

Contents

<i>List of Illustrations</i>	viii
<i>Preface and Acknowledgements</i>	xiii
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	xiv
Introduction: The Invasion Issue	1
1 Supplementing the Home Army	13
2 Planning for Defence	34
3 Mobilization and New Auxiliaries	52
4 Protection Companies and Invasion Scares	76
5 The Home Army in 1915	98
6 Reforming and Expanding the Home Army	123
7 Restructuring and Compulsion	147
8 'A Sham or a Real Thing'? The Volunteer Force in 1917	166
9 The Diminishing Threat	178
Epilogue	194
<i>Appendix I Extra Reserve Battalions</i>	205
<i>Appendix II Home Defence Scheme, July 1914</i>	206
<i>Appendix III Provisional Units</i>	208
<i>Appendix IV The Home Army in November 1918</i>	209
<i>Appendix V Coastal Fortresses and Garrisons</i>	211
Notes	213
Bibliography	248
Index	254

1

Supplementing the Home Army

The Edwardian public knew little of the extent of military planning or of the petulant and irascible relations between the two armed forces. The press and regular squabbles within the House of Commons drew attention to the political, and to some degree the strategic differences, but the detail remained a mystery. Since it had come to power in 1905, apart from a small cabal within the Cabinet, the Liberal Party had little knowledge of how far Britain's military resources were earmarked for use on the Continent. Had it known, Herbert Asquith's administration might well have fallen.¹ Preferring to keep his party largely ignorant of a likely Continental commitment, the Prime Minister nevertheless regularly and publicly expressed his confidence in Haldane, in the necessity of his reforms and in the ability of the home army to defend the shores. Haldane harboured no doubts about the indispensability of his work, but as accusations of his Germophilia grew increasingly frequent and as criticism about his reforms' creations mounted, Asquith's confident support became essential.

The original antipathy held by former members of the Militia towards its successor organization persisted long after the Special Reserve had begun to recruit in 1908. The thrust of the criticism centred around Haldane's perceived misplaced optimism for the SR's continued development. Something like 35,000 of the initial 55,000 recruits were in fact militiamen who had transferred to finish their terms of service and about 10 per cent of the remainder had been discharged on medical grounds soon after attestation. Furthermore, over 6100 recruits quit the SR for the Regular Army before completing their initial six months' training, a drain of qualified men which was to become a persistent feature and complaint throughout the Reserve's existence. Too many recruits were also physically poor specimens. Members were supposed to

be at least 17 years old, but in reality many were mere boys of 15 or 16 who joined the organization as an alternative to the workhouse. Moreover, because recruits enlisted for general service, on mobilization they could be posted to any battalion or regiment. Even if he was drafted to his own 1st or 2nd Battalion, the Special Reservist would not know his officers, Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) or even most of his comrades. With so many pernicious faults the Special Reserve was, to its critics, a dangerous and useless deception because it wasted money and fooled the public into assuming that it was a trained and efficient force. The former Secretary of State, Arnold-Forster, asserted that in some places 90 per cent of the existing strength had 'no intention of going through the Special Reserve any more than they have of going through the Salvation Army'.² Haldane was further ridiculed for his frequent assertion that the paltry number of 100 non-Militia officer recruits would be hugely expanded within 12 months by an influx of men from the universities' officer training corps, for the infantry's poor state of training and for the state of the Special Reserve's artillery units which rarely had the opportunity to practise with live rounds.³

There was also some contemporary confusion over the precise function of the Special Reserve and Extra Reserve battalions. Haldane again explained that the 27 Extra Reserve units might well be sent abroad but he did not deny the suggestion that some of the 74 3rd Battalions might also serve overseas.⁴ This was a departure from their original stated purpose but Haldane emphasized that their primary and secondary functions as draft finders and coastal garrisons had not been superseded. Although Haldane did not go into detail, it is probably safe to assume that if some of the battalions were sent overseas, garrisons for their war stations would presumably have had to found by the derided and consistently under strength Territorial Force.

The credibility of this expansion of the Special Reserve's role was questioned by, amongst others, George Wyndham, the Unionist spokesman on military affairs.⁵ He argued that if it was now to perform a triple role of 'grinding out the drafts', provide garrisons for UK ports and perhaps serve abroad, its establishment would have to be increased.⁶ At full strength, each battalion was supposed to muster 550 men but on mobilization the posting of Army Reservists not immediately required for the Expeditionary Force was expected to expand each battalion to about 1500. Given this entirely unproven establishment and the possibility that an undisclosed number of units might be sent abroad, doubt was cast on the ability of a Territorial Force with an unachieved establishment of just over 300,000 to provide a would-be invader with an

adequate deterrent. Moreover, if the proposed mobile Central Force was, as some believed, to require another 200,000 troops to repel a raid of 70,000, in their existing attenuated forms and further handicapped by an acknowledged lack of horses, the Special Reserve and the Territorial Force would clearly be found wanting.

Haldane estimated that if the entire Expeditionary Force went abroad, about 40,000 Regular troops, largely Royal Garrison Artillery (RGA) and Royal Engineers (RE), would remain. He struggled to defend the existing size and quality of the home defence auxiliaries and accepted that a total of perhaps 345,000 men would be adequate to resist a raid of 70,000. The concentration of this force would necessitate port garrisons and line of communication troops having to 'flock' to augment the 100,000 core of the Central Force.⁷ This could leave ports, naval bases and arsenals virtually denuded of defenders. The Admiralty and War Office were awake to the possibility of the enemy striking at several places simultaneously, perhaps with a major landing to draw the Central Force and then launching smaller raids against selected vulnerable points. The assumption that the expanding Special Reserve battalions and the Territorial Force could cover all eventualities would mean stretching their resources to an untested degree and the gullibility of the public beyond the realm of reality. Critics who continued to regard the pre-1908 structure of home defence as the ideal, pointed out that in the year before Haldane's reforms the Militia, Yeomanry and Volunteers totalled 349,141; in 1911 the Special Reserve, which was not, of course specifically for home defence, and the Territorial Force came to a combined total of just 330,610.⁸

At the instigation of the Adjutant-General (AG) and the Chief of the General Staff (CIGS), a small committee was established to examine the existing structure of the Reserve, to make recommendations and, above all, to report quickly.⁹ Haldane largely accepted the committee's findings, offered some radical solutions to address the shortages of officers and men,¹⁰ but waited until March 1911 before announcing that the establishment of the 27 Extra Reserve battalions would be increased from 500 to 750. He believed the additional men would allow the battalions to fulfil their function as coastal garrison units or line of communication troops more efficiently. Instead of merely echoing the committee's supposition that the extra men would be found by simply enlisting ex-Regulars, he went a stage further by declaring that they would be drawn from members of a new reserve he had conceived two years earlier. The 200 ex-Regulars that were to be recruited for each of the Extra Reserve battalions and those sufficient to make up 10 per cent

of the 74 3rd Battalions would, he announced, eventually be composed of men enlisted from the Veteran Reserve (VR). Haldane estimated that about 10,000 of these former soldiers, all of whom would have served their time in the Army Reserve, would be forthcoming.¹¹ In addition, he adopted all of the committee's recommendations on changes to the duration of recruits' and annual training.

Apart from those who he expected would come from the VR, Haldane made no mention of how the additional number of men was to be attracted to the Special Reserve units. Besides the continuing shortage of officers, a position which some thought would be alleviated by the Secretary of State's proposal to reduce the training period from one year to three months,¹² the salient criticisms of the SR centred around the quality of recruit and the difficulties of building competence and *esprit* when companies could be only 30-strong on parade. Even the length of both the initial and annual training periods was acknowledged as militating against men who were in regular employment: those who could undertake the obligation tended to be the young, the feckless and the transient unskilled worker.

The storm of protest over the SR's apparent lack of progress showed no signs of abating during 1912, but many of the critics who could still not resist comparing the Special Reserve with the defunct Militia, were generally well-meaning. Some of those who were most hostile to the existing state were themselves Commanding Officers of 3rd and 4th Battalions.¹³ They preferred to see the SR succeed but were concerned at its low public esteem and how successive Governments had treated both the Militia and its successor as a 'stepchild [for whom] it had constantly to apologise'.¹⁴ They wanted the Reserve to receive the same encouragement as the Territorial Force, a decent walking-out uniform and a higher public profile.¹⁵ Undoubtedly they had a case. There was still an unsatisfactory imbalance in the ages and types of men who joined and there was the added confusion of the differing lengths, frequency and quality of their training. Special Reservists who worked for the General Post Office (GPO) had to give up their holidays to complete their annual training, while their GPO colleagues in the Territorial Force did not. Furthermore, abolishing the Militia had certainly destroyed the ancient link between local forces and the landed families. Many of those 'county' families whose sons had traditionally joined the Militia now joined the Territorial Force. The result, despite the reduction in officers' training period to six months, was a continuing officer shortage within the Special Reserve.

The SR probably was more efficient than the Militia, and the Government did introduce the incentive of a £1 re-engagement bounty

in May 1912,¹⁶ but there were still too many recruits of poor physical stature and too many others who transferred to a line regiment as soon as they had secured their training bounty. It was not, as one Member asserted, a force 'simply and solely to catch the tramp [seeking] six months' shelter and clothing',¹⁷ but the Government did accept that it was a force which needed a revitalization and an injection of purpose. After all, if the Special Reserve scheme to reinforce the Regulars broke down, then the organization's role as an integral element of the home army would be affected and the very departure of the Expeditionary Force could be thrown into jeopardy.

Another of Haldane's creations had, like the Special Reserve, suffered a similar experience of public derision and stunted development. The War Office had first begun to consider the Secretary of State's proposal to establish a reserve for the Territorial Force in December 1908, the establishment of which had become an essential element of Haldane's overall plan for the home army. Despite the failure of earlier attempts to create reserves for auxiliary forces, Haldane was confident that on this occasion a scheme was viable. Provision for such an organization had already been made within Section VII of the *Territorial and Reserve Forces Act, 1907* and during the 1909 Army Estimates debate Haldane told the House: 'We are organizing a new reserve of Territorials. We think that the men who pass through the [Territorial] Force with a good training should not be lost.' He went on to suggest that former Territorials should be formed into a reserve which would increase the potential strength of the Territorial Force from 300,000 to 400,000.¹⁸ The intended size of the TF Reserve was somewhat at odds with the preliminary discussions already taking place within the War Office and there was no early public mention of the plan to form two other auxiliary elements which were certainly already under consideration. Nevertheless, the general principle of creating the Reserve was generally well received and it was made known that the next stage of the proceedings would involve negotiations with the county associations.

The discussions already begun between the Army Council and the General Staff envisaged a TF Reserve of about 60,000.¹⁹ There was some opposition to immediately establishing the TF Reserve as it might have served as an inducement to the 86,000 ex-Volunteers who had joined the Territorial Force on a one-year agreement not to re-engage but leave and enrol instead in the Reserve. A preferred option was a suggestion that only men who had served as a Territorial for two or three years would be eligible to join. This would, it was hoped, encourage the one-year men to serve in the home army until they

qualified for the Reserve.²⁰ There was some disagreement about whether TF Reservists should be allowed to camp with Territorial units and also continued argument about the intended size of the Reserve. Haldane was known to be thinking still in terms of 100,000, but the Quartermaster-General (QMG), Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert Miles, thought this seemed unnecessarily large.²¹

There was an early lack of consensus over how the Reserve should be organized. Colonel Findlay, an Assistant Adjutant-General (AAG), wanted to see it formed into reserve units analogous to a mobilized Special Reserve.²² Lieutenant-General Miles fundamentally agreed, suggesting that on mobilization the number of TF Reservists required to bring Territorial units up to establishment would simply 'move up' to their parent unit. This would have the benefit of simplifying the storage and issue of clothing and equipment and thus reduce costs.²³ General Sir William Nicholson, the CIGS, opposed this suggestion and recommended a more flexible approach. He preferred to see the TF Reserve as merely a register of trained individuals who would, in an emergency, be expected to serve in any of their county association's units.²⁴

Once general agreement had been reached within the War Office, in July 1909 the proposals were presented to the Territorial Force Advisory Council.²⁵ With the exception of a few reservations regarding grants and conditions of service, the Council 'cordially welcomed' the War Office's draft memorandum and copies were sent to county associations two days later.²⁶ The Army Council's overriding concerns were the costs and time necessary to establish the Reserve. In December 1909, Nicholson claimed that it was still impossible to estimate the expenditure required for the new reserve but warned that if it was substantial it would 'retard the completion of the Expeditionary Force and the Territorial Force'.²⁷ A minute by Haldane insisted expenditure must be restricted 'to the absolute bare necessity or the projected 100,000 will cost more than we can find'.²⁸

The Army Council's concern over the passage of time was linked to the approaching termination of engagement of former Volunteers who had enrolled for two years. If the TF Reserve was provisionally established by 1 April 1910, these men could resign from the Territorial Force on 31 March and enrol immediately in the Reserve. Further draft proposals, many of which included suggestions culled from the county associations' responses to a circular, were prepared and discussed within the War Office and the King's approval was secured.²⁹

On 7 March 1910, Haldane announced to the Commons, 'Provision for the [Reserve] which the House sanctioned last year is now being

carried a stage further.' Enrolment in the TF Reserve would begin within a few weeks enabling, he predicted, the 14 Territorial divisions of the home army to be quickly supplied with 'mature and trained men' on mobilization.³⁰ With the issue one week later of a Special Army Order authorizing despatch of the regulations to the counties, Haldane's object had been achieved within the necessary time scale. Associations were informed that, although final decisions had yet to be made, they could immediately register the names of any soldiers whose terms of service were about to end.

The regulations confirmed that the TF Reserve would be sub-divided into three sections: the TF Reserve itself, the Technical Reserve and the Veteran Reserve.³¹ Anyone who had served at least one term in the Territorials would be eligible to join the TF Reserve which, with an establishment of 100,000, was intended to reach 33 per cent of the Territorial Force's designated strength. Men could enrol for between one and four years and, with the permission of the commanding officer of the Territorial unit, could volunteer for drills and camp. No soldier would be allowed to serve more than four years and the compulsory age of retirement was identical to that enforced in the Territorials. Provision was made for men to fire an annual course and retain their uniforms but the principal tenet adhered to throughout was that of minimizing cost. As an example of the official parsimony evident throughout the process, the department of the Quartermaster General had its way over the musketry course: former yeomanry, infantry and engineers were to be allowed to fire 20 rounds each year; other arms were permitted only ten.³² Despite a few unfriendly snipes from the Unionists, not all of whom were entirely convinced of the Reserve's worth, the organization's concept was well received both within the House and the country. Yet, within three years of its creation, the TF Reserve was acknowledged to be a miserable failure. At best it was capable of mustering a mere 2 per cent of its anticipated 100,000 men.

Simultaneously with his proposal to create the TF Reserve, Haldane announced his intention of forming the other two reserves. In a circular letter to the associations in July 1909, the Secretary of State declared his intention of enlisting the help of certain men whose specialist skills would be able to provide essential auxiliary assistance to the Regular and home forces in times of emergency. In particular he wished to attract vets, doctors, civil and electrical engineers and railway, telephone and telegraph personnel to the new Technical Reserve (TFTR). The men need not have served in the military and the Army Council did not initially anticipate any burden of training would be laid at the door of the

county associations. With a few exceptions the TFTR would be organized through the various technical and professional bodies representing the members' diverse skills and a Technical Reserve Advisory Committee.

When he made his announcement, Haldane clearly had little firm idea of how the TFTR would organize, mobilize or operate. One Government spokesman unhelpfully declared that the authorities were simply 'leaving it to develop'.³³ Several European powers, such as the Habsburg Empire, did have a similar organization but Haldane seems not to have thought of extending the British experiment further than a fairly loose liaison between the War Office and the Advisory Committee. In effect, all it would at first amount to was a register of men 'who would be invaluable in time of war, but who would be very difficult to get unless we had them carefully selected in the intervals of peace'.

Reaction to its proposed formation was largely muted but there was a general agreement that such a organization was desirable. Some county associations acknowledged it could be a very valuable force, especially for the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers, but thought the men should have a certain degree of military training in peace time with the units to which they would be attached in war. At least one association went even further and suggested its members should attend at least one Territorial camp in order to learn military discipline. The Army Council was not impressed, dismissing the suggestion with the acerbic assertion that 'discipline cannot be learnt by one day at camp'.³⁴

Progress in developing the Technical Reserve was slow. Having been really little other than redundant from the start, the TF Advisory Committee ceased meeting in 1913.³⁵ The only element which succeeded in establishing itself firmly within the broad spread of the county associations was the Voluntary Aid Detachment (VAD). Yet even this success had its limitations. The detachments were intended to care for sick and wounded Territorials of the home army within the immediate vicinity of their own areas and to provide personnel for hospitals and ambulance trains on mobilization. Organizing and administering the VAD as part of the Territorial Force Technical Reserve resulted in the inevitable calls from the counties for additional finance. The detachments relied upon voluntary contributions and, when in 1911 Haldane refused a grant of £5 per detachment, the counties had expressed concern about whether the units could be kept in existence. Furthermore, disputes over the certification of orderlies had done little to improve relations and morale.³⁶

The disappointing failure to recruit men into the aid detachments appears to have been typical of the generally disappointing development of the Technical Reserve as a whole. There were attempts to identify

certain types of dockyard artisans and GPO telegraphists but these were more to do with ensuring they would not be allowed to enlist if war came rather than to encourage them to register their willingness to avail themselves to the army. One fundamental reason behind the TFTR's lack of attractiveness to skilled men was the practice and attitude of many artisan trade unions. Several of these associations were actively opposed to the Territorial Force and had, from its inception in 1908, campaigned to discourage their members from enlisting.³⁷

Requests from Home Commands for county associations to compile registers of motorcycles and cars in certain counties fell largely on deaf ears,³⁸ but one element which did eventually become a tangible part of the TFTR, but which had not only to struggle to gain recognition and acceptance from the War Office but also, like the Voluntary Aid Detachment, suffered a fitful development, was the Corps of Guides. The original idea for such a corps had sprung from the Surrey County Association when, in February 1910, its committee requested the authorities to give consideration to the sanctioning of a new organization which would be able to provide specialist local knowledge to commanders of the home army.³⁹

The concept was that a Corps of Guides should be drawn from hunting men, farmers and the like, probably over military age, and who need not have any knowledge of the rifle or of military discipline. These District and Parish Guides would work under the supervision of a Chief Guide, who would in turn be responsible to the Territorial Force Association. A register of suitable men would be kept by each county and, to comply with the terms of the Hague Convention, they would be issued with a badge and hat.⁴⁰ The initial Whitehall response was not encouraging. Major-General Archibald Murray, the DMT, wrote to Nicholson suggesting that as Territorial cyclist battalions were already supposed to be familiar with potential invasion sites, a corps of guides would be an unnecessary duplication.⁴¹ Twelve months later he again came to the same conclusion but did suggest an alternative scheme to Nicholson whereby every cyclist battalion in Eastern Command should attach 10–20 'intelligent' men as guides to the HQ of the various mobile forces.⁴² The CIGS, the DMT and Brigadier-General Lancelot Kiggell, the Director of Staff Duties (DSD) who all believed that a group of untrained civilians would be more likely to 'hamper rather than assist' the home army, concurred with this solution.⁴³ Furthermore, Kiggell thought it 'unsound military policy to persuade individuals to undertake a measure of service which, while useless for military purposes, may be claimed by the giver as a fulfilment of their responsibility to the state'.⁴⁴

In contrast to the tardy development of the Corps of Guides, and the frequent squabbles between the various ambulance units which constituted the VAD, the third element of the TF Reserve, the Veteran Reserve, had been expanding with unanticipated rapidity. Former Territorials might have been disinterested in joining their own force's reserve but they were demonstrating a remarkable willingness to enrol beside ex-Regulars and ex-Volunteers in a body which offered no social advantage, no opportunity to camp or drill and not even a promise of royal patronage. The Veteran Reserve had burst upon the national scene with a vigour and dynamism which had surprised even its instigator.

Unaware that the year was to mark the peak in Territorial recruiting and eager to exploit the apparent success of his new force, in 1910 Haldane announced that registration for the Veteran Reserve would commence a few weeks after the Territorial Force Reserve itself had been established.⁴⁵ Conscious that Territorials who had joined at the time of the force's creation would be approaching the end of their four-year period of service in 1912, Haldane hoped those soldiers who were not prepared to re-enlist for a further four years, or who did not qualify for the TF Reserve, might commit themselves instead to this new organization. Away from Whitehall, and long before the formal declaration that registration for a Veteran Reserve was about to commence, other enthusiasts for the development of a citizen-based home army had already done a great deal of prompting and preparatory work.

John St Loe Strachey, editor and proprietor of the *Spectator* and friend of politicians from both sides of the divide, had long deplored the apparent wastage of so many men under 40 years of age who annually passed out of the Regular Army. Strachey had spoken to Haldane on several occasions about a number of schemes designed to raise auxiliary formations for home defence and had convinced the Secretary of State that a register of former servicemen was a simple and cheap way of eventually utilizing these men. Haldane even speculated that they might be able to raise four divisions of fit and trained men to act as a third line behind the Regulars and Territorials. Until a survey had been undertaken to ascertain how many men might be willing to offer their services, Haldane refused to make any guarantees about attaching Veteran Reservists to particular or specific home army Territorial units. With the determined object of keeping costs to a minimum, neither was he prepared to commit himself to promises of equipping the VR.

Haldane was later to retract his loose talk of a third line home army for such a project would require an organization far too expensive and complex for the existing financial climate. He did repeatedly stress, however, the importance of this new auxiliary to the wider concept of his citizen army: he wanted the veterans to become another link in the chain which bound the army to the nation and the nation to the army.

The proposal also enjoyed the public support of Charles á Court Repington, although for Repington, and also for many other of the VR's supporters, the scheme did not go far enough. When published, the official regulations reflected the War Office's insistence that specific local duties for the VR would only be determined following consultation with the constabulary.⁴⁶ The clear general intent was for the VR to remove horses and cattle from threatened areas and to provide guards for vulnerable points such as bridges, tunnels and gas works. Advocates of a more purposeful role for the Reserve were, however, encouraged by the hint that the younger and fitter Veteran Reservists might be used as reinforcements to the Regular Army and, more likely, to fill up vacancies and replace battle casualties in home defence Territorial units.

The regulations allowed virtually anyone who had had some sort of military service to register his name. Officers who were no longer members of the Army Reserve or liable for call up were allowed to join, as were former Special Reservists and ex-members of the Militia. Former Rifle Volunteers were also accepted providing they were not already members of the Territorial Force or the TF Reserve. Various other classes of men were eligible, as was any individual who could produce to his county association a war medal as proof of former service.

In order to celebrate official recognition of the movement, in June 1910, Surrey held a parade of 1300 Veteran Reservists drawn up in 14 companies on Horse Guards. Haldane was clearly surprised to witness so many veterans drawn from only one county within such a short time of the movement's official inception yet, although evidently moved and encouraged by what he saw, he did not permit himself to be swept away by the occasion. His address was supportive, but peppered with caution:

I think [this] may prove to be an historic afternoon ... it may be that we shall from this day see our way to get together in a fashion that has not been dreamt of before It remains to be seen how we can turn your patriotism to the greatest advantage to the nation. The regulations are only a beginning ... [they] give us ground upon which,

possibly hereafter, we may proceed much further. You are that kind of reserve which, if properly utilized, may be the best guarantee of peace and security for the nation.⁴⁷

Haldane also announced that Lord Roberts had agreed to serve as the VR's Colonel-in-Chief and, in March 1911, in front of an audience in the Mansion House which included the country's leading military and political notables, Haldane outlined some revisions to the earlier regulations. He underscored his previous emphasis on the Reserve's importance as a social institution intended to create a tangible bond between those still serving and their former comrades, and to give members an honoured and privileged position at public functions. To encourage its development as a body of comrades he decided to abandon the upper age limit but still rejected the idea of demanding a binding agreement from members. Such an obligation would, in his view, run contrary to the conception underlying the VR's formation and, more importantly, involve the Government in additional expenditure.

Nationally, the county associations turned their minds to how men might be encouraged to register their names. A huge parade organized by the Surrey Association in May 1911 was attended by Generals Sir Ian Hamilton, Sir Spencer Ewart and Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien. It was addressed by Lord Roberts who used the occasion to suggest that 25,000 armed veterans should be employed as home garrison troops. He thought they could make a valuable contribution to home defence but that they should be kept distinct from Territorial units. This separation would release the Territorials for mobile warfare and preserve what he called their 'elasticity and dash'.⁴⁸ Veteran Reservists were invited to attend George V's coronation parade in June 1911 and, as the result of the publicity gained, one MP speculated that 'in the near future' national strength could be as high as 200,000.⁴⁹ Appeals for veterans to register appeared in local papers, post offices, police stations, public houses and public baths. Large firms and town councils were leafleted, Lords Lieutenant were urged to take a public lead, Old Comrades Associations were targeted and one Education Committee asked its Attendance Officers to gather information about ex-servicemen when on their weekly rounds. A resolution from the members of the 1st Volunteer Battalion Norfolk Regiment's Veterans' Association encouraged its members to join, and at least one northern council declared that the local Veteran Reserve company would be affiliated to the town's Territorial battalion.⁵⁰

Recruiting was given a further fillip in August 1911 when the organization's name was changed to the more youthful and purposeful

National Reserve (NR). A new set of regulations issued in November also persuaded thousands more of the doubters to sign. Although still describing the Reserve 'primarily as a register of trained [men with] no further obligation for military service', they did state that National Reservists might be utilized 'either for active duties with the home defence forces or for other services'.⁵¹ This remained far from the categorical promise of involvement as part of the active home army many of the NR's supporters urged, but it was progress.

The most important difference between the original and revised regulations was the introduction of a classification system for members. Instead of simply maintaining a register, counties now had to enrol their members in one of three divisions. Class I was to consist of officers under 55 and other ranks under 45 who were considered to be physically fit enough to join a combatant unit. Class II was for officers between 55 and 60 and men between 45 and 55 who were fit either for combatant duty in garrisons or other fixed positions or for administrative work. Finally, Class III was to comprise officers and men not qualified to join the other two sections but who would become honorary members and be retained for 'social and influential purposes'.

By 1912, London boasted 36 National Reserve battalions, organized into seven brigades. Within this host, the City of Westminster had two battalions, each of eight companies of 100 men. The 1st Battalion comprised one company of Royal Navy, Royal Horse and Royal Field Artillery, two of cavalry, one each of Guards, engineers and departmental men and one mixed company. The 2nd Battalion's eight companies were all infantry. Company commanders were a mixture of former Indian army and British cavalry officers, with a smattering of senior ranks from regiments of the line. National strength was recorded as 76,000⁵² and most members had been issued with a badge, usually paid for by some enthusiastic local benefactor.

The question of giving the National Reserve some real identity and of allowing its members to belong to an official, recognized element of the home army caused frequent exchanges in the House and a seemingly never-ending flow of county resolutions to the War Office. With the exception of a few counties which very early on decided to leave the questions of drills and uniform until men arrived at their depots on mobilization, the associations regularly raised the issues of the supply of rifles and the provision of service dress.

At first the War Office rejected petitions requesting officers be permitted to wear the uniform of their former corps on National Reserve ceremonial occasions but, bowing to an outburst of protest, it relented

and granted permission for officers to do so. Whenever proposed designs for other ranks' 'uniforms' (usually comprising a belt, bandolier and cap) were sent to the War Office for approval, the reply was invariably disappointing: the War Office often retorted that gentlemen of decorum would object to wearing a 'uniform cap with their normal plain clothes', and that the buttonhole badge was sufficient under the Hague Convention for wearers to be treated as combatants.⁵³ Furthermore, the idea that Territorial uniforms should be supplied to National Reservists was often criticized on the grounds of practicality. Uniforms were generally tailored for fit 18-year-old youths, not for portly middle-aged men. This argument had prompted Colonel Banon, an AAG, to explain to the Derbyshire Association why there was official opposition to providing service dress for Reservists:

The sight of a body of old soldiers in plain clothes and medals is a much more dignified and inspiring sight than if they were clothed in badly fitting uniforms and out of date equipment.⁵⁴

Although its representatives could provide a string of arguments, the principal reason behind the War Office's refusal to provide uniforms was cost. It was again on grounds of cost that for the first three years of the NR's existence the authorities maintained a stern opposition to providing separate funds for musketry practice. Haldane, and later Jack Seely, his successor at the War Office in 1912, gave repeated assurances that there were abundant arms and ammunition available in store which would be issued should an emergency arise but, they were not, both men insisted, available merely for practice.⁵⁵

Haldane expected a good proportion of National Reservists would already be members of the 140,000 strong National Rifle Association. To encourage those who might otherwise not bother to join a club, the WO ruled that county association funds could only be donated to those rifle clubs which already contained a significant number of Territorial members. Encouragement to practise musketry was often provided by wealthy gentlemen who offered cups and prizes to teams winning competitions and to the men who trained them. Relations between the Territorials and those National Reservists who were dependent upon the use of Territorial ranges usually ran fairly smoothly, but the Oxford Association, for example, admitted that 'knotty points were continually arising with regard to the granting of shooting facilities'.⁵⁶ In another instance, the CO of the 5/Highland Light Infantry complained to his association that National Reservists were entering competitions with his

soldiers and winning too many prizes. In the interests of unit morale, he urged the committee to provide separate prizes for the Reservists.⁵⁷

Linked to the issues of uniform and shooting was the obvious desire of National Reservists to form a corporate identity. Repington and other of the Reserve's supporters had long been advocating such a scheme, believing it could most easily be achieved by holding regular company and battalion parades. Denied state money to finance headquarter buildings on the argument that because the Reserve would not be mobilized by units there was no need for them, many battalions and companies seized upon this proposal to demonstrate publicly the physical existence of the National Reserve. Some battalions even chose to create permanent facilities for their members and founded clubs which not only provided a focal point for battalion life but also, by proclaiming the NR's existence within the community, acted as a strong inducement to recruitment. Successful clubs were established in many areas but, what was more important to many of the Reserve's supporters was the War Office's continuing disinclination to allocate its members specific mobilization roles at a time when the strength of most of the home army's Territorial units was in marked decline.

Echoing G.P. Gooch's comment of a few years earlier that 'long immunity from the realities of warfare had blunted our imagination', Haldane attributed the post-1912 decline in Territorial Force recruiting to 'a disease of ten years' peace'.⁵⁸ Although young men were demonstrating a growing reluctance to enlist in the principal home defence force, throughout 1911 and 1912 the enthusiasm of older former soldiers and sailors to register with the National Reserve remained largely undiminished. In July 1912, the War Office announced that the 'response had exceeded estimated expectation' and although disappointed at the very slow progress of the TF Reserve, it was content with the growing popularity of the National Reserve.⁵⁹

In March 1912, Jack Seely, the Under Secretary of State for War, informed the House of Commons that of the NR's total strength of 76,972, just under 28,000 were officers aged between 55 and 60 and other ranks between 45 and 55.⁶⁰ Although immediately there were increased calls for the NR to replace the moribund TF Reserve, an idea categorically rejected by the War Office, Seely usually adhered to the line that the NR was a 'military asset of the greatest value'.⁶¹ He would only go as far as to acknowledge the suggestion that in an emergency, members might promise to put themselves at the disposal of the military authorities for service within the British Isles.⁶² In this he was largely following the line of his predecessor. Haldane had also talked of the NR

as having 'awakened the nation in military matters' and insisted that it had indeed become one of the recognized forces of the Crown.⁶³ If that was the case, some argued, to what use was it to be put and how effective might the force actually prove to be? Was it merely as one MP claimed, a list that could be flourished in the face of the House of Commons to demonstrate there was no need for national service? Of equally persistent concern was the number of members who might prove to be of some military value. Rumours that Seely had persuaded 100 Chelsea Pensioners to join the NR in order to help to cover the deficiency in Territorial numbers, and the fairly widespread claim that 65 per cent of the National Reservists on parade in Hyde Park in June 1912 would be incapable of doing anything of value, fuelled suspicions that the Government really had no idea of what it wanted the National Reservists to do.

The continuing rise in registration should be seen in the context of the decline in TF membership. The quality and size of the home army was a frequent topic of debate in Parliament and although sympathetic to its ambitions many MPs and military men remained extremely dubious about the value of the NR and indeed of the Territorial Force as a whole. The National Service League's campaign for conscription remained insistent and, in warning against what many saw as an over-estimation of the NR's potential, they had a point. It is possible that 70 per cent of those registered nationally were ex-Volunteers rather than former Regulars, but firm figures are hard to find. In Preston, 56 per cent of National Reservists were ex-Regulars, 44 per cent in Shropshire, 40 per cent in Liverpool and only 20 per cent in Southport.⁶⁴ The remainder were thus overwhelmingly former Rifle Volunteers, men who in 1908 had not transferred to Haldane's new force, or a smattering of ex-Volunteers who had spent a year or two in the Territorials. The majority of these men were of middle age, probably married, held steady jobs and were unlikely to be fit enough for immediate active service. If they were members of a rifle club they might have kept up their musketry but the War Office was sufficiently pragmatic to assume that 20 per cent of registered men would be of absolutely no military value whatsoever. What the military authorities required was some analysis of the Reserve's composition and an assessment of how realistic it was to plan on the assumption that the NR might be used to bolster the home army and even, perhaps, an expeditionary force. In 1913, therefore, the War Office issued a new set of regulations⁶⁵ and an instruction for the counties to undertake a survey of their National Reservists with a view to assessing how many members might be capable of performing a useful, albeit still loosely defined, role.

For the purposes of the survey the War Office required the counties to reclassify their men into the following revised divisions: Class I was now to consist of officers and other ranks who satisfied the medical requirements for active service at home and abroad; Class II was for officers and senior non-commissioned officers under 55 and men under 50 years who were fit enough for a home defence combatant unit for duty in fixed positions or for administrative work at home. The new Class III was itself divided into three categories: the first two sections consisted of men who declined to undertake any obligation but who qualified by age and physical fitness for Classes I and II, while the third comprised those whose age or fitness precluded them from doing anything militarily useful. These men were to be considered honorary members and were permitted to attend parades and socials. Finally, the War Office not only wanted associations to categorise their men by age but also by training and occupation.

The authorities continued to shy away from asking men to undertake a definite liability for military service but members who were eligible to register in Classes I and II were instead invited to sign an 'honourable obligation' to the effect that they would offer themselves for service at a time of imminent danger. In return for this undertaking and provided that they were deemed fit and accepted, on mobilization Class I men were promised a gratuity of £10 and Class II, £5. The regulations stated that men in these two classes would be used to reinforce the Regular Army and to fill up vacancies and provide for wastage in units of the home army. They would also be used to strengthen garrisons, guard vulnerable points and what were termed 'other military duties' in and around threatened areas. Deployed to guard strategic sites would, again, enable other elements of the home army to be used more effectively.

Despite a great deal of grumbling about increased administration and a lack of government funds to cover it, most county associations had despatched their returns by February 1914. The survey and the subsequent classification revealed two important things about the National Reserve. First, recruitment had slowed from its boom period of 1911 and 1912 and second, that only about one quarter of the 200,000 registered men could be assessed as having any real military value.

Seely's analysis of the returns showed that nationally there were just under 14,000 Class I and 46,000 Class II men. The great majority of members were thus Class III, whose age or reluctance to commit themselves to the 'honourable obligation' made them of dubious reliability. Furthermore, evidence suggests that at the most, only about one third of the men in Classes I and II were ex-Regulars as opposed to former

Volunteers, Militia or time-served Special Reservists.⁶⁶ The relatively low number of men in Class I is perhaps surprising when considering annually something like 12,000 men left the Army Reserve. However, it was widely accepted that in total, only something like 5000 of these ex-Army Reservists would be fit enough, willing or able to fight in a campaign beyond four years of their release.

The paucity of men to fill shortages within the already under establishment Territorial units was further compounded by the NR's regulations which stipulated that men not required for Territorial units should be used to furnish contingents for the protection of local vulnerable points. The War Office had long anticipated using the NR in home defence protection squads but the 1913 regulations still failed to give a firm lead in defining, other than in general terms, what was meant by 'vulnerable points'. To do so would, the War Office believed, involve an unwanted commitment to increased expenditure.

The survey had, in reality, provided only a speculative idea of the organization's potential for it was a 'reserve' in name only. Even if a man was reasonably fit, a proficient shot and an ex-Regular, it would of necessity be weeks before he could be efficient enough to take his place in an overseas battalion. As even the Territorials' most strident supporters accepted the need for an intensive post-mobilization six month training period for its young soldiers, it was optimistic to assume that a 45-year-old family man could be ready in substantially less time than a fit 20 year old with probably no commitments. Few military thinkers were prepared to assume the NR would be capable of filling up the Special Reserve or Territorial units, believing instead that it would do no more than act as guides or orderlies in the event of invasion. During the Army Estimates debate of June 1913 Colonel Burn became one of several Members who expressed doubts:

You cannot look on the National Reserve as a real reserve in the sense that men will be fitted to join the ranks in the event of our Expeditionary Force being ordered abroad. Many of them have never been in the army at all and they get no training year after year. How can men without uniforms, without officers and without training be fit to take their place in the Army and face a Continental foe?⁶⁷

Despite these doubts, Colonel Banon continued to encourage the county associations to recruit. His message was simple and oft repeated. He stressed that the NR had 'come to stay' and anticipated 250,000 members by 1914. It had been created, he said, because there was the

possibility of Britain becoming involved in a European war and because it was a 'great pity to allow a large number of trained and active men to disappear into civilian life'. Exploiting its creator's concepts of a citizen army and of a nation-in-arms, he continually stressed that the Reserve would bring the army into touch with the nation and that by giving ex-Regulars and auxiliaries an 'honourable position in their country', it would do much to 'bring down any prejudice that still exists against young men joining the Regulars or Territorials'. Again echoing Haldane's sentiments, Banon explained the ideal of continuity of service: youngsters would begin elementary military drill in the Boy Scouts, progress to the Cadets and, when old enough, join either the Regular Army, the Special Reserve or the Territorial Force. Having served their time in the active forces, men would pass through the Territorial Reserve and the three classes of the National Reserve. By 'carefully, methodically and inexpensively' registering the names of men in their final stages of services, counties would create a reservoir of trained men into which the AG could 'dip on mobilization'. He intimated that apart from erstwhile infantry and gunners, former specialists could on mobilization act as medical orderlies, telegraphists, farriers, wheelwrights and clerks for the home army.⁶⁸

Unpersuaded by Seely's own public belief of a brighter future, calls to abandon the TF Reserve and replace it with a stronger and more dynamic National Reserve continued undiminished. The agitation coincided with yet more resolutions and expressions of discontent from the counties which demanded a more explicit definition of the duties the NR would be expected to fulfil should the Regulars and Territorials be mobilized. Typical of the calls for the Government to stop its procrastination came from a representative of the Leicestershire Association:

I simply wish that the members of the National Reserve should know that it is recognized that they are a portion of the defensive force of this country; they want to prove that it is so, and they want to know that they will have real business before them on mobilization.⁶⁹

This was echoed by a resolution submitted by the Council of County Territorial Associations clearly designed to provoke a War Office response:

In view of maintaining the interest of the men and of leading them to believe in the utility of the National Reserve, the War Office [should]

be moved to take steps to draw up schemes for utilization ... such as: protection of the lines of communication, public buildings, power stations, of landing stations, the protection and distribution of food, technical services such as the RAMC [Royal Army Medical Corps], ASC [Army Supply Corps], remount duties, telegraphists etc., local guides and messengers.⁷⁰

Similar sentiments were expressed by the Kent Association in February 1913 when, having enthusiastically registered over 5000 Class I and 2350 Class II men, it pithily minuted: 'It is understood that the Government intend to make use of this force in some manner, but nothing is yet known except for reports appearing in the papers.'⁷¹

Yet more disdain was heaped upon Seely for his apparent support of the idea to use the NR to complete establishments for the Territorial Force and the Special Reserve. From his position as Chairman of the County of London Association, Lord Esher described the idea of using the NR as a 'sort of bucket for filling up gaps' in the Regulars and Territorials as 'a very great error'. The National Reserve was not originally intended, he insisted, as a supplement to the Territorial Force and was a 'distinct force ... with an entirely distinct function'. Knowing that their units would be made up to strength from this reservoir of former soldiers, Esher argued, might cause some Commanding Officers (COs) to neglect Territorial recruiting. Such a policy would 'take the steel out of Associations, out of commanding officers and out of the men themselves'.⁷² One critic thought it 'ludicrous' to contemplate putting old soldiers into the same units as raw recruits or under the command of a young, naive Territorial officer, whilst another thought it was unfair to expect patriotic former soldiers to serve in such a 'rotten organization'.⁷³

Despite the seemingly relentless criticism, during the debate on the 1914 Estimates, Seely continued to express a remarkable confidence in the condition of the various home forces. He acknowledged the Special Reserve was some 13,000 short of establishment but was confident that as an identical number of National Reservists had agreed to serve overseas, the Special Reserve remained in a position to fulfil its designated function of rapid reinforcement of the Regular battalions and as coastal garrisons.⁷⁴ He praised the patriotism and willingness of these National Reservists, especially as they were prepared to serve without 'fee or reward of any kind in the meantime'. Seely next turned to the Territorials. He claimed that as 45,000 Class II National Reservists had undertaken to serve at home and the Territorial Force was, in his estimation, 56,000 under establishment, these Class II men would go a

long way to making good the deficit. He was so convinced these Reservists would come forward on mobilization that he assured the House there was no reason for it to be 'concerned' for the state of the Expeditionary Force or for the defence of the British Isles.⁷⁵ This did not satisfy *The Times* which could not resist again drawing attention to the Government's perceived neglect of the home army. Impressed by the spectacle of the 1st London National Reserve Division arrayed for inspection on Horse Guards, the correspondent noted: 'At present much enthusiasm and *esprit de corps* which might be usefully directed for the public advantage are officially neglected except when required to cover other official shortcomings.'⁷⁶

The War Office, sometimes with a degree of grudging co-operation from the Admiralty, had, meanwhile, been devising plans by which the Special Reserve and the Territorial Force could be deployed in the event of an enemy incursion. The various schemes were designed to offer responses to several potential scenarios but, comprehensive as they were, the plans were often, of necessity, largely speculative. Besides the difficulties thrown up by the navy's reluctance to offer much in the way of concrete assistance, the planners' difficulties were compounded by the state of the army's own home defence forces. The 'Home Army's' constituent parts were under strength, indifferently trained, inadequately equipped, excessively youthful and, perhaps above all, ridiculed by many leading soldiers and politicians, the public and the press. Until or unless the quality and size of the home forces were perceived to have improved, public acceptance of the concept of despatching an expeditionary force to the left flank of the French Army was equally speculative.

Index

- Abbey Wood, 54
Adjutant-General, 15, 31, 50, 108, 152, 178
Admiralty, 7, 15, 34–5, 39, 40–1, 46–7, 52, 66, 69, 79–80, 108, 120, 140, 158, 191, 204, 216
Aldeburgh, 112, 159
Amesbury, 57
An Englishman's Home, 10
Antwerp, 79
Arbroath, 45
Army Council, 17–20, 37, 42, 49, 72–3, 91, 126, 129, 133, 135, 161, 168, 178, 184, 198–9
Army Estimates, 10, 30, 38, 44, 156
Army, Regular, 1–4, 8, 11, 22–3, Army Reserve, 14, 16, 23, 30, 43, 49, 55, 159
Arnold-Forster, H., 14
Asquith, H., 12, 13, 39, 41, 47, 90, 161
Assistant Adjutant-General, 18, 26, 30–1
Assistant-Director Ordnance Supply, 56, 103–4
Aubers Ridge, Battle of, 99
Australian Overseas Training Bde, 183
- Baden-Powell, Lord A., 9
Baker, H., 38
Balfour, A., 70
Bannockburn, 57
Banon, Col. F., 26, 30–1
Barrow, 58
Battenberg, Admiral Prince L., 52–3
Bedford, 48, 57
Belgium, 36
Beresford, Admiral Lord C., 9, 122
Bethune, Maj-Gen E., 37, 102, 127, 129–30, 139, 144
Bideford, 68
Bigland, A., 83
Birmingham, 200
- Bishops Stortford, 159
'bolt from the blue', 2, 9
Bonar Law, A., 157
Bonner, Master, 69–70
Boys' Brigade, 138
Boy Scouts, 31, 200
Bradford, 117
Brentwood, 58, 180, 193
Bridgeman, Brig-Gen, 114
Bridges, R., 84
Brightlingsea, 227
British Empire, 2
British Expeditionary Force, *see* Expeditionary Force
Brunner, Mond & Co, 111
Bull, Sir W, 114
Bungay, 58
Burn, Col, 30
Bury St Edmunds, 58
- Cabinet, 10–11, 13, 76, *see also* War Cabinet
Cadets, 31
Calais, 79
Canadian Training Division, 159, 193
Cannock Chase, 124
Canterbury, 58, 180, 193
Caporetto, 173
Carson, Sir E., 121–2
Cave, G., 72
Central Force, *see* Home Army
Chamberlain, Lord, 131
Channel, The English, 41, 47, 59, 79–80
Chelmsford, 107
Chelsea Pensioners, 28
Chief Constables, 43–4, 70, 80
Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 15, 18, 21, 37, 53, 76–7, 79, 100, 108, 124, 173, 179, 186, 188, 191–2
Childers, E., 4

- Chorleywood, 87
 Churchill, W., 39, 76, 199, 203
 Church Lads' Brigade, 116
 Cleethorpes, 195
 coastguard, 42
 Coasts, East, 76, 80, 113, 123, 143,
 159, 169, 172–3, 188, 191–2;
 South, 80, 159, 191; West, 159
 coast watch, 42, 67
 Colchester, 58
 Committee of Imperial Defence, 2–4,
 41, 94, 219
 Conan Doyle, A., 69–70, 74
 conscription, 2, 4,
 Continent, 2, 5, 6, 7, 61, 77
 Continental commitment, 13
 Cook, Sir F., 70
 Corps of Guides, 21–2, 42, 44
 Craik, Sir H., 91
 Crewe, Lord, 110
 Croft, Brig-Gen, 156–7
 Crowborough, 181
 Cunliffe, Sir F., 71, 87
 Curragh, 50, 58
 Customs, 42, 67

 Dallas, Maj-Gen A., 193
 Dartmouth, Lord, 50
 Deal, 237
 Defended Ports, *see* Ports
 demobilization, 194
 Deputy Chief of the General Staff,
 108, 152, 162–4
 Deputy Quartermaster General, 181
 Derby, Lord, 117, 139, 144–5, 179,
 186
 Derby Scheme, 121, 123, 126, 148–9
 Desborough, Lord, 69, 91, 110,
 120, 129
 Director of Army Signals, 159
 Director-General Territorial Force, 37,
 39, 127, 129–30
 Director-General Territorial and
 Volunteer Force, 152, 162, 165,
 175, 187
 Director of Military Operations, 5, 10,
 163–4, 183
 Director of Military Training, 7–9, 21,
 35–6, 80

 Director of Movements, 160
 Director of Organization, 185
 Director of Recruiting, 153
 Director of Staff Duties, 21–2
 Doncaster, 150, 57
 Douglas, Gen Sir C., 53, 76–7, 79
Dreadnought, 35
 Dukes of: Devonshire, 92; Norfolk,
 92; Rutland, 97
 Dumpton Gap, 52
 Dunblane, 57

 East Anglia, 158, 179–80
 Eastern Front, 141
 Emergency Committees, 86, 90, 154
 Employers' Territorial Association, 70
 Errol, Lord, 164
 Esher, Viscount, 3, 5, 32, 38, 40
 Ewart, Maj.-Gen. S., 5, 10, 24
 Examination Service, 46
 Expeditionary Force, 7–8, 14–15, 17–18,
 36, 40, 41, 48, 52, 60, 64, 108
 Extra Reserve, 5, 7, 14–15, 55, 182,
 205, 222

 Fenians, 44
 Fens, 45, 80
 Fergusson, Col. A., 70
 Festubert, Battle of, 99
 Findley, Col., 18
 Fisher, H.A., 73
 Fisher, Admiral Sir J., 6, 9, 37, 80, 158
 Form E624, 127
 Forster, H., 137–8
 Fortescue, Lord, 112, 114
 Forth Bridge, 60
 France, 36
francs tireurs, 92, 114, 202
 French, FM Sir J., 93, 99, 122–3, 126,
 132–3, 136, 139–41, 143–4, 148,
 154–8, 161, 164–5, 166, 172,
 174, 178–9, 192
 French Army, 33
 fyrd, 11

 Gallipoli, 100
 Geddes, Sir A., 173, 179, 187
 General Post Office, 16, 21, 111, 192
 General Staff, 7, 11, 17, 165

- George V, 18, 24, 110, 123, 128, 140, 143
- German Army, 175–8, 184, 186
- Germany, 3, 6, 7, 36, 39, 76, 107, 115, 163
- Gibraltar, 59
- Godley, A., 84
- Goldie, Sir G., 219
- Gooch, G., 27
- Gravesend, 79
- Great Yarmouth, 81
- Griffith-Boscawen, Sir A., 215
- Grimsby, 52
- Guildhall, 92
- Haig, FM Sir D., 178–9
- Hague Convention, 21, 26, 92
- Haldane, R. B., 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22–4, 26–7, 31, 40, 60, 66, 75, 201, 204
- Halton Park, 118
- Hamilton, Gen. Sir B., 126, 142
- Hamilton, Gen. Sir I., 11, 24, 123
- Hamilton-Gordon, Gen., 184
- Hankey, Sir M., 41, 76, 107
- Hapsburg Empire, 20
- Harewood, Lord, 112, 139
- Harmsworth press, 10
- Harris, Lord, 86, 112, 155, 200
- Harris, P., 68–70, 74, 110, 130, 136, 145, 153, 157, 172, 175–6
- Harrison, Gen Sir, R., 226
- Harrow, 53
- Hatfield, 58
- Hayle, 78
- Henry, Sir E., 35
- Hereford, 117
- High Seas Fleet, 7, 39, 81, 158
- High Sheriffs, 70
- Hindenburg, Gen., 158
- Home Army
 - Central Force, 9–10, 15, 35, 41, 45, 48, 57–8, 64, 76–7, 79, 86, 93, 103–4, 107–8, 121, 125–6, 195, 206–7: Command
 - Reinforcement Pools, 192;
 - Composite units, 156, 192;
 - Depot Companies, 124;
 - Extemporized units, 158–9: Fire Commands, 212
- Home Defence Bns, 94, 126: Home Service Bns, 195, 208; Home Service Divisions, (71st, 72nd, 73rd) 142, 148, 158, 173–4, 179, 208; Home Service Garrison Bns, 124–5, 143, 158, 184;
- Independent Brigades, 158–9;
- Independent (Kent) Force, 180, 192–3, 209; Local Forces, 48, 126, 159, 207; Mixed Bdes, 143, 183, 189, 191, 193; Northern Army, 140, 142, 156, 158, 160;
- Provisional units, 100–3, 124–5, 127, 132, 134, 141, 143, 158, 160, 195, 208; Recruit Distribution Bns, 148, 182, 210; Southern Army, 132, 142, 156, 158, 160, 174; XXIII Corps, 180, 192–3, 208–9
- Home Commands, 8, 21, 37, 42, 65, 77–8, 93, 125, 129, 133, 141, 192, 207: Aldershot, 9, 48, 126, 193; Eastern, 35, 104, 125, 175, 181, 208; Irish, 126; Northern, 57, 179, 208, 210–11; Scottish, 78, 126, 196; Southern, 56, 126, 170, 179, 182; Western, 59, 117, 242; London District, 9, 48, 126, 193
- Home Guard, 203
- Home Fleet, 12
- Home Ports' Defence Committee, 41
- Home Office, 4, 48, 67, 72, 85–8, 92, 154–5
- Home Service Medal, 200
- Horse Guards, 23
- Hotchkiss machine gun, 169
- Hunton, 107
- Hurd, A., 235
- Hutton, Gen. Sir E., 239
- Hyde Park, 136
- Hyndmann, H., 9
- Imperial Reserve Army, 157
- Imperial Service option, 61–2, 98, 109
- India, 4, 58–9, 76

- Indian Mutiny Medal, 167
 Inspector-General of
 Communications, 160, 192
 Inspector of Gymnasia, 109
 invasion inquiries, 3, 7, 39, 123–4,
 173–4
 invasion/raid scares, 2, 7, 15, 35, 40,
 61, 64, 76–7, 80, 89, 108, 123,
 140, 155, 157–8, 164, 167,
 174–5, 189, 191, 193, 201, 204
 Inverness, 57
 Ireland, 9, 35, 50, 121–2, 179, 183,
 186
 Ipswich, 52
 Isle of Man, 97

 Jellicoe, Admiral Sir J., 80, 173

 Keighly, 117
 Kiggell, Maj.-Gen. L., 21, 36, 80,
 107–8, 123
 Kinghorn Fort, 52
 King's Lynn, 81
 Kitchener, FM Lord H., 50, 54, 60–1,
 64, 66, 72, 79, 93, 99, 100, 105,
 108, 113, 117
 Kitchener's Army, *see* New Army

 Landsdowne, Marquis of, 120
 Lands End, 159
Landsturm, 69, 196, 204
 Le Cateau, 64
 Leconfield, Lord, 238
 Lee, A., 38
 Legion of Scouts and Guides, 42
Leinster, 245
levée en masse, 89
 Liddell Hart, B., 154, 170, 197
 Limerick, 58
 Lincolnshire, Marquis of, 92,
 122, 128
 Liverpool, 28, 59
 Lloyd George, D., 90, 130–1, 139,
 144, 155–6, 173, 178, 194
 Lloyd, Gen. Sir F., 77, 123, 139, 238
 Local Government Board, 118, 150,
 152, 187
 London Bombing School, 171
 London County Council, 68

 London's defences, 3, 109, 114, 159,
 193, 198
 London Fire Service, 198
 London General Omnibus Co., 193
 Long, W., 130, 150
 Loos, Battle of, 100
 Lords Lieutenant, 86, 90, 119, 137,
 199–200: of Durham, 120; Kent,
 86, 112, 155, 200; Lincolnshire,
 120
 Lowestoft, 159, 123
 Luton, 48

 Macpherson, I., 153, 157, 175,
 188, 190
 Macready, Lt-Gen. Sir N., 152, 178
 McKenna, R., 72, 92
 Maidstone, 59
 Manchester Ship Canal, 77
 Maurice, Maj.-Gen. Sir F., 163
 Mediterranean, 5, 37
 MI5, 185
 Miles, Lt-Gen. Sir H., 18
 Militia, 2, 4, 5, 13–16, 23,
 29, 90
 Ministry of National Service,
 179, 187
 Ministry of Reconstruction, 179,
 182–3
 Mollington, 68
 Mons, 64
 Murray, Maj.-Gen. A., 7–9,
 21, 35
 Murray, Sir G., 84

 'nation-in-arms', 6
 National Defence Association, 39
 National Defence Corps, 196
 National Patriotic Association, 69
 National Registration, 114
 National Reserve, 25–30, 32, 35, 43–5,
 49, 56–7, 64–7, 77–8, 81–2, 90,
 94–6, 102, 110, 113–14, 118–19,
 122, 133, 182, 191, 196, 199,
 201, 203
 NR Divisions, 1st London, 33
 NR Battalions, City of Westminster,
 25: Edinburgh, 218
 National Rifle Association, 26

- National Service League, 4, 6, 9, 28, 49
- Navy League, 9, 10
- New Army, 60–4, 70, 77, 82, 85, 89–90, 93–4, 98, 107, 109, 124, 143, 167, 202
- Newcastle, 46, 144
- Newton, Lord, 120
- Nicholson, FM Sir W., 18, 21, 37, 39
- Norfolk, 1st Volunteer Bn (Rifle Vols), 24
- Northcliffe press, 9, 10, 87
- Northamptonshire, 59
- Norwich, 107
- Officer Training Corps, 6, 14, 119
- Oldham, 231
- O'Callaghan, Maj.-Gen. Sir D., 198
- O'Moore Creagh, Gen., 68, 70, 72, 84, 132
- Ostend, 79, 90
- Paget, Gen. Sir A., 132, 142, 126, 174
- Pals battalions, 64, *see also* New Army
- Parliament Acts, *Amending*, 130–1: *Defence of the Realm*, 1914, 67, 104; *Military Service*, 99, 127, 134, 148, 154, 175–6, 179, 201; *Official Secrets*, 1911, 43; *Regulation of the Forces*, 1871, 55; *Territorial and Reserve Forces*, 1907, 17, 129; *Volunteer*, 1863, 120, 129–31; *Workmen's Compensation*, 1906, 131 Bills; National Service (TF), 1913, 49
- Peel, Lt-Col. R., 182, 215
- Perth, 57
- Police, 34–5, 43–4, 47, 68, 85
- Police Chronicle*, 85
- Porter, Gen Sir T., 226
- Ports/Defences, 34, 205, 211–12
- Berehaven, 41: Bull Island, 80; Cromarty, 41, 159; Dover, 34, 79; Falmouth, 41; Felixstowe, 47, 58, 195; Forth, 47, 54, 58, 181; Haile, 41, 80; Hartlepool, 81, 180; Harwich, 34, 41, 46, 48, 55, 180–1; Humber, 35, 48
- 80, 180, 183, 188; Hull, 41, 34, 55; Lough Swilly, 41; Lowestoft, 77; Newhaven, 18; Orkneys, 47; Pembroke, 55; Plymouth, 41, 54, 67; Portland, 41; Portsmouth, 41; Scapa Flow, 41, 79; Sheerness, 47, 55; Sheppey, 47, 55, 181; Shoeburyness, 55, 180, 183; Spurn Point, 41, 80; Tees, 181; Thames and Medway, 35, 45, 47, 77, 79, 140, 180–1; Tyne, 35, 46, 52, 78, 181, 188
- posse comitatus*, 224
- Pragnell, Sir G., 70
- Precautionary Period, 7, 34–5, 42, 45, 46, 52
- press, 4
- 'press gang clause', 91
- Preston, 59
- prisoners of war, 73, 185, 196
- Privy Seal, Lord, 131
- Provost-Marshal, 115
- Pulteney, Lt-Gen. Sir W., 193
- Quartermaster General, 18–19
- Queenborough, 86
- 'race to the sea', 59
- railways, 35, 48, 57, 77–8, 81, 95, 160–1; Great Western, 81; Southern, 82; Regulating Stations, 160
- Ranksborough, Lord, 197
- Regular Army, 1–4, 8, 11, 22–3, 29, 31, 40–1, 47–8, 53, 60, 65, 79, 122, 133, 137, 140, 162
- Agricultural Companies, 192, 194
- Brigades, 18th, 35; 200th, 109; 206th, 180
- Composite Bdes, 156, 192
- Divisions 4th, 9, 35–7; 6th, 9, 35–7
- Graduated Bns, 147–8, 178, 182, 189, 192, 208
- Independent Bdes, 156
- Labour Corps, 185
- Local Reserve Bns, 124
- MGC, 148

- Regular Army – *continued*
 RE, 15, 20, 37, 55, 163, 211
 RGA, 15, 37, 41, 46, 55, 163,
 189, 211
 Reserve Bns, 124–5, 142: Training
 Reserve, 142, 158, 178, 195;
 4th Reserve RFA, 181; 1st Siege
 Artillery Reserve, 194
 Regiments, Cameronians
 (Scottish Rifles), 195; East
 Yorks, 195; Guards, 25;
 Highland Light Infantry, 26;
 Manchester, 4, 124;
 Northumberland Fusiliers, 4,
 50; Rifle Brigade, 201; Royal
 Scots Fusiliers, 194; Royal
 Sussex, 195; South Lancs, 195;
 West Yorkshire, 194
 Young Soldier Bns, 147, 181–2,
 189, 192
 Repington, C., 4, 6, 10, 23, 39, 87, 88,
 155, 157, 174
 Reserve of Officers, 5
 Richborough, 174
 Rickmansworth, 87
 Rifles, 94: Lee Enfield, 197, 130, 143;
 Lee Metford, 107; Martini, 106,
 130, 137; Meiji, 107; Ross, 137
 Rifle Volunteers, 2–6, 12, 15, 17, 24,
 28–9, 39, 60, 166–7, 170, 190
 Roberts, Lord, 4, 6, 9, 10, 24 40,
 41, 88
 Robertson, FM Sir W., 124, 173–4,
 179–81, 183–4, 192, 198
 Roseberry, Lord, 70, 122
 Rothchild, Lord, 116
 Royds, Col., 176
 Royal Air Force, 180, 185, 196
 Royal Defence Corps, 41, 127–9,
 132–5, 145, 161–3, 184–89, 191,
 195–6, 201,
 Royal Flying Corps, 242
 Royal Navy, 1, 6, 7, 9–10, 25, 33–5,
 37–40, 42, 47, 52, 76, 99, 193
 Royal Marines, 46
 Rundle, Gen. Sir L., 100
 Russian Provisional Government,
 173
 Rye, 95
 sabotage, 52, 85, 105
 Salisbury Plain, 48, 58, 107, 124
 Salvation Army, 14
 Samuel, H., 118,
 Samuel, J., 235
 Saughall, 68
 Saye and Sele, Lord, 64
 Scarborough, 58, 181–2, 187
 Scarbrough, Lord, 39, 161, 164–5,
 175–7, 198–200
 Sclater, Lt-Gen. Sir H., 50
 Sea Fencibles, 220
 Seaford, 159
 Sea Scouts, 67
 Seely, J, 26–9, 32, 38, 40–1, 43–5, 50
 Selby, 57
 Selsey Bill, 159
 Shrewsbury, 59
 Sidmouth, 68
 Simon, Sir J., 127
 Sittingbourne, 59
 Smith-Dorrien, Gen. Sir H., 24, 121
 Somme, Battle of, 129, 141
 South African troops, 193
 South African War, 1, 115
 South Foreland, 125
 Southport, 28
 Special Constables, 43–4, 67, 72,
 85–7, 150–4, 200
 Special Reserve, 5–8, 13–16, 23, 29,
 32–3, 45, 47, 55, 58, 64, 77,
 125–6, 142, 158, 182, 193–5, 201
 SR units: 3/Bedford, 182; 3/Border,
 55; 3/Gloucestershire, 55;
 3/Gordon Highlanders, 55;
 King Edward's Horse, 213, 222;
 3/KORL, 182; 3/Lancashire Fus,
 55; 3/Manchester, 195; North
 Irish Horse, 213; 3/Ox.& Bucks
 LI, 215; 5/Rifle Bde, 182;
 3/Seaforth Highlanders, 194;
 3/Somerset LI, 194–5; South
 Irish Horse, 213; 3/Suffolk, 171,
 194; 3/West Kent, 182, 215;
 3/Wiltshire, 194;
 6/Worcestershire, 182
Spectator, 22
 'splendid isolation', 3
 spies, 88, 90

- St Albans, 56
 St Bart's Hospital, 113
 Stewart, Sir C., 69
 Stopford, Lt-Gen. Sir F., 86
 Stowmarket, 77
 Strachey, John St Loe, 22, 50, 70, 89, 122, 135
 Stanmore Hill, 56
 Stratford, 160
 Stroud, 154
 submarines, 46, 79, 82, 90, 106
- tanks, 189
- Tennant, H., 64–6, 73, 92, 114, 121, 128–9
- Territorial Army, 199, 201, 204
- Territorial Force, 1, 5–8, 10, 14–17, 21, 26–7, 31–3, 35–8, 44–5, 49, 60–2, 69, 73, 89, 94, 116, 122, 140, 144–5, 151, 166–70
- TF Advisory Council, 18
- TF Council of County Associations, 31, 39
- TF County Associations, 10, 60, 169: Buckinghamshire, 66, 78; Cheshire, 234; Cornwall, 197; East Riding, 43, 137, 220; Essex, 49; Derby, 26; Hertfordshire, 66, 78; Kent, 32, 216; Leicestershire, 31, 197; City of London, 134, 172–3; Co. of London, 32, 49, 197; Northumberland, 219; Nottinghamshire, 94, 137; Oxfordshire, 26, 64; Perthshire, 78, 102; Shropshire, 94; Surrey, 23, 42, 50; West Riding, 49, 139; Wiltshire, 197
- TF Reserve, 17–20, 22, 27, 44, 147, 169, 197
- TF Technical Reserve, 19–21, 42
- TF Divisions, 48, 54–9, 62, 64, 76, 98, 108, 141: 1st Mounted, 48, 58, 104, 107, 126, 142, 159, 206; East Anglian, 58, 103, 206; East Lancashire, 48, 58, 63, 79, 98–100, 223; Highland, 48, 57, 206; Home Counties, 48, 55, 59, 206; 1st London, 48, 52, 59, 99, 206; 2nd London, 56, 58–9, 62, 99, 206; Lowland, 100; North Midland, 99, 206; Northumbrian, 46–7, 54, 99, 101, 108; South Midland, 102, 206; Welsh, 59, 100, 103, 206; Wessex, 48, 54, 58, 76, 79, 98–9, 206; West Lancashire, 48, 56, 58; West Riding, 26, 48, 58, 206; 57th, 126; 58th, 126; 59th, 126; 60th, 127; 64th, 126, 158, 179–81, 209; 65th, 126, 159; 66th, 126; 67th, 105, 126, 158, 161, 179, 209; 68th, 126, 158, 173, 179–80, 209; 69th, 126, 173, 179, 181, 193, 210
- TF Brigades, South Lancs, 58; South Wales, 59; Welsh Border, 54; 2nd West Riding, 57; East Lancs Reserve 181, 183; Home Co. Reserve, 183; West Lancs Reserve, 181
- Yeomanry Brigades, 2/1st Highland, 105; Welsh Border, 58
- Yeomanry regiments, 15; London Roughriders, 105; West Kent, 60
- TF Cyclist units, 21, 52, 106, 126, 142–3, 158–9, 179, 193, 206–7, 243; Northern Cyclist, 46, 52; 3/1st N. Midland Divisional Cycle Coy, 106
- TF Regts, 1/6th Black Watch, 216: 2/6th Black Watch, 102; 5/Black Watch, 52; 7/Black Watch, 52; 1/Brecknock, 59; 1/Buckinghamshire, 57; 2/5th Buffs, 105; 4/Buffs, 52; 1/Cambridgeshire, 52, 57; 2/6th Cheshire, 109; 4/DCLI, 222; 5/DCLI, 63, 222; Devon, 54; 6/Devon, 57; 4/Dorset, 60; 4/Duke of Wellington's, 52; 4/East Surrey, 182, 215; 1/5th East Yorkshire, 243; 2/8th Essex, 106; 8/Essex, 52, 106; 4/Hampshire, 228; 5/Hampshire, 228; Honourable

Territorial Force – *continued*

Artillery; Company, 63, 158;
 1/Hereford, 59; 5/KOSB, 57;
 4/KSLI, 59; Liverpool Scottish,
 56; London, 54, 141, 195;
 5/London, 63, 99; 12/London,
 99; 13/London, 99; 14/London,
 59, 62; 15/London, 63;
 25/London, 52; 6/Manchester,
 60; 9/Middlesex, 53, 57;
 10/Middlesex, 57;
 Monmouthshire, 59, 99; 2/6th
 Norfolk, 242; Rifle Brigade, 118;
 2/RF City of London, 53, 60;
 4/Seaforth Highlanders, 171;
 Somerset Light Infantry, 54;
 2/4th Sussex, 109; 6/Sussex,
 106; 6/Welsh, 59; West
 Kent, 63
 TF Misc units, Durham Co. RGA,
 81; 2/1st E. Anglian Divisional
 Artillery, 103; Kent (Fortress)
 Coy, RE, 221; Welsh Howitzer
 Brigade, 106
 TF Supernumerary/Protection
 Companies, 66, 94–8, 101,
 118–19, 125, 133–4, 195
 TF Special Service Sections, 7, 35,
 42, 45–6, 52, 165
 First Line, 66, 83, 93, 97, 102,
 104, 135
 Second Line, 63, 66, 93–4, 97–102,
 109, 135, 141, 158, 179
 Third Line, 97–8, 109, 126–7, 135
Territorials, or England's last
hope, 38
 Thanet, 52
 Thorne, W., 157
 Tilbury, 79
 Tirpitz, Admiral von, 7
 Totnes, 58
 trained bands, 11
 Treasury
 tribunals, 147, 149, 151–2, 155, 168
 Troup, Sir E., 154
 Tunbridge Wells, 59

 Ulster Volunteers, 69
 Unionist Party, 19

Veteran Reserve, 16, 19, 22–3
 Voluntary Aid Detachment, 20, 22,
 102, 151
 Volunteer Force, 147, 149–52, 156–7,
 161–76, 178–9, 181, 183–7, 190,
 192–3, 196–99, 202–3
 VF special service companies,
 186–90, 200, 203
 VF units, Buckinghamshire, 169,
 240; Cheshire, 244; Devon,
 176–7; Essex, 171, 231, 240;
 Gloucestershire, 170;
 Hertfordshire, 243;
 Huddersfield, 171; Kent, 154,
 171, 200; Lincolnshire, 241;
 London, 157, 159; Manchester,
 240; Oldham, 240; Ramsgate,
 175; Shropshire, 169, 240;
 Suffolk, 171, 243; West
 Yorkshire, 244; Vol. RFC, 167
 Volunteer Training Corps, 41, 67–8,
 70–3, 81–93, 109–21, 125, 128–9,
 131, 135–8, 140–1, 144, 146
 148, 150
 Central Committee, 74, 91, 93,
 110–16, 119, 135, 149, 154, 177
 VTC units, Athletes' Corps, 83:
 Birkenhead Corps, 83;
 Birmingham Electrical, 112,
 120; Buckinghamshire Vols,
 116, 240; East Riding Vols, 137;
 Essex Vols, 83; Deal Vols, 247;
 Fleet Street Company, 138;
 Ju Jitsu Corps, 84; Lancashire
 Vols, 83; LCC Corps, 116;
 Letchworth Vols, 143; Lydney
 Vols, 226; Middlesex Vols, 112;
 Motor Sections, 120; National
 Guard, 110–11, 117; National
 Volunteer Guard, 73; Naval
 Home Defence Corps, 112; N-E
 Railway Corps, 116; Newent
 Coy, 241; Nottingham Vols,
 137; Old Boys, 83; Optimists,
 111; Oxford Vols, 137; Piano
 Tuners' Corps, 83; Preston Vols,
 231; Public School Corps, 111;
 Rye Company, 95; Station
 Companies, 112, 120; United

- Volunteer Training Corps – *continued*
 Arts Rifles, 84, 232, 246;
 Warwickshire Vols, 112
 vulnerable points, 34–5, 40, 48–9,
 77–8, 81, 94, 113, 126
- Walmer, 237
 Wandsworth, 68
 War Cabinet, 99–100, 161–2, 174,
 178, 188, *see also* Cabinet
 War Council, 93
 Ward J., 82
 Warner, Sir C., 215
 War Office, 2, 7, 15, 17, 18, 20, 23,
 25–30, 33–4, 36, 41, 43, 48–9, 55,
 61–6, 69–78, 80, 83, 85, 90–6,
 101, 103, 107, 113, 115, 117–18,
 120, 127, 129–32, 137–40,
 145–53, 155, 158, 161–2, 164–5,
 168, 172, 175, 177, 179–80,
 184–8, 190, 197–9, 203
- Wash, The, 79, 100, 124–5, 193
 Watford, 58
 Wells, H., 69–70, 87–8
 Western Front, 99, 146, 155, 173
 Whigham, Maj.-Gen. Sir R.,
 152, 162
 Willesden, 160
 Wilson, Admiral Sir A., 39
 Wilson, FM Sir H., 36–7, 186, 191
 Wirral, 68
 Woolcombe, Gen., 115
 Woolwich, 54
 Worthing, 100
 Wyrall, E., 194
 Wyndham G., 14, 38
- Ypres, Battles of, 99, 100, 162, 173
- Zeebrugge, 90, 93, 99, 157
 Zeppelins, 81, 90, 108, 195