


Questions	67	1.2 Mind and God	113
Recommended reading	68	1.3 Phenomenalism	114
6 Truth	69	2. Hume	115
1. Necessary and contingent truths	70	2.1 The mind	115
2. Kant and synthetic <i>a priori</i> truths	70	2.2 Impressions and ideas	116
3. Theories of truth	74	2.3 The principles and habits of association	116
3.1 The correspondence theory of truth	74	2.4 Reasoning consists in discovering relations	117
3.2 The coherence theory	76	2.5 Physical objects	117
3.3 The pragmatic theory	77	2.6 The complete sceptic	117
3.4 The semantic theory	78	3. Kant	118
4. Conclusion	81	3.1 Perception	119
Questions	81	3.2 Conception	119
Recommended reading	81	3.3 The phenomenal and noumenal worlds	120
7 Scepticism	82	4. Logical positivism: phenomenalism in the twentieth century	121
1. Philosophical doubt versus ordinary doubt	83	4.1 The verification principle	122
1.1 The evil genius	86	4.2 Quine and 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism'	122
1.2 Descartes' answer	87	Timeline: perception	124
1.3 Ordinary doubt	88	5. Conclusion	126
2. Doubt and the search for knowledge	90	Questions	126
3. Conclusion	93	Recommended reading	126
Questions	93	10 Explanations: Purposive and Causal Explanations	127
Recommended reading	94	1. Purposive and causal explanations	127
8 Perception: Rationalism and Empiricism	95	2. Causation	130
1. Ultimate reality	96	3. The problem of induction	134
2. Appearance and reality	98	3.1 Discovering hypotheses	134
3. The problem	99	3.2 Justifying hypotheses	137
4. Rationalism	100	4. Conclusion	138
5. Descartes' rationalism	101	Questions	138
6. Empiricism	103	Recommended reading	138
7. Locke's empiricism	104	11 Explanations: Confirming and Falsifying Theories	139
7.1 Innate ideas	104	1. Theories	140
7.2 Experience: the source of knowledge	105	2. Karl Popper, falsification and pseudo-science	143
8. Conclusion	107	2.1 Experiments and observation	144
Questions	107	2.2 Falsification	145
Timeline: epistemology	108	2.3 Science and pseudo-science	147
Recommended reading	110	3. Thomas Kuhn and confirmation	148
9 Perception: Idealism and Phenomenalism	111	3.1 Normal science	149
1. Subjective idealism: Bishop George Berkeley	112	3.2 Crisis and revolution	149
1.1 Objects	113	4. Feminist epistemology	150

2.5 Kant: the self as transcendental	217	19 Freedom in Context	252
3. Conclusion	219	1. Centring the subject	253
Questions	219	1.1 Kant	253
Recommended reading	219	1.2 Individualism	254
		1.3 Existentialism	254
17 Creating the Self	220	2. Decentring the subject	257
1. Existentialism: inventing the self	220	2.1 Historicism	258
1.1 Sartre: existence precedes essence	221	2.2 Freud: undermining consciousness	262
1.2 The feminist self: Simone de Beauvoir	222	2.3 Structuralism and post-structuralism	263
1.3 Kierkegaard and Nietzsche	225	3. Conclusion	264
2. Psychoanalysis	228	Questions	264
2.1 Freud and the unconscious	228	Recommended reading	264
2.2 R.D. Laing: existential psychotherapy	229		
3. Marxism	230	20 Responsibility and Punishment	265
3.1 Marx and false consciousness	230	1. When is an act compelled?	265
3.2 Marcuse: one-dimensional thinking	231	1.1 External compulsion	266
4. Decentring the subject	234	1.2 Internal compulsion	269
4.1 Structuralism and the self	234	2. Responsibility	271
4.2 Post-structuralism and the self	234	3. Punishment	274
5. Conclusion	236	3.1 Vengeance	274
Questions	236	3.2 Deterrence	274
Recommended reading	236	3.3 Retribution	275
		3.4 Rehabilitation	276
		3.5 Protection	277
		4. Conclusion	278
		Questions	278
		Recommended reading	278
18 Determinism and Freedom	237		
1. Causes and compulsions	239	PART III	
2. Hard determinism	241	Understanding Our Relations with Others	
2.1 Physical determinism	241		
2.2 Psychological determinism	242	21 Metaethics	282
2.3 Freedom as an illusion	242	1. Relativism	284
2.4 Consciousness	243	2. Metaethical theories: objectivism and subjectivism	285
3. Indeterminism: libertarianism	244	2.1 Objectivism	285
3.1 Why isn't our moral self determined?	246	2.2 Subjectivism	286
3.2 We only <i>appear</i> to be free because we don't yet know the causes	246	3. Metaethical theories: cognitivism and non-cognitivism	287
3.3 Freedom is impossible if indeterminism is true	247	3.1 Cognitivism	287
4. Soft determinism: compatibilism	247	3.2 Non-cognitivism	293
4.1 Character	248	4. Is all moral discourse futile?	295
4.2 The moral self	250	4.1 The is-ought gap	295
5. Conclusion	251		
Questions	251		
Recommended reading	251		

4.2 Descriptivism	297	2.4 Legitimacy and morality	343
5. Conclusion	298	3. Theories of legitimacy	343
Questions	298	3.1 Divine right theory	344
Recommended reading	299	3.2 Force theory	344
		3.3 Voluntary acceptance theories	345
		3.4 Moral purpose theories	352
22 Normative Ethics:		4. Conclusion	356
Deontology	300	Questions	356
1. Teleological and deontological ethics	301	Recommended reading	356
2. Deontological ethics, Kant and rational rules	303		
3. Egoism and altruism	307	25 Politics: The Extent of Power	357
3.1 Psychological egoism	308	1. Theories of human nature	358
3.2 Ethical egoism	308	2. Freedom	358
3.3 Altruism	310	2.1 Negative liberty	359
4. Morality and sentiment: Hume and Rousseau	312	2.2 Positive liberty	359
4.1 Hume	312	3. The extent of state power	362
4.2 Rousseau	313	3.1 Insulating the individual	362
5. Female ethics: the ethic of care	315	3.2 The state as the actual will of the individual	366
6. Conclusion	318	4. Conclusion	368
Questions	319	Questions	368
Recommended reading	319	Recommended reading	369
23 Normative Ethics:		26 Politics: Forms of Government	370
Consequentialism and Virtue Ethics	320	1. The extent of power	370
1. Consequentialist theories: utilitarianism	321	1.1 Totalitarian	371
1.1 Act and rule utilitarianism	321	1.2 Libertarian	371
1.2 Happiness	324	2. Legitimacy	371
1.3 Preference utilitarianism	326	2.1 Autocracy	372
1.4 Moral pluralism	329	2.2 Democracy	375
2. Virtue ethics	330	3. Forms of government	375
3. Conclusion	333	4. Protest, civil disobedience and our moral and legal obligations	378
Timeline: ethics	334	4.1 Law and morality	378
Questions	336	4.2 Civil disobedience	379
Recommended reading	336	4.3 Solutions	381
		5. Conclusion	382
		Questions	382
		Recommended reading	383
24 Politics: Legitimacy and the State	337		
1. Authority, power, legitimacy, force and influence	339	27 Politics: Political Theories	384
2. Legitimacy	340	1. Ideology	385
2.1 Legitimacy and legality	340	1.1 The end of ideology debate	385
2.2 Legitimacy and consent	341	1.2 Political socialization	386
2.3 Other sources of legitimacy	341	1.3 Interpretations of ideology	386
		2. Classifying political theories	388

2.1 The use and limits of power	388	3.6 Fascism: reversing the forces of history	398
2.2 Human nature	389	3.7 Socialism and communism: dialectical history	399
2.3 The left and right wing spectrum	389	4. Conclusion	401
2.4 The concept and role of the state	390	Questions	401
3. Political theories	393	Recommended reading	401
3.1 Anarchism: order without authority	393	Conclusion	402
3.2 Liberalism: minimizing the state	394	<i>Answers to questions</i>	404
3.3 Totalitarianism: constant mobilization	395	<i>Glossary</i>	406
3.4 Conservatism: the rule of tradition	396	<i>Bibliography</i>	416
3.5 Nationalism: pre-political homogeneity	397	<i>Index</i>	429

The Subject



Key issues

- ▶ What is philosophy? How can we learn to philosophize?
- ▶ How can it teach us to be more effective thinkers; not just uncritical recyclers of the opinions of others, but people who can think for ourselves?
- ▶ Why do we search for ultimate answers? Why is it important to find the non-arbitrary explanation of things; the highest principles behind all things?
- ▶ If philosophical questions involve answers about the way things *had* to be, that they could not have been otherwise, how different is this from other forms of enquiry?
- ▶ Why should we learn to question all those assumptions we take for granted about the fundamental issues that shape our lives: about our knowledge of the world, ourselves and our relations with others?
- ▶ If we should, why stop there? Should we not question the very idea that philosophy is or can be the search for such foundations, perhaps even doubting whether they are there in the first place?
- ▶ Why are these questions even more relevant today?

Contents

1. What is philosophy?	1
2. The relevance of philosophy	3
3. Learning to philosophize	4
4. The method of philosophy	7
5. Conclusion	9
Recommended reading	10

■ 1. What is philosophy?

At the start of each year, as my mind turns to a new batch of students about to start their first course in philosophy, the same question comes to mind: 'What am I to say to them when they ask me "What is philosophy?"' And each year I try to answer with the same wide-eyed excitement I first felt as an undergraduate: 'This is a subject like no other that you have studied. You are about to embark on the most exciting experience of your academic lives. This will be a genuine voyage of discovery for all of us, me included. Together we will discover things that we have not seen or thought about before.'

This may seem wide-eyed and innocent, but it is the sort of excitement that drew most of us to philosophy in the first place. Like no other subject it places you at the centre of learning. We begin with the assertion that there are no right answers. You will see things from your own perspective that I have never seen before, as I will see things you have never seen. Both of our contributions are important and valuable. Of course it would be foolish to deny there are *some* right

answers, but the key to this subject is not to recognize them as such. From the moment you do, the search for truth is ended, and in this subject the process, the search, is more important than the product. The twentieth-century British philosopher Bertrand Russell once said, 'To teach how to live without certainty and yet without being paralysed by hesitation is perhaps the chief thing that philosophy, in our age, can do for those who study it.' Unlike any other subject, then, philosophy asks you to accept doubt and uncertainty, and search beyond the narrow confines of accepted opinion. You are left free to make your own contributions and reveal your own insights.

These are the key ingredients of a genuine voyage of discovery. It is not an exaggeration to say that it is driven by the same insatiable search for answers that drove Columbus to set sail for the New World and the first astronauts to risk their lives. Philosophy shares the same sense of wonder and passion for the ultimate answers to things. Another British philosopher, A. N. Whitehead, once described philosophy as 'the product of wonder'. It is that persistent questioning of all those things we take for granted. Accepting nothing on trust, the philosopher asks what makes our assumptions rationally defensible. Even though we may think there is no need to question them, and even though our conclusions may make us uncomfortable, this is an unyielding quest to go beyond what we know and take for granted.

Stand anywhere on the Earth's surface, look up at the sky and everything you see will be moving – the stars, the moon, the sun – everything that is except the thing you're standing on, the Earth. All the evidence and all common sense should convince us that the Earth is the centre of the universe and everything else revolves around it. To doubt this should seem like the ravings of a madman. Yet this is exactly what Galileo and Copernicus did, despite the derision of all those who appealed to common sense and threatened them with prosecution to force them back into line. Indeed, so dangerous were these thoughts to the Catholic Church that Galileo was eventually forced to recant his beliefs in 1633 under the threat of excommunication.

Philosophy involves the same nagging doubt about all those assumptions we take for granted about the fundamental issues that shape our lives: about our knowledge of the world, ourselves and our relations with others. For example, we regularly

use concepts like knowledge, truth, freedom, equality and authority, but rarely do we question what we mean by them. Yet they may contain implicit assumptions about us and the world which, unknown to us, shape and direct our views about life. And once we have examined them we may find we no longer want to retain these views.

Our understanding of the world around us depends upon concepts like 'knowledge' and 'truth'. When we say we 'know' something, this can mean different things, different forms of knowledge, about which we can have serious doubts. If we say we believe in God, what sort of evidence would we need to justify such a claim? We are accustomed to believe the word of scientists, but on what grounds do we base this trust? Indeed, it's worth asking whether we can, in fact, have genuine knowledge at all about anything beyond ourselves. We can be certain of our own existence, but can we be equally certain that anything else exists?

And yet even here, where we might think certainty about ourselves is easy to find, we can still have serious doubts about how we understand ourselves. We all ask ourselves whether we are doing the right thing, not just morally, but in terms of our personal goals. We might find ourselves pursuing fame, wealth, power or just pleasure, but when we stand back from our lives, we are bound to ask whether these are worth pursuing for their own sake, or whether they are worthless as goals, perhaps even dangerous. There may be other things of much more lasting significance and more deeply fulfilling. For our own happiness and fulfilment it's necessary to discover what these might be. As the ancient Greek philosopher, Socrates, says, 'The unexamined life is not worth living.'

But then even closer to home, what are we doing when we think about these things and come to our decisions? On what are they based and are we free to think what we will? Thinking, feeling, intending, believing, these are all part of our everyday experiences. But how do we understand these mental processes? Are they the product of a disembodied will, which we cannot locate within the physical body, or are they the results of physical changes in the brain, just blind biochemical responses? After all, we accept without any dismay that many people are increasingly using mind-altering drugs to influence their moods and govern their mental lives.

The same can be said about all those things that govern our relations with others: the political and

moral issues that shape our daily lives. How should we conduct our moral lives? And how much power should governments have to restrict our rights and freedoms? Here most of us are more than willing to concede that there is almost endless room for doubt and difference of opinion.

For example, we might claim that democracy is the ideal form of government, or that we should always keep promises, or that we should never lie. But what sort of claims are these? Can we find an objective basis for political and moral judgements of this type, or are they all just a matter of individual opinion? If they are just a matter of opinion, is there any reason to prefer one opinion to another, or is it just a question of what the majority prefers, or perhaps even just a matter of taste?

■ 2. The relevance of philosophy

Nevertheless, despite their significance for the fundamental issues in our lives, we can still ask why these intriguing questions should be relevant to us *now*. What makes them any more relevant today than they were, say, 400 years ago, when modern philosophy began? The simple answer is that we all search for order, meaning and value in our lives: in our understanding of ourselves as individuals, of the world in which we live, and of our relations with others. We want our experience of life to make some sense, when all too often it appears fragmented and pointless. And most, if not all, of us find experience without sense intolerable. Psychologists and sociologists are frequently telling us that the rise in suicides among the young, the increased use of hallucinogenic drugs, and increased medication for depression are all signs of a growing sense of malaise, of alienation from a world that a growing number of us no longer have ways of understanding.

In pre-modern times, when societies were shaped, if not controlled, by their religious beliefs and the churches in which they worshipped, meaning and value was easy to find. Every daily activity was suffused in religious significance, from buying bread to planting crops. But since the seventeenth century, when the scientific revolution and the Enlightenment freed the individual from dependence upon the authority of the Bible and ancient texts, we have been dependent upon our unaided reason to uncover what we believe is the truth

about ourselves, the world around us and our relations with others.

But this type of freedom comes at a price. The individualism born in the seventeenth century migrated from a dependence upon individual reason to uncover scientific truths, to our economic life in the nineteenth century with the triumph of *laissez-faire* capitalism, and to our political lives in the twentieth century with liberal democracy and universal suffrage. In the process it has laid waste to many of the traditional social mechanisms for creating meaning and value in our lives.

Indeed the achievements of the twentieth century were in many ways unique in marking the triumph of our attempts to create the means whereby each one of us can isolate ourselves within our own personal territory. Unlike the people of previous centuries, we acquired the capacity to draw tighter personal cordons around ourselves. With videos and television it is now no longer necessary to go beyond the home for entertainment and information. Most of us in the Western world spend at least four hours a day watching television. Within the family this process of individualization has gone even further, with children possessing their own televisions and video recorders in their own rooms, where they spend hours apart from the family under the influence of fantasies created by producers whose only concerns are sales and profits.

But even outside the home, where we're forced to confront other people on the streets or on public transport, the personal cordon can be maintained with technology, like the personal music player, that acts as a badge of privacy warning off all those who dare to intrude. And then there are even larger numbers of us who are happy to retreat from the real world into the safer confines of virtual relations on the Internet. As each generation passes we seem to be retreating further and further into the privacy and security of our own lives, spending more of our time passively observing the world through a screen.

Likewise in the West we demand as our right private access to those things we believe are essential to our lives: our own living space and forms of transport. Indeed in his book, *The Private Future* (1974), Martin Pawley points out that the equal distribution of population throughout the dwellings in any developed country would give every individual his own private room and still leave hundreds of thousands of rooms unused. A similar distribution in, say, Pakistan would result in

each room holding nine people. In some developed countries, notably the United States, the entire population could be accommodated in private cars, none of them full. In India the same distribution would result in more than one hundred persons crowding around each car.

So, if we cannot get meaning and value from our contact with others or through religious authorities, or even through meaningful work in a mechanized society, where do we find it? The answer for most of us is in the worship of materialism, of possessions. We are what we own. We are the products of a new consciousness industry, buying not just goods, but identities. In the language of consumerism objects take on a magical significance. We buy cars, not only because they are a means of transport, but, perhaps more important, because they say something about us to the outside world. They are the advertising hoardings on which we etch our identities for those who look on. It leaves you wondering what might be the epitaph of our age, compared with the more noble achievements of previous ages, like the towering Gothic cathedrals of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and the great engineering triumphs of the nineteenth century. As T. S. Eliot suggests in his poem 'The Rock', it might be something far more prosaic, like the asphalt road or thousands of lost golf balls.

Although this problem is not unique to the twenty-first century, it is probably more acute for us than it was for previous generations. While we are inclined to believe that technological progress and economic growth are good in themselves, bringing efficiency, prosperity and greater consumption, we are left without any sense that there is a global meaning to our civilization. And, on an individual level, the single-minded pursuit of wealth leaves most of us hollow, without any sense of having a personal meaning to our lives. Indeed, our need for this is probably more urgent today than in previous generations. Modern technology has given Western governments the means to exert their power over any part of the world and, significantly, a much greater capacity for good and evil. Some philosophers are fond of pointing out that technology is an amplifier; that each time we commit ourselves to some technology we are endorsing and reinforcing certain values that are inherent in it. So, we ought to be sure that these are the values that should have lasting significance in our lives.

Moreover, such technological change occurs at a rapid pace, leaving most of us without the time or

capacity to think ethically about its effects. The prospect of human cloning confronts us before we have had time to discuss it. GM foods are now part of the food chain, consumed by millions of people, of whom only a small percentage have had the time to discuss it and even fewer who have had any influence over the decision making. The same can be said for stem cell research, organ donations and similar ethical problems. For many who protest, sometimes violently, globalization seems to go ahead at a pace and in search of goals dictated more by multinational companies than by the individuals who will be affected. Our knowledge seems divorced from our values: we have power, but without insight. Our wealth and technology always seem to be outstripping our wisdom.

All of this points to the importance of philosophy and for doing some serious thinking about these issues. Philosophy is this search for order, meaning and value. By thinking the unthinkable and asking the most difficult of questions we can rationally explore these and other fundamental issues. In this way we can form a consistent, systematic and coherent framework of beliefs, values and assumptions, which will help us interpret experience and find some sense in it all.

■ 3. Learning to philosophize

Given this need to create such a framework to negotiate the uncertainty of rapid, bewildering change, just how are we to begin to philosophize? The first thing we must do is to make clear what we're looking for: in other words what are these fundamental issues that we need to examine? What type of questions do philosophers ask that others don't?

Put simply, the questions philosophers ask are fundamental because they concern the principles, assumptions and beliefs that underlie all our other attempts to understand ourselves and the world: psychological, economic, sociological, political and so on. The truth of many other things depends upon our answers to these questions. They may involve questions about the meaning of the ideas and concepts we use, like 'freedom', 'justice' and 'responsibility'. Or they may be concerned about what we base our knowledge on and what we mean when we say that something is 'true'. They involve examining the standards we use when we arrive at judgements we believe to be sound. Other questions concern whether there is any meaning in

life and, if so, how we are to reveal it. We are also concerned about the values we ought to hold and why, particularly in our relations with others.

As you can see, if you look at these questions carefully, they cannot simply be settled by calling upon evidence. They go beyond the findings of empirical science, which proceeds by way of experiment, testing each theory against the evidence. It explains one event, say the spread of influenza, by reference to other events, say, the spread of a new virus or changes in consumption habits that might weaken resistance to it. By contrast, philosophy doesn't confine itself to these secondary or 'contingent' factors (meaning that they might or might not have happened depending on the circumstances). Philosophers are concerned with the first causes that explain all contingent things. So, where scientists finish, philosophers begin. They will ask whether the methods employed in science are reliable; whether our observations of the world can be trusted or if they merely reflect our preconceptions; whether empirical evidence is the best indicator of the truth; indeed, whether the world as a whole is intelligible and, if it is, whether we can ever know it.

Questions like these are about fundamental issues, involving the search for ultimate answers. They are a search for the non-arbitrary explanation of things, the highest principles behind all things. We are rational creatures. We are not content with explanations that depend upon other explanations, and causes of things upon other causes, even though at times this is all we have. We search for the ultimate answer or cause of things. If we are told, 'Well, this is just the way things are!' we are inclined to go on asking 'Why?' until we get to the ultimate reason, where our explanation needs no further explanation.

As we all know, this sort of relentless questioning is most clearly seen in young children. For example, one morning last week as I took my dog for his usual walk I met my neighbours, who were taking their dog and their five-year-old son, Pearson, for a walk. As our dogs frantically chased each other around our legs tangling us up in their leads, Pearson interrogated me. Like many children of his age he asks 'Why?' questions with an unquenchable passion. Never satisfied with my answers, each one was followed by yet another:

'Where have you been, Bryan?' he asks.

'We've been for a walk around the reserve, Pearson,' I answer, already preparing myself for the next question.

'Why have you?'

'Because my dog likes to go out in the morning,' I answer, although I know it is not enough.

With crushing inevitability, he asks, 'Why does he?'

'Because he likes to see all the other dogs,' I respond, knowing that this will not settle it either.

Pearson ploughs on, 'But why does he like to see the other dogs?'

'Because he's very sociable,' I offer, hoping this might do it.

'Why is he?'

'Because all dogs are sociable,' I answer. And so the conversation goes.

Of course, in Pearson's case it was not a serious attempt to reveal an ultimate reason, but if we were in his position asking these questions, more than likely it would be. We set ourselves the task of uncovering the fundamental ground for believing what we believe. It's a search for reasons for things beyond which we cannot go. One explanation for something is more satisfactory if it explains more than the previous explanation: if it encompasses more, if it is more general. In Pearson's case he quickly reaches this point when I make the abstract statement that all dogs are sociable. At this point we are free of the actual circumstances: we have reached the general statement that applies to all dogs. At this level we may be able to discover the ultimate, non-arbitrary reason for things: the most satisfying explanation beyond which we cannot go; beyond which there is no further reason, no further explanation.

One further distinction may help in clarifying the type of question involved in philosophy. While the answers we give in subjects like history and the natural and social sciences are contingent, in that they depend upon the empirical evidence, which could have turned out differently, philosophical questions involve answers about the way things *had* to be: they could not have been otherwise. For example, in history and in the sciences we might find ourselves asking questions like, 'Were the Nazis responsible for setting fire to the Reichstag in 1933?', 'Was the fall in turnout at the last election due to the apathy of the electorate or to a revolt against all the established parties?', or 'Are the causes of global warming to be found in the

increased emissions of carbon dioxide or some other factor?’

By contrast the questions philosophers usually ask are conceptual; they are in search of answers that are necessarily true. That is, their truth is not contingent upon the prevailing circumstances or available evidence, but by virtue of their very nature in all possible worlds. Having said that, of course, we may not always be able to produce answers that are necessarily true; we may just have to settle for answers that at this time are only just probably true. The point is, however, that the type of question we ask is designed to search out necessary truths, even though we may not always be successful and have to settle for something less.

As we will see in the following chapters, we will ask questions like ‘What is knowledge?’, ‘What is truth?’, ‘Is there a God?’, ‘What is morally right?’, ‘What is meant by freedom?’ The answers to all these questions do not depend upon particular times and circumstances: they are true in all possible worlds. We are not just asking about the truth of proposition X, but the truth of all propositions. What do we need to make *any* proposition true?

For example, you may ask the question, ‘What is knowledge?’. This is not a question about a particular item of knowledge, nor is it asking for a scientific answer about the types of knowledge we possess and the methods we use to gather it. What we are asking is what it is to have knowledge: what distinguishes it from mere belief, a hypothesis or a rumour. What do we mean when we use the word ‘knowledge’; what are we looking for that would make something knowledge? If you say that it is a condition of everything we regard as knowledge that it must be true, then this assertion is not just true, but necessarily true: it has to be true of all knowledge. It is not just true as a matter of fact for this or any other item of knowledge, but by definition. The very nature of knowledge dictates it.

From this you can see these are fundamental questions, for which we aim to find ultimate answers. Many philosophers describe the process as one in which we are in search of the ‘foundations’ of what we know about the world, ourselves and our relations with others. In the process this has generated a range of important theories and systems of thought, all of which we will examine in the chapters that follow; systems of thought like rationalism, empiricism, idealism, realism materialism and pragmatism.

However there is an important group of modern

philosophers who challenge the very idea that philosophy is or can be the search for foundations, because, they argue, such foundations are not there in the first place. Loosely described as ‘postmodernists’, they start from the premise that philosophers cannot be divorced from the cultural context in which they work; a context structured by ideas, ideologies, values, assumptions, methods and aspirations. All of this shapes the way they function, how they go about their work and the goals they set themselves. The search for foundations, then, is inescapably determined by the culture in which it is pursued. Philosophers, they argue, are no different from other thinkers, in that they cannot think outside a frame of reference without at the same time adopting another. The best they can do, therefore, is to pursue a clearer understanding of the culture in which they work: its literature, its history, ethics, politics and so on. And in coming to such an understanding they are, in turn, themselves contributing to its evolution.

This is an important departure from the traditional way in which we see philosophers working. Indeed, it strikes at the fundamental assumptions of modern Western culture. Since the seventeenth century scientific revolution and the Enlightenment, we have assumed there is a single objective reality, and science and reason offer the most effective method of discovering it. In contrast the American philosopher Richard Rorty, in his now-famous book, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (1979), declares that ‘we will not imagine that there are enduring constraints on what can count as knowledge, since we will see “justification” as a social phenomenon rather than a transaction between “the knowing subject” and “reality”.’

So, according to Rorty, our search for foundations is more a search for understanding of the beliefs, values and assumptions of each of our cultures at a particular moment in history. He explains, ‘the foundations of knowledge or morality or language or society may be simply apologetics, attempts to externalise a certain contemporary language-game, social practice, or self-image.’ Truth, then, is merely ‘what your contemporaries let you get away with.’ As a result, he concludes ‘no area of culture, and no period of history, gets Reality more right than any other.’

In fact, in terms of the search for foundations, he does not believe, as we are accustomed to believe, that truth can be pinned down in objective and rational conditions that must apply to achieve an

Richard Rorty (1931–)

Born in New York and educated at Chicago and Yale, he taught at Wellesley College, Princeton University, the University of Virginia and Stanford University. He has consistently argued against the idea of philosophy as the search for foundations. Indeed he has called for the overthrow of what he has described as the 'spectatorial account of knowledge' which has dominated philosophy since Plato and Aristotle. He holds that no statement is epistemologically more basic than any other and no statement is ever justified finally or absolutely.

So the search for foundations amounts to little more than an attempt to externalize our own contingent prejudices that find their roots in our own culture. Since Descartes invented the mind, traditional philosophy's attempt to uncover timeless foundations has been an 'attempt to escape from history'. Along the same lines he also rejects the idea that sentences or beliefs are true or false in any interesting sense other than being useful or successful in terms of present social practices. In Dewey, Wittgenstein and Heidegger he claims to have found philosophers who have developed, in what he describes as the 'edifying philosophy', alternatives to the search for 'grounding' of the intuitions and customs of the present. His publications include *The Linguistic Turn* (1967), *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (1979), *Consequences of Pragmatism* (1982) and *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity* (1989).

accurate representation of reality. Rather, it is merely what it is better in our interests to believe: 'the notion of "accurate representation" is simply an automatic and empty compliment which we pay to those beliefs which are successful in helping us do what we want to do', he declares. The rest is little more than 'a self-deceptive effort to externalise the normal discourse of the day.' There is no distinction between reason and persuasion, invention and discovery, theory and practice, even between literature and philosophy. They all amount to just one thing: our attempt to present the beliefs, values and assumptions that rule our culture as reality.

Its critics see postmodernism as presenting a very real threat to the achievements of the last 400 years of modern philosophy. As the British philosopher Simon Blackburn points out,

'According to popular fears, they scoff at everything we hold dear, replacing truth, reason, objectivity, knowledge, and scientific method with fashion, rhetoric, power, subjectivity and relativism – thereby summoning our history and politics, literature and art, indeed western civilisation itself, to its doom.'

Despite the exaggeration implied in these doom-laden fears, postmodern philosophers face serious criticisms, as Blackburn suggests. They have been charged with paradox when they say that there is not truth or that truth is relative, because if there is not truth they are in effect inviting you not to believe what they say. And, similarly, when they claim the fact that there are no absolute values justifies our tolerating all values, they are elevating toleration itself into an absolute value.

The conflict between these two sets of ideas will feature throughout this book as we examine each successive theme. Like all the other problems you will be presented with, you will have to decide for yourself where you stand on this.

■ 4. The method of philosophy

Nevertheless, despite the implications of this, when we study philosophy we are not simply tracking the footsteps of those who have gone before. This is your own voyage of discovery too. As the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein said, and we ourselves have already discovered, 'Philosophy is not a theory but an activity.' It is a method, involving thinking skills, that lifts us above the simple and uncreative activity of merely reproducing the ideas of others, so that we are able to search for and discover answers for ourselves. In this lies, perhaps, its greatest value.

For some this comes as a shock, but for most it is a welcome liberation from the enthrallment to facts that characterizes so much of our education. The problem is that we all grow up believing that education is largely about knowing things; that clever people just know a great deal. Each subject we study we assume has its own authorities, the teacher and the texts, and our role is just to sit quietly and patiently, learn the facts, memorise them, and then recall them on demand in examinations in order to trade them successfully for marks.

But by learning in this way we only exercise and develop a limited range of our intellectual abilities: the lower cognitive skills. It is often said that most

of us use less than 10 per cent of our mind's potential. In other words, the most that we set ourselves to do is to understand what someone else is arguing and to recall it accurately on demand. These are important thinking skills, but that's not all there is to learning. Indeed, in learning this way, the most important part is left out: the ability to think. What's more, you have no opportunity to introduce and use your own ideas: they are seen as irrelevant and unimportant. So you don't experience the excitement of discovering something for yourself, some insight that is genuinely and uniquely yours. This may not be something you have experienced before in learning, but it is an essential part, a daily experience, in philosophy.

Although this is not a story that derives from philosophy, it is the sort of experience you should be having as you wrestle with your own ideas. To make sure it does happen try recording your insights and how your ideas develop in your own intellectual journal. In 1953 Francis Crick and James Watson together discovered the 'double helix', the structure of DNA, for which they were later awarded the Nobel Prize. In his account of his work with Crick, Watson explains how this unpredictable, inspirational thinker would suddenly be consumed by an idea that had been long fermenting in his mind. One day on a train journey to Oxford, Watson describes how Crick suddenly saw a key part of the solution:

Soon something appeared to make sense, and he began scribbling on the vacant back sheet of a manuscript he had been reading. By then I could not understand what Francis was up to and reverted to *The Times* for amusement. Within a few minutes, however, Francis made me lose all interest in the outside world. ... Quickly he began to draw more diagrams to show me how simple the problem was. Though the mathematics eluded me, the crux of the matter was not difficult to follow.

By the end of the hour-and-a-half journey, he explains, it was clear what they had to do.

As this example illustrates, decent thinking is a continuous, cumulative affair that goes on outside the classroom in your mind, your journal and your notebooks, producing sparks of inspiration and insights that are genuinely yours. This is philosophy, as it is any subject that involves genuine, serious thinking. We all see things from our own unique

perspective, so we can all learn from one another. I'm convinced that I learn as much from my students as they do from me. Each time I examine a philosophical text or theme with a new group they help me to see things I have never seen before, because they see it with fresh eyes from a different perspective. You do have an important contribution to make. And this is the exciting opportunity that philosophy offers you.

Nonetheless, it does mean abandoning the easy, comfortable assumption that learning is just about accumulating facts. As we found out earlier, you cannot use your own ideas or develop the higher cognitive skills, like analysis, synthesis, criticism, evaluation and discussion, if all you are concerned about is to gather the facts and recall them. The German theologian Paul Tillich described the problem well when he said, 'The passion for truth is silenced by answers which have the weight of undisputed authority.' If you have a 'fact' there is nothing more to discuss, nothing to say, except to clarify details when they aren't clear. But you don't learn to think like a historian or a scientist by learning, respectively, historical and scientific facts. To learn to think involves suspending your judgement and accepting that there are doubts that need to be addressed. Only in this way can you develop the thinking skills that are so important to philosophy - the skills to analyse, synthesise, discuss, criticize, evaluate and use evidence.

And, of course, this is when learning gets interesting, because your own ideas count for something. You may think you know what a concept means; after all you have probably used it all your life. But now suspend your judgement and ask yourself, 'But what do we *really* mean by it?', and you are on your way to becoming a philosopher. Like a scientist testing a theory, you will have to think up your own borderline examples of its use to test the concept at its limits. This will allow you to see more clearly the assumptions you usually make when you use it, and reveal the interrelations it has with other ideas. In the process you will uncover the issues that are at the heart of the philosophical problem in which the concept plays a central role. This is an exciting process, but it means you must, as Russell says, learn to suspend your judgement and yet still function in a state of doubt.

Nevertheless, even though it draws upon your own ideas and insights, it doesn't mean that just *any* answer to a problem is satisfactory; it's not just a matter of opinion. Opinions may be a point of

departure; they often are. But they have to result in the right answers: those that a rational person can accept as reasonable and defensible after careful thought. In this lies the method of philosophy.

In the next three chapters we will see what this method is exactly. When we consider a philosophical problem, indeed any problem, our first step is very often to gather the evidence from which we can devise a hypothesis or theory to solve the problem. But before we do this we must be sure that we have asked the best question, the one, that is, that gets at the heart of the problem and will allow us to answer it directly. To do this we must be sure that we understand the implications of the key terms, the concepts we are using.

We are concerned here with the logical analysis of language, the meaning of the words and concepts we use. Some philosophers argue that this is the main task of philosophy, indeed, its only legitimate function: to expose the confusion in our use of language that lies beneath the contradictions in our thinking. But, although this is centrally important and is often the point at which we discover the solutions to problems, it is not all there is to devising a solution. This involves both analysis and synthesis. Not only must we suspend our judgement and analyse the meaning and implications of the terms we often take for granted, we must also synthesise arguments and evidence to devise a possible solution to the problem.

Once we have this possible solution as our theory we need to test it. In the second step, therefore, our aim is to test for their validity the arguments, which make up our theory. We must be sure that our arguments are consistent, that there is no error in our reasoning. However, the validity of an argument is only concerned with its form, not its content. So, while an argument might be valid, in that it is quite consistent and makes no logical error, it still might be untrue, because its assumptions, its premises, are untrue. This leads us to the third step.

In this our concern is to test our arguments for their truth. It involves not just checking to see that our assumptions are correct, but, equally important, checking that our theory adequately answers the problem. Beyond this we must also look at the consequences of our theory. In particular we must check to see if it is consistent with other theories we might advance to answer other problems that are connected with this problem. Our aim is to create a coherent and systematic view of the whole. Each of the theories answering the problems we believe are

important must create a coherent and consistent system of ideas.

So, to summarize:

1. Hypothesizing – designing a solution:

- 1.1 Asking the best question
- 1.2 Designing the best solution
- 1.3 Analysing the key concepts

2. Testing for validity – is our argument consistent? – are there any logical errors in our reasoning?

3. Testing for truth:

- 3.1 Are the assumptions correct?
- 3.2 Are the arguments true?
- 3.3 Is the theory adequate to answer the problem?
- 3.4 The consequences of our theory – does it make a coherent system of ideas?

■ 5. Conclusion

It should be clear from this that the study of philosophy brings to those who learn its method not just the excitement of genuine discovery, but benefits in the development of their minds that are not easily found elsewhere. It is sometimes said of philosophy that it detaches your mind from the real world: that it is concerned with speculative ideas that have no practical value. This may be true of some philosophers, but not of philosophy. Learning its method alone enlarges your view of the world and of yourself, liberating you from the fragile prejudices that your understanding may be built upon.

Learn well and you will likely become a more effective thinker, not just absorbing and reproducing facts uncritically. You will take less for granted, particularly the pronouncements of those we take to be authorities. You will be less willing to follow the crowd and be more prepared to doubt what seems obvious to everyone else. But, by the same

token, your own beliefs will come in for the same critical scrutiny: you will be less willing to accept the ambiguities and confusions that lie at the heart of your thinking. In this way you are likely to become more aware of the limits as well as the justifications of your beliefs.

But still, this doesn't mean that you will become an inveterate sceptic unwilling to embrace any belief. Indeed, in many respects it's quite the reverse. Your thinking will not only have more depth, but more breadth. While you will be more likely to pursue your own ideas more deeply, freeing them from unexamined assumptions, implications and ambiguities, you are also likely to have a more open mind. You will develop the intellectual strength to tolerate and understand views different from your own. Not for nothing do parents often say to me that their offspring is not just more thoughtful, creative and inventive, but is, quite simply, just a nicer person.

■ Recommended reading

Blackburn, S. *Think* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

Emmet, E. R. *Learning to Philosophize* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968).

Nagel, Thomas. *What Does It All Mean? A Very Short Introduction to Philosophy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

Warburton, N. *Philosophy: The Basics* (London: Routledge, 1992).

Index

A

- a posteriori*, 15–16, 70, 99
a priori, 15–16, 70, 99, 103
absolute idealism, *see* idealism;
 objective idealism
absolutism, 284–5
accidental generalisations, 134
accountability, 376, 396
action guiding, 287, 292–3, 325
active agency, 244
Acton, Lord, 376, 397
Adams, John Crouch, *see*
 Leverrier
affirming the consequent, the
 fallacy of, 40–1
agathistic theories, 321, 323
 definition, 321
agnostic, 87
agnosticism, 169
alienation, 267, 399
aliens, 83
Althusser, Louis, 234
altruism, 310–2
 golden rule, 310
analogy, argument by, 48–50, 132,
 134
 Copi's six criteria, 49–50
 fallacy of false analogy, 49–50
analysis, 8–9, 17
 three-step technique, 18–23
analytic propositions, 15, 58, 98
anarchism, 370–1, 380, 393–5
 communalist, 394
 law and morality, 379
 see also civil disobedience;
 direct action;
 Kropotkin; Proudhon
Anarchy, State and Utopia,
 (Nozick), 358
An Evil Cradling (Keenan), 155
Anselm, St., 88, 160
 brief life, 160
 ontological argument, 160–1
anthropomorphism, 156–8
Anti-Duhring (Engels), 262
appearance and reality, 96–9
Aquinas, 158, 161, 169, 213, 222
 brief life, 161
 cosmological arguments,
 160–3
 doctrine of analogical
 predication, 158
 self, 213, 222
 Summa Theologica, 161
Arendt, Hannah, 320–1, 396
 banality of evil, 320
 brief life, 321
 Eichmann in Jerusalem, 320
 permanent impermanence,
 396
 perpetual motion mania, 396
aristocracy, 341, 372, 391, 394
Aristotle, 158, 213, 239–42, 248,
 253, 265–6, 272, 303, 331–3
 biography, 240
 character, 272
 determinism, 265–6, 269
 eudaimonia, 331
 free will, 239–41
 golden mean, 332–3
 Nicomachean Ethics, 265–6,
 284, 331
 paradox of hedonism, 332
 reason, 331–3
 relativism, 284
 teleological view, 213
 virtue ethics, 330–3
Arnold, Matthew, 363
 Culture and Anarchy, 363
 Arrival and Departure, (Koestler),
 241
asking the best question, 9, 11–13
atomism, 254, 260, 262, 313, 350,
 362–5, 392, 398
 see also mechanistic concept
atomistic theory of perception,
 107, 195–6, 402
Augustine, St., 174
Auschwitz, 255
authoritarianism, 379, 381, 389
 law and morality, 379
 see also autocracy
authority, 13–16, 19, 26–31, 55,
 339–40, 343–56, 393–4, 397
 divine, 55
 secular, 55
Autobiography of John Stuart Mill,
 (Mill), 326
autocracy, 338, 340–2, 361, 371–2,
 380
 liberal, 375–6
 totalitarian, 375–6
 see also authoritarianism
autonomous discourse, 287–8,
 291
Ayer, A.J., 63, 293, 402
 brief life, 293
 entitlement, 63
 Language, Truth and Logic, 121
 logical positivism, 121
 see emotivism
B
Bacon, Sir Francis, 95, 137–8, 385
 ideology, 385
 Novum Organum, 95
Baier, Annette, 350–1
Barthes, Roland, 263
Beauvoir, Simone de, 222–4
 brief life, 223
 The Second Sex, 222
Beckett, Samuel, 79,
begging the question, 12, 65, 137,
behaviourism, 206–9
 instrumentalists, 207
 logical or metaphysical,
 207–9
 methodological, 206–7
Being and Nothingness, (Sartre),
 224, 256
belief, 59–60, 76
 see also religion
Bell, Daniel, 385
 The End of Ideology, 385
Bem, Sandra, 318
Bentham, Jeremy, 274–5, 301, 321,
 323–4, 327, 364, 381, 393
 brief life, 275
 extent of power, 364
 felicific calculus, 324
 first/second order evils, 324,
 327
 punishment, 274–5
 *Principles of Morals and
 Legislation*, 274–5
 security, 275
Berkeley, Bishop George, 61,
 98–100, 112–5, 196
 biography, 112
 doctrine of abstract ideas, 113
 empiricism, 61
 esse est percipi, 114
 external world, 106
 God, 103, 113–5
 Husserl, 196
 idealism, 100
 ideas of sensation and
 reflection, 114
 Locke, 113
 mind and ideas, 113
 notions, 114
 perpetual annihilation, 113
 physical objects, 113–5
 science, 115
 subjective idealism, 112–5
 *Three Dialogues between Hylas
 and Philonous*, 112–4
 *Treatise concerning the
 Principles of Human
 Knowledge*, 112
Berlin, Isaiah, 71, 97–8, 102,
 359–62
 brief life, 359
 Enlightenment, The, 71
 liberty, 359–62
 metaphysics, 97, 98
 'Two Concepts of Liberty', 359
Beyond Freedom and Dignity,
 (Skinner), 268
Beyond Good and Evil,
 (Nietzsche), 226
biconditional propositions, 84
bifurcation of nature, 181
Blackburn, Simon, 7, 81
Blake, William, 313
 Songs of Experience, 313
 Songs of Innocence, 313
Blanshard, Brand, 250
body politic, 390
 see organic analogy
Bolshevism, 399
Bonhoeffer, Dietrich, 155
Born, Max, 246
Bradley, F.H., 366
Brahe, Tycho, 82
brain in a vat argument, 86
Brave New World, (Huxley), 188,
 367
Brecht, Bertold, 67
 The Life of Galileo, 67
Breuer, Josef, 262
British idealists, 359–60, 366
 positive liberty, 366–8
 see also Bradley; Green;
 Ritchie
Brittain, Robert, 248–9
Broad, C.D., 205
 see identity theory
Brothers Karamazov, The,
 (Dostoevsky), 173
Buddhism, 155
bureaucracy, 342

- Burke, Edmund, 258, 391
 conservatism, 374
 democracy, 374
Reflections on the Revolution in France, 258, 391
- Butler, Joseph, 311
- Butterfield, Herbert, 361
- C**
- Campbell, C.A., 245
 determinism, 245
- capitalism, 254–5, 261, 386–8, 399–401
- Carnap, Rudolf, 121, 293
 brief life, 123
see emotivism
- Cartesian Meditations*, (Husserl), 196
- Castroism, 395
- categorical propositions, 34–7
 category mistake, 189, 207
- causal theory of perception, 103, 106
see also Descartes; Locke
- causation, 130–4, 199, 237–51
 causal explanations, 239
 deductive nomological argument, 239
 determinism, 237–51
 principle of universal causation, 237–9, 247
see also cause; Hume
- cause, 130–4, 202, 239–41, 246–51
 animistic, 130
 correlation, 132
compare conditions, 202
see also compulsion
- centring the subject, 253–7
 certainty, sources of, 55
- character, 269–71, 278, 330–3
see Aristotle; determinism; virtue ethics
- charismatic authority, 375
- Chateaubriand, François René, Vicomte de, 313
- chicken sexer, 63–4
- China, 372
 Cultural Revolution, 401
 Great Leap Forward, 372
- Chomsky, Noam, 105
- Christian ethical theory, 291
- civil disobedience, 280–1, 378–82, 393–4
see also Bentham; Hume; King; Locke; Plato; Rawls; social contract theory; Thoreau
- Civilisation and its Discontents*, (Freud), 210
- cognitivism, 279, 287–92, 297–8
compare prescriptivism
- coherence theory, 76–7, 93
- collectivize, 252, 258
- Collingwood, R.G., 73, 239
- commensurability, 325
see utilitarianism
- communism, 361, 388, 396–401
 Soviet communism, 388
see Marxism; socialism
- Communist Manifesto, The*, (Marx), 255, 262
- compatibilism, *see* determinism
- composition, fallacy of, 33
- compound propositions, 37–4
- compulsion, 239–42, 248–51, 265–71
- conative, 292, 298, 312
- concentration camps, 255–7
- Concept of Mind, The*, (Ryle), 189, 207
- concepts, xvi, 17–23, 155–7, 376, 388
 analysis of, 17–23, 388
 open and closed, 17–18, 376
 religious, 155–7
- Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, (Kierkegaard), 171, 172
- conditional propositions, 38
- Configurations of Masculinity*, (Di Stefano), 350
- Conjectures and Refutations*, (Popper), 143
- consciousness, 181, 185–8, 203–4, 207, 215–6, 241, 243–4, 386–8, 400
 and rationality, 186
 and self, 215–6
 class, 386–8, 400
 free will, 241, 243–4
- consensus politics, *see* end of ideology debate
- consent, theory of, 346–7
- consequentialism, 274–5, 280, 283, 318, 321–30
 definition, 321
 punishment, 274–5
see also agathistic theories; hedonistic theories; morality; utilitarianism
compare deontological ethics; virtue ethics
- conservatism, 371, 391–2, 395–99
 law and order, 397
 pragmatic, 396
 tradition, 396–8
- Conservative Party (Britain), 395
- contingent claims, 5, 15–16
see also empirical propositions
- contingent truth, 70–1, 159–60
- conversion, 33–6
 illicit, 33–4, 36
- Cooper, David, 229
- Copernicus, Nicolaus, 85, 181
- Copi, Irving, 49
- Coplestone, F.C., 158
- correspondence theory, 74–8
 self-referential, 78
- cosmological arguments, *see* God
- counterfactual conditionals, 76
see also subjunctive conditionals
- creationists, 153
- Crick, Bernard, 378
- Crick, Francis, *see* Watson, James
- cricket morality, *see* Koestler
- criticism, 51–2
see also playing devil's advocate
- Critique of Pure Reason, The*, (Kant) 72, 217, 253
- Cultural Revolution, 401
- Culture and Anarchy*, (Arnold), 363
- D**
- Darkness at Noon*, (Koestler), 302, 320, 341, 354–5, 364, 375
- Darrow, Clarence, 270–1
- Darwin, Charles, 136, 154, 163–4
Descent of Man, The, 154
 hypothesizing, 136
Origins of Species, 154
- Davidson, Donald, 93
 decentring the subject, 257–64
- deduction, 27–41, 133
- Defoe, Daniel, 350
- degrees of the truth theory, *see* idealism
- deism, 156, 169
- democracy, 17, 338, 341–2, 348, 372–82, 391, 393, 395, 398, 401
 analysis of, 17
 broad/narrow definitions, 377–8
 delegate, 374
 direct, 372–3, 393
 indirect, 372–5
 liberal, 340, 348, 373–4, 376–8, 395, 398
 literacy, 372
 mass, 363
 parliamentary, 394, 401
 representative, 374, 391–2
 responsible, 374, 391–2
 secret ballot, 372–3
 totalitarian, 348, 373, 375–8
see accountability; law; participation; Macpherson
- denotation, 205
see identity theory
- denying the antecedent, the
 fallacy of, 40
- deontological ethics, 280, 283, 300–315, 320–1
see double effect; Ewing; Kant, moral theory; Prichard; Ross
compare consequentialism; utilitarianism; virtue ethics
- Derrida, Jacques, 234–5, 264
see post-structuralism
- Descartes, René, 58, 61, 83–9, 95, 98–103, 111, 160, 181–2, 186–8, 190, 197, 204, 207–8, 213–4, 264, 317
 animals, 182, 186
 biography, 84
 clear and distinct ideas, 88–9, 101–3
- cogito ergo sum*, 61, 88–9, 187–8, 209
- Discourse on Method*, 87
- dualism, 100, 111, 181, 187–8, 197–211
- evil genius, 86–7, 95, 98, 102
- female ethics, 317
- foundations, 112
- God, 101–3, 160
- hyperbolic doubt, 86
see also scepticism
- innate ideas, 98–9, 102
- interactionism, 182, 198–200
- matter, 101–2
- Meditations on First Philosophy*, 83, 87, 101, 160, 214
- method of doubt, 83–8
- mind, 181, 222–4
- ontological argument, 88, 160
see also God
- physical objects, 114
- rationalism, 61, 101–3
- self, 182, 186–8, 213–5, 217
- substance, 100
- wax example, 101–2
compare behaviourism; Husserl; Nietzsche
- Descent of Man, The*, (Darwin), 154
- descriptions, 8, 132
see also prescriptions
- descriptivism, 279, 297–8
compare Hare; prescriptivism
- desires, 311–2
- Destutt de Tracy, A.L.C., 385
- determinism, 182–3, 237–51, 255–6, 259, 261, 265–71, 278
 antecedents, 238, 241–4, 247
 chance, 246–7
 character, 245, 248–51
 consequents, 238
 definition, 238
 hard, 241–4
 indeterminism, 241, 244–7
 moral self, 245–6, 250–1
 physical, 241–2
 psychological, 242
 soft, 241–2, 247–51
see also causation; consciousness; fatalism; free will; predeterminism
see Aristotle; Blanshard; Campbell; Hume; James; Kant; J.S. Mill; Nagel; Sartre; Spinoza
- Devlin, Lord Patrick, 364, 379
The Enforcement of Morals, 364
- law and morality, 379
- Dewey, John, 78, 98, 123, 207
 biography, 208
- Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, (Hume), 169, 175
- Diderot, Denis, 169
- Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's*

- Development, A.* (Gilligan), 316
- Dilemma of Determinism, The* (James), 245
- Dilthey, Wilhelm, 258–9
- direct action, 393–4
- direct realism, 114
- Discipline and Punish* (Foucault), 235
- Discourse on Method* (Descartes), 87
- disjunctive propositions, 38
- Di Stefano, Christine, 350
- Configurations of Masculinity*, 350
- divine right theory, 341, 344
- division, fallacy of, 32–3
- doctrine of analogical predication, 158
- Dodgson, C.L., 79
- Dostoevsky, Fyodor Mikhailovich, 173
- The Brothers Karamazov*, 173
- double effect, 302
- dual aspect theory, 200–1
- dualism, 100, 111, 181, 187–8, 197, 198–211
- see also Descartes
- Duff, Antony, 277
- restoration, 277
- duties, 391, 393
- compare rights
- Dynamics of Faith*, (Tillich), 172
- E**
- Ecce Homo* (Nietzsche), 174
- Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, (Marx), 175
- economic man, 350
- Edwards, Paul, 238
- Ego and the Id, The*, (Freud) 228
- egocentric predicament, 90
- egoism, 301, 306–10
- ethical, 308–10
- psychological, 308, 310
- see Butler; Epicurus; Hobbes; Lincoln; Medlin; Moore; Plato, The Ring of Gyges
- Eichmann, Adolf, 320
- Eichmann in Jerusalem*, (Arendt), 320
- Einstein, Albert, 62, 78, 135, 139–42, 144, 146–7, 154
- induction, 135
- relativity, 62, 78, 140–2, 144–5, 148–9
- 11th Thesis on Feuerbach*, (Marx), 262, 403
- Eliot, T. S., 4
- Ellis, Ruth, 249, 269–70
- Emile*, (Rousseau), 313–5
- emotivism, 279, 286, 293–4
- see also Ayer; Carnap; Stevenson
- compare naturalism
- empirical propositions, 14–16, 58, 130
- empiricism, 61–2, 73–4, 101–7, 113–8, 200
- Berkeley, 113–5
- feminist epistemology, 151–2
- four key principles, 103–4
- Hume, 115–8
- induction, 61, 104
- Locke, 104–7
- sense experience, 61
- End of Ideology, The*, (Bell), 385
- end of ideology debate, 385
- consensus politics, 385
- see also Bell
- Enforcement of Morals, The*, (Devlin), 364
- Engels, Friedrich, 262, 387
- Anti-Duhring*, 262
- Enlightenment, The, 3, 14, 55, 71, 74, 82, 150, 169, 175, 181, 245, 252–4, 258, 262, 313–5, 398
- philosophes*, 169, 175
- see Berlin, Isaiah
- compare romanticism
- Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, (Hume), 312
- entailment, 44–5, 63, 76, 133
- Epicurus, 309
- epiphenomenalism, 202–4, 241, 243
- epistemic theories, 74
- see also truth
- epistemology, 16, 70
- a posteriori, 70
- a priori, 70
- see also feminist epistemology
- equality, 355, 360, 390, 396
- freedom 360
- social, 396
- equivocation, fallacy of, 32–3
- Eros and Civilisation*, (Marcuse), 232
- error theory, 290
- see J.L. Mackie
- Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, (Locke), 214
- Escape from Freedom*, (Fromm), 372
- Essay on Liberation*, (Marcuse), 233
- Essay on the Inequality of Human Races*, (Gobineau), 398–9
- Essay on the Principle of Population*, (Malthus), 362
- essentialism, 182, 315
- female ethics, 315
- see also self
- ethical scepticism, 284
- ethics, 282–336
- metaethics, 282–98
- normative ethics, see morality, 282–3, 300–36
- see absolutism; cognitivism; emotivism; ethical scepticism; expressivism; intuitionism; morality;
- naturalism;
- non-cognitivism;
- objectivism;
- prescriptivism;
- relativism; subjectivism
- see also action guiding;
- autonomous discourse;
- is-ought gap; reason;
- universalism
- Ethics*, (Spinoza), 241
- Ethics and Language*, (Stevenson), 293
- Eurocommunism, 401
- Euthyphro*, (Plato), 173–4, 285, 325, 381
- evidence
- quality, 63–4
- quantity, 64–5
- evil genius, see Descartes
- evil, the problem of, 174–5
- evolution, 148, 153
- evolutionary ethics, 288
- Ewing, A.C., 302
- existentialism, 182, 192, 220–30, 254–7
- choice, 255
- existential psychotherapy, 229–30
- self, 182, 220–8,
- see also Frankl; Kierkegaard; Sartre
- Existentialism and Humanism*, (Sartre), 192, 221, 256–7
- experience, 55,
- see sense experience
- explanation, 127–53, 239
- background theories, 146
- causal, 128–34
- covering law model, 133–4
- deductive nomological model, 133–4, 239
- explanandum, 133, 239
- explanans, 133, 239
- initial conditions, 133, 146
- necessary connection, 130–4
- purposive, 128–9
- reduction to the familiar, 129–30
- subjunctive and counterfactual conditionals, 132–4
- universal laws, 133
- compare descriptions
- see also causation; accidental generalisations
- expressivism, 286, 288
- extent of power, see power
- external world scepticism, 83
- extrinsic value, 302, 321
- Eysenck, Hans, 270
- F**
- Fact, Fiction and Forecast*, (Goodman), 136
- faith, 165–6
- see religion
- fallacies, 31–4, 40–1, 49–50, 137
- affirming the consequent, 40–1, 137
- denying the antecedent, 40
- equivocation, 32–3
- of composition, 33
- of division, 32–3
- of false analogy, 49–50
- of illicit process of major and minor term, 33–4
- of undistributed middle term, 33
- suppressed premises, 31–2
- false analogy, fallacy of, 49–50
- false consciousness, see ideology; Marx
- falsification, 137–8
- fascism, 155, 361, 392, 395–9
- irrationalism, 398
- racial purity/superiority, 399
- radical right, 399
- third way, 398
- see also Gobineau; Social Darwinism
- fatalism, 238, 247, 403
- female ethics, 280, 315–8
- Bem, Sandra, 318
- Descartes, 317
- essentialism, 315
- Gilligan, Carol, 316
- Grimshaw, Jean, 317
- Held, Virginia, 317
- Jaggar, Alison, 316, 318
- Noddings, Nel, 316
- compare Rousseau
- see also Wollstonecraft
- Female Eunuch, The*, (Greer), 349
- Feminine Mystique, The*, (Friedan), 349
- feminism, 349, 351
- radical, 349, 351
- socialist, 349
- feminist epistemology, 150–2
- and postmodernism, 152
- relativism and scientific objectivity, 150–2
- standpoint theorists, 151–2
- theories of validation, 150–2
- feminist politics, 280, 349–52
- Baier, Annette, 350–1
- Di Stefano, Christine, 350
- Held, Virginia, 350–1
- Pateman, Carole, 349–50
- the personal and political, 349–50
- social contract theory, 349–52
- feminist self, 222–4
- feudalism, 399–400
- Fichte, Johann, 182
- fideism, 169–70, 179
- force, 339–40, 345
- force theory, 344–5
- Foucault, Michel, 234–6, 264, 266, 277
- brief life, 267
- Discipline and Punish*, 235
- The History of Sexuality*, 235
- insane, 264
- Madness and Civilisation*, 266

- normality, 277
 see also post-modernism;
 Laing
- foundations, 6–7, 318
- Frankena, William, 321, 330
 golden rule, 306–7
 see also Kant
- Frankl, Victor, 229, 255–7
Man's Search for Meaning, 255
- freedom, 18–20, 242–3, 252–264
 analysis of, 18–20
 equality, 360
 political freedom, see liberty
 see Freud; Hegel; Kant;
 Kierkegaard; Marx; J.S.
 Mill; Sartre
 see also determinism; free
 will; historicism; post-
 structuralism
 structuralism
- free will, 156, 182–3, 210, 239–51
 and God, 156
 see also Aristotle;
 consciousness;
 determinism;
 responsibility
- Freud, Sigmund, 178–9, 210–11,
 228–9, 262–3
*Civilisation and its
 Discontents*, 210
The Ego and the Id, 228
The Future of an Illusion, 178
 superego, 178
 unconscious, the, 188–9,
 262–3
 see Marcuse
- Friedan, Betty, 349
The Feminine Mystique, 349
- Fromm, Erich, 372
 brief life, 372
Escape from Freedom, 372
- functionalism, 209–210
- fundamental questions, 4–6
- Future of an Illusion, The*, (Freud),
 178
- G**
- Galileo Galilei, 82–3, 101, 144,
 181
- Galle, J.G., 141
- Gauthier, David, 350–1
- Gellner, Ernest, 397
- gender, 222
- Genealogy of Morals, The*,
 (Nietzsche), 176
- generalizations, 34–7, 91
 partial, 36–7
 universal affirmative, 34–5
- general will, theory of, 347–9,
 375, 395
- Genesis and Structure of Society*,
 (Gentile), 366
- Gentile, Giovanni, 347, 366–8,
 389, 395
 absolute democracy, 395
 brief life, 367
 extent of power, 366–8
- Genesis and Structure of
 Society*, 366
- German Ideology, The*, (Marx),
 255, 386, 403
- gerontocracy, 342
- gestalt psychology, 107, 196, 402
- Gettier, Ernest, 66
 examples, 66
- Gilligan, Carol, 316
*A Different Voice: Psychological
 Theory and Women's
 Development*, 316
- Gladstone, W.E., 362
- Gobineau, Joseph, 398–9
*Essay on the Inequality of
 Human Races*, 398–9
- God, 101–3, 106, 132
 cosmological arguments,
 161–3
 miracles, 92, 165
 ontological argument, 88,
 160–1
 revelations, 165–6
 teleological argument
 (design), 142, 163–4
 see also Aquinas; Anselm;
 Berkeley; Descartes;
 Hume; Kant; Locke;
 Russell
- golden rule, 310
 see Frankena; Kant;
 universalism
- Goodman, Nelson, 136
Fact, Fiction and Forecast, 136
- Goodman, Paul, 393–4
- government, 337–68, 370–82
 forms of, 337–8, 370–82
 power, 357–68
 see authority; autocracy;
 democracy; force;
 influence; legitimacy;
 liberalism; power;
 totalitarianism
 see also political obligation;
 social contract
- Great Chain of Being, The, 344
- Great Leap Forward, 401
- Green, T.H., 359–60, 366
 brief life, 360
 positive liberty, 359–60
- Greer, Germaine, 349
The Female Eumuch, 349
- Grimshaw, Jean, 316–7
 female ethics, 316
- Gulliver's Travels*, (Swift), 115
- H**
- happiness, 324–6
 see also utilitarianism; virtue
 ethics
- Hare, R.M., 272, 294–6, 298, 324,
 327–9, 348
 brief life, 294
 descriptive fallacy, 298
 descriptivism, 298
 intuitions, 272, 324
 is–ought gap, 295–6
- Moral Thinking*, 272, 294, 298,
 324, 327
- preference utilitarianism,
 327–9
- prescriptivism, 294–5, 298
- harm, 254, 363–5
- Harman, Gilbert, 66
 no false lemmas principle, 66
- Hawking, Stephen, 136, 154
- hedonism, 301, 321
 definition, 321
- Hegel, G.W.F., 76, 112, 259–61,
 362, 366, 391, 397, 398, 400
 absolute idealism, 76, 112
 and Kant, 259–61
 and Marx, 261–2
 antithesis, 259
 biography, 260
 freedom, 260–1
 history, 261
 objectivity, 259
Phenomenology of Spirit, 259
 relations, 260
 spirit (*Geist*), 259–61, 366
 synthesis, 259
 theory of the state, 362, 366
- Heidegger, Martin, 98, 192
 brief life, 192
- Heisenberg, Werner, 139, 246–7
- Held, Virginia, 317, 350–1
 female ethics, 317
 feminist politics, 350–1
- Hempel, Carl, 134, 142
Philosophy of Natural Science,
 134
- Herapath, John, 142
- Herder, Johann Gottfried von,
 397
- hermeneutics, 258–9
- Hick, John, 155, 158
- hierarchy, 391
- Hill, Thomas, 366
 deferential wife, 366
- historicism, 258–62
- historicize, 252, 258
- history
 laws of, 391
 theories of, 341, 372, 396–7
- History of Sexuality, The*,
 (Foucault) 235
- Hobbes, Thomas, 182, 194, 286,
 309, 344–5, 350, 355,
 358–62, 389
 brief life, 194
 egoism, 309
 freedom, 359
 human nature, 358–62, 389,
Leviathan, 309, 342, 344–5
 materialism, 194
 moral subjectivism, 286
- holism, 263
- Holmes, Sherlock, 137
- Hospers, John, 141, 263, 270,
 271–4
- Hudson, W.D., 296, 297
Modern Moral Philosophy, 296
- Human Destructiveness*, (Storr),
 242, 268, 270
- human nature, 345, 348–9,
 358–62, 370–1, 388–9
- liberty, 358–62
 see Hobbes; Rousseau
- Hume, David, 28–9, 61, 72–3, 98,
 112, 115–8, 381, 402
 biography, 131
 causation, 72, 116, 131–4
 counterfactual and
 subjunctive
 conditionals, 132–4
 determinism, 247–8
*Dialogues Concerning Natural
 Religion*, 169, 175
 empiricism, 61
*Enquiry Concerning the
 Principles of Morals*, 312
 fact/value distinction, 313
 habits of association, 72, 74,
 105, 116, 131
 Hume's Law, 296, 313
 impressions and ideas, 71,
 116
 induction, 28–9, 104, 144–5
 is–ought gap, 296, 313
 justice and utility, 354
 matters of fact, 71, 117
 metaphysics, 117
 mind, 99, 115–6
 miracles, 92, 165
 necessary connection, 132–4
 physical objects, 117
 principle of induction, 137
 relations of ideas, 71, 117
 scepticism, 117–8
 science, 116
 self, 72, 216–7
 sensualism, 115
 sentiment, 312–5
 teleological argument, 163–4
Treatise of Human Nature, A,
 72, 115, 152, 216, 296
 vicious circle, 28–9
 will, 250
- Husserl, Edmund, 182, 195–6
 Berkeley, 196
 brief life, 195
Cartesian Meditations, 196
 Descartes, 195–6
 intentionality, 195–6
 phenomenology, 196
 transcendental ego, 182, 196
 see also Merleau-Ponty
- Huxley, Aldous, 188, 193, 285,
 312, 367
Brave New World, 188, 367
Point Counter Point, 285, 312
Science, Liberty and Peace, 193
- Huxley, Thomas, 169, 203, 210,
 278
 conscious automata, 203, 210,
 278
- hyperbolic doubt, 86
 see undercutting defeater
 see also scepticism
- hypothetical syllogisms, 38–40
 mixed, 39–40
 pure, 38–9

- hypothetico-deductive method, 135, 140–1
- I**
- idealism, 76, 100, 103, 193
 absolute, 76, 103
 degrees of truth theory, 76
see also Hegel
- identity theory, 204–6
- ideological warfare, 388
- Ideology and Utopia*, (Mannheim), 387
- ideology, 6, 78, 155, 232–3, 261, 266, 382, 385–8, 389, 394–7, 400
 emotional safety, 388
 end of ideology, 385
 false consciousness, 386–7, 400
 liberty, 361–2
 science of ideas, 385
 secular religion, 385
 system of beliefs, 385, 387–8
see also Bacon; Destutt de Tracy; Marx; Mannheim; political socialization; Trilling
- If this is a Man*, (Levi), 256
- illicit process of major and minor term, fallacy of, 33–4
- imperialism, 391, 400
- individualism, 394
- induction, 2–4, 27, 46–53, 65, 91, 134–8, 140–50, 196
 confirmation, 137, 146–50
 curve-fitting problem, 136
 discovering hypotheses, 134–7
 hypothesizing, 136
 justifying hypotheses, 137–8
 logical positivism, 122
 narrow inductivism, 134–7, 145, 196
 observation and experiment, 135–6
 principle of, 28, 137–8, 140, 143
 rational defensibility, 46
see also argument by analogy; hypothetico-deductive method; probability; uniformity of nature
see also Hume; Popper; Semmelweis; Smith
- influence, 339–40
- initial conditions, 133, 146
- innate ideas, *see* Descartes; Locke
- Inside the Criminal Mind*, (Samenow), 271
- intentionality, 195
see Husserl; Merleau-Ponty
- interactionism, 100, 102–3, 187, 194, 198–200, 202–3
- interests, 311–2
- internationalism, 390
- intrinsic value, 302, 321
- intuitionism, 287, 289–92, 297
see also G.E. Moore
- is-ought gap, 295–8
- J**
- Jaggar, Alison, 316, 318
- James, William, 77, 123, 245
 belief in God, 77
 brief life, 245
 determinism, 245–6, 247
The Dilemma of Determinism, 245
- Jefferson, Thomas, 254
- justice, 327, 354–5, 378
 distributive, 327
 equality, 355
 theory of, 352–5
 special responsibility, 327
 utility, 352–5
see also Hume; Locke; Rawls
- Jung, Carl, 317
- K**
- Kalin, Jesse
 strong universalism, 305
- Kant, Immanuel, 59, 72–4, 98, 103–5, 112, 118–121, 152, 217–8, 253–4, 260–1, 285, 302–7, 309–10, 402
 agnosticism, 115
 and Hegel, 259–61
 antinomies and paradoxes, 73
 biography, 72
 categorical imperative, 254, 303–5
 categories, 119, 217
 critical idealism, 103–4, 118–9
Critique of Pure Reason, *The*, 72, 217, 253
 determinism, 253–4
 dignity of the individual, 253
 dogmatic slumber, 118–9
 existentialism, 200–2
 forms of intuition and understanding, 73, 103–5, 118–20
 freedom, 253–4
 golden rule, 306–7
 maxim, 303
 metaphysics, 120–1
 mind, 118–9
 moral theory, 218–9, 253–4, 285, 302–7
 noumenal and phenomenal worlds, 73, 118, 120–1, 201, 218, 260–1
 ontological argument, 120–1, 160
 paralogsms and antinomies, 120–1
 perception and conception, 73, 119–20
 phenomenalism, 120
 practical reason, 254, 303–7, 309–10
 Rousseau, 313
 self, 217–9
 sense experience, 118–9
 synthetic *a priori* propositions, 118–9, 254
 universalism, 253–4, 303–7, 309–10
 willing, 304–6, 309–10
see also Frankena; Ross
compare Eichmann
- Kedourie, Eli, 397
- Keenan, Brian, 155
An Evil Cradling, 155
- Kelsen, Hans, 379
The Pure Theory of Law, 379
- Kennedy, J.F., 341
- Kepler, Johannes, 78, 82, 101, 141, 144, 146–7
- Kesey, Ken
One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest, 277
- Kierkegaard, 169, 170–2, 225–6, 255
 and Marx, 262
 biography, 171
Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 171, 172
- Sartre, 226
- Self, 225–6
- subjective truth, 170–2
- subjectivity, 225–6
compare, Descartes
- King, Martin Luther, Jr., 380
 civil disobedience, 380
- Klein, Melanie, 262
- Kneale, William, 134
 principles of necessitation, 134
- knowledge, 2, 12–3, 55, 57–67, 76, 86–7, 89–93, 95–107
a posteriori, 99
a priori, 99, 103
 and belief, 59–60, 13
 and justification, 62–6
 and truth, 60–2
 as good reasons, 65–6
 demonstrative, 90
 foundations, 121, 126
 innate ideas, 98–9
 intuitive, 90
 probability, 65
 reasonable doubt, 66
see Russell
see also universals
- Koestler, Arthur, 241, 318, 354, 364, 375
Arrival and Departure, 241
 consequential logic, 375
 cricket morality, 303, 318
Darkness at Noon, 302, 320, 341, 354–5, 364, 375
 infallible pointsman, 375
 vivisection morality, 302, 354
- Kripke, Saul, 206
 brief life, 206
Naming and Necessity, 206
- Kristeva, Julia, 264
- Kropotkin, Peter, 394
- Kuhn, Thomas, 148–50, 286, 317, 318
 brief life, 148
 confirmation, 148–50
 crisis, 148–50
 normal science, 148–9
 objective reality, 150
 paradigms, 148–9
 pre-paradigm science, 150
 relativism, 152
 revolutions, 148–50
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, *The*, 148
- L**
- labour theory of value, 352, 363
- Lacan, Jacques, 263
- Laing, R.D., 182, 190, 229–30, 266–7
 normality, 277
 ontological insecurity, 182, 190
 sanity, 266
laissez-faire, 392, 395
 language, 75, 122
 religious language, 155, 157–9
Language, Truth and Logic, (Ayer), 121
- Laplace, Pierre Simon de, 238
- Lapp, Ralph, 342
- law
 and morality, 378–9
 and order, 392, 397
 learning, 97
see Plato
- left/right spectrum, 371, 389–90, 394
- legitimacy, 281, 338–56, 371–8, 380
 and legality, 340–1
 and morality, 343, 379
 theories of, 343–56
- Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm von, 58, 101, 188–9, 200–3
 and Locke, 105
 brief life, 201
 monad, 201–2
The Monadology, 201
petit perceptions, 188–9
 pre-established harmony, 202
 rationalism, 101
 truth of reason, 102
- Leopold, Nathan, 270–1
- Leverrier, Urbain, 141, 147
- Levi, Primo, 256–7
If this is a Man, 256
Truce, *The*, 257
- Levi-Strauss, Claude, 105, 234, 263–4
- Leviathan*, (Hobbes), 309, 342, 344–5
- Lewis, C.I., 122
 expressive language, 122
The Liberal Imagination, (Trilling), 388
- liberalism, 338, 362–5, 371, 376, 389, 391–6, 398–9
 classical, 389, 395
 extent of power, 362–5
see also democracy

- liberty, 358–62, 366–8, 388, 395
 freedom, 358–9
 human nature, 358–62, 368
 ideological concept, 361–2, 368
 limitations, 360–1
 negative, 359–60, 368, 395
 positive, 359–62, 366–8, 395
see also natural rights
- Life of Galileo, The*, (Brecht) 67
- Lincoln, Abraham, 310–2
- Lloyd, Genevieve, 223,
The Man of Reason, 223
- loaded language, 12
- lobbyists, *see* pressure groups
- Locke, John, 61, 71, 98, 100,
 103–7, 114, 214–6, 344–7,
 352–3, 362–3, 378, 393, 402
 atomistic theory of
 perception, 107, 195–6,
 402
 Berkeley, 113
 biography, 104
 causal theory of perception,
 106
 empiricism, 61, 104–7
*Essay Concerning Human
 Understanding*, 214
 extent of power, 362–3
 gestalt psychology, 107
 God, 106, 132
 innate ideas, 104–5
 labour theory of value, 352,
 363
 Leibniz, 105
 mind, 112
 necessary connection, 132
 perception and sensation,
 106–7
 physical objects, 106, 114
 political obligation, 352–3,
 363
 political power, 357–8
 primary and secondary
 qualities, 105–6
 rebellion, 352, 363, 378
 rights, 352–3, 362–3
 self, 214–6
 simple ideas, 105–6
tabula rasa, 99, 103
 trust, 352, 363, 378, 381
Two Treatises of Government,
 344–7, 352–3, 362, 393
compare structuralism
see also social contract theory
- Loeb, Richard, *see* Leopold
- logic, 27–8
see also deduction; fallacies;
 induction
- Logic of Scientific Discovery, The*,
 (Popper), 143
- logical distinctions, 16
- logical necessity, 98, 103
- logical positivism, 79, 121–6, 157
 induction, 122
 language, 122
 metaphysics, theology and
 ethics, 122
- Quine, 122–6
 verification principle, 122
 Vienna Circle, 79, 121
- Longino, Helen, 152
 contextual empiricism, 152
Science as Social Knowledge,
 152
- Luther, Martin, 255, 283
- Lysenkoism, 78
- Lysenko, T.D. 78
- M**
- Machiavelli, Niccolò, 342, 344–5,
 355
 brief life, 355
 law and morality, 379
The Prince, 342, 379
- Mackie, J.L., 156, 290
 brief life, 290
 error theory, 290
 paradox of omnipotence, 156
- Macpherson, C.B. 376–8, 382
 communist variant, 376
The Real World of Democracy,
 376
 underdeveloped variant, 376
- Madness and Civilisation*,
 (Foucault), 266
- Malcolm, Norman, 89, 93
- Malthus, Reverend Thomas, 362
*Essay on the Principle of
 Population*, 362
 wage fund theory, 362
- Mannheim, Karl, 387–9, 394, 397
 brief life, 387
Ideology and Utopia, 387
 particular ideologies, 387,
 388
 total ideologies, 387–8
Man of Reason, The, (Lloyd), 223
 mandate theory, 374
- Maoism, 395, 400–1
see also Cultural Revolution;
 Great Leap Forward
- Man's Search for Meaning*,
 (Frankl), 255
- Marcuse, Herbert, 231–4
 brief life, 232
Eros and Civilisation, 232
Essay on Liberation, 233
 Freud, 232–3
One-Dimensional Man, 232
 self, 231–4
- Margenau, Henry, 247
- Marx, Karl, 175–6, 230–1, 253,
 255, 261–2, 386–7, 400,
 402–3
 alienation, 231
 biography, 230
 capitalism, 261, 386–7
 class society, 230–1
 class conflict, 262
 commodity fetishism, 261
Communist Manifesto, The,
 255, 262
 communist stage, 262
 dialectical materialism, 261–2
- Economic and Philosophical
 Manuscripts*, 175
- 11th Thesis on Feuerbach*, 262,
 403
- false consciousness, 231, 261,
 386–7, 400
- German Ideology, The*, 255,
 386, 403
- Hegel, 261–2
 ideology, 230–1, 261–2,
 386–7, 400
- Kierkegaard, 262
- materialism, 112, 261–2, 403
 praxis, 403
 relations of production, 230
- religion, 175–6
- the state, 262
see communism; self;
 socialism
- Marxism, 155, 230–4, 360, 391,
 397, 399–401
 alienation, 399
 antithesis, 400
 class conflict, 399–400
 class consciousness, 400
 dialectical materialism,
 399–401
 historical materialism,
 399–401
 superstructure, 400
 synthesis, 400
 thesis, 400
see capitalism; communism;
 feudalism; ideology;
 imperialism; socialism
see also Castroism;
 Eurocommunism;
 Maoism; Stalinism
- Maslow, Abraham
Motivation and Personality,
 267
- Masters, Brian, 248–9, 267
- materialism, 100, 112, 190, 192–5,
 203, 206, 255
see also behaviourism;
 Hobbes; identity
 theory; mind and body
- Matrix, The*, 93
- matter, 100–2, 112, 115
- Mazzini, Giuseppe, 391, 397–8
- meaning, 60
- mechanistic concept, 258, 260,
 313, 362–5, 392–4, 398
 of the state, 392–3
see also atomism
- Medawar, Sir Peter, 67, 135–7,
 140, 143, 145–7
 falsification, 146–7
 inductivism, 135–7
 Popper, 143
 pseudo-science, 145
 science, 140
- Meditations on First Philosophy*,
 (Descartes), 83, 87, 101, 160,
 214
- Medlin, Brian
 egoism, 309–10
- membrane theory, 135–6
- Meno*, (Plato), 59
- Mercury, 148
- meritocracy, 391
- Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 107,
 195–6
 brief life, 196
 intentionality, 195–6
 mind and body, 196
The Structure of Behaviour, 196
see also gestalt psychology
- metaethics, *see* ethics
- metalanguage, 80–1
- metaphysics, 97–8, 117, 120–1,
 181, 198, 201–2, 207
see also substance
- method of philosophy, 7–9
- Milgram, Stanley
Obedience to Authority, 269
- Mill, James, 321, 393
- Mill, John Stuart, 114–5, 245, 248,
 250–1, 254, 321–3, 326–7,
 332, 348, 354, 357–8, 363–5,
 373
*Autobiography of John Stuart
 Mill*, 326
 Bentham, 326
 biography, 322
 Carlyle, 323
 character, 248, 250–1
 Coleridge, 323
 education, 323
 God, 156
 harm, 254, 363–5, 379
 interactionism, 200
 justice and utility, 354
 mental crisis, 323,
 moral self, 245, 278
 naturalistic fallacy, 290, 296,
On Liberty, 254, 348, 363,
 paradox of hedonism 326,
 332
 political power, 357–8
 principle of insulation,
 363–5, 381
 principle of utility, 364
 sensationalism, 114–5
 social contract, 364
A System of Logic, 200, 250
 tolerance, 52
 tyranny of the majority, 327,
 348, 363, 373
Utilitarianism, 290, 321, 323
 utilitarianism, 52
 ultimate laws, 200
 will, 250–1
 Wordsworth, 323
see also Descartes; Hume;
 Kant; Locke
- Millett, Kate, 151, 349
Sexual Politics, 151, 349
- mind, 95–6, 98–100, 103–5, 112,
 115–6, 118–9, 181–2
 theories of, 55
- mind and body, 184–211, 222–4
 brain, 184–5
 consciousness, 185–96
 incorrigibility, 187–8
 materialism, 192–5

- mental and physical properties, 204
 mental events, 184, 190
 other minds, 190–2
 physical events, 184, 190
 privileged access, 190–2
 reductive fallacy, 193
 unconscious, the, 188–90
see behaviourism; dual aspect theory; dualism; epiphenomenalism; functionalism; identity theory; interactionism; parallelism
see also Descartes; Hobbes; Husserl; Merleau-Ponty; Ryle
- Minogue, Kenneth, 397
 miracles, 92, 165
Modern Moral Philosophy, (Hudson), 296
modus ponens, 39
modus tollens, 39–40, 52, 137
Monadology, The, (Leibniz), 201
 monism, 100, 112, 181, 192–3, 203–4
- Moore, G.E., 289–92, 296, 309–10, 321, 330
 brief life, 289
 egoism, 309–10
 intuitionism, 289–92
 moral pluralism, 330
 naturalistic fallacy, 289–91, 296
Principia Ethica, 289
see also open question argument
- morality, 300–336
Euthyphro problem, 173–4, 285
 female ethics, 315–8
 moral reasoning, 307
 prudential reasoning, 307, 309, 355
 religion, 173–4
 sentiment, 312–5
see also Hume; law; Rousseau
see altruism; consequentialism; deontological ethics; egoism; evolutionary ethics; teleological ethics; utilitarianism; virtue ethics;
see extrinsic value; golden rule; intrinsic value
- moral populism, 348
 moral purpose theories, 352–6
see Theory of Justice; Utility theory
- moral realism, 286
 moral self, *see* determinism; J.S. Mill
- Moral Thinking*, (Hare), 272, 294, 298, 324, 327
Motivation and Personality, (Maslow), 267
 Mussolini, Benito, 390
- mysticism, 156–8
- N**
- Nagel, Thomas, 87, 159, 181, 185–6, 201, 206, 247, 278
 brief life, 195
 consciousness, 185, 278
 determinism, 247
 insideness, 185, 194, 201, 206, 209
The View from Nowhere, 206
Naming and Necessity, (Kripke), 206
- Napoleon, 258
 Narayan, Uma, 151
 nation, 391, 397
- nationalism, 155, 360–1, 390–2, 397–9
 colonial, 398
 nation and state, 397
 national purity/superiority, 397
 pre-political homogeneity, 397
see also Hegel; Herder; Mazzini
 compare fascism; Nazism; patriotism
- naturalism, 288–92
 compare emotivism
- naturalistic fallacy, 289–91
see also G.E. Moore; open question argument
- natural leaders, 391–2
 natural rights, *see* rights
Natural Rights, (Ritchie), 395
- Nazism, 395, 398
- necessary conditions, 44–6, 59, 77, 131–2, 185–6
see sufficient conditions
- necessary truths, 6, 15, 70–1, 159–60
- needs, 328
- Neptune, 141, 147
- Newton, Isaac, 62, 78, 91, 141, 144, 146–9, 199, 402
Optiks, 101, 185, 193
Principia Mathematica, 101, 148
 time and space, 149
- Nicomachean Ethics*, (Aristotle), 265–6, 284, 331
- Nietzsche, Friedrich, 107, 174, 177–8, 226–8, 398
 bad conscience, 177–8
Beyond Good and Evil, 226
 biography, 177
 Descartes, 226
Ecce Homo, 174
 existentialism, 227–8
Genealogy of Morals, The, 176
 master morality, 177
 overman, 227
 perception, 107
 personal identity, 227–8
 religion, 176–8
 self, 226–8
 slave morality, 177
- will to power, 226–8, 398
- Nilsen, Dennis, 248–9, 273
Nineteen Eighty-Four, (Orwell), 266, 342, 367, 375
- Nixon, R.M., 341
- Noddings, Nel, 316
- non-cognitivism, 279, 291, 293–7
- non-empirical claims, *see* empirical claims
- non-mental facts, 76, 103
- non-naturalism, *see* intuitionism
- normative claims, 14–15
- normative ethics, *see* ethics; morality
- Novum Organum* (Bacon), 95
- Nozick, Robert, 358, 394
Anarchy, State and Utopia, 358
 brief life, 358
 entitlement theory, 358
 minimal state, 358, 394
- Nuremberg Laws, 284–5, 343, 380
- O**
- Obedience to Authority*, (Milgram), 269
- objective idealism, 76, 103, 112, 366–8
 compare subjective idealism
- objectivism, 150–2, 283, 285–7, 291, 294
 moderate objectivism, 306–7
see also feminist epistemology; Ross
- objectivity, 259
see Hegel
- obligation, 23
see political obligation
 compare obliged
- observation and experiment, 135–6
- obversion, 35
- offence, 365
see also harm
- olics, 19
- One-Dimensional Man*, (Marcuse), 232
- One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest*, (Kesey), 277
- On Liberty*, (J.S. Mill), 254, 348, 363
- ontological argument, *see* God
- ontological theories, 74
see also truth
- open question argument, 289–91, 296
- Optiks*, (Newton), 101, 185, 193
- organic concept, 258, 375, 396, 398–9
 of the state, 390–3, 396, 399
see body politic
- Origins of Continents and Oceans, The*, (Wegener), 77, 149
- Origins of Species*, (Darwin), 154
- Ortner, Sherri, 223
- Orwell, George, 266, 342, 367, 375
- Nineteen Eighty-Four*, 266, 342, 367, 375
- P**
- Paley, William, 50, 163, 283
- pantheism, 201
- Pap, Arthur, 238
- paradox, 78–81
 definition, 78–9
 liar's paradox, 79, 80
 paradox of hedonism 326, 332
see also J.S. Mill; Sidgwick
- paradox of omnipotence, 174, parallelism, 201–2, 204
- partial generalizations, 36–7
- participation, 371, 373, 376, 378
- Pascal, Blaise, 169–70
 induction, 28
 Pascal's wager, 169–70
Pensées sur la religion, 170
- Pateman, Carole, 349–50
The Sexual Contract, 349
- patriarchalism, 349–52
- patriotism, 390, 397–8
- Pauling, Linus, 143
- Pawley, Martin, 3
The Private Future, 3
- Peirce, Charles, 77
 brief life, 77
Pensées sur la religion, (Pascal), 170
- perception, 83, 95–107
 definition, 101
see also sense experience
see also Kant; Locke; Nietzsche; Piaget; Plato
- Perry, R.B., 90, 268
 egocentric predicament, 90
- phenomenalism, 114–5, 121
 agnosticism, 115
 logical positivism, 121
 sensualism, 115
see also Kant
- phenomenology, 196, 264
 bracketing, 196
 reduction, 196
 transcendental ego, 196
- Phenomenology of Spirit*, (Hegel), 259
- philosophes*, 169, 175
- Philosophical Investigations* (Wittgenstein), 18, 87, 192
- philosophize, xvii
- Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Rorty), 6
- philosophy, 16, 57
 as an activity, 16
 method of, 57, 74
- Piaget, Jean, 107
 perception, 107
- Planck, Max, 246
- plate tectonics, 148
- Plato, 55, 58–9, 71, 96–7, 100–1, 158, 210, 283, 291, 309, 345–6, 381–2
 appearances, 71, 96
 biography, 58, *Crito*, 345–6, 381–2,

- ethical theory, 291
Euthyphro, 173–4, 285, 325, 381
 forms, universals, 71, 96, 101, 111
Glaucon and the cave, 96, *Meno*, 59, 97,
 moral realism, 286,
Protagoras, 96, 283,
Republic, 96, 306, 309, 331, 345–6
 The Ring of Gyges, 309
Theatetus, 58–9,
 virtue ethics, 331,
see also social contract theory
 playing devil's advocate, 51–2
 pleasure, 325–6
 pluralism, 100, 112, 181
Point Counter Point, (Huxley), 285, 312
 political obligation, 280–1, 339–56, 363, 377–82
see divine right theory; force theory; moral purpose theories; social contract theory; theory of consent; theory of the general will; voluntary acceptance theories
 political socialization, 386, 388
 political theories, 337–8, 382, 384–401
 human nature, 358–62
see also anarchism; ideology
 Popper, Sir Karl, 62, 74, 81, 135, 137–8, 143–7, 149–50
 bold theories, 62, 143–4
 brief life, 144
 conjectures, 135
Conjectures and Refutations, 143
 falsification, 62, 137–8, 143–7
 induction, 144–7
Logic of Scientific Discovery, The, 143
 narrow inductivism, 135
 pseudo science, 144–7, 149–50
 semantic theory of truth, 74, 81
 postmodernism, 6–7, 56, 69, 74, 93, 152, 224, 264, 318
 and feminism, 152, 318
 post-structuralism, 234–6, 264
see also Derrida; Foucault; Kristeva
 power, 13–14, 17–8, 21–3, 339–40, 344
 extent of, 281, 338, 357–68, 370–1, 379
see Bentham; Gentile; Locke; Mill; Rousseau
see also authority
 pragmatic theory of truth, 62, 77–8
 pragmatism, 77
see also Dewey; James; Peirce; Quine; Rorty
 predeterminism, 183, 238
 preference utilitarianism, *see* utilitarianism
 premises, 29
 prescriptions, 14
 prescriptivism, 279, 286, 294–5
see Hare;
 pressure groups, 378
see also lobbyists
 presuppositions, 44–5
 Prichard, H., 302
Prince, The, (Machiavelli), 342, 379
Principia Ethica, (Moore), 289
Principia Mathematica, (Newton), 101, 148
 principle of induction, 140
Principles of Morals and Legislation, (Bentham), 274–5
Private Future, The (Pawley), 3
 private language argument, 79, 87, 93, 122
 probability, 47–8, 65
 absolute, 65
 inductive, 65
 statistical, 65
Problems of Philosophy, The, (Russell), 28, 58, 99
 propositions, 15, 37–41, 70
 analytic, 70
 compound, 37–41
 conditional, 38
 disjunctive, 38
 synthetic, 70
 Protestantism, 155
 Protestant work ethic, 276, 363
 protracted provocation, 249, 269–70
 Proudhon, Pierre Joseph, 371, 379, 394
 prudential reasoning, 307, 309, 355, 381
compare morality
 psychoanalysis, 144–5, 147, 228–9
see self
 psychological libertarianism, 244
 ptolemaic system, 78
 Ptolemy, Claudius, 78
 punishment, 183, 238, 274–8
 consequentialism, 274–6
 deterrence, 274–6
 protection, 277–8
 rehabilitation, 276–7
 retribution, 275–6
 utilitarianism, 274–5
 vengeance, 274
see also Duff; Protestant work ethic; responsibility
Pure Theory of Law, The, (Kelsen), 379
 Putnam, Hilary, 86
Q
 Quakers, 155
 quantum theory, 139, 141, 246
 Quine, Willard van Orman, 122–6
 biography, 123
 Duhem–Quine Thesis, 123
 myth of meaning, 123
Two Dogmas of Empiricism, 122–6
 web of knowledge, 123
R
 racism, 398–9
 purity/superiority, 398–9
 Radford, Colin, 59
 radical, 390
 radical right, 390, 399
 Raphael, D.D., 353
 stringent moral obligations, 353
 Rashdall, H., 307
 rationalism, 61, 73–4, 100–3, 392, 398
 definition, 58
 experience, 58
 intuition, 102
 reason, 58
see also Descartes; Leibniz; Spinoza
 rationality, 150
 Rawls, John, 318, 350, 354–5
 biography, 354
 civil disobedience, 378
 equality, 355
 justice, 318, 354–5
 Kant, 354–5
 original position, 355
Theory of Justice, The, 354
 reactionary, 390
 reality, 96–9, 101
see also appearance and reality
Real World of Democracy, The, (Macpherson), 376
 reason, 56, 58, 283
 and faith, 168–79
 reductive fallacy, *see* mind and body
Reflections on the Revolution in France, (Burke), 258, 391
 Reich, Wilhelm, 262
 Reid, Thomas, 216
 brave officer paradox, 216
 relativism, 150–2, 279, 284–5, 318
see also feminist
 epistemology
compare ethical scepticism
 relativity, 62, 78,
 special theory of relativity, 62, 78,
 religion, 67, 154–79
 and science, *see* science
 anthropomorphism, 156–8
 belief, 169–70
 divine command theory, 173–4
 doctrine of analogical predication, 158
Euthyphro problem, 173–4
 existence of God, 159–66
 faith, 168–73, 179
see also Kierkegaard; Tillich
 free will, 156
 morality, 173–4
 mysticism, 156–8
 omnipotence, 156
 Pascal's wager, *see* Pascal
 problem of evil, 174–5
 religious concepts, 155–7
 religious language, 155, 157–9
see also Anselm; Aquinas; Freud; God; Marx; Nietzsche
compare science, language and explanation
 Republican Party (USA), 395
 responsibility, 182–3, 210, 238–9, 241, 250–1, 257–8, 263, 265–74
 introspection, 273
 premeditation, 271–2
 reasoned defence, 272
 reasons, 273–4
 unconscious forces, 272–3
see also free will; punishment
 revelations, 165–6
 revolution, 390
 rights, 344, 352–3, 359, 362–3, 377, 393, 398
 civil, 377
 minority, 377
 natural, 344, 352–3, 359, 362, 393
compare duties
 Ritchie, David, 366, 395
Natural Rights, 395
Roads to Freedom, The, (Sartre), 256
 romanticism, 258, 313–5, 398
 Rousseau, 313–5
compare Enlightenment
see also Blake
 Rorty, Richard, 6–7, 69, 78, 81, 93, 98, 152–3, 188, 192
 biography, 7
 normal and abnormal discourse, 152–3
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 6
 pain statements, 188
 pragmatism, 78, 81
 Ross, W.D., 302
 actual and *prima facie* duties, 306
 Rousseau, Jean–Jacques, 312–5, 345, 347–9, 357–62, 366–8, 389, 395
 biography, 347
 conscience, 313–4
 democracy, 348
Emile, 313–5
 extent of power, 366–8
 freedom paradox, 348
 human nature, 348–9, 358–62, 389
 Kant, 313
 noble savage, 350

- political power, 357–8
romanticism, 313–5
sentiment, 312–5
The Social Contract, 313, 345, 347–9
totalitarianism, 348
Royal Society, The, 55
rule of law, 377, 380–1
Russell, Bertrand, 2, 19, 28, 58, 87, 99, 106–7, 114–5, 160–1, 201, 402
biography, 28
dual aspect theory, 201
induction, 28
knowledge by acquaintance, 91
knowledge by description, 91
non-mental facts, 58, 103
ontological argument, 160–1
sensationalism, 114–5
The Problems of Philosophy, 28, 58, 99
Russian Revolution, 400–1
Ryle, Gilbert, 190, 207–9
brief life, 209
category mistake, 189, 207
philosopher's myth, 208
qualities of mind, 189
The Concept of Mind, 189, 207
- S**
Samenow, Stanton, 271, 276
Inside the Criminal Mind, 271
Sartre, Jean-Paul, 192, 221–2, 224–5, 229–30, 255–7
and de Beauvoir, 222–4
bad faith, 222, 224–5, 229–30, 256
Being and Nothingness, 224, 256
biography, 221
determinism, 256
existence precedes essence, 182, 256
Existentialism and Humanism, 192, 221, 256–7
freedom, 256
inter-subjectivity, 192
Kierkegaard, 226
Marxism, 224
other minds, 192
pour soi/en soi, 256
The Roads to Freedom, 256
war, 256
Saussure, Ferdinand de, 234–5, 263
scepticism, 55, 82–94
external world scepticism, 83
philosophical and ordinary doubt, 83–90
undercutting defeater, 86
see also Descartes; ethical scepticism
Schapiro, Leonard, 396
Schlick, Moritz, 121
scholasticism, 169
Schopenhauer, Arthur, 73, 250
brief life, 251
Schweitzer, Albert, 308
science, 61–2, 67, 77–8, 89, 91, 105–6, 115–6, 135–6, 140–1, 144–7
and pseudo-science, 144–7
and religion, 67, 82–3, 153–4
language and explanation, 159
observation and experiment, 135–6, 140–1, 144–5
see also Kuhn; Medawar; Popper; Weisz; Wolfe
see also explanation; feminist epistemology; theories
Science as Social Knowledge, (Longino), 152
Scientific Revolution, The, 3, 14, 61–2, 181
Scruton, Roger, 64, 66, 89, 333
Searle, John, 210, 243–4
brief life, 243
consciousness, 243–4
functionalism, 210
Second Sex, The, (de Beauvoir), 222
self, 182, 186, 188, 190, 203, 212–36
consciousness, 182, 215–6
continuity, 182
decentring the subject, 234–6
essentialism, 182, 213
existential psychotherapy, 229–30
personal identity, 212, 214, 215–7
psychoanalysis, 228–9
see also Aquinas; Descartes; Hume; Husserl; Kant; Locke; Sartre
see also existentialism; feminist self; Marxism; post-structuralism; structuralism
semantic theory of truth, 78–81
semantics, 70, 79–81
semantic language, 79–81
compare syntax
Simmelweis, Ignaz, 136–7, 152, 185
sense experience, 83–7, 96, 98, 101, 103–7, 118–26
perception, 83, 106–7
sentence, 15
sentiment, *see also* Hume; Rousseau
serial killers, 248–9, 267–8
Sexual Contract, The, (Pateman), 349
Sexual Politics, (Millet), 151, 349
Shaffer, Jerome, 205
see also identity theory
Sidgwick, Henry, 307, 326
paradox of hedonism, 326
Singer, Peter, 329
brief life, 329
supererogatory actions, 329
situation ethics, 322
Skinner, B.F., 206
Beyond Freedom and Dignity, 268
Smart, J.J.C., 205, 324
see also identity theory
Smith, Adam, 350, 392–3
The Wealth of Nations, 393
Smith, William, 136
social class, 386–8, 391
consciousness, 386–8
social contract theory, 345–52
civil disobedience, 381–2
Social Contract, The, (Rousseau), 313, 345, 347–9
Social Darwinism, 398–9
socialism, 391–2, 394, 398–401
social role, 391
Socrates, 2, 55
brief life, 326
see also Plato
soft determinism, *see* determinism
solipsism, 87, 88–9
Sophists, 283
sound arguments, 30–1, 77
and probability, 47–8
Soviet Union
five-year plans, 372
special responsibilities, 327
Spinoza, Benedictus de, 58, 101, 200–1, 241, 243
brief life, 200
determinism, 241, 243
Ethics, 241
rationalism, 101
see also dual aspect theory
Stalinism, 395, 400–1
Star Trek, 86
state, 262, 390–3, 396–7
see also mechanistic concept; organic concept
statement, 15
Stevenson, C.L., 293
Ethics and Language, 293
see also emotivism
stoicism, 243
Storr, Anthony, 229, 242, 268, 270
Human Destructiveness, 242, 268, 270
Strawson, Peter, 307
string theory, 142
structuralism, 105, 234, 263–4
see also Althusser; Barthes; Lacan; Levi-Strauss; Saussure
Structure of Behaviour, The, (Merleau-Ponty), 196
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, The, (Kuhn), 148
structures, xvi
subjective idealism, 112–5
compare objective idealism
subjectivism, 283, 285–8
subjunctive conditionals, 132–4
see also counterfactual conditionals
subliminal advertising, 249
substance, 71, 98, 100, 181, 198, 201, 216
sufficient conditions, 44–6, 62, 77, 185, 186
see also necessary conditions
sui generis, 287
Summa Theologica, (Aquinas), 161
supererogatory actions, 328–9
see also Singer
suppressed premises, fallacy of, 31–2
Swift, Jonathan, 115
syllogisms, 29–30, 33–6, 38–41
hypothetical, 38–40
syllogistic arguments, 34–41
forms, 34–41
syntax, 79–81
syntactical language, 79–81
compare semantics
synthesis, 9
synthetic *a priori* propositions, 16, 70–4, 254
synthetic propositions, 15–16
System of Logic, A. (J.S. Mill), 200, 250
Systematic Theology, (Tillich), 172
- T**
tabula rasa, *see* Locke
Tarski, Alfred, 79–81
brief life, 79
metalanguage, 80–1
rules of 'satisfaction', 80–1
see also semantic theory
tautocracy, 376, 378
tautology, 70, 78–81
Taylor, Charles, 213
teleological argument, *see* God
teleological ethics, 300–3
Tennant, F.R., 165–6
Theatetus, (Plato), 58–9
theism, 156
theocracy, 341, 372
theodicy, 174
theories
background theories, 146
coherence with other theories, 52–3
confirmation, 146–50
evidence, 140
explanatory power, 78
falsification, 137–8, 143–7
fundamental theories, 146–7, 149
predictive power, 140–3
saving, 52, 77, 92
simplicity, 142–4
testing, 140–3, 145
terrorism, 314–5
Thompson, E.P., 376, 378
tautocracy, 376, 378
Thompson, June and Hilda, 249, 258, 269–70, 272
Thoreau, Henry David, 380–1
civil disobedience, 380–1
Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, (Berkeley) 112–4
Tillich, Paul, 8, 172–3

- brief life, 172
Dynamics of Faith, 172
 faith as the ultimate concern, 172–3
 God as 'Being-itself', 173
Systematic Theology, 172
 Tillyard, E.M.W., 67
 timelines, xvi
 totalitarianism, 338, 344, 348, 361, 366–8, 371, 375, 389, 392, 395–6
 general will, 375
 ideal goals, 396
 law and morality, 379
 mass mobilization, 396
 national defence, 396
 private/public distinction, 371
see also Arendt; autocracy; democracy; Kelsen
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, (Wittgenstein), 79, 121, 166
 tradition, 390, 391, 396–8
 transcendental meditation, 157
Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, (Berkeley), 112
Treatise of Human Nature, A, (Hume), 72, 115, 152, 216, 296
 Trilling, Lionel, 388, 397
The Liberal Imagination, 388
Truce, The, (Levi), 257
Truman Show, The, 83
 truth, 9, 60–2, 69–81
 and certainty, 61
 and meaning, 60
 and probability, 47–8
 and validity, 7–8, 29, 47–8
 as subjective, 170–2
 belief, 76
 coherence theory, 62, 76–7, 93
 correspondence theory, 18, 22, 74–6
 knowledge, 76
 pragmatic theory, 62, 77–8
 semantic theory, 78–81
 testing for, 43–54
compare validity
see also Tarski, Alfred
Two Dogmas of Empiricism, (Quine), 122–6
Two Treatises of Government, (Locke), 344–7, 352–3, 362, 393
 tyrannicide, 365
- U**
 ultimate answers, 4–6
 ultimate laws, 199–200
 ultimate reality, 96–7
see also universals (forms)
 uncertainty principle, 139, 246–7
 undercutting defeater, 86
see also hyperbolic doubt
see also scepticism
 undistributed middle term, fallacy of, 33
 uniformity of nature, 140, 143, 146
 universal affirmative generalizations, 34–5
 universalism, 287, 291, 295, 303–7, 309–10, 325
see also golden rule
 universal laws, 133
 universal negative generalizations, 35–6
 universals (forms), 71, 96–7, 111
 Uranus, 141, 147
Utilitarianism, (J.S. Mill), 290, 321, 323
 utilitarianism, 52, 254, 283, 286, 288, 301, 321–30, 353, 381, 393
 act and rule, 321–4
 commensurability, 325
 definition, 321
 egoistic, 323
 external preferences, 328
 happiness, 324–6
 hedonistic, 323
 ideal, 323
 moral pluralism, 329–30
 needs, 327–8
 pleasure, 325–6
 preference management, 328
 preference utilitarianism 52, 326–9
 punishment, 274–5
 supererogatory actions, 328–9
 universalistic, 323
see also Bentham; Hare; James Mill; J.S. Mill; Moore; Sidgwick; Smart
see also situation ethics; special responsibilities
 utility theory, 352–5
 justice and utility, 352–5
- V**
 validity, 9, 29–34, 137
 and truth, 29, 30
 definition, 29
 two methods for checking, 31
compare truth
 venn diagrams, 34–37, 45
 verification principle, 122
 Vienna Circle, *see* logical positivism
View from Nowhere, The, (Nagel), 206
Vindication of the Rights of Women, A, (Wollstonecraft), 315
 virtue ethics, 280, 283, 318, 330–3
 character traits, 330–3
 the good life, 331–3
 happiness, 330–3
 Plato, 331
 virtues, 330–3
see also Aristotle
compare consequentialism; deontological ethics; utilitarianism
 vivisection morality, *see* Koestler
 voluntary acceptance theories, 345–52
- W**
 Watson, James, 8, 17, 135, 141, 143, 149, 185
 experiments, 141
 simplicity, 143
 theorizing, 135
 Watson, John, 206–7
Wealth of Nations, The, (Smith), 393
 Wegener, Alfred, 77, 149
Origins of Continents and Oceans, The, 77, 149
see also plate tectonics
 Weisz, P.B., 134
The Science of Biology, 134
weltanschauung, *see* Mannheim, total ideologies
 Whewell, William, 135
 whig interpretation of history, 361
 Whitehead, A. N., 2
 will, 270, 278
see Kant; J.S. Mill; practical reason
 Williams, Bernard, 69, 324–6, 328
 brief life, 324
 government house
 utilitarianism, 328
 hedon machine, 326
 Winchester, Simon, 136
The Map that Changed the World, 136
 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 7, 17–8, 75, 79, 98, 121–2, 166, 192
 biography, 80
 conceptual analysis, 17–18
 logical positivism, 121
Philosophical Investigations, 18, 87, 192
 picture theory, 75
 postmodernism, 93
 private language argument, 79, 87, 93, 122, 192
 religious language, 166
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 79, 121, 166
 Wolfe, A.B., 134–5
 Wollstonecraft, Mary, 315
 brief life, 315
Vindication of the Rights of Women, A, 315
- Y**
 Young Hegelians, 262