

Contents

<i>Acknowledgments</i>	vii
<i>Notes on the Contributors</i>	viii
<i>Introduction</i>	x
Part I Definitions	
1. Defining Terrorism <i>C.A.J. (Tony) Coady</i>	3
2. What Is Terrorism? <i>Igor Primoratz</i>	15
Part II Justifications	
3. A Defense of the 'Red Terror' <i>Leon Trotsky</i>	31
4. The Burdens of Terrorism <i>Nick Fotion</i>	44
5. Political Terrorism as a Weapon of the Politically Powerless <i>Robert Young</i>	55
6. Terrorism, Rights, and Political Goals <i>Virginia Held</i>	65
7. Terrorism, Morality, and Supreme Emergency <i>C.A.J. (Tony) Coady</i>	80
8. How Can Terrorism Be Justified? <i>Uwe Steinhoff</i>	97
Part III State Terrorism	
9. State Terrorism and Counter-terrorism <i>Igor Primoratz</i>	113
10. The Evolution of the Modern Terrorist State: Area Bombing and Nuclear Deterrence <i>Douglas Lackey</i>	128

Part IV Cases

11. Terror Bombing of German Cities in World War II <i>Stephen A. Garrett</i>	141
12. Violence and Terrorism in Northern Ireland <i>Peter Simpson</i>	161
13. Terrorism in the Arab–Israeli Conflict <i>Tomis Kapitan</i>	175
14. The Catastrophe of September 11 and its Aftermath <i>Burton M. Leiser</i>	192
 <i>Selected Bibliography</i>	 209
<i>Index</i>	211

1

Defining Terrorism

C.A.J. (Tony) Coady

There are two central philosophical questions about terrorism: What is it? And what, if anything, is wrong with it? Here I propose to deal primarily with the first question, but I do so because of the importance of the second. The point is that various issues about the rights and wrongs of terrorist acts, and, for that matter, anti-terrorist responses, cannot be adequately addressed unless we are clear about what topic we are discussing. Too many debates about terrorism are at cross-purposes because of radical confusions about exactly what is being discussed.

Mathematical exactitude is not indeed to be expected in the clarification of political concepts. They will always have fuzzy edges and will be subject to contentious interpretations generated by other concepts used in the clarification. Yet we need to get as sharp a focus as we can on this difficult subject, and a much sharper one than is currently available in so much public debate. A further complication is that the definitional question is essentially irresolvable by appeal to ordinary language alone since terrorism as a concept is not 'ordinary' in even the way that intention, guilt, and dishonesty are. Nor is it a technical term belonging to some science; its natural home is in polemical, ideological, and propagandist contexts or, less alarmingly, highly political ones. Even so, there are certain contours to the confused public outcry about terrorism that can give a purchase for conceptual analysis even though the analysis must be complemented by a dose of stipulation. The success of any

An earlier, much shorter version of this chapter was published as: C.A.J. Coady, 'Terrorism,' in Lawrence C. Becker and Charlotte B. Becker (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Ethics*, second edition (New York and London: Routledge, 2001), vol. 3, pp. 1696–9. © Routledge/Taylor & Francis Books, Inc. 2001. Reproduced by permission.

such analysis must be judged both by its degree of fit with such contours and its contribution to specific and more general moral debates about violence. This latter aspect is always particularly significant in the discussion of political concepts since efforts at conceptual clarification alone in this arena can seem arid without reference to their moral and political impact.

Definitions abroad in the theoretical literature, of which there have been estimated to be more than 100,¹ fall into several groups emphasizing different aspects of the phenomena commonly referred to as terrorist. Nearly all of them take it that terrorism is, or involves, violence of a political nature as opposed to mere, as it were, mundane criminal violence, though most legal regimes would also count terrorist acts as illegal. Beyond this, they differ in the stress they put upon such things as the following.

- (a) *The effect of extreme fear, either as intended or as achieved*: Definitions that focus on this element are influenced by the reference to terror in the word itself and by certain aspects of the history of its use. They sometimes go beyond the fear effect to incorporate further strategic goals that the fear is intended to produce, such as changing government policy in the community to which the victims belong.
- (b) *An attack upon the state from within*: Here all violent internal attacks upon the state from political motives are regarded as terrorist and the state's own employment of violence cannot be terrorist.
- (c) *The strategic purposes for which political violence is used*: Goals such as publicity-seeking or the influencing of some target group at some remove from the immediate victims of attack are often cited here.
- (d) *The supposedly random or indiscriminate nature of terrorist violence*: Recourse to this feature is often prompted by the bewildering effect that terrorist attacks often have upon the community attacked, though, as we shall see, what appears random will often be a function of the perspectives of those whose comfortable world is shattered by the violence.
- (e) *The nature of the targets of political violence*: This emphasis concentrates on the terrorists' selection of victims and so has a tactical dimension to it. It rejects the idea, sometimes implicit in (d), that terrorism typically has no tactical rationale.
- (f) *Secrecy in the use of political violence*: This fastens upon the obvious fact that terrorists generally operate 'in the dark' as much as possible.

Some definitions combine a number of these emphases; others are more austere concentrated. Hughes defines terrorism as 'a war in which a secret army... spreads fear,'² thus drawing on (a) and (f); Paskins and Dockrill say it is 'indiscriminate war of evasion,'³ which combines (d) and apparently a version of (b); Wardlaw speaks of terrorism as 'the use, or threat of use, of violence by an individual or group, whether acting for or in opposition to established authority, when such action is designed to create extreme anxiety and/or fear-inducing effects in a target group larger than the immediate victims with the purpose of coercing that group into acceding to the political demands of the perpetrators,' thus combining (a) and (c).⁴ Coady, Primoratz, Teichman, and Walzer concentrate upon the idea that terrorist violence is targeted upon non-combatants or innocents, so stressing a version of (e).⁵

This last emphasis catches a central logical and moral aspect of common discourse employing the term since terrorism is frequently objected to because 'the innocent' are attacked. Indeed, this is probably the most common public complaint about terrorism, even if there remain many unclaritys and even evasions about who are to count as innocent. Both sides in the Israel – Palestine conflict, even those whose record for 'clean hands' is deeply suspect, voice this complaint about innocent victims. Yasser Arafat, for example, has stated: 'No degree of oppression and no level of desperation can ever justify the killing of innocent civilians. I condemn terrorism, I condemn the killing of innocent civilians, whether they are Israeli, American or Palestinian...'⁶ The significance of the statement for my purposes lies in its acknowledgement of the understanding of terrorism in terms of attacks upon the innocent, not in Arafat's credibility in making the condemnation.

This approach also gives a handle for serious ethical discussion by linking terrorism to moral argument about war, in particular (though not exclusively) to the just war tradition which imposes strong conditions for non-combatant immunity from direct attack. In addition, I think that there are reasons of theoretical utility favoring a definition that is relatively uncommitted on the specific or ultimate purposes of terrorist violence. If we treat terrorism as the political tactic of directing violent attacks upon non-combatants, we can leave it an open empirical question for which broader purposes it is used. More exactly, I would define it as: *the organized use of violence to attack non-combatants ('innocents' in a special sense) or their property for political purposes*. This might be thought too restrictive in one direction since the threat to use such violence, even where the violence does not result, would be regarded by some as itself an instance of terrorism. If you think that plausible, you could

amend the definition accordingly. I am disinclined to do so because I think that the threat to do X is generally not itself an instance of doing X, and in the present case the threat to do an act of violence is not itself an act of violence, no matter how disturbing it may be. But this depends upon the definition of violence and I have discussed that elsewhere.⁷

This definition avoids any reference to the broader purposes mentioned in (a) above, and I have already given reasons for doing that. Other theorists, however, who share my general approach are more inclined to include some reference to purposes, such as influencing government policies. So Igor Primoratz, who also includes a reference to threats, defines terrorism as ‘the deliberate use of violence, or threat of its use, against innocent people, with the aim of intimidating some other people into a course of action they otherwise would not take.’⁸

The element of fear in (a) raises complex issues. There are parallel reasons for excluding it as a purpose from a definition emphasizing the targeting of non-combatants since attacks upon non-combatants may be made not to terrorize a whole population or some segment of it, but for publicity value, for ‘symbolic’ reasons, or merely to strike the only blow thought to be possible. On the other hand, the publicity or symbolic effect will usually operate and be expected to do so through the fear generated by the violence; the third sort of case, ‘the only blow possible,’ is perhaps best treated, in its pure form, as exceptional. Yet we would surely call the bombing slaughter of a busload of schoolchildren ‘terrorist’ even if the perpetrators intended to spread anger rather than fear, believing that an angry population and government would act foolishly and play into their hands. So, on balance, I would prefer a definition that left out the fear reference, though its incorporation would still catch a good deal that I would count as terrorism.

Some general reference to purpose is in any case required to make it clear that the tactic of terrorism has a political rather than a merely personal or criminal orientation. Spectacular criminal outrages, with no political motivations, are often enough called terrorist in the media because they frighten people and vividly set their perpetrators at odds with the state, but the major interest of terrorism, both theoretically and morally, lies in its political orientation. Terrorist acts will be illegal but their significance is deeper and more disturbing than, say, a revenge bombing of a police station by criminals. When criminals operate on a scale and with ambitions that bring them into the political arena, then the matter is different, as is illustrated by the Colombian drug syndicates of the 1980s. And the reverse tendency is also worth noting because terrorists will sometimes engage in ordinary crime, such as bank robbery

and stealing arms from police stations or military barracks in order to support their political campaigns.

If we define terrorism as the tactic of intentionally directing violent attacks at non-combatants with lethal or severe violence for political purposes, we will capture a great deal of what is being discussed with such passion and we can raise crucial moral and political questions about it with some clarity. We might narrow the definition in certain respects by incorporating a reference to the idea that the attacks or threats are meant to produce political results via the creation of *fear*, and we could widen it, as I did earlier in this essay, by including non-combatant property as a target where it is significantly related to life and security. I would rather not do the former (for reasons already given) but would favor doing the latter because I think that attacks upon the property of innocent people would normally incur the charge of terrorism, though it would not usually be regarded as being as grave as attacks upon their life and limb. If an armed group seized an empty civilian airliner and blew it up as a contribution to their political campaign for liberation or whatever, this would plausibly be regarded as a terrorist act. If Israeli tanks are destroying the homes of innocent people in Palestine without actually killing the inhabitants, then this should surely count as terrorism. (Of course, it is a disputed factual question whether the inhabitants are actually non-combatants, as many of them seem to be.) In any case, we may be flexible, for present purposes, about the inclusion of either the effect of fear or the target of property within this style of definition. Let us call a definition of this type a 'tactical definition' since it is a crucial element in it that terrorism must involve the tactic of targeting non-combatants.

Such a definition will not require reference to secret armies nor, on one reading, the idea of indiscriminate violence. The adjective 'indiscriminate' is ambiguous, since it may mean something like random or irrational (as it were, wholly indiscriminate) or it may mean a particular lack of discrimination, a failure to make a relevant discrimination. Terrorism clearly does not have to be indiscriminate, in the sense of random or irrational, since terrorists may carefully weigh the worth of the victims they target for achieving the purposes they have in mind. It was presumably important to the September 11 terrorists that the World Trade Center was understood to be at the heart of the American global business domination that they hated and that it was such an important symbol of American pride. Nor need terrorists be totally bereft of any sense of morality as some commentators suggest. Wilkinson, for instance, claims that 'what fundamentally distinguishes terrorism from other

forms of organised violence is not simply its severity but its features of amorality and antinomianism.' Terrorists are, he claims, 'implicitly prepared to sacrifice all moral and humanitarian considerations for the sake of some political end.'⁹ Even if this were true of some terrorists, it seems to be far too strong a thesis to build into the definition of terrorism. On the other hand, a great deal of what is called 'terrorism' does deliberately violate those normal discriminations, characteristically enshrined, for example, in just war theory, favoring non-combatant immunity. This does not convict them of blindness to all moral constraints, but it does highlight their rejection of one set of highly pertinent moral values.¹⁰ If this rejection underpins the sense of 'indiscriminate' in play, then reference to indiscriminate violence is compatible with a tactical definition.

This way of proceeding ties the widespread moral revulsion against terrorism to the fundamental prohibition in just war theory (under what is sometimes called 'the principle of discrimination') against violation of the rights of non-combatants. It avoids the pitfall of making terrorism immoral by definition, since its immorality needs to be established by argument for the acceptability of the principle of discrimination. It also helps to raise sharply the moral analogies between the state's use of violence against non-legitimate targets, either in state-to-state warfare or against its own citizens, and the political violence of non-state agencies against similarly illegitimate targets. There is a genuine case to be made in support of the common accusation of the insurgent that states, too, use terrorism. This should do nothing to excuse its use by revolutionaries, but it does point to a certain hypocrisy in much common indignation about terrorism. Those who think that the state terrorism of the World War II saturation bombing raids was justified by some argument of necessity, or other overriding moral considerations, cannot refuse to look at such arguments when mouthed by revolutionaries. A further advantage of the tactical definition is that it allows that there may be employments of revolutionary or insurgent violence that are not terrorist. This is important because if terrorism is judged to be entirely, or mostly, immoral because of its violation of the principle of discrimination, then there is still room for some non-terrorist anti-state political violence to be morally acceptable. This possibility is obscured by those definitions, in the spirit of (b) above, that treat terrorism as any form of sub-state violence directed against the state. Such definitions, which I have elsewhere called political status definitions, also have the disadvantage that they make state terrorism impossible a priori.

This last consequence is avoided by those who define terrorism, in the spirit of (a) and (c) above, as the use of violence to spread fear for specific political purposes. For instance, Grant Wardlaw, one of the most judicious political scientists to write on this issue, defines political terrorism (as noted earlier) in this fashion. The approach captures some of what is involved in the ways that terrorism is discussed, but it has two principal defects as a theoretical tool. The first is that it suffers from being too specific about the purposes of terrorist acts since, as already suggested, such acts may aim at inducing anger rather than fear, and they may seek to achieve their political objectives by a process other than inducing the 'target group' to accede to their demands. They may, for instance, intend to demonstrate to other groups the vulnerability of the target group, so that the other groups will mobilize against the target group. The second defect is that the definition fails to discriminate sufficiently between terrorist and non-terrorist uses of political violence. Much employment of violence for political purposes in revolution or interstate warfare, that would not normally be considered terrorist, is aimed, at least in part, at creating anxiety or fear in the enemy beyond the battlefield with a view to bringing the war to an end. Inflicting defeats and losses on the enemy's troops by standard military attack is often intended to serve multiple purposes, but an important one is creating such anxiety in the enemy government and its supporters as will induce them to surrender or negotiate. But it would surely be counter-intuitive to see all or most military engagements as terrorist. This is an especially important issue from the point of view of the ethical assessment of terrorism, since, unless one is a pacifist, there will be forms of violent political struggle that may be morally legitimate whereas there seems to be at least a common presumption against the moral validity of terrorism. The tactical definition copes much better with these matters.

A difficulty with the tactical definitional approach is that the concept of non-combatant needs clarification, especially for the case of revolutionary violence. Its moral significance also needs to be established against certain natural objections. We cannot enter fully into either of these here, but the distinction between combatant and non-combatant is clearly more difficult in subversive war than 'normal' war. In 'normal' war the immunity of non-combatants is a basic principle because our justification for using lethal violence is specified by the need to deal with those who are prosecuting the evil which gives us just cause. 'Combatants' is the technical term for such agents and will include those who do so under duress, such as conscript soldiers, and agents without uniforms, such as spies and certain politicians. Non-combatants are therefore not

identical with civilians, though it is an understandable shorthand to equate them. It is also common to describe non-combatants as 'innocent' and to treat them as immune to attack because of their innocence. But fully moralized notions of innocence and guilt are out of place here. They invoke ideas of free choice and full knowledge that are relevant to imputing moral blame and praise, whereas it seems that we are morally entitled to defend ourselves against an attacker even where the attacker is coerced or deluded. The sense in which non-combatants are 'innocent' is more that in which they are 'non-harming,' that is, not engaged in prosecuting the evil that justifies (or is argued to justify) the use of violence to protect or remedy. These somewhat technical uses of 'non-combatant' and 'innocent' are clearly meant to apply to contexts far removed from conventional interstate warfare. Hence, the September 11 attacks upon the World Trade Center were terrorist because their victims would count as non-combatants or innocents even though no relevant declared interstate war was then in progress. The attack upon the Pentagon was arguably different except for the fact that the passengers on the hijacked plane were clearly non-combatants, whatever the status of the victims in the Pentagon. There is an important area for debate here, and I have only scratched the surface of it, but it is receiving increasing attention from philosophers.¹¹

In addition to these serious problems of philosophical clarification, there are other objections to the distinction. Supporter of doctrines of 'total war' and 'collective guilt' (notions once readily invoked in the context of formal war, notably in World War II) have tended to be contemptuous of any moral distinction between combatant and non-combatant. Under the influence of these doctrines, for instance, we find Winston Churchill saying during World War II: 'it is absurd to consider morality on this topic... In the last war the bombing of open cities was regarded as forbidden. Now everybody does it as a matter of course. It is simply a question of fashion changing as she does between long and short skirts for women.'¹² These attitudes of contempt or dismissal have been well critiqued elsewhere, so it is perhaps sufficient here to note the obscenity of arguing that there is no moral difference between killing soldiers who are trying to kill you and deliberately bombing a kindergarten in enemy territory. And, although the distinction is not based primarily on a consequentialist ethic, it is also worth noting the horrendous consequences of its disregard in the wars of the twentieth century where the vast carnage of that century's wars fell increasingly, as the years progressed, upon civilian populations.

Whatever the problems in understanding and applying the distinction in formal war settings, the sort of informal war often associated with terrorism increases such problems for familiar reasons. One of the most important of these is that in 'normal' war, it is fairly clear who are the obvious candidates for combatant status, namely those bearing and using arms of various kinds and those directing and assisting their military efforts. There are difficult, borderline cases, but there is a certain palpability about much of the classification into combatant and non-combatant (soldiers on the one hand, infants in prams on the other). But in guerrilla war or insurrection, a twelve-year-old girl in civilian clothes may be a suicide bomber, and there is a strong tendency for revolutionaries or militant dissidents to argue that all the civil authorities of the regime and even the ordinary submissive population are part of the evil that is being fought. None the less, some revolutionaries do try to make the discriminations both in their theory and propaganda and in their practice. The Cypriot revolutionary, General George Grivas, for instance, showed his sensitivity to the distinction in his memoirs when he wrote of the EOKA campaign, 'We did not strike, like the bomber, at random. We shot only British servicemen who would have killed us if they could have fired first, and civilians who were traitors or intelligence agents.'¹³ Whether Grivas truly described EOKA practice is less important for our discussion than his acknowledgment of the possibility and desirability of directing revolutionary violence at morally legitimate targets.

It is important from the point of view of morality and often of long-term political objectives not to identify people as combatants too readily. From a moral point of view, we need good reason to use lethal violence and we cannot afford to be casual about the possession of such reasons. Politically, both revolutionaries and governments tend to lose support by slaughtering village administrators, and killing peasants or destroying villages on suspicion, not to mention the difficulties created for post-war reconstruction by such policies. A genuine reluctance to harm non-combatants will be exhibited in the reluctance to classify people as combatants even where this involves a degree of real risk to one's life and cause. Of course, in the heat of battle, combatants may lose this reluctance as fear, panic, and confusion swamp their consciousness. There is even a certain sort of madness in the midst of combat that can overcome common sense and conscience.¹⁴ Yet not all killing of non-combatants arises in such frenzied contexts. A lot of it is planned in a cool hour, as was the Allied bombing of German cities in World War II or the Vietcong massacres of village leaders in the Vietnam war.

Here there is no excuse for the ignoring or abandoning of the reluctance in question.

This point about reluctance has another implication for the definition of terrorism. If terrorism is defined in terms of violent attacks upon non-combatants, then certain actions or policies that will not strictly count as terrorist can none the less be carried out in a terrorist spirit because they show indifference to the welfare of non-combatants. If a grenade and machine-gun attack is made against soldiers on duty in a crowd of civilians when it could have been made when they were alone, it would be understandable to describe the attack as terrorist simply because the civilian casualties were eminently avoidable. If the avoidability is sufficiently stark, it may be difficult to see the deaths and injuries as unintentional but, in some cases, they may be unintended but culpably reckless.

This suggests that the tactical definition of terrorism might be extended somewhat, while keeping much the same focus, by including acts which are not sufficiently concerned with avoiding harm to non-combatants. Another expansionary suggestion would be to define terrorism in terms of any breach of the *jus in bello* so that the refusal to give quarter to combatants, or the mutilation of corpses, for instance, would be terrorist. The first suggestion has more merit than the second, though both would make reasonable analytical and ethical tools. The second has the defect that there is room for even more debate about the other rules of war than the central dictum about non-combatant immunity. As for the first expansion, I am sympathetic to the concerns behind it, but would be inclined to resist it on grounds of conceptual economy. Intentional targeting of non-combatants is sufficiently different as a tactic to negligent or reckless behavior that harms non-combatants, that it deserves separate classification, especially as the two behaviors will generally raise somewhat different moral concerns.

All of the discussion of combatants and non-combatants assumes that there is a certain rationality or rough intelligibility about the aims and purposes which resort to political violence is meant to advance. This is not to legitimize or morally endorse them, for what is understandable can still be evil. But where an ideology of either a state or an insurgent group is sufficiently bizarre, it may be impossible to take seriously their classifications of combatant and non-combatant, just because we find their rationale for resort to violence too bizarre. Hence when they declare doctors, magistrates, or police to be perpetrators of an amorphous evil, we may be right to see their attacks upon them as just as terrorist as attacks upon postmen or office workers.

Even if we are unimpressed by the need for some form of non-combatant immunity, there remains an important problem for terrorist policies in that they face serious criticism in purely pragmatic terms, since it is by no means clear that terrorism can be expected to work. This is partly because it is sometimes obscure what goals are being pursued, but even where this is relatively clear, it is often doubtful whether there is any reasonable prospect of success. This is also true for goals provided by the view of terrorism as 'expressive' (of despair or righteous anger, perhaps), since the point of expression cannot be disconnected from the realistic possibilities of audience recognition. I called this criticism 'pragmatic,' but this is not to suggest that it is not also moral. The adoption of policies that kill or maim will be immoral if they are also futile. Prudence is a moral virtue and in the just war tradition several of the moral conditions that must be satisfied before resort to war can be legitimate are prudential, such as that of last resort and reasonable prospect of success.

Finally, it is important to stress that acts of political violence may be very wrong even where they are not terrorist. Perpetrators of an unjust war or an unjust revolution do a great wrong even where they do not kill or endanger non-combatants. Nazi troops who shoot armed Jewish resisters do evil even where they respect non-combatant immunity because they have been agents in creating the unjust situation that calls forth legitimate armed resistance to them.

Notes

1. Alex P. Schmid, *Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases, and Literature*, pp. 119–58, cited in Walter Laqueur, *The Age of Terrorism* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1987), p. 143.
2. Martin Hughes, 'Terrorism and National Security,' *Philosophy* 57 (1982), p. 5.
3. Barrie A. Paskins and M.L. Dockrill, *The Ethics of War* (London: Duckworth, 1979), p. 89.
4. Grant Wardlaw, *Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Counter-Measures* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 16.
5. C.A.J Coady, 'The Morality of Terrorism,' *Philosophy* 60 (1985); Igor Primoratz, 'What Is Terrorism?' chapter 2 in this volume; Jenny Teichman, *Pacifism and the Just War* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986); Michael Walzer, 'Terrorism: A Critique of Excuses,' in Steven Luper-Foy (ed.), *Problems of International Justice* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1988).
6. *The Age*, February 5, 2002 (reprinted from the *New York Times*).
7. See C.A.J. Coady, 'The Idea of Violence,' *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 3 (1986).
8. Igor Primoratz, 'What Is Terrorism?' p. 24.
9. Paul Wilkinson, *Political Terrorism* (London: Macmillan, 1974), pp. 16–17.

10. Wilkinson goes so far as to assert that, for terrorists, 'such Judaeo-Christian notions as mercy, compassion, and conscience must go with the weak to the wall of history' (p. 17). But, whatever their sins, some terrorists are surely moved to their violence by compassion for the fate of their comrades, compatriots, or co-religionists, or at least this fact should be open to investigation. Nor is it obvious that all terrorists are bereft of conscience, even if their conscience is defective. Wilkinson's restriction of mercy, compassion, and conscience to the Judaeo-Christian tradition is simply astonishing.
11. See, most recently, David Rodin, *War and Self-Defence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). See also Jeff McMahan, 'Self-Defense and the Problem of the Innocent Attacker,' *Ethics* 104 (1993/94), and 'Innocence, Self-Defense and Killing in War,' *Journal of Political Philosophy* 2 (1994).
12. Quoted in Stephen A. Garrett, 'Political Leadership and Dirty Hands: Winston Churchill and the City Bombing of Germany,' in Cathal J. Nolan (ed.), *Ethics and Statecraft: The Moral Dimension of International Affairs* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1995), pp. 80–1.
13. Quoted in Robert Taber, *The War of the Flea* (London: Paladin, 1972), p. 106.
14. Michael Walzer gives an excellent example of this frenzy by citing Guy Chapman's recounting of an episode from World War I of Allied soldiers killing Germans who were trying to surrender. See Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, third edition (New York: Basic Books, 2000), pp. 306–7.

Index

- Aceh, 58
Afghanistan, 106, 123–4, 195, 199, 201–2
African National Congress, 56, 59–60
Algeria, 52
Al-Qaeda, 76, 107, 108, 195, 199–204, 206
Al-Qassam, Izzeddin, 178
amoralism, 7–8, 23–4
(*see also hostes humani generis*)
anarchists, 23
Arafat, Yasser, 5, 180–1, 199, 202, 205
Arendt, Hannah, 23
Argentina, 117
Arnold, Hap, 131
Aum sect, 108
Austria, 31

Baier, Annette, 108
Bakunin, Mikhail, 23
'balance of terror', 121
Bali, 62
Begin, Menchem, 179–80
Ben-Eliezer, Benjamin, 186
Ben-Gurion, David, xxii, 176–7, 183
bin Laden, Osama, 207
Bolsheviks, xiv, 31, 37, 40, 42
Borman, William, 74
Bosnia, 47, 121
Brzezinski, Zbigniew K., 115
Bush, George W., 195, 199–202

Cambodia, 115
Charles I (England), 32
Chechnya, 158
Cherwell, Lord (F.A. Lindemann), 144
Chiang Kai-shek, 197
Chile, 116
China, xx, 95 n. 27, 133–4, 196, 202
Chomsky, Noam, 62 n. 1

Churchill, Winston, 10, 86–7, 128–31, 136, 144–5, 149–50, 152, 155, 156, 157, 197
Clausewitz, Carl von, 146
Clinton, Bill, 106, 138 n. 20
Coady, C.A.J. (Tony), xii, xviii–xix, xx, xxi, 5, 21–2, 62 n. 4, 67, 69–70
Columbian drug syndicates, 6
consequentialism and
 non-consequentialism,
 xiii, xv–xix, 60–1, 68–71, 82, 101, 162
Coser, Lewis, 68
counter-terrorism, 122–5
Coventry, 146
Croatia, 121
Cuban Missile Crisis, 134, 198
Cyprus, 11, 58

Dajani, Pasha, 177
de Gaulle, Charles, 197
de la Muerthe, Boulaye, 156
definition (characterization) of
 terrorism, x–xiii, 3–13, 15–26, 44, 55–7, 62 n. 4, 65, 80, 98, 114, 161, 175
Deir Yassin, 179–80
Denikin, Anton Ivanovich, 38, 40
Dershowitz, Alan, 189 n. 25, 190 n. 33
dirty hands problem, 83–93
Dockrill, M.L., 5
double effect, doctrine of, 99–100, 106, 124
Douhet, Giulio, 128
Dresden, xxi, 23, 67, 85, 129–31, 136, 145, 157
(*see also* terror bombing of German cities)
Dukhonin, Nikolay Nikolayevich, 36
Dunkirk, 149

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 135
Ellsberg, Daniel, 135

- English Revolution, 32
 EOKA, 11
 European Union, 172, 174
- Falk, Richard, 66, 68
 Fotion, Nick, xiii, xv, xx
 France, xix, 32–3, 38, 52, 196, 202
 Frankland, Noble, 146, 151
 French Revolution
 (see France)
 Friedrich, Carl J., 115
 Fullinwider, Robert, 63 n. 11
- Garrett, Stephen A., xx–xxi
 Geneva Convention, 158, 200–1
 Germany, xx–xxi, 23, 31, 38, 67, 68, 85–7, 92, 105, 115–16, 118, 120, 128–31, 141–58, 197
 Gandhi, Mahatma, 58, 74
 Girondists, 32
 Goebbels, Josef, 129
 Goldstein, Baruch, 184–5
 Good Friday Agreement (Northern Ireland), xxii, 171–4
 Great Britain, 38, 58, 59, 87, 90, 105, 128–31, 136, 141–58, 163–74, 178, 196
 Grivas, General George, 11
 Guantanamo Bay, 200
 Guiliani, Rudolph, 195
 Gulf War, 99, 133
- Habermas, Jürgen, 68
 Hamas, 184–6, 199–200
 Hamburg, xxi, 23, 118, 129, 141, 157–8
 Hansell, Haywood, 131
 Hare, R.M., 67–9
 Harris, Arthur, 87, 129, 143, 148, 154, 156, 157–8
 Hegel, G.W.F., 36
 Heinzen, Karl, 25
 Held, Virginia, xiii, xvi–xviii, xx, 5, 98–103
 Herzl, Theodor, 176
 Heydrich, Reinhard, 15
- Hiroshima, xx, 23, 66, 82, 97, 106, 132, 134, 136
 Hirschbein, Ron, 99
 Hitler, Adolf, 66, 86–7, 115, 130, 142, 149, 156, 197
 Hizbullah, 22, 199–200
 Hobbes, Thomas, 203
 Holmes, Robert, 66, 67
 Honderich, Ted, 62–3 n. 5
 hostages, 35
hostes humani generis, xxii–xxiii, 203–4
 (see also amoralism)
 Hughes, Martin, 5
 Hungary, 31
 Hussein, Saddam, 196
 Hyams, Edward, 26
- International Monetary Fund, 206
 intuitionism, 82–4
 Iraq, 62, 195–6, 198–200
 Ireland, Republic of, 164, 173–4
 Irgun Zvai Leumi, 59, 90, 179
 Irish Nationalists, 25, 163, 167–72, 174
 Irish Republican Army, 57, 165, 169, 202
 Islamic Jihad, 199–200
 Islamic world, 52, 61–2, 200–1, 206
 Israel, xi, xxii, 7, 52, 59, 62, 76, 90, 104–5, 107, 117, 123, 175–88, 206
 Italy, 150, 197
- Jabotinsky, Vladimir, 177–8
 Jacobins, xix, 23, 32–3, 113
 Japan, xx, 23, 87, 131–2, 150, 197, 200
 (see also Hiroshima; Nagasaki)
 Jefferson, Thomas, 204
jus ad bellum, 60–2
jus in bello, 12, 25, 60–2, 80–2, 182, 187
 Just War Theory, xviii, 80–1, 123–5, 157, 161–2
 (see also *jus ad bellum*; *jus in bello*;
 non-combatant immunity;
 Walzer, Michael)

- Kaledin, Alexei Maximovitch, 37
 Kant, Immanuel, 96 n. 42, 187
 Kapitan, Tomis, xx, xxii
 Kautsky, Karl, xiv, 31, 34–42
 Kennedy, John F., 135, 198
 Kerensky, Alexander, 37
 Khmer Rouge, 115
 Kolchak, Alexander, 38
 Kolnai, Aurel, 119
 Korean War, 133
 Kosovo (Kosova), 47, 58, 121
 Krasnov, Pyotr, 37, 38
- Lackey, Douglas, xx–xxi, 55
 Laqueur, Walter, 18–20, 26, 68, 114, 117–18
 Lavrov, P.L., 25
 Lebanon, 57, 68, 123, 183–4
 Leiser, Burton M., xxii–xxiii, 65
 LeMay, Curtis, 131, 134, 136
 liberalism, 40
 Locke, John, 80
 Lomasky, Loren, 57
 London, 146
- Machiavelli, Niccolò, 83–5, 147
 Mafia, 22
 Marcuse, Herbert, 23
 Marxism, xiv
 McMahan, Jeff, 103–5
 McNamara, Robert 135
 Mensheviks, 38
 Montagnards, 32
 Moro, Aldo, 18–20, 57
 Munich Olympics massacre, 180–1, 202
- Nagasaki, xx, 23, 66, 82, 97, 106, 132, 134, 136
 Nagel, Thomas, 84–5, 94 n. 14
 Napoleon, 18, 156
 Nationalist paramilitaries (Northern Ireland), 171
 (see also Irish Republican Army)
 NATO, 196
 Nechaev, Sergei, 23
 Netanyahu, Benjamin, 65, 183
 Nicaragua, 67
 Nielsen, Kai, 44, 68
- non-combatant immunity, xii, xviii–xix, 5–13, 17–21, 57, 67, 69–70, 80–93, 98–106, 124, 146, 157
 Northern Ireland, xvi, xxii, 59, 161–74, 202
 Nozick, Robert, 76–7
 nuclear weapons, 121, 133–6
 (see also Hiroshima; Nagasaki)
- Oslo peace process, 184–5
- Palestine Liberation Organization, 180–1, 183, 202, 206
 Palestine, xi, xxii, 7, 52, 59, 76, 104–5, 107, 115, 117, 123, 175–88, 203
 Palestinian Authority, 199
 Paris Commune, 35–6
 Paris, Count of, 35
 Paskins, Barrie A., 5
 Pearl Harbor, 150, 200
 Pentagon, The
 (see September 11, 2001)
 Pinochet, Augusto, 116
 pirates, xxii, 203–4
 Poland, 148
 Portal, Charles, 148
 Potsdam, 154
 Primoratz, Igor, xii, xx–xxi, 5–6, 55, 62 n. 4, 76–7, 81, 98–101, 106
 Protestant paramilitaries (Northern Ireland), 170–1
 Protestant Unionists (Northern Ireland), 163, 165–74
- Rabin, Yitzhak, 123
 Rahman, Omar Abdul, 206
 Rawls, John, 82, 87, 96 n. 42, 146
 Reagan, Ronald, 68, 195
 Red Army Faction (Germany), 68
 Red Brigades (Italy), 18–20, 57
 ‘red terror’, xiv–xv, xx, 31–43
 revolution and terror, xiv–xv, 31–42
 rights and rights violations, xv, xvii–xviii, 69–77, 98–103
 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 200
 Ross, W.D., 82–3
 Rotterdam, 157

- Royal Air Force, xxi
 Ruddick, Sara, 73
 Rushdie, Salman, 118
 Russia, 158, 196, 202
 Russian Revolution, xiv–xv, xx, 25, 31, 33, 37–42
 Ryan, Alan, 115
- Sabra and Shatilla, 183–4
 sacredness of human life, 40–1
 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 88
 Saudi Arabia, 207
 Savinkov, Boris, 38
 Scott, James C., 98
 self-defense, 17
 September 11, 2001, xxii–xxiii, 7, 10, 19, 47, 61–2, 64 n. 17, 97, 99, 118, 124, 137, 152, 184, 192–207
 Serbia, 121, 133
 Sharon, Ariel, 104, 183–4, 185
 Sicily, 150
 Simpson, Peter, xxii
 Sinn Féin, 163, 165
 Social and Democratic Labour Party (Northern Ireland), 169
 South Africa, 56, 59–60, 70, 71
 Soviet Union, xx, 87, 113, 115–16, 133–5, 150, 198
 Sri Lanka, 56
 Stalin, Josef, 115, 128, 197
 state terrorism, xi, xix–xxi, 8, 22–3, 24, 55, 69, 74, 89, 113–27, 128–38, 145, 178
 Steinhoff, Uwe, xix–xx
 Stern Gang, 59, 90
 Story, Joseph, 203
 Strategic Air Command (SAC), 134, 136
 Strategic Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), 134–6
 Sudan, 106, 107
 supreme emergency, xviii–xix, 81–2, 85–93, 105–6, 120–1, 146–50
 Syria, 115
- Tailhade, Laurent, 23, 119
 Taiwan, 133
 Taliban, 107, 123, 195, 200
- Tamil Tigers, 56
 Teichman, Jenny, 5, 21
 terror bombing of German cities, xxi, 8, 10, 11, 67, 82, 85–7, 90–2, 105, 118, 120, 128–31, 141–58
 instrumentality of, 152–6
 military necessity of, 147–8, 150–2
 (*see also* supreme emergency)
 Thatcher, Margaret, 57
 Thierry, Augustin, 32
 Tilly, Charles, 68
 Tokyo, 132
 Tripoli, 107
 Trotsky, Leon, xiii–xv, xx, 23
 Truman, Harry S., 132, 197
 Tsarism, 40
- Ulster
 (*see* Northern Ireland)
 Ulster Protestants
 (*see* Protestant Unionists)
 United Kingdom, 162–5, 170, 172, 174
 United Nations, 67, 71, 172, 179, 196, 199, 200, 202, 204, 206
 Security Council, 196–9, 206
 Charter, 197–9, 202
 United States of America, xx, xxiii, 7, 33–4, 38, 52, 57, 61–2, 67–8, 87, 99, 107, 108, 118, 123–4, 129, 131–7, 150, 153–5, 186, 192–207
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 71
 utilitarianism, 69–70, 82, 101
- Vansittart, Robert, 142
 Vietnam War, 11, 133, 195
 violence, threats of, xii, 5–6, 16–17
 Vitoria, Francisco, 93 n. 4
- Walzer, Michael, xviii, xx, 5, 20, 58–60, 65, 66, 67, 81–93, 105–6, 107, 120, 124, 136, 143, 147
 Wardlaw, Grant, 5, 8, 77 n. 1
 Warsaw, 157
 Washington, George, 195

- Weber, Max, 78 n. 24, 83–5,
88, 109 n. 19
- Weizmann, Chaim, 176, 180
- Wellman, Karl, 16–17, 67, 69
- Wellmer, Albrecht, 68
- ‘white terror’, xv, 40–2
- Wilkins, Burleigh, 68
- Wilkinson, Paul, 7–8, 23, 65
- World Bank, 206
- World Trade Center
(*see* September 11, 2001)
- World War I, 81
- World War II, xx, xxi, 8, 10,
11, 13, 47, 67, 82, 85–7,
89–92, 105, 118, 120,
128–31, 141–58, 202
- Ya’alon, Moshe, 186
- Young, Robert, xiii, xvi, xviii, xx
- Yudenich, Nikolai, 38
- Zionism, 176–80, 185, 188