

Contents

<i>List of Tables</i>	ix
<i>Preface</i>	x
<i>Notes on the Contributors</i>	xi
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	xv
1 Introduction: Globalization and the Crisis of National Identities	1
<i>Paul Kennedy</i>	
Understanding identities	2
Globalization and competing explanations for change	7
Globalization and society: a crisis of identities?	13
Coming to terms with globalization: case studies	21
Part I Globalization: Crisis and Threat	29
2 Russia in Search of Itself	31
<i>Catherine J. Danks</i>	
Background	32
Defining Russia's borders	33
Russia's identities	35
Globalization: Russia under attack?	41
Conclusion	44
3 Identity and Conflict in Globalizing Times: Experiencing the Global in Areas Ravaged by Conflict and the Case of the Bosnian Serbs	46
<i>Ioannis Armakolas</i>	
Introduction	46
The global and the local	47
Experiencing global involvement in the field:	
Bosnian Serb identity transformations	49
Additional issues related to the identities of the Bosnian Serbs	57
Concluding remarks: self-reflection for the sake of the future	62

4 Identity in the Former GDR: Expressions of ‘Ostalgia’ and ‘Ossi’ Pride in United Germany	64
<i>Patricia Hogwood</i>	
East Germans between East and West	64
Identity in divided Germany	67
Eastern identity: the events of 1989 and beyond	71
Mapping the new eastern identity	76
5 ‘You and Me Against the World’: Christian Fundamentalists and White Poverty in the USA	80
<i>Julie F. Scott</i>	
Introduction: fundamentalist religion and its revival	80
The Protestant fundamentalist worldview: a Missouri case study	82
American Protestant fundamentalism, modernity and globalization	85
Looking ahead	95
Part II Globalization: Opportunity and Creative Adaptation	97
6 Glocal Culture in the Thai Media: the Occidental ‘Other’ in TV Advertisements	99
<i>Asawin Nedpogaeo</i>	
Introduction	99
Thailand and its identity construction	100
Some historical background	102
Rendering westerners and the West	103
<i>Farang</i> in Thai TV advertisements	105
Conclusion	111
7 Globalization, Identity and ‘Ireland’	113
<i>G. Honor Fagan</i>	
Introduction	113
Why Ireland?	114
Cultural revival?	116
Globalization: beyond the buzzword	117
Globalization and culture	119
Culture and identity	121
By way of conclusion	123

8 Civil–Military Relations and Professional Military Identities After the Nation-State	124
<i>Glen Segell</i>	
Introduction	124
Defining globalization and identity for civil–military relations	125
After the nation-state: unravelling the debates on civil–military relations	127
Global military forces and global civil society	135
Conclusion	137
9 On the Construction of Political Identity: Negotiations and Strategies Beyond the Nation-State	139
<i>Darren J. O’Byrne</i>	
Political identity: some assumptions and preconceptions	139
Political identity under globalized conditions?	141
World citizenship as a nation-state construction	143
National citizenship as a local construction	146
Cultural identity/political action	149
Local citizenship as a global construction	153
Summary	153
Part III Globalization: The Challenge of an Uncertain Future	159
10 The Immigration of Foreign Workers: a Mirror of Israel’s Changing Identity	161
<i>William Berthomière</i>	
Migration time: Israel time	162
The perception of the ‘Other’ and understanding the self	170
11 Identities, Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Some International Concerns	175
<i>Elizabeth Stanley</i>	
The global context	175
The South African context	177
Myth and identity in South Africa	179
Confused and confusing identities	181
Embracing identities	183
Conclusions: international concerns	188

12 Globalization and National Identity Rituals in Brazil and the USA: the Politics of Pleasure Versus the Politics of Protest	190
<i>Lauren Langman</i>	
Introduction	190
Globalization	191
Identity, hegemony and desire	195
Brazil does carnival	197
From American football to superbowl	201
Back to the political	206
Conclusion	209
13 Globalization and Alternative Approaches to the Transformation of Nation-States: Scotland as a Test Case	210
<i>John W. Books</i>	
The theoretical perspectives	211
Assessing the theoretical perspectives	217
Conclusion	222
<i>Bibliography</i>	224
<i>Index of Names</i>	241
<i>Index of Subjects</i>	246

1

Introduction: Globalization and the Crisis of Identities?

Paul Kennedy

The literature on contemporary identities and social change abounds with terminology and images of radical transition, disorientation, turbulence, confusion, rootlessness and constant motion. The possibility of crisis or even the chaos of a Humpty-Dumpty world where no amount of trying will ever succeed in putting things back together again, seems an ever-present reality. Thus, societies are fragmenting and disintegrating; their internal structures are becoming dis-assembled and merged into the maelstrom of the 'global post-modern' (Hall, 1992: 302). The boundaries of societies and cultures are being breached by vast, criss-crossing flows of ideas, images and information, their former impermeability lost forever. Communities, once invested with deep meanings and encapsulating close-knit relations, are becoming de-localized – torn from familiar and particular places (Albrow et al., 1997). Everywhere the once-separate items in the global mosaic of cultures are leaking, merging into one another (Friedman, 1994), losing their distinctiveness. Meanwhile nations have become 'unbound' and experience deterritorialization as multinational corporations (MNCs) weave chunks of local economies into their own global empires, as migrant diasporas refuse permanent assimilation, preferring to develop transnational 'networks...that span their home and host society' (Basch et al., 1994) and as global social movements embed national citizens in worldwide commitments. Everyone on the planet, it seems, is being propelled into a life of perpetual mobility, whether of the imagination, the body or both (Rapport and Dawson, 1998: 4).

This book explores some of the issues raised by just such a theorization of a 'world-in-turmoil' through a selection of case studies drawn from the conference outlined in the Preface. A key theme running through these chapters is that in many situations the nation-state and

nationalism continue to provide a pivotal axis around which individuals and collectivities frame their sense of cultural affiliation and feelings of belonging. Other kinds of cultural identity also figure in these accounts, especially those relating to regional, ethnic, religious, racial and class affiliations along with lifestyles. However, not only were issues surrounding nationality and national identity invariably present somewhere in the narrative, they normally assumed the central place and so it is with the implications of such questions – whether for societies, institutions, groups or individuals – that our contributors are mostly, though not solely, concerned.

Understanding identities

Social scientists invariably reject essentialist notions of individual, national or other collective identities as determined by fixed properties derived from common origins which define the distinctiveness, solidarity and inclusiveness shared by members. This is not to say that major differences do not exist between collectivities and do not inform the actions and beliefs of their members. Thus, Hall (1998) argues that ethnicity is a particularly ‘strong, well-bounded version of cultural identity’ precisely because it is based not just on shared meanings but also generations of intermarriage and descent coupled to long-standing residential ties to particular places. In such circumstances ethnic identity is ‘experienced as if it were a part of our biological nature’ (Hall, 1998: 181). Similarly, modernizing nation states usually drew upon common characteristics of language, historical heritage, ethnic origins and geographical location that preceded the modern era. During this process the ideology of nationalism came to embody the ‘belief that national identity is fundamental and natural’ (Basch et al., 1994: 37). However, all this is a very different thing from claiming that the very existence and identities of modern nation-states depended on an inner core of immutable characteristics inscribed in immemorial time.

In decisively rejecting such ‘common sense’ notions, social scientists have insisted that identities are constituted and validated through ongoing interactions. Because the process of identification always involves construction it reveals additional characteristics. Firstly, it is ‘a process never completed – always “in process” . . . conditional, lodged in contingency’ (Hall 1997: 2). Similarly, identity is not ‘permanently given’ (Melucci, 1996: 159). Rather, identity formation involves construction and reconstruction throughout ‘the life-course of individuals and groups and through their different faces, roles and circumstances’

(Melucci, 1996). Identity looks more towards an uncertain future than it harks back to a clearly defined past. Secondly, though identity may encompass some difference within itself it also 'entails... the binding and marking of symbolic boundaries, the production of "frontier effects"' (Hall, 1997: 2-3). Indeed, all identity construction requires the summoning of difference, the relativization of the self as against the 'other' imagined as separate, outside – and perhaps also as marginal, inferior and dangerous. Thus, drawing on Anderson (1983), Hannerz (1996: 21) observes how shared commonality within the nation is paralleled by a strong sense of cultural and linguistic discontinuity with respect to outsider-nations. In Europe, this condition was profoundly shaped by the growing ability of people to 'engage in a common intelligibility' within each nation assisted by the spread of print. Here, too, Said's pathbreaking study, *Orientalism* (1995), remains illuminating. Thus, he showed how the Orient became a mirror in which Europe saw its own reflection, revealing both its objective but also its imagined differences from the Orient. The largely mythical Orient invented by European artists, explorers and later colonial officials was mysterious, decadent and barbaric. This tells us far more about the fears and desires of Europeans than about the objective realities of the world they attempted to depict.

Thirdly, rendering collective identities meaningful and viable requires representations or structures of meaning. In the case of the nation-state, Anderson's (1983) argument has been enormously influential. Modern nationhood was not only invented through the 'imagined community', but this was the only vehicle capable of unifying vast numbers of dispersed citizens, divided by class and other interests, into the unit of belonging we call the nation. Thus, the prime ingredient which makes a national or any other kind of community viable is 'the idea we have of it, ... the meanings we associate with it, the sense of community with others we carry inside us' (Hall, 1998: 182). Among the representations crucial in bringing modern nationhood to life as a rallying point for citizen loyalty were the following: the ability through art, popular culture or the media to relate the 'narrative of the nation', its turning points, defining features and past glories; the emphasis on its continuity with a distant past, aided by traditions and ceremonies which speak of an ancient lineage; the existence of a 'foundational myth' of national origin; and the idea of a pure 'primordial folk' from whom all are descended (Hall, 1992: 294-5). However, as many writers have suggested, historical reflection soon reveals a very different story; centuries of violent civil wars, the forced amalgamations, exclusions or

oppressions of peripheral peoples, periods of inward and outward conquest and frequent migrations bringing new cultures to unwelcoming shores. Such realities belie the fiction of unified national communities enjoying centuries of unbroken solidarity and purity of purpose.

Finally, most observers insist that power relations are invariably central to the construction of representations of identity; certain groups and individuals exercise more influence over this process than others. As Gupta and Ferguson (1992: 14) suggest, when it comes to constructing such representations the key question is to enquire who has defined 'the "we" that keeps coming up in phrases such as "ourselves" and "our own society"'. Similarly, we need to question the determination to separate so decisively 'the unity of the "us" and the otherness of the "other"'. However, as Gupta and Ferguson (1992: 17) also point out, the 'politics of otherness' is not just about control over the formulation of representations; the ability to determine differences of identity between people and places also resides in power over military, economic and legal resources – as, for example, in the case of laws and rights pertaining to immigrants.

Turning to individual identities, we find that economists and psychologists regard individuality and individual identities as separate and distinctive from social identities. Here, there appear to be two selves with the individual/personal unique self being regarded as more real, more significant and quite different from the socially learned or social self (Jenkins, 1996: 15). How these two entities may be linked is unclear. Reviewing twentieth century sociological thinking on this topic, and adopting a starkly different viewpoint Jenkins (1996) argues that 'individual identity – embodied in selfhood – is not meaningful in isolation from the social world of other people. Individuals are unique and variable, but selfhood is thoroughly socially constructed' (20) through early socialization and everyday social interactions. Individual and social identity are 'entangled' with each other, they are produced by 'analogous' processes and they are both 'intrinsically social' (19). According to interactionist theory (for example, Mead, 1934), what guarantees this overlap between individual and social identity is the fact that the self is constituted through interactions with significant others who provide us with various definitions of ourselves. Indeed, we are unable to know ourselves except through our perceptions of how others see us and how they respond to our characteristics and actions. The wider set of ongoing and organized social relationships – or the generalized other – provides actors in micro-relationships with an agreed interpretation of characteristics and actions and thus

gives an overall coherence and confirmation to shared interactive experiences.

In all this there are close but not perfect parallels with the way in which collective identities are formed. Thus, at the core of the self there is a lack, a deficit. The contrived identity which emerges to fill this gap arises largely from our interactions with different others whose responses enable us to focus more clearly on who we are in relation to them. Indeed, neither the 'I' – Mead's formulation of the ego, the individual self – nor the 'me', as 'the organized set of attitudes of others which one himself assumes' (Mead, 1934: 175) can be formed except through the impact of external forces coming from our social world. Moreover, though the internalized 'I' possesses a capacity for autonomy it is one that is largely informed by involvement in social life. This theorization enables us to "'bridge the analytical gap" between the individual and society' (Jenkins, 1996: 25) – agent and structure, object and subject – that has formed such a central part of the twentieth-century sociological debate.

In this widely employed sociological-interactionist formulation, social identity simultaneously becomes synonymous with 'collectively shared' identity (19) and 'the way in which we more or less self-consciously locate ourselves in our social world' (Preston, 1997: 168). Thus, the individual has to invest in the social positions and cultural identities – nationhood, ethnicity, vocation, class and so on – offered by society. This is the process of identification whereby we 'align our subjective feelings with the objective spaces we occupy in the social and cultural world' (Hall, 1992: 276). Identification, therefore, 'stitches... the subject into the structure' (276). When this occurs, social identity 'marks the ways in which we are the same as others who share that position and the ways in which we are different from those who do not' (Woodward, 1997: 2).

This seems straightforward enough. However, returning to Hall, in a later discussion (1997) he hints at the existence of two different and contradictory ways of thinking about identification. On the one hand, identities are something we are 'obliged' to assume and they involve 'attachment to the subject positions which discursive practices construct for us' (6). Here, a compulsive element seems to be paramount. Yet, in taking on these identities, the 'knowing' subject is also quite aware that they are 'representations... (which are)... always constructed' (6). Accordingly, we need to theorize why, when and how subjects 'fashion... these positions... struggling with, resisting, negotiating and accommodating... the rules which they confront and regulate themselves' (14). This second scenario seems to open the door to a

rather different interpretation of individual identity, one that endows the self with more capacity to act autonomously. It also seems to accept that social identity does not always occlude individual personal identity. Thus, the 'balance of power' between society and social actor, structure and agent is tipped more decisively towards the latter. Other writers have been prepared to go somewhat further in recognizing not only the agent/actor's scope for autonomy but also the capacity to activate this through the individual's personal rather than his/her social self and identity.

Albrow (1996: 151), for example, insists that 'the transformations of structure which the multiplication of worlds has created' means that we need to distinguish self from personal identity. While the former is constructed out of the membership of social groups and everyday social life, the latter is 'forged out of individual experience' and enables individuals to give 'accounts of themselves'. What is expressed by personal identity is not membership of particular social groups but 'the unique identifier' to which everyone is entitled' namely, 'the universality of the right to be a distinct human being'. Giddens (1991), too, believes that under the condition of late modernity individuals exercise much greater control over whether, when and how to assume a given social identity. Indeed, he believes that the individual is more or less compelled to take charge of the self as a reflexive project given the weakening hold of once-powerful solidarities such as class, occupation, church, locality, gender and family and their declining ability to define and confine our life experiences. Beck (1992) develops a similar argument, though he sees greater individual self-determination partly as a response to the additional risks caused by the environmental devastation associated with industrial modernity.

Returning to Giddens, 'self-identity becomes a reflexively organised endeavour' (1991: 5) which requires the construction of a biography and a striving for coherence in the face of growing exposure to a multiplicity of global influences. Accordingly, as the collective cultural identities prominent during the period of modernity and the high point of nation state power diminish in significance, so the 'tightly confined personal realm' (209) where lifestyle choices abound becomes 'increasingly important in the constitution of life-planning and daily activity' (5). In short, although the individual has almost certainly been valued in all previous cultures and epochs (75), in late modernity, 'the self undergoes massive change' (80) and it is choice and 'self-actualization' that are central to this transformation. Later in this chapter we return to this theme.

Globalization and competing explanations for change

Many observers continue to doubt the significance and uniqueness of globalization as a force for change in human affairs. Nevertheless they might concur with the groundswell of opinion which asserts that we are indeed living through a period of rapid change even turmoil. Here – as the contributors to this book are well aware – there is no lack of competing explanations for the universal and multidimensional changes we face at the turn of the millennium. Major geopolitical events are surely significant: for example, the unravelling of regimes following the end of the Cold War; the determined moves towards regionalization, especially in the European Union (EU), and the challenge this poses for nation-states; and the rise of new industrial nations each armed with their own version of modernity and contributing to the ‘dehegemonisation’ of the West (Friedman 1994: 41). According to Laclau (1994) the end of the Cold War helped to bring other consequences. Thus, it has eliminated any further possibility for ideologies, countries or movements to claim that their project offers ‘a fulfilment of a universal task... a mission predetermined by universal history’ (Laclau 1994: 1). While this has opened the way for a flowering of ‘particularistic political identities’ it also added fuel to the postmodern bonfire of philosophical, political and moral certainties that was ablaze long before the period 1989–1992. Meanwhile – and boosted by the feminist assault on patriarchy and gender relations and the green movement’s message that environmental destruction calls into question the project of modernity itself – postmodern sensibilities have also eroded all the boundaries, expectations and certainties that once structured everyday social and cultural life. Here, perhaps the most momentous shift in social life has been the apparent disintegration of class loyalties, work and occupation as central forces that once gave shape, meaning and solidity to identities and affiliations.

Accompanying all these sources of uncertainty there has been a series of seismic shifts in economic life. In large part, these come under the general heading of economic globalization: the worldwide penetration of capitalism into every social and geographical crevice; the rise of apparently unaccountable global corporations and instantaneous, unregulated – and perhaps uncontrollable – financial markets; the ability of corporate interests, at one and the same time, to superimpose their own changing grids of multifaceted activities regardless of national borders onto certain world regions while marginalizing and starving others of capital; and the pressures and worldwide insecurities

associated with growing economic rivalry between industrial/izing nations. Here, some writers (for example, Burbach et al., 1997; Martin and Schumann, 1997; Bauman, 1998; and Sassen, 1998) seem to blame globalization for most of these problems – whether this is understood primarily as an economic phenomenon or in broader terms. However, as we have already seen, the changes associated with economic globalization have been accompanied by several parallel transformations including geopolitical change, a shift in ontological orientation, at least in the industrial societies, and the worldwide shift towards post-Fordist flexible labour regimes involving widespread casualization at the workplace. Though globalization is presumably implicated in these changes, each also needs to be seen as driven partly by its own logic and momentum. In any case, both economic globalization and post-Fordist insecurities have been massively bolstered by the triumphalist ascendancy since the late 1970s of one particular variant of capitalist economics – namely the ethos of neoliberalism. By the late 1990s, and with its tendency to equate individual freedom and happiness almost entirely with private economic decision-making and its blatant celebration of inequality, neoliberalism had come to dominate the policies of most governments as well as the agendas set by powerful intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) such as the World Bank. Together, post-Fordist practices and neoliberal ideology have further tightened the screws of economic insecurity experienced by millions in North and South.

Economic uncertainties have been further compounded by technological change especially ‘the information technology revolution’ and the rise of the symbolic economy as the major source of wealth and power (Castells, 1996: 470–5). The latter has strengthened capital but individualized labour, especially in manual work. It has also split the world between those who have ready or easy access to the spaces where information and knowledge flow along the lines of communication that make up the network society and those excluded from it. The shift of power towards the global symbolic economy and network society also undermines democracy since the activation of civil society and electoral politics dwindle in significance now that government policies exercise diminishing influence over national affairs (Castells, 1997: 11).

We turn now to the question of globalization – as a multi-dimensional and not just an economic force – and its special contribution to the radical uncertainties of the current era. Here, as we have just seen, any attempt to unravel and lay bare its essential features and effects as compared to the other parallel transformations of our time is bound to be speculative and contentious. In addition, we need to ask what, if

anything, is new and distinctive about globalization today compared to the past. Thus, Albrow (1996: 7) suggests that the era of modernity, spearheaded by the nation-state, and marked by the struggle to 'extend human control over space, time, nature and society', is now coming to an end. Moreover, the era into which we are now moving is not the result of powerful globalizing tendencies that have suddenly been invented from scratch since the impulses to modernization and capitalism evident from the early nineteenth century were inherently globalizing from the outset (Giddens, 1990). Partly, this was because nation-state rivalry and capitalist competition compelled the first industrializing nations and their bourgeoisies to incorporate the whole world into their commercial spheres through imperialist ventures. In addition, the orientations at the heart of the modernizing process facilitated the spread of resources, meanings and collaborative social networks across the world. Giddens identifies three such orientations: the separation of time from space; the increasing proliferation of disembedding mechanisms and expert systems which release actors from their dependence upon relationships involving specific others; and the increasing application of reflexivity to every life experience.

Thus, what is different about the present compared to the recent past is that globalization processes have intensified and accelerated during recent decades, they have become autonomous and self-sustaining – no longer dependent upon leading or hegemonic countries, as in the case of America's postwar multi-dimensional leadership of the West – and they have undergone qualitative change. We now explore this claim by highlighting six mutually reinforcing aspects of globalization – though in doing so we make no claims to offer a definitive interpretation.

Drawing on Magatti's useful analysis (1999), we argue, first, that in recent decades, the economic, cultural, political and social spheres of the social system have become more and more disconnected and autonomous from each other. These can be regarded as roughly approximate to the four institutional sub-systems once identified by Parsons (1951) as clearly differentiated from each other, but also operating as vital and functionally interdependent parts of each society or nation. At the same time there is a 'diminishing spatial coincidence' between these spheres 'within the boundaries of the nation state' (Magatti, 1999: 10). In other words, this detachment from the nation-state framework has been accompanied by the absorption of these spheres as components into global structures or realities – whether of worldwide cultural flows, transnational social exchanges, supra-state political loyalties or the economic power over regions and nations super-imposed by MNCs. Each of

these spheres, moreover, is increasingly integrated around its own needs, rules and values.

Although none of this necessarily means that nation-state power has declined, these detachments have massively deepened the overall fragmentation existing at the national-societal level, calling into question 'the very idea of society as a unitarian . . . cohesive and institutionally organized system' (Magatti, 1999: 11). Like other observers, Touraine (1998: 129–30) insists that these changes are most advanced in the economic sphere. While he believes that what is often referred to as 'economic globalization' actually consists of several technological and economic strands which operate partly independently of each other – as we have also suggested – he nevertheless argues that it has 'destroyed and come to replace . . . the mobilizing state' while causing 'the breakdown of social and political constraints on economic activity' (130). This amounts to 'the most radical rupture ever observed between the actor and the system' (130) and given that it signals not only the declining ability of social actors to influence economic life, except as consumers, but also other changes including: 'cultural fragmentation'; the return of issues such as ethnicity and religion to the centre of public life; and a form of extreme individualism marked by the collapse of normative control in many areas of social life (Touraine, 1998: 130–1).

Secondly, like most observers, we note that it has been the unparalleled advances achieved by worldwide capitalism in the economic sphere – in transport, communications and information technology – which have largely underpinned the 'great leap forward' in the transnational interconnectedness and interdependencies we associate with globalization. The latter, of course, are the other side of the coin to the dwindling internal coherence of individual societies. Thus, ultimately global linkages rely upon the greatly enhanced opportunities for innumerable social actors to stretch and intensify social relationships across the world as time–space compression slices through boundaries, gobbles up territory and distance, speeds up exchanges and facilitates the much greater mobility of people, goods, ideas, images and much else besides.

Thirdly, and from the perspective of individuals, globalization exposes us to a bewildering proliferation of influences and experiences. Of course, sociologists have always been alert to the ways in which modernization profoundly altered social life. Thus, medieval communities – based on intersecting social allegiances grouped around blood ties, friendship and unquestioned loyalty – shared a 'common life-world'

which bound localities and different social groups together (Berger et al., 1973: 63). In contrast, modern societies are highly differentiated, impersonal and specialized. Not only is the public world of work, the economy and bureaucracy sharply separate from the private world of family, leisure and friendship but both sectors are subject to increasing complexity with growing knowledge and proliferating choices. This 'plurality of life worlds' (62) means that modern individuals need to engage in 'long range life-planning' (71) and increasingly have to 'define themselves' (73) and their own identities while coping with 'widely discrepant . . . meaning systems' (75). Consequently 'the subjective realm of identity is the individual's main foothold in reality' (74). But since it is always changing in response to the increasing pluralization of life-worlds, modern individuals also experience a condition of 'homelessness' (77). They are always in migration; never at home. Globalization has further radicalized this subjective experience of a disjointed and homeless life because it has massively increased the available life-worlds (Magatti, 1999). This multiplication in the flows of pluralizing influences has been so considerable that it amounts to a quantum leap in human experience.

Thus, along with money, goods, people and information, cultural experiences of all kinds – abstract knowledge, aesthetic preferences in everything from cuisine and music to designer goods and TV soaps, marriage customs, religious beliefs and so on – exhibit a growing capacity to break loose from their original moorings in particular societies. Through these often disjointed, incomplete yet powerfully evocative 'landscapes', individuals and groups carry their different 'imagined worlds' (Appadurai, 1990: 296), weaving them into criss-crossing patterns of meaning and social exchange spanning cultures and nations. Such 'landscapes' are disseminated through a multiplicity of overlapping sources. Here, the role of the mass media and the dissemination of popular cultural forms are absolutely crucial because they provide abundant and seductive resources for the construction of 'imagined worlds'. Furthermore, and linking to our earlier argument about the technological underpinnings of globalization, the mass media also constitute perhaps the single most powerful force responsible for bringing cultures and societies into constant juxtaposition but without the necessity for 'actual bodily movement' (Smith and Guarnizo, 1998: 14). Nevertheless, 'real' transnational personal encounters are also increasing rapidly and contribute strongly to the pluralization of life worlds and the greater opportunities for cultural hybridity associated with globalization in general. Important, here, are tourist flows – nearly 600 million

international visitors in 1996, worldwide – various kinds of corporate, professional or political collaboration in the pursuit of global goals but especially the transnational cultural, business and political links being forged by many ethnic diasporas ‘from below’ (Portes, 1997).

Fourthly, the different dimensions of globalization coupled to geopolitical changes such as the end of the Cold War are increasingly generating a syndrome of interconnected world problems from whose consequences none can escape and which require global collaboration if solutions are to be found. The spread of industrialization to many countries accompanied by the relative marginalization of other regions (Hirst and Thompson, 1996) is perhaps the most obvious case. Here, we see environmental pollution caused by overheating in the industrial regions but coinciding with the devastation to forests, soils and climates, linked to poverty and destitution, in the marginalized ones. The prospects may be bleak: a world community which must not only face the present and future burdens associated with climate change and the costs of amelioration but which also needs to deal with the unrest caused by mass migrations or wars, triggered by conflicts over scarce resources – especially water – and large-scale environmental deterioration in particular regions. It is easy to point to many additional problems which are truly global in scope: drug trafficking; the dissemination of technologically advanced weaponry, including nuclear materials, associated with the globalization of the nation-state system, persistent regional quarrels and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union; growing global inequality; how to stabilize the deregulated global financial markets and encourage more even investment flows; and dealing with the abuses of media power and information technology.

A fifth and qualitatively distinctive feature of globalization – one of the key themes highlighted in Robertson’s crucial contribution to this field – concerns the emergence of what he refers to as ‘globality’; the ‘consciousness of the (problem) of the world as a single space’ (1992: 132). Our internalized experience of globalization includes the capacity to begin thinking about ourselves collectively. Our shared concern with ‘humanity’, as expressed, for example, through the United Nations and its numerous humanitarian organizations and declarations, has begun to extend our loyalties beyond an affiliation solely to people of the same national, ethnic or religious identities as ourselves. Arguably, this marks a clear break with the past. Perlmutter (1991: 898) adds flesh to the bones of this newly emerging subjectivity, by claiming that now, for the first time in history, we are increasingly prepared to value diversity and the right of every culture to occupy a space in the world and to share

in the common human endeavour on equal terms. Thus, we are seeing an end to the long era of one-sided cultural and political flows where societies engaged with others primarily in order to dominate them.

Lastly, the global problems shared by once-separate nations and allied to the capacity to think about ourselves collectively, seems to be contributing towards the creation of an 'embryonic global civil society' (Shaw 1994: 23). Partly, this consists of the proliferation of international non-governmental organizations (INGOS), whose members increasingly collaborate transnationally in order to pursue goals concerned with human rights, green, women's, aid, alternative development and other issues, but also overlaps with churches, trade unions, student groups and others. Certainly, if some observers had failed to find such activities especially noticeable before, 1999 was the year in which it became virtually impossible to ignore such pressures and demands. These were especially focused on two campaigns. The Jubilee 2000 campaign involved the attempt to persuade the G7 nations, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund to act decisively with respect to the issue of Third World debt relief. The second, directed at the World Trade Organization, attempted to link the goal of trade liberalization much more firmly to those of fairness and environmental safety and to find ways to exercise more control over the juggernaut of corporate capital. But global civil society is also being formed by the extension and the 'convergence' (Shaw, 1994: 23) of many nation-states' civil societies in global space. This is being facilitated by such changes as the formation of active regional economic/political groupings, especially the EU, the increasing reach of key intergovernmental organizations and their tendency to become focal points for local and global pressure group activity, the growing range of transnational community networks and lifestyles and the shared values carried by global communication, sports, educational, arts and entertainment systems (21-3).

There are many reasons for scepticism about the ability of a 'medley of boundary-eclipsing actors' to successfully reshape 'the political architecture of international relations' and to act as 'an unambiguous force for democratization of a global society' (Pasha and Blaney, 1998: 418). Not least among these are the continuing power of (and deep inequities within) the nation-state system, the authoritarian and predatory nature of many states, so that the prospect of autonomous and viable civil societies and NGOs operating within – never mind between – some countries remains highly dubious (437-8), and the fact that consensus between INGOS concerning what exactly constitutes the 'global "common good"' (436) is rarely assured and sometimes

blatantly absent. Nevertheless, a multi-stranded global civil society is springing up, it is striking ever-deeper roots into the social life experienced by even the poorest people and nations, and so long as we live in a world of intricately linked problems of great magnitude, it is likely to remain a major actor on the world's stage.

Globalization and society: a crisis of identities?

Multi-dimensional changes, including globalization, presumably mean that like societies, nations and communities, individuals too, are facing a condition of acute anxiety, perhaps even crisis. Thus, as Hall (1992: 303) points out, marketization, migration, communications, time-space compression and the 'cultural supermarket' effect, among other influences, are 'fragmenting the cultural landscapes of class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, race, and nationality and it is these which previously gave us firm locations as social individuals' (275). These structures and certainties also defined and shaped our social and personal identities. Because they are now disintegrating, so individuals, too, are losing the feeling they once experienced of having a 'place in the social and cultural world'. It follows that 'our sense of ourselves as integrated subjects' is also becoming dislocated and de-centred. Indeed, in the view of many writers (for example, Hall, 1992; Woodward, 1997; and Castells, 1996, 1997), the de-centred self faces a crisis of identity.

Castells (1997: 1) outlines the dilemma in no uncertain terms: 'Our world, and our lives, are being shaped by the conflicting trends of globalisation and identity.' But 'when the world becomes too large to be controlled, social actors aim at shrinking it back to their size and reach' (66) while engaging in a search for meaning. Individuals attempt this 'not around what they do but on the basis of what they are, or believe they are' (Castells, 1996: 3). In short, identity becomes our 'only source of meaning'. But there are great dangers here, as many writers have suggested. The most obvious is that many people may be tempted to cluster around the primary identities and meanings derived from religion, ethnicity and nationality. This, in turn, may lead to extreme forms of identity politics. Indeed, wherever globalizing forces lead people to seek 'protective strategies' involving the attempt to 'salvage centred, bounded identities for placeless times' we are likely to find the revival of 'patriotism and jingoism' (Robins, 1991: 41). Constructing 'defensive' (Castells, 1997: 9) identities as 'trenches of resistance and survival' (8) around such territorial and primary affiliations is particularly likely as a response to stigmatization and social exclusion,

whether this is experienced by minorities living within host societies or by the majority populations inhabiting nations that feel themselves to be marginalized within the world polity. Here, Barber (1995), for example, points to the dangers of an ethnic, religious or nationalistic resurgence or jihad, in various parts of the world, as a backlash against the trivializing, commercialized 'McWorld' ethos associated with hegemonic western values and economic power.

Other writers believe that the desire to re-establish traditional identities as a bulwark against the forces of globalization is as likely to affect sections of the majority host populations living in wealthy, established nations as the excluded minorities or the new and/or ethnically fractured countries and/or marginalized and impoverished countries of the Third World (Hall, 1998: 200). Thus Robins (1991: 41) describes the uncertainties facing the Europeans as they learn to live with the minority cultures imported from their former colonies, to cope with American and Japanese influences and to construct a new continental identity around the European Union (EU). The alarming ascendancy of right-wing, authoritarian and anti-immigration parties across the EU, for example in France and Austria, and the increasingly restrictive 'fortress Europe' policies adopted by the EU with respect to refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants during the 1990s bears sad witness to the power of such pressures (see, Okojie, 1999). More generally, Melucci (1996: 158) observes that the fragmentation brought about by the organizational complexity of modern life and intensified by globalization has undermined 'the stability of belonging' that once defined most people's lives. This has forced identity concerns to centre stage and encouraged the revival of nationalist, ethnic and linguistic particularities as a way both of re-asserting difference and of re-discovering a lost sense of identity.

On the face of it, the claim that we are faced with a crisis of identities intensified by globalization seems sensible and difficult to refute. Yet, we are surely entitled to ask certain questions: what kind of crisis are we dealing with?; is it of manageable proportion?; and do the transformations linked to globalization constitute a crisis for everyone and in equal proportion? Unravelling these doubts involves dealing with two sets of issues. One concerns the need to ask questions about theory. How useful are the foundational concepts and the underlying assumptions about social life upon which sociologists and other social scientists have tended to rely at least until recently? Secondly, there is a substantive or phenomenological dimension – namely, how do humans at this historical juncture actually experience the changes we have been

discussing? What evidence, for example, is there to suggest that in their personal lives social actors perceive these changes as entirely threatening and disempowering, and does this vary as between individuals and situations?

Theoretical difficulties

When thinking about the impact of globalization on identities much more is at stake than the increasing fragmentation of those structures and processes which supposedly create fully socialized actors by enabling us to 'align our subjective feelings with the objective places we occupy in the social and cultural world' (Hall, 1992: 276). Rather, it is their very existence which is increasingly being thrown into doubt. A list of the problematical entities now in question would have to include the following:

- Society as a bounded unit which can be mapped quite literally on to a nation-state located in a fixed territorial space, both coinciding with a more or less self-sufficient economy and carrying its own distinctive culture of 'Thainess', 'Britishness' or whatever;
- The operation of a 'generalized other' of master rules, sufficiently coherent to be able to offer a template for guiding and reinforcing the overlapping webs of social exchanges as these extend to the furthest micro-extremities of social life;
- A largely self-contained, consistent and inclusive flow of shared cultural meanings moored to 'definite places' and where any differences there may be are negated or neutralized by vague references to 'multiculturalism' or 'subcultures' (Gupta and Ferguson, 1992: 7); and
- The existence of flourishing communities as small-scale units of belonging which are rooted in known, fixed localities and built around persisting social relations between particular social actors based on the recognition of mutual ties, obligations and loyalties.

Secondly, therefore, it appears that the categories and assumptions which apparently served sociology and other social science perspectives well in former times now require drastic re-thinking. Touraine, for example, claims that ultimately 'the idea of society has lost its significance' (1998: 132) and that a fundamental reappraisal of sociology is therefore necessary. In a similar vein, the writers from the Roehampton Institute who explored London as a global city and who contributed to the book edited by Eade (1997: especially chapters 2, 3 and 4) have questioned much of our existing repertoire of sociological

assumptions and models. Partly this is because the latter derive from nineteenth-century anxieties concerning the replacement of traditional communities by the complex, impersonal *Gesellschaft* structures of urban-industrial, capitalist societies – an era of state-led nation-and society-building which has now past, at least in the West. But in addition, globalization is causing deep changes which further undermine conventional sociological categories (Albrow et al., 1997).

Thus, it 'detrribalizes' community and culture while disaggregating these entities into disparate elements and relocating the fragments into new locations and flows (34). It also de-links community and culture from specific locations along with both individual and collective identities. In addition, intellectuals themselves, including sociologists, are travelling the world and are encountering 'decontextualized knowledge' which does not depend upon fixed locations or commitments (31). In fact, sociology is becoming as fragmented as the societies it tries to understand (35). But we also need to recall our earlier discussion. If recent changes, including globalization, have virtually demolished the coherence of the social collectivities, structures and systems of meanings that once created the fully socialized actor – as most observers seem to agree – then presumably the latter, too, must have become severely dysfunctional, or much more self-reliant and distinctive – or perhaps both. In either event, living with late modernity's plurality of life worlds, now magnified and multiplied by globalization, requires the person who is skilled in the task of continuous self-construction and re-construction and able to deal with the ever-changing particularity of experiences which assail him/her alone. This contemporary social actor desperately needs his/her core personal identity and the scope for autonomy that goes with it in order to navigate the now much more perilous uncertainties associated with being a social being. Similarly, the same resource makes it possible to cope with life in a globalizing world so that it is experienced sometimes as a challenge rather than a constant crisis.

Thirdly, it may be possible to go one step further and argue that the central concepts employed by sociologists and others were never as valid or useful as we once supposed even when applied to traditional societies and the earlier phases of modernity. Rapport and Dawson (1998: 4), for example, claim that the 'localizing image of separate and self-sufficient worlds' demonstrated in much earlier anthropological work was 'never more than a useful ideology that served the interests of (some) local people, and . . . was animated by the practices of (some) anthropologists'. Perhaps this is an unduly harsh evaluation. Be this as it may, at least

since the mid-1980s anthropologists and others have increasingly re-evaluated what earlier scholars understood by such terms as 'culture' and 'tradition'. Thus, neither of these entities can be regarded as totally fixed and internally coherent forces which are programmed into social members through childhood learning, once and for all. Nor are they simply reinforced in later life by unchanging and unchallengeable external social pressures. Moreover, culture and tradition do not have clearly defined boundaries. Instead of invading and then dominating social actors from outside, culture provides 'a "tool kit" of symbols, stories, ritual and world views, which people may use in varying configurations in order to solve different kinds of problems' (Swidler, 1986: 273). It provides scope for inventiveness and negotiation by its members. It evolves continuously and overlaps with alternative cultures (Clifford, 1988).

In conclusion, it may be that the very notion of an identity 'crisis' linked to globalization may sometimes tell us as much about the challenges confronting some established sociological concepts and modes of thinking as it does about the changes underway in the existential world and the way they affect people's actual lives. Alternatively, what is really being threatened by globalization, perhaps, is the need – both by citizens and some social scientists – to believe in the idea of bounded, coherent, distinctive and separate societies, nations, cultures and communities, tied to familiar, concrete locations, even though our actual daily experiences mostly tell us that these once closely entwined but now 'lost' entities are neither possible any longer – nor are we necessarily always harmed by their departure.

Living with globalization: crisis or challenge?

If there is indeed a crisis of identities augmented by globalization, then for whom does it matter, how much and why? There is surely a possibility that for some nations, collectivities and individuals, globalization is perceived and experienced less as something innately threatening and disempowering and, rather more, as a force offering challenges which can be met and managed to advantage. Presumably, we can suppose that responses as between these two polar positions are likely to vary considerably. Any attempt to think seriously about such questions is seriously hampered by the relative dearth of detailed case studies. Much more empirical work needs to be done. Nevertheless, the following writers provide useful ideas pointing us in some interesting directions.

We begin with Robins' (1991: 22) observation that the citizens of older nations such as Britain not only should heed Bhabha's call (for example,

1990) for a new sense of responsibility 'in our recognition of other worlds... other cultures, other identities and ways of life', but that the inclination to cling to older notions of an inclusive, closed British identity imposes a 'burden' because while such attempts may still be possible they are certainly decreasingly meaningful (40–3). More positively, Hall (1992) argues that while many people fear and resent the disintegration of national and other collective identities and try desperately to restore closure and cultural purity, others 'accept that identity is subject to the play of history, politics, representation and difference' (Hall, 1992: 309). They learn to live with the kaleidoscope of fragmented, ever-changing and plural realities brought by immersion in a global culture and the need to live in a multicultural society. Such capabilities are likely to be especially evident among migrant communities living within often hostile host societies. The continuous journeys of self- and collective discovery in which some Caribbean people as well as many black minorities living in Britain have been engaged, represent just one interesting case (Hall, 1991). Often such projects involve not just a search for roots but also the rediscovery or tracing of numerous, intertwining cultural and historical 'routes' based around the Black Atlantic diaspora (Gilroy, 1994).

Other diasporic groups also seem to find little difficulty in moving continuously across boundaries and cultures while juggling identities and maintaining permanent transnational networks, loyalties and interests (for example, Basch et al., 1994 and Chan, 1997). Moreover, most display at least some elements of the cosmopolitanism defined by Hannerz (1990) as the ability to coexist comfortably with cultural diversity or even to actively seek immersion in other cultures (241). Again, the London research carried out by colleagues at the Roehampton Institute suggests that whether such migrants are 'voluntary' or 'involuntary' cosmopolitans they have the capacity to make themselves feel at home wherever they are currently located (Albrow et al., 1997: 24). In doing so they construct 'locality' – and, presumably, a sense of collective kinship-ethnic-national identity – by activating communication technologies and the media but also by utilizing global social networks tied primarily to family and ethnic affiliations. 'Community' has become independent of specific places. Over time and for second-generation migrants, identities and affiliations become even more malleable as they stretch to include members, values and meanings drawn both from the host society and from a burgeoning transnational community. In fact, a growing number of scholars have celebrated the confident expressions of 'cultural hybridity, multi-positional identities (and)

border crossing' on the part of numerous diasporic, transnational groups across the world (Smith and Guarnizo, 1998: 5).

However, coping with cultural fluidity or even the inclination to lean towards it is not confined to diasporas and ethnic minorities. Thus, according to Albrow (1996: 151), globalization may be undermining our ability to make sense of national and other kinds of collective identity but it is likely that most people do not wish to engage in such activities anyway. Some writers are even more upbeat on this subject. Drawing on the recent work of many anthropologists, Rapport and Dawson (1998: 6) declare that 'movement has become fundamental to modern identity, and an experience of non-place (beyond "territory" and "society") an essential component of everyday existence'. Indeed, they suggest that it is the perpetual need to manoeuvre between the 'global inventory of ideas and modes of expression' which enables people to 'make sense to themselves and others' (25). Consequently, for many individuals, and not just those with a strong cosmopolitan bent, living in the global mainstream is not only perfectly amenable but 'that movement can be one's very home' (27).

Again, the London research (Eade, 1997) supports this claim because it demonstrates the numerous ways of coping with the de-localization of community, social fragmentation and pluralization of meanings brought partly by globalization. For example, some white residents remain isolated in the face of large-scale overseas migrant communities, mourning the loss of the older, native community and resenting multiculturalism. Others participate in global friendship networks through holiday visits, letter and phone and/or maintain regular ties with other elderly people through local amenities. Meanwhile, yet other white residents embrace the opportunity to participate in migrant life through neighbourhood, school or other connections while others feel neither loyalty to any group nor resentment arising from their relative social isolation with respect both to white and migrant inhabitants because for them the borough is simply a site offering temporary accommodation while their significant relationships lie elsewhere. More or less the same wide range of possible affiliations to local and global networks are displayed by migrants.

Further, the London study (Eade, 1997) elaborates several concepts designed to help scholars understand how individuals living in de-localized communities navigate the global realities to which they are exposed while making sense of their relationships and identities. For example, Albrow (1997: 51-3) employs the idea of 'socosphere', viewed from the perspective of each individual's own network of social

relations. The degree to which each individual's sociosphere either overlaps with those of others or remains more or less entirely separate, will vary considerably but either way locality is engendered when and where any given sociosphere is acted out in physical space. This formulation enables us to understand how individuals can experience thoroughly globalized lives and multiple identities, participate in rich, diverse and satisfying relationships, and yet live more or less completely outside a community in the traditional sense.

Coming to terms with globalization: case studies

We have presented the debates surrounding globalization and identities in terms of a dichotomy between the reality of crisis and threat as contrasted with the possibility of challenge and opportunity. This has also provided us with a *modus operandi* for presenting our case studies such that the chapters are arranged into three sections. The first section (Part I) deals with nations or with groups for whom globalization appears to present extreme difficulties such that the words 'crisis' and 'threat' fit their situations rather accurately and do not unduly exaggerate their current plight. In stark contrast, the second section (Part II) examines four case studies where 'opportunity' and rather successful 'adaptation' to change seem to offer a more accurate depiction of the prevailing situation. Here, globalization seems to offer – or promises to do so in the near future – a set of resources for empowering the reconstruction of identities in ways that enhance problem-solving and genuine hybridization without jeopardizing integrity or autonomy. Finally, in Part III our four contributors explore situations where those involved confront 'difficult and uncertain challenges' where it is even more difficult to predict future outcomes.

Clearly our mode of presentation involves an essentially contrived format. A different range of examples might generate very different forms of presentation, themes and key issues. In any event, the situation currently facing the countries included in our study is highly provisional; their circumstances may alter dramatically in the future. Finally, identity questions are not necessarily the sole or even the most critical issues pertaining to our case studies. Nevertheless, we believe that our selection and form of presentation does relatively little injustice to empirical reality while providing a useful framework for thinking about the issues of identity formation, and its tensions and dynamics, at a time of rapid globalization.

Part I deals with two nations (Russia and Serbia), one former nation (the former German Democratic Republic, now east Germany) and a small fundamentalist Christian sect in the USA. Though they are not all locked into 'crisis' situations of the same magnitude, each appears to have been severely problematized by recent exposure to globalization and other worldwide changes. Here, internal divisions and nervous, angry dealings with external interests all indicate that leaders and citizens perceive their identities to be in crisis and desperately in need of re-inventing for the sake of national pride or even survival.

In Chapter 2, Catherine Danks examines the historical circumstances that help to explain the attempts by Russia's leaders and internal political groupings to cast around for an identity that can help to revive its severely wounded national pride in the aftermath of the Cold War, economic collapse and the humiliations inflicted by dependence on western financial handouts. Simultaneously, they are endeavouring to generate citizen support for a project of national revival. In pursuing these tasks Russia's political groups have tried to forge a new national identity out of various traditional ingredients by insisting on such timeless sources of cultural uniqueness as the peasant commune, the ancient bonds of blood and soil and the idea that the Russian Orthodox Church remains the repository of the national soul. Similarly, there have been attempts to manipulate representations of the western 'other'. This is depicted not just as different but also as evil and likely to undermine Russian spirituality and communality given the West's obsessions with material progress and hedonistic individual self-realization. Such concerns are understandable but may constrain the development of a healthy civil society.

A similarly picture of stark alternatives and risky confrontations intensified by global pressures is explored by Ioannis Armakolas in his study of Serbian nationalism from 1990 to the middle of the decade (Chapter 3). He suggests that the consolidation of an aggressive Serbian national identity and the crystallization of clear and hardened ethnic divisions among ordinary citizens only became apparent following the unparalleled upsurge of global interest associated with the 1990 elections in Bosnia and the growing external pressures to find solutions to ethnic conflict by separating the Croatian, Serbian and Muslim communities. Until this time, ethnic cultural identities were not especially problematic for most ordinary people and there was relatively little popular support for the nationalist projects pushed by some political leaders. Normally, we associate the global civil society of humanitarian observers, journalists, media specialists and international

non-governmental organizations (INGOS) – dispensing aid, protecting the rights of oppressed minorities, informing an alarmed global public and galvanizing reluctant governments into supportive action – as major players in the frontline struggles against injustices. In this case, however, the unprecedented scale of intervention by global civil society, accompanied by escalating western government interest, led to a growing perception on the part of Serbian citizens that a formidable and hostile ‘global other’ was unfairly representing them as a barbarian, pariah people. Moreover, because this gargantuan labelling process by the world community offered few avenues of escape it also seems to have helped foster a spiralling process of deviance amplification. Governments and the agents of global civil society need to take careful stock concerning their role in this and similar events elsewhere.

In Chapter 4, Patricia Hogwood’s study of how the former citizens of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) are struggling to cope with the reality of post-Cold War absorption into a united Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) contains strong echoes of the same sense of national and personal identities-in-crisis that we encounter in Danks’ and Armakolas’ studies. A key factor underpinning such anxieties is the perception by eastern citizens that the majority FRG members and the inhabitants of the wider European Union find it all too easy to disparage their previous situation and current predicament. This barely concealed contempt further problematizes the difficulties of coping with the new and much larger scale of German and European identity. The new situation has also exposed east Germans to the globalizing images rampant in a thoroughly postmodern and Americanized economy much more intensively than ever before. Many have responded by seeking refuge in a reactive ‘identity of contrariness’ based on ‘Ostalgie’ and ‘Ossi’ pride for the former GDR. Here, alternative representations celebrating such former virtues as community solidarity have been rekindled in popular east German cultural exchanges.

The last chapter in Part I by Julie Scott (Chapter 5) traces the ways in which the different overlapping changes associated with modernity, postmodernity and now globalization have progressively undermined the once-stable sense of personal and national identity experienced by many white Christians in the United States of America. By offering an ever-greater scope for exercising personal freedom and hedonistic lifestyles, uncluttered by moralizing pressures, postmodernity has provoked panic and fear among many American Christians. Various aspects of globalization, from the rise of powerful rival economies across the world to the growing proportion of Hispanics, Asians and

other non-white residents who claim American citizenship rights, have accentuated these uncertainties. The community members believe that being 'chosen' by God promises them personal sanctuary in a society threatened by satanic forces. This perception is often linked to another – namely, that the USA is a country which once enjoyed the status of being God's 'chosen' nation. This particularity was based on a pure, racialized national identity. But in the absence of religious conversion it is now equally in jeopardy from contamination by dangerous internal and external forces.

In marked contrast, Part II examines two nations (Thailand and Ireland), a major institution with strong historical loyalties to nationhood (the military) and a tiny sample of citizens living in Britain for whom globalization has so far brought certain creative opportunities for re-constructing a sense of identity but in ways that are potentially beneficial rather than threatening or dangerous. Instead of undermining identities, global influences have provided various resources, which have been utilized in the attempt to find creative and empowering responses to the challenges constantly posed by a fast-changing world.

Asawin Nedpogaeo's chapter (Chapter 6) examines how over time the manipulation of media and cultural resources by Thailand's political elites and professionals has resulted in the construction of a modern national identity partly by relying on the power of representations. Central to this process has been the employment of images of the Occident as 'other'. These have provided a vehicle for distilling those unique ingredients that constitute the essence of 'Thainess' and in much the same way as the West has relied on the reverse process. His research also offers interesting examples of the universal process of 'glocalization' highlighted by Robertson (1995) through which global influences are selected, indigenized and so turned into locally accessible and relevant resources by active national agents. Using examples taken from recent Thai adverts he shows how comical representations of westerners are used to render harmless and comprehensible what might otherwise be perceived as the dangers of western dominance while accentuating what is positive and special about a thoroughly modern yet continuously re-Orientalized Thailand.

Focusing mainly on Ireland's cultural and media industries, Honor Fagan (Chapter 7) evaluates the content and validity of the claims, which have accompanied the 'Celtic Tiger's' rapid economic ascent and re-invention. Whereas most observers insist that globalization has so far proceeded furthest in the economic and technological spheres

Fagan argues that globalizing forces have actually penetrated deepest into our everyday lives at the social and cultural levels. This chimes strongly with the increased significance of issues concerning the self, subjectivity and personal identity which appear to dominate the lives of most postmodern citizens – at least in the advanced societies. But it also helps to explain Irish cultural confidence and creativity. Thus, Ireland's ability to re-invent itself in recent years has involved drawing on its history and ancient culture. However, the national identity which has been re-imagined is not pure, local and authentic. Not only is such a thing impossible, given that all culture is contrived and perpetually in movement, but the momentum for reconstituting Irishness has partly arisen as a response to the demands of global markets which it helps to feed. Global culture also provides some of the ingredients which sustain the essentially hybrid nature of all cultural processes.

In Chapter 8, Glen Segell considers the changing nature of the relationship between the civil and military authorities within nation-states, given the declining autonomy and even sovereignty they are experiencing in the face of regional economic and defence arrangements – especially in Europe – and the pressures of globalization. Among the many indications of declining state power are the dependence of national defence needs on strategic inter-state alliances and the growing number of international and especially internal disputes which require the joint deployment of national military forces at regional or world level. Such changes are creating dilemmas not just for nation-states but also for the military as an institution and for its individual serving members since they call into question the latter's sense of patriotic, national identity which until now has always been strongly instilled into military forces. Change is also imposing new professional duties and obligations such as providing humanitarian and relief aid, acting as buffers between warring civil factions and the need to collaborate closely with troops from other countries – services for which few serving members been properly prepared or trained. Despite these problems, Segell argues that in most countries the military are proving to be surprisingly adaptable in coming to terms with the changes generated by globalization.

Arguing from the standpoint that globalization has de-linked society and culture from politics and the nation-state, Darren O'Byrne (Chapter 9) explores the implications this has for individual citizens living in London today. Once, the nation-state could either disregard cultural pluralism or suppress any such manifestations while insisting upon the coalescence of political and cultural identity into one unambiguous

national identity. However, the pluralization of life worlds and multiculturalism, both augmented and intensified by globalization, have progressively called into question the very possibility of a universally acceptable and clearly understood image of nationhood. In short, recent changes have finally exposed the underlying multi-ethnic character of most nations leaving citizenship much freer than before to become a formally abstract entity, devoid of specific cultural content. In the British case, individual strategies for coping with these changes vary enormously but for many, far from being perceived as disorientating and traumatic, the situation seems to have fostered or underpinned a pragmatic journey of self-discovery empowered by the reflexive exercise of personal choice.

In Part III, our contributors examine four cases where rapid change, partly brought about by globalization, is challenging identities and in ways that are deeply uncertain with respect to possible outcomes. Here, there are opportunities as well as threats and so there is much for social actors to play for.

In Chapter 10, the role of the 'other' in the construction of Israeli national identity is explored by William Berthomière. He argues that until quite recently Israel was able to remain largely self-absorbed in the internal enterprise of national consolidation and so was rather insulated from the globalizing forces which have compelled most countries to question their national identity. This possibility was strengthened by certain circumstances – especially the ability to rely both on returning Jewish emigrants and on the flow of Palestinian workers as sources of skilled/professional and unskilled labour, respectively, for Israel's expanding economy. However, from the late 1980s, Palestinian revolt, the 'Intifada' and the closure of the Occupied territories cut off most of Israel's Palestinian labour supplies. This has forced Israel's employers to rely increasingly – and for the first time – on a rising flow of semi- and unskilled immigrant workers from across the world. These new workers bring with them a new multiculturalism and a variety of religious identities. Coinciding with growing internal divisions between neo- and post-Zionists, these escalating global influences are helping to push Israel into a long-delayed but challenging era of identity reconstruction.

Elizabeth Stanley (Chapter 11) explores the issues raised by the deliberations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in the new, Post-apartheid South Africa. While many nations are finding it necessary to forge a new identity in the face of radical globalizing forces, few have been compelled to engage in such wholesale re-invention as a

matter of very survival while remaining under the full glare of a largely sympathetic global spotlight as South Africa. Here, and unlike the Serbian case, the involvement of global civil society has been largely positive not least by helping to legitimize the process of national renewal and identity reconstruction. As with our other case studies we encounter the central role of processes of representation. However, in the South African case these have taken the form of deeply harmful ethnic categorizations and myths of exclusion and separation, once inscribed dangerously into the national psyche and political structures, but now being painfully re-constituted with the support of the TRC.

Working within the sociological tradition of critical theory, Lauren Langman (Chapter 12) observes that we now live in an age of cyberfeudalism and technocapitalism – conditions characterized by ever more extreme inequalities of wealth alongside extremely sophisticated technologies from whose influence few can escape. Not only does this condition require a globalized mass consumerism, it also generates thoroughly commoditized mass produced cultural spectacles, closely tied into the world tourist industry. Building his discussion around the two cases of Brazil's annual carnival and US football as expressed through superbowl, Langman shows how these examples of global carnivalization offer their spectators opportunities for individual realization and escape from the destructiveness and divisions of late capitalism. In addition, both of these events are forums for projecting Brazilian and US national identity into the global arena. Thus, they offer examples of the process of glocalization in that each originated in the cultural orientations imported by European Catholic and Protestant settlers in Brazil and the USA, respectively, long ago. Langman is highly critical of global capitalism, and its apparent ability to depoliticize us by 'colonizing' our desires. Yet he also argues that new forms of effective resistance to the destructive impact of globalization are emerging in the shape of numerous groups of cyberactivists who are opposed to world inequality, environmental destruction, human rights abuses and so on.

In our final case study, which explores the character of Scottish nationalism, John Books argues that several theoretical approaches throw light on this phenomenon. Moreover, each points to the significance of certain key causal factors – for example, the long history of Scotland's economic dependency whether as a peripheral extension of the core English economy or as a location for the investment by MNCs. It remains an open question as to whether globalization – as the most recent of those forces which have helped to galvanize support for greater

national autonomy and the desire to refine a special identity – will eventually prove to be the most powerful. Nevertheless, the resources and opportunities generated by EU regional economic policies combined with the economic uncertainties brought by wider globalizing tendencies, do seem to have enhanced Scotland's economic and cultural viability. The preference on the part of voters, until now, for greater autonomy rather than political independence may, however, swing more decisively toward the latter should Scotland's industrial policies and the uncertainties and pressures brought by globalizing forces create a situation where the goal of continued economic modernization becomes derailed.

Acknowledgement

We would like to thank our colleagues, David Francis and Phil Mole, for their useful and constructive comments on this chapter.

Index of Names

- Adorno, T. 207
Ahlstrom, S. E. 86
Aho, J. A. 91
Albrow, M. 1, 6, 9, 17, 19, 20–1, 89,
139, 145, 153, 215–16
Almond, G. A. 211
Ammerman, N. T. 80, 81, 82, 84, 90,
91, 92, 94
Anderson, B. 3, 101, 118
Andropov, Yuriy 32
Appadurai, A. 11, 118, 162
Appleby, R. S. 80, 81–2, 89, 95, 96
Asmal, K. 176, 179, 182, 187
Asmal, L. 179, 182
Attias, J. C. 165
Atwood, T. C. 91
- Bakhtin, M. 193
Bakic-Hayden, M. 62
Barber, B. 15
Barker, C. 100
Barr, J. 81, 82
Barthes, R. 107, 110
Bartram, D. V. 167, 168
Basch, L. 1, 2, 19
Bauer-Kaase, P. 71
Bauman, Z. 8, 178
Beck, P. A. 221
Beck, U. 6
Beinart, W. 177, 180
Bellah, R. N. 86
Benbassa, B. 165
Berdyaev, N. 39
Beresford, D. 181
Berger, B. 11, 87–8
Berger, P. 82, 87–8
Berger, P. L. 11
Bhabha, H. K. 18–19
Bigo, D. 170
Biko, Steve 181
Blair, Tony 72
Blanc, C. S. 1, 2, 19
Blaney, D. 13, 47–8
- Bondarik, Nikolai 40
Boraine, A. 176
Borowski, A. 167
Bowman, G. 52, 53, 54, 59
Boyer, P. 90
Brecher, J. 186
Breuning, M. 213–15
Briggs, A. 110
Bruce, S. 80, 87, 91
Burbach, R. 8, 42
Bush, George 81, 91
Buthelezei, Chief 185
- Calhoun, N. 76
Calhoun, C. 141
Campbell, D. 52, 63
Canclini, Nestor Garcia 120
Cardosa, F. H. 212
Carrier, J. 102
Castells, M. 8, 14–15, 191, 196–7,
207–8
Chan, B. K. 19
Chulalongkorn, King 104
Clifford, J. 18
Clinton, Bill 90, 91
Cohen, E. 104
Cohen, L. 187
Cohn, N. S.
Cole, S. G. 86
Connolly, W. E. 180
Costello, T. 186
Creighton, M. R. 105, 106
Cummings, R. 203
Cunningham, A. 103
- Dalton, R. J. 221
da Matta R. 197, 199
Davis, G. 140
Davis, R. 177
Darwin, C. 86
Dawson, A. 1, 17, 20
De Bord, G. 193
de Bruyn, Gunther 72–3

- de Klerk, F. W. 177, 185
 de Kock, Eugene 182
 De Valera, E. 114, 115, 121
 Dieckhoff, A. 162, 165, 173
 Dixon, A. C. 87
 Dollar, G. W. 86
 dos Santos, Theotonio 212–13,
 220
 Dostoevsky, Fedor 35
 Doyle, Roddy 122
 Drache, Daniel 117
 Dragovic-Soso, J. 53
 Duckenfield, M. 76
 Durkheim, E. 201
 Durrschmidt, J. 1, 17, 19, 148
 Dyer-Witthford, N. 208
 Dyson, K. 66
 Dyzenhaus, D. 183
- Eade, J. 1, 16, 17, 19, 20, 145, 150,
 153
 Eco, U. 205
 Eide, E. B. 52
 Eisenstadt, S. N. 165
 Elias, N. 194
 Engels, Friedrich 195
 Evron, B. 165
 Ewen, S. 192
 Ewick, P. 184
- Faletto, E. 212
 Falwell, Jerry 89, 91
 Featherstone, M. 123
 Fennell, G. 145, 153
 Ferguson, J. 4, 16
 Flanagan, S. C. 221
 Florovsky, George. 39
 Foules, R. B. 88
 Freud, Sigmund 194, 197, 200
 Freye, G. 198
 Friedman, J. 1, 7
 Fromm, E. 197
 Frost, M. 47
- Galnor, I. 165
 Gcina, Cikizwa Ivy 181
 Gensicke, T. 71, 73, 74
 Gerth, H. H. 94
 Gibbons, L. 115–16
- Giddens, A. 6, 9, 87, 99, 141–2, 154,
 196, 215
 Gilroy, P. 19, 150, 152
 Glazunov, Ilya 40–1
 Godina, V. 49
 Godobo-Madikizela, P. 183
 Goldblatt, B. 184
 Gorbachev, Mikhail 32, 36, 41
 Gorenburg, G. 171
 Gramsci, A. 114, 196
 Green, J. C. 89
 Greiffenhagen, M. 70
 Greiffenhagen, S. 70
 Guarnizo, L. E. 11, 20
 Gumilev, Lev 39–40
 Gupta, A. 4, 16
 Gupta, D. 81
 Guth, J. L. 89
 Gutman, R. 50
- Hall, S. 1, 2, 3, 5, 14, 15, 16, 19, 47,
 89, 99–100, 122, 150
 Hämäläinen, P. K. 70
 Hamber, B. 176, 185, 188
 Hamilton, A. 104
 Hannerz, U. 3, 19
 Hansen, Lene 49, 51
 Hayden, R. 62
 Hayner, P. B. 176
 Held, D. 117
 Hill, S. S. 88
 Himmelstein, J. L. 88, 91
 Hirst, P. 12
 Hitler, Adolf 68
 Hobsbawm, E. 77
 Hochschild, A. 197
 Honecker, Erich 74
 Horkheimer, M. 195, 207
 Hosking, G. 35–6, 45
 Hunter, J. D. 81, 92
 Huntington, S. P. 125, 211
 Hussey, G. 116, 117, 122
- Ignatieff, M. 60, 178
 Ishiyama, J. T. 213–14
 Ivan the Terrible 35, 44
- Jaffrelot, C. 162
 Jameson, F. 114, 119, 120

- James, H. 69, 73
 Janowitz, M. 125
 Jenkins, R. 4, 5
 Jess, P. M. 99
 Johns, S. 177
 Johnson, S. D. 81, 88, 89, 91
 Juteau, D. 165
- Kagarlitsky, B. 8, 42
 Kanstroom, A. 66, 79
 Kaplan, R. 49
 Karadzic, Radovan 57
 Kasian, Tejapira 105
 Kayatekin, S. A. 175
 Keane, Fergal 187
 Kearney, Richard 122
 Keith, M. 187
 Kellner, H. 11, 87–8
 Kellstedt, L. A. 89
 Kelly, D. M. 95
 Khasanova, G. 39
 Kibble, S. 185, 188
 Kiberd, D. 121, 123
 Kindley, R. 216
 Kirkpatrick, L. A. 84, 86
 Kivisto, P. 91
 Klages, H. 71, 73, 74
 Kohl, Helmut 67, 70
 Kuechler, M. 66
 Krasikov, A. 43
 Krisch, H. 78
 Kroll, M. D. 95
- Laclau, E. 7, 56
 Lawson, M. P. 81
 Lebed, Alexandr 45
 Lehmbbruch, G. 65
 Lenin, V. I. 123
 Leonowens, Anna 104
 Levinas, D. 173
 Levy, J. 176
 Liebman, R. C. 89
 Liebowitz, Y. 165
 Linger, D. 200
 Lipschutz, R. 47
 Lipset, S. 79
 Luckmann, T. 82, 87
 Lukashenko, Alexandr 34
 Luker, K. 88
- Luzhkov, Yury. 40–1, 45
- MacBride, J. 204, 205, 206
 MacDonald, L. 47
 Magas, D. 53
 Magatti, M. 9, 10, 11
 Major, John 218
 Mandela, Nelson 177
 Mandela, Winnie 181, 185
 Manzo, K. 58
 Marcuse, H. 192, 197, 200, 207
 Marié, M. 162
 Marsden, G. M. 80, 86, 87
 Marsland, D. 146, 147
 Martin, H. P. 8
 Marty, M. E. 80, 81–2, 89, 95, 96
 Marx, Karl 195
 Massey, D. B. 99
 Mbeki, Thabo 182
 McDaniel, T. 39
 McFarland, S. C. 84, 86
 McGreal, C. 182
 McGrew, A. G. 176
 Mead, M. 4, 5
 Melucci, A. 2–3, 15
 Meintjes, S. 184
 Merkl, P. 74
 Miller, D. 141, 144, 154
 Mills, C. W. 94
 Mlinar, Z. 118
 Moeran, B. 101
 Monama, B. 177, 179
 Muller, A. 178
 Munson, H. 81
 Munck, R. 114
 Myburgh, J. 182
- Nattrass, N. 185
 Ni Houlihan, Cathleen 121
 Noll, M. A. 86, 87
 Núñez, O. 8, 42
- Offe, C. 65
 O’Hearn, Denis 115, 117
 Okojie, P. 15
 O’Leary, Michael 116
 Oriard, M. 203, 204, 205
 O’Toole, F. 116
 O’Tuathail, G. 46, 50, 63

- Owen, D. E. 88
- Page, E. 67
- Parker, R. 197, 200
- Parrington, V. L. 86
- Parsons, T. 9
- Pasha, M. K. 13, 47–8
- Perlmutter, H. 12
- Peter the Great 35, 41
- Petras, J. 56
- Pile, S. 187
- Pilger, John 183, 188
- Polosin, Vyacheslav 43
- Poplasen, President 56
- Popov, N. 53
- Porat, L. 171
- Portes, A. 12
- Posa, C. 55
- Powell, G. B. 211
- Preston, P. W. 5
- Prokhanov, Alexandr 40
- Pushkin, Alexandr 35
- Ram, U. 172
- Ramet, S. 53, 57–8
- Ranger, T. 77
- Rapping, E. 205
- Rapport, N. 1, 17, 20
- Rasputin, Valentin 33
- Reagan, Ronald 81, 91
- Real, T. 205
- Reeves, P. 35, 41
- Reynolds, C. J. 100–1
- Richter, M. 75
- Roberts, R. S. 179, 182
- Robertson, R. 12, 24, 101, 144, 193
- Robins, K. 14, 15, 18
- Rokkan, S. 79
- Rolston, B. 181
- Roosevelt, Teddy 203
- Rose, R. 67
- Rowe, D. 205
- Ruccio, D. F. 175
- Rutskoi, Alexandr 44
- Sachs, Jeffrey 41
- Sardar, Zia 120
- Said, E. 3, 101
- Salecl, R. 52, 62
- Sassen, S. 8
- Savitsky, Piotr 39
- Scheff, T. 197
- Scheffer, R. 176
- Schiller, N. G. 1, 2, 19
- Schlesinger, K. 72, 73
- Scholte, J. A. 117
- Schumann, H. 8
- Schwartz, D. 204
- Schweigler, G. 68
- Seligman, M. E. P. 95
- Sethi, S. 95
- Shamiyev, Mintimer 38
- Shaw, M. 13, 47, 48
- Shlapentokh, V. 41–2
- Shlapentokh, D. V. 40
- Shohat, O. 171
- Sibley, S. S. 176, 184, 189
- Sklair, L. 192
- Smidt, C. E. 89
- Smit, J. 181
- Smith, A. 157
- Smith, M. P. 11, 20
- Smith, T. W. 91
- Smyth, G., 117, 122
- Smyth, Marie 182–3
- Smyth, W. 122
- Sofos, S. 52
- Solzhenitsyn, Alexandr 33, 34
- Sooka, Yasmin 179
- Sorabji, C. 48–50, 52, 58–9
- Spence, D. 67
- Stalin, Josef 35
- Staab, A. 75, 76
- Stallybrass, P. 193
- Starovoitova, Galina 36, 37
- Steel, J. 187
- Stone, M. 73
- Storpor Perez, D. 165
- Sweetman, J. 132
- Swidler, A. 18
- Tansey, Paul 119
- Tamney, J. B. 81, 88, 89, 91
- Teeple, G. 192
- Thatcher, Margaret 218
- Thomas, P. N. 177
- Thompson, D. 95

- Thompson, G. 12
Thongchai 101, 102
Tito 53
Tomlinson, J. 119
Touraine, A. 9, 10, 16
Trubetskoi, N. 39
Turner, B. S. 89, 94
Turner V. 194
Tutu, Archbishop Desmond 178
- Vajiravudh, Prince 104
Victoria, Queen 103
Vieux, S. 56
Vladimir of Kiev, Prince 43
- Wald, K. D. 88, 91
Wallerstein, I. 212
Wallis, R. 80, 87
Walzer, M. 47
Washbourne, N. 1, 17, 19
Waters, M. 118
- Weber, M. 94, 194
Westendorp, Carlos 61
White, A. 193
Whittaker, T. K. 115
Wilkinson, R. 202
Wilson, B. 80
Wise, N. 104, 106, 109
Wolffe, J. 80
Woodward, K. 5, 14
Woollacott, M. 182
Wuthnow, R. 81
Wyatt, D. K. 103, 104
- Yanay, U. 167
Yavlinsky, Grigory 41
Yeltsin, Boris 31, 33, 34, 38, 39, 41,
43, 44, 45
- Zimmerman, M. 165
Zyuganov, Gennady 33, 40, 45
Zhirinovskiy, Vladimir 37, 45

Index of Subjects

- Advertising 192
Aer Lingus 116
African-American 84, 94
African slaves 196
agent/structure, agency 4, 16, 82, 88, 94
aid relief 25
Albania, Albanians 55, 62, 120, 211
Algeria, Algerian 94
Allied forces 125, 135
America, American
 aggressive sub-culture 109, 205–6
 football 190, 201–6, 209
 generals 125
 identity 87, 128
 influence on Europe 15
 male aggression 205–6
 post-war leadership 9
 presence in Thailand 104
 protestantism 85–92, 95
 representations of 111
 superbowl (football) 27
 technology 126
 Uncle Sam image 110–11
American Coalition for Traditional Values 89
American Council of Churches 87
Americanization 119
Amnesty 176
Amusement society 192
Anglo-Dutch Amphibious Force 127
Anglo-Saxon 93
 media 116
anthropology, anthropological,
 anthropologists 17, 18, 20
anti-Catholic 84
anti-colonialist/imperialist 109–10, 116
anti-fascism 69
anti-foreign sentiment 66
anti-immigrant/immigration policies, movements 15
anti-modernist 120
anti-semitic/semitism 40, 84
anti-sweatshop movement 208
anti-western 94
apartheid 177, 179–80, 182–3, 185–6, 188
 anti-apartheid movement 179
 economy of 183
 post-apartheid 26
apocalyptic, apocalypse 84–5, 88–90
Arabia 103
armed forces 124–5, 127, 129–30, 132
Argentina 163
Ashkenazim 163
Asia/Asian(s) 23, 40, 102, 104
Asian Tigers 220
asylum seekers 15, 66
Austria 15, 68
Authoritarianism 192
Azerbaijan 34

Balkan(s) 51, 57, 67, 131
Bangkok 103
baptists 43
baseball 202
Basques 77
Baywatch 193
Belgium, Belgian 126, 169
Belarus 31, 34–5
Belovezhskaia Forest Accords 31
Berlin 73
biblical criticism (movement) 86
biblical literalism 92
Black Atlantic 119
Black Cat Whisky/label/advert 107–10
Blairism 72
Bolshevik Revolution 32, 35, 43
Bolshevism 39
Bosnia(n) 22, 46–51, 53–62
Bosnian Serbs 46, 48, 52–3, 55–6, 60, 62
Bourgeois revolutions 206

- Brazil 27, 120, 163, 190, 196,
197–201, 209
myth of origin 198
Brincar/brincadeira 198
Britain 16, 103, 107, 110, 114, 116,
126, 149
British/Britishness 26, 150–1
government 214–15
military 132
troops 125
British Petroleum 127
Brussels Pact 135
Buddhism, Buddhists 43
Bulgaria 211
Burney Treaty (1826) 103
Burma, Burmese 102–3
- Canada 163
Capital(ism) 191, 192, 195, 206, 209
flows 191
techno-capitalism 206
post- 208
Caribbean 19, 149
Carnival, carnivalesque 27, 190–1,
193–4, 195, 196, 197–201, 202,
207, 209
carnivalization 27
casualization, casual (flexible)
labour 8
Caucasians 105
Caucasus 40
Celtic Tiger 24, 113, 117, 119
Celtic cultural revival 113
Chechen War 40
Chechnia, Chechens 34–7
Chicago Fundamentalism Project 81,
96
China, Chinese 40, 101–4
Christendom 40
Christians, Christianity 23, 41, 43,
80, 85
Christian community 24
Christian Democratic Union/Christian
Social Union 70
Christian Europe 103
Christian Right 90
citizens, citizenship 3, 18, 25, 26,
36–8, 79, 128, 132–4, 141
citizens, second-class 69, 77
- Citizenship Law (Germany) 79
Citizenship 196
rights 24, 79, 140
civic identity 31, 36–7, 39, 45
civilian authority/control 125, 127,
129
civil–military relations 124–34,
136–8
civil rights 88
civil society(ies) 8, 13, 36, 134, 136–7
Class domination 192
subaltern class 196
coalition(s) 86, 88–9
Cold War 7, 22, 23, 68, 77, 124–6,
128, 136
Colombians 169
colonialism(ist) colonies 102–4, 109,
116, 149–50, 152, 190
commercialization 122
communalism, communal unity 88,
92, 94, 129, 149
control 130
Communism, communist forces 37,
64, 72
Communist party(ies) 33, 40
community(ies) 1, 3, 14, 16, 17, 18,
19, 20, 34–5, 65, 72, 77, 82–3,
88–90, 93–5, 100
global/world 12, 23
international 50, 55–6, 61
Jewish 43, 57
migrant 19–20, 26, 66, 86, 128
Muslim 22
national(ist) 4, 54, 122
traditional 17, 21
transnational 13, 19–20
comparative politics 211
computers 191, 192, 208
conformism 192
consensus (social/political) 87
consumer culture/goods/values/
society 87, 90, 92, 104, 119, 190,
191, 192, 206, 207, 209
corporate capital/interests 7, 13
corporations 191
life-careers 203–4
cosmopolitanism 19, 20, 122, 145
Cossack, Cossack communities 34,
36

- counter-culture/al 87
- counter-hegemonic movements 191
- crisis of identity 122
- Croatia(n) 22
- Croats 49, 55, 57–8, 62
- cultural authenticity (Irish) 120–1
- cultural autonomy 120
- cultural boom (Irish) 119
- cultural consumption 192
- cultural diversity 121
- cultural globalization 118, 122–3
- cultural identity/industry 117
- culture industries 191, 192, 193, 196, 201
- cultural imperialism 113, 116, 119–20
- cultural productivity 119
- cultural resistance 196
- cultural revival 113, 117
- cultural standardization 122–3
- cultural studies 114
- cultural traffic 118
- cultural vacuum 90
- cultural values 130
- culturalization of social life 118
- culture, peasant folk 193
- culture, popular 194
- cyberactivism/activists 27, 191, 207, 208, 209
- cyber feudalism 27, 194–5
- cyberspace 50, 207
- cyrillic alphabet 38, 41
- Czech Republic 211

- Danzig Corridor 127
- Darwinism/Evolutionism 86–7, 152
- Dayton Agreement 47, 56
- de-centered, de-centredness 14
- de-localized, de-localization 1, 20
- democracy, democratic,
 - democratization 8, 13, 32, 36–7, 44–5, 68, 120, 125, 133
 - democratic ideals 65
 - principles 128
- Denmark/Danish 127
- denomination 86
- Dependency Theory –
 - Dependistas 212–13, 219, 220
 - centre–periphery relations 163, 213, 219
 - forms of dependence 213
- deregulation, deregulated 12
- detritorialization 1
- desire 195–7
- detrribalized, detribalization 17
- deutschmark 67
- Development Theory –
 - Developmentalism 211–12, 219, 223
- deviancy amplification 23
- devolution (Scottish) 210
- diasporas, diasporic 1, 12, 19, 20, 34, 148, 151, 155
- discrimination 84
- disembedding, disembedding
 - mechanisms 9
- disempowering, disempowerment 16
- drug trafficking 12
- dual identity/allegiances 125, 128–9
- Dublin 114, 116–17, 123
- Dutch forces/interests 127, 130
- Dutch Shell 127

- East Asia/tiger economies 115
- East Timor 124, 134–5, 185
- Eastern Europe 176
- Easty Girls 74
- east–west cultural divide 77
- Easy Jet 116
- economic globalization 7, 8, 10
- economies of scale 126
- economism 117
- electoral politics 207, 208
- electronic communications/
 - media 99, 101, 191, 192–3, 194, 207, 208
- Empire
 - European 128
 - Roman 110
- England/English 123, 132, 144, 146–8
- Enlightenment 86, 120, 191, 206, 209
- Environmentalism 208
- Equal Rights Amendment Act 88, 91
- Estonia 210
- Ethiopia 166
- ethnic cleansing 54, 131

- ethnicity 2, 5, 10, 14, 52, 149
 diversity 133
 minorities 133
 ethnic war 49
 ethnocultural identities 36
 Ethnonational political theory
 213–14, 220, 223
 ethnos 40
 Eurasianism 339–40
 European Corps: Combined French,
 German and Belgian military
 force 126, 135
 European Defence and Security
 Policy 132
 European Economic Community 115
 European Union/Community 7, 13,
 15, 23, 28, 66–7, 89, 91, 95, 114,
 124–5, 127, 129, 131–3, 148, 211,
 216, 217–18
 evangelical(ism) 83, 86–7, 89, 95

farang 104–6, 108–11
 fascism, fascists 37
 Federal Republic of Germany 23,
 64–72, 75, 79
 Female genital mutilation 208
 Feminism 197, 208
 Feudal Europe 193
 order 194
 financial markets, flows 7, 25
 First State treaty on Currency,
 Economic and Social Union 65
 fortress Europe 15
 France/French 15, 94, 110, 125, 163,
 169
 free trade 115
 liberalization 13
 French Foreign Legion 125
 Freudian theory 197
 Function mirror 162
 fundamentalism 22, 80–4, 87–95
 Christian 80–1, 85, 93, 95
 Hindu 94
 Islamic 81, 93–4
 Jewish 94
 Protestant 82–6, 92–3, 95–6

 G7 nations 13
 GDP/GNP 119

 Gaelic identity 121
gaijin 100, 105
 gangsta 196
 gay rights 88
 Gender gap 208
 generalized other 4, 16
 genocide 56, 124, 131
 Georgia 344
 Germany 169
 German Democratic Republic 22, 23,
 64–5, 67–79
 Germany, Germans 23, 37, 60, 64–65,
 67–78, 126
 Germany: Political Parties
 Christian Democratic Union/
 Christian Social Union (CDU/
 CSU) 70
 Socialist Unity Party (SED)/
 Regime 71–2, 74–5, 78
 SPD–Green coalition 72
 Party of Democratic Socialism
 (PDS) 78–9
 Germanness 70
 gesellschaft society/structure 17
 Ghanaians 169
 Glasnost' 32
 globality/global values 12, 129, 131,
 133, 135, 137–8, 144
 global age/era 123
 global capital(ism) 193
 global civil society 13, 14, 22–3, 27,
 47, 53, 63, 89, 134–8
 global corporate capital 12
 global culture 89, 100, 118–19, 123,
 144
 cultural industries 123
 flows 163
 global economy/finance/market 12,
 32, 90, 121, 129, 185, 189
 global flows 118, 123, 162
 global homogenization 123
 global links 89
 global media 129
 global 'other' 23
 global polity 89
 global reach 448, 63
 global roles 132
 global shift 89
 global social movements 1

- global social networks 9, 19, 20
 global society 13, 136
 global technology 126
 global trade 91
 globalization 7–14, 32–3, 38–9, 41–4,
 47–52, 64, 75, 85–6, 89–90, 93, 95,
 99–101, 111–12, 117–25, 127–8,
 133, 135, 137, 139, 153, 168–70,
 172, 175, 186, 191–2, 193, 196,
 198, 201, 206, 207, 208, 209, 211,
 215–17, 221, 223
 glocal culture 99, 101, 107, 119
 glocalization 24, 27, 101, 111, 193
 God's Way Community 82–5, 88–91,
 94
 grass roots 71–2
 Great Depression 114
 Great Patriotic War 37
 Greece 169
 Gulf War 126

 Heavy metal 196
 hedonism 191
 hegemony, hegemonic 9, 15, 73, 100,
 192, 195, 206
 (de)-hegemonization 7
 Hispanic(s) 23
 Hollywood 42, 201
 homelessness/homeless mind 11, 88
 Hong Kong 103
 human rights 135, 175
 human rights discourse 176
 Human Rights Watch 176
 humanitarian intervention/
 missions 127–31
 Hungary 42, 211
 hybridity, cultural hybridity, hybrid
 identities 11, 19, 25, 100, 118,
 120, 123, 150
 hybridization 21, 100, 122
 hyper-inflation 41

 id 194
 identification 2, 5, 54, 56, 58–9, 140,
 142, 144–5, 148–9, 155–6
 identity formation/construction 2, 3,
 100–1, 104, 118, 122, 139, 141–2,
 144, 146–7, 150–1, 153–4, 190,
 192, 195–7, 201, 202, 209

 gender identities 204
 resistance identities 196–7
 identity politics 14, 32, 45, 87, 90,
 139–40, 143, 146–7, 153–4, 175
 ideology 7, 108
 imagery (erotic, violent) 191
 imagined community 3, 118
 worlds 11
 immigrant (*see* migrant)
 imperialism, imperial(ist), imperial
 power 9, 32, 34–6, 41, 102, 107,
 109, 111, 123, 155, 190
 times 127
 Independent European Programme
 Group 126–7
 India, Indian 102–4
 Individualized selfhood 197
 Indonesia 185
 inequality, inequities 13, 27, 72, 78
 global inequality 12
 information/communications
 technology 8, 10, 32
 information technology,
 revolution 117
 flows 191
 Intel computer company 115
 interactionism, interactionist
 theory 4, 5
 intergovernmental organizations 8,
 13
 internal colonialism 104
 International Criminal Court 176
 international debt 188
 international diplomacy 49
 international economic
 institutions 129
 international justice 176
 International Monetary Fund 13,
 188, 189, 191
 international media images 129
 international non-governmental
 organizations 13, 22–3, 126
 international order 68
 international organizations 48, 135
 international relations 13, 128–9,
 134, 211
 international trade 89
 international proletarianism 33
 Intifada 26

- Iran, Iranian 94
- Ireland 24, 113, 116, 118–21, 123, 220
- Irish, Irishness 25, 115–17, 121–3, 132
- Irish Development Association 115
- Islam(ic) 40, 44, 52, 80
territories 163
- Israel 26, 94, 161–73
Aliyah (Jewish immigration) –
 Aliyot 162, 163
Ashkenazim 163
elections (1977) 165
Eretz Israel 162
ethnic division of labour 167–8
founding fathers 163, 165
foreign workers 161–3, 166,
 168–72, 173
function mirror 162
Gathering of exiles (*galouyot*) 162
global cultural flows 163
illegal workers 169
Intifada 167
Israelity 166
Israeli–Arab conflict 172
Israeli ethnoscape 162
Israeli identity 162, 165, 165, 168,
 170, 172
Israeli–Palestinian conflict 166
Jewish-migrants as ‘Other’ 166
Kav La’Oved and, defence of 171
kibboutz 162
Law of Return 166, 174
Likud Party 165
Lod Airport 161
migration into Israel 161–73
Mizzoug galouyot (fusion of
 exiles) 163
non-Jewish migrants 161–2
Olim 163
Origins of migrants during
 Aliyot 163
orthodox religious 163
Oslo Agreement (1993) 167
‘Other’ 170–2
Palestinian question 165
Palestinian workers 166–8
Pluralist-Assimilationist,
 society 165–6
People/Land/State synthesis 165
political party allegiances 165
secular-religious Jews 163
self-reflexive time 162, 163
Sepharadim 163
Shoah 163
Vatikim 163
- Italy, Italian, Italianicity 107, 126
- Jacobite Romanticism 107
- Japan, Japanese 15, 102–6, 192
- Jehovah’s Witnesses 43
- Jerusalem 161
- Jesuits 43
- Jewish, Jews 40, 84, 86, 89, 94
 identity 172
 immigrants 26
- Jihad 15, 120
- Jubilee 2000 campaign 13
- Kazakhstan 34
- Kosovo 56, 124, 129, 189
- Kosovo Albanians 53, 62
- Kosovo Force (KFOR) 127, 131, 135,
 137
- länder 65–8, 72, 77–8
- Landmine Treaty 208
- Latin America 176, 198, 213
- Latvia 210
- Lebanon 127, 130
- Liberal Democratic Party (Russia) 37
- lifestyle(s), lifestyle choices/issues 6,
 13, 87–9, 190
- lifeworlds 10, 11
 plurality/pluralization of 11, 26, 88
- liminal, liminality 113, 120
 realms 194
 inversion 201
 anti-structures 206
- Lithuania 210
- lobbying 89, 91
- London 19, 20, 25, 144–5, 147
- Ludic 190
 identities 196, 209
 festival 202
- Maghreb 171
- marginalization 78, 89
 marginalized 15, 80, 90

- Malaya/Malaysia 102
 Male bonding 205
 Mardi Gras festivals 202
 market culture 76, 116
 marketization 33, 44, 64
 Marxist analyses 119
 revolutionaries 71
 mass consumerism/consumption 27,
 43–4, 75–6, 90, 192–3
 mass culture 192, 206, 207
 mass media, media industries 11, 19,
 24, 47–8, 50, 83, 89, 99, 101,
 105–6, 111, 114, 116, 192, 209
 McDonaldization 117, 119
 McWorld 15, 120
 McDonald's 193
 McJobs 206
 media subcultures 192
 Mediterranean 86, 169, 171
 mercenary forces 125
 Mexico 120
 migration 175
 to Israel 161–73
 mass migration 11, 12, 14, 66–7,
 86, 122, 149–50
 chain migration 66
 Middle Ages 190
 Middle East 81, 93–4
 military conflicts 124
 military forces 127
 military identities 124, 132
 identity crises 131
 military minds 124
 military planning agencies 132
 military professionalism 127, 129,
 132, 137
 millennialist 89, 92, 95
 Missouri 82, 94
 modernity 6, 7, 9, 17, 81, 86, 92, 104,
 120–1, 140–1, 143, 145–6, 152,
 154, 156
 counter 120
 late 6, 87
 modernization 9, 10, 28, 38–9, 80,
 85–6, 93, 104
 conservative 114, 120, 128, 130
 sponsored 120–1
 Mongols 39–40
 monopoly capitalism 115
 Montenegrins 60
 Morgan Stanley investment bank 115
 Moral Majority 89
 multiculturalism 16, 20, 25, 26, 54,
 57, 58, 62
 multicultural 19, 51, 155–6
 multi-ethnic 39, 53, 58–9, 61, 66
 multinational 35, 39, 133
 military forces/operations 129, 135
 multinational corporation 1, 9, 27,
 127, 136, 176, 187, 190, 191, 212,
 213, 215, 217
 multi-positional identities 19
 multiple identities 21
 Muslim 39, 47, 49, 52, 57–8, 60, 62
 Muslim-Croat federation 47, 61
 Namibia 130
 narod(s) 58–9
 nation-state 1, 2, 3, 6–10, 16, 25, 89,
 126, 128–9, 131–4, 140–5, 149–50,
 153, 156; after the 124–5,
 127–8, 137; centred
 thinking 119; death of
 117–18, 123; defence of 127,
 129–30; European 133;
 modernizing 131; rivalry
 between 9, 124; security 125;
 system of 12–13
 nationhood 2, 26, 101
 national capitalisms 191
 National Association of
 Evangelicals 87
 National Opposition (Russia) 34
 National Salvation Front 33
 National Salvation Group 34
 nationalism 2, 22, 51, 53, 57–58, 73,
 106, 128–9, 132–3, 141, 146–8,
 206
 dual 152
 nationality(ies) 14, 36–8, 130, 139
 nazi 69
 Near Abroad 34
 neocolonialism 189
 neoliberal/neoliberalism 8
 clones 207
 neoluddites 208
 network society, networks 8, 48, 118,
 134, 136, 196

- New Christian Right 89
 New Technologies 191, 194
 New World 190
 Nigerians 169
 non-governmental organizations/
 goups/interests 48, 50, 53, 61, 207
 North Atlantic, Treaty
 Organization 91, 124–6, 128,
 131–2
 forces 129–30, 135
 operations 137
 Northern Ireland 176
 Cost of Troubles Study 182
 North Sea oil rigs 127
 nostalgia 122
- Occident(al) 24, 99, 104–7, 109–11
 Occidentalism 101–2, 104, 107,
 111–12
 One-dimensionalism 192
 Opium Wars 103
 Organization for Economic
 Co-operation and Development
 (OECD) 66
 organized crime 67
 Orient 3, 101
 Orientalism 3, 101–5, 151
 (re)-orientalized 24
 Ossi (Easterner) 64, 69–71, 74–5, 77
 Ostalgia 64, 74, 77–8
 other 3, 4, 26, 39, 51, 53, 56, 99–102,
 104–5, 109–12, 146, 148, 155
 othering 51, 94
 outsiders/outside groups 83
 outward-oriented economic
 growth 115
 Ozarks Region 82, 94
- Palestine, Palestinian 26
 Parrot Soap 109–11
 pariah 23
 Party of Democratic Socialism
 (PDS) 78–9
 patriarch, patriarchal 7
 patriarchy 189
 patriotic(ism) 39, 72, 76, 86, 111,
 128, 132
 Peaceful Revolution (1989) 64, 70
 Peasants 193
- Pentecostal Church 43
 Persian Gulf 124
 Peruvians 169
 Petroleum Authority of
 Thailand 106–7, 109
 phenomenological approach/
 investigation 15
 Philippines 167, 220
 pluralization/plurality/pluralism of life
 experiences 87–9, 90, 91–2
 Poland/Polish 42, 127, 210
 pollution 191, 207
 popular culture 41, 191
 popular identity 71–2, 74
 popular resistance 193
 Portugal/Portuguese 103, 196, 197
 post-Cold War 126
 postcolonial 113, 120–1, 150
 post-Civil War 86
 post-Fordism(ist) 8, 191
 postmodern, postmodernity 1, 7, 23,
 70, 75, 114, 116–17, 120, 123, 139,
 152
 poststructuralism 122
 post-traditional society 100, 154
 post-unification 71, 76–77
 post-War era/period/generation 69,
 75, 77, 85, 87–8
 privatization 87
 proletarian revolution 208
 protectionism 115
 Protestantism/Church 86–7, 89, 93,
 196, 203
 ethic 194
 colonizers 195
 Puritan/Puritanism 203
- racism 122, 150
 rationalism 140
 rationalization 80, 87, 125, 140
 rationalization, standardization and
 interoperationability
 policies 125–6
 Reaganomics 90
 Reconstruction (Soviet, 1985–91) 32,
 40
 reference culture 67, 71, 75
 reflexive, reflexivity 6, 26, 123, 141,
 154, 156

- Reformation 43
 refugees 15, 47, 65, 122
 reggae 196
 regionalization 125, 127, 133, 137
 reinvented tradition 123
 relativization 3
 Renaissance 43
 representation(s) 5, 24, 27, 54, 57, 62, 111
 Re/Unification 64–5, 67–8, 74, 76–9
 Rituals 190
 Roman Catholic Church 43, 84, 86, 89
 clergy 121
 Catholics 196, 197
 Roman-ness 110
 Romania 163, 211
 Royal Air Force 126
 Royal Navy 127
 Rugby 202
 Russia(n) 22, 31, 33–4, 36–42, 44–5, 95, 100
 Russian Empire 37, 39, 41
 Russian Federation 31, 34, 36–9, 42, 44
 Russian Federation political parties/
 tendencies
 Liberal Democratic Party of the
 Russian Federation 37
 National Salvation Front 33
 National Salvation Group 34
 Red-Browns 38
 Russian Communist Party 33, 40
 National Republican Party 40
 Yabloko 41
 Russian Orthodox Church/
 Orthodoxy 22, 35, 37, 39, 43–5, 95
 Russian State Duma 35
 Russian Soviet Federative Socialist
 Republics 33, 37
 russification 37–9
 Rwanda 124, 189

 Sarajevo 46–7, 51, 53, 57–61
 scapes/landscapes 11, 118
 Schengen Agreement 169
 Scotland 28, 108, 210
 Scottish/Scottishness/
 Scottishcity 27, 107–9, 132, 214, 219
 Scots 77
 Scottish Assembly/Parliament 212, 216, 218, 220
 Parliamentary elections
 (1999) 210, 218
 Scottish Committee 212, 215, 219
 Scottish economy 215, 217–18
 changing economic structure
 of 217–18, 219, 221
 communications revolution 221
 EU structural funds 218
 Locate in Scotland (policy) 215, 221
 multinationals in 212–13, 215, 217, 218, 221
 Scottish Enterprise (initiative) 215, 221
 Scottish Office 215, 219
 Scottish Parliament Referendum
 (1997) 210
 Scotland political parties – groupings
 in 221–2
 Labour Party 210, 216, 218
 Scottish National Party (SNP) 210, 211, 213, 214, 216, 218, 220, 223
 Communists and Socialists 213
 Scottish Referendum (1979) 218
 Scotch whisky 107–8, 217
 Second Coming of Christ 84
 Second World War 58
 secularization, secular,
 secularized 80–81, 87–8, 92
 self-occidentalism 105
 separation of nation and state 139
 Serbia, Serbian 22, 23, 27, 35, 46–7, 51–3; military forces 131
 Serb(s) 48–9, 51, 54–6, 58–60, 62
 Serbo-Croat 58
 Seven Day Adventists 43
 shopping mall selfhood 190
 Siam/Siamese 103–4
 Sierra Leone 176, 189
 significant other(s) 4
 Slavs, slavic 34–5, 39–40, 62
 Slavic Union 34
 Slovakia 211
 Slovenia/Slovenes 54–5
 soccer 202

- social exclusion 14, 115
- socialized 197
- societalization 80, 87
- sociosphere 20, 21
- South Africa(n) 26, 27
 - Armscor 185
 - Freedom City 187
 - human rights violations/killings/
tortures 176–9, 181–3, 184–5
 - identities 177, 180, 183, 186–7,
189
 - ideological myths 179–80
 - international debt 188
 - media 178, 186
 - multinational corporations in
187
 - victim and perpetrator
identities 180–5, 187
 - violent crime 187
 - wine 183
- South African politics and political
parties
 - African National Congress
(ANC) 182, 183, 187
 - Inkatha Freedom Party 178
 - Land Law and relocation 187
 - National Party 177, 178, 182
 - Pass Laws 180
 - Population Classification Act
(1952) 180
 - Promotion of National Unity and
Reconciliation Act (1995)
177
 - Rainbow Nation 177
- South Africa – Truth and
Reconciliation Commission
(TRC) 26–7, 175, 176, 177–9,
182, 184, 185, 186, 188
- children and youth 186
- gender 184–5
- reparations assistance 183–4
- TRC Final Report (1998) 178, 186,
188
- TRC First Committee 177–8
- TRC Second Committee 178
- TRC Third Committee 178
- TRC and self-deception 179
- South Korea 44
- Southern Europe 196
- sovereignty, sovereign states 23, 43,
68, 125–6, 128, 135
- Soviet Union/Soviet 12, 31–2, 37–8,
40, 44, 95, 163, 166
- Spain 77, 173
- Sportuguese/sports chatter 205
- Sri Lanka 103
- Srpska 46, 48, 54, 58, 60
- standardization 125
- Stasi regime 69
- stigmatization 14
- subcultures 16
- subjectivity 191
- supranational entities/
identities 128–9, 131–3
- superbowl 190, 197, 201–6
- superego 195
- superpower 31, 111
- symbolic economy 8
- Tajikistan 34
- Tamizdat 32
- Tatarization 38
- Tartarstan, Tatars 36–9, 44
- Technical/managerial elites 195
- technocapitalism 27
- telecommunications 47, 118, 191,
192
- Thailand 24, 100–2, 104, 106, 109,
111
- Thai/Thainess 16, 24, 99, 101–3,
105–6, 108–12
- culture 101, 104–5, 108, 110
- elites 99, 101, 103
- media industries 111
- society/viewers 108–9, 111
- Third Way Socialism 72
- Third World/South 8, 15, 169, 213;
sweatshops 195
- time–space compression 10, 14, 196
- tool-kit (cultural) 17
- Tornado project 126
- totemic religion 201
- tourism/tourists 32, 104, 116, 119,
191, 198, 201, 215, 217–18
- Transitional states
(democracies) 175, 176, 182–3
- hierarchies of pain and,
responsibility in 182–3

- transnational corporations 115
 - see also* multinational corporations
- transnational, transnationalism
 - 10, 11, 12, 13, 115, 121, 126, 131–3
 - civil authorities 131
 - collaboration/exchanges/flows/
 - networks 9, 48, 125, 127, 132
 - control 130
 - cultures 118
 - investment 15
 - military forces 127
 - organization 135
 - symbols 128
 - political mobilization 208
- Treaty of Rome 176
- Treaty of Westphalia 124, 135
- Trotzidentität 73
- Truth Commissions 176, 188
- Turkic 40
- Turkmenistan 38
- Turkey 171

- Ukraine/Ukrainian 31–2, 34, 36
- Unemployment/
 - underemployment 207
- Unification (German) 74
- Unification Treaty 65
- United Kingdom 77, 94, 127, 132
 - regionalism 214
 - 1966 general election 218
 - 1970 general election 218
 - 1974 general elections 210, 218
 - 1979 general election 218
- United Nations 12, 124, 127–8, 132, 135, 182
 - peace-keeping forces 127–8, 130, 135, 137
 - Security Council 127, 130, 137
- United Nations Interim Force (in Lebanon) 127, 130
- United/New Germany 68–9, 73, 75–8
- United States of America/USA/US 42, 127
 - as a chosen nation 22–4
 - citizens 140
 - current political strife 94
 - founders 91
 - immigrants to Israel 163
 - modernization 86
 - preachers to Russia 43
 - Protestantism 80–3, 85–6, 92
 - Protestant settlers 27
 - superpower 111
 - transnational corporations 115
- urban–rural divide 49–50, 57–60
- USSR 32–8, 41, 126
- Uzbekistan 38

- Venice 198
- Vietnam
 - Vietnamese 65, 101
 - Vietnam War 104
- Violence
 - inter-state–intra-state 175
- Virgin Air 116

- War crimes 176
- Washington, DC 94
- Wales
 - Welsh 132, 214
- Welfare state 192, 206
- Wessi (Westerner) 68–9, 73, 75–8
- Western Europe 192
- Workers/wage labourers 195
 - technicians 195
 - semi-skilled 195
 - service 195
- World Bank 8, 13, 189, 191
- World Trade Organization 13, 41, 191, 208
- worldview 82, 87–8, 93–5, 103

- xenophobia 66

- Yugoslavia, Yugoslav 35, 46, 54, 56, 58–9, 62, 127
- Yugoslav War/conflict 46–8, 50, 52–3, 56, 63, 66

- Zapatistas 208
- Zionists 26
 - neo-Zionists 172
 - new-Zionists 162
 - post-Zionists 162, 172, 173
 - post-Zionist state 172
 - Zionist project 162