), now the European Union (EU). Europe is the paradigm of regionalization and serves both as a model, stimulating other regions to become more integrated, and as a threat, provoking other regions to be prepared for a sudden protectionist turn in the world economy.

The other two core regions, North America and East Asia, are both economically strong, but they lack a regional political order. This is particularly true for East Asia, where tensions between nation-states, especially Japan and China, are just below the surface, rather similar to nineteenth-century Europe. East Asian regionalism is often described as *de facto* regionalism, whereas regionalization in Europe and to a lesser extent North America is supposed to take place *de jure*. This contrast may be due to differences in political culture, but an alternative explanation could lie in the fact that the inter-state

relations in East Asia are rather tense and unsettled, as might realistically be expected in a security complex with few institutionalized inter-state arrangements. Nevertheless, it is obvious that on other levels than the inter-state level there has been an impressive process of regionalization on the ground through the combination of Japanese capital and Chinese entrepreneurship.

The most comprehensive organization covering this region is the 15-member strong forum Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), set up in 1989 and firmly adhering to 'open regionalism'. In my view it is wrong to describe APEC as a region. Rather we need to see it as an interregional organization expressing US hegemonic interest, just like the Atlantic Community (see chapter 3 by Bøås and Hveem in this volume).

The overall picture of the North American continent is as follows. The core is occupied by the USA, Canada and Mexico, organized in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which has an internal hierarchy and regional division of labour, constituted by the USA in the centre, Canada and northern parts of Mexico in a semiperipheral position, and the rest of Mexico as periphery, also including Central America and the Caribbean, although they are not formally part of NAFTA.

Structurally close to the core are the *regions in the intermediate zone*, all of them in preparation for incorporation into the core; the speed of this depending on their continuous good, 'core-like', behaviour as a condition for entry. This implies, for instance, maintaining economic growth in a context of openness and deregulation, as well as eliminating and, if necessary, repressing, domestic conflicts. Until recently, the ASEAN countries provided a particularly good example of successful handling of these imperatives, but Central Europe should also be mentioned in this regard. Failure means sinking into the periphery.

Regions or subregions in this zone are, tentatively, the following:

- *Central Europe* is obediently waiting for membership in the EU. In the front line are the Czech republic, Poland and Hungary, with a question mark for Slovakia. They are known as the Visegrád group (see chapter five in volume two). This group is now joined by Slovenia, having escaped from the Balkan embroglio and showing an exemplary performance as a Central European candidate for EU-membership. Croatia with the same historical tradition intends to follow a similar route, although (until the death of

Tudjman and the fresh elections in 1999) it was held back due to a miserable human rights record. As a subregion Central Europe seems to have lost coherence and become a waiting room for NATO and EU candidates.

- *The Baltic countries* Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are also candidates for EU membership and intermediate status. They have reoriented themselves more or less completely away from the post-Soviet area towards the West and can, like Slovenia and Croatia, be included in a 'larger Central Europe'. These countries, with Estonia lead the way, will sooner or later be incorporated in the EU. Although they are often lumped together, the three countries differ a lot and there is little to make them into a subregion.
- the *post-Soviet area* is now, with the exception of the Baltics, in the process of being reintegrated in the form of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). CIS may perhaps lay the ground for a future core region, but this is, to say the least, an uncertain prospect. This large area is not really a region. The historical Soviet Union can best be seen as an empire, an enlargement of the old Russian empire and, as has been the case with declining empires, the constituent parts move as part of different natural regions in different directions: European, Caucasian and Central Asian. The two latter are here treated as peripheral regions. Apart from western Russia, the European part consists of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldavia, all rather turbulent countries, the last-mentioned among the poorest of the world. This underlines the disconnection between postcolonialism and poverty.
- *Latin America* is now in the process of becoming 'North Americanized', but with an important southern bloc, Mercosur, making some resistance to the neoliberal logic imposed by the USA. Presumably it will also become more defensive about Latin culture than Mexico in NAFTA. The future relationship between NAFTA in the core and intermediate Mercosur is crucial but hard to foresee.
- *Southeast Asia*, primarily the original ASEAN-6 countries Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, is repeating the development pattern of East Asia to which it is increasingly linked economically as well as in security terms. By adding the four poor and peripheral countries Vietnam, Burma, Laos and Cambodia, ASEAN-10 has become a much more heterogeneous organization.

- *South Pacific* (containing 'European Pacific' – Australia, New Zealand) is now being drawn by Japanese capital into the East Asia economic space. The region has been organized in the South Pacific Forum.
- *Coastal China*, following in the footsteps of Southeast Asia, is forming part of a Greater China subregion together with Hong Kong and Taiwan. The most dynamic areas are the special economic zones.
- *North Africa* as an Arab region is sometimes, treated as part of the Middle East. Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia have been, since 1989, organized in the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), which Egypt also joined in 1994. The region has, as part of the Mediterranean region, been a candidate for intermediate status, but, due to the domestic unrest in Algeria (with spill-over risks in the neighbouring countries) and repressive political structures in the others, a rather weak one, now about to sink into the periphery. Putting an end to this destructive process is necessary in order to avoid sinking into the periphery.

Remaining in *the periphery zone* are the following regions:

- *The Balkans* is a region which can be defined as an explosive regional security complex. Greece, only partly present due to its EU membership, and Turkey, a bridge to the Middle East, are the stronger actors. Of former Yugoslavia, Serbia/Montenegro and Macedonia are Balkan, together with two former 'East European' countries, Bulgaria and Romania. All countries have, due to these different historical alignments, lost whatever little tradition of cooperation they once might have had. The current degree of regionness in the Balkans is thus extremely low.
- *Caucasus* makes up part of southern Russia (i.e., Northern Caucasia), with Chechnya, Dagestan and other autonomous republics, and an area south of the Caucasian mountain range (Transcaucasia), where there are three post-Soviet countries, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan with complex external and internal relations. In this region unity is through its many problems rather than any positive cooperative schemes.
- *Central Asia* is also more peripheral than the western parts of the post-Soviet area. There is little likelihood of Russia and Central Asia's five states sticking together, unless a new empire of the old coercive type is formed. Major changes, as far as new align-

ments are concerned, can be expected, but in the present turbulence it is hard to tell exactly what changes will take place.

- The *Andean region* as well as *Central America* and *the Caribbean* are here seen as peripheral subregions of Latin America due to several handicaps such as small sized countries and rather one-sided resource endowment in the two latter, and a tradition of unruly populist politics in the former. All three were early organized into formal regions (the Andean Group 1968, Central American Common Market, CACM, and CARIFTA 1968, replaced by CARICOM 1973), but the experience was not very successful. The rather ambitious Andean Group (with Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela) was consciously designed to be more developmentalist than the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA). It went into passivity due to political reasons (the Chilean coup).
- *The Middle East* is a region originally defined from outside and with an unsettled and explosive regional structure which in this respect can be compared to the Balkans. The ethnic pattern is extremely heterogenous. The states are incoherent, and several regimes compete for regional hegemony or dominance. The level of regionness is low and, to the extent that a stronger regional identity will emerge, it will be confined to various subregions, the North African Maghreb countries (or western group, organized in the Arab Maghreb Union, AMU), the Mashreq countries (or eastern group organized in the Arab League) and the Gulf area (organized in the Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC).
- *South Asia* has, in spite of the emergence of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), so far shown a low level of 'regionness' because of domestic violence and the 'Cold War' (sometimes getting hot) between the two major powers, India and Pakistan, now also diverging in terms of regime type due to fundamentalist trends. The other countries, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives all share a suspicious attitude towards India. To the extent that this recurring hostility, particularly between India and Pakistan, can be overcome, the region may quickly reach intermediate status, but probably, as in the case of China, at the cost of new and deepening internal divisions.
- The countries in the former *Indochina subregion* of Southeast Asia, together with Burma (situated between South Asia and Southeast Asia) have recently become ASEAN members, in spite

of their economic and political problems, as for instance manifested in the domestic political tensions in Cambodia, where membership was postponed for some time as a result. Like the southern enlargement of EU, this one may in the longer run stabilize the whole region through better control over a potentially destabilizing north–south division within the region.

- *Inland China*, which has not been part of the modernization process, is lagging far behind the rest of China in terms of economic development. There are also ethnic tensions emerging. This may endanger the coherence of the Chinese state/empire and destabilize the intermediate Chinese region – ultimately the coastal areas – as well.
- The 53 *African* countries, represented at the continental level by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), are grouped into more than 200 regional bodies. However, judging by the results of integration, it is not the number of regional organizations that counts. Apart from the formal regions, there are more important informal networks transcending state borders and these networks can be seen as embryonic regional civil societies. To the extent that it is possible to speak of a new regionalism in the African context, the trend should be away from single issue organizations to consolidated, multidimensional regions, ranging from economic development to security. On the whole, the level of regionness is very low in Africa and there are even some geographical areas which largely lack experience of regional cooperation. North Africa was dealt with above as an intermediate region. As in Asia, there are several distinct regions within the continent.

In *West Africa*, where the major regional initiative ECOWAS with 16 members had been more or less paralyzed for a long time, partly due to Nigerian dominance, partly because of the modest level of communication between the French and British former colonies, there were unexpected signs of a somewhat more active regionalism in terms of a regional security regime.

Central Africa, dominated by former Zaire, the Democratic Republic of Congo (Kinshasa), is a region only in the sense of a geographical area and has a social system (security complex) in which there has been a high level of violence over the past years. Efforts at external interventions have been confused and ineffective and as far as regional initiatives are concerned, non-existent. One can speak of a rather primitive regional security complex and

there will be limited regional action here. Recent warfare and its consequences in terms of changing regional power structures suggest that a new pattern of alliance is emerging. Congo has for instance now joined SADC.

East Africa constitutes a traditional region formed by colonial bonds, but also culturally integrated through the Swahili language. In the north-eastern subregion *Horn of Africa* the record of conflict is more protracted than any record of cooperation. Even in the Horn, a pattern of regional cooperation is slowly beginning to emerge, recently interrupted by one of the few inter-state wars (Ethiopia–Eritrea). Countries in the region (Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan) did, in January 1986, establish the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD).

The Eastern group of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda form one area of historical integration by colonialism, but were later divided by national rivalries and even war (the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda under Idi Amin). Furthermore, Tanzania joined the Southern Africa Development Community and oriented itself towards the south. The ‘old’ and imposed regionalism that failed miserably is now being revived by a ‘new’, more spontaneous, regionalism, albeit challenged by the old type of political leadership.

In *Southern Africa* several subregional initiatives in the context of the new regionalism, at least in terms of declared objectives, have been undertaken. One example is SADCC (Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference) now SADC (Southern Africa Development Community), covering 14 countries. The main function of SADCC was originally to reduce the dependence on South Africa, when it was still a regional power with designs of regional dominance through the destabilization of ‘hostile’ regimes.

The grouping of regions, subregions or even parts of larger states into the three categories suggested above is necessarily problematic, itself an indicator of the complex dynamics of globalization, regionalization and transformations on the state level. ‘Subregions’ are in my terminology not subcontinental areas but more distinct regional groupings within a larger region, for instance the Horn of Africa in East Africa. In order to make meaningful comparisons between regions, it is important to be aware of not only the historical differences as expressed in culture and politics, but also the structural position, expressed in sustained economic development and relative political stability. That peripheral regions are called ‘peripheral’ because they are stagnant, turbulent and war-prone is

of course not an explanation of their status, merely a structural analysis of their relative positions in the world system in terms of underdevelopment and conflict-proneness. These crucial dimensions are closely linked. Underdevelopment generates conflicts, and conflicts prevent the necessary steps to get the economy in order. To the extent that structural criteria change by deliberate political action, the region 'moves' from one structural position to another.

The exact borderlines delimiting this 'New Third World' are impossible to draw. The dividing line sometimes crosses through large heterogenous countries, typically former (classical or colonial) empires (Russia/Soviet, China, India, Brazil, Indonesia). It seems likely that attempts to reach intermediate status by quickly linking up to the world market in these cases will lead to deeper internal divisions with destabilizing consequences. This leaves those parts of the countries in the intermediate zone which control state power with a great responsibility for countering the process of peripheralization and internal disintegration.

There are also cases where individual countries are lingering between two structural positions due to different regional options (Chile between core and intermediate position, and Slovakia, Ukraine, Peru and Vietnam between intermediate and peripheral position). The only way for poor and violent zones to become, as regions, less peripheral in structural terms is to become more regionalized, i.e. to increase their levels of 'regionness', particularly in the inter-linked areas of security and development. Otherwise, their only power resource would rest in their capacity to create problems for the core regions ('chaos power'), thereby inviting or provoking some sort of external engagement. This mechanism can be seen in Southern Europe's concern for North Africa, in Mitteleuropa's concern for Eastern and Southeastern Europe and Russia, in Scandinavia's concern for the Baltics, and in the growing emphasis put by the Chinese (PRC) authorities on spreading some of the economic dynamics from the coastal areas to the interior so as to avoid the prosperous areas being invaded and thereby undermined by desperate paupers; the so-called floating population of perhaps one hundred million, fleeing the nameless misery of interior China. One remedy will be discussed below.

SECURITY REGIONALISM

By *security regionalism*, I mean attempts by the states and other actors in a particular geographical area – a region in the making – to *transform a security complex with conflict-generating interstate and intrastate relations towards a security community with cooperative external relations and domestic peace*. The Nordic countries constitute the best example of a security community, and the European Union was originally launched with this particular purpose in mind. To a large extent it has succeeded, but nothing should be taken for granted. The current security challenges to the EU are of course not comparable to the original EC project of six countries which, in security terms, was primarily intended to stabilize the German–French relationship.

In peripheral regions there is, in contrast, a conspicuous lack of positive cooperation that could lay the foundation for a regional security community. The normal situation is a tense security complex, prone to both interstate and intrastate conflicts. Today the latter kind of conflict predominates and creates a pressure on external actors to intervene in those ‘failed states’ which risk to give rise to regional security crises. The question whether such intervention is regional or extra-regional is one important criterion by which the level of regionness can be assessed. Increasing regionness in a regional security complex is manifested in an increasing need for preventive diplomacy or intervention at the level of the region, rather than either extraregional (multilateral or plurilateral), or intraregional (unilateral or bilateral). Of course, if we are dealing with a mature security community, the issue of external intervention should not arise, since this is the highest level of regionness along the security dimension.

The New Regionalism implies the possibility of a regional formation with a distinct identity and capacity as an actor. It does not preclude a function for the old nation-state, which for certain purposes could be a useful level of decision-making. However, in certain cases, the nation-state often prevents rational solutions, whereas the regional level opens up new ways of solving conflicts that have become institutionalized in the historical state formations. Under the umbrella of multilateralism, the regional actor can, with lesser risk of provoking bilateral hostilities, intervene in intra-state conflicts which threaten to become destructive for the region as a whole.

In the field of *conflict management* and *conflict resolution*, the

idea that conflicts within a certain region are best dealt with directly by the region concerned is not new; in fact it was already discussed when the UN was formed. In the earlier debate, however, the 'region' was simply conceived as an intermediate actor, to which a security task could be delegated. With increasing 'regionness', however, the region becomes an actor in its own right, transforming itself from object to subject. An important criterion for assessing the level of 'regionness' in a transformed regional security complex is the institutionalized capacity for autonomous conflict management and conflict resolution at the regional level.

It is important to note that this regional capacity should have an institutional foundation rather than being an ad hoc improvisation, a 'coalition of the willing' (Morris and McCoubrey, 1999). Regionalization thus implies a security dimension, which is essential to the dynamics of the integration process. Integration and disintegration form part of the same dialectical process and should be dealt with within a single theoretical framework. To develop such a framework is a challenge to the social sciences.

I suggest five crucial elements in such a framework particularly adapted for regional analysis of predominantly domestic but regionalized conflicts:

- (1) development regionalism and the prevention, or rather 'provention' of conflict;
- (2) the nature and dynamics of the conflict;
- (3) modes of external intervention;
- (4) patterns of peace settlement and conflict resolution, and
- (5) post-conflict reconstruction.

Development Regionalism and Conflict Provention

Regionalism as a means of conflict management and conflict resolution is a rather new phenomenon. In contrast, *regionalism as development policy* has been tried in all parts of the world, and it seems there is a general consensus that it has been a failure as far as development is concerned. But traditionally it was concerned with trade. We need to broaden this approach. By development regionalism I shall thus refer to *concerted efforts from a group of countries within a geographical region to increase the complementarity and capacity of the total regional economy as well as finding the right balance between function and territory.*

Further, how can such a long-term regional strategy today be made more relevant both for development and for conflict prevention or, to use Burton's term, *provention*, combining the promotion of conditions conducive to peace and the prevention of conditions conducive to violence (Burton, 1990)? Thus provention implies 'the promotion of an environment conducive to harmonious relationship' and 'prevention of an undesirable event by removing its causes' (Burton, 1990: 2–3; see also Nilsson, 1999). In this context we are interested in provention mainly in a regional context.

Why did the old regionalism fail to promote peace and development?

- (1) It was imposed from outside the region for geopolitical reasons, and in such cases there were few incentives for economic cooperation, particularly if, as was often the case, the 'natural' economic region had been divided in accordance with the Cold War pattern.
- (2) The attempts at regional cooperation/integration that actually took place were inherited from colonial schemes and therefore not seen as compatible with the new status of national independence.
- (3) They did not go beyond trade arrangements between nations emerging from what essentially had been colonial empires, where economic relations already had become distorted and 'dependent'. Trade was never a sufficient field of cooperation, due to the lack of complementarities between neighbouring countries in areas with similar resource endowments. The outcome was rarely encouraging, as the global pattern of uneven development was reproduced within the region, and with political tensions and sometimes outright conflicts as a logical result.

Among other things the previous efforts failed to reach a balance between 'function' and 'territory'. Thus rather than 'proventing' unwanted outcomes, the old regionalism created new conflicts.

However, even in the earlier regionalist efforts a distinction could be made between exchange-based free trade areas (such as the Latin American Free Trade Area) and common markets also involving conscious efforts to specialize production (such as the Central American Common Market and the Andean Pact). The former approach is based on considerations of static comparative advantage, the latter more dynamic (Mytelka, 1992). Neither, however, was very successful. Closer economic relations between states are

in the conventional view seen as results of development rather than preconditions for development.

In contrast, the 'new' regionalism is more political and development-oriented. Its approach to free trade is cautious, far from autarkic but, since regional coherence is a major concern, more selective in its external relations. It is careful to see to the interests of the region as a whole. The emergence of economic blocs makes it necessary for the excluded countries to stick together in order not to be completely dwarfed. In addition to these imperatives related to the current transformation of world economy and world order, we must of course add the classical arguments, such as territorial size, economies of scale and externalities. It may also prevent the emergence of those problems which typically are associated with earlier strategies for regional development.

Development regionalism in the context of the New Regionalism may provide solutions to many specific economic and development problems in the South, as well as some problems in the North that have become accentuated by globalization. In this context the security aspect is particularly relevant. Seven possible advantages, carrying different force in different contexts and situations, can be mentioned:

- Although the question of size of national territory and population undoubtedly has become less important in a highly interdependent world, regional cooperation remains imperative, particularly in the case of micro-states who have to cooperate to solve many common problems (*the sufficient size argument*). The idea that a small country should specialize and find its competitive niche in a larger functional system contradicts the idea of a balance between territory and function which is central to regionalism.
- Inward-looking development (earlier popularized as 'self-reliance') was rarely viable on the national level because of a lack of dynamic linkages; yet a 'development from within' may be a feasible development strategy at the regional level if defined as coordination of production, improvement of infrastructure, making use of complementarities (*the viable economy argument*). This is distinct from regional autarky, which in the current global economic integration has lost whatever relevance it might once have had.
- Turbulence in the global market place may cause havoc for vulnerable national economies, particularly those who do not follow the mainstream orthodoxy. Economic policies may remain more

stable and consistent if underpinned by regional arrangements which cannot be broken by a participant country without provoking some kind of sanctions from the others (*the credibility argument*). The logic of this argument rests on the assumption that, if a country is locked into a regional arrangement, which implies giving up its independence as far as economic policy is concerned, it is less likely to make sudden and drastic shifts in its economic policy. For external potential investors the country is now considered as more safe. The argument has been much used in connection with discussions about a European Monetary Union (EMU). Countries not living up to the criteria of convergence are apt to become the prey of speculation. It would take extraordinary resources (like Norwegian oil) and exceptional political stability (Chile) to stay out of regional integration and yet remain safe.

- Collective bargaining on the level of the region could improve the economic position of marginalized countries in the world system and make it possible for them to influence raw material prices or protect the structural position and market access of emerging export countries (*the effective articulation argument*). This argument is particularly relevant for countries which are strongly outward-oriented and export-driven, the typical case being ASEAN. It is also relevant in cases where there is little complementarity, i.e. neighbours exporting the same product (e.g., oil).
- Regionalism can counter the disruptions caused by globalization and uneven development, reinforcing societal viability by including social security issues and an element of redistribution in the regionalist project (*the social stability argument*). Globalization leads to exclusion and creates a need for new ways of bringing about inclusion. A regional organization may compensate for the decline of the national welfare state by creating a wider security net that would match the transnationalization of economies. Regionalism must be redefined to reinforce societal viability. It should, in the process of regionalization, include social security issues and social protection, for instance by regional compensation, development funds or specialized banks. This argument becomes particularly relevant when the degree of regionness is so advanced as to include an element of redistribution among the constituent states and, most importantly, their subnational regions. The trade-off between deepening and enlargement is basically the trade-off between the increased efficiency gained from a high degree of

integration between similarly developed national economies and the increased regional social and political stability gained from the adoption of more fragile states by the more robust. So far only the EU has an explicit social policy in the context of regional integration. In spite of being an issue in most regions, it is at the most embryonic in the peripheral regions where the scope for solidarity is limited. The social stability argument can also be extended to political stability, providing a commitment to democratic practices is made part of the regional arrangement and thus links up with credibility in a wider and deeper sense.

- It is well known that ecological and political borders rarely coincide and it is, furthermore, increasingly realized that few serious ecological problems can be solved within the framework of the nation-state. Some problems are bilateral, some are global, quite a few are regional. The regional ecological issues are often related to water: coastal waters, rivers and ground water. Examples are the South China Sea, Barents Sea, the South Asian river systems, the Mekong River system, the Nile, the Euphrates and Tigris, the Zambezi river and the uneven exploitation of ground water resources in the areas around Jordan. It is clear these issues cannot be studied separately from the question of regional security (see volume four). Regional 'environmental security complexes' constitute imperatives for regional cooperation. The fact that regional management programmes exist and persist, in spite of nationalist rivalries, shows the need for environmental cooperation (*the resource management argument*).
- During the Cold War, a common argument (the 'common security' approach) against nuclear armament was that the destructive capacity of the military establishments was excessive and therefore irrational, and that whatever reduction in the level of armament that could be negotiated might be used for civil (development) purposes. Some regions, such as East Asia and Europe (and within these regions Japan and West Germany in particular) were seen as 'free riders' of the security order since they could devote relatively more resources to investment and economic growth than to the military sector. In the post-Cold War order these regions have been encouraged to take a larger responsibility for their own security. At the same time the removal of the Cold War 'overlay' (Buzan, 1991, and Buzan's chapter 1 in volume four) permitted latent conflicts to reemerge, giving rise to costly (conventional) armaments races. The security situations

differed from region to region with vacuum problems in East Asia and Europe, eruptions of older conflicts in South Asia and the Middle East, breakdowns of the political order leading to 'tribalism' in Africa and the Balkans. The only region experiencing relative peace is Latin America, which now may be said to have achieved a comparative advantage in peace and political stability, due to the peace process (described by Frohmann in chapter 4 in volume 4). It can also be said that the ASEAN countries over the years have reaped security benefits from regional cooperation, and that this has been a crucial factor behind the dynamism of the organization. Successful regional conflict resolution could eliminate distorted investment patterns, making resources locked in the 'security fund' (military expenditures) available for more productive use (*the peace dividend argument*).

Development regionalism is thus a way to break vicious circles and is also an important 'proventive' factor by which conflict-generating development processes can be eliminated at an early stage. Obviously the peace relevance of the seven arguments differ, the most interesting in this context being: social (and political) stability, resource management and the peace dividend arguments. Let us now consider the issue of manifest conflicts and how to handle them in a regional perspective.

Nature and Dynamics of Domestic Conflict

The structure of the international system is in fundamental transformation, lifting the overlay of stabilizing controls that were part of the Cold War system. The resulting conflicts are of different kinds: some old, but occurring in a radically new global context, some qualitatively new. The internal conflicts constitute challenges to the nation-state and, thereby, the nation-state system, or what we have called the Westphalian system and political logic (see my introductory chapter to volume one in this series). Post-Westphalian political rationality, in contrast, assumes that the nation-state has lost much of its usefulness and that solutions to problems of security and welfare must be found increasingly in transnational structures, multilateral or (as this chapter argues) regional.

Early examples of the dissolution of Westphalian state-formations are few and tended to confirm the persistence of the world-system. This system did not permit 'national liberation' after a first phase

of decolonization (in which the global hegemon had a national interest) as soon as this particular wave of national liberation was supposed to be over and done with. This stability in state-formation proved, however, to be an illusion. States in all parts of the world are irreversibly challenged from within, some becoming what Richard Falk has called 'black holes' or 'pathological anarchies' (Falk, 1999). These pretheoretical concepts and metaphors are in need of further theorizing.

How can we reach a theoretical understanding and explanation of this phenomenon? Let us first distinguish between two types of explanatory approaches. The first links particular outcomes to one or several (but not too many) possible causes. Normally a firm causal relationship can at best be established in individual cases. The second is systemic, which means the building of a model containing all seemingly relevant factors and relationships. This may enlighten us about general features of most cases, but it has little to tell us about the specific causes of any particular case, nor does it provide any solution for preventing or solving a particular conflict. However, such a model may offer the basis for an analytical framework for use in comparative research.

We are interested in what is now called 'complex humanitarian emergencies' (CHE), sometimes called 'complex political emergencies' which by definition are multidimensional. Root causes are normally political as well as socioeconomic, and the resulting crisis is of such dimensions as to raise the issue of external intervention, the third element of the CHE-complex, which can be described as a triangle of socioeconomic crisis, political crisis, and external intervention.

To understand what actually happens when a society breaks down, we must understand *what makes society possible* in the first place. Ever since modern society took shape, this question has been asked and discussed in terms of 'civil society' (Tester, 1992), by which I mean formal or informal social institutions located between state and *primary groups*, which can be either 'primordial' (which simply means that they have a previous and long existence) or (more recent) socially constructed subcultures. Primary groups can also be territorial, class-based, and so forth. They constitute the smallest 'we-group'.

Civil society needs the legal framework and the protective shield of the state, and without civil society the state in turn is reduced to its inherent coercive function. From this it follows that a modern civil society typically develops within a nation-state framework;

it becomes a *national* civil society. Different primary groups establish cross-cultural relations in the expectation of continued conditions of law and order. Within a grouping of states with enduring stable and peaceful relations, constituting a 'security community', there may emerge a *regional* civil society, transcending the nation-state order. Similarly, in a stable world order one may also be able to identify an embryonic international civil society (or 'global civil society') which is as yet very fragile and easily undermined by the rise of global turbulence connected with the crisis of the state.

A simple model of a national civil society would thus be a situation where multicultural institutions mediate between the state and the primary groups. Civil society is by definition open and inclusive (although voluntary) and facilitates non-violent communication between all groups constituting the national system. Anybody may participate (although everybody is not obliged to). The role of the state is to provide the legal framework, guarantee the safety of transactions and maintain social coherence throughout national society.

Departing from this model, a process of political erosion can be understood as a transfer of loyalties from the level of national civil society to primary groups, due to increasing insecurity and uncertainties. A breakdown of organized political life and inter-group social communication within a particular society (here defined and delineated by the nation-state), creates a situation in which each group becomes responsible for its own security (Posen, 1993), a situation aptly described as a 'security dilemma' (Walter and Snyder, 1999). The security dilemma approach provides a good departure for analyzing the dynamics of the conflict but it is only part of the story and has little to say about the nature and cause of conflict. The breakdown of order provides an opportunity to fight, but fighting only takes place after a decline in the codes of neighbourliness, which is a particular socio-psychological process with a dynamics of its own. *Both structure and behaviour of actors are thus being transformed in a dialectic relationship.* Increasing uncertainty and lawlessness provide lucrative opportunities, and gradually a criminalized economy in need of permanent warfare is born. In the worst case scenario, society turns into a 'black hole'.

This may lead to regional security crises, as has been demonstrated by Bosnia and Kosovo in Europe, Cambodia and Indonesia (East Timor) in Southeast Asia, Lebanon in the Middle East, Liberia and Sierra Leone in West Africa, Somalia and Sudan in the Horn

of Africa, Angola and Mozambique in Southern Africa, Rwanda and Zaire in Central Africa, Nagorno-Karabakh and Tajikistan in the former Soviet Union, and Kashmir and Sri Lanka in South Asia. The impulse to intervene is thus for very good reasons also regional.

As war disappears as an interstate issue and appears as an intrastate one, the nature of war itself (if 'war' is the right expression) is changing (Joenniemi, 1997; Kaldor, 1999). Ethnic cleansing, mass rape, systematic killing of children, destruction of cultural monuments of great symbolic value are some of the methods used in 'the new wars'. Security against some sort of payment is in these anarchical situations organized in small scale, personalized ('feudal'), overlapping and competing clusters, which in the context of modernity must be described as 'criminal'. Like premodern wars, the war as such has become a way of accumulation ('primitive accumulation'), and to secure access to scarce natural resources formally under state control (for instance, oil, timber, gold and diamond mines). Africa provides many recent examples (Reno, 1998).

The continuous and increasing eruption of 'black holes' can be seen as a general tendency towards world disorder. It may also be seen as part of the creation of a new world order, in which the nation-state loses some of its historical importance, while a more diffuse and multilevel form of governance is being shaped. Of interest here is the role of the regional factor; what are the regional implications of the conflict, and what role can the region play in the conflict?

The nation-state is the first victim when political territories fall apart. The 'black hole syndrome' is a new type of conflict endangering regional and world peace, with currently no generally accepted method and means by which it can be contained. The reason for this is, simply, that the international system was built on a Westphalian illusion: that all nation-state projects will succeed and that the states, in the name of sovereignty, can be left completely to themselves in solving 'domestic' problems. Black holes constitute a danger, not only to a particular region, but ultimately to the state system as a whole. Therefore they provoke international counteraction of some sort, however feeble, misinformed and confused. This is the third dimension of our comparative framework, to which I now turn.

To Intervene or Not

Why would external actors be interested in intervening in domestic conflicts? How is intervention legitimized? What are the possible actors and methods used? We are not interested in outright national selfishness or lust for power here, but nor can we take altruism for granted. Instead, a predominant self-interest in the preservation of peace among adjoining nation-states is the key factor that has to be explained. In my view the explanation must be found in the degree to which a transnational network has developed in which the countries concerned have developed a stake.

The 'new world order' and 'the end of history' are two global scenarios that already have become classic misconceptions. In the current turbulence, the United Nations is instead increasingly preoccupied with what have been called 'failed states', the number of which is steadily increasing. The erosion of the Westphalian state system is also destroying the foundation of the United Nations as we know it. To intervene militarily in the affairs of another state has until recently been taboo. Today it is more widely accepted, although it is difficult to reach a consensus about the precise criteria and norms for intervention. Externally imposed protected zones – so called 'safe havens' – within countries haunted by civil war may become normal. It is an unfortunate, but sometimes necessary, substitute for nonexistent or failed constitutional guarantees within the states of concern. In the future this may also be a first step towards an 'orderly division' of a state; i.e. controlled and supervised from outside and supplied with some kind of legitimation from the so-called international community. A refugee-generating country is an international security risk, and will be dealt with as such by affected countries. This type of counter-sovereignty operation is not compatible with what was originally stated in article 2 of the UN charter: 'Nothing in this charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state'.

The different cases of external intervention we have seen so far also have different degrees of legitimacy, not unrelated to the behaviour of the parties involved in the conflict. The less their legitimacy and the more barbarian their behaviour, the more urgent and the more acceptable external intervention will appear. There are in international law two major types of legitimation:

- (1) a conflict constitutes a threat to international peace, and
- (2) the behaviour of the parties to a conflict violates human rights.

Principles of legitimate humanitarian intervention must be agreed upon beforehand. Dieter Senghaas has proposed a rather exhaustive and still relevant list: genocidal policies, policies displacing vast numbers of people, wars/civil wars and essential relief operations, internal persecution of people without external consequences, violation of minority rights, ecological warfare, attempts to acquire weapons for mass destruction and their proliferation (Senghaas, 1993).

Variations in the nature and dynamics of conflict will influence the pattern of intervention. It is important to bear in mind that intervention with the purpose of preventing a conflict does not have to be military, and that early civil intervention, and prevention, is always better than late military intervention with the purpose of subduing an acute conflict. Here I shall deal with the latter and unfortunately more common case. Five different modes of military intervention in acute regional security crises can be distinguished: *unilateral*, *bilateral*, *plurilateral*, *regional* and *multilateral*:

- The *unilateral* can be carried out either by a concerned neighbour trying to avoid a wave of refugees into its own territory, or by a regional/super power having strategic or economic interests in the region.
- In the *bilateral* case there is some kind of (more or less voluntary) agreement between the intervenor and the country in which the intervention is made.
- The *plurilateral* variety can be an ad hoc group of countries or some more permanent form of security alliance.
- The *regional* intervention is carried out by a regional organization and thus has a territorial orientation.
- The *multilateral* normally means a UN-led or at least UN-sanctioned operation.

Here I am mainly concerned with regional and multilateral interventions as the two modes which to my mind (probably in some kind of combination) will be the predominant forms in the future, to the extent that legitimacy continues to play a role in international relations. Unilateral and plurilateral interventions lack legitimacy and the bilateral case is a rather exceptional case. The more different the value systems are between the intervening power and the country

subject to intervention, the less the chances are for a broad acceptance, particularly in cases of early intervention or preventive diplomacy. This is an argument for security regionalism as against multilateralism. The UN system, as noted above, implied a distinct role for 'regional arrangements or agencies' (Rivlin, 1992), and it is no surprise that the idea has surfaced again as the number of failed states has multiplied. Two schools can be identified: one that proposes a new level of UN organization by the creation of 'regional security commissions' (Lunn, 1993), and one that proposes a stronger link between existing regional organizations and the UN system (Bakwesegha, 1993).

The New Regionalism provides a third approach. The reality is very different from an idealized hierarchical order in which the regional level intermediates between a global space, occupied by multilateral organizations such as the UN on the one hand, and a national 'floor' of sovereign states on the other. What is stressed here is rather the emerging regional formations, assuming a level of actor capacity that the traditional formal regional organizations (the OAU, OAS, and so on) lack. Nevertheless, they do not get their mandate from above but from the cooperating states pooling their sovereignty. Generally one would assume that regional interventions are more coercive and more enduring, since the regional mission is not simply a task to be performed ('before Christmas') but a serious crisis to be permanently solved in the interests of the whole region. The emerging order will be structurally different from the Westphalian order and so will, as a result, the role of the UN system in such an order. This can be called 'regional multilateralism', by which I mean a world order based on constructive relations between moderately introverted and rather self-sustained world-regions.

As far as forms of intervention are concerned, one much discussed issue is whether the intervention is coercive or non-coercive. A lot of confusion is associated with this basic distinction relating to different forms of peace missions, for instance peace-keeping vs. peace-enforcement. Due to the principle of non-intervention embraced by the UN system, it is only the first which is generally accepted; but as an effect of the changing nature of conflict there is normally an escalation from peace-keeping over 'extended peace-keeping' to peace-enforcement. The recent (May 2000) UN debacle in Sierra Leone illustrated the difficulties of making sharp distinctions between these forms of intervention.

Conflict Resolution

As the fourth component of the framework, I focus on the pattern of conflict resolution, with particular reference to the regional dimension of the process. The current wave of ethnic mobilization may have the historical function of modifying the nation-state project, and the pattern of development inherent in it (Hettne, 1993c). The question is, how? If we exclude coercive assimilation of ethnic or other minorities, a method which usually forms part of the problem rather than of the solution, there are in principle three possible ways out of such domestic crises:

- (1) *constitutional change*, modifying the ethnic power balance and establishing a power-sharing arrangement within a particular state formation. A political constitution can be seen as an instrument of conflict resolution in a multiethnic state. This is why ethnic demands often include constitutional reform; for instance, administrative decentralization of political power to ethnically distinct provinces, internal self-determination which refers to social groups rather than to administrative units, and ‘consociational democracy’ where democracy functions as a human rights regime rather than as a formal political model. This solution would prevent the conflict from deteriorating into a regional security problem. Its logic remains within Westphalianism.
- (2) *the dismemberment of the state*, sometimes accompanied by ‘ethnic cleansing’, is an option that remains open when the preferred solution – constitutional reform – has failed. This unpopular solution has actually been seriously discussed more recently (Kaufmann, 1999). Division is rarely a good solution, since the old inter-ethnic conflict simply is redefined as an inter-state conflict, pathological Westphalianism, but in some cases it may nevertheless be necessary to prevent massacres and massive human rights violations by the drawing of frontier lines. However, an increase in the number of states with unsettled grievances among themselves implies a decreasing level of regionness. The Balkan region provides the best example.
- (3) a completely reversed process, i.e., an increasing level of regionness, is the *integration* of neighbouring states into a regional formation, a process which provides solutions to ethnic tensions simply by downplaying the role of borders. Ethnic conflicts often spill over into nearby countries and become

perceived as threats to national security. South Asia provides many examples. Conflicts among states are therefore more easily solved within an appropriate regional framework. A regional organization can take the role of mediator in ethnic conflicts better than the states concerned, and in terms of culture and values still be closer to the parties than international, extra-regional mediators. In addition, regionalism is the relevant line of protection, the defensive bulwark, against the anarchy of the world market and the global forces of homogenization and the implied cultural ethnocide. So far this solution, a compromise between Westphalianism and post – Westphalianism, which retains a territorial orientation through the regional focus, has seldom been tried. However, there are many examples of a positive regional influence which also, in a smaller way, implies increasing regionness.

Post-conflict Reconstruction

After conflict-resolution comes post-conflict reconstruction, which is a new human experience of massive social engineering, completely different from the physical rebuilding of war-torn societies where inner societal coherence is still intact. The black hole syndrome includes not only physical destruction but social exclusion, depletion of ‘social capital’, erosion of civil society, decay of institutions and decline of civility. It is a destruction of the social and moral substance of society. The complex rebuilding cannot be done by outside actors, but normally not without them either. Local actors become paralyzed by mutual hostility and fear in addition to lacking necessary resources. There is thus no alternative but to build on the combined efforts of external intervenors and remaining ‘islands of civility’ (Kaldor, 1999) to combat hate, suspicion, corruption and criminality. There are already manuals based on early experience produced by NGOs who, because of the ‘new wars’, have assumed a new task and new role. Here we are mainly concerned with the regional dimension of reconstruction. In the process of normalization it is of utmost importance that the destroyed society is reintegrated in the regional economy, communication network and system of resources in a supportive way through regional cooperation, which may not have been the case before. Thus, such cooperation must proactively avert tensions that might lead to renewed violence, i.e., what was above described as provention.

Here the circle is closed: regional cooperation for development reduces the level of conflict and the peace dividend facilitates further development cooperation. This positive circle can also be turned into a vicious circle, where conflicts and underdevelopment feed on each other. Development regionalism is a way to break vicious circles and an important preventive factor by which conflict generating processes can be 'prevented' before they occur. It is also a necessary framework for a post-conflict reconstruction phase.

A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW

The following section provides a brief and necessarily tentative survey of experiences of regional conflict management in regional and interregional systems which are based on economic, developmental and security links. The survey makes use of the various regions and subregions identified in the first section and tries to assess the nature of regional intervention and conflict management/conflict resolution, particularly the extent to which a long-term increase in the importance of the regional factor can be observed.

Europe: Paradigm and Paradox

Europe is a paradigm of the 'new regionalism' in the sense that security, political and economic motives clearly interact in a way that enforces further regionalization of an increasingly comprehensive kind. The Cold War order set the pattern and limits for regional integration in Europe, and the subsequent 'lifting of overlay', due to the hegemonic decline of both superpowers, completely changed the agenda for regional integration. The constantly growing EU therefore had to go far beyond the old task of easing traditional great power tensions.

The record of institutionalization is inconclusive, but one has to realize that progress normally is uneven. The Amsterdam constitutional summit in June 1997 was, for instance, not very encouraging, but towards the end of 1999 (after the Helsinki meeting) a new dynamism reappeared. The process of European regional integration goes on, but at the same time neonationalism is rising all over the continent. However, so far there is no change in the general direction and, as before, cooperation is likely to occur as soon as

it is deemed necessary and compatible with the 'national interest', as traditionally defined.

Europe is now on the (perhaps winding) road to higher 'regionness' in the field of security, in spite of strong reservations among many states, due to a remarkable revival of nationalism even in the core. Security orders are not created at the negotiation table, but emerge from responses to real challenges, which are often hard to predict. In other words, they are necessarily improvised. Furthermore, there is competition between existing institutions born in different historical contexts, and this is at a time of recurring crises rather than orderly planning. At the same time, there is a race between integration and disintegration, between the creation of a *regional security community* on the one hand, and the emergence of militant forms of both neonational and subnational identity-formation on the other. This is the paradox of European integration.

In Europe there are a number of old and new instances of intrastate conflicts representing mixtures of different forms of political rationality (pre-Westphalian, Westphalian and post-Westphalian) and different types of conflicts: the Basque province and Catalonia in Spain; Italy's north-south problem; the Ulster conflict; the Vallon-Flemish conflict in Belgium; the recent devolution of power from Westminster to Scotland and Wales; the split up of Czechoslovakia; the Magyar diaspora; the breakup of, and civil wars in, former Yugoslavia (to be discussed below) as well as gang wars in the great cities, neofascist violence against immigrants, fundamentalist sectarianism and internal exiles. The new types of transnational crimes are in themselves motives for further regionalization because of the need for supranational 'domestic' coordination (the third pillar of the EU).

To be on the waiting list for EU membership constitutes a strong incentive for the candidates to keep potential conflicts within or between their countries at a low level, since internal disorder would imply exclusion from 'Europe', in spite of being part of the European security system. This can for instance be seen in the propitiation in the case of the Hungarian-Romanian conflict in Transylvania. It can also be seen in the comparatively painless breakup of Czechoslovakia (a 'post-Westphalian divorce'). The very existence of the EU makes it unlikely that conflicts so close to the core could be allowed to escalate. The intermediate regions thus tend to become 'core-like', not only in terms of economic performance, but also in

terms of domestic peace. Here we can talk of an extended 'Central Europe', incorporating those parts of the Baltics and the Balkans that will qualify. This is a political conceptualization of 'Central Europe' just as 'Eastern Europe' was more political than geographical.

The Balkan region is a difficult case. One can of course speak of a 'regional space', or of a primitive regional security complex (with high security interdependence), but there is no formal regionalism; there are few spontaneous regional activities apart from smuggling; there is certainly no regional civil society; and the Balkans is very far from being an actor in its own right and with an agenda of its own. It has provided a major security dilemma for Europe.

The break-up of Yugoslavia provided the first serious challenge to the emerging regional security system in Europe in the form of two large-scale wars and consequent interventions; first Bosnia, then Kosovo. Few observers would consider the European response to these crises an unqualified success. The record rather underlined the power vacuum in a Europe still searching for a viable security order. Gradually every conceivable security organization became involved and in the end an ad hoc group of great powers, rather reminiscent of the nineteenth-century type of power balance politics known as the Concert of Europe, took over the negotiations. US unilateralism (the Dayton agreement in November 1995) was the single most efficient factor in putting an end to the Bosnian war. The subsequent peace process, which turned out to be longer than was expected at the time, was supervised by a complex, somewhat improvised plurilateral organization led by NATO and, in charge of civil affairs, a High Representative, representing the EU.

In the even stranger case of Kosovo, Yugoslavia, a sovereign state, was attacked because of terrorizing its own population and, as a consequence, part of its territory was *de facto* occupied and cut off. This intervention was also plurilateral but of still more doubtful legitimacy in terms of existing international law. That the road to a stable solution is very long is in this case more generally realized, and the main responsibility will rest on Europe: the EU and the European pillar of NATO.

There are different logics behind peacemaking, peacekeeping, conflict resolution, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction. In the latter process at least, European institutions must ultimately be involved and the former republics of Yugoslavia form part of the larger European system, which will thus contain core, intermediate and peripheral zones.

A solution must also be found on the subregional level; there is a need for 'Balkanization' in the more positive sense of the word. At present the Balkans is an explosive security complex with a low level of regionness and thus very far from being a security community. Only by increasing the degree of regionness can the Balkan periphery become organizationally part of Europe; otherwise one conflict will lead to another, provoking new external interventions (see chapter 11 by Jelica Minic in volume 4). The recent more relaxed relationship between Greece and Turkey shows that anything – in time – is possible.

In spite of European regionalism being the most advanced case of regional integration, the regional factor was slow in making itself felt as far as acute conflict management was concerned. What forms could a strategy for security regionalism in post-conflict reconstruction in the Balkans take? There are, if we exclude the catastrophic options of isolation and further disintegration, or the establishment of outright external rule, three future routes:

- (1) Formal cooperation by governments anxious to increase the level of regionness (positive Balkanization).
- (2) Informal cooperation, made possible by increasing homogeneity through convergencies in terms of partly externally imposed political regimes, economic policies and security arrangements.
- (3) Passive integration through gradual participation in European structures.

Cooperation between governments will take place on a bilateral basis and, as has happened in other regions, bilateralism may turn into trilateralism and regionalism. More likely, there will be hostile alliances, perhaps along religious or other historical lines, hindering overall regional integration in the sub-region. Passive integration is not an ideal form since the conditions will be completely decided and imposed by external actors. It might become like a colonial situation, or, put more nicely, a protectorate. This leaves informal cooperation through more or less spontaneous convergencies in various policy areas as the most viable road. The convergence in these policy areas will of course not be wholly spontaneous. It will depend on a number of externally imposed conditionalities associated with participation in European structures: democracy, human rights, clean government, market economy and of course non-aggression.

The prospect of full scale integration is bleak and will remain so

for a long time, particularly for Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, no permanent borders and boundaries must be allowed to establish themselves between 'Europe' and 'non-Europe' since we are dealing with one single security complex. The urge to be part of Europe seems to be a common goal for all Balkan countries, and this seems to be the first time that all the countries in the subregion share the same goal. To secure that goal certain standards must be met, and here we find the convergencies that constitute Balkan regionalization, 'positive Balkanization', today. The so called stability pact is a first, albeit hesitant, step in that direction and underlines the important role of economic development with a preventive impact in the field of security. This means that the dogmatic neoliberal approach must be questioned. The urgency to solve the security crisis is different from some other peripheral regions of the world, which are peripheral also in the sense that their security situation matters little for the major players. In terms of our framework the management of Balkan conflicts has been a failure: plurilateral rather than regional intervention, division rather than integration, prevention rather than prevention. Europe has to do much better, since the Balkans is not the only problematic area. The Baltics is another. In Mediterranean Europe, if North Africa is included here, there are further security problems and challenges to come.

Post-Soviet: New Regionalism or Old Imperialism?

In the *post-Soviet area* there are emerging successor-states and nations that, to avoid economic fragmentation and political tensions, will have to sort out their relations within some kind of regionalist framework. Thus there is for security as well as economic reasons a strong need for regionalism, and the first answer to this need was the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Should this be seen as an example of New Regionalism or Old Imperialism? The answer is not clear. For most countries, with the exception of the strongly western-oriented Baltics, a poorer Eastern version of the EU is the best they can possibly hope for. Economic nationalism on the level of the previous republics is, in view of Russia's economic dominance, not a very realistic proposition, which also seems to be generally understood. Yet even Russia is sinking into general poverty, and it will take a long time for this region to consolidate the intermediate position that rightly belongs to it. This possibility should not, however, be ruled out.

Russia remains a geopolitical challenge for Europe as soon as (or perhaps even before) the economic austerity is over. The crucial issue is whether Russia will 'become European' or not; that is, if it will stress its European or its Asian identity. If Russia follows its anti-Europe tradition, as urged by the conservatives, the Church and the oppositional communist–fascist alliance, the situation in the Europeanized regions with Russian populations will become untenable and a number of states will face dismemberment. The problem with the CIS is its awkward resemblance to an empire rather than to the New Regionalism, as shown by the reluctance of the international community to let Russia operate in the Transcaucasian area with a UN-mandate, not to speak of the management of its 'internal' problems, such as Chechnya. This is in contrast to what the USA is able to secure in its 'near abroad', for instance Haiti. From the Russian point of view it is hard to see the principal difference between the two cases. As the Chechnya case shows, no one will prevent Russia from 'solving' security crises the best it can. In this particular case the oppressed party is doing its best to regionalize the conflict, i.e., to involve the Muslim neighbours in a shared mission (Jotun, 2001).

Also in the conflicts outside Russia, the 'near abroad', the peace-keeping actions have a strong flavour of Russian imperialism, as for instance in the suppression of the Tajik opposition. In this case the other Central Asian countries participated in the peace-keeping, thus giving it a regional character, because this particular uprising, directed against the old nomenklatura, was a threat to the regional order. However, the region did not mediate, but supported one party in the conflict (Jotun, 2001). This shows the bias in regional, as distinct from multilateral interventions, to prioritize an end to the crisis higher than managing the conflict in a non-partisan way.

The Americas in the Grip of North Americanization

With the southward expansion of North America in the form of NAFTA, 'America' is no longer an ambiguous concept with a smell of imperialism, but increasingly coincides with *the Americas* as a geopolitical reality. All over the continent there is a trend towards 'sameness' in terms of economic policies and political regimes; i.e., the recent democratic wave. Different groups of states or regions in the making will nevertheless chose different routes towards higher

regionness, since there are also quite important differences in the content and depth of homogenization. There is also a legacy of violence and fear, as well as unresolved social problems, which seems to be on the increase in the more peripheral areas (Kroonings and Kruijt, 1999). Thus it is important to also bear in mind the contrasts.

The formal organization of NAFTA is an elite project based on neoliberalism, but it is interesting to note that as the opposition to this project from civil society takes a regional form, an alternative regional identity is also articulated. According to Marianne Marchand (Marchand, 2001), 'North American regionalisation reflects both the worst and "the best" of new regionalism'.

The intermediate zone in the continental system is the group of countries forming the Southern Cone (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay, with Chile and Bolivia as observers). These countries, Brazil in particular, try to develop a more Latin alternative through Mercosur, thus resisting North Americanization – unless the magnetism or bandwagon effect of NAFTA will have a similar impact as the EU had in Europe, meaning that rival organizations gradually lose relevance. For this cultural reason, it is reasonable to think that the third periphery apart from Central America and the Caribbean, namely the Andean countries, will link up to Mercosur rather than NAFTA. This assumption is strengthened by the fact that the Andean Pact, while it was more active, represented a more introverted and interventionist form of regionalism.

What about the peripheral subregions? The countries in the Andean area are still in the grip of populist politics and constitute rather incoherent political systems, reflecting the peculiar distorted economy (the coca- or narco-economy).

The small Central American states have strong incentives for regional cooperation. The crucial issue is whether the countries can develop a common approach to NAFTA, or whether they will join this bloc as individual client states and thus become 'North Americanized' and peripheries in relation to NAFTA. The natural catastrophes in the form of floods which hit the Central American region raised the issue of a transnational policy and programme of reconstruction.

The discussion of size and self-reliance has for obvious reasons been a special concern for Caribbean economists, particularly those who were concerned with structural transformation, which is particularly hard to achieve in a small dependent economy. Consequently, integration of the region in a common market system was advo-

cated. Such a policy has not been very successful, however, for reasons largely connected with the problem of dependence (Axline, 1979). Today regionalism is again more urgent in the region. All the countries of the region realize that they have to cooperate regionally (see chapter 8 by Grugel and Payne in volume 3). In no region are the arguments for regionalism stronger. Between the many islands there are cleavages due to colonial history and language, within the islands there are what has been called 'dual societies', characterized by their lack of common civic culture. Thus not only the region but also the societies within the region and within each country are fragmentized and divided. In the Caribbean, the 13-member-strong regional organization, CARICOM, now contains less than 6 million people. There are only 32 million people in the greater Caribbean. The next step would therefore be to form a Caribbean Basin region including Central America, but different from the Cold War initiative associated with Ronald Reagan and George Bush.

Let us now turn to the security issue. The possibilities for a Latin American regional peace order are comparatively good; in fact the peacefulness of the continent has become its major relative advantage, and the cost of breaking this trend very high indeed. Quebec is, apart from the Mexican south, the only subnational region rocking the boat in the core, but this particular ethnonational movement has over time turned into a more pragmatic form of microregionalism, and therefore less politically threatening. This adjustment of 'nationalist' motivations to post-Westphalian realities is similar to the micro-regionalist phenomenon in Europe. In Canada national identity is being reformulated and transferred from the federal to the provincial level, suggesting that the integrity of the Canadian nation is endangered (see chapters 7–9 in volume 2 and chapter 5 in this volume).

On the other hand, the whole region is at the same time threatened by social upheaval and disintegration as the neoliberal doctrine gets translated into growing geographic, social and ethnic divisions. Provention is not part of development. In the USA there are internal low-intensive social wars going on in the big cities (Los Angeles being the obvious case), the 'race war' continues, and Christian fundamentalists and white militias are capable of doing occasional harm. Mexico has seen guerilla fighting in two states: Chiapas and Guerrero. Thus, even in the core itself there are problems on the social and political fronts, in spite of the fact that the economies are said to be in excellent shape. What this suggests is a need for a

deepening of the regionalization process beyond trade harmonization even in the core.

Mexico and to some extent also Central America/Caribbean (in spite of being peripheral) are quickly becoming 'North Americanized' due to the new geopolitical realities. NAFTA may be said to have provided a guarantee against undemocratic tendencies in Mexico. Similarly, the strong discontent expressed by Paraguay's Mercosur neighbours probably prevented a threatening coup d'état in that country in April 1996, a threat repeated more recently. This can be compared to the reaction among the EU member countries to an unwanted political development in Austria. As was shown by the Mexican crisis, stability (also relevant for investors' assessments) is a wider and more complex concept than continuity and consistency with regard to economic policies, since social repercussions must also be taken into account. Being part of NAFTA did not prevent Mexico from being thrown into a major crisis caused by external speculation on a volatile and nervous financial market. Being part of NAFTA, however, did facilitate the salvage programme that followed, by which time the calm had been temporarily restored. For the same reason, the Chiapas conflict did not deteriorate, and the democratic process has been kept on the track, culminating in the 2000 presidential election.

The firm reaction of Mercosur countries to the attempted coup in Paraguay referred to above shows that in the intermediate zone political crises will also be managed within the subregion. In contrast, most of the conflicts in the more peripheral parts of the Americas still involve the United States, the regional and global superpower, and most experiences of conflict resolution imply the USA imposing its unilateral solution on the other parties; this is of course much resented in the region. Interventions in Guatemala (1954), Santo Domingo (1965), and more recently Nicaragua, Grenada, Panama, and Haiti are well-documented examples. Of the recent examples it should be noted that only the intervention in Haiti got UN support and can qualify as a multilateral one. All the others were unilateral. The tradition of unilateral action by the USA has so far been the most important obstacle to the development of a collective security regime in the Americas, and constitutes one reason for the weakness of the OAS. Thus regional interventions are rare. In the turbulence in Ecuador and other Andean countries, most recently Peru, however, the OAS played a certain role.

Regionalism can thus also become a factor counteracting

hegemonism and preventing non-democratic trends in the periphery. The case of Nicaragua is an interesting example of an attempt to reach a regional solution against the strong forces of regional hegemonism. The relative legitimacy of the Sandinista regime and the international (moral) support it could count on prevented overt, but not covert, intervention. Although lacking in resources, the so-called Contadora process demonstrated a new regional spirit (see chapter 4 by Frohmann in volume 4, and chapter 5 in this volume).

Asia: Growth amidst Poverty

In Asia there are also examples of regions (East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia) from all three zones – i.e., core, intermediate and peripheral – but they do not yet constitute an interregional system. The regions themselves are, with the exception of Southeast Asia, rather loosely organized. *East Asia* is economically dynamic but rather weak in terms of transnational political structures and regional identity. It belongs to the core more in terms of economic strength than in terms of security criteria. Consider the volume of Japanese investments and the entrepreneurial role of the Chinese diaspora, together constituting a virtual regional production system. The future of the region is either rather bleak – in case the potential conflicts were translated into war – or very bright – if the degree of interdependence were to prove to be a point of convergence of interests, where every state gets a stake in stable peace. As was pointed out in the beginning of this chapter, APEC does not constitute a region. It is, as Bøås and Hveem say in their contribution to this volume, a ‘bargaining forum’.

Most political initiatives towards organized regionalism, for instance the Security Forum and the controversial East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), instead come from the intermediate region, *Southeast Asia*, which, however, is becoming more and more economically integrated with East Asia. The two will soon constitute one regional system. It makes more sense to treat them as subregions of one larger East Asian region (see chapter 1 by Öjendal in volume 3). Paradoxically, however, the core East Asia still resembles a classic balance of power model of security, such as prevailed as nineteenth century Europe, whereas intermediate Southeast Asia through ASEAN represents a more advanced security arrangement, if not a security community (Acharya, 1998).

The countries in ASEAN are outward-oriented and as far as the original group (ASEAN-6) is concerned in various phases of a NIC-type development path. The more recent members, Burma and the former Indochinese countries, are clearly peripheral. The political systems are at best formally democratic, but varieties of 'developmental authoritarianism' in fact constitute the homogenizing political factor for which the ASEAN countries are often criticized by their competitors in the West. Problems on the international market usually reinforce domestic authoritarianism due to the strong two-way causal relationship between economic growth and political stability. Economic growth and redistribution are thus preconditions for ethnic peace and political stability, which in turn is a precondition for the economic confidence expressed by international capital towards the region. The 'open regionalism' is thus a way to articulate common interests within the region in relation to the globalization process.

There are some expressions of a more exclusivist Asian regionalism within the region. The Malaysian prime minister Mahathir has proposed an East Asian Economic Caucus (which was discussed in detail in chapter 3 in volume 3). This was to be a sort of Asian response to the threat of European and North American 'fortresses'. The EAEC proposal slowly gained support among other ASEAN countries and to some extent China, whereas Japan took a more sceptical attitude. It is currently neither on the agenda, nor dead and buried.

East Asia is still divided along Cold War lines. The region is, in terms of security, an enormous vacuum and, from this point of view, marked by a rather low level of regionness. Thus a growing maturity of the regional security complex may lead to a more formal regionalism, just as the normalization of the relations among the countries in South East Asia has been accompanied by a more formal and predictable regional arrangement than presently seems possible in East Asia.

Southeast Asia was previously in the same situation. As the super-powers pulled out, old rivalries emerged at the same time as the objective preconditions for cooperation encompassing the whole subregion in the longer run improved. There is a feeling of encirclement and external penetration in the subregion, coexisting with a tradition of reliance on external security support. Somehow this contradiction must be overcome by the development of a regional security order to increase the regionness and ultimately the 'coreness' of the region.

The Cambodian conflict has been of major concern for the ASEAN countries. Its resolution and subsequent post-conflict reconstruction was a triumph for the UN, and also gave an opportunity for Japan, heading the operation, to participate in a large international operation in the new role of regional power. In this case, the UN thus successfully cooperated with regional actors. Of importance for the successful outcome was the lack of ethnic divisions and the strong accumulated urge for peace in the war-torn country.

Another major crisis more recently erupted in Indonesia when East Timor, after massacres carried out by Indonesian militia, became another case for UN intervention, forced upon the political regime but resisted by the nationalist militia supported by sections of the military. From a regionalist point of view the low profile of ASEAN was disappointing but, in view of the consensual and non-interventionist tradition of that organization, not surprising. However, some of the ASEAN countries were quite active in crisis management, and there were certainly lessons learnt.

South Asia is one of the last regions to wake up to the challenge of the new regionalism (see the contribution by Muni in volume 3), and it is still rather isolated in the Asian context. It has been a region characterized by distrust and conflict, penetrated by external powers, which, in fact, have sometimes been invited by states in the region as part of their internal hostilities. Until the mid-1980s there was no formal regional cooperation whatsoever. To the extent that one can say that South Asia had reached a certain level of regionness, its network of relations was mainly conflictive. The region was traditionally inward-looking, since until recently the regional great power, being at the same time a unique civilization, strongly emphasized self-reliance. For similar security reasons, the smaller countries encouraged external links. However, there is at the same time a potential homogenization in terms of political regimes and economic policies and an inherent cultural homogeneity reflecting the shared Indic civilization, until now subsumed under a variety of inter- and intra-state conflicts, making the region a 'dangerous place' (with nuclear weapons).

The potential (of an inherent regional civil society) remains unrealized due to a dysfunctional Cold War-like Westphalian political rationality, if rationality is the right word. This is why I place South Asia in the peripheral zone of conflict and poverty, although it is true that the 'hindu rate of growth' has now been definitely overcome. The traumatic India-Pakistan conflict, which has so far

exploded in three wars (disregarding minor skirmishes), prevented all more ambitious organized efforts towards regionalism. Bangladesh's relations with India have often been characterized by distrust and hostility. The relations between India and Sri Lanka became increasingly tense when the Sinhalese–Tamil conflict erupted and Tamils fled to Tamilnadu, where they also received covert military training. The northern mountain kingdoms of South Asia were more or less absorbed into the Indian Union through processes of democratization and anti-monarchy agitations, discretely encouraged from India. Thus the bilateral conflicts in the region invariably involve India. The prospect of a multilateral intervention in a conflict here is distant; the regional power would not even permit regional conflict management.

The crucial conflict is, of course, that between India and Pakistan. It is a conflict that defines the regional security complex and provides a key to its transformation into a regional security community. Its elimination would make all the difference as far as further regionalization is concerned. Summits of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) have emphasized regionalism as the most appropriate way to relate to current changes in world order, but at the same time nationalist suspicions linger as nationalist and fundamentalist movements gain strength. It is, however, both a strength and a weakness that SAARC contains all the South Asian states. It is a weakness, because the conflicts in the region will continue to paralyse SAARC for some time to come, confining its scope to non-controversial and marginal issues such as tourism and meteorology. It is a strength, however, precisely because controversial problems can be handled within one organization, providing at least a framework for regional conflict management.

Put differently, the regional organization coincides with the regional security complex and can therefore be seen as the embryo of a security community. Conflict resolution, however, has not so far been considered a task for SAARC. There have therefore been several cases of unilateral and bilateral conflict resolution, the most traumatic after Bangladesh being the IPKF mission (Indian Peace Keeping Forces) in northern Sri Lanka in 1987. Obviously South Asia, like the Middle East, has a long way to go before a regional approach to conflict resolution can be adopted. This keeps them in the peripheral zone as defined above.

Regional cooperation in the economic field, or development regionalism, is at best embryonic. The economic rationale is not

overwhelming, but has to be created (Adiseshiah, 1987). The slow process of economic convergence has at least started. In the field of resource management, due to the shared river systems, there are strong interdependencies (environmental security complexes) which so far have been a source of conflict rather than cooperation. They may also, however, be turned into imperatives for regional cooperation, as shown by the agreement between India and Bangladesh on the sharing of Ganga waters. This treaty not only changes the political climate between the two neighbours but also paves the way for a broader regional agreement (including Bhutan and Nepal).

Regional diversity is also largely reflected within the individual states. There is no rationale for an Indian or Pakistan nation which does not apply to the South Asian region as a whole. The reason for seeking regional solutions is that bilateral suspicions make any other solution fragile. The overall trend in the region is towards occasional crisis-ridden muddling-through democracies, where the threats from intra-state heterogeneity are more problematic than inter-state conflicts. However, to an increasing degree, internal and external issues become interwoven, reinforcing the arguments for development and security regionalism, but unfortunately not necessarily the political will to implement them.

The Middle East: A Long March Towards Peace

The Middle East 'region' is in many ways the most complex of the Third World regions and part of the problem is that it constitutes a region which is mainly an arena of conflicting regional interests. Peace is thus clearly a necessity for development. Since conflict is the main characteristic of the region, the best way of approaching the regional issue is through the regional security complex concept, albeit with a rather broad concept of security (discussed by Barry Buzan in chapter 1 in volume four). It is the region of 'realist thinking' *par préférence*, besides East Asia. The artificial boundaries, the competing elites, and the lack of democratic tradition make the power play between heavily armed states as close to Machiavelli's world as one can come. Superpower involvement during the Cold War followed the same cynical logic.

It is therefore very difficult to foresee what a new security system in the Middle East might look like. The problems to be solved are many: to pacify Iraq, to contain the power and influence of

Iran, to find a solution to the Palestine question and to reduce the gap between the rich Gulf states and the poor Arab masses. Then there is a host of minority and human rights problems, of which the most urgent is the Kurd question, affecting a number of neighbouring countries.

The classic case of breakdown occurred in this region, namely Lebanon. The complexity of this crisis, however, makes it less adequate as a paradigmatic case, although the regional dimension should not be lost as far as the negative impact on the conflict is concerned. There was a complex interaction between internal and external factors, where the delicate ethnic balance within Lebanon was a crucial factor.

The major problem of this region thus lies in the field of security. Peace will open a new world, and therefore the breakthrough in the Israel–Palestine peace process was extremely important, albeit only the first step of a long march. A regional development process based on the triangle Israel–Jordan–Palestine is essential for the consolidation of the peace process in this part, as well as for further development in the whole region. Conflict in the Middle East is to a large extent identified with the Palestine issue, which goes back to the formation of the present subregion, centred on the river Jordan, and its constituent states. Israeli, Jordanian and Palestinian leaders are linked together, and sooner or later Syria must also be included. A common question has been ‘given peace in the Middle East, then what?’ (Fischer, 1993). Equally important is the question of how economic and ecological cooperation could prevent conflicts and build peace. The peace agreement can be compared both to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the democratization of South Africa, insofar as its importance for regional integration is concerned.

Previous regional arrangements have been dictated by external powers (hegemonic regionalism), and several states, for example, Iran under the Shah, Turkey and Israel, have played what was earlier called ‘subimperialist’ roles, in one word, protectors of US interests.

The problem of regional hegemonism (which should be distinguished from hegemonic regionalism) has a long historical tradition, and there are several competing states with a potential for regional leadership or hegemony in parts of the Middle East. But they suffer decisive handicaps in performing that particular role. Turkey and Iran are both outside the Arab community of states. Iraq lost

its position as regional power as a consequence of the 1990–91 Iraq–Kuwait War, which raised the issue of a ‘new world order’ and changed the Middle East political landscape. For instance, the Kurd question made it clear, perhaps for the first time, that there would be limitations to national sovereignty in the future.

Due to numerous subregional and subnational identities, the Middle East lacks a regional identity which, if ever constructed, is bound to emerge in different subregional manifestations (Laanatz *et al.*, 2000). Among such subregional projects are, first of all, those that relate to the competing hegemonic projects, the Pan-Arabic project and the two systems of alignments that are connected to Turkey and Iran, and which point towards Caucasia and Central Asia rather than the ‘Middle East as such’. ‘Middle East as such’, however, is (as noted above) a social construction with little relevance inside the region and possibly distorts our understanding of what goes on in the area. If ‘Middle East’ means anything at all it has something to do with the Arab world. Pan-Arabism is a historical movement which has been sustained by anti-Israelism (anti-colonialism) but like other pan-movements it has lived a largely ideological life with few material interests to support it. The diverging interests in the region tended to split the Arab world into the North African Maghreb countries (western group), the Mashreq countries (eastern group) and the Gulf area. In each of these subregions there are distinct common interests (realized or not) that constitute more natural bases for regionalist projects, and in two of them there are established regional organizations: the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). If we use our distinction between old and new regionalism, these organizations are primarily of the old kind, and therefore only slowly adapting to the challenges of today. The GCC has so far been little but an alliance for the purpose of internal and external security, although in spite of this it has unintentionally, and this is more like the ‘new regionalism’, facilitated contacts on the level of society (Barnett and Gause, 1998).

The initiative that comes closest to what is meant here by the New Regionalism and the ideas of security and development regionalisms is the subregionalist project which includes Israel, Palestine and Jordan (and in a larger circle also Egypt, Syria and Lebanon) and which forms part of the Middle East peace process (see the contributions by Helena Lindholm-Schulz and Michael Schulz in volumes 3 and 4). The radically new dimension here is that the

project includes enemies defining the security complex, but it is significant that the development and peace project so badly needs the active involvement of a number of external actors, and that it therefore might collapse at any time. This by itself is only an expression of the very low level of regionness, although it also shows the enormous potential in a combination of development and security regionalisms as an essential part of the peace process. No one has expressed it better than former Foreign Minister Abba Ebban: 'Israeli, Jordanian and Palestinian leaders are tied together inextricably. Geography, history and mutual interest give them no escape' (quoted from Schulz *et al.*, 2001). For the future the greatest hope lies in the widening of the peace process among this smaller circle (or 'peace quartet': Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Palestine) to include an increasing number of countries in the area we still for lack of a better word call the Middle East. The great danger is that the external factor has become too dominant (compared with the non-existence of this factor in the South Asia security complex) and therefore there is a high risk of a backlash.

Africa: Regionalization or Recolonization?

In Sub-Saharan Africa there has been little formal regional integration, simply because there is little to integrate. There is therefore an urgent need for a broader and more dynamic concept of development, beyond 'stabilization'. Again this is only possible within a framework of regional cooperation. The 'dynamic approach' to regional integration (Robson, 1968) must be further developed. Above all, this must become a political imperative among African leaders as the only way to halt the continued marginalization of the continent. This also implies a more realistic view on political intervention in the economic process than has been the case during the last decade. If the great discovery of the 1980s was that political intervention is not necessarily good, the discovery of the 1990s was that it is not necessarily bad either. The nation-state system seems more or less defunct, and the concept of a national development process is dying with it. The cruel choice seems to be: regionalisation or recolonisation, that is, changes orchestrated from outside.

At recent OAU summits it has been repeatedly stressed that the ongoing integration of Europe calls for a collective response from the member states, in the form of an African Economic Community (AEC). Many previous initiatives have of course been taken

in this direction, for instance the Lagos Plan of Action (1980), but undoubtedly the issue has now assumed a special urgency. The implementation of the AEC will take decades, and the first five-year period is devoted to the strengthening of existing regional economic communities as building blocs in the creation of a continent-wide unity.

Of importance here is the ongoing democratization – the so called ‘second liberation’ – in Africa. Similarly, economic policies are ‘harmonized’ due to the dramatically increased dependence on IMF and the World Bank, as well as the donor countries who all tend to give the same advice, i.e., structural adjustment. The new political conditionalities can be criticized from many points of view, but they undoubtedly harmonize the political cultures in the various nation-states. The problem is whether the externally imposed economic policies are consistent with internal political pluralism in poor, unstable states.

Promising efforts towards increasing regionness are being made, particularly in Southern Africa. Much depends on the character of a post-apartheid regime, not only for southern Africa but for whole sub-Saharan Africa. Three scenarios can be outlined (Martin, 1991):

- (1) ‘regional restabilization’ under South African dominance;
- (2) regional breakup, peripheralization and bilateralization of internal and external relations; and
- (3) a neoregional alternative implying regional restructuring based on a symmetric and solidaric pattern of development.

The last one is a very optimistic scenario, but it is noteworthy that the contributions on Africa both in this and in the previous volume are rather optimistic, compared to the continent’s general image in the media.

The dominant worry in Africa now is undoubtedly the worsening security situation in many parts of the continent. If the development of nation-states really were a necessary path to progress, the *African* people would have to pay a heavy price. Almost half of the internal wars raging in the world take place in Africa. Millions of people have been killed in uprisings, civil wars and massacres. Yet in spite of all this suffering the African states do not seem to be on firmer ground today than when they emerged from decolonization, although experiments in ‘power sharing’ have been started in a few states. Hence the need for the development of a regional capacity

for conflict resolution. A symbolic development in this direction is that a Division of Conflict has been opened by OAU to deal with tensions between and within member states. The principle of non-interference is thus being reconsidered, which is quite remarkable, even if so far there has been little action. The OAU simply does not possess the resources and mechanisms required to be a regional – i.e., continental – force.

The two major regional divisions on the African continent have been the Arab–African conflict, as manifested in the civil war in Sudan, and the White–Black conflict in formerly apartheid South Africa, as manifested in the conflict between South Africa and the ‘frontline states’ which led to the destabilization of Mozambique and Angola. The latter conflict is now partly resolved and this has had a dramatic impact on the continent.

There are innumerable subnational conflicts which are testimony to the artificiality of the African state. The Liberian crisis, spilling over to Sierra Leone, can be said to have speeded up the process of regional cooperation (see chapter 6 by Söderbaum in volume 4). The problem in this region, as in so many others, is the dominance of one state. Thus, peace enforcement and peacekeeping on the regional level implies a significant role for the regional power with obligatory (and often realistic) suspicions that there is an imperialistic project behind the allegedly humanitarian intervention. In the case of Liberia, the Nigerian role was subsequently diluted and the peacekeeping force transformed into an all-African force through the participation of Zimbabwe, Egypt and Botswana. At the same time the OAU as a regional organization stepped in, with blessings from the UN. Only by involving more and more international parties was regional legitimacy increased. Thus multi-lateralism and regionalism often go together, and this is as it should be. Disintegration on the level of the nation-state creates a power vacuum filled either with violence or with some kind of external involvement. The significant issue is who does the intervening. Should it be France or the United States, this would imply a low level of ‘regionness’. Should it be the region itself, this would indicate a process of regionalization and increasing regionness. If different countries within one region intervene on different sides of the conflict, as in the dissolution of former Zaire, we are facing a worst case scenario.

The more stable regimes within certain regions of Africa may feel obliged in the years to come to interfere through regional in-

stitutions in countries en route to anarchy in order to prevent the whole region from sinking. It need not be emphasized that there are dangers of regional hegemonism in this as well. However, if the intervention has a certain degree of legitimacy in comparison with the regime against which the intervention is carried out, the regional cause is strengthened. Integration and disintegration go together. The point is, obviously, not that a regional political structure is inherently better than a national one, which would be nonsense since all political communities are 'imagined' or constructed, but that the shift in the relative importance of the levels has some significance for the pattern of an emerging new world order. As far as the multilateral level is concerned, it has been tried in Somalia – with disastrous results; it never happened in Rwanda – with disastrous results, and it succeeded a regional intervention in Sierra Leone with disastrous results.

CONCLUSION

This overview has perhaps not exactly proved that the region is establishing itself as the master agent in global change. In most cases formal regionalization is a weak and contradictory process, but it is important not to mix up the process of regionalization with the activities of the formal organisation. What can be stated with some certainty is that, as the capacity of the state to handle the many challenges that it faces declines, so the region is becoming an arena for different kinds of activity. One reaction is for the states to pool sovereignty, another for non-state actors to take advantage of the porousness of borders to establish whatever networks or lines of communication they deem beneficial to their interests. In the field of security 'which is what concerns us here' it is unavoidable that most domestic divisions and strifes spill over into the larger region.

The issues of conflict and conflict resolution illustrate the importance of making a distinction between regionalism and regionalization. From the regionalist point of view there are many potential advantages in regional conflict resolution, which in the short run are bound to be frustrated due to lack of institutional preparedness. Institutional arrangements are nevertheless achieved (ASEAN, SADC, and now in Europe after the Helsinki summit). Nevertheless, judging from the cases reviewed here, it is undoubtedly

true that international conflict in the last decade has become regionalized in the more negative sense of conflict-widening, and that this regionalization of security will most also probably continue with regard to conflict resolution (Kanet, 1998).

What then is the actual record of *regional involvement in conflict management*? What are its advantages or disadvantages as compared to multilateral operations? First it has to be said that interventions in which a regional organization is the main actor are still rare, and it cannot be said that these few cases have proved very successful. This is agreed in most of the relevant literature. Cooper and Berdal (1993) even describe regional organization as 'particularly ill-suited' for military intervention. Diehl (1994) makes an assessment of possible advantages such as greater consensus in the organization, greater support from within the region and greater concern for stable conflict resolution. These advantages are rather theoretical and the empirical cases to support them ambiguous. There are also some distinctive disadvantages such as resource constraints, a weak regional organization and the difficulties of maintaining a position of neutrality. The overall assessment of Diehl's study is that regional intervention has fewer comparative advantages.

This seemingly predominant type of argument to my mind has two weaknesses. First, it assumes a real choice between multilateral and regional operations, in spite of the fact that the former option is becoming increasingly unlikely due to lack of resources, organizational capacity and political will. The current situation in Africa underlines this. And, second, it assumes a Westphalian international order with the region as a level of implementation between the international and the national. This organizational model is incompatible with the historical-structural trend I call the New Regionalism. Whereas the old regionalism was an arrangement that prevented the UN from interfering in a constructive way in regional conflicts, the New Regionalism seems to herald a world order in which the UN and the regional organizations will have to resume a shared responsibility for resolving regional security crises, rather than the UN delegating authority and distributing mandates. One reason for this shared responsibility is the exhaustion of UN powers and the still rather embryonic character of emerging regional formations.

My main point is, however, that multilateral and regional actors represent different types of potentially competing authority structures. It also seems unrealistic to think of intermediate regional

security organizations that are at the same time subordinated to the Security Council and representative of the states in the region, because the state-centric approach is becoming increasingly irrelevant as the world enters the post-Westphalian stage. In the future the UN may have to operate in a new political landscape of regional formations which define themselves as they evolve out of shared interests and perceived threats among a large number of actors.

Regionalization contradicts basic multilateral principles as conventionally defined, but may also be a step towards a 'new multilateralism'. A complex, more 'globalized' world needs a 'new multilateralism' (Cox, 1997). A regional intersubjective dialogue could provide the basis for 'regional multilateralism'.

For several reasons the issue of regional conflict resolution is of particular importance, above all because of its implications for national sovereignty, a principle fundamental to the way the Westphalian system is organized. When a regional security complex moves from largely negative to largely positive interdependencies (what is sometimes called a security community), a post-Westphalian political rationality is introduced, which means a collective stake in interdependence and growing preparedness to search for transnational solutions to national or subnational problems.

The New Regionalism can be seen as a compromise between Westphalianism and post-Westphalianism with important consequences for the future development of multilateralism. This is a vicious circle, where conflict and underdevelopment feed on each other. But the circle can also become positive. Regional cooperation for development, or 'provention', would reduce the level of conflict and the peace dividend facilitate further development cooperation. Regional peace thus becomes a comparative advantage in an integrating but turbulent world economy. Consequently, regional conflict means disaster for millions and millions of non-combattant populations as the catastrophes in West Africa, Central Africa and the Horn of Africa show.

The ASEAN component of the Southeast Asian region is a good demonstration of the economic value of regional stability. This was underlined by the recent 'Asian crisis' and the subsequent political turmoil in Indonesia. Another ex-Third World region today experiencing relative peace is Mercosur, which may now be said to have achieved a comparative advantage in peace and political stability. This cannot be stated with certainty about the Andean group. In

Central America formal regional institutions have done little to facilitate a process of regional integration. However, in the last few years, conflict resolution, in combination with more compatible and internationally acceptable economic policies, have not only moved the small and fragile states closer together but also created a new dynamism in the region as a whole. Similarly, Southern Africa can, through the new political order established in South Africa and the peace agreements in Angola (albeit frustrated), Namibia and Mozambique, begin to strive towards intermediate status. As the crisis in Zimbabwe reminds us, however, there are no linear processes.

Security and development form one integrated complex, at the same time as they constitute two fundamental imperatives for regional cooperation and increasing regionness. Thus political will and political action will play a part in breaking the vicious circle of uneven globalization, regional conflict, underdevelopment and human insecurity. This is particularly the case in the peripheral regions.

In the current transformation of the world economy, regionalism can thus be seen as an alternative to the globalization scenario. National development strategies will have to adapt to a more regionalized world. The regional factor will play a more important role in shaping future patterns of conflict and conflict resolution. Development regionalism and security regionalism constitute a package that, although its contents vary, relevant in all emerging regions, particularly in the marginalized areas. Even if 'delinking' is not on the agenda anymore, its general orientation may be more or less offensive/defensive, or extroverted/introverted. Development regionalism contains the traditional arguments for regional cooperation such as territorial size and economies of scale, but, more significantly, add some which are expressing new concerns and uncertainties in the current transformation of the world order and world economy. Not least among those concerns is regional security.

If the regional factor becomes as important as this chapter argues, the future process of globalization will in fact be a process of interregional cooperation and conflict. The study of interregional relations is immensely complex, since it will not be sufficient to deal with intergovernmental contacts only. The multilayered nature of policy-making makes it hard to foresee in what direction the relations will ultimately develop. Regionalism is an emergent phenomenon, and we cannot yet tell much about its final shape and ultimate role in the formation of a new world order. It can only be studied in the context of global structural change, and as

the combined outcome of different types of actors transcending national spaces.

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