

Contents

<i>Foreword by The Rt. Hon. Chris Patten, Former Commissioner for External Relations</i>	ix
<i>Notes on the Contributors</i>	xi
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	xiii
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	xv
1 Introduction: Gatekeepers and Boundary-Spanners – Thinking about Foreign Ministries in the European Union <i>Brian Hocking</i>	1
2 The Evolving Role of Foreign Ministries in the Conduct of European Union Affairs <i>David Spence</i>	18
3 Austria <i>Hanspeter Neuhold</i>	37
4 Belgium <i>Rik Coolsaet and Ann-Sofie Voet</i>	60
5 Denmark <i>Knud Erik Jørgensen</i>	75
6 Finland <i>Esko Antola</i>	95
7 France <i>Melanie Morisse-Schilbach</i>	111
8 Germany <i>Elfriede Regelsberger</i>	132
9 Ireland <i>Ben Tonra</i>	146
10 Italy <i>Mario Zucconi</i>	163
11 The Netherlands <i>Duco Hellema</i>	177

12	Portugal <i>José M. Matos Correia</i>	191
13	Spain <i>Ignacio Molina and Fernando Rodrigo</i>	212
14	Sweden <i>Magnus Ekengren and Bengt Sundelius</i>	238
15	The United Kingdom <i>David Allen</i>	250
16	Conclusion <i>Brian Hocking</i>	273
17	Afterword: Towards a European Diplomatic System? <i>Brian Hocking and David Spence</i>	287
	<i>Index</i>	306

1

Introduction: Gatekeepers and Boundary-Spanners – Thinking about Foreign Ministries in the European Union

Brian Hocking

Observers of foreign ministries and the systems of diplomatic representation over which they preside have reached very different conclusions as to their role and significance in the rapidly shifting patterns of world politics. On the one hand, there are those who argue that the critical functions that these institutions perform remain in essence unaltered. The implication of this interpretation is that the traditional state-centred diplomatic machinery of representation, intelligence-gathering and communication remains as it has traditionally been portrayed: a key institution of the international system and a major resource through which governments pursue their policy objectives.¹ A contrary view, however, asserts that the twin forces of globalisation and regionalisation are challenging governments and have dramatically diminished the significance of these traditional instruments of diplomacy. Consequently, the role of the foreign ministry (FM) has become increasingly marginalised in the face of both internal and external pressures.

This divergence of views about diplomacy in general and the role of the FM in particular is echoed in the specific context of the European Union (EU). For many observers, the EU is a complex political system transcending the traditional processes associated with classical diplomacy, and is far removed from preoccupations with its institutional machinery. And yet, whereas foreign ministries – characterised as one of the ‘pioneer ministries’ in the development of the integration enterprise – have been joined in the EU arena by other bureaucratic players traditionally regarded as having a purely domestic policy remit, they remain one of the key ministries in dealing with EU affairs in the majority of member states.²

It is this apparent polarisation of views as to the continuing role and significance of the foreign ministry that provides the context for this book. The justification for engaging in such a project is well supported by the extensive literature on the EU. It is now a familiar proposition that the nexus

between member state governmental and administrative systems and EU processes is critical to an appreciation of the character and development of European integration. The very nature of European foreign policy and diplomacy, as Hill, Wallace and many others have argued, has been recast in such a way that its national and European facets are intertwined: 'European foreign policy is "a system of external relations", a collective enterprise through which national actors conduct partly common, and partly separate, international actions.'³ As Hill and Wallace also note, three decades of European Political Cooperation (EPC), and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 'have transformed the working practices of West European foreign ministers and ministries' as the conduct of national foreign policy has evolved into 'a form of high-level networking with transformationalist effects and even more potential'.⁴ The implications are as relevant to the organisation and operations of foreign ministries themselves as they are to the pattern of European representation and its interrelationship with national diplomatic representation. A growing EU external presence demands more coordination at the European level but also within and between foreign ministries themselves, and poses questions regarding the nature of the diplomatic role and, for example, the training requirements that underpin it.⁵

This book was conceived with two related objectives in mind. Firstly, at the broader level, the aim is to reconsider the nature and role of the foreign ministry in the context of rapidly changing international and domestic environments. It might be more appropriate to use the word 'consider' rather than 'reconsider' in this context, for one of the premises on which the book rests is that we know surprisingly little about this familiar feature of national administrations.⁶ The reasons for this are to be found in the academic study of international relations and the approaches adopted by varying theoretical persuasions to the study of diplomacy and its institutions and, additionally, in the lack of hard data about the activities of diplomats.⁷ The resulting tendency has been to adopt stereotypical perspectives of the diplomatic milieu characterised by simplistic assertions and images, most familiarly manifested in arguments about the 'decline' of diplomacy and its institutional forms. As the chapters in this volume amply demonstrate, such generalisations demand considerable qualification. Not only is it the case that FMs differ considerably in terms of their place in their respective political and administrative settings, but the precise character of the external roles that they were created to perform have varied from country to country.

The more specific objective is to reflect on the response of FMs to the development of European integration. Whereas it would be misleading to assume that the challenges confronting EU member state FMs are solely the product of developments within the European arena, a series of unparalleled new tasks for European foreign ministries have arisen as a result of two specific responsibilities: the coordination of sectoral ministries' affairs for EU business, and participation in the CFSP. If there are points of similarity and

dissimilarity in the general response of foreign policy administrations to change, the existing evidence suggests that there are actually significant variations between member states in their responses to these two sets of challenges.

The phrase 'integrating diplomats' was selected to reflect these interrelated concerns. Its resonances are clear in the EU context. The book focuses on the role of diplomats in the integration process and, simultaneously, raises the issue of whether the integration of national diplomatic institutions might not prove the logical outcome of the process. However individual member states have responded to the processes of Europeanisation, their respective diplomatic systems have played a significant role, albeit at differing phases in the evolution of the EU. The implication, of course, is not that they have been, or are, the sole engines of the integration project. Indeed, the gradual embedding of the 'domestic' components of national administrative systems has become a key feature of the EU policy environment and one to which foreign ministries have been required to respond. But these trends have to be seen in a wider context, for diplomats are confronted with broader processes of integration which, whilst obviously related to regionalisation, are part of the general patterns of change associated with globalisation. Thus, at the international level, diplomats have found their work focused increasingly in multilateral forums, and often characterised by highly technical subject matter. At the domestic level, a reflection of the oft-noted evanescence of the domestic-foreign policy 'divide', they have found that the policy milieu in which they work is inhabited by bureaucrats from an ever more diverse range of government departments.

One of the themes of the management of foreign policy in an era of growing interdependence has been the trend towards a more broadly based foreign policy 'community' of which the FM and its diplomatic networks are but one element. The role of the foreign ministry in this context – as we shall see later in this chapter – has frequently been portrayed as one of seeking to integrate incoherent international policies through varying processes of coordination. But beyond the purely administrative context, the nature of much contemporary negotiation demands another, broader mode of integration: namely with societal interests and, in particular, with the representatives of civil society.⁸ This mode of diplomatic integration, often represented in terms of 'two-level games' wherein diplomats become players at both domestic and international negotiating tables, has come to be regarded as a familiar feature of the European as well as the broader negotiating arena.⁹ In these senses, 'integration' presents both a series of interconnected challenges and opportunities for diplomats.

In pursuing this theme, this introduction has several objectives. The first of these is to reflect on the nature of foreign ministries as bureaucratic actors, both in general terms and in the European environment. Following from this I set out two models which, I believe, move us beyond the

tendency to view the developments in national foreign policy administration from relatively narrow perspectives. These I term the 'gatekeeper' and 'boundary-spanner' image and suggest that the latter captures the role of the FM much more accurately in the context of the complex EU policy milieu. The chapter then proceeds to consider developments specific to intra-EU relations: namely, the implications for foreign ministries of the rise of domestic ministries as major bilateral actors in European interstate relations and the consequent need for a nationally coordinated position in European Community affairs. From this we move on to consider the implications for foreign ministries of the CFSP and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), both of which fall outside the far-reaching integration of the European Community (first) pillar of the European Union and yet are replete with implications for the integration of daily policy making.

Evaluating foreign ministries

It has become an accepted premise of the extensive EU literature that institutions matter, that – as Aspinall and Schneider note in their overview of neo-institutionalist approaches to the EU – they structure political actions and outcomes.¹⁰ However, there has been a tendency, it is suggested, to focus on institutional patterns at the European level rather than the national level. Pursuing this theme, Hanf and Soetendorp have noted:

Most frequently these developments are examined in terms of how policy-making is organized at the EU level, and how the interaction of national and European-level actors affects the definition of national interest, the resources available for pursuing it, the exercise of influence and the legitimacy of the decisions reached at the EU level. Likewise, interest is focused on the organizational alternatives for organizing the relations between the different institutional actors of the EU.¹¹

Along with many other observers, amongst them Bulmer,¹² Richardson¹³ and Ladrech,¹⁴ they argue that EU policy processes have to be regarded as 'nested games', in which the policy processes at the national and European levels mutually influence one another through a complex interplay of formal and informal structures and processes which embrace both EU, national and subnational actors. The degree to which national institutional arrangements privilege policy choices and outcomes, both in the European and the broader international contexts, is of major importance here.

From this recognition, a considerable literature tracing the impact of Europeanisation on political and administrative structures and processes at the national level has evolved. Hanf and Soetendorp draw a distinction, however, between studies mainly preoccupied with the development of EU-focused transnational subsystems as distinct from the relations between

national institutions *per se* and the EU institutional environment. In the pursuit of this goal in the UK context, Bulmer and Burch have adopted a historical institutionalist approach which traces the response of the UK administrative system to EU membership.¹⁵ Their analysis of the pattern of departmental roles and relationships in the periods before and after British accession to the EEC underscores the significance of bureaucratic adaptation to an understanding of the impact of European integration on the machinery of government. Interestingly, their conclusion is that, despite the profound effect that the EU has had on British policy, the impact here has been one of 'slow and steady adaptation'.¹⁶

It is this notion of adaptation that provides a central theme of this study. The proposition that bureaucratic institutions adapt to changing policy milieus is hardly a novel one and has received considerable attention at both the European and the broader international levels. For example, the concept of adaptation, derived from Haas's definition in terms of the ability of actors to respond to new demands, underpins Hanf and Soetendorp's study of the adaptation of the smaller member states to Europeanisation.¹⁷ But the FM has not generally been seen as an institution marked by a high degree of adaptive capacity. Indeed, Manners and Whitman, in their reinterpretation of EU member state foreign policy, conclude that conservatism in foreign policy administration is one of the most notable features of EU member state bureaucracies. They base this conclusion on the observation that 'without exception the traditional structures of a foreign ministry with a foreign minister in charge of foreign policy have been maintained, if not strengthened'.¹⁸

Such a conclusion ignores the significant changes that have occurred within systems of national diplomatic representation, including the FM at their centre, over recent decades. Around the world, foreign ministries have sought to respond to increasing demands against the background of diminishing resources, internal bureaucratic reorganisations, expanding policy tasks, a revolution in communications and information technology and, not least, the expectations generated by transnational civil society organisations and the business community. The proliferation of reviews of foreign ministry and diplomatic service organisation is ample testimony to the demands placed on the foreign policy machinery and its attempts to adapt to them. Not only in the EU context but in other countries and regions, foreign ministries and their diplomatic services are experimenting with new modes of managing their business. Co-location, shared diplomatic premises and staff exchanges between foreign ministries are not solely manifestations of a proto-European diplomatic presence. They reflect experiments (often unsuccessful) in many other settings.

But stereotypical views of the foreign ministry and its characteristics – as with the role performed by professional diplomats in the field – are, of course, common. In their evaluation of foreign policy management in Sweden and Finland, Karvonen and Sundelius attribute this in part to the

acceptance of US-oriented analyses of the consequences of interdependence on bureaucratic structures which are often insensitive to local political environments.¹⁹ More generally, however, there is a tendency to group foreign ministries into a uniform category which denies significant variations in their origins, the specific roles that they have been called upon to perform and their political and bureaucratic status.²⁰ As can be seen from the chapters in this book, FMs have not infrequently been founded on the demands of commerce rather than those of 'high' foreign policy, and it is by no means the case that they have occupied the apex of their respective bureaucratic hierarchies.

Furthermore, against the view of foreign ministries as bastions of conservatism, there are compelling arguments for regarding them as possessing a higher degree of innovative capacity than the more domestically oriented parts of the bureaucracy. One reason is to be found in the fundamental character of national diplomatic systems, with their need to link international and domestic policy environments, a point explored in greater depth below. Associated with this is what Wiseman has noted as the twin characteristics of mobility and the capacity to adapt readily to international environments.²¹ The point is reinforced by Kramer and Quendler:

Diplomats and foreign ministries are more sensitive, more exposed to and are more challenged by the dramatically changed international environment than are other departments of bureaucracy and sectors of society. They therefore might be in a better position to adapt their 'product' to the needs of the newly structured 'international market'.²²

Linked to this is a factor related to the FM's relationship to domestic interests. Despite the fact that the conduct of international policy, as already suggested, demands an ever increasing involvement with a growing range of domestic constituencies, foreign ministries are less likely to be subject to the attentions of interest groups which focus on domestic departments and can act as forces resisting innovation.²³

In short, we need to recognise the unique as well as the common features of foreign ministries, whilst resisting the tendency to make assumptions regarding their role and status. This is as true of the EU policy environment as it is of the broader, global context. Here, it is tempting to assume that the pressures of 'convergence', reflecting processes of Europeanisation, are producing similar responses in the administrative structures of the member states. It may well be, however, that institutional change is conditioned as much, if not more, by factors relating to the internal character of the state.²⁴ What is most likely to be the case, however, is a pattern of responses that reflects an amalgam of both factors and which ensures that convergence will be overlaid by the unique experiences enshrined in the policy structures and processes of individual states.

Foreign ministries and the European policy environment

The linkage between the European and member state arenas provides one of the distinctive characteristics of EU policy processes, sustaining the image of a complex multilevel policy environment underpinned by intensive and extensive negotiation. The portrayal of the EU in terms of policy networks – despite the ambiguities and imprecisions that surround the term – have become familiar.²⁵ But as Jönsson *et al.* note, networks are multidimensional phenomena assuming a variety of forms which can only be determined by careful empirical research. One distinguishing feature of what can be termed a ‘diplomatic site’ focusing on an issue and embracing a particular configuration of actors is the degree of governmental involvement. Using Coleman and Perl’s typology, such sites may range from those with a high degree of governmental involvement to private, self-regulatory regimes where interactions between transnational and governmental actors will tend to be relatively sparse and unstructured.²⁶

These variations in the constitution of networks are clearly visible in the context of EU diplomacy. As Keukeleire notes, a focus on the CFSP provides a much more traditional, intergovernmentalist diplomatic environment in which the range of actors is limited and in which foreign ministries play a significant role. This stands in contrast to his depiction of pillar-transcending ‘structural’ diplomacy which has as its core aim the development of structural change in those regions of the world with which the EU has differing forms of relationship and which is ‘centred around quite an extensive agenda of institutionalised dialogue between very diverse actors from the EU and the third states concerned’.²⁷ Notably, the constituent networks on which this dimension of EU diplomacy rests embrace not only a proliferation of governmental actors but a growing range of NGOs and other representatives of civil society.

Thus the multifaceted points of contact between member state governments, and between them and the representatives of civil society, has changed significantly the ways in which negotiation is conducted. As with other policy environments, this poses important questions as to management and sequencing in policy processes, where precisely diplomacy occurs and who is engaged in it. A familiar manifestation of this issue in the EU context is the debate over the significance or otherwise of bilateral diplomacy amongst national governments. The notion that bilateralism is redundant is refuted by many observers of the EU and broader European scene including Kohler-Koch who, utilising network governance imagery, argues that the growing significance of core coalitions in the integration process reinforces the need for bilateral diplomacy within the broader multilateral context – that is to say, ‘multiple bilateralism’.²⁸ This does not in itself, of course, mean that national diplomatic systems are unchallenged, for it is obvious that they are, but it does pose more subtle questions regarding processes of

diplomatic socialisation, whether a European mode of diplomacy is emerging and how that relates to member state diplomacy and the machinery through which it is conducted.

Clearly, the complex EU policy environment provides scope for a variety of perspectives on the role of diplomacy and its mechanisms. One of these includes patterns of intra-EU negotiation which, as noted earlier, may be regarded as 'beyond' diplomacy with its state-oriented connotations. Thus, for example, Jørgensen cites one observer's prediction that we are witnessing the end of 'traditional' European diplomacy as intra-European diplomacy is replaced by democracy.²⁹ Another perspective rests on the suggestion, noted above, that there is some form of convergence in diplomatic style and practice. This is seen in the working style of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and the processes of diplomatic socialisation which have been identified as a key aspect of its operation.³⁰ Apart from this, and the legacy of EPC noted earlier, there are other socialising forces at work amongst the EU member state diplomatic services reinforced by administrative working groups such as the CFSP Committee on Administrative Affairs (COADM). Apart from the latter's focus on matters of administrative concern to foreign services, it is also concerned with diplomatic training.

Yet another perspective is clearly related to the prospect of the development of a putative European foreign policy in the form of the CFSP. Just as the point is often made that this demands a reconsideration of the fundamental characteristics of foreign policy and not simple extrapolations from state-based definitions and criteria, so with diplomacy and its mechanisms. Although we have a reasonable amount of evidence regarding the development of European diplomacy in the field, in the shape of the requirements under the Maastricht Treaty for cooperation and consultation between member state missions and in terms of the role of the Commission Delegations,³¹ this often rests implicitly on the assumption that a European foreign service would possess characteristics not dissimilar to those of national diplomatic systems. In one sense, of course, this is not surprising. As is frequently observed, the CFSP can be used as a tool of national foreign policy, but it is equally true that the tools of CFSP are largely constituted from the diplomatic resources of member states. Keukeleire suggests that:

While declarations of the Council or EU representatives may still be labelled the CFSP's 'own' instruments, most of the other instruments are put at the CFSP's disposal by member states, or are instigated by member states, in particular by the member state that plays a central operational role in CFSP diplomacy as (temporary) chair of the Council of Ministers.³²

But he goes on to make a more telling point. Not only is the image of CFSP too easily cast in terms of an ideal-type of foreign policy, to focus on the

second pillar may distort our overall perceptions of an emerging European diplomacy. Rather than solely CFSP-focused, an analysis of EU diplomacy should also embrace intra-EU diplomacy and EU 'structural' diplomacy referred to above. This suggests that what is most innovative in EU diplomacy may lie outside CFSP and in, for example, the sphere of economic diplomacy with its complex patterns of public and private sector interactions.³³

The thrust of this brief analysis directs our attention to two interrelated layers of complexity. On the one side we are confronted by the changing nature of diplomacy as it adapts to shifts in the configuration of both domestic and international environments. A key lesson here is that the idea of 'traditional' diplomacy – equated with state-based foreign policy – as a yardstick against which to measure some new mode of 'European' diplomacy, is problematic inasmuch as the 'traditional' is itself enmeshed in processes of profound change. The second layer of complexity lies in determining the character of what is 'European' in this context. The multilayered character of intra- and extra-European diplomacy and its points of intersection, presents us with formidable – if intriguing – analytical tasks. It also suggests a fluid institutional environment in which the roles of national foreign ministries and their networks of international representation are much less clearly defined than some analyses would suggest. This is captured in Hanf and Soetendorp's identification of the following options for the foreign ministry in a bureaucratic environment marked by a growing diffusion in the management of international and European policy on the one hand, and a concentration into the hands of prime ministerial and presidential offices on the other: 'To what extent does the foreign office play a role as policy-maker, gatekeeper, respected "honest broker" or simply postmaster?'³⁴ In the next section we explore this issue in terms of two contrasting models: that of the gatekeeper as contrasted to that of the 'boundary-spanner'.

Gatekeepers and boundary-spanners

The notion that foreign ministries and their associated diplomatic networks act as a filter between domestic and international environments sits uneasily with changes in policy processes associated with globalisation and regionalisation. But it seems to possess a surprising degree of vitality. In part, this reflects the fact that there *are* situations in which the national diplomatic system may indeed act as the primary conduit through which international policy is articulated. More often, however, this is the product of intra-bureaucratic struggles as domestic and international pressures impact on national administrative systems. Peters suggests that the resultant quest for coordination may result in changing claims to the role of 'central agency' and it is possible that foreign ministries may assume this role in certain contexts.³⁵ But as the development of the EC/EU illustrates, this is far more likely to be a shared – and contested – honour.

At the same time, claims to 'gatekeeper' status may simply reflect attempts to ward off challenges from other bureaucratic actors. Moreover, it is of questionable historical accuracy on two counts: firstly as suggested earlier, in many national bureaucratic settings, the foreign ministry has simply *not* been the primary agency in the shaping and implementation of international policy. Second, even in countries with well-developed and influential national diplomatic systems, the management of international policy (and in the case of the EU, intra-European relations) has characteristically involved processes of bureaucratic bargaining in which foreign, finance and trade ministries (amongst others) jostle with presidential and prime ministerial offices for pre-eminence.³⁶ By creating a mythology based on dubious claims to lost pre-eminence in the management of external policy, diplomats may, paradoxically, have provided substance to arguments which see them of decreasing relevance, thereby diminishing the value of the real roles that they perform.

As is suggested in Table 1.1, the gatekeeper image rests on a number of linked assumptions, the most fundamental of which is the centrality of the territorial state and the primacy of the control of boundaries and the communication flows that cross them. Associated with this are the frequent claims made for the special qualities to be found in foreign policy, inscribed in its 'foreignness', reinforced by its equation with high policy and the pursuit of an identifiable national interest. The assertion of exclusivity in the management of international policy may result in several strategies through which foreign ministries seek to establish control, whilst recognising the need for coordination in the face of a much more diffuse international policy environment. These strategies are most likely to be rooted in the conceptualisation of coordination as a hierarchical, top-down process in which the foreign ministry, aided by the diplomatic network over which it presides, assumes the role of dominant central agency.³⁷ Consequently, it is not simply that this image fails to accord with the essence of the developing EU polity, it has tenuous roots in the historical development of European (and non-European) diplomatic systems.

A contrasting image emerges from Ansell and Weber's identification of actors possessing the capacity to straddle or 'span' boundaries.³⁸ The role and importance of these 'boundary-spanners' resides in the changing character and significance of boundaries themselves, underpinned by their increasing porosity. However, unlike much globalisation and regionalisation argumentation which suggests that this porosity has rendered boundaries insignificant,³⁹ Ansell and Weber draw a different conclusion. Adopting an 'open systems' perspective on sovereignty derived from organisation theory, they suggest that boundaries are fluid and contingent, 'simultaneously continuous with and demarcated from', as opposed to being strictly defined by, their environments.⁴⁰ Rather than fixed and permanent, boundaries reconstitute themselves in response to shifting patterns of interactions. Far from being irrelevant, therefore, they become sites of intense activity as they are

Table 1.1 Images of diplomatic systems

	<i>Gatekeeper image</i>	<i>Boundary-spanner image</i>
Setting	State-dominated environment according high salience to territorial boundaries. Assumed priority of 'high politics', special qualities of foreign policy and clear identification of national interest.	Complex mixed actor system comprising permeable boundaries and multilayered policy arenas. Boundaries as areas of intense activity. Emphasis on complex, interactive agendas with relatively little issue hierarchy; national interest often hard to identify and/or articulate.
Role	To control domestic–international transactions.	To achieve access and presence; to mediate across porous policy arena boundaries. Facilitative role in management of issue-directed coalitions.
Objectives	Emphasis on exclusive management of external environment. Maintaining key role in determining national responses on major areas of international policy.	Emphasis on shared, cooperative management strategies with public and private sector actors. Assert foreign policy 'voice' in diffused international policy management processes.
Strategy	Asserting status inscribed in the 'specialness' of foreign policy. Bureaucratic bargaining in response to domestic bureaucratic challenges. Seeking coordinating role defined in hierarchical terms.	Adapting to complexity produced by domestic–international interface. Developing 'cooperative' relationships with public and private agencies through policy networks. 'Coordination' defined as facilitating information flows and sharing 'lead' department status on international issues.

enacted and re-enacted. In such an environment, actors – boundary-spanners – capable of assuming the role of mediators or brokers assume a special significance: 'They aim at modulating, regulating, and sometimes controlling what kinds of resources, signals, information and ideas pass in and pass out of the semipermeable membranes that are the boundaries of the organization.'⁴¹ In doing so they operate both outside and within the organisation, assuming a diversity of forms in both the governmental and non-governmental arenas. Lobbyists, management consultants, think-tanks, epistemic communities: each may discharge such mediating functions.

This perspective provides an alternative – and, in many policy contexts, more relevant – set of criteria for understanding the role of the foreign ministry in a variety of contexts, including dense diplomatic milieus such as the EU. The continuing need to reconstitute sovereignty, combined with a recognition of the advantages conferred by juxtaposing the qualities inherent in sovereignty-endowed and sovereign-free actors, places a premium on structures able to adapt to environments marked by high levels of uncertainty and ambiguity. As Henrikson argues, it is the very qualities implicit in what he terms the *associative* nature of diplomacy and diplomatic systems that enable them to perform valuable functions in world politics.⁴² In this sense, the pattern of relationships between national diplomatic systems has created what he terms one of the ‘constitutive orders’ underpinning the international system, or a public good conferring such benefits as the promotion of international law and precision in international discourse.⁴³

At the same time, as we have seen, changes in the global environment demand that these manifestations of ‘closedness’ (Henrikson underpins his discussion with the imagery of the medieval guild) be balanced with those of openness. If the guild is to respond to the demands of an interdependent or globalising world, then it needs to do what it has done in the past, namely develop strategies for managing change. This it can do, in part, by providing a channel between domestic and international environments in the processes of regime construction, enhancing the transparency of international institutions and, thereby, their legitimacy in the public eye, and assembling and coordinating a range of interests in combating global problems.⁴⁴ Perhaps most significantly, in a world which is marked by significant levels of cultural conflict, diplomats, through their generic mediative skills are well placed to ‘weave’ understanding out of the conflicts over value and institutions that divide communities.⁴⁵

Rosenau takes this theme further when suggesting that we are witnessing the emergence of a world constituted by intermingling ‘spheres of authority’ (SOAs) in which people may develop affiliations to a variety of entities alongside the state, none of which can lay claim to be the focus of ultimate loyalty: ‘people will learn to balance diverse and even conflicting commitments in the absence of a terminal state’.⁴⁶ As they do so, Rosenau sees a crucial role for diplomats who, using their experience and skills, should be well-placed to assist in the creation and legitimisation of new patterns of social contract between individuals and a plethora of SOAs. To repeat the earlier point, what appears to be common to these varying perspectives is the capacity of the national diplomatic system to draw on a combination of generalist and specialist skills and to apply these in boundary-spanning roles.

In Table 1.1, we can begin to see some of the dimensions of this alternative viewpoint and their implications for understanding the continuing role of the national diplomatic system. Whereas the gatekeeper image rests on the assumption that its key objectives lie in controlling national boundaries

and insulating the state from its environments, the boundary-spanner image defines this in terms of mediating within and across spaces represented by the points of interface between the state and its environments. In other words, the logic of boundary control is replaced by a logic determined by an awareness of the limits of control combined with the needs of access to, and presence in, these environments. This, combined with enhanced permeability between domestic and international policy, strengthens the claims of other bureaucratic actors to a voice in international policy and weakens the identity of 'foreign' policy as a category in its own right endowed with distinct qualities which, in turn, demand the maintenance of special policy processes. Bureaucratic bargaining rather than the hierarchical model of coordination which, as suggested earlier, is no stranger to the management of the international environment, consequently becomes far more prominent. Coordination, as is clearly demonstrated by the ensuing examination of its significance in the case of the EU, becomes a matter of facilitating information flows and sharing 'lead' department status on international issues. Equally, as EU-focused lobbying adopts multiple routes of influence, some within and others outside national channels, the coordination of national policy becomes at once more critical yet more elusive.⁴⁷

This is hardly surprising given the fact that coordination is an evanescent concept assigned differing emphases by analysts who, it has been argued, tend to be more concerned with its practical manifestations than the concept itself.⁴⁸ At the most general level, coordination 'implies that in working together the component parts of a system do not impede, frustrate or negate each others' activities. Coordination enables the whole to perform better than the sum of the parts or at least to prevent disintegration and fragmentation.'⁴⁹ But beyond this basic definition lie a variety of differing experiences and strategies, clearly apparent from the country studies in this book. At the ends of the spectrum are to be found modes of positive and negative coordination.⁵⁰ The former involves the development – or imposition – of a single position on a given issue, an approach likely to bring to the surface bureaucratic and political tensions and conflict. The negative end of the spectrum suggests a much more minimalist definition. This might, as indicated below, simply involve the dissemination of information – admittedly no mean task in a policy environment as complex as the EU. It might also involve coordination by persuasion, achieved as Karvonen and Sundelius suggest, by the dominance of a 'big idea' relating to the place of a state in the international system which creates a set of norms governing the behaviour of national actors.⁵¹ In the context of the EU, an important 'big idea' relates to perspectives on the nature of the Union itself and the place of a member state within it. Where this is seen in foreign rather than 'extended domestic' terms, then not only does this have implications for the nature of coordination, but also those departments deemed to be the key element in the coordination processes.⁵²

Thus, from the perspective of the foreign ministry, coordination has become a central issue in two senses. Firstly, it constitutes a dominating feature of the policy environment in which it operates and presents challenges to which it is forced to adapt. It should be noted, of course, that even in the context of member states, the EU constitutes one part, albeit a highly significant and distinct one, of the challenges presented by increasingly internationalised policy processes. Secondly, the dynamics of coordination and the modes of achieving it offer the possibility of developing strategies for adaptation on the part of foreign ministries – as with other bureaucratic actors.

Conclusion

Several points regarding the nature and role of foreign ministries in complex policy milieus have emerged from this discussion. Amongst the more general, but central to an understanding of the issues with which this book is concerned, is the importance of relating the foreign ministry (and the national diplomatic system of which it is a part) to its context. I have argued that there has been a notable tendency to generalise about foreign ministries as actors, to assume that they are locked into a cycle of irreversible decline and that they represent forces of conservatism. A specific manifestation – in the EU context – of such arguments is to be found in the proposition that national administrative systems are treading the path of ‘convergence’ in response to the dictates of Europeanisation. Such views reflect stereotypical thinking, fail to appreciate the distinctive features in the development of national foreign policy systems, and undervalue the innovative and adaptive capacity that such systems are capable of displaying. This is as true of EU member state foreign ministries as it is elsewhere. But the European context adds to the equation the unique demands of responding to enhanced integration. Here, the problems are underscored by the need to adapt to a situation in which the demarcation lines between what is not yet a ‘European domestic policy’ but is neither ‘foreign’ policy, are increasingly blurred. At the centre of this puzzle lies the core issue of policy coordination – a complex one in which policy actors play differing roles depending on the nature of the issues involved as well as the political and bureaucratic cultures in which they are located. This provides the setting within which the foreign ministry is constrained to operate. It is the nature of this setting, and the responses of foreign ministries to it which forms the substance of the following chapters.

Notes

1. G. Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice* (London: Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1995) ch. 2; A. James, ‘Diplomacy and international society’, *International Relations*, 6(6), 1980.

2. D. Rometsch and W. Wessels, 'European Union and national institutions', in D. Rometsch and W. Wessels (eds), *The European Union and Member States: Towards Institutional Fusion?* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996) pp. 330–1.
3. C. Hill and W. Wallace, 'Introduction: Actors and Actions', in C. Hill (ed.), *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy* (London: Routledge, 1996) p. 5.
4. Op. cit., p. 6.
5. S. Duke, 'Diplomacy without a corps: training for external representation', *DSP Discussion Papers*, No. 76 (Leicester: Centre for the Study of Diplomacy, 2001).
6. See Z. Steiner, *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World* (London: Times Books, 1982); B. Hocking (ed.), *Foreign Ministries: change and adaptation* (London: Macmillan – now Palgrave Macmillan, 1999).
7. For discussions on the diplomatic studies literature, see: L. Reychler, *Patterns of Diplomatic Thinking: a Cross-national Study of Structural and Social-Psychological Determinants* (New York: Praeger, 1979); P. Sharp, 'For diplomacy: representation and the study of international relations', *International Studies Review*, 1(1), 1999; S. Sofer, 'Old and new diplomacy: a debate revisited', *Review of International Studies*, 14(3), 1988; C. Jönsson, 'Bargaining, negotiation and diplomacy: a research overview', *DSP Discussion Papers*, No. 63 (Leicester: Centre for the Study of Diplomacy, 2000); K. E. Jørgensen, 'Modern European diplomacy: a research agenda', *DSP Discussion Papers*, No. 31 (Leicester: Centre for the Study of Diplomacy, 1997); B. Hocking, 'Catalytic diplomacy: beyond "newness" and "decline"', in J. Melissen (ed.), *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice* (Basingstoke: Macmillan – now Palgrave Macmillan, 1999).
8. For a discussion of this in the context of multilateral diplomacy, see: R. O'Brien et al., *Contesting global governance: multilateral economic institutions and global social movements* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). On the relationship between diplomats and NGOs, see: A. F. Cooper and B. Hocking, 'Governments, non-governmental organizations and the re-calibration of diplomacy', *Global Society*, 14(3), 2000.
9. P. B. Evans, H. K. Jacobson and R. D. Putnam (eds), *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics* (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1993).
10. M. Aspinall and G. Schneider, 'Same menu, separate tables: the institutionalist turn in political science and the study of European integration', *European Journal of Political Research*, 38(1), 2000.
11. K. Hanf and B. Soetendorp (eds), *Adapting to European Integration: small states and the European Union* (London: Longman, 1998) p. 2.
12. S. Bulmer, 'Domestic politics and European Community policy making', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 21(4), 1983.
13. J. Richardson, Preface in Y. Mény, P. Muller and J.-L. Quermonne, *Adjusting to Europe: the Impact of the European Union on National Institutions and Policies* (London: Routledge, 1996).
14. R. Ladrech, 'Europeanisation of domestic politics and institutions: the case of France', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 32(1), 1994.
15. S. Bulmer and M. Burch, 'Organizing for Europe: Whitehall, the British State and the European Union', *Public Administration*, 76, Winter 1998, pp. 601–28.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 624.
17. Hanf and Soetendorp, p. 7. Their reference is to E. Haas, *When Knowledge is Power* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).
18. I. Manners and R. G. Whitman, *The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000) p. 261.

19. L. Karvonen and B. Sundelius, 'Interdependence and foreign policy management in Sweden and Finland', *International Studies Quarterly*, 34(2), 1990.
20. See B. Hocking, 'Foreign Ministries: redefining the gatekeeper role', in Hocking, *Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation*, pp. 2–5.
21. G. Wiseman, "'Polylateralism" and new modes of global dialogue', *DSP Discussion Papers*, No. 59 (Leicester: Centre for the Study of Diplomacy, 1999) p. 15.
22. H. Kramer and F. Quendler, 'The role of diplomacy and foreign ministries in the "new political architecture" of Europe after 1989 – the case of Austria', Second Pan-European Conference on International Relations, Paris 13–16 September 1995, p. 5.
23. *Ibid.*
24. See Hanf and Soetendorp on this point: pp. 9–10.
25. See, for example, C. Jönsson *et al.*, 'Negotiations in networks in the European Union', *International Negotiation*, 3(3), 1998, pp. 319–44; F. R. Pfetsch, 'Negotiating the European Union: a negotiation-network approach', *International Negotiation*, 3(3), 1998, pp. 293–317.
26. W. Coleman and A. Perl, 'Internationalized policy environments and policy network analysis', *Political Studies*, 47(4), 1999, pp. 701–7.
27. S. Keukeleire, 'The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor', *DSP Discussion Papers*, No. 71 (Leicester: Centre for the Study of Diplomacy, 2000) p. 25.
28. B. Kohler-Koch, 'Network governance within and beyond an enlarging EU'; paper presented at the International Political Science Association conference, Quebec City, August 2000.
29. See Jørgensen, 'Modern European Diplomacy', *op. cit.*, in which he cites P. Allott, 'The European Community is not the real European Community', *Yale Law Journal*, 24(2), 1990.
30. A. Blair, 'Permanent Representations to the European Union', *DSP Discussion Papers*, No. 68 (Leicester: Centre for the Study of Diplomacy, 2000); J. Lewis, 'Diplomacy in Europe's polity: socialization and the EU Permanent Representatives'; paper presented at the International Studies Convention, Chicago, February 2001. For a practitioner's view, see D. Bostock, 'Coreper Revisited', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40(2), June 2002.
31. M. Bruter, 'Diplomacy without a state: the external delegations of the European Commission', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 6(2), 1999; T. Bale, 'The expectations–capability gap? Studying EU diplomatic co-operation in third countries'; paper presented to the ECSA sixth biennial international conference; Pittsburgh, June 1999.
32. Keukeleire; *op. cit.*, p. 10.
33. See, for example, B. Hocking and M. Smith, *Beyond Foreign Economic Policy: the United States, the Single European Market and the Changing World Economy* (London: Pinter, 1997).
34. Hanf and Soetendorp, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
35. B. G. Peters, 'Managing horizontal government: the politics of coordination', *Public Administration*, 76(2), 1998, p. 306.
36. I have developed this point in B. Hocking, 'Foreign ministries: the myth of the gatekeeper', paper presented at the 38th International Studies Association Convention, Toronto, March 1997.
37. Peters, 'Managing horizontal government', *op. cit.*, p. 298.
38. C. K. Ansell and S. Weber, 'Organizing international politics: sovereignty and open systems', *International Political Science Review*, 20(1), 1999, pp. 73–93.

39. Scholte, for example, regards *transboundary* activity as the defining quality of globalisation. See: J. A. Scholte, 'Global capitalism and the state', *International Affairs*, 73(2), 1997, p. 431.
40. Ansell and Weber, *ibid.*, p. 77.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 82.
42. A. K. Henrikson, 'Diplomacy for the 21st century: "re-crafting the old guild"', Wilton Park Occasional Paper 1, 1997.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
44. *Ibid.*, pp. 20–30.
45. *Ibid.*, pp. 22–4.
46. J. N. Rosenau, 'States, sovereignty and diplomacy in the information age', *Virtual Diplomacy Series No. 5* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, February 2000) pp. 12–13.
47. M. P. C. M. Van Schendelen (ed.), *National Public and Private EC Lobbying* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993) p. 277.
48. Karvonen and Sundelius, p. 82. Amongst the literature on coordination see L. Metcalfe, 'International policy coordination and public management reform' International Institute of Administrative Sciences, Second International Conference, Toluca, 27–30 July 1993; D. Spence, 'The coordination of European policy by member states', in M. Westlake (ed.), *The Council of the European Union* (Cartermill, 1995) pp. 353–72; H. Kassim, B. Guy Peters and V. Wright, *The National Co-ordination of EU Policy: the Domestic Level* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
49. Metcalfe, p. 7.
50. Kassim, Peters and Wright, p. 14.
51. The example that Karvonen and Sundelius give is of the doctrine of neutrality in the case of Sweden and Finland in the 1980s. Not only did this serve as a significant instrument of coordination but also helped to underpin the position of the foreign ministries in a rapidly changing domestic and international environment. See Karvonen and Sundelius, ch. 4.
52. Kassim, Peters and Wright, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

Index

- acquis communautaire*, 28, 182
adaptation, 5, 6, 274
adaptation strategies, 285
Aland Question, 96
Amsterdam Treaty, 19, 122
Ansell, C. K., 10
arbitration, 24–5
Aspinall, M., 4
Austria, 37–59, 277
 admission to EU, 37
 and CESDP, 47
 and CFSP, 47, 52
 and COREU, 2, 47
 Council for Questions of Austrian
 Integration Policy, 42
 diplomatic and consular
 representations abroad, 50–2
 EC development cooperation, 49
 Economic Chamber Austria, 42
 electronic documentation and
 information system (ELAK), 45
 Federal Ministries Act (1986), 41
 Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
 37, 275: expenditure on, 53;
 impact of EU membership, 46–9;
 legal and consular affairs, 48;
 organisational structure, 44–6;
 reform, 40–1; staffing, 45
 foreign cultural policy, 49, 56*n*28
 foreign policy, 38–9: legal framework,
 41–2
 historical background, 37–9
 international cultural affairs, 48
 international cultural exchanges,
 48–9
 Länder, 47, 51
 missions abroad, 53
 National Bank, 47, 51
 neutral status, 37, 39
 Permanent Representation to the
 EU, 51
 referendum on EU membership, 44
 relations with EU, legal features, 42–4
Aznar, José Maria, 216, 217
Barcelona process, 22
Belgium, 60–74
 basic statistics, 72–3
 bilateral diplomacy, 280
 and CFSP, 69–70
 diplomatic posts, 62
 export promotion, 62
 federalism, 63
 federal structure, 64–5
 foreign policy, 64–5
 foreign trade, 64
Inter-ministerial Economic
 Commission (IEC), 62
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA),
 60–1: and European integration,
 61–3; internal organisation, 65–9;
 reform, 70–71
NGOs, 66
Permanent Representation, 68, 69
state reforms, 63
Berrill, Kenneth, 257
Berrill Report, 252
bilateral departments, 22
bilateral diplomacy, 7, 204, 279, 280
bilateralism, and the EU, 279–80
Bildt, Carl, 239
Bjerregaard, R., 82
Blair, Tony, 260–1
boundaries, 10–11
‘boundary-spanner’ image, 4, 9–14,
 284–5
Bretton Woods, 147
British Trade International, 268
Brusselsisation, 27
Bulmer, S., 4, 5
Burch, M., 5
bureaucratic culture, 275
Carlsson, Ingvar, 239
‘central agency’ role, 9, 10
CESDP *see* Common European Security
 and Defence Policy
CFSP *see* Common Foreign and Security
 Policy

- Christensen, J. P., 82, 83
 civil society, representatives, 7
 Coleman, W., 7
 commerce, 6
 Committee for Civil Aspects of Crisis Management, 31
 Committee on Civil Law Matters, 20
 Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), 8, 20, 21, 23, 29, 30, 120, 181, 230
 Committee of State Secretaries, Germany, 136–7
 Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP), 47, 267
 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 2, 4, 7, 8, 26, 33, 69, 85, 87, 105, 117, 205
 and Austria, 47, 52
 and Belgium, 69–70
 Committee on Administrative Affairs (COADM), 8
 contours of system, 30–2
 and Denmark, 278
 and foreign policy, 278–9
 and France, 119–21
 and Germany, 136, 137, 138, 140, 141
 growth, 25–30
 impact on Irish diplomatic network, 157–8
 influence on Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 203–4
 and the Netherlands, 187
 and Portuguese embassies, 204–5
 and Portuguese foreign policy, 202–3
 and Spain, 222, 230, 231
 and Sweden, 243, 245–6
 and the United Kingdom, 267
 Commonwealth of Independent States, 202
 communications and information technology (CIT), 279
 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 77
 conservatism, 6
 consulates, 50
 context of foreign ministries, 14
 convergence, 6
 Cook, Robin, 260–1, 266, 268
 coordination, 13–14, 19, 280–2
 and foreign ministries, 21–2
 as a strategy, 282–4
 COREPER *see* Committee of Permanent Representatives
 COREU *see* European Correspondents Cipher Network
 Council of Europe, 31, 77
 Council Meetings, 21
 Council of Ministers, 20
 Portuguese Presidency, 202
 Council of Ministers for European Union Affairs (CMEUA), Portugal, 199
 Danish Institute of International Affairs (DUPI), 87–8
 Davignon Committee, 69
 Delegations, 8
 Delors, Jacques, 253
 Denmark, 75–94
 and CFSP, 278
 coordination of EU policies, 86–7
 Danida, 76, 78, 84, 87
 domestic and foreign policy, 77
 embassies, 85–6
 EU membership, 79–82
 Folketing, 82, 83
 information technology, 88
 and multilateral institutions, 76–7
 overseas missions, 90
 Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 75, 274: budget reductions, 84–5; domestic constituencies, 87–8; expenditure on, 89; organisation and agendas, 76–7; organisational reform, 77–9, 83–4; and the Prime Minister's Department, 81–2; reform debate, 82–3
 and the Single European Market, 79–80
 and the Third World, 77
 DGIA (Directorate General IA) (European Union), 87
 diplomatic integration, 3, 32–3
 'diplomatic sites', 7
 diplomatic socialisation, 8
 diplomatic style, convergence, 8
 domestic interests, 6
 domestic ministries, and international policy, 278

- domestic policy, 18
 role of foreign ministry, 18–21
 Duncan Report, 252
 Durão Barroso, J. M., 196
- EFTA *see* European Free Trade Association
- embassies, 50, 52, 140
 Denmark, 85–6
 Ireland, 152, 158
 Portugal, 204–5
 role, 279–80
- EMU *see* European Monetary Union
- EPC *see* European Political Cooperation
- Ersbøll, N., 82
- ESDP *see* European Security and Defence Policy
- EU *see* European Union
- European Community for Coal and Steel, 180
- European Community pillar, and Spain, 227–30
- European coordinating divisions, 19
- European Correspondents Cipher Network (COREU), 30, 52, 69, 70, 88, 203, 204
 and Austria, 2, 47
- European Council, 23, 65, 81, 182
- European Economic Area (EEA), 97, 239, 240
- European Free Trade Association (EFTA)
 Association Agreement with Finland, 104
 and Finland, 96
- European integration, 2
 and the Netherlands, 179–83
 and Portugal, 199–200, 204
 response of foreign ministries, 2, 3
- Europeanisation, 273, 277–8
 impact at national level, 4
 impact on Ireland, 156–7
- European legislation, 19
- European Monetary Union (EMU), 163, 206, 215
 and Italy, 171
- European policy environment, and foreign ministries, 7–9
- European Political Cooperation (EPC), 2, 26, 69, 136, 140, 155, 158, 201–2, 205
 and France, 119
 influence on Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 203–4
 and Portuguese embassies, 204–5
 and Portuguese foreign policy, 202–3
- European Recovery Programme (ERP), 146
- European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), 4, 26, 31, 33
- European Union Council, 199
- European Union Departments, functions, 21
- European Union (EU), 1–2
 and bilateralism, 279–80
 external presence, 2
 and foreign ministries, 277–80
 foreign policy, 26
 and Germany, 136–7
 policy making and negotiation, 18–19
 policy processes as ‘nested games’, 4
 relations with Austria, 42–4
 and Spain, 227–31
- evaluating foreign ministries, 4–6
- expertise, 283
- external relations, 18
- Fatcett, D., 265
- Financial Times*, 23, 25
- Finland, 95–110
 Association Agreement with EFTA, 104
 coordination of EU affairs, 106–7
 diplomatic representation; inter-war period, 98–9; post-war period, 99–100
 diplomatic service presence, 199
 and EFTA, 96
 EU membership, 97–8, 102, 104
 EU secretariat, 105–6
 Foreign Ministry: organisational reform, 99; professionalism, 100–1; reform of 1998, 101–4; resource framework, 107; structural reforms, 100
 foreign policy, 96–7, 100, 105
 foreign policy management, 5–6
 foreign representation, 95–6

- Finland – *continued*
 and Germany, 97
 historical background, 95–8
 independence, 95, 98
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
 expenditure on, 107
 neutrality, 97
 Paris Peace Treaty (1947), 97
 and the Soviet Union, 96, 99
 treaty with the Soviet Union (1948), 97
- Fischer, P., 85
- foreign–domestic divide, 276
- foreign ministries
 categorising, 274–7
 and coordination, 21–2, 280–4
 and the EU, 277–80
 and the European policy
 environment, 7–9
 evaluating, 4–6
 response to European integration, 2, 3
 role, 1, 2, 3
 role in domestic policy, 18–21
- foreign policy, 10
 Austria, 38–9, 41–2
 Belgium, 64–5
 EU, 26
 Finland, 96–7, 100, 105
 France, 111–14, 121–3
 Germany, 132–3, 134, 135–6, 140, 141
 Ireland, 165–6, 170
 Italy, 165–6, 170
 Netherlands, 177, 186
 Portugal, 191, 193–4, 198–9, 202–3,
 295
 Spain, 212–17, 223, 226, 232
 United Kingdom, 255, 258, 262, 265,
 266
- foreign policy management, 3
 Sweden and Finland, 5–6
- France, 111–31, 282, 283
 bureaucratic culture, 275
 democratisation, 121–2
 and EPC, 119
 and the EU, 115–17
 European policy, 115–17
 External Economic Relations Division
 (DREE), 122
 Faroux plan, 121
 Foreign Ministry (Quai d’Orsay),
 111–14, 115–16, 274, 275, 276:
 and CFSP, 119–21; and the EU,
 117–19; expenditure, 125; and
 foreign policy, 121–2; reform,
 113, 114; strategies and
 responses, 117–19; structure, 124
 foreign policy, 111–14, 121–3
 Racone Report (1969), 13
 SCE (Service de Coopération
 Economique), 117
 SGCI (General Secretariat of the Inter-
 ministerial Committee for
 European Economic Questions),
 116, 117, 118, 119
 Védrine reform, 120–1
- G-7, 169
- ‘gatekeeper image’, 4, 9–14, 19, 21, 25,
 262, 284
- General Affairs Councils, 23, 29, 31
- Germany, 132–46
 bureaucratic culture, 275
 and CFSP, 136, 137, 138, 140, 141
 Chancellery, 139
 coalition agreement, 134
 Committee of State Secretaries,
 136–7
 diplomatic missions, 142
 and the EU, 136–7
 Federal Chancellor’s office, 25
 Foreign Ministry (Auswärtiges Amt),
 132, 133, 276: adaptation and
 reform, 134–6; and the EU,
 136–7, 138–9; number of
 personnel, 141–2; organisation
 and agendas, 133–4; personnel
 cuts, 135; reform, 136; strategies
 and responses, 137–41
 foreign policy, 132–3, 134, 141:
 multilateralism, 140; ‘output’,
 135–6
 Foreign Service Act (1990), 141–2
 foreign service cooperation, 140
 information technology, 135, 140
 Ministry of Economic Affairs, 24, 133
 representation in EU institutions, 141
 unification, 132
- globalisation, 12
- González, Felipe, 216, 217
- governmental involvement, 7
- Gulf War
 Second Gulf War, 122
 and Spain, 216

- Hain, Peter, 255, 268
 Hanf, K., 4, 5, 9
 Heisbourg Report, 126*n*18
 Helsinki Final Act (1975), 100
 Henderson, N., 257
 Henrikson, A. K., 12
 High Representative, 27
 role, 29
 Hill, C., 2
 historical institutionalist approach, 5
- Ibero-American Summit, 196
 IDA Ireland, 150
 information, sharing, 85–6
 information flows, 13, 19
 information technology
 Denmark, 88
 Germany, 135, 140
 United Kingdom, 263
 innovation, 6
 integration of diplomats, 3, 32–3
 intergovernmentalism, 26–7
 international environment, 275–6
 internationalisation, 273
 international policy, and domestic
 ministries, 278
 Ireland, 146–62, 282
 basic statistics, 159
 coordination of international
 interests, 150–1
 Dáil, 149
 Department of External Affairs:
 departmental status, 147;
 diplomatic service, 150;
 establishment, 146; organisation
 and agenda, 148–52; reform and
 adaptation, 151–2; reorganisation,
 147; role in Europe, 148; structure
 and organisation, 149–50
 Department of Finance, 154
 Department of Foreign Affairs, 154–5,
 275: European issues, 153–4, 159;
 reform and adaptation, 155–6;
 strategies and responses, 156
 Department of Justice, 154, 155
 Department of the Taoiseach, 153,
 154
 diplomatic impact of CFSP, 157
 EC membership, 148, 149, 153
 embassies, 152, 158
 Europeanisation, 156–7
 foreign policy, 149: European
 dimension, 153
 interdepartmental committees, 154
 ‘Ireland House’ concept, 152, 158
 Irish Tourism Board, 152
 Joint Oireachtas Committee on
 European Affairs, 151, 156
 Minister for Foreign Affairs, 149,
 153
 Northern Ireland conflict, 149
 overseas missions, 155
 Permanent Representation (PermRep)
 in Brussels, 154–5
 policy coordination, 152
 Strategic Management Initiative
 (SMI), 152
 structural impact of CFSP on the
 diplomatic network, 157–8
 Technical councils, 154
 and the UN, 147
 White Paper on foreign policy, 151,
 156, 158
- Italy, 163–76, 276, 283
 Communist Party (PCI), 166
 corruption, 164
 Development Assistance Programme,
 169–70
 and EMU, 171
 foreign policy, 165–6, 170
 foreign trade, 171
 Fornari report, 167–8
 Ministry of Defence, 163
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA),
 166–7: adaptation, 169–70;
 Division of Commercial Affairs,
 164; Division on European
 Integration, 173–4; personnel,
 171–2; reform, 163, 165, 167,
 168; reform structure, 173;
 restructuring, 172; structure
 1887–1967, 164–5
 Presidential Decree (1967), 163, 165,
 167
 public administration reform, 172
- Jönsson, C., 7
 Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), 19
 and Spain, 230, 231
- K4 committee, 231
 Karvonen, L., 5, 13

- Keukeleire, S., 7, 8
 Kohler-Koch, B., 7
 Kramer, H., 6
- Ladrech, R., 4
 Laeken European Council (December 2001), 28
 Laffan, B., 273
 lead ministries, 18, 19–21
 League of Nations, 76, 96, 99
 linkage, 283
 Løj, M., 87
 Lubbers, Ruud, 187
 Luxembourg Jumbo Meeting, 97
- Maastricht Treaty, 8, 34*n*1, 49, 67, 98, 104, 105, 116, 137–8, 139, 140, 154, 202
 pillars, 278
 Mandelson, Peter, 255, 259, 261
 Manners, I., 5
 Marshall Aid, 180
 Military committee, 31
 Minister or Secretary of State for European Affairs, 24
 missions abroad
 Austria, 53
 Denmark, 90
 Germany, 142
 mobility, 6
 Møller, O., 88
 multilateral diplomacy, 204, 279
- national diplomatic representation systems, 5
 national diplomatic systems, 285
 national institutions, 285
 NATO *see* North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
 Netherlands, 177–91
 bureaucratic culture, 275
 and CFSP, 187
 CoCo Han (High level officials), 186
 Coordinating Committee for European Cooperation (CoCo), 180, 181, 182
 decision making process, 183, 186, 187
 EU policy making, 183, 185
 foreign economic relations, 180
 foreign policy, 177, 186
 long term coordination, 186
 Minister for Development Cooperation, 178
 Ministry of Economic Affairs, 179, 181
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 274:
 Council for European Affairs (REZ), 180; Department for European Integration (DIE), 180, 181, 185; Directorate-General for European Affairs, 180; Directorates-General, 178, 185; and European integration, 179–83; history, 177–9; personnel, 187–8; reorganisation, 184–6
 Permanent Representation, 182–3
 Prime Minister's role, 182, 183
 Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR), 184
 White Papers (1995), 184, 185
 networks, 7
 NGOs *see* Non-Governmental Organisations
 Nogueira, Franco, 195
 Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), 7, 281–2
 Belgium, 66
 Spain, 213–14
 Nordic cooperation, 77
 North Atlantic Treaty, 166
 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), 39, 89, 166, 180, 212, 214, 216, 218
- OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development), 75
 OEEC (Organisation for European Economic Cooperation), 75, 180
 Ordóñez, F. E., 217
 OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe), 31, 196
- Paris Peace Treaty (1947), 97
 Patten, Chris, ix, 30
 peacemaking operations, 43
 Perl, A., 7

Permanent Representation

- Austria, 51
- Belgium, 68, 69
- Ireland, 154–5
- Netherlands, 182–3
- Portugal, 200–1
- Spain, 227
- United Kingdom, 259, 260

Permanent Representations to the European Union, 18, 22–4

- role, 23
- staffing, 23

persuasion, 284

Petersberg tasks, 31, 43

Peters, B. G., 9

Plowden Report, 252

Policy Unit, 27, 31

Political and Security Committee (PSC), 27, 30–1

Portugal, 191–212, 279

- Agency for Development Assistance, 198
- and CFSP, 201–5
- Council of Ministers for Development Questions, 207
- Council of Ministers for European Union Affairs (CMEUA), 199
- democracy, 193
- EC membership, 193, 194, 195
- embassies, 204–5
- Emigration Institute, 195
- European Correspondent Service, 203–4
- and European integration, 199–200, 204
- European Integration Commission (EIC), 194
- foreign policy, 191, 193–4, 195, 198–9, 202: and CFSP, 202–3: and ECP, 202–3
- General-Directorate for Cooperation, 195
- General-Directorate of Political and Economic Affairs, 195
- ICEP (Investment and Foreign Trade of Portugal), 206
- Institute for Economic Cooperation, 195
- Institute for Portuguese Cooperation, 197

Integrated Cooperation Budget, 207

Interministerial Commission for

- Community Affairs (ICCA), 201
- Minister for Foreign Affairs, 199, 200
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs: budget, 207–8; European dimension of role, 198–201; evolution of political role, 191–4; and foreign relations, 205–7; General-Directorate of Bilateral Relations, 196; General-Directorate of Community Affairs (GDCA), 196, 200; General-Directorate of Consular Affairs and Portuguese Communities, 197; General-Director of Foreign Policy, 197–8; influence of CFSP, 203–4; influence of EPC, 203–4; international representation, 208; personnel, 208; personnel policy, 200; reform, 194–8; structure, 196

National Plan for Development Cooperation, 206–7

Permanent Representative in Brussels (REPER), 200–1

- policy-making procedures, 197
- Presidency of Council of Ministers, 202

Prime Minister's role, 199, 200

Secret Services, 206

Powell, Charles, 252

prime ministers' offices, 18, 24

Quendler, F., 6

Racine Report (1969), 13

Rapid Reaction Force, 28

representation, 283

Richardson, J., 4

Rio Conference 1992, 200

Roland Berger and Partners, 135

Rosenau, J. N., 12

Rosenberg, R. L., 221

St Malo initiative, 33

Schengen Agreement, 205, 206, 231

Schneider, G., 4

Second Gulf War, 122

security policy, 34

- Single European Market, and Denmark, 79–80
- Smith, M. J., 259
- Soetendorp, B., 4, 5, 9
- Solana, Javier, 27
- Sotelo, Calvo, 216
- sovereignty, 12
- Soviet Union, and Finland, 96
- Spain, 212–38, 276
 - Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional (AECI), 220, 221
 - Autonomous Communities (ACs), 212–13
 - central government and foreign policy networks, 214–17
 - Cervantes Institute, 221–2, 225 and CFSP, 222, 230, 231
 - Council of Ministers, 230
 - cultural promotion, 221
 - development aid, 225
 - and the EU, 227–31
 - and the European Community pillar, 227–30
 - foreign policy, 212–17, 223, 226, 232
 - and the Gulf War, 216
 - Institute for Cooperation with Iberoamerica (ICI), 221
 - Institute for Cooperation with Mediterranean, Arab and Developing Countries, 221
 - intergovernmental pillars, coordination, 230–1
 - Interministerial Committee for International Cooperation, 221
 - interministerial committees, 228–30 and JHA, 230, 231
 - Ministry for Agriculture and Fisheries, 214
 - Ministry of Defence, 214–15
 - Ministry for Economic Affairs, 215
 - Ministry for Education and Culture, 215
 - Ministry for Finance (Treasury), 215
 - Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 212, 217–22, 275: budgetary and human resources, 223–7; Diplomatic School, 219; Directorate-Generals, 219, 223; representations abroad, 225; role, 232–3; structure and functions, 217–19; *Subsecretaría*, 219
 - Ministry for Home Affairs, 215
 - Ministry for Industry, 214
 - Ministry for Public Administration, 213
 - National Authority for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 219
 - nationalist parties, 213
 - NGOs, 213–14, 221
 - Office of Diplomatic Information, 219
 - Permanent Representation in Brussels, 213, 215, 227
 - Private Office, 216, 219
 - Secretariats of State for Foreign Affairs, 222–3
 - Secretariat of State for European Affairs, 222–3, 227–8
 - Secretariat of State for International Cooperation and Iberoamerica (SECIPI), 219–22
 - Trade Department, 214
 - Treasury, 225
- Spanish Civil War, 192
- spheres of authority (SOAs), 12
- Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum, 20
- Stuttgart Solemn Declaration on European Union, 138
- Sundelius, B., 5, 13
- Sweden, 238–49
 - Advisory Committee for European Union Affairs, 243
 - central coordination, 241
 - and CFSP, 243, 245–6
 - Coordination Group for EU-relations, 242
 - decision-making, 244
 - and European integration, 238, 239
 - Foreign Ministry, 238–40: adaptation to EU membership, 240–46; EU coordinator, 245; reorganisation, 241–2, 243; role, 246–8
 - foreign policy management, 5–6
 - neutrality, 238, 239, 246–7
- Thatcher, Margaret, 252, 253
- three-pillar system, 34*n*1
- Tindemans Report, 138
- Tordesilhas Treaty, 202
- Treaty of Nice, 27, 28, 267
- Treaty of Rome, 61, 62
- Treaty of Warsaw, 96
- 'two level games', 3

- uncertainty, 273
- United Kingdom, 250–73, 276, 282
 - administration of aid, 250
 - bureaucratic culture, 275
 - Cabinet Office, 256, 259
 - Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS)
 - Report, 255, 257–8
 - and CESDP, 267
 - and CFSP, 267
 - Department for International
 - Development, 251
 - devolution policies, 260
 - Diplomatic Service, 253
 - Duncan Report, 257
 - and EU membership, 5
 - Foreign Affairs Unit, 253
 - Foreign and Commonwealth Office
 - (FCO), 274: budget, 253–4;
 - European dimension, 258–61;
 - Fundamental Expenditure Review, 255; gatekeeper role, 262; history, 250–1; and information technology, 263; mission statement, 263–4; organisation and agendas, 251–8; personnel, 252; recruitment, 262; reform, 263, 264–5; reorganisation, 260; strategies and responses, 261–6; structure and functions, 253–5;
 - trade promotion, 265
 - foreign policy, 255, 258, 262, 265, 266
 - Foreign Policy Centre, 266
 - global role, 266
 - Minister for Europe, 261
 - ministerial committees, 256
 - Overseas Development
 - Administration (ODA), 250
 - Permanent Representative, 259, 260
 - Plowden Report, 256–7
 - trade policy, 268
 - Westland crisis, 256
 - White Paper on the Civil Service, 261
- United Nations (UN), 31
 - and Ireland, 147
- United Nations (UN) Security Council, 43
- Uruguay Round negotiations, 200
- van Staden, Alfred, 72
- Wallace, W., 2, 22
- Weber, S., 10
- Western European Union (WEU), 27, 39, 196
- Whitman, R. G., 5
- Wiseman, G., 6
- World Trade Organisation (WTO), 66