

Contents

<i>Acknowledgements</i>	x
1 Introduction: Identity and Why It Matters	1
Identity matters, whether you know it or not	2
Identity matters, whether you discuss it or not	3
Identity matters, even when you don't need to think about it	4
Therapist views of identity	4
Preserving identity from chaos – <i>and</i> naïvety	5
Sociologies of identity	6
Identity past and present	10
Single and multiple selves	14
Early explorations of the problem of identity	16
The familiar <i>and</i> mysterious self	20
Present day threats to identity	24
Identity matters	27
Questions for Counsellors	28
2 In Search of Self – Counselling and Identity	29
Historical overview	29
Looking for patterns in the debates about identity	36
Can identity ever be ‘pinned down’?	39
Is there a ‘real’ me?	42
Finding ourselves and losing ourselves	47
Postmodern identities	50
Diversity and integrity of identity	53
Self as subject and object	54
Self, autonomy and agency	58
Questions for Counsellors	60
3 Telling What’s Wrong – Narratives and Metaphors of Sickness and Health	62
Health and ‘satisfaction’	63
Quantities versus qualities of health	63
Health and humanity	65
Individual health and social progress	66

	Are we all proletarians now?	71
	Myths of a healthy ‘golden age’	74
	Finding our own narratives of health	77
	A broader view of health	79
	Evidence of health and sickness	82
	Healthy and unhealthy narratives of health	86
	Healthy points of view	92
	Questions for Counsellors	97
4	Truth Telling – Identity and Reality	98
	Secular and spiritual realities	99
	Cosmopolitanism or chaos?	101
	Deconstructing, or destroying, ‘truth’?	104
	How much truth can we stand?	108
	How conscious do we need to be?	110
	Why won’t truth stand still?	113
	The myth of the ‘detached’ seeker after truth	118
	The search for enlightenment	124
	Questions for Counsellors	130
5	Honoured and Esteemed? Identity and Happiness	133
	How deserved is your self-esteem?	133
	Happiness and goodness	137
	Happiness, consumerism and the good life	141
	Happiness and wealth creation – the pessimist’s perspective	143
	Happiness and wealth creation – the optimist’s perspective	149
	A rise or fall in gross domestic happiness?	152
	Personal happiness and social progress	155
	Questions for Counsellors	163
6	Feeling Good and Being Good: Identity and Ethics	165
	Who is an authority concerning ethics?	166
	Ethical authorities and ethical authoritarianism	169
	The myth of ethical neutrality	172
	Ethics within schools of counselling	175
	Ethics and beliefs in progress	178
	Ethics and corruption	180
	Ethics and language	184
	Are we disinterested, dissociated or committed?	190
	Questions for Counsellors	195

7	What Was It Like For You? – Measuring and Assessing Change in Identity	198
	Persons and reasons versus treatments and results	198
	Professionals versus amateurs	201
	All must have prizes?	207
	Resourcefulness versus resources	211
	In search of ‘objectivity’	212
	Treatment <i>of</i> a client versus treatment <i>as</i> a person	214
	First person versus third person perspectives	217
	First persons as language users, not ghosts in a machine	219
	The research agenda: are we asking the wrong questions?	221
	Qualitative research	226
	Future prospects	229
	Questions for Counsellors	232
8	Transcending Self: Identity, Society and the Transpersonal	234
	Personal prospects and social trends	235
	Designer spirituality	240
	Transcending oneself	243
	Anchoring oneself	245
	The role of ‘peak experiences’	249
	Transcending time	253
	Secular and transcendental identity	256
	Mechanical versus organic identities	258
	Taking a larger perspective	261
	Questions for Counsellors	264
9	Conclusion – Identities, Past, Present and Future	266
	Questions for Counsellors	277
	<i>Notes</i>	279
	<i>Bibliography</i>	283
	<i>Index</i>	292

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Identity and Why It Matters

One of the distinct features of twenty-first century society is its relentless preoccupation with the question of identity. (Furedi 2004:148)

I am I plus my surroundings, and if I do not preserve the latter I do not preserve myself. (Jose Ortegay Gasset 2000)

The novelist Salman Rushdie asserts that the modern self is ‘a shaky edifice we build out of scraps, dogmas, childhood injuries, newspaper articles, chance remarks, old films, small victories, people hated, people loved.’¹ (Sennett 1998:133)

Who do you think you are? What are you to make of yourself? What do others make of you? Do you make too much of yourself? Are you complacent, or cruel, with yourself? Are you forgetful of yourself? Or self-obsessed? Critics of counselling complain that it encourages people to become altogether too preoccupied with themselves. A BBC guide to counselling was entitled *Let’s Talk About ME*² and counselling, rightly or wrongly, tends to be seen as an essentially, and perhaps excessively, ‘me-focused’ activity. The counsellor can help me talk about (aspects of) me, clarify my agendas and options, pay attention to me and my concerns, help me to be more clear about who I am, where I am, where I came from, and where I am going. With a counsellor, above all, a client can reveal and explore some, or many, chapters in the Story of Myself. Mindful of ourselves, few seem to be willing or able to transcend their own life story, as mystics have perennially enjoined us to do:

The sage has no mind of his own,
He is aware of the needs of others. (Feng & English 1982:49)

Questions relating to personal identity are often, clearly, of central importance within counselling. People frequently come to counsellors to find, reclaim, remould, face up to, make something of, or control, (aspects of) ‘themselves’. They want to see how they have been shaped, helped or damaged by their circumstances. They want to consider what they could do to put themselves in better shape and to determine what that better shape ought to be.

In this chapter I shall introduce a competitive range of contrary and contradictory voices, questions, themes, and ways of thinking about the subject of identity. I wish to show why the topic is so important, not just to counsellors, but to all of us. *The aim will not be to argue for a single 'answer' to the questions raised.* Rather, I wish to offer readers, counsellors and others, a richer vocabulary, and a wider variety of perspectives, so that they can explore the subject for themselves and make their own integrated picture. In other words, rather than providing a single account of identity, I seek to offer *a larger canvas, and a wider range of colours, with which people can paint for themselves the story of their lives.*

The book is critical, in places, of what I try to show is the dogmatic and/or simplistic slumber to be found in, rather too many, schools of counselling. But my aim, ultimately, is *to strengthen and support therapeutic talk and action.* Such strength and progress will come, I argue, when counselling is less dominated by quasi-professionals, and more *anchored in, aware of, and owned by, the cultures, communities and societies of which it is a part.*

Identity matters, whether you know it or not

'If I'm just a social worker, maybe you're just an ex-junkie. Is that all that's happening here?' (Ram Dass and Gorman 1985:123)

Issues around personal identity are not just relevant to those already predisposed to think or talk about themselves. Identity is often a centrally important problem for people, young and old, rich and poor, who may not feel good about, or think very often about, 'themselves' at all. By no means everyone is prone to introspection.

For example, many teenagers suffer problems in seeking to establish their identity, and in finding role models. Their struggle to do so is clearly important.

Erikson has pointed out that the chief feature of adolescence is the renewed search for self-identity. The two year old has already gone through the preliminary stage. But later he has lost himself again, so to speak, in his family and gang loyalties. Now in adolescence the problem once more becomes more acute. The central teenage problem becomes 'Just who am I?' (Allport 1961:124)

Yet teenagers may rarely, if ever, go around consciously (or unconsciously) thinking that they are suffering from problems in establishing their identity. They may never introspect in any way about their self-image or their 'stream of consciousness'. Nonetheless, much of what they feel, think, do and don't do may be greatly determined by implicit, tacit, received and unthinkingly accepted or constructed views they have concerning:

- Who they are;
- Where they stand;
- Where they came from;
- Where they are going;
- What they are capable of doing; and
- What are their entitlements and obligations.

Most people, apart from those within the ‘chattering classes’, may never have reflected on any of these questions. They may never have thought about something so seemingly abstract as identity. But the counsellor, if she³ is to help, may need to assist the client in clarifying these questions.

Identity matters, whether you discuss it or not

Why? Because counsellors will need to be aware of how constructs of identity crucially and unfailingly inform and affect what goes on between counsellors and clients. The counsellor needs to know how identity influences what she and clients do and don’t do, see and don’t see. To be aware, she will herself need to develop a broad, deep and sophisticated understanding of identity and its role in shaping or stunting the lives of clients.

We all, including small children, make assumptions and develop expectations about the identity of another very rapidly indeed. For example, children in a classroom will scent within a few minutes, or less, whether a new teacher will keep control effortlessly, or only after a struggle, or not at all. In this sense they share the rapid perception of a wolf pack concerning threat, opportunity and the strength of ‘presence’ of a newcomer. ‘People understand: First things first. So how do you come in? Do you come *in*, or do you come *on*? No small matter’ (Ram Dass and Gorman 1985:157).

Our first impressions of another are made very rapidly, and are primarily determined by non-verbal cues. Of course, these first impressions can often be driven by stereotypes that we have about other people that are simplistic, prejudiced and plain wrong. We cannot avoid forming first impressions, but the challenge is to ensure that the *first* impressions we form do not become our *last*. All too easily we assume that we ‘know’ what we want to know about another, and *then we just stop looking!*

This book will, therefore, seek to go beyond first impressions of identity, and will examine multiple answers and solutions to questions about self. It will encourage a sophisticated and cosmopolitan understanding of persons. It will discourage excessive self-preoccupation and any obsessive need to be consciously ‘aware’ of all that we do. It will challenge postmodern views that there is no identity to clarify; no truth separable from opinion; no author behind any text. It will explore the way constructions of self influence clients, counsellors and what goes on between the two. *More generally, this book seeks to*

consider how constructions of self influence all of us in every aspect of our daily lives.

Identity structures what we do and don't do, see and don't see, attend to and ignore, prioritise and avoid. *Our view of ourselves will determine whether we treat ourselves kindly or forever see ourselves as 'no good' and requiring continuous punishment.* This is why I think the book will interest the lay reader as well as the counsellor and why I have tried to make it readable and relevant at every stage. Constructs of identity can be, if anything, more crucial for those suffering from low self-esteem. They may shy away from mirrors or any kind of self-preoccupation. They may well not think at all about concepts of 'self'. Sociologists and philosophers may like to explicitly conceptualise identity, but – let's face it – most people do not. Identity matters, whether we think much, little, obsessively, not at all of 'ourselves.'

Identity matters, even when you don't need to think about it

Our ideas about who we are, and the ideas that counsellors have about who we are, matter very much to our wellbeing and to the success, or otherwise of counselling. What others see in us, and what we see in ourselves, is crucially important, not least because 'WYSIWYG' can apply to people as to software – *what you see*, in yourself and other, *is what you are likely to get*. If you cannot, in the first instance, see yourself as doing, being, achieving . . . whatever, then you are less likely to achieve it. Of course, the reverse is not necessarily the case; grandiose fantasies about ourselves do not guarantee the reality unless we are also lucky, resourceful, competent, privileged, practised, informed, experienced, well trained and educated, highly motivated, etc.

Ideas and tacit understandings about identity, then, *particularly when we never think about them*, matter to all of us as we go about our daily lives. This is so, regardless of whether or not we are consciously preoccupied with or aware of any such ideas. Yet how much time is given over to the examination of self-concepts and identity in the training of counsellors?

Therapist views of identity

Most schools of counselling adopt, implicitly or explicitly, some model or other of identity. Freud spoke of 'Id, Ego and Superego', Rogers referred to an authentic 'organismic' self, Jung believed in a 'collective unconscious'. There are many other accounts of identity, and of what it is to be a person, as we shall see. But there are doubts about how far individual or collective identities remain fixed and unchanging: 'Psychoanalysis, a therapy that grew out of experience with severely repressed and morally rigid individuals who needed to come to terms with a rigorous inner "censor", today finds itself confronted

more and more often with a “chaotic and impulse-ridden character” (Lasch in du Gay et al. 2000:224)

Identities may change perhaps, and certainly there is a great variety in counsellor assumptions and theories of identity. However, I have seen very little systematic effort to compare, contrast or critique counsellor constructs of self. Some counsellors appear to accept without much question that there is an *authentic self* to be ‘found’ and that a counsellor is best placed to help a client find it. Also that the client is an *autonomous* being who can become more autonomous still by uncovering their defences, habits, contradictions, tensions, low self-esteem, negative attitudes etc. Finally, the belief is commonplace that the counsellor is able to engage in ‘advanced empathy’ with the client with very little investigation made of the highly problematic nature of empathy.

These beliefs, that we can become more autonomous, authentic and empathic, are a part of the underlying faith of most counsellors and schools of counselling. We believe we can be authentic, insightful and accurate in our understanding of ourselves, other people and the world around us. Counsellors, we assume, can assist us to know ourselves as we are, perceive our world accurately, and come to terms with the reality of our circumstances. Other people, likewise, we hope, can shake off their own defences, pretensions, prejudices and delusions. We can, therefore, meet other people free of spin, game-playing and image making. We can, with the assistance of a counsellor, really get to know one another, and find genuine intimacy with other human beings. And being genuine, we can find the distance between another and ourselves that is appropriate and right for each of us.

For example, Carl Rogers, the icon of person-centred counselling observed (1980:16) that: ‘I feel a sense of satisfaction when I can dare to communicate the realness in me to another.’ He later asserted (1980:173), for example, that: ‘Her organism wants to be healthy and strong, but the introjected “I – the false self she has taken on to please others – wants to be, as she says at one point, thin and “intellectual”.’ One of his clients wrote (quoted 1980:209): ‘Dear Dr. Rogers . . . I think that I began to lose me when I was in high school.’

Preserving identity from chaos – *and* naïvety

Authenticity, autonomy, intimacy and a foundational reality; here are the underlying core values of counselling. Within them, it is assumed, we find our identity. Without them we are lost to ourselves and to others. In many respects these values form part of the Enlightenment project of person-centred humanistic principles developed from the Renaissance onwards, which sought to recover and develop ancient Greek values lost, in the West, after the fall of Rome.

I will say, from the outset, that I do not intend to try to tear down these values. I do not seek to capsizе counselling into that kind of postmodern

relativism wherein nothing can be known, nothing can be done, nothing is intrinsically worth doing, and nobody is there to claim or do anything. But a great deal has happened since the Renaissance humanism implicit within counselling first began to break free from the authority of priests and scriptures. Beliefs about identity, authenticity, autonomy, intimacy, empathy and reality – have all come under the intense gaze of philosophers, sociologists, anthropologists, literary critics and cultural theorists.

Both psychology and counselling, place the individual as the main focus of their agenda. Yet the literature within counselling and psychology concerning identity and authenticity is surprisingly small. Sociologists examine wider social processes and it might be thought that they would spend less time than counsellors and psychologists in exploring concepts of identity. In fact, the reverse is true. I find that identity is a much more alive and intense subject of debate among sociologists than it is within psychology. Lewis (2002:370), for example, asserts, I think quite rightly, that:

Postmodern cultural theory has been most acute in its analysis of the subject (self) and the fragmentation of modernist conceptions of a unified subjectivity. . . . The point here is that the self – an individual human being and his/her experience of life – has not been the same throughout history. The notion of ‘who I am’ is only conceivable in relation to other humans and the culture within which the individual functions. Members of oral, tribal cultures, for example, conceived of themselves as ‘extempore’, beings mysteriously connected to animals, objects and spirit beings.

For more than a century sociologists have recognised identity and authenticity as highly complex, important and problematic concepts. They have written a great deal about these topics and, I will try to show, substantial progress has thereby been made in our understanding of what it is to be a person and what it is to make genuine contact with another person. ‘The issue of identity is central to cultural studies, in so far as cultural studies examines the contexts in which both individuals and groups construct, negotiate and defend their identity or self-understanding’ (Edgar & Sedgwick (eds) 1999:183).

Likewise philosophers in the past century have revolutionised our understanding of these core ideas and values. Questions about identity are not mere ‘leisure pursuits’ or ‘cultural entertainment’ for those with the time and energy to pursue them. As Eagleton(1996:89), observes: ‘Just to survive, the human animal cannot rely on instinct but must bring self-reflective resources into play.’ Yet what notice do training programmes in counselling and psychotherapy take of these developments? Remarkably little recognition of sociological and philosophical thinking is to be found within most counselling prospectuses.

Sociologies of identity

To a considerable degree, I have to admit, this reluctance to engage with philosophies and sociologies of identity is understandable. Too much of the

prose on offer on this topic is tortuous in the extreme. I have quoted extensively from materials that seem to be readable and relevant. But theorising about identity too often floats away into inaccessible, abstract prose that does not help counsellors, clients or laypersons who want practical, relevant and useful material with which to take stock of themselves and their circumstances.

This book seeks to maximise the *gain* in conceptualising identity while minimising the *pain*. I quote extensively from a very wide range of sources; sometimes to illustrate an argument; or in order to leave a question hovering in the background; or to set the reader thinking ahead; or shift an agenda, or stretch the issues. Always, I am seeking to show the diversity of thinking within a unified agenda and attempting to encourage the reader to make their own selections and establish their own priorities.

The book seeks to be practical, and the discussion will, I think, be of interest not just to counsellors but also to that much larger *general public interested in taking stock of themselves, for themselves*. This, I am certain, includes everyone at one or more stages in their lives.

Because of this ignorance of current discussion about identity, counsellors may still refer to ‘getting in touch with myself’ and ‘making real contact with another’ as though these were self-evidently simple, true and important ideas about which there needs to be little investigation. Moreover, counsellors tend simply to assume, rather than actually demonstrate, that counselling is a significant means by which people can develop insight, self-awareness, self-esteem and authentic relations with others.

Of course, a growing amount of research is done on effectiveness within counselling (of which more later). But much of this focuses on client self-reports. If clients are satisfied with counselling does that prove that counselling is effective? How far can I know myself? What does the statement mean? If I claim that I know myself better after counselling does that mean that I actually do know myself better? How far does my feeling of satisfaction about a service mean that the service is as authentic and effective as it claims? Who decides? Who defines? How? With what authority?

The person-centred counsellor, Brian Thorne, remarked (1991:4) that: ‘At that time [during my primary school days] I simply experienced, with alarming frequency, the powerful sensation of knowing what it felt like to be in someone else’s skin.’ How well did he know this? How could he know this? How could, and did, he find evidence for what he ‘knew’? How far is such ‘knowing’ actually possible? What we do know, is that not all those who claim to ‘see the world as you see it’ are able to convince anyone else that they are right. Also we know that a guru may convince disciples that they have finally ‘found themselves’ within the church or therapy of . . . yet few others may be convinced.

Worse yet, we know that even the majority opinion may not be reliable. Majorities, after all, may be saturated in sentimentality, prejudice, indolence, laziness, childishness, kitsch, ignorance and illusion of one kind or another. This does not mean that élites can necessarily be relied upon either to be reliably insightful, real, wise, sensitive or whatever. It is not easy to ‘get real’ with

ourselves and find ‘underlying truths’. The certificates placed on the walls of counsellor consulting rooms do not demonstrate that truth and authenticity can be relied upon after however many sessions of counselling.

As we pay close attention, we notice that whenever we say, ‘I am this,’ or ‘I am that,’ there is to some degree a feeling of being an impostor. That whenever the ‘I am’ of just being is attached to this or that in the world, there is a feeling of falsity, of incompleteness, or somehow not quite telling the whole truth. (Levine 1986:17)

Nonetheless, I think we mostly, and rightly, persist in thinking that truth, knowledge and self-knowledge of some kind or another are real and important, however difficult they may be to achieve. We draw back from the chaos of concluding that there are only opinions and that no perspective is more valid, authentic and significant than any other.

I do think that progress can be made with these, and other, questions concerning knowledge of self and other. I believe that the Enlightenment agenda can continue to progress. In other words, I believe in the possibility of person-centred truth seeking and truth telling and that responsible mature choice and judgement by honest individuals is both possible and desirable. *I also believe that counselling, and the society to which it belongs, will never become more ‘self aware’ if it continues to ignore key ideas and developments made, not just within psychology but, more so, within sociology and philosophy.*

We live in a postmodern era. This, I will try to show, is a fundamental reality and not just an abstract debate that we can examine or ignore as we prefer. Postmodernism is a reality that is of profound importance if we really want to make progress in our understanding of what it is to ‘be ourselves’, to ‘be real’, to be responsible, to be free (insofar as that is possible and desirable), and to be virtuous. It is a reality that is of essential importance if we want to see how far empathy with another human being is possible. Empathy is of central importance for counsellors. Yet sociologists have looked far more carefully at empathy than psychologists. Counsellors really can no longer afford, therefore, to ignore sociology.

Who, or what, is this image and reality of ‘self’ that, probably without our realizing it, may be inspiring or hindering us in our daily lives? Who is this ‘self’ that we may be seeking to find, get away from, construct, let out, smarten, straighten, add to, subtract from, integrate, divide or multiply? . . . ‘just as one’s current sense of self is validated through the interpreted past, so too does one’s self-image contain within it assumptions, goals, purposes and wishes that are directed toward one’s future’ (Spinelli 1994:174).

What is this ‘self-concept’ which, even when (particularly when) we know nothing of it, and never think about it, has such a powerful effect on what we think, feel, do and don’t do? ‘Self’ is a highly paradoxical concept. *On the one hand, in all kinds of predictable ways, we know who we are very well indeed.* We can answer any number of questionnaires concerning our identity, as regards background, preferences, circumstance, fantasies, habits, consumer

preferences, networks, contacts, affiliations, beliefs, hopes, fears, etc. *On the other hand, others may claim, sometimes with good reason, to see more clearly than we can the nature of our behaviour, intentions, character, personality and dilemmas.* ‘The parts that I make up for you are creative parts that can do anything. I make up an unconscious that is concerned and caring and willing to work on your behalf, because I don’t want parts of you that have limitations’ (Bandler and Grinder 1981:162).

We may ourselves sometimes find something deeply mysterious about who we are. We may long to become more than we are. We may search vaguely for some connection to something ‘more real’ within ourselves. We may feel a deep emptiness within. We may feel overly full of ourselves, weighed down by our own weight, or tired of ourselves. We may, as T. S. Eliot put it (in ‘Burnt Norton’) feel ‘hollow’ and/or ‘stuffed’. We may wish we could meet someone else or do something else that would bring out something fresh and new from ourselves. ‘Stan, you are not a noun. You are a verb. A constant changing process ever unfolding into its next open moment’ (Levine 1984:119).

Friends, family and colleagues may, in some respects, understand us more than we understand ourselves. Their understandings will differ, a little or a great deal, according to the different aspects of ourselves that we present to different people. Our relationships with different people ‘brings out’ different ‘sides’ of our personality. Also our roles differ. When I am in the role of ‘father’ I will, in many ways, behave differently, and see myself differently, from when in the role of husband, friend or colleague.

There is nothing within this universe of change that I can call myself for very long, nothing I can say I am that is the whole truth. In fact, much of the time we feel like we are pretending to be someone else simply by pretending to be anything at all. (Levine 1986:17)

Jane may say to Joan, ‘I don’t know what Jean sees in John.’ The John seen by Jean, Joan and Jane may be profoundly different. Is there a ‘real’ John beneath all these appearances? Is Jean’s John a more accurate view of the reality of John than Joan’s or Jane’s John? Who decides? Is any one view as ‘valid’ as any other? There does not seem to be one absolute, objective, privileged view of ‘the truth’ about John. Neither does it seem acceptable that any description of John is as true and useful as any other.

We are what we know how to do best. (Smail 1996:224)

We seem to be both a subject and an object, *and* the verb that links the two! We can think of ourselves and imagine looking at ourselves as an object. Yet who, then, is the subject, the observer? ‘We think we are our thoughts. We call our thoughts “I”. In letting go of thought, we go beyond ourselves, beyond who we imagine we are’ (Levine 1986:21).

The John seen by Jean will, in part, be shaped by their dealings with each other and also by Jean's own personality, hopes, fears, experiences and expectations. Likewise with Jane and Joan. They may 'hit it off' and see each other in a highly positive way. They may, or may not, like the look and smell of each other. The chemical scent given off by their compatible or incompatible immune systems may attract or repel. They may reward or punish each other, and this will certainly affect how they see each other.

The self in contemporary cultural discourse is not a single thing at all, but an open 'system' subject to change, choice, personal motivation, desire, freedom and an infinite raft of interactions and redirections. The unfixing of culture and the de-bordering of nations have opened the way for new formulations of the self and the 'identity' which constitutes the self. (Lewis 2002:370)

People may, or may not, much trust each other and this will strongly influence what, and how much, they reveal, and how honest they are with each other. They may wish to get *through* to each other, or get *the better of* each other, or *get away from* each other. We may well not wish to open ourselves to another. We may know from past experiences that they are not to be trusted and that we should remain on our guard. Even when there is trust, the way in which John is seen will also depend substantially on what Jean, Joan and Jane hope and expect to be able to give to and get from John.

Identity past and present

We have always had theories about what it means to be a human being, and more particularly what it means to be an 'individual' human being. Theology and philosophy have speculated about the individual and the individual soul. Early modern theories suggested that each individual constitutes a natural and spiritual essence which is more or less fixed from the time of birth. (Lewis 2002:30)

Concern about the nature of 'self', its past, present and future, goes back a long way. In most poor, 'primitive', historic and prehistoric cultures a great deal of what limited amount of wealth was available was given over to looking after, reflecting upon, respecting, ritualising, burying and telling stories about selves whose bodies, at the very least, had died. Is there any 'self' remaining after the body has rotted away? If so, in what sense?

In most cultures people have not been willing to accept that John has gone when John has died. All manner of ideas have been embraced to show that, in some way or another, somewhere or another, John is still around. Ancestors remain present to us, certainly within our own memories, and this, understandably, matters to us a great deal. What are we to make of this widespread belief in the continuity of self? How are these various ideas best to be understood in a new millennium? Certainly they do not seem to be cultural

luxuries. On the contrary, they appear to be central to the morale, wellbeing, and *raison d'être* of those who believe in them.

We may be able to face ourselves and our lives only because we feel reassured in the belief that our ancestors are still looking after us, or that our pharaoh, within his vast pyramid, keeps us properly hinged within the universe. Our ancestors, in stone tombs, may be littered all around us. In earlier times they may have seemed more present, more solid, more unchanging and more significant than all the ever-changing paraphernalia of our daily lives. In earlier times and for many still today, 'real' life only began in the 'afterlife', after we had died. In that eternal world we would all meet up again and really live. This imperfect material life on earth was just a preparation for the heavenly existence that was to come.

But perhaps we can come to terms with the idea that this life here on earth is not a 'rehearsal' for something more real? Perhaps we can accept that here and now is as 'real' as it will ever get; that this life is the actual performance and not a preparation. Perhaps we can accept that, for many of us, our life is already nearly over? And perhaps it is enough just to remember and be reassured in the thought that people, who are now gone, once cared for us and cared about us? We can be assisted by imagining what they *would* say to us now if we could ask for their advice.

We may see ourselves as shining and coping only because the light of God shines within and upon us. We may believe that we know ourselves within God and in no other way. Clearly there is no unanimity of view concerning the nature of self, and there is no reason to believe that our grandchildren will accept our current views about our identity.

There are, however, common features within most constructions of self; common assumptions, without which it is difficult to see how we could conceive of any kind of self:

What exactly do people mean when they speak of the self? Its defining characteristics are fourfold. First of all, continuity. You've a sense of time, a sense of past, a sense of future. There seems to be a thread running through your personality, through your mind. Second, closely related is the idea of unity or coherence of self. In spite of the diversity of sensory experiences, memories, beliefs and thoughts, you experience yourself as one person, as a unity.

So there's continuity, there's unity. And then there's the sense of embodiment or ownership – yourself as anchored to your body. And fourth is a sense of agency, what we call free will, your sense of being in charge of your own destiny. (Ramachandran 2003)

Within these basics, though, there is room for a great deal of debate. The last characteristic, our sense of 'agency', is particularly problematic. 'We are none of us as much in charge of ourselves as we think. The exercise of will may be an illusion' (Smail 1996:182). Social process, assumptions, values, negotiations and interactions will have a substantial influence on how we see ourselves, and

on how others see us. No wonder then, that sociologists have so much to offer in the understanding of self. Just as individuals may develop little insight if they cut themselves off from the world around them so, likewise, psychology and counselling may make little progress in understanding individuals if they just focus on individuals. Individuals grow within the soil of the society of which they are a part.

The personal is not opposed to the political – but constructed by the political. (Cohen & Taylor 1992:21)

Displaced and dislocated within the wider global frame of post industrial capitalism, the individual self turns increasingly to consumption, leisure and travel in order to give substance to everyday life. (Elliott 2003:2)

You can't lead a sane life in an insane society. Function is going to clash with dysfunction. (Hillman & Ventura 1993:205)

I think we talk so much about inner growth and development because we are so boxed in to petty, private concerns in our jobs. (Hillman & Ventura 1993:13)

So, if a counsellor wants to know more about personal identity and personal growth they need to know something (rather a lot actually) about the soil that fosters or inhibits such growth, just as gardeners need to know about the conditions of growth for plants. These conditions of growth are not so much to be found inside the plant as in the soil and wider environment from which the plant will grow. Likewise, if we want to understand self we have to understand Society. Yet the counsellors' journal *Self and Society* has focused more on self and less on society than I think it should. Once again, we need sociology and a social psychology. We need to look at social processes. 'Modernism, of course, re-created the subject-self in terms of the subject-object split. Rene Descartes explained reality (and subjectivity) in terms of knowledge' (Lewis 2002:370).

How we are seen and received, and how we project ourselves will be a negotiated process of give and take. This will itself depend on our powers, roles, resources, accoutrements and skills as well as our character and personality. John, with jeans and an old jalopy, will see himself, and will see himself being seen, very differently from John in a Jaguar with other designer accessories.

The Jaguar itself will be seen differently, and will have different meanings according to the dreams, preferences, projects and stereotypes of different observers. To Joan, John-plus-Jaguar may equal a highly desirable partner. To Jane, the Jaguar may put John in the category of 'nasty exploitative capitalist'. The cold and heartless John that Jane then 'sees' will differ radically from the warm and witty John seen by Joan. John may pick up the hostility from Jane and may lose his tendency to warmth. Mutual stereotyping may become mutually reinforcing.

Will a counsellor be able to see beyond these prejudices? How far will a counsellor's needs, preferences, prejudices, knowledge, beliefs, affiliations, etc. affect not just her reactions to John but the very nature of the John that she sees and brings out? Will the counsellor seek to 'bring something out' of the client, or help the clients bring something out for themselves, or 'put something in' to the client?⁴

If people were totally knowable and known by each other then communication and interaction would be redundant. On the other hand, if people were a total mystery to each other then any kind of interaction would be difficult if not impossible. We proceed to engage with each other in a context of tacit and received understandings, expectations and recognisable roles and situations. We have social, personal, impersonal and professional projects to get on with and we deal with, and see, the people around us according to how we think and hope they can deal with us in our plans for the day.

In other words, *we never see another person in a social vacuum*, we never ourselves as observers exist in a social vacuum, and so we never observe as disinterested and disembodied observers. We see people in the context of their and our own, roles, plans, preferences, opportunities and constraints. What we see is partly determined by what the other person can, and cannot, do with and for us. What we become, and how we see ourselves, is partly determined by what we are, and are not, able to do for ourselves, and for others and with others.

Identity is both a problem and a project. (Kidd 2002:93)

The idea of multiple personalities and the sub-personalities attracted a great deal of attention by the end of the nineteenth century. (Hardy 1987:185)

A general who defeats Napoleon at Waterloo is likely to have a different self-image from a beggar who is ignored in the street. Their identity is to some degree an 'internal' matter known only to themselves. But in many respects their identity is a public reality, readily observable by others.

A self is a repertoire of behaviour appropriate to a given set of contingencies. (Skinner 1979:194)

There are many respects in which our identity seems like an ever-moving and changing process, a mysterious context to the daily content of our lives and experiences, a tenuous idea, an enigma that always seems to signify more than our theories and descriptions of self. We 'bring out' different aspects of ourselves with different people and, depending on who they are and what they want, different people see 'in' us different qualities, opportunities and threats. Yet we also (generally) experience, or imagine, a continuity of self within ever changing circumstances. What is the basis, and validity, of this 'continuity'? Perhaps a certain degree of 'not knowing' about who I am is unavoidable and even desirable if we are not to become stale to ourselves?

To what does this sense of ‘I’ refer? There is presence, a sense of just ‘I am’ which when you follow it back further and further will turn more into an ‘am-ness’ than ‘I-ness’. (Levine 1984:118)

The scientism and objectification of philosophical thought seem merely to have ossified the individual, reinscribing Christian articulations of the essential soul with an equally essentialist discourse of the self. (Lewis 2002:371).

Rapid changes in our circumstances can leave us with a profound identity crisis. Or, if our situation seems stuck or moribund, we can feel that the ‘real’ me is buried beneath tired or oppressive surfaces. We may feel that we are unable to grow into who we really ought to be. We may feel we are frustrated potential rather than a fulfilled actuality.

celebrities perform all those roles that were once carried out by religion, ideology and history. It is now the spring from which we derive many of our multiple identities. (Sardar 2002:41)

Yet, (another paradox), the more self-obsessed we become the more sterile the process of ‘personal development’ may seem to be. We may become weighed down by our own weight, spoilt by our own comfort, jaded by our own good fortune, bored by the lack of surprise in our lives. And the more full of ourselves we become the emptier the experience of ‘me’ may be. *Perhaps we find ourselves by losing ourselves? But what does that mean in practice?* What is to be made of, for example, the Zen and Taoist observation that we should loosen ourselves from any idea we may have about who we are? ‘both the existentialist and the Buddhist say that there is a deeper “basic anxiety” and in the view of Buddhism this is due to our deep-rooted attachment to the ego.’ (de Silva 2000:110)

Observing our own I, or self, we misconceive it to be inherently existent and through this misconception are drawn into afflictive emotions that motivate actions which tie us in tight bonds and cause us to be swept away by the four powerful river currents of suffering. (Gyatso, Fourteenth Dalai Lama 1984:141)

It is rather a willingness to be open to forces greater than oneself and a readiness to co-operate with them. (Thorne 1991:16)

Single and multiple selves

This book will consider the range of conceptions and narratives of self offered within philosophy, social science and cultural history that can be put to real practical use, both by the layperson and by counsellors on behalf of their clients. The book explores the notions of self that are currently implicit within a variety of modes of counselling and provide practical ways in which these conceptions

can, and should, be given more depth and range. The book will challenge a number of myths and fallacies that are currently powerful within counselling practice. It will show how a larger social, cultural, ethical and spiritual apprehension of self would improve the work of counsellors and the benefits to clients. I will examine self as integrated, divided, single, multiple, subject, object, process, prison, platform, performer, context, reality and illusion:

The philosopher Kant argued that we never experience the knowing self in the same way that we experience the object-self. The knowing self is just there, a transcendental or pure ego. The knower apprehends but is not itself apprehended.

The opposite solution, offered by William James and John Dewey among others, holds that there is no substantive knower apart from the process of knowing. The knower is nothing more than the organism itself. (Allport et al. 1961:129)

I will explore and critique Carl Rogers' concept of the 'organismic' self and show that conceptions of self make no sense if described purely within an individualistic or 'experiential' discourse.

Ibsen's Peer Gynt strips himself of all identities and roles in the onion scene to find nothing – an empty space. (Blackman & Walkerdine 2001:118)

The very number of present-day 'psychologies' amounts to a confession of perplexity. (Jung 1995:33)

Each chapter will refer, as appropriate, to constructions of identity from philosophers, sociologists and social psychologists that are of continuing relevance to contemporary concerns. Each chapter will include questions designed to link the theoretical issues raised with the practical dilemmas faced.

Almost the whole time I am writing conversations with myself. Things I say to myself tête à tête. (Wittgenstein 1998:88e)

The most intimate operation of your life becomes the potential grazing ground of the media (non-stop television on the Louds family in the USA, endless 'slice of life' and 'psy' shows on French TV). The entire universe also unfolds unnecessarily on your home screen. This is a microscopic pornography, pornography because it is forced, exaggerated, just like the close-ups of sexual acts in a porno film. (Baudrillard 1998:443)

In examining the history of ideas about self we shall see very clearly how each is a response/reaction to, or elaboration of, what went before. Ideas about self, just like selves themselves, need to be understood in context. The icon (and demon figure) of behaviourist psychology, B. F. Skinner, (1904–90) for example, stated (1979:195) that: 'The picture which emerges from a scientific analysis is not of a body with a person inside, but of a body which is a person in the sense that it displays a complex repertoire of behaviour.'

Skinner focused on behaviour, out of frustration with introspectionists like Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) who, he feared, made no testable or coherent statements at all. Skinner was tired of metaphysical claims about invisible selves that in some mysterious fashion ‘occupied’ bodies. We learned about each other, Skinner argued, by observing carefully what we *do*.

Even so called ‘mind-readers’ and ‘mind-controllers’⁵ do not read minds or control minds in any metaphysical, non-physical, sense. What they do is observe behavioural cues and verbal responses very intensely indeed, make inferences about intentions, and take actions, make judgements and predictions accordingly. Their control lies in the subtlety of their movements and speech, and the accuracy of their observations, not because of any non-physical ‘emanations’ coming out of a non-physical homunculus sitting somewhere behind the eyes.

So Skinner spoke of ‘self’ as a ‘complex repertoire of behaviour’. The trouble is that objects that are not seen as selves also can elicit complex repertoires. Musical boxes have ‘complex repertoires’. Computers much more so. Is a ‘complexity of repertoire’ alone enough to make something a ‘person’? And what about the problem that, however much behaviourists might wish to pass them by, we do have private experiences, reactions, hopes, dreams, fantasies that others cannot access directly and which we see as a central feature of our identity?

Surely we do not reach an adequate understanding of identity if we see ourselves as no more than ‘complex repertoires of behaviour’? People resent, I think rightly, being seen as mere ‘portfolios of behavioural outcomes’. What about meaning, purpose, understanding? Yet the behavioural agenda is still alive and well and has, for example, had an enormous influence in recent years on the way in which education has been transmuted into training via, for example, the UK focus on ‘National and Vocational Qualifications’.

There is a conceptual thinness in its conception of the character of human being. It is a conception that sees human beings as mere performers rather than reflective actors. (Barnett 1994:77)

Early explorations of the problem of identity

The philosopher Rene Descartes (1596–1650) wanted to break away from superstition, uncertainty and empty speculation about self and others. Descartes asked, what foundation of certain knowledge existed from which we could build an understanding of the world? Descartes decided to strip away anything that lacked any kind of certainty. Then all that would be left would be bedrock of fundamental truth. Descartes thought that we could build up from this and, provided we took great care, we could establish a surer basis to our knowledge.

Descartes looked ‘out’ on all the objects of the world and found grounds for uncertainty. But then, he thought that even as he raised doubts about all the objects that he looked upon and thought about, surely one single thing remained beyond doubt? He could have doubts about all these objects around him, but he who doubted; the subject who observed and thought about all these objects; his existence was surely beyond doubt? Hence Descartes’ famous assertion, ‘Cogito ergo sum’, ‘I think, therefore I exist’. I am confused, uncertain, full of doubt, yet here I am, the quizzical doubter. That, surely, is beyond doubt?

I thence concluded that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature consists only in thinking, and which, that it may exist, has need of no place, nor is dependent on any material thing; so that ‘I,’ that is to say, the mind by which I am what I am, is wholly distinct from the body, and is even more easily known than the latter, and is such, that although the latter were not, it would still continue to be all that it is. (Descartes [1637] 1965:27)

In this way Descartes’ philosophy described an essential self that was non-physical; that was somehow ‘connected to’ but not physically locatable in, the body. The self could survive the death of the body. It could survey objects and bodies. It could not itself be directly observed. Its existence in others could be inferred. And, although non-physical, self was the most *essential*, central and ‘real’ fact of life. I could be aware of myself, even if not actually able to see myself, as an observer. I could observe my private experiences that others could not observe.

John Locke (1632–1704) likewise considered ([1690] 1998:ch. X) self to be an indubitable core of certainty: ‘As for our own existence, we perceive it so plainly and so certainly, that it neither needs nor is capable of any proof.’

David Hume (1711–76) was much less certain: ‘I never can catch “myself” at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception’ (Hume [1739] 1966: Book 1, Part 4, sec VI).

Descartes’ ‘self’ was a subject, a thinker, an observer and a doubter. Locke shared Descartes’ certainty that this self existed but Hume noted that subjects could not be observed as objects. Selves were neither physical objects nor objects of experience. *Hume observed bodies on the ‘outside’; and heat, cold, etc. from the ‘inside’; but never ‘himself’, inside or out.*

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) profoundly understood Descartes’ subject–object, mind–matter dualisms and Hume’s scepticism about the whereabouts of these ‘subjects’ and ‘minds’. What was to be done? Those who focused on minds and subjects were always in danger of empty speculation, untestable propositions, difficulties in achieving mutual understanding, undisciplined flights of fantasy. Those who confined themselves to objects and the physically observable, risked finding themselves in a disenchanting robotic world lacking in humanity, spirit, life, mutual recognition and the understanding that came

from two subjects – selves, persons, homo *sapiens*,⁶ really succeeding in making contact with each other. I did not reach you by referring to you merely as a ‘complex repertoire of responses’, nor by treating you as an object of manipulation.

Somehow, then, we hoped to make, and thought we could succeed in making, significant contact with other *persons*, other human *beings*. Yet, as Hume observed, could we even manage to observe ‘ourselves’? Kant noted ([1781] 1991:ss12) that: ‘The empirical consciousness which accompanies different representations is in itself fragmentary and disunited, and without relation to the identity of the subject.’

We experienced heat, cold and objects all around us, but what was this ‘me’ that the objects were around and the heat was ‘within’? What held all this experience together into a coherent unity? What was the coherent ‘self’ around which this coherent experience cohered? ‘Only because I can connect a variety of given representations in one consciousness, is it possible that I can represent to myself the identity of consciousness in these representations’ (Ibid.).

I (who?) certainly did connect all these representations together. My experiences seemed to be threaded together into a ‘string’ or ‘stream’ of consciousness. And without this, how could I think at all:

All general conceptions – as such – depend, for their existence, on the analytical unity of consciousness.

the synthetical unity of apperception is the highest point with which we must connect every operation of the understanding, even the whole of logic, and after it our transcendental philosophy; indeed, this faculty is the understanding itself. (Ibid.)

Without such coherence of experience how could there be any understanding at all? Likewise, without a ‘self’ as ‘that which understands’ how could there be understanding? How could any object or activity be understood unless there was a subject that did the observing and the understanding? ‘I am conscious myself of a necessary a priori synthesis of my representations, which is called the original synthetical unity of apperception’ (Ibid.).

Self, then, for Kant, was a necessary presupposition, and a necessary fact, given the degree of coherence that there was in the world. Moreover, for Kant, this coherence did not just stop with individual selves. There could be no real understanding or individual identity unless these were themselves embedded into something larger:

there exists among the transcendental ideas a certain connection and unity, and that pure reason, by means of them, collects all its cognitions into one system. From the cognition of self to the cognition of the world, and through these to the Supreme Being, the progression is so natural, that it seems to resemble the logical march of reason from the premises to the conclusion. (Ibid.)

So, Kant agreed with Hume that when we thought, felt, did, or observed, we never came across ‘myself’ in the process of thinking. But the self was implied immediately in the recognition of there being any thought going on at all. This was because thoughts could not happen without a thinker to think them:

I cognize myself, not through my being conscious of myself as thinking, but only when I am conscious of the intuition of myself as determined in relation to the function of thought. (Ibid.)

All the modi of self-consciousness in thought are hence not conceptions of objects (conceptions of the understanding – categories); they are mere logical functions, which do not present to thought an object to be cognized, and cannot therefore present my Self as an object. Not the consciousness of the determining, but only that of the determinable self, that is, of my internal intuition (in so far as the manifold contained in it can be connected conformably with the general condition of the unity of apperception in thought), is the object. (Ibid.)

Perception and thought was a unified and unifying process and the perceiver and thinker was, in Kant’s view, a unified and unifying entity:

the I or Ego of apperception, and consequently in all thought, is singular or simple . . . [it] cannot be resolved into a plurality of subjects, and therefore indicates a logically simply subject – this is self-evident from the very conception of an Ego, and is consequently an analytical proposition.

The proposition of the identity of my Self amidst all the manifold representations of which I am conscious, is likewise a proposition lying in the conceptions themselves, and is consequently analytical. (Ibid.)

A unified self, Kant believed, was built in to our very capacity to think, understand and negotiate at all. It was one of Kant’s ‘synthetic a priori’ truths; a truth of logic and a truth about the world. It was logically unavoidable but it was also a fact about what existed in the world.

Likewise, Kant argued, it was a fact about the world and an unavoidable truth of logic that there were separate selves who distinguished ‘me’ from ‘you’ from ‘it’. You were not me and you were not an object. My body was not me and it was an object.

I distinguish my own existence, as that of a thinking being, from that of other things external to me – among which my body also is reckoned. This is also an analytical proposition, for other things are exactly those which I think as different or distinguished from myself.

A thinking being, considered merely as such, cannot be cogitated otherwise than as subject. (Ibid.)

For Kant, selves, others and objects, and the fundamental difference between each, was embedded into our logic, our language and, not least, our world. Without them there simply could not be any logic, language, world at all. ‘Self’ and ‘other’ came with the set. Without them there was no possibility of there being any language, any object, any coherent world at all.

This was a very unifying picture and very reassuring if it was true and if you could believe it – and *understand* it! Kant, and those who followed him, thought he had settled the scepticism of Hume. Kant preserved self by showing that it was far more than a material object. But he anchored self into a material and coherent world, and thus ensured that self did not vanish into private fantasy, incoherent mysticism, or ‘chaotic’, romantic reverie.

Kant remains very difficult to read, yet his analysis is much more sophisticated than some of the naïve discussion about self that continues 200 years after his death.⁷

The problems about identity, we might hope, are solved and over. We can all go home and get on with our lives. We might not follow every word that Kant wrote about self. But we might rest reassured in the thought that, via Kantian Deep Thought, self has been preserved from chaos, non-existence, oblivion, fundamental uncertainty, emptiness, meaninglessness.

Perhaps, except that history suggests otherwise. Kantian thinking still has a place and has not, I think, been entirely unraveled. Yet others have rolled out all kinds of questions and doubts about identity subsequent to Kant. And these questions run and run and will not all be put down finally and constrained within the framework of Kantian thinking.

Wouldn't it be absurd for an airline pilot to deny knowledge of the principles of flight, or for a physician to claim ignorance of the basics of human physiology and anatomy? Yet I, a neuro-psychologist, can give no satisfactory account of how the brain generates conscious awareness. Worse still, I find myself edging towards a doubt that it means anything at all to say that the brain generates consciousness. (Broks 2003:92)

Some philosophers (dismissed by others as ‘Mysterians’) argue that the ‘problem of consciousness’ exceeds human mental capacity . . . (Ibid.:101)

So what are these questions and doubts? What are the problems? Is there a problem at all? Why don't I just get on with my life? Indeed, is it not the case that I do indeed just get on with my life? I rarely get up in the morning and say ‘I've cleaned my teeth but I just can't go any further until I have established just who I am!’

The familiar *and* mysterious self

Here is part of the mystery of identity: As I have said, on the one hand I know myself in endless ways, and my identity is not generally, in daily life, a press-

ing problem for me. Except that sometimes it really is. And sometimes I might look back and regret the folly of time wasted in trying to ‘be’ and to ‘assert’ a ‘me’ that I no longer value, no longer believe in, no longer identify with, nor believe ever really existed. Clearly there is an issue about how to construe our identity since there is, without doubt, an enormous variety in the way in which selves *are* construed. For example:

The doctrine of egolessness is the key to the understanding of the Buddhist psychological analysis presented in this work. (De Silva 2000:8)

Forms of lamentation that are mandatory in Greece would be considered vulgar and shameful in England. (Nussbaum 1997:227)

It was thought, moreover, [in Ancient Greece] that only in a male–male sexual relationship would one be likely to have a deep spiritual and emotional bond with one’s lover: women were sequestered and relatively uneducated. (Ibid.:235)

Hoggart’s *The Uses of Literacy* is quite explicit in its nostalgia for the cohesion and dignity of the pre-World War II working class culture of England. (Lewis 2002:127)

If there is no problem about identity, how come there are so many different constructions of identity? How come we ‘identify’ ourselves with so many different causes, stories, characters, objects, principles, ideas, institutions and people? Though, on the other hand, why should we not? Perhaps a crucial feature of our identity is that it changes and that we can have a hand in changing it? We can ‘make something of’ ourselves. We can make ‘more of’, or something *else* of, ourselves. We can *find* ourselves, *lose* ourselves, *avoid* ourselves, *escape* ourselves, *know* ourselves, *not know* ourselves; and all these options can be both opportunities and constraints in different times, places and circumstances.

The Leavisite legacy and the Frankfurt School critique share a certain pessimism, a fear that human society is disintegrating under the weight of mass-mediated messages and the dehumanising effects of impersonal, mass urbanisation. (Lewis 2002:122)

Goffman, *The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life*: Humans play many different roles. They follow certain scripts that are relevant in some situations but not in others. Individuals give ‘front stage’ and ‘back stage’ performances. Interaction – since it is social by nature – is a performance to an audience. (Kidd 2002:77)

While psychoanalysis may not be overtly antipathetic to community life, social solidarity, and family ties, it certainly places no great value on them. (Fancher 1995:123)

Hegel (1770–1831) took unification still further than Kant as a means of preserving and defining ‘self’. Our identity, according to Hegel, could not be found by isolated introspection or by fragmented observation of others or

objects. We did not find ourselves alone, on our own, for we were not alone and we could not act alone.

Only Big System philosophy could get to the parts of self that other people and other ideas could not reach. Indeed 'self' was just a part in the Big System, and it had no meaning, direction, shape or coherence at all except within this system. This did not make self a static entity since a part of our very being, our reason for being, was that we strove towards a deeper apprehension of coherence, of oneness, of reunion, of realizing, feeling, knowing, not just thinking, our belonging to a bigger story, a bigger mystery.

We strove to come closer to 'the Absolute' of which we were a part. In a dialectical process of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, we developed a vision, but soon there would be doubts and opposition. This was not a step backward since a *synthesis* of proposition and opposition would eventually emerge that took us to a larger understanding of reality. The synthesis would then itself comprise a thesis against which more doubts, questions and uncertainties would surface. These themselves would ultimately be embraced within a still bigger picture, and a still more sophisticated account. This progress in our understanding of the world was mirrored in the progress in our understanding of ourselves. Indeed the two were not really separate, as Kant had sought to show.

There is no inherent reason why internal dynamics, rather than one's place in society, must be the principal source of health or illness. (Fancher 1995:125)

We have no logical basis, within behaviourism, for saying, 'The individual is in good working order, but the environment is awry.' (Ibid.:168)

Hume had been skeptical of Descartes, and Kant sought to synthesise Hume and Descartes. Hegel, too was a synthesiser. From whence would come the next antithesis? Or was Hegel right about all this? Could the opposition come up with an even bigger, broader, deeper 'Absolute' than Hegel's? It seemed unlikely, and indeed the argument went absolutely the other way, as we shall see. By raising doubts about his 'Absolute', were critics of Hegel showing that he was right and paving the way to the next enlargement of the picture? Was intellectual 'progress' inevitable? Were we getting a deeper grasp of ourselves and our world? Were we becoming more moral and responsible and aware beings? Or just going round in circles? 'Self-deception is a constant problem as we progress along a spiritual path. Ego is always trying to achieve spirituality. It is rather like wanting to witness your own funeral.' (Trungpa 1973:63)

Hegel argued that we found ourselves by integrating ourselves with, rather than differentiating ourselves from, the larger universe. But he did not see this as a conflict-free process leading to peace, salvation, a 'final' destination and resting place. It was not all heavenly choirs, choruses and harmony. On the contrary, conflict was built into the process. Thesis produced antithesis. Self produced Other. Dichotomies abounded. Yet the process did not have to lead to disintegration. On the contrary, a synthesis of the opposites could eventu-

ally be found, and a deeper harmony thereby embraced. Admittedly, synthesis was itself challenged by another 'other', another 'opposite', another 'different'. What seemed like a resolution became another thesis challenged once more by its antithesis. Progress, nonetheless, could continue as we finessed, refined, broadened and deepened our understanding. We could thereby move closer to an appreciation of the overall unity of existence praised by Spinoza, Leibnitz and so many theologians and mystics. For Hegel we engaged, via this dialectical process, with ever-deeper levels of reality in a fusion of thought, feeling and experience.

But were we really progressing in our knowledge of our God as an Hegelian Absolute? Or were we progressing by realising that 'God' was a superstition that we no longer needed?

The sociologist Emile Durkheim, (1858–1917), was ambivalent about how far a self could be founded and nurtured within secular modernism. On the one hand he believed that science, social science, educational reform, rational enquiry and empirical investigation could make a better world and more happy, aware and responsible individuals. In this sense he saw the torch of progress as being within the hands of secular modernists and less so as belonging to the church and its priesthood.

On the other hand, although he himself was agnostic, Durkheim could see the powerful social role of the church in holding individuals and communities together, giving them a sense of meaning, purpose and solidarity. Durkheim coined the term 'anomie', the sense of disconnection and alienation that seems to be so much a part of the modern experience. The division of labour, he thought, separated people off from each other even as they became more dependent on each other. They might not see the product or purpose of their work. They occupied just a fragment of the overall social space and might not see how it inter-linked with the wider world. Suicide appeared to increase when people felt less connected to their society.

My mother pointed out some twenty years ago, in the height of my spiritual grandiosity, that I was good at loving humanity but not so good at loving individual human beings. (Zweig 2000)

What is in fact a social phenomenon comes to be experienced by ordinary people as a personal problem. (Smail 1996:112)

We are all haunted by the possibility of slipping from our perch. (Ibid.:229)

Suicide was not merely a personal and private decision. It could not be understood merely by looking at individual consciousness but was itself a product of social process and social disintegration. Technology and mechanisation could involve treating people like machines, like objects. How could ethics and social solidarity survive if we were all just seen as instruments of production? How could identity survive this destructive process? The disintegration of the sense of self was a product of social disintegration and it was the duty of

sociologists not merely to understand the process but to propose remedies that would preserve and promote persons via improvements in the societies on which our identities depended.

Present day threats to identity

Increasingly in the world as it is, people are just *reduced* to their private selves . . . (House & Totton 1997:167)

I recall the word of Warren Bennis in the film of you and him, when he characterised your viewpoint as ‘devilishly innocent’. How do you square this ‘human and humane’ world you predict with the fact that the suicide rate in this country has gone up 171% in the last 30 years? (Rollo May letter to Carl Rogers in Greening 1984: 16)

Sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920) explored the interconnections between our individual character and the society of which we were a part. What if we believed we were headed for Hell unless we made very substantial efforts to improve ourselves? What if we believed that we were miserable offenders who needed both to confess our sins and work day and night to make amends? What if we believed that we had no right to celebrate, spend, or distract ourselves in idle dissipation? Why, we would save, invest, work and work and work again. Society would accumulate capital; people would obey orders. Timetables would be made and followed. If other conditions were right, an entire capitalist revolution might be achieved. And so it was, or so Weber argued.

More recently, in *The Corrosion of Character*, Richard Sennett (1998) has taken a more negative view of capitalist revolution, seeing it as a way of frustrating human attempts to develop a mature and stable identity, as we shall see.

Such secular capitalist social ‘progress’ can both ‘advance’ and damage individuals and societies. The material and technical progress has been greatly evident and was indeed a revolution even though achieved at great price to those at the bottom of the social order. Others paid a price too. Weber observed the ‘iron cage’ of bureaucracy lowering itself, not just onto society but into the minds and identities of the bureaucrat. Georg Simmel (1858–1918) argued that a whole new ‘metropolitan’ type of individuality was emerging, which consisted in, and was created by, the intensification of nervous stimulation. Anthony Giddens suggests that now most of us can exercise ‘cosmopolitan’ freedom, and welcomes the prospect.

But how rational, and right, was it to treat people as ‘instruments’ for some larger, seemingly impersonal, purpose? What place was there for personal moral engagement, individual integrity, and personal responsibility in a world of big businesses, bureaucratic systems and impersonal procedures? What happened

to our sense of magic, mystery and enchantment within a science whose central metaphor was the machine?

How was our humanity – our sense of uniqueness, of the sublime, of brotherliness, (and sisterhood), and of genuine personal relations – to be sustained in a world dominated by ‘impersonalities’, procedures, systems, techniques, and machines? What place was there, in all this so-called progress, for the human part of human beings? Weber and Durkheim raised the questions, and they remain as pressing now as they were a century ago.

The philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) was likewise deeply concerned about how identity could be maintained given the widespread alienation of individuals from society. There was always a danger, in any society, that we could become ‘inauthentic’. We would attempt to ‘be’ someone who we were not: ‘We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see and judge. The “they”, which is nothing definite, and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness’ (Heidegger [1927] 1995:164).

Instead of being with ourselves or with others we started to be *for* others. We created ourselves and presented ourselves and thought ourselves to be whatever it was we imagined others (themselves imagined) thought we were and ought to be. We became a mask, a presentation, a production, a plausible show, we lost our own true authentic selves in the crowd, in the imagined ‘they’.

Such alienation was always a potential problem in any time and place, Heidegger thought. But it was a particularly pressing problem in a modern era that was so much focused on techniques, systems, bureaucracies, machines and mass organisation. In such a context, where we made such a fetish of machinery and technology, we could turn ourselves into a machine. We might come to see ourselves as no more than a skills-portfolio, a potential pattern of predetermined outcomes that ‘they’ wanted us to achieve. A patter of clichés predicted, prepared and preferred by Weber’s bureaucracy. We might be asked ‘what do *you* think, feel, understand, and want?’ But the answers that we imagined were all our own might be simply a reflection of answers prepared in advance by spin doctors, public relations specialists, managers, marketing specialists, human resource consultants, social psychologists, motivational analysts or counsellors!

A lot of therapies are simply another dose of hypnosis. Now we have the ‘human potential top-dog’ saying ‘You should be open, you should be warm, you should love everyone.’ (Stevens 1977:262)

Consciousness has been reduced by certain popular dogmas to a psychobabbling subjectivity that legitimises the passing sensation, the available comfort, the half-truth. (Rosen 1977:222)

For Karl Marx (1818–83) individual identities were a product of culture, and this was itself shaped by the underlying economic structure; the ‘material forces

of production', including the *means* of production and the *relations* of production. For Marx 'it was the economy, stupid' even more so than it has been thought to be for recent liberal politicians.

Marx accepted Hegel's account of a dialectical process but argued that the forces at work were material rather than 'spiritual'. For Marx we were made, and broken, by the underlying material, socio-economic processes that comprised and contained us. Eventually we would emerge from false consciousness when the proletarians took over all the means of production. Millions followed and constructed their experiences, agendas and their very identities around the Marxist project.

Marx believed that personal worth was being boiled down into mere 'exchange value' and this, he thought, was highly damaging to individual identities. Our work had lost all individual character, and we had become mere appendages to machines. People might think otherwise, both rich (exploitative) and poor (exploited). But when they did so they were victims of 'false consciousness'. So, to get to the underlying reality that structured self one needed to examine the culture that shaped our ideas concerning who we were, what our life was about and to what we were entitled. We then needed to see how the culture was itself structured by the nature of the underlying economy.

We are witnessing a fundamental shift in which higher education moves from being a form of cultural transmission to one in which it becomes a means of generating economic capital. (Barnett 1994:138)

Sociologist Theodore Adorno (1903–69) looked at this shaping process in more detail. The mass media, he argued, was the most important cultural formation that shaped individuals. These media controlled what we thought, how we thought, what we dreamed about, hoped for and expected of others and ourselves. They created 'pseudo individuals'. For Adorno, as with Schopenhauer, escape and liberation to authentic living was possible, not so much, as in Marx, via collective action of the proletariat, but through *art*. The artist was not merely someone who provided decoration, distraction and entertainment, but the best artists expressed our deepest, truest, most authentic longings, conflicts and concerns. Through inspirational art we could get a deeper understanding of who we really could become and ought to become.

For Louis Althusser (1918–90) it was not just the mass media that mattered. All social institutions were involved in the construction of individual and collective identities. Churches, schools, civil services, police, families as well as mass media told us who we were, where we were, and what was going to be on offer for us. *Structures* shaped individuals more than persons could, in isolation, change structures. So in order to understand the formation of identity it was less important to focus on the accidents of individual circumstances, decisions and 'stream of consciousness'. Far more important was the need to study the underlying social structures, collectives, communities and institutions. We needed to understand their interconnections, their dynamics,

their priorities and the power relations operating between them. There was a 'science' of history expressed through class struggle and changes in the means of production.

We also needed to see, as Norbert Elias (1897–1990) argued, the ways in which social control became fundamentally lodged within the human psyche. Society and its structures wrote themselves deeply into each individual human being.

Jürgen Habermas and others in the Frankfurt School of sociology likewise tried, and try, to link individuals to societies by integrating Marx and Hegel with psychoanalysis and existentialism. Prominent thinkers from the 1920s and 1930s included Max Horkheimer, Theodore Adorno, Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, and Walter Benjamin. Habermas, as we shall see, sought to preserve conceptions of humanity and individual dignity in the face of depersonalisation, mechanisation and (as he saw it) exploitation.

Identity matters

There are many other important contributors to the debates about identity, to be considered in the following pages. The aim of this book will be to provide at least a flavour of the nature, direction, conflicts and consensus that exists in past, present and possible future discussions about the nature of identity. As in my last book, (Howard 2000), I hope to show that these individual thinkers do not operate in a social and cultural vacuum, but react and respond to what went before, and create the circumstances around what is likely to be said next. So it is that they are best understood when the relations, reactions and alliances among them are appreciated. The identity, agenda and achievement of Habermas, Freud or anyone else can only be understood within the social and cultural context within which they were operating. This will become ever more evident as we proceed.

Above all, to repeat, I want to show why the issues explored in these chapters matter in practice for all of us as we shape our days, our dress, our accoutrements and our priorities. Many of the stories and characterizations that we think are 'us-and-ours alone' have been taken, off-the-peg, from thinkers, movers and shakers who may well be unknown to us. Our freedom, our range of options may be far less than some within the human potential movement for example, like to claim for us. However whatever freedom, insight and agency we may be able to manage is likely to be much enhanced when we have a larger awareness of the many and varied forces at work that shape us, assist us, frustrate us, define us and fill our dreams and days. 'Just because you feel good about yourself doesn't mean that you're doing good things; and doing good things doesn't mean that you're going to feel good later on' (Bandler & Grinder 1981:129).

Certainly counsellors, for whom questions about identity are so central, cannot afford to avoid any longer the lively debate among cultural theorists,

anthropologists, sociologists and philosophers about the nature of identity. That so many counsellors and therapists have remained so relatively ignorant for so long of these developments is itself a symptom of the intellectual and social fragmentation that has itself been of major interest to many sociologists.

Questions for Counsellors

1. What theories and concepts about identity are implicit and explicit within your own training in counselling? What alternatives have you considered?
2. Do you agree with Brain Thorne that counsellors need to know what it feels like to be in the skin of the client? How do you go about checking that you have achieved this?
3. Do you, like Bandler and Grinder, 'make up' parts of the client's personality? Or do you 'observe' these parts? In either event, how do you justify this practice?
4. Are you seeking to help a client find their 'authentic' self, or merely a manageable account of (some aspect of) themselves? Are selves 'found' or 'founded'?
5. Do you share Locke's view that selves can be 'plainly observed'? Or Hume's that the self can never be 'observed' at all? Or are you uneasy with both these accounts?
6. Do you agree with Kant that 'self' is an integral part of our very capacity to think, talk, act and understand? Or with the Buddhist view that 'self' is essentially an illusion that gets in the way of clear understanding? Can both these views be, in some sense, true?
7. Is it possible, or desirable, to think about 'self' separate from social and spiritual context? In knowing your clients how do you find out about these contexts? How far can you rely on client descriptions of these contexts?
8. How far do clients bring what are essentially collective social and spiritual more than private personal problems to you? How do you know? What do you do about it? Think of specific examples.
9. The John seen by Jean, Joan and Jane may be profoundly different. Is the John seen by you, the counsellor, a deeper, more 'objective', more accurate perspective? Who is to decide and how?
10. How far do you agree with Salman Rushdie that the modern self is 'a shaky edifice'?

Index

- Adorno, T., 26, 27, 48, 65, 74, 80, 104, 129, 130, 132, 141, 195, 266
- Allport, G., 2
- Althusser, L., 26, 72
- American Psychological Association, 83, 202, 210
- Anglicanism, 90, 140
- Apollo, 33
- Aquinas, T., 30
- Aristotle, 30, 39, 136, 147, 163–5, 168, 186, 188, 196, 259
- Arnold, M., 37, 250
- Assagioli, R., 60, 176, 243, 264
- ataraxia*, 147, 164
- Bakhtin, M., 225
- Bandler, R., 9, 27, 28, 45, 61, 89, 90, 93, 95, 97, 110, 114, 131, 184, 236, 261
- Banister, P., 191
- Barnett, R., 16, 26, 35, 59, 80–2, 84, 118, 119, 128, 129, 172, 185, 191, 195, 196
- Barthes, R., 50
- Baudrillard, J., 15, 42, 52, 73, 83, 106, 107, 130, 159
- behaviourism, 22, 32, 64, 79, 89, 90, 95, 208, 209, 219
- Benjamin, W., 27
- Bentham, J., 34
- Bergin, A. E., 203, 204, 208, 209, 219, 222
- Blackman, L., 15, 38, 68, 76, 118, 119, 216
- Blake, N., 85, 172, 185
- Blake, W., 217
- Blumer, H., 91
- Boethius, A., 135, 153
- Bond, M., 154
- Bower, P., 206
- Boyle, N., 58
- Brinich, P., 30, 34
- British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy (BACP), 199, 203, 204, 206–8, 232
- Broks, P., 20, 31, 85, 169, 178, 184, 216, 249
- Brooks, D., 240, 264
- Buddhism, 14, 48, 50, 52, 53, 55, 59, 99, 100, 104, 113, 130, 242–5, 264, 277
- Cameron, D., 115
- Carrithers, M., 37
- Cather, W., 105
- Chaney, D., 40, 69, 76, 103, 106, 108, 274
- Charlton, B., 79, 110, 155, 250
- Chesterton, G. K., 77
- Christianity, 29, 30, 32, 57, 58, 76, 99, 100, 130, 136, 138–41, 145, 171, 173, 242, 249, 250
- Cockburn, D., 39, 273, 277
- Coffield, F., 238
- Cohen, S., 12, 42, 104, 146, 164, 180, 271, 272, 277
- Cohn, H. W., 255, 262, 263, 274
- Constantine, 249
- consumerism, 34, 40, 44, 45, 50, 86–8, 135, 138, 140, 141, 145–7, 149, 152, 153, 157–9, 161, 164, 167, 172, 173, 240
- Cooley, C. H., 39, 244
- Craib, I., 67, 128
- Critical theory, 64
- Dalai Lama, 14, 48, 61, 242, 246
- Darwin, C., 101, 185
- Dawes, R. M., 101, 133, 169, 201
- Dawkins, R., 259, 260
- de Silva, 14, 21, 41, 55, 67, 71, 75, 86, 99, 150, 168, 183, 242
- Deleuze, 157
- Democritus, 256
- Derrida, J., 50, 51, 52, 56, 104, 105, 107, 130
- Descartes, R., 12, 16, 17, 22, 30–2, 39, 47, 53, 111, 192, 219
- Dewey, J., 15, 244, 269
- Diagnostic and Statistical Manual*, 70
- Dineen, T., 83, 98, 172, 198, 200–3, 207, 209–11, 213, 268
- Dionysus, 173
- Dryden, W., 56, 175, 204, 209, 211–13
- Durkheim, E., 23, 25, 75, 91
- Eagleton, T., 6, 41
- Edgar, A., 6, 48
- Egan, G., 120, 122–4, 132
- Elias, N., 76, 90, 161, 182

- Elliott, A., 41, 42, 54, 58, 101, 105, 107, 151, 248
 Ellis, A., 248
 Emerson, R. W., 75, 244
 encounter groups, 170, 174
 Enfield, H., 153
 Engel, M., 266
 enlightenment, 5
 Enlightenment (the), 30, 41, 76, 82, 130, 132
 Erikson, E., 2
 erklaren, 87
 Erwin, E., 202, 205
 Eysenck, H., 100, 101

 Fancher, R. T., 21, 22, 62, 79, 88, 89, 91, 97, 105, 108, 109, 111, 130, 131, 142, 163, 209
 Featherstone, M., 174
 Feldman, K. S., 71
 Feltham, C., 56, 98, 125, 126, 137, 144, 147, 164, 175, 204, 208, 209, 211–13, 215, 248
 Ferrucci, P., 158, 159
 figuration, 182, 183
 Fiore, E., 211
 Fonagy, P., 82, 204, 205, 207, 212, 213
 Foucault, M., 51, 58, 77, 79, 105, 190
 Frankfurt School, 129, 141, 157, 191, 195
 Frankl, V., 68, 73, 95
 Freud, S., 4, 27, 32, 54, 55, 69, 88, 101, 104, 133, 136, 137, 138, 139, 243, 246, 252
 Fromm, E., 27, 83, 106, 130, 144, 248, 256
 Frosh, S., 274, 277
 Frost, R., 77, 246
 Furedi, F., 1, 128, 134, 199

 Gadamer, H.-G., 225
 Galbraith, J. K., 98
 Gallway, W. T., 92, 93
 Garfield, S. L., 203, 204, 208, 209, 219, 222
 Geisteswissenschaften, 217
 Gemeinschaft, 86
 Gendlin, E. T., 44
 Gergen, K. J., 34, 53, 62, 102, 104, 105, 172, 244, 252, 264, 267, 272, 277
 Gessellschaft, 86
 Giddens, A., 24, 54, 144, 151, 161, 183
 Goffman, I., 21, 53, 75, 84
 Gorman, P., 2, 3
 Gough, B., 224, 226

 Greening, T., 24, 177
 Grinder, J., 9, 27, 28, 45, 61, 89, 90, 95, 97, 110, 114, 131, 261
 gross domestic product, 65, 239

 Habermas, J., 27, 56, 80, 81, 108, 129, 130, 132, 141, 186, 191–5, 199, 225, 263, 269, 278
 Hall, S., 53, 56
 Halmos, P., 270
 Hardy, J., 13, 242
 Hart, W., 247
 Hawthorne effect, 217
 Hegel, G. W., 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 56, 57, 244, 256
 Heidegger, M., 25, 38, 49, 53, 113, 114, 176, 225, 262, 269
 Heraclitus, 33
 Herman, E., 175, 177
 Hillman, J., 12, 145, 234, 235
 Hinduism, 33
 Hodson, P., 206
 Homer, 90
 Horkheimer, M., 27, 48, 65, 74, 80, 129, 130, 132, 141, 195, 266
 House, R., 24, 77, 90, 198
 Howard, A., 27, 30, 89, 105, 124, 199
 Hume, D., 17–20, 22, 28, 31, 32, 69, 274, 275

 Illich, I., 84
 Irigaray, L., 84

 James, O., 236
 James, W., 15
 Jameson, F., 102, 106
 Jamieson, A., 206
 Jesus, 30, 104, 141
 Jung, C. G., 4, 15, 42, 62, 73, 176, 222, 246, 270

 Kant, I., 15, 17, 18–22, 28, 34, 107
 Kellner, D., 54, 106, 130
 Kennan, G., 178
 Kidd, W., 13, 21, 43, 87, 106, 107
 Kierkegaard, S., 35, 53, 60, 262
 Klein, M., 41, 43, 129, 144, 146–9, 160, 161, 164, 181

 Lacan, J., 52, 55, 101
 Laing, R. D., 84, 157
 Lasch, C., 5, 93, 157, 181, 196, 244
 Layard, R., 152, 153
 Leavis, F. R., 37

- Leibnitz, G. W., 23, 33, 34
 Levine, S., 8, 9, 14, 241, 252, 253, 264
 Lewis, J., 6, 10, 12, 14, 21, 43, 56, 67, 102, 103, 105, 106, 151
 Locke, J., 17, 28, 31, 32
 Lyotard, J. F., 52
- Mace, C., 90, 248
 Machiavelli, N., 33
 Madonna, 43, 158
 Mann, T., 70
 Marcuse, H., 27, 76
 Marinoff, L., 119, 146, 150
 Marsden, O. S., 174
 Marshall, A., 86, 97
 Marx, K., 25–7, 72, 240
 masculinity, 86, 274
 Maslow, A., 175, 177
 Mauss, M., 37
 May, R., 24, 159, 170, 173, 177, 180
 McLeod, J., 202, 203
 McFadden, M., 224, 226
 McNeill, W., 71
 Mead, G. H., 91, 244, 248
 Melman, S., 98
 Mental Health Foundation, 144
 Merleau-Ponty, M., 225
 middle class, 46, 87, 88, 207, 212
 Mill, J. S., 35, 45, 179
 Miller, A., 87, 144
 Minsky, M., 110, 256, 258, 263, 265, 266, 272, 274, 275, 277
 Mohammed, 104
 Monbiot, G., 165, 168, 179
 Moore, M., 75
 Morris, T., 65, 99, 125, 148, 181–3, 241, 264, 267
 mysticism, 20, 33, 39, 56, 241, 245, 247, 248, 258
- New Age, 99, 113, 159, 241
 Nietzsche, F., 33, 69, 177, 200, 249
 Nussbaum, M., 21, 85, 86, 89, 101, 107, 117, 118, 126, 145, 168, 179, 180, 183, 196, 269
- Ortega y Gasset, J., 1
- Pagels, E., 57
 Parfit, D., 247
 Parmenides, 32, 256
 Parsons, T., 73
 Parsons, W. R., 45, 94, 243
 Peck, S., 68, 176, 182, 196
- Perls, F., 39, 48, 49, 61, 93, 110, 112, 114, 119, 174, 175, 186
 Pilger, J., 144, 178
 Pilgrim, D., 67, 100, 101, 199, 211, 217
 Plato, 32, 33, 57, 81, 111
 Porter, R., 29, 69, 70, 76, 77, 179
 postmodernism, 41, 42, 43, 51, 52, 53, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 158, 159
 praxis, 186, 188, 190, 196
- qualitative research, 216, 217, 222, 227, 233
- Raabe, P., 67
 Rainwater, J., 46, 60, 61
 Ram Dass, B., 175
 Ramachandran, V., 111, 113, 131
 Reinfeld, F., 57, 58, 75, 77, 84, 108, 181, 182
 Renaissance, 76
 Ricoeur, P., 37, 225
 Roberts, Y., 142
 Rogers, C., 32, 54, 96, 124–9, 132, 176, 177, 203
 Rosen, R. D., 63, 184, 196
 Roseneil, S., 274
 Roth, A., 82, 204, 205, 207, 212, 213
 Rousseau, J. J., 34, 60, 68, 103
 Rowe, D., 38, 60, 235, 241
 Rowland, N., 63, 205
 Royal College of Psychiatrists, 207
 Russell, B., 135
- Sabo, A., 81, 145, 195
 Sacks, O., 110
 Sands, A., 86–9, 101, 114, 131
 Sarason, S., 267
 Sardar, Z., 48, 173
 Sartre, J. P., 53
 Schopenhauer, A., 33, 61, 149
 Sedgwick, P., 48
 Sennett, R., 134, 142, 157, 237, 238, 272, 277
 Seymour, J., 274
 Shakespeare, W., 64, 199
 Shelley, C., 30, 34
 Sidgwick, H., 185
 Simmel, G., 71
 Skinner, B. F., 13, 15, 16, 65
 Sloan, T. S., 150, 184, 251
 Smail, D., 45, 61, 63, 67, 78, 95, 122, 141, 164, 172, 204, 263
 Smith, A., 168
 Socrates, 29, 35, 89, 102, 150, 181, 230

- spectating, 92
 Spinelli, E., 39, 40, 48, 61, 109, 208
 Spinoza, B., 33
 suicide, 68
 St. Augustine, 30, 32, 34
 Stevens, J. O., 42, 48, 90, 93, 111, 243, 264
 Stevenson, R. L., 137
 Stiglitz, J., 65
 Storr, A., 29, 73
 Strauss, L., 158
 Susman, R., 174
 Sutherland, P., 64, 81, 209
 Swann, W. B., 134, 179, 238, 239
 Swingewood, A., 225
 Szasz, T., 84, 137, 204

 Taoism, 14
 Tarnas, R., 244
 Taylor, C., 67, 93, 170, 196, 243, 268
 Taylor, L., 12, 42, 104, 146, 164, 180, 271, 272, 277
 techne, 186, 188, 190, 196
 teenagers, 2, 43
 Thoreau, H. D., 34, 57, 58, 74, 84, 108, 130
 Thorne, B., 7, 14, 28
 Tolly, K., 63
 Trungpa, C., 22, 241
 Turkle, S., 50, 53, 107, 146, 151, 164

 Van Deurzen, E., 58, 77, 90, 101, 109, 110, 113, 115, 119, 235
 Ventura, M., 12, 145, 234, 235
Verständigung, 192
Verstehen, 87, 192, 217
 Viorst, J., 245
 Virgil, 90

 Walkerdine, V., 15, 38, 76, 118, 119, 216
 Walsh, S., 101
 Watts, A., 39
 Weber, M., 24, 25, 87, 103, 195, 217
 Wendell Holmes, O., 181, 182
 Wilbur, K., 41, 50, 55, 57, 100, 186, 216, 244, 246, 247, 249
 Williams, R., 141, 263
 Williamson, W., 238
 Willis, P., 86
 Wittgenstein, L., 15, 38, 44, 88, 105, 225
 women, 21, 31, 40, 43, 83, 84, 86, 156, 176, 212, 213, 217
 Woodward, H., 129
 working class, 21, 53, 86–8, 97
 Wright Mills, C., 115
 Wundt, W., 16

 Zeldin, T., 98, 99, 142, 143, 150, 152, 240, 267
 Zen Buddhism, 14, 43, 55, 246
 Zweig, C., 23, 53

