

# Contents

<i>Preface to the Second Edition</i>	x
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	xi
<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>1 Moral Monism</b>	<b>16</b>
Greek monism	19
Christian monism	23
Monism of classical liberalism	33
Locke	36
J. S. Mill	40
Critique of monism	47
<b>2 Forms of Pluralism</b>	<b>50</b>
Vico	50
Montesquieu	55
Herder	67
Misunderstanding culture	76
<b>3 Contemporary Liberal Responses to Diversity</b>	<b>80</b>
Rawls	81
Raz	90
Kymlicka	99
General comments	109
<b>4 Conceptualizing Human Beings</b>	<b>114</b>
Human nature	114
Basis of cultural diversity	123
Pluralist universalism	126
Asian values	136
<b>5 Understanding Culture</b>	<b>142</b>
The nature and structure of culture	142
The dynamics of culture	151

viii *Contents*

Cultural community	154
Loyalty to culture	158
Cultural interaction	163
Cultural diversity	165
Evaluating cultures	172
Respecting cultures	176
<b>6 Reconstituting the Modern State</b>	<b>179</b>
The Canadian debate	185
The Indian debate	191
The search for new political formations	193
<b>7 The Political Structure of Multicultural Society</b>	<b>196</b>
Modes of political integration	199
Structure of authority	207
Justice	209
Collective rights	213
Common culture	219
Multicultural education	224
National identity	230
Conditions of success	236
<b>8 Equality in a Multicultural Society</b>	<b>239</b>
Equality of difference	243
Equal treatment	248
Contextualizing equality	249
Limits of equality	257
Implications	261
<b>9 Logic of Intercultural Evaluation</b>	<b>264</b>
Intercultural dialogue	268
Female circumcision and other practices	273
Polygamy	282
General observations	292
<b>10 Politics, Religion and Free Speech</b>	<b>295</b>
The Satanic Verses	295
Responses to Muslim protests	298
Logic of political discourse	304
Communal libel or group defamation	313

Free speech	317
Religion and public life	321
<b>11 Conclusion</b>	<b>336</b>
<b>12 A Response to My Critics</b>	<b>345</b>
Misunderstanding multiculturalism	345
Locating culture	356
Operative public values	363
Redistribution	365
Liberalism	367
<i>Notes</i>	373
<i>Bibliography</i>	385
<i>Index</i>	398

# 1

## Moral Monism

The obvious fact that different societies understand and organize human lives differently and entertain different even conflicting conceptions of the good life has been noted and commented upon in all civilizations. In western thought, reflections on the subject go back to the ancient Greeks and have given rise to several responses, of which moral monism is one of the oldest and the most influential. Moral monism refers to the view that only one way of life is fully human, true, or the best, and that all others are defective to the extent that they fall short of it.<sup>1</sup> Since every way of life necessarily embodies several values, moral monism either argues that one value is the highest and others merely a means to or conditions of it, or more plausibly and commonly that although all values are equally important or some more than others, there is only one best or truly rational way to combine them. For the monist evil, like error, can take many forms, but the good, like truth, is inherently singular or uniform in nature. Even as the same proposition cannot be true in one place and false in another, the same way of life cannot be good for one person or society and bad for another. Although the monist considers only one way of life to be truly human, he is not committed to the view that all human beings or societies ought to live by it. He might believe that since they are unequally endowed intellectually and morally, those unable to lead the truly human life should be left free to live such inferior ways of life as are best suited to them. What he cannot concede is that the good life can be lived in several more or less equally worthwhile ways.

Although the monist has the theoretical resources to establish a hierarchy among different ways of life, it is not necessary that he should do so. He might agree with the Stoics that ways of life that fall short of the

highest are so imperfect and unworthy that there is no point in taking them seriously and establishing a moral hierarchy among them. Or, like the early Christian theologians, he might argue that the good does not admit of degrees and that ways of life are either good or bad and cannot be hierarchically graded. Or he might argue with the Gnostics and the Neo-Platonists that such a hierarchy should be avoided in order to discourage people from aiming at the next best way of life rather than the best itself. Although the monist need not grade ways of life, he cannot ignore important differences between them.

In order to show that one way of life is the best, the monist needs to ground it in something that all human beings necessarily share and is transcultural in nature. If some did not share it, they would not be bound by his preferred way of life, and if they shared it coincidentally it would lack a rational basis. The obvious candidate is human nature. The monist could also appeal to the structure of the universe, God, and so on, but in order that these can be shown to be binding on all human beings, they need to be mediated by human nature. He might define human nature strongly or weakly, as something that determines or only disposes humans to act in a certain way. And he might either give it a substantive content or only highlight its distinctive and largely formal features. Whatever his approach, and each has its strengths and limitations, the monist relies on a conception of human nature to deduce or justify a particular way of life.

If his conception of human nature is to do the required philosophical work, the monist needs to assume the following. First, the uniformity of human nature; that is, all human beings, however much they are divided by time and space, share a common nature consisting of certain unique capacities, dispositions and desires. The monist does not deny that they differ in important respects or that no two human beings are ever exactly alike, but insists that differences define their particularity not their humanity and do not penetrate or shape their shared nature. In his view differences are not autonomous, and only represent so many different ways of expressing or combining the shared universal features. Some men pursue wealth, others women, fame or learning. Although the objects of their desires differ, the underlying desire is the same, be it that for pleasure, status, recognition or pride. Like human desires human capacities too, in his view, have basically the same nature, structure and mode of operation. Reason, the allegedly highest among these, is the same in all human beings and functions or ought to function in an identical manner.

Second, the monist assumes the moral and ontological primacy of similarities over differences. Since only what human beings share in common is supposed to constitute their humanity, the monist argues that their similarities are ontologically far more important than their differences. Differences vary from individual to individual, do not affect let alone form part of their humanity, and are ultimately inconsequential. All human beings are human in exactly the same way, not each in his or her own way. Third, the monist insists on the socially transcendental character of human nature. Human nature inheres in human beings as their natural endowment. Although it can be developed only in society, it is deemed to be unaffected by the latter. For the monist human beings are therefore basically the same in different times and places, and their cultures or ways of life make at best only a minor difference. Fourth, the monist assumes the total knowability of human nature. For some monists human nature is relatively simple and consists of readily specifiable capacities and desires; for others it is complex and elusive but capable of being discovered by means of sustained philosophical, theological or scientific investigation. Finally, the monist takes human nature as the basis of good life or, what comes to the same thing, asserts the unity of good and truth. For the monist the content of the good life is determined in the light of the central truths about human nature, not merely because 'ought' implies 'can' but because the good lacks an ontological basis and remains purely subjective unless it is grounded in human nature. Since human nature consists of several different capacities and desires, the question arises as to which of them is central to it and should form the basis of the good life. The usual monist tendency is to stress the *differentia specifica* of the human species, be it the theoretical intellect, love of God, or the capacity for self-determination and autonomy.

Monism can take several forms. I shall briefly examine three of the most influential, namely the rationalist monism of Greek philosophy, the theological monism of Christianity, and the regulative monism of classical liberalism, and show how each has difficulty accounting for and coming to terms with moral and cultural diversity. Of the three the first advocates a substantive and comprehensive way of life, the second a substantive body of doctrines and a way of life based on them, and the third a relatively thin vision of the good life to which all ways of life are expected to conform. All three appeal to human nature but define it differently. The first takes a thick and largely secular, the second a thick and theologically grounded, and the third a relatively thin and secular view of it.

## **Greek monism**

The tendency to argue that only one way of life is the best and that all others can be judged and even graded in terms of it goes back to Plato. For him the natural world was diverse and not uniform because God or the *demiurgus* would otherwise remain purely ideal in nature and lack perfection (Lovejoy, 1961, pp. 48–52). Each species had a distinct nature or rather embodied a distinct ‘idea’, and its characteristic mode of perfection consisted in realizing the latter and thereby contributing to the perfection of the cosmos. Different species formed a hierarchy based on the degree to which they realized the totality of goodness or the Idea of the Good.

For Plato, human beings were no different. Their characteristic mode of perfection consisted in realizing the potentialities of their nature and living up to the idea of man. While social customs and practices varied, human nature did not. This raised the question as to who was to discover it and how, for the person doing so was himself shaped by the customs and beliefs of his society, and the human nature he aimed to discover was itself overlaid with customs and hence opaque. Plato gave little attention to the question. He took the rather simple-minded view that human nature consisted of those capacities that were unique to humans, and that their discovery and the determination of their status called for a capacity for rational abstraction and critical reflection which a philosopher acquired after arduous training.

For Plato, human nature was composed of three basic elements, namely reason, spirit and desire. Reason was both theoretical and practical in nature. The former, which human beings shared in common with God, was equipped to acquire true knowledge of the universe, and the latter, which was unique to them, related to human conduct. The spirit was the source of psychological energy and expressed itself in emotions such as anger, indignation, pride, honour and ambition. Desires largely related to the objects of bodily and other needs. For Plato, reason was the highest of the three faculties. Desires were inherently unruly and required its directive and regulative control, and the spirit too had an irrational dimension and needed to be guided by reason. Of the two forms of reason, theoretical reason was higher because it was the source of the knowledge of the Idea of the Good without which practical life lacked coherence and direction. It also dealt with eternal and unchanging objects, was free of the constraints of space and time, and hence divine in nature. Plato argued that although all human

beings shared a common nature and possessed all three faculties, they did so in different degrees and were unequally equipped to lead the highest form of life. Depending on which of the three elements was dominant in them, different human beings found their happiness in different forms of life. Although these forms of life were good *for* them and indeed the only forms of life possible for them, their *objective* moral worth could be rationally determined and hierarchically graded.

Plato graded all human activities and ways of life on the basis of the hierarchical theory of the human soul. The *bios theoretikos*, the way of life devoted to the contemplation and pursuit of theoretical knowledge, was the highest. The activities and ways of life in which the spirit was the dominant principle came second, and those devoted to the satisfaction of desires came last. Plato readily admitted that all ways of life involved all three faculties, for the philosopher practised moral virtues and had his share of desires, and the artisan thought about God and the meaning of life. His hierarchical distinction was based on which human faculty dominated and formed their organizing principle.

Plato's discussion of the ways of life was intended to be universally valid, applying not just to the Greeks but also to others. To be sure, he did not say much about the latter, but what he did say reflected his general view.<sup>2</sup> The Greeks were a superior people to the Egyptians and the Phoenicians for, unlike the latter who took an instrumental and practical view of knowledge, they desired and pursued it for its own sake and valued 'theory' or pure contemplation. Unlike many an Enlightenment writer nearly two millennia later, Plato freely acknowledged that the Greeks had learned and borrowed much from others, but insisted that they had invariably refined and improved upon it, and that their very willingness to learn from others and the desire to 'travel for the sake of theory' as Pythagoras had put it demonstrated their superiority (Halbfass, 1990, pp. 6f). The fact that the Greeks had established a regime of free enquiry conducive to intellectual and other pursuits whereas other societies only knew despotism and tyranny offered further evidence of Greek superiority. Such a distinction between the Greeks and non-Greeks implied that relations among the former were governed by different principles from those regulating their relations with non-Greeks. For Plato, all Greeks constituted a 'single people', were 'kindred', and 'by nature' friends. Regrettably they did fight among themselves, but this was a 'civil strife' not a war and subject to certain rules: they should not treat each other harshly or take fellow Greeks as slaves. By contrast non-Greeks were their 'natural enemies',

and their relations with them were exempt from these constraints. Although opposed to wars for national glory and territorial expansion, Plato, like Aristotle after him, approved of those intended to rule over 'inferior' subjects (Tuck, 1999, p. 53; Aristotle, *Politics*, p. 12).

Like Plato, Aristotle was struck by the diversity of the natural world and explained it in terms of the principle of divine plenitude. Each species had a distinct 'nature' – the term he preferred to Plato's 'idea' – and took it to mean a dynamic and self-moving essence. All members of a species shared a common nature or essence, and their well-being and characteristic mode of perfection, as well as their distinct contribution to the harmony of the cosmos, consisted in realizing their species-potentialities.

Aristotle's view of human nature was somewhat different from Plato's. He did not assign the spirit a distinct status, and thought desires to be less chaotic and unruly than Plato did. However, he too believed that reason was the highest human faculty, and was both theoretical and practical in nature. Theoretical reason was divine and immortal and, although it was an integral part of human nature, it entered it 'from outside'. It was higher than practical reason because it was self-sufficient, free from worldly constraints, and enabled human beings to participate in God-like existence (*Ethics*, 1955, Book X, ch. VIII). Unlike the life of practical reason, which involved the development and exercise of moral and political virtues such as justice and courage and required other human beings, the life devoted to theoretical contemplation was self-contained and free from the contingent responses of other men. It dealt with immortal and unchanging objects, was most honourable and worthy, and offered the highest and lasting happiness. As Aristotle put it, 'That which is proper to each thing is by nature best and most pleasant for each thing. None of the other animals is happy since they in no way share in contemplation'.

Theoretical life was devoted to the study of theology or first philosophy, mathematics and physics, and of these the first was the highest. And even here, 'since pleasure is found more in rest than in movement', contemplating truths already attained was more pleasurable than inquiring after them (*Ethics*, 1995, Book X, ch. VIII). For Aristotle the best way of life was devoted to 'the worship and contemplation of God' (Ross, 1956, p. 234). Sometimes he gestured in a slightly different direction, arguing that, since human beings lived in society, they should also cultivate appropriate virtues and combine the contemplative with moral and political life. It is not clear whether he thought such

## 22 *Rethinking Multiculturalism*

a balanced life higher or lower than the purely contemplative (Ross, 1956, pp. 232–4; MacIntyre, 1985, pp. 137–53). In any case he was convinced that only the life in which contemplation played a dominant role was truly human and happy. Next in worth was the life devoted to moral and political virtues and practical wisdom, and included above all the life of the citizen. The life devoted to productive activities had the least worth. Since human beings were unequally endowed, Aristotle thought that only a small minority was capable of leading the highest life. Many more were capable of the next best life, most others fated to lead the third best, and some were only fit to be slaves. For Aristotle a properly constituted society should respect this hierarchy and create conditions in which each way of life received its due recognition and importance.

In spite of their important differences, both Plato and Aristotle were moral monists and shared all the five assumptions of moral monism stated earlier. They classified and graded different ways of individual and collective life in terms of which human faculties these exercised and cherished, and graded the ontological status and dignity of the latter in terms of their metaphysical view of man's place in the universe. For them, humans occupied an intermediate position between God and animals. Theoretical reason, which enabled them to participate in the divine, was the highest, and desire which drew them closer to the animals was the lowest.

The vision of the highest form of life advocated by Plato and Aristotle is underpinned by a number of beliefs concerning the nature of God, the inner human impulse or duty to become God-like, the constitution of human nature, the idea of the highest or purest pleasure, and so on. They do not offer convincing reasons for these beliefs and sometimes only reproduce the cultural biases of the Greek aristocracy. This is not to say that their views are indefensible, though some are, but rather that it is possible to take different and equally valid views on the nature of God and man, purity of pleasure, the nature of human happiness and so on, and arrive at very different ideas about the best way of life. For Plato and Aristotle the philosopher's way of life is higher than that of the artist, the poet, the priest and the citizen because theoretical reason is the highest faculty and its exercise the source of true and lasting happiness. On different assumptions to theirs, just as plausible as

their own if not more so, their whole way of thinking appears self-serving and even incoherent.

As we saw earlier, moral monism disjoins reason and morality from culture, and Plato's and Aristotle's thought is a good example of this. It takes no account of the fact that different societies understand and structure human nature differently, cultivate different capacities and virtues, and assign different meanings and worth to human activities and relationships. To be sure Plato acknowledged the role of the 'type of human character' dominant in a society, and thought that it determines what kind of constitution suits it best. However, the character involved only refers to which of the three human faculties is predominant and has no cultural significance. Aristotle stressed the importance of social classes and relativity of the criteria of justice, but this, again, amounted to no more than recognizing the importance of economic interests. The closest either of them came to appreciating the importance of culture is their acknowledgment of the role of customs, which are but a small part of it. And even then they treat these as largely irrational outgrowths, spontaneous like natural vegetation, mute, passive and devoid of moral meaning and significance. Since both philosophers ignored the role of culture in shaping human beings, they were unable either to appreciate that the good life can be defined and lived in several different ways, or to guard against the influence of their culture on their own thought.

### **Christian monism**

Like Plato and Aristotle, Christian theologians combined their even greater delight in the infinite diversity of the natural world with a commitment to moral monism. God could have easily created a uniform universe. The fact that He did not shows how great a value He placed on diversity (Lovejoy, 1961, pp. 64f). Augustine asked why God did not make all things similar and replied, *non essent omnia, si essent aequalia* (if all things were similar, all things would not exist). Thanks to God's infinite and overflowing love of His creation, He conferred the gift of actuality on all possible grades of goodness. He created diversity not as a vehicle of His self-realization, for He was already self-sufficient, but out of His love of his creation and as part of His design to create a perfect world. Each species in it was endowed with a unique

nature, occupied a distinct place in the universe, and contributed to its perfection and harmony by attaining its own characteristic mode of perfection.

Aquinas developed this argument more fully. Existence was a form of goodness, and it was better to exist than to be merely possible. The divine will, which always chose the good, willed the existence of all possible grades of goodness. The perfection of the universe consisted in 'the orderly variety of things', each reflecting the likeness of God 'according to its measure'. In a profoundly significant remark he observed that the fact that an angel was better than a stone did not mean that two angels were better than one angel and a stone, for 'two natures are better than one'. A stone might benefit from being an angel but the universe did not, for although the universe with two angels contained a greater quantity of goodness than that with one angel and a stone, it was less 'excellent' (*ibid.*, pp. 75f). For Aquinas as for many other Christian theologians, diversity was an intrinsic good, an irreducible and autonomous value, and the perfection of the universe as of any social whole within it consisted not in the highest possible quantity of goodness in the abstract, but in the widest possible variety of the natures it contained. As we shall see later this idea was used by Vico, Herder and others to provide a theologically grounded theory of moral and cultural pluralism.

The celebration of diversity in Augustine, Aquinas and others was grounded in a particular view of the universe and suffered from its obvious limitations. The diversity they celebrated was that of types or species, each endowed with a distinct nature whose realization constituted its characteristic mode of perfection. All the members of a species therefore had an identical destiny, to realize the potentialities of their shared nature. Indeed, since each species contributed to the harmony and perfection of the universe only by remaining true to its unique nature, its members must conform to the uniform norms of their species-nature. So far as human beings were concerned, they were to aspire for the same kind of perfection. Since they were unequally endowed or differently circumstanced, they attained their characteristic mode of perfection in different degrees, but it was inconceivable that they could lead different and equally legitimate forms of good life.

Christian moral monism differed from the Greek in several important respects. It was theologically grounded, and went hand in hand with religious monism or the belief that Christianity alone represented the 'one and true' religion. While Plato and Aristotle claimed to demon-

strate on philosophical grounds that a particular way of life was the highest, Christianity made it a matter of faith. Some of its theologians did, of course, seek to demonstrate its truths on rational grounds, but most realized that this could not be done. Some even welcomed this limitation because it showed that one accepted Christianity not as a matter of rational necessity but as an uncoerced act of faith. Plato and Aristotle had no interest in how the rest of humankind lived and whether or not it knew of their doctrines; for Christianity humankind had a vital common interest in salvation, and those knowing the way to achieve it had a duty of love to 'spread the good news'. This missionary work was theoretically facilitated by the fact that, unlike Plato and Aristotle for whom most of humankind was inherently incapable of leading the highest way of life, the Christian way of life was within the moral reach of all. Although Christian theologians admitted that some kind of moral life could be lived on the basis of natural reason alone, they insisted that it was inherently precarious because of the fallibility of natural reason, shallow because it lacked energy and depth which could only come from the love of God, and incomplete because morality was only a step towards the otherworldly life which alone represented the final human destiny. A truly moral life therefore needed a religious basis, and its quality was higher the truer the underlying religion. While Christianity thus accommodated moral diversity, it graded it hierarchically and remained as committed to moral as to religious monism. Christian monism introduced the ideas of moral universalism, missionary work and religious intolerance that were absent in its Greek counterpart.

Christian monism faced two problems, internal and external. Since its central doctrines could be interpreted in several different ways, its spokesmen had to decide whether to establish a theological orthodoxy or tolerate and even cherish hermeneutic pluralism. Secondly, Christianity was confronted with other religions such as Judaism and Paganism and later Islam, 'Hinduism' and others and, again, it had to decide whether to dismiss them as false or embrace religious pluralism. Although hermeneutic and religious monism do not entail each other, there is a tendency for them to go together, partly because intolerance and exclusivity in one area tend to encourage them in the other, and partly because the 'only true' religion cannot risk diversity of interpretations lest it should unwittingly come under the influence of other religions and compromise its absolute truth. Not surprisingly Christianity built up a powerful tendency towards hermeneutic and religious

monism. No great religion, especially one as philosophically rich and universalist in its ambition as Christianity, can suppress all internal differences or dismiss other religions as false. Christian monism was therefore constantly shadowed by a pluralist impulse, and its history is marked by a tension between the two.

In the early years Christianity was widely seen by its followers as a strand of thought within Judaism. Some of them even thought that one could not become a Christian unless one was a Jew. After all Jesus himself was one, Judaism provided the context of everything he said and did as well as his sacrificial death, and he could not be accepted as a Messiah without also believing in the Mosaic covenant, the Davidian monarchy, and the divine inspiration of the Hebrew Scriptures. Other Christians took a looser view of the relation between the two, but even they thought that one could be both a Jew and a Christian. Not surprisingly early Christians observed many of the ritual precepts of the Law and frequented the Jerusalem Temple. The subsequent Christian decision to reject the practice of circumcision and some of the Jewish dietary taboos was largely designed to facilitate missionary work among non-Jews and not to signify a break with Judaism.

For reasons too complex to discuss here things began to change radically towards the end of the second century. Christianity made a clean break with Judaism, and a Christian who observed any of its ritual precepts was excommunicated. It was argued that Jesus had not only fulfilled Biblical Judaism but established a new religion, and that his followers were now God's chosen people. Christianity was the only true religion, it had supplanted and superseded Judaism, and a Jew who fully understood his faith had a duty to convert to it. Such a view was not easy to maintain, for several passages in the Book of *Leviticus* stated that the Law was a perpetual covenant, Jesus himself said that he had not come to abolish or even alter but fulfill the Law, and several passages in the Acts depicted the Apostles as attending Temple services, observing at least some Mosaic dietary regulations, and performing various other ritual acts after the death, resurrection and ascension of Jesus. Not surprisingly, Patristic writers devoted enormous intellectual energy to explaining all this away and insisting on a total rupture with Judaism. St Augustine played a decisive role in the process. Drawing on the scattered elements of Patristic thought, he worked out a position that was later incorporated into the Latin theological tradition and became part of the standard Catholic view.

For Augustine the Mosaic Law and all of Jewish history were significant only as a prelude to Christianity. Moses and other Old Testament prophets knew that the Law was grossly inadequate, a mere shadow of the true reality that was to come in the shape of Jesus. Christians were therefore the only true heirs of Moses, and the Jews who failed to convert to Christianity were guilty of apostasy. For Augustine the Hebrew scriptures themselves indicated that the Mosaic Law would be abrogated with the arrival of the Messiah and that its validity was historically limited. The Jews who continued to observe its precepts were spiritually blind, willful, ‘carnal’ (sticking to the letter of the Law and missing its deeper spiritual meaning) and idolatrous. They had become so degenerate that they had not only denied themselves the salvation offered by Jesus, but done the work of Satan by rejecting and crucifying him.

While denouncing the Jews and their religion, Augustine had to explain their part in the divine design (Augustine, 1967, pp. 218f; Hood, 1995, pp. 10–14). He was convinced that their providential role was to assist the spread of Christianity. Their status as homeless exiles and the destruction of their Temple offered the conclusive proof that God had rejected them in favour of Christians, whose church alone was the *Verus Israel*. They also served the purpose of vouchsafing the veracity of the claims of Christianity. If they did not exist, pagans would accuse Christians of inventing the Old Testament prophecies that pointed to Jesus as Messiah. Christians therefore had a duty to tolerate and even protect Jews not because they had given them their Messiah, let alone because every religion deserved to be tolerated, but because their existence furthered the cause of Christianity (Hood, 1995, pp. 10–15 and 110; Deane, 1963, pp. 72, 206–20).

For Augustine, Christianity was the only true religion, the Catholic church was its only authorized spokesman, and there was no salvation outside the Church (Gilson, 1959, pp. 165–84). Christians alone led a truly good life, and that too only if their faith was free of theological errors. It is hardly surprising that Augustine spent much of his active life fighting what he took to be the four great heresies of his age, namely Manicheism, Donatism, Pelagianism and Arianism, and laying the theological foundations of what he took to be the true interpretation of Christianity.<sup>3</sup> Surrounded by so many heresies, he could not avoid appreciating that sincere Christians ‘accommodated the sacred words’ to their understanding and ‘found therein true albeit different meanings’. However, he was uneasy with the consequences of such

hermeneutic pluralism and insisted that new meanings were to be accepted only 'if they ... are true', that is, in conformity with the views of the Catholic Church.

Armed with a doctrine claiming to offer the only true interpretation of Christianity, Augustine attacked non-Christians and heretics. Although he thought that the prevailing Roman way of life was not based on such low vices as greed and brute conquest but on the 'love of honours, power and glory' and created a free republic devoted to the pursuit of the common good, he was in no doubt that this *libido ista domination* was 'smoke without weight', a source of deep moral corruption, and had predictably led to Rome's ruin. Devoid of a true religion Rome was not a 'true commonwealth', lacked 'true justice', and offered not a genuine but only an 'allowable peace'. Like the individual, a society was to be judged by the object of its love, and only the Christian society which was based on the highest and noblest object of love in the shape of God was truly human. Augustine's rejection of Rome was so fierce that at every turn he juxtaposed 'your Virgil' with 'our Scriptures' and exuded the spirit of what one of his perceptive commentators calls 'Christian nationalism' (Brown, 1967, pp. 306f and 231).

In his early writings Augustine had argued that the state should do no more than maintain earthly peace, leaving the salvation of the soul to the Church and tolerating non-Christian ways of life. In his later writings he took the opposite view that the Christian ruler had a duty to cultivate Christian virtues among his subjects and use his power 'for the greatest possible extension of his worship' (Deane, 1963, ch. VI). The 'righteous persecution' of heretics and backsliders, which was designed to safeguard their own 'spiritual health' and save them from 'eternal death', was an act of love, like that of a father chastizing his undisciplined son. The ruler therefore had a duty to punish heretics with death, to ensure that no Christian was left outside the church, and peacefully to convert Jews and other non-Christians. If the latter persisted in their errors, they were to be tolerated but not accorded the full membership of society.

Unlike Augustine, Aquinas was more hospitable to some of pre-Christian thought. To be sure Augustine, too, had drawn philosophical inspiration from Plato, but he did not think much of his or Aristotle's political and social thought or of the Greek and Roman ways of life. Aquinas was sympathetic to and drew heavily on them. Rejecting the fear of the Franciscans and secular priests, the so-called Augustinians,

that Aristotelian ideas would corrupt the Christian faith, he produced a brilliant and generous philosophical synthesis of Christian and pre-Christian ideas. However, thanks to his belief in the absolute truth of Christianity and his insistence on the need for its one true interpretation, he adopted a largely instrumental attitude to Aristotelian ideas, taking over only those that fitted into the Christian framework as propounded by the Catholic church. Even then his theology remained highly suspect in the eyes of the church for decades.

For Aquinas, as for Augustine, religion was the basis of the truly good life, Christianity was the only true religion, the Catholic Church was the only authorized custodian of it, and an unquestioning faith in it was the only way to salvation. Since true faith was the *sine qua non* of the good life, Aquinas insisted that all possible steps should be taken to safeguard its purity. It was 'a much graver offence to corrupt the faith than to forge money' and deserved harsher punishment. If heretics and blasphemers persisted in their errors, they could be put to death unless political expediency and the likely disorder dictated otherwise. The same treatment was to be meted out to apostates who 'could be constrained, even physically, to observe what once they accepted for ever'. As for unbelievers, they threatened the faith of 'simple people', for whom it was 'dangerous' to hear 'anything different from what they believe' and who should therefore be 'forbidden to communicate with unbelievers'. Since it was prudent to tolerate smaller evils in order to avoid greater ones, unbelievers should be isolated rather than persecuted; as Aquinas says quoting Augustine, 'if you do away with harlots, the world will be convulsed with lust'.

Aquinas's treatment of Jews was not very different from Augustine's (Aquinas, 1952, vol. 2, pp. 43f; Hood, 1995, pp. 76–105). He thought that although they rejected the Christian faith, they accepted its anticipation in the form of 'the figure of that faith in the Old Law'. This was both to their advantage and disadvantage, the former because they did receive some divine guidance, the latter because they chose to disregard it. Since Jews shared some of the Christian scriptures and corrupted the Christian faith by their 'false interpretation' of them, their unbelief was a 'more grievous sin than that of the heathens' who did not accept the Gospel. Thanks to their sin of deicide, Jews were 'destined to perpetual slavery', and sovereigns 'may treat their goods as their own property' provided, of course, that they did not deprive them of the basic necessities of life. Christians were not to socialize or discuss religion with them, and Jews were not to be allowed to exercise public or even

private authority over Christians. Jews of both sexes should ‘on all occasions be distinguished from other people by some particular dress’, so that Christians may not inadvertently mistake them for one of them. As against many of his intolerant predecessors and contemporaries, Aquinas argued that the Jewish religious rites should be tolerated because they foreshadow the truth of Christianity and reassure its adherents that even ‘our enemies bear witness to our faith’. Like Augustine, he saw Judaism as nothing more than a part of Christian prehistory, and Jews as a people whose theological *raison d’être* was to serve the cause of Christianity (Aquinas, 1952, vol. 2, pp. 432–40).

Aquinas was one of the first to formulate a coherent and influential Christian response to Islam. His *Summa Contra Gentiles* was a theological manual intended to guide Christian missionaries in Spain in their disputes with non-Christians. Since it was designed to convert the latter and since the arguments derived from the Bible were of no help, Aquinas based the work on allegedly neutral philosophical premises. They were, of course, nothing like that and largely presupposed the truth of the Christian faith. Aquinas had little interest in understanding Islam let alone entering into a dialogue with it. His main concern was to show that it was a false and immoral religion.<sup>4</sup>

Since the central doctrines of Christianity were deemed to be open to only one true interpretation, those disagreeing with it had no choice but to leave the Catholic fold and set up an alternative church and theology of their own. Luther and Calvin did not challenge the traditional belief that Christian doctrines were amenable to only one true interpretation, and simply replaced the standard Catholic view with their own. As Protestantism in turn gave rise to different sects, each of them made the same monist claim. Although Christianity became internally diversified, the monist claim of each group and the consequent doctrinal hostility to the rest did not encourage hermeneutic pluralism. The doctrinally closed, exclusive and dogmatic groups had little interest in a mutual dialogue or even tolerance, except among the dissidents at the periphery.

As far as other religions were concerned, Christians faced a problem. On the one hand they were convinced that theirs was the only true religion and that others were either false or inferior. On the other hand, they could not demonstrate such a claim and had the additional difficulty of explaining why God should be partial to them and condemn the rest to eternal damnation. By and large they stuck to religious monism and explained away the difficulties involved in terms of God’s

inscrutable will, circular philosophical arguments, and the symbolic significance of the greater worldly success of Christian societies. Some non-Christian religions were rejected as false, others presented as commendable anticipations of Christianity. In either case salvation of their adherents lay in converting to it.

Thanks to the Holocaust, the end of the European empires, the pluralist ethos of our times, and the self-assertion of non-Christian religions, some radical rethinking is taking place among Christian theologians and religious leaders, and there is a genuine desire to understand other religions better. Such movements had, of course, occurred in the past as well, but they were confined to a small minority of liberals and disapproved of by the religious establishment. When, for example, Chicago held the World Parliament of Religions in 1893 in order, among other things, to explore what the *Chicago Tribune* called the ‘wells of truth outside’, some religious leaders condemned it for ‘coquetting’ with ‘false’ religions, and the Archbishop of Canterbury refused to attend it on the ground that Christianity was ‘the only true religion’ and had nothing to gain from a dialogue with others (Eck, 1993).

This is no longer the case today. Some years ago the World Council of Churches set up a unit in charge of dialogue with other religions, and it has done valuable work. The Second Vatican Council set up a special secretariat in 1963 to deal with non-Catholics, and issued a sympathetic *Declaration on the Relationship of the Church to Non-Christian Religions*. The Declaration generously urged reverence for what is ‘true and holy’ in other religions and belatedly rejected the pernicious belief that Jews were guilty of deicide. It called their persecution immoral and insisted that they should ‘not be spoken of as rejected or accused’ (Ariarajah, 1991, pp. 129–30). In many countries there are also several church-inspired interfaith networks which organize dialogues between Christianity and other religions and explore areas of common theological and moral concerns. Indeed, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the initiative for the dialogue is almost invariably taken by Christians.

Contemporary Christian attitudes to other religions vary greatly, ranging all the way from their dismissal to their acceptance as equally worthy religions. The most influential and widely shared view, however, is to see them as valuable but wholly insufficient for salvific

purposes, and hence inferior. The Second Vatican Council, which talked of ‘sincere respect’ for the goodness in other religions, insisted that all such goodness was necessarily inadequate. Pope Paul VI’s *Ecclesium Suan* ‘recognizes and respects’ their moral and spiritual values but not their religious insights, and hopes that since there is ‘but one true religion’, those who ‘seek God and adore him’ will one day convert to Christianity (Ariarajah, 1991, p. 131). Even the currently fashionable talk of the Judeo-Christian tradition reflects the same attitude. While it shows respect for Judaism, it tends to see it largely as a precursor to and reaching its perfection in Christianity. Karl Rahner, one of the major influences on Catholic and even non-Catholic attitudes to other religions, expresses this with considerable theological sophistication. For him Christianity is the ‘absolute religion ... which cannot recognize any other religion besides itself as of equal right’. Since God loves all human beings, His grace is given to non-Christians as well, but only on ‘account of Christ’. They are ‘anonymous Christians’ and ‘invisible members’ of ‘the only true Church’ (D’Costa, 1986, p. 84, Ariarajah, 1991, pp. 201f).

Like every other religion claiming to be the only true religion, Christianity faces a problem.<sup>5</sup> It cannot abandon its claim to uniqueness, for that denies its historical and doctrinal identity; nor should it, for the claim is both true in the sense that Christianity does represent a distinct vision of God and human destiny and is consistent with the similar claims of other religions. Again Christianity may rightly claim that it is self-sufficient and has the resources to provide a worthy life, for the claim is eminently reasonable and intellectually defensible. This does, of course, deny its adherents access to the rich resources of other religious traditions, but if they are content with the kind of good it realizes, they are right to live by its truths.

While Christianity is right to claim uniqueness and even self-sufficiency, it is wrong to claim that it exhausts all possible forms of religious goodness, that there is no salvation outside of it, and that all other religions are misguided or inferior. Such a claim is inherently unsubstantiable as there is no non-circular way of comparing and grading the truths of different religions. The claim also has only a limited historical basis, for early Christians rarely made it, and it is, as we saw, largely a product of subsequent theological orthodoxy. In the New Testament Jesus said that Gentiles will share the kingdom of heaven and be judged on the same basis as the faithfuls. Peter told Cornelius that ‘God has no

favourites' and that 'whoever in every nation is God fearing and does what is right is acceptable to Him' (*Acts*). The monist Christian claim has also been a source of much intolerance and violence against Jews, Muslims, native Indians and others, and sits ill at ease with its commitment to love and non-violence.<sup>6</sup> Christian theology needs to find ways of both retaining its identity and uniqueness and opening up itself to the reality and value of religious plurality (Hick, 1973).

### **Monism of classical liberalism**

In the formation of liberal thought many factors played an important part, of which three have received far less attention than they merit, namely Christianity, colonialism and the nation-state. Since liberalism developed within a cultural milieu suffused with centuries of Christian influence, it could hardly avoid being shaped by it. Some early liberals such as Locke, Montesquieu and Tocqueville thought that Christianity was the only religion to develop the liberal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and even dissent, and was alone worthy of a free man. In their view liberalism was a secular expression of and sustained by Christianity, which is why the expression 'spreading Christianity and civilization' (meaning liberalism) aroused no anxiety on either side. Other liberals such as Bentham, some leaders of the French enlightenment and the two Mills were either ambivalent or hostile towards Christianity and saw liberalism as its secular surrogate, playing broadly the same moral and social role that Christianity had played for centuries.

Whatever their attitude to Christianity, liberal writers freely borrowed or imbibed the latter's language, categories of thought, imagery, self-understanding and manner of relating to others ways of life and thought. Liberals represented the 'light', the rest lived in darkness; they had discovered the truly human way of life, others left much to be desired. Human history was a struggle between good and evil represented respectively by liberty, individuality and rationality on the one hand, and despotism, collectivism, blind customs and social conformity on the other. Like pre-Christian Europe, preliberal Europe lived in 'dark ages'. And just as non-Christian religions were pagan and devoid

of true religious sensibility, nonliberal societies were benighted, backward, unconsciously yearning for liberal truths, made up of 'anonymous' liberals, and desperately in need of liberal missionaries.

Liberalism developed during the period of European colonial expansion, and some of its greatest thinkers such as John Locke and J. S. Mill were personally associated with it. Liberal writers had to take a principled stand on colonialism and show why the colonies were not free to lead their self-chosen ways of life. Colonialism thus could not and did not remain an external historical phenomenon which liberals could comfortably ignore.<sup>7</sup> It confronted them with theoretical problems and perplexities, and shaped the way in which they articulated their conception of the individual, the content of their principles, and the conditions and limits of their application (Gerth and Mills, 1948, pp. 71–2; Tuck, 1999, pp. 14–15 and 226f). This is not at all to maintain the absurd view that liberalism was nothing more than an ideological justification of colonialism, but rather that it did not develop in a historical vacuum and that its theoretical content and self-understanding cannot be fully comprehended without taking account of its complex relationship with the colonial experience and its subjugated 'other' (Mehta, 1999; Parekh, 1994b).

The third factor that played an important part in the development and articulation of liberalism had to do with the rise of the modern state. The latter was a historical fact by the time liberalism appeared on the scene. As I argue later, liberalism formed a close alliance with it and successfully shaped it in a particular direction. It is hardly surprising that a strong, united, powerful, territorially bounded and sovereign state became and has remained one of its central presuppositions. Almost all liberals assumed, often uncritically, that every society needed such a state, and even that the latter was one of the major distinguishing marks of a 'civilized' society. As liberalism gained intellectual and political ascendancy, it gave the state its modern character. It emphasized and institutionalized such ideas as the rule of law, equality of citizens, individuals as the sole bearers of rights and obligations, and the direct and unmediated relationship between the citizen and the state. In order to consolidate itself both politically and ideologically and to create an individualist moral and political culture, the state set about dismantling traditional institutions, communities and ways of life, with liberals providing the necessary ideological justification. Since these communities and the associated bodies of ideas offered strong resistance, liberal writers had to show why their vision of the good life was superior and

deserved to be enforced. The resulting intellectual and political battles with their countrymen formed the domestic counterpart of the colonial experience, and provided yet another context that shaped the structure and content of liberal thought.

Even as liberals sought to civilize ‘backward races’ abroad, they used the state to civilize the ‘reactionary’ feudal and the ‘backward’ working classes at home. The two missions were closely related, required a similar strategy, and formed part of a common national project. A liberal state could not consistently claim to civilize backward races abroad while leaving their domestic counterparts untouched, and vice versa. It also could not mobilize the political and military power required to carry out its external civilizing mission unless its own people were internally united and enthusiastically shared that mission; conversely, the task of uniting them became easier if they were all inspired by a common external project and materially benefited from it. As with all revolutionary doctrines, the sense of mission became central to liberal self-understanding and deeply shaped its identity. Indeed, unless liberals were constantly engaged in distinguishing themselves from and subduing their ideological opponents at home and abroad, they felt they were in danger of losing or diluting their sense of what they stood for and why. J. S. Mill, Tocqueville and many others thought that a large empire was necessary to cultivate lofty sentiments, a global vision and a sense of personal and national pride among its citizens, and that these in turn were essential to sustain a vibrant and self-confident liberal culture at home and in the world at large.

Given the importance of these and other factors the presence of monism in liberal thought is hardly surprising. Classical liberalism drew on Greek rationalism and Christian universalism and arrived at a form of monism which, while sharing some features in common with both, is nevertheless distinct. Like the Greek philosophers classical liberals stressed the centrality of reason and arrived at a vision of the good life based on such values as critical rationality, choice and personal autonomy. Unlike them, however, they defined reason in more modest and largely practical terms and stressed its universality. Like the Christian thinkers they therefore argued that their vision of the good life was within the moral reach of all human beings. However, unlike them and like the Greek philosophers, they argued that it could be rationally demonstrated and shown to be binding on all rational beings.

Some classical liberals took a formal and relatively minimalist view of human beings and prescribed not the highest but the minimally good way of life, not the moral maximum but the moral minimum. Others advanced a more substantive vision and came pretty close to the Greek philosophers. Locke is a good representative of the first and J. S. Mill of the second tradition. In their own different ways, both held up particular visions of the good life as universally binding and judged all societies and ways of life in terms of them.

### **Locke**

Locke advanced a set of what he considered to be universally valid propositions about man and society. God created human beings and gave them the earth in common. God's gift entailed both rights and duties, the right to mix their labour with nature and use its products to satisfy their needs, and the duty to develop natural resources to the full and maximize the conveniences of life (Locke, *Second Treatise*, § 33–4). Since all men had identical faculties including and especially reason, and since they were all ontologically dependent on their creator and hence independent of one another, they were all equal. For Locke equality implied that all human beings had equal dignity and rights, that no authority was legitimate unless it was based on their uncoerced consent, that each should exercise his rights with a due regard for others, and so on. As rational beings, humans were expected to govern their affairs rationally. Since the use of force signified rejection of reason, whoever used it without due authorization opted out of the human community and could be punished and treated like an animal.

Locke had no doubts about how the rational person should live, and how rational society should be organized. The former possessed such qualities as industry, energy, enterprise, self-discipline, civility, acknowledgment of others as one's equals and all that followed from it, control of passions, obedience to the law, and reasonableness. A truly rational society established the institution of private property and encouraged industry and accumulation of wealth. The duty to be fruitful and multiply 'contains in it the improvement too of arts and sciences', and hence a rational society encouraged these as well. As for its political structure, it had a clearly defined territorial boundary, a cohesive, centralized and unified structure of authority entitled in peace and war to speak and act in the name of the community, and the will to per-

sist as an independent polity that made it 'too hard' for its neighbours to attack and overrun it (Locke, *Second Treatise*, § 108; Tully, 1993, p. 165). A rational society was governed not by customs and traditional practices but by general and 'positive laws' enacted by the supreme legislature. Political power in it was institutionalized, subject to clearly stated procedures and checks, and separated into legislative, executive and federative powers. Locke's conception of the truly rational man and society informed his theory of education, and his attitudes to the poor and the working classes in England and the Indian ways of life in the 'new world'. Since his attitude to the latter shows most clearly the limitations of his approach to cultural diversity, I will concentrate on it.

English colonization of America was not without its internal critics. These, many of them clergymen, argued that England was wrong to violate Indians' rights to their land and way of life. Land was their 'rightful inheritance', and depriving them of it was an act of injustice. Since it was also the basis of their way of life, the injustice amounted to 'impiety' and was most 'displeasing before God' as the Rev. Roger Williams, the minister of Salem, put it. Although the critics were a small and uninfluential minority, they raised important issues which the defenders of colonialism could not ignore.

Locke justified English colonialism in terms of his vision of the good life. Since Indians roamed freely over the land and did not enclose it, it was free, empty, vacant, wild, and could be taken over without their consent. Whilst some Indians did not enclose their land in Locke's sense, coastal Indians who lived in villages and engaged in nonsedentary agriculture did. Locke argued that enclosure was not enough, for their practice of letting it rot and compost every three years for soil enrichment showed that they did not make a rational use of it. In Locke's view, the trouble with Indians was that they lacked the desire to accumulate wealth, engage in commerce and produce for an international market, and hence to exploit the earth's potential to the fullest. In this regard English settlers were vastly superior and had a much better claim to the land. Locke acknowledged that the principle of equality required that Indians should not starve or be denied their share of the earth's proceeds. Since English colonization increased the conveniences of life, lowered prices, created employment, and thus benefited Indians as well, Locke thought that it did not violate the principle of equality.

Vacant lands in Locke's sense existed in several parts of Europe as well, but he would not allow their colonization because they fell within

the boundaries of established political societies, whose independence and territorial integrity demanded respect under international law. Locke had to show why the Indian vacant land was not part of their territory, and hence unavailable for colonization. He argued that although Indians called themselves nations or political societies, these were nothing of the kind. They had no centralized and unified structure of authority, were not governed by positive laws, lacked a collective sense of identity, did not have clearly bounded territories, did not speak 'one language' and so on. Locke could not see how such a loosely held collection of individuals could be said to be 'one society', let alone a political one (Tully, 1993, pp. 151f).

Although Indians did not constitute a political society in Locke's sense, he could not deny that they had developed at least some kind of civil structure. Rather than argue that it was a less-advanced political society, he insisted that it represented a more advanced stage of the state of nature. The distinction was crucial, for it enabled him to draw a qualitative distinction between Indian and European societies and to argue that relations between the two were governed not by the law of nations, which demanded respect for their territorial and cultural integrity, but by the law of nature which only enjoined respect for Indians as individuals. Since Indians were unable to raise themselves to the level of the 'civilized part of mankind', English colonialism was in their interest. Locke was prepared to admit that Indians might not see things this way, but was convinced that in the long run they would 'think themselves beholden' to the English. If the obstinate Indians resisted, they would have behaved irrationally, forfeited their liberty in an 'unjust war', and could 'be destroyed as a lion or tiger' or taken as slaves.

It never occurred to Locke that the very idea of owning land appeared odd and sacrilegious to those who saw themselves as inseparable from and defined their collective identity in terms of it. For him, enclosure had to involve unambiguous physical demarcation, an informal, notional and relatively permeable boundary would not do. Locke insisted that labour, too, had to be of a particular kind to qualify as such, and dismissed planting, hunting, trapping, fishing and non-sedentary agriculture as 'spontaneous provisions' or products of 'unassisted nature' and, except for the very last step of picking or killing, not forms of labour at all. For Locke, land must not be wasted, but again he defined 'waste' in extremely narrow and utilitarian terms, considering

land used for hunting, roaming for fun, or chasing animals as a waste. Cultivation, too, was narrowly defined to mean 'improvement', and the latter in turn had to produce a maximum yield, with the result that the Indian practice of not exploiting land to the fullest, letting it 'rest and breathe for a while', and allowing animals their share of access to it was dismissed as irrational and wasteful. Locke insisted that the right to property must be based on labour, be it one's own or one's servants'. This culturally biased argument took no account of the basis of the Indian claim to their land, which was that they had lived on it for generations, that their gods and dead spirits inhabited it, that their customs were interwoven with it, and so on. For Indians it was not their land because they laboured on it; rather they laboured on it because it was their land, which they owed it to their ancestors to keep in good condition. Locke's conception of political society displayed a similar cultural bias. He uncritically universalized the emerging European, especially English, state, and condemned other societies for failing to be like it (Tully, 1993).

Locke's whole approach to the Indian way of life was based on the belief that there was only one proper or rational way to organize personal and collective life, and that those that differed from it were defective and deserved neither respect nor even a patient and sympathetic exploration from within. He uncritically assumed that reason was the highest human faculty and formed the basis of the good life, that it was inherently calculating and result-orientated, that the earth's resources should be exploited to the full, that the desire to accumulate wealth signified rationality and civilization, that life must be lived with utmost moral seriousness, and so on. This is a coherent and in parts an attractive view of life but not the only one, and Locke says nothing to show that it is. Reason is certainly an important faculty but not the highest, and can be defined and exercised in several different ways. The references to God's injunction to develop the earth's resources to the full have no meaning outside a particular interpretation of the Christian tradition. And there is no obvious reason why only the life devoted to the pursuit of wealth, power and satisfaction of ever-increasing desires should be considered truly rational or human.

Locke never asked if the Indian way of life might not represent a different view of human flourishing and contain elements missing in his own and from which he might learn something. Even when he noticed

that Indians led peaceful and contented lives, were ‘free of hurry and worry’ as a contemporary missionary put it, did not quarrel over property, settled disputes peacefully, did not commit offences, and managed to do without a centralized coercive apparatus, the qualities he himself admired in other contexts, he dismissed them as deficiencies born out of a lack of ambition and drive. Convinced of the absolute superiority of his preferred way of life, he was unable to view Indian society with critical sympathy, distinguish its good and bad features, and use it to interrogate his own.

### **J. S. Mill**

Although Mill shared many of Locke’s views, his liberalism differed from Locke’s in several important respects. Locke was a natural-law theorist, Mill a qualified utilitarian. Locke’s liberalism was largely deontological, Mill’s teleological. Locke’s had a religious basis and was a form of secularized Christianity; Mill’s was secular and intended to provide a secular alternative to it. Like all contractualist writers, Locke was primarily concerned to show the necessity and value of civil society and explore the kind of moral qualities and virtues individuals needed to sustain it; that is, he began with civil society and defined and structured moral life in terms of it. Being a perfectionist and a teleologist Mill proceeded in the opposite direction, aiming to show the kind of life human beings ought to lead and exploring the type of society that was most conducive to it. In this respect he was following the lead of the Greek and Christian philosophers, for all of whom reflections on the nature and destiny of man were their starting point and provided the guiding principles of their social and political thought. Not surprisingly liberalism in Mill’s hands no longer remained minimalist and advocated a substantive vision of the good life.

Mill’s theory of man is too well-known to need elaboration. Man is the highest being on earth and should lead a life worthy of his status. His ‘destiny’ and ‘comparative worth as a human being’ consists in perfecting himself, in becoming the ‘highest’ or the ‘best thing’ he is capable of becoming (Mill, 1964, pp. 116f). Such a fully human life has two related components. First, it involves all-round development of his intellectual, moral, aesthetic and other capacities and growing up to his fullest stature. A person whose life is a ‘complete and consistent whole’

has a fullness of life about him, is both a 'noble and beautiful object of contemplation', and makes the human race 'infinitely worth belonging to'. Mill calls this the Greek ideal of self-development and thinks that it is not only better than but includes all that is worthy and valuable in others:

It may be better to be a John Knox than an Alcibiades, but it is better to be a Pericles than either: nor would a Pericles, if we had one in these days, be without *anything* good which belonged to John Knox. (Mill, 1964, p. 120)

Second, a fully human life involves individuality, self-determination or autonomy, the terms Mill uses either interchangeably or to emphasize different aspects of a common ideal. The goal is to become the author of one's life such that ideally there is little about oneself beyond the unalterable that one has either not created or reflectively endorsed. It involves making one's own choices and decisions, forming one's own desires, beliefs, opinions and values, making sure that they are 'properly one's own', critically examining the rationale of inherited beliefs, and revising them where necessary. 'One whose desires and impulses are not his own has no character, no more than a steam-engine has a character' (*ibid.*, p. 118).

Given his view of man, Mill was most sensitive to the value of diversity, choosing as the epigraph for his *On Liberty* Humboldt's remark stressing 'the absolute and essential importance of human development in its rich diversity'. For Mill the diversity of individual character, lifestyles, and tastes was both inescapable and desirable, the former because each individual was unique, the latter both intrinsically and instrumentally. Diversity added richness and variety to the human world and made it aesthetically pleasing. It stimulated imagination, creativity, curiosity and love of difference. Since mankind 'speedily became unable to conceive diversity when they have been for some time unaccustomed to see it', it was 'good that there should be differences even though not for the better'. Diversity also led to progress because it created a climate conducive to the emergence of exceptional and original minds, provided new sources of inspiration, and encouraged a healthy competition between different ways of thought and life. Furthermore, since no way of life developed all human potentialities, no type of character all desirable traits and no system of morality all virtues, each needed others to balance and complement it and to guard it against the all too familiar tendency to mistake a partial truth for the

whole. There was a role in society for both secular and religious moralities, for left to itself the former lacked a feel for the great virtues of self-sacrifice and the latter encouraged submissiveness and passivity. For similar reasons a society needed both rational and reflective as well as emotional and passionate individuals.

Mill insisted that, like individuals, societies too were unique. They had different histories and traditions, and their members differed in their temperament, character and level of mental development. In some societies people were dreamy and affectionate, in others intensely worldly and practical; in some trustful, in others suspicious and even cynical; some had an advanced moral and political culture, others were primitive. Just as no way of life suited all individuals, none fitted all societies, and each had to discover by trial and error one most appropriate to it. Although a universally valid legal and political philosophy was possible, its application must be mediated by a 'philosophy of national character'.

Mill set so much store by diversity that he almost turned it into the master key to progress (Mill, 1964, pp. 129f). For centuries Europe had remained stagnant, decadent, mired in dogmas, but had now decisively turned the corner. For Mill, Europeans avoided the 'Chinese' fate because of their 'remarkable' diversity of character and culture. In Europe individuals, classes and states cherished their differences, struck out diverse paths of development, and resisted attempts at assimilation. As a result they never entirely lost their vibrancy and creativity, for if one society was passing through a bad period, it could always draw inspiration from the liveliness of some others. Mill's explanation raised more questions than it answered. He did not clearly explain why Europe declined for centuries and passed through the dark ages, and why and when its people began to develop the love of diversity. He did not explain either why the presence of different classes should by itself cultivate and sustain the love of diversity when similar social differences in India, China and elsewhere allegedly did not.

Since Mill considered diversity so important, he was deeply disturbed by the tendency towards social homogenization and cultural assimilation that he found dominant in his age. Thanks to such factors as increased communication, uniform education, disappearance of ranks and varied neighbourhoods, social levelling and the ascendancy of public opinion, people read, saw, desired and listened to the same things, feared and hoped for the same objects, enjoyed the same rights and liberties, and developed the same character. No class was strong

and distant enough to have the will to resist mass opinion and nurture nonconformity. The greatness of England was 'now all collective', and its individual citizens were all small. 'But it was men of another stamp than this that made England what it has been, the men of another stamp will be needed to prevent its decline'. Mill was convinced that England and indeed every other European society as well as the United States required a radical cultural change. They needed to encourage differences of tastes, beliefs, opinions, character and lifestyles even if these sometimes appeared pointless, and to cherish eccentricity even if it occasionally took wild and strange forms. The earlier hierarchical society which once stood against homogenization had irretrievably disappeared, and the task had now fallen on intellectuals and the cultural elite.

Mill made out a far more powerful case for diversity than most of his predecessors and gave liberalism a new orientation. He was able to do so because he appreciated the immense richness and complexity of human nature and the inability of any way of life to embody more than a small part of it. This enabled him to argue that the good life could be lived in several different ways, that each profited from a dialogue with the rest, and that it was wrong to construct an ideal mode of human existence on the basis of 'some one or some small number of patterns'. These are profound insights which no theory of cultural diversity can afford to ignore.

In spite of its obvious strengths, Mill's case for diversity is inadequate.<sup>8</sup> It rests on the assumption that human beings are naturally unique and that human uniqueness somehow underwrites moral and cultural diversity. Although the assumption is not totally mistaken, it is too simplistic to form the basis of a theory of diversity. Mill does not ask why and in what respects human beings are unique, the depth and extent of their uniqueness, under what social conditions it can be nurtured, and so forth. Furthermore, the assumption sits ill at ease with his repeated complaint against the increasing homogenization of his age, for the latter would seem to imply that the natural uniqueness of human beings is powerless before the pressure of public opinion and cannot be depended upon to sustain diversity.

Even if Mill were able to give a coherent account of human uniqueness, his theory of diversity would remain inadequate because of its limited range and content. For him each individual must lead a life of excellence. The form of excellence varied from individual to individual but not the moral imperative to pursue excellence itself. Anyone who

was content to drift through life, ignored his higher capacities, or failed to approach life with the requisite degree of intellectual and moral seriousness betrayed the dignity of the human species. Furthermore, it was not enough to pursue excellence. Excellence had to have a specific content, namely, to develop all one's powers into a 'complex and consistent whole'. No 'portion of human nature' that one possessed should remain uncultivated, for then one wasted rare human passions and capacities and led a truncated and one-sided life, which is why Mill considered John Knox's life inferior to that of Pericles. Again, for Mill the desirable way of life should be freely determined by the individual on the basis of a careful assessment of available alternatives and aim at constant self-creation. This ruled out a wide variety of ways of life, such as the traditional, the community-centred and the religious as well as those that were not grounded in self-knowledge, did not set much store by an energetic and go-ahead spirit, or preferred contentment, weak ambition, humility and self-effacement to their opposites. Since Mill's theory of diversity was embedded in an individualist vision of life, he cherished individual but not cultural diversity, that is diversity of views and lifestyles within a shared individualist culture but not diversity of cultures including the nonindividualist.

Mill naïvely assumed that different ways of life and types of character can all happily coexist, that the social structure is neutral between them, and that the best of them will win out in the end. Ways of life compete for power and resources, and the success of some often spells the disintegration of others. Furthermore, every social structure tends to value and throw its weight behind some of them rather than others. Diversity cannot therefore be left to the vagaries of the cultural marketplace, which might not encourage it at all as Mill thought to be the case in contemporary Britain. Since Mill does not analyse the social conditions necessary for the flourishing of diversity, and since he does not want the state to play a cultural role, he has no way of guarding against such a possibility and is reduced to vague and sentiment exhortations about cultivating eccentricity and difference.

Like Locke and others, Mill had difficulty appreciating the role of culture and finding a secure space for it in his theory of man. He started with a particular view of man and derived from it his preferred conception of the good life. Culture matters to him only as a context or raw material to be taken into account in deciding how best to realize a transculturally valid vision of the good life, not as an independent

factor that might shape the nature and content of that vision itself. For him all societies have an identical destination. Since they are unique and unequally endowed, their paths, pace and degrees of achievement vary, but not their ultimate goal. This is why he argues that 'philosophy of national character' mediates only the application and not the character and content of the truly human life.

The limitations of Mill's theory of diversity are strikingly evident in the fact that he saw no difficulty in justifying colonialism and dismantling the traditional cultures of subject societies. Since they allegedly did not cherish autonomy, individuality, go-ahead character, restless energy, ambition and constant progress, they were 'backward' societies with 'no history' and had to be civilized. And since their members were in a state of 'nonage', the civilizing mission had to be undertaken by a 'superior people'. Like Locke, Mill insisted that these societies, which included 'dark Africa' and the 'whole East', had no right to territorial integrity. The right to one's way of life and to territorial non-intervention only belonged to those who were 'mature' enough to think and judge for themselves. Since backward societies allegedly lacked that capacity, the right was 'either a certain evil or at best a questionable good for them'. A 'parental despotism' by outsiders was necessary to kick-start their history, and bring them to a take-off point from where they could be relied upon to continue their progress unaided (Mill, 1964, pp. 199, 224, 377, 378, 382).

As human beings their members had equal *moral* claims to the pursuit and protection of their individual interests, but as collectivities they had no *political* claim to independence and self-determination. Mill condemned both the racial arrogance of and the misuse of political power by the colonial government, so much so that many of his countrymen called him unpatriotic and some of his obituarists could barely restrain their relief at his death. However, like Locke, the natives were for him equal individual objects of moral concern, not self-determining collective subjects entitled to equal respect for their ways of life.

For Mill, great empires served three important liberal goals. They carried liberal ways of life and thought to backward parts of the world. They made the world safe for liberal societies by eliminating potential threats. And finally, by fostering national pride, self-confidence, sense of greatness, lofty sentiments and a high sense of moral purpose, they inspired their citizens to pursue great ideals and scale yet greater heights of intellectual and moral excellence from which both

the country and the entire humankind benefited. The linkage between liberal values and national power and greatness is to be found in the writings of many other liberals as well, including James Mill, Tocqueville and T. H. Green.

Mill maintained that just as a civilized nation had a right to rule over primitive or semi-civilized societies, a more civilized group within it had a right to 'absorb' and dominate inferior groups. He had no doubt that the Breton and the Basque and the Scottish Highlanders and the Welsh stood to benefit greatly by becoming absorbed respectively into the French and the English ways of life and gaining access to the latter's artistic, philosophical and other achievements. Indeed, he could not understand why small and backward cultural communities should wish to remain within the 'narrow mental orbit' of their cultures rather than stay 'in tune' with the great intellectual and moral currents of the age. As he put it (1964, p. 363),

Nobody can suppose that it is not more beneficial to a Breton, or a Basque of French Navarre, to be brought into the current of ideas and feelings of a highly civilized and cultivated people – to be a member of the French nationality, admitted on equal terms to all the privileges of French citizenship, sharing the advantages of French protection, and the dignity and prestige of French power – than to sulk on his own rocks, the half-savage relic of past times, revolving in his own little mental orbit, without participation or interest in the general movement of the world. The same remark applies to Welshman or the Scottish Highlander as members of the British nation.

Mill welcomed the 'blending' or 'admixture of nationalities' because, like a 'crossed breed of animals', the new group was likely to 'inherit the special aptitudes and the excellences' of the original groups (1964, p. 304). However, that happened only if the culturally superior group remained the dominant partner. If there was any danger of the inferior group acquiring ascendancy by virtue of its greater numerical strength or power, that would constitute a 'sheer mischief to the human race and one which civilized humanity with one accord should rise to prevent'. This is why, when Lord Durham's Report on Canada rejected the 'backward' French Canadians' 'vain endeavour' to preserve their cultural identity and insisted that their true interests lay in being subjected to the 'vigorous rule of an English majority', Mill enthusiastically welcomed it, calling it an 'imperishable memorial of that nobleman's courage, patriotism and enlightened liberty' and urging 'all legitimate means' to assimilate the French Canadians, (*ibid.*, p. 377).

The thought of Locke and Mill, like that of Christian thinkers, displays a strange blend of moral egalitarianism and political and cultural inegalitarianism: equality of human beings but inequality of cultures, respect for persons but not their ways of life, rejection of racism but advocacy of cultural domination, equal concern for all as individuals but not as self-determining collective subjects. The process of reasoning involved in each case is the same. Human beings are considered to be equal because they share a common nature, and the latter implies that the good life is the same for them all. The shared human nature is the basis of *both* equality and moral uniformity or monism. All human beings are entitled to equal respect by virtue of being human. However, precisely because they are human their ways of life must conform to the required model and, if they do not, others may legitimately control and guide them. This form of reasoning underlies the thought of many other liberal and nonliberal writers including Tocqueville, Kant, Hegel and Marx.<sup>9</sup>

### **Critique of Monism**

In earlier sections I have discussed three major traditions of moral monism and argued that none of them is able to redeem its promise to show that there is only one correct or best way to understand human existence and lead the good life. This is not because the thinkers involved were not rigorous enough, after all they were some of the finest minds of their age, but because their enterprise was philosophically flawed. Human beings are culturally embedded, and a culture not only gives a distinct tone and structure to shared human capacities but also develops new ones of its own. Since cultures mediate and reconstitute human nature in their own different ways, no vision of the good life can be based on an abstract conception of human nature alone. Furthermore, as I have indicated from time to time and shall argue fully later, moral life is necessarily embedded in and cannot be isolated from the wider culture. A way of life cannot therefore be judged good or bad without taking full account of the system of meaning, traditions, temperament and the moral and emotional resources of the people involved. An attempt to prescribe one in the abstract would necessarily be based not on what human beings are like, but on what they should ideally be like, and would have no relevance for nor carry conviction with any community.

The very idea that one way of life is the highest or truly human is logically incoherent (Berlin, 1969, pp. 145ff; Gray, 1995a, pp. 38–76). It rests on the naive assumption that valuable human capacities, desires, virtues and dispositions form a harmonious whole and can be combined without loss. Human capacities conflict for at least three reasons, namely intrinsically and because of the limitations of the human condition and the constraints of social life: the first, because they often call for different even contradictory skills, attitudes and dispositions and the development of some of them renders that of others difficult if not impossible; the second, because human energies, motivations and resources are necessarily limited and one can cultivate only some of the valuable human capacities; and the third, because every social order has a specific structure with its inescapable tendency to develop some capacities rather than others and allow only certain ways of combining them. Since human capacities conflict, the good they are capable of realizing also conflicts. Like human capacities, values and virtues too conflict. Justice and mercy, respect and pity, equality and excellence, love and impartiality, moral duties to humankind and to one's kith and kin, often point in different directions and are not easily reconciled. In short every way of life, however good it might be, entails a loss. And since it is difficult to say which of these values are higher both in the abstract and in specific contexts, the loss involved cannot be measured and compared, rendering unintelligible the idea of a particular way of life as representing the highest good. As Raz observes, 'what one loses is of a different kind from what one gains ... and quite commonly there is no meaning to the judgement that one gains more than one loses' (1994, p. 179).

The idea that different ways of life can be graded is equally untenable. It presupposes that a way of life can be reduced to a single value or principle, that all such values or principles can in turn be reduced to, and measured in terms of, a single master value or principle, and that the good can be defined and determined independently of the agents involved. No way of life can be based on one value alone. It necessarily involves a plurality of values, which cannot all be reduced to any one of them and which can be combined in several different ways. Furthermore, the values realized by different ways of life are often too disparate to be translated into a common and culturally neutral moral language, let alone measured on a single scale. And since a way of life is meant to be lived, it cannot be abstracted from the capacities,

traditions, dispositions and historical circumstances of its members (Walzer, 1983, pp. 312f).

Moral monism also runs the constant danger of grossly misunderstanding other ways of life and spells a hermeneutic disaster. Since its approach to them is primarily judgmental, it has only a limited interest in understanding them. And to the extent that it seeks to understand them, its focus is on explaining why they are similar to or different from its preferred way of life. Such a biased frame of reference, and the consequently skewed angle of vision, necessarily prevents the monist from appreciating their specificity and complex internal structures. Since many of these ways of life are generally too weak or diffident to talk back, or since the monist is too impatient to listen to their protest, he is rarely compelled to reconsider the theoretical apparatus he brings to his study of them. The standard Christian and liberal accounts of non-Christian religions and nonliberal ways of life respectively provide good examples of this.

Moral monism suffers from other defects as well. It views differences as deviations, as expressions of moral pathology. For Plato and Aristotle non-contemplative and non-Greek ways of life had little to recommend themselves. For Augustine and Aquinas, non-Christians and even those Christians who disagreed with the official interpretations of their central doctrines were all wrong and had nothing of value to contribute. For many liberals, non-liberal ways of life are irrational, tribal or obscurantist; and for Marxists religious, traditional and national ways of life are worthy of destruction. Since moral monism cannot see any good outside its favoured way of life, it either avoids all but minimum contact with them or seeks to assimilate them by peaceful or violent means. Plato and Aristotle favoured the first approach because they considered the barbarians congenitally defective and incapable of education. Christians, liberals and Marxists favoured the second approach because they thought that the divinely revealed or rationally excogitated truths were within the moral reach of all. The ease with which these and other groups have justified or condoned egregious violence against alternative ways of life, often in the name of human equality and universal love, should alert us to the dangers of all forms of monism.<sup>10</sup>

# Index

- Abortion 201, 325–6, 329  
Ackerman, B. 223, 382  
Acton, Lord 322  
affirmative action 191, 224, 237  
African Americans 159, 161, 217,  
220, 225, 237, 343  
Alford, W. 378  
Algeria 197  
Ames, R. T. 378  
Amish 3, 104, 165, 167, 172, 178,  
205, 217, 265  
Anglican Church 260  
animals 22, 36, 62, 83, 122, 130,  
201, 214, 264, 274  
An-Na'im, A. 378  
anti-blasphemy law 258–9, 260–1  
anti-Semitism 178, 242, 266, 316,  
330  
Appadurai, A. 164  
Appiah, A. 365  
Appignanesi, L. 382  
Aquinas, T. 24, 28–9, 30, 49, 325  
Arabs 234, 236–7  
Archimidean standpoint 167, 339  
argument 307–8, 309, 310–12, 325,  
327  
Arianism 27  
Ariarajah, W. 31–2  
Aristotle 21–5, 28–9, 49, 52–3, 86,  
137, 163, 310, 375  
arranged marriages 264, 267,  
274–5  
Asian values 136–7  
assimilation 42, 94, 171, 196, 198,  
262  
assimilationism 1, 5, 7, 98, 166,  
197, 200, 203, 206, 251, 341,  
343  
Audi, R. 382  
Augustine, St. 24, 26–9, 49, 86, 375  
Australia 5, 212, 217, 235, 262,  
315  
authenticity 78, 108, 150  
authority 9, 36, 85, 105, 128, 137,  
169, 181–3, 185, 189, 194, 198,  
201, 207, 210, 236–7, 281,  
288–9, 291, 293, 322, 334,  
340–1, 379  
autonomy 41, 45, 59, 79, 89, 91,  
93–6, 99, 100–4, 110–11, 134,  
140, 147, 157, 177, 194, 200,  
205–6, 253, 275, 281, 290, 338,  
360, 377  
Balakrishnan, G. 384  
Bangkok Declaration 136  
Bangladesh 382  
Barry, B. 111, 345, 346, 347, 348,  
349, 351, 352, 353, 355, 356,  
368, 383, 384  
Basques 4, 46, 217, 232  
Bauböck, R. 213, 379–80  
Bauer, O. 374  
beliefs 2, 61, 65, 89, 99, 100, 102,  
105–6, 112, 138, 143, 145,  
147–9, 152, 156, 163, 165, 169,  
174–5, 177, 183, 198, 260, 276,  
279, 281, 285, 297, 305, 322,  
324, 333, 336  
Bell, D. 378

- Bellamy, R. 377–8  
 belonging 196, 224, 237–8, 262–3, 339, 342  
 Benedict, R. 376  
 Bentham, J. 10, 33, 109, 121, 367, 368  
 Berber 197  
 Berger, P. 377  
 Berlin, I. 48, 51, 165, 208, 368, 374, 376  
 Bhabha, H. 378  
 Boddy, J. 381  
 Brahmanic culture 152  
 Breton 46, 232  
 Britain 5–7, 64, 93, 160, 190, 201, 209, 215, 232, 241, 244, 248, 253–4, 257, 259, 260, 273, 312–13, 328, 344, 359  
 Brown, D. 375  
 Brown, P. 28  
 Buddha 63, 86  
 Buddhists 123, 131, 215, 233, 236, 358, 369, 370–1, 377, 379  
 Burke, E. 73, 86, 374
- Cairncross, J. 381  
 Calvin, J. 30  
 Canada 90, 102, 185–91, 217, 235, 244–5, 262, 343, 379  
 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 185, 187–8, 208, 382  
 Caney, S. 383  
 Canovan, M. 382, 384  
 capacities 17, 48, 50, 52–3, 66, 68, 91, 116, 119, 121, 125, 127, 129–33, 155, 157, 167, 239, 240, 284, 336  
 capitalism 152, 174, 373  
 Carens, J. 222, 378–9  
 Carrithers, M. 146  
 Carter, S. 382  
 Casanova, J. 382
- Catholics 26, 28–9, 30, 32, 54, 106, 149, 172, 215, 254  
 Catholic Church 215–16, 218, 325, 329, 332, 375, 376  
 character 41–5, 58, 122, 284, 310  
 China 54, 62, 122, 205, 228  
 Chinese 123, 137, 139–41, 144, 147, 163, 219, 220, 233, 369  
 choices 91–2, 95, 100, 108, 138, 147, 164, 172, 176, 199, 275, 279, 280, 334  
 Christianity 17–18, 23, 24–9, 30–3, 35, 40, 47, 49, 54–5, 59, 60, 64, 88, 106, 110, 131, 135, 146–7, 163, 168, 175, 180–1, 190, 193, 197, 225, 232, 236, 240, 252, 255, 257–9, 260–1, 263, 286, 291, 299, 302, 309, 322, 325, 351, 367, 370, 371, 375, 377, 379, 380  
 Church of England 216, 258  
 citizen 6, 22, 34, 45, 84–6, 88–9, 90, 103, 181–2, 184, 187–8, 194, 196, 200–2, 211, 221, 224, 232–3, 238, 242, 248, 263, 268, 269, 309, 314, 322–4, 327, 331–2, 340–2  
 citizenship 8, 46, 97, 180, 183, 189, 192, 205, 237, 250, 262, 333  
 civic assimilationism 199, 202–4, 206, 341  
 civilization 33, 39, 65, 106, 225–6, 228  
 civil society 87, 184  
 Clark, R. T. 71  
 classics 228–9  
 Cligent, R. 282  
 climate 57, 62–4, 75, 120  
 Cohen, J. 223, 311, 382  
 collective rights 8, 9, 208, 213, 215–18, 380  
 collectively exercised collective rights 216

- Colley, L. 153
- colonialism 7, 33–5, 37–8, 45, 65, 73–4, 178, 229, 233, 310
- commercial society 60, 66
- Commission for Racial Equality 210
- commitment 283, 287–8, 305, 312, 328, 341–2
- common culture 219, 221–2
- communal libel 313–15
- communism 7, 140, 324
- communitarian 137, 185, 196
- community 9, 12, 13, 34, 36, 44, 51, 67–9, 71, 74–5, 78, 94–6, 101, 104, 107, 120, 122, 124, 130, 132, 135, 138, 155, 161, 165, 172, 176–7, 182–5, 188, 190, 192–3, 205, 218–9, 271, 274, 295, 313, 331, 339, 340–1, 373
- compensatory discrimination 211
- conflict 76, 97, 152, 194, 196, 205, 211, 331, 377
- Confucius 377
- Connolly, W. 375
- consensus 81, 84, 87–8, 128, 133, 138–9, 171, 203, 208–9, 236, 266–7, 268, 272, 307, 321
- conservatism 79, 87, 97, 175, 266, 338–9
- conservatives 112, 137, 145, 147, 169, 196, 301, 321, 325, 374
- Constant, B. 319
- constitution 99, 104, 141, 173, 182, 207–8, 236, 268, 333
- constitution of India 208
- context 44, 69, 251, 256–7, 267, 280, 293, 312, 316, 320
- Coward, H. 375
- creativity 75, 152, 177, 223
- Croatia 233–4
- culturalism 10, 11, 78, 114
- cultural community 6–8, 123, 148, 152, 154–6, 158, 161–3, 170, 185, 187–8, 196, 200, 202–3, 211, 213, 219, 256
- cultural conflict 149
- cultural determinism 157
- cultural diversity 350, 367
- cultural identity 211, 225, 243, 247, 294
- cultural rights 8, 9, 101, 108
- culture 1–14, 23, 35, 38, 42–4, 46–7, 51, 65, 67–9, 70–80, 85, 91, 95–9, 100–1, 103, 106–9, 110, 121, 124–5, 128, 130, 132, 135–6, 138, 141–6, 148–9, 150–5, 157–8, 160–3, 165, 167–8, 170–1, 173–7, 194, 196, 198, 200, 201, 20–4, 211, 217, 221, 225, 239, 250–1, 264, 276, 279, 289, 306, 336–7, 339, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 357, 362, 373–4
- customs 23, 51, 56, 67, 143, 145, 204, 242, 272
- Dallmayr, F. 376
- D'Costa, G. 32
- Deane, H. A. 27–8
- deliberation 89, 199, 223, 267
- deliberative democracy 14, 341
- democracy 7, 83–4, 87, 139, 171, 206, 208, 233, 319, 323, 331, 333–5, 343–4, 376
- derivative collective rights 213–14
- despotism 45, 58, 61–3, 65
- determinism 78, 157–8
- dialectic 119, 121, 124, 127, 156, 253, 293, 304
- dialogue 14, 15, 66, 108, 111, 124, 128–9, 133, 168, 171, 208, 219, 221–3, 241, 267–8, 270–2, 293–4, 305–6, 311, 313, 334, 337–8, 340–1, 345, 375

- differences 1, 2, 8, 9, 17, 18, 41,  
44, 49, 74, 81, 90, 96, 98, 114,  
125, 131, 150–1, 164, 166, 170,  
184, 189, 199, 200, 211–12,  
222, 224–5, 240, 242, 246, 248,  
256, 261, 325, 331, 337, 340–2,  
347, 348, 373
- dignity 2, 22, 33, 36, 44, 46, 76,  
125, 130, 132, 134–5, 140, 146,  
177, 204, 208, 214, 292, 315,  
320, 327, 338
- disagreement 12, 111, 148, 173,  
199, 224, 238, 261, 266–7, 270,  
291–2, 295, 377
- discipline 153, 156, 277, 288–9,  
331
- discrimination 1, 197–8, 201, 203,  
210, 249, 257–8, 260, 279, 293,  
316–17
- distinct society 185, 186
- diversity 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 12, 18, 21,  
23–5, 37, 41–5, 51, 55–6, 66–7,  
69, 72–4, 76–7, 80–1, 88–9, 90,  
97–8, 104, 108–9, 123, 125–7,  
165–6, 167–9, 170–1, 195,  
201–2, 205–6, 208, 219, 262–3,  
336, 338, 340, 342–3, 373–6,  
382
- dogmatism 13, 135, 264, 275, 332
- dominant culture 144, 166, 197,  
343
- Donatism 27
- Dorkenoo, E. 381
- Dossa, S. 384
- Dummet, M. 301
- Durkheim, E. 376
- duty 48, 71, 97, 135, 138, 176,  
197, 246–7, 317
- Dworkin, R. 105, 161, 177, 377
- Eck, D. 31, 375
- education 89, 94, 202, 210, 217,  
229–30, 254, 265, 331–3
- Egypt 20, 217, 275
- El Dareer, A. 381
- Eliot, T. S. 378
- Elworthy, S. 381
- Empire 45, 71
- Enlightenment 20, 68–9, 71, 345,  
346
- equality 9, 33–4, 36–7, 47–9, 54,  
55, 61, 85–6, 88, 102, 128,  
132, 134–5, 147, 174–5, 183,  
185, 187, 193, 202, 208, 210–1,  
221–2, 239, 253, 282, 284, 286,  
292, 306, 313, 325–6, 338, 344,  
356, 358, 364, 366
- Equal Opportunity Employment  
Agency 210
- ethnic groups 103–4, 139, 154,  
181–2
- ethnicity 199, 206, 235
- Eurocentrism 61, 63–4, 225, 227,  
230, 338, 380
- Europe 33, 37–8, 43, 52, 54–5,  
61–3, 66, 106, 180, 189, 204,  
205
- European Court of Human  
Rights 378
- European Union 195
- evil 76, 116, 170, 296
- excellence 43–5, 48, 50, 56,  
120–1, 129, 144, 167, 172,  
197
- faith 25, 29, 334
- Falk, R. 378
- fascism 92, 266, 293, 325, 328
- fear 52, 58, 72, 132, 190, 311
- federation 183, 185, 187, 190–1,  
200
- female circumcision 264, 275–6,  
278–9, 280–1, 293–4
- feminism 1, 3, 4, 279
- Figgis, J. 374

- Fiji 232  
 Filner, I. 382  
 Fletcher, G. 377  
 forgiveness 213, 380  
 Foucault, M. 156  
 France 6, 7, 64–5, 190, 232, 249,  
     250, 252–4, 257, 275, 328, 332,  
     344–5, 359, 362, 383  
 Franciscans 28  
 Fraser, N. 382  
 freedom 2, 33, 75, 78, 85–6, 91,  
     96–7, 100, 113, 129, 132, 141,  
     188, 230, 256, 281, 288, 292,  
     302, 308, 317–9, 320, 334–5  
 freedom of the press 100, 319  
 free speech 303–5, 312–13, 315,  
     317, 319, 320, 352, 353  
 fundamentalism 92, 164, 253–5,  
     300, 302, 305, 351, 361
- Gadamer, H. 14  
 Galeotti, A. 380  
 Galston, W. 380  
 Gandhi, M. 161, 309, 328, 364,  
     370, 371, 372, 377, 378–9, 382,  
     384  
 Garver, E. 310  
 gays 2, 3, 4  
 Gbadegesin, S. 282  
 Geertz, C. 120, 377  
 genocide 103, 134, 139  
 Germany 5, 92, 232, 242, 328  
 Gilbert, P. 230  
 Gilson, E. 27  
 globalization 8, 164, 395  
 Gnostics 17  
 God 17–19, 22–5, 28, 30–2, 36,  
     54, 58–9, 69, 71, 74, 106, 115,  
     118, 120, 122, 129, 144, 148,  
     173, 214, 239, 297–8, 302, 325,  
     328, 330, 334, 339  
 Goldberg, D. T. 375
- good life 11, 16, 18, 23, 29, 35, 37,  
     39, 40, 45, 47, 55–6, 59, 66–7,  
     81, 99, 100, 105–7, 125, 129,  
     132–3, 138, 144, 177, 199, 202,  
     208–9, 217, 236, 269, 293, 340,  
     377  
 good society 211, 339, 340  
 Goodwin, J. 284  
 Grass, G. 296  
 Gray, J. 48, 375, 377  
 Greeks 16, 18, 20, 22, 41, 205  
 Green, T. H. 46  
 Greenawalt, K. 382  
 Grillo, A. 379  
 Grotius, H. 181  
 Gutmann, A. 381–2  
 Guyana 232, 274  
 Gypsies 3, 165, 172, 242, 265,  
     346, 373
- Habermas, J. 14, 93, 200, 307,  
     310, 311–12  
 hadith 175, 277  
 Halbertal, M. 377  
 Halbfass, W. 20, 374  
 Hall, S. 378  
 Hampshire, S. 126, 374  
 Hanseatic League 180, 205  
 Hansen, T. 379  
 harmony 51, 55, 137, 262–3  
 Hart, H. L. A. 378  
 Hegel, G. 10, 47, 86, 93, 121, 151,  
     201, 343  
 Heidegger, M. 13  
 Herder, J. G. 10, 12, 24, 50, 67–8,  
     70–2, 74, 76–7, 126, 149, 151,  
     165–6, 374–6  
 Hillman, E. 381  
 Hinduism 25  
 Hindus 25, 123, 131, 144, 146,  
     149, 174, 180, 190–2, 198, 215,  
     232, 235, 241, 265, 273, 280–2,  
     291, 370, 371, 372, 375, 379

- history 33, 51–3, 62–3, 67, 74, 78,  
 90, 93, 101, 118, 121, 136, 141,  
 169, 176, 203, 225, 228, 262,  
 293–4, 298, 309, 331–2
- Hobbes, T. 10, 58, 109, 121, 194,  
 199
- Holocaust 7, 31, 161, 242
- homogeneity 8, 10, 76, 82, 90,  
 101, 158, 168, 170–2, 183–4,  
 195, 219, 344
- homogenization 42–3, 66, 105,  
 112, 181
- homosexuality 121, 373
- Honig, B. 377
- Hood, J. 27, 29
- Horton, J. 384
- House of Lords 216, 257, 260
- human condition 118, 133
- human dignity 360, 367
- human identity 125
- human nature 10–12, 17–19, 21–3,  
 43, 44, 47, 51–2, 58, 59, 61–2,  
 67, 68, 72, 76, 80, 82, 99,  
 114–16, 118–19, 120, 123–5,  
 128, 133, 239, 240, 349, 377
- human rights 8, 134, 136, 139,  
 140, 211, 266, 324, 381
- human worth 131, 134, 136
- Humboldt, W. 41, 165, 166
- humiliation 140, 212, 304, 320
- Hunter, J. 302
- Ibn Batuta 205
- identity 1, 2, 5, 6, 32, 35, 38, 46,  
 68, 75, 95, 98, 100, 108, 111,  
 124, 126, 131, 148–9, 155,  
 156, 162, 176, 179, 181, 183,  
 186, 193–4, 203–4, 211, 220–1,  
 230, 232, 236–7, 239, 241, 252,  
 300, 309, 316, 337, 341–3, 345,  
 350, 361, 363, 368, 369, 372,  
 373
- ideology 5, 34, 151, 338
- Ika Tribe 153
- imagination 41, 50–3, 67, 70, 75,  
 77, 91, 105, 116, 126, 171, 195,  
 207, 226–7, 295–6, 317, 320,  
 336
- immigrants 1, 3, 5, 89, 93, 102–3,  
 109, 112, 154, 210, 233, 273,  
 276, 278, 296, 304, 359, 360,  
 362, 374
- incest 61, 201, 267
- incommensurable 172–3, 310
- India 54, 62, 147, 153, 191–2, 217,  
 223, 228, 233, 235, 237, 262,  
 274, 281, 309, 312–13, 320,  
 321
- indigenous peoples 1, 89, 93, 112,  
 165, 157, 172, 202, 262, 346
- individualism 54, 65, 86, 90, 135,  
 137–8, 225, 290
- individually exercised collective  
 rights 216
- individuals 9, 18, 28, 34, 38, 40,  
 42, 44, 67, 69, 92, 99, 107,  
 123, 130, 147, 149, 157–8,  
 181–4, 195, 214–15, 275,  
 313–14, 340
- Inglehart, R. 382
- integration 196, 199, 204, 233,  
 237, 248
- integrity 91, 94–5, 122, 130, 134,  
 138, 264, 276, 318, 327, 342
- interests 106, 135, 181, 195, 202,  
 214, 215, 217, 222, 237, 282,  
 306, 328, 342
- intolerance 33, 107, 198, 264
- Iran 147, 171
- Iraq 381
- Islam 7, 25, 30, 59, 131, 147, 175,  
 252, 255, 258, 276, 298–9, 301,  
 311, 318, 375, 377
- Islamophobia 311, 316
- Israel 207, 215–16, 233–6, 269,  
 379

- Jaffrelot, C. 379  
 Jainism 86  
 Jenkins, R. 301  
 Jews 3, 5, 26–7, 29, 30–1, 33, 75,  
     104, 107, 161–2, 172, 178, 180,  
     197, 204, 207–8, 216, 220, 241,  
     245–6, 251, 254–6, 264, 274,  
     313–14, 316, 318, 373, 379  
 Jones, P. 213, 377, 382  
 Judaism 26, 30, 32, 175, 370, 371  
 judgment 173–4, 176, 273, 291,  
     293, 307–8, 316, 320, 334  
 justice 9, 13, 21, 28, 48, 59, 62,  
     81–5, 87, 101, 109, 135, 152,  
     168, 193, 208, 210, 236–7, 258,  
     322, 328, 341, 377, 379  
 Justice Frankfurter 315
- Kant, I. 47, 71, 76, 82, 92, 99, 296,  
     308, 367, 368, 375  
 Kashmir 191–3  
 Keating, P. 212  
 Kekes, J. 377, 378  
 Kelly, P. 364, 365, 383  
 Khomeini, A. 300, 311  
 King, M. L. 309, 325, 364  
 King, P. 382  
 Kiss, E. 380, 383  
 Knox, J. 41  
 Koran 88, 277, 282, 285, 297, 302,  
     334  
 Kukathas, C. 199, 346, 356  
 Kurds 217  
 Kymlicka, W. 12, 14, 80–1, 89, 99,  
     100–5, 107, 109, 114, 156, 165,  
     177, 213, 352, 374, 379
- language 52, 68, 75, 85, 89, 96,  
     101–2, 116, 129, 143, 149,  
     153–4, 162, 186, 204, 217, 223,  
     227, 263, 297, 299, 305, 317,  
     320, 332, 377
- Larmore, C. 382  
 Leary, V. 378  
 Le Carre, J. 301  
 legitimacy 7, 151–2, 175, 203,  
     235, 379  
 Leibnitz 68  
 Levinson, S. 382  
 liberal 6, 7, 12, 13, 31, 35, 45–6,  
     49, 91, 109, 110–1, 113, 162,  
     174, 240, 262  
 liberal democracy 134, 138, 141  
 liberalism 10–11, 13–14, 18, 33–5,  
     40, 43, 60, 71, 80, 83–5, 87–9,  
     90, 96, 99, 104–5, 107, 112,  
     338–9, 340, 346, 347, 348, 349,  
     354, 367, 374–5  
 liberal society 102, 284, 286, 288,  
     289, 319  
 liberty 38, 46, 58, 62, 65, 71, 89,  
     99, 102–3, 193, 202, 206, 211,  
     284, 318, 329, 333, 340, 363  
 Locke, J. 10, 33–4, 36–7, 38, 40,  
     44–5, 47, 60, 88, 109, 200, 367  
 Lord Durham 46  
 Lovejoy, A. 23, 376  
 loyalty 71, 112, 121, 138, 158–9,  
     160–1, 171, 181–2, 189, 196,  
     231, 237, 342, 380  
 Luckmann, T. 377  
 Lukes, S. 354  
 Luther, M. 30
- Macedonia 233–4  
 Machiavelli, N. 238  
 MacIntyre, A. 22  
 magic realism 295–6  
 Mahajan, G. 208  
 Maitland, D. 374, 382  
 Malaysia 232, 234  
 Malinowski 376  
 Mandel, R. 380  
 Manicheism 27  
 Margalit, A. 377

- Marx, K. 47, 86, 93, 151, 153, 322, 377
- Marxism 2, 49, 87, 112, 325, 339, 374
- Mason, A. 235, 342
- Mazrui, A. 159
- McChesney, A. 378
- meaning 3, 120, 142–3, 159, 146, 155, 174, 200, 241, 269, 317, 321
- Mehbubani, K. 378
- Mehta, U. 34
- Mendus, S. 382, 383
- Michelfelder D. 374, 382
- Mill, J. S. 10, 34–6, 40–1, 43–7, 63, 71, 86, 88, 92, 99, 106, 109, 165–6, 170, 201, 319, 367, 368, 375, 381
- Miller, D. 230, 363, 383, 384
- millet 199, 205–6
- minimum universalism 126–7, 135
- minorities 7, 9, 13, 98, 101–2, 171, 187, 189, 193, 197, 232–5, 247, 259, 262–3, 267, 374
- missionaries 25–6, 34, 62, 71
- Mitterrand, F. 373
- Modood, T. 379–80, 384
- monastic order 218
- monism 11–12, 16, 22, 24–6, 30, 33, 47, 49, 50, 67, 80, 126–7, 240, 374–5
- monists 10, 17–18, 22, 55, 59, 61, 72, 77, 80, 166
- monogamy 146, 283–4, 286, 288–9, 290, 291–2
- Montaigne 50, 72
- Montesquieu, B. 10, 12, 33, 50, 55–9, 60–9, 72–5, 77–8, 149, 151, 322, 374, 376
- morality 23, 25, 36, 40, 47–8, 58, 64, 69, 70, 75, 125, 138, 143, 145, 156, 173, 215, 293, 328–30, 356, 357
- moral minimum 111, 136, 265
- moral monism 365
- moral practice 130, 132
- Mormonism 381
- Morocco 250, 381
- Moruzzi, L. 380
- Muhammed 297–9, 321
- multicultural education 225, 227, 230, 333
- multicultural public realm 203
- multicultural society 4, 6–10, 12–14, 96, 105, 195–6, 202, 205–207, 209, 213, 219, 222–4, 231–3, 235, 237–8, 261–5, 295, 304, 306, 333, 339, 340–1, 343–4
- multiculturalism 2–6, 13, 95–6, 101, 172, 222, 336, 340, 343, 346, 347, 348, 350, 351, 354, 356, 366, 367, 369, 370, 372, 373–4, 383
- multiculturally constituted culture 219, 221–4, 236
- Muslims 7, 33, 90, 149, 159, 172, 175, 193, 198, 216–17, 232, 237, 241, 242, 250–9, 263, 265, 274, 276, 282, 285–6, 288–9, 290–2, 299, 301–5, 310, 313, 320–1, 351, 352, 354, 359, 361, 362, 379–80, 384
- nation 71, 76, 101, 103, 184, 234, 250
- nationalism 28, 104, 184, 285, 338
- nationalities 46, 71
- national character 71, 75, 78
- national culture 4, 101, 104, 193, 197, 224
- national identity 224, 230, 232–8, 250, 258–9, 260
- national minorities 1, 89, 103–4, 108, 217

- nation-state 8, 33, 38, 46, 68, 197, 285  
 naturalism 10, 11, 114, 374  
 Nazi 318, 324  
 needs 50, 58, 63, 69, 70, 117–8, 131, 133, 171, 185, 188, 192, 239, 240, 242, 284, 287, 340  
 Neo-Platonists 17  
 Netherlands 274, 328  
 New Age Movement 164  
 New Zealand 209  
 Nietzsche, F. 13, 93  
 Nigeria 205, 283, 343  
 Nimni, E. 374  
 nonliberal cultures 14, 49, 94, 96, 110–11, 374  
 Northern Ireland 195  
 Norway 274  
 Nozick, R. 199
- Oakeshott, M. 82, 199, 364, 365, 376, 383, 384  
 obligation 158–9, 182–3, 268, 273, 283, 313, 329  
 operative public values 267, 269, 270–4, 276, 286, 292–4, 363, 364  
 oppression 96–7, 229, 329  
 Orientalism 299  
 O’Sullivan, N. K. 379, 384  
 Ottoman Empire 7, 62, 180, 205, 213, 379
- Pagan 25, 33, 54  
 Pagden, A. 375  
 Pakistan 204, 295, 321, 381  
 Paled, Y. 379  
 Palmer, R. E. 374, 382  
 Pangle, T. 60, 66  
 patriotism 46, 122, 342  
 peace 199, 207  
 Pelagianism 27
- Pericles 44  
 persuasion 308, 310, 321, 340  
 philosophy 21, 55, 64, 118, 120  
 Pieterse, J. 375  
 Plato 19, 20–5, 28, 72, 86, 127, 308, 377  
 plurality 12, 25, 28, 30, 33, 50, 55, 59, 61, 73, 76, 81, 83, 109, 110, 127, 147, 172, 195, 235, 250, 337–8, 373, 377  
 pluralist universalism 127  
 police 209, 210  
 political community 181, 200, 202, 205, 215, 217, 227, 230–1, 235, 237–8, 292, 342  
 political culture 134, 200, 203, 236, 259, 312  
 political deliberation 86, 306–7, 310, 322, 327  
 political discourse 13, 200 294, 304  
 political doctrines 11, 13, 338–40  
 political philosophy 42, 67, 82–3, 124,  
 political theory 9, 10, 15, 55, 61, 93, 99  
 Popper, K. 310–11  
 polyandry 61, 201, 282  
 polygamy 56, 201, 264, 267, 282, 286, 291–3  
 polygyny 57, 61, 78, 282–5, 291–2, 294, 381  
 Pope Paul VI 32  
 pornography 137–8, 190  
 Poulter, S. 381  
 power 35, 37, 46, 78–9, 82, 86, 88, 104, 117, 121, 133, 140, 151–2, 157, 174, 202, 221–3, 240, 293, 306, 343, 373  
 prejudice 69, 75, 86, 129, 155, 159, 209  
 primary collective rights 213–15  
 Prince Charles 236

- private realm 200, 203–4, 222, 224  
 proceduralism 199, 201–2, 206, 341  
 progress 41, 55, 65–6, 99  
 Protestantism 30, 144, 257  
 public culture 84, 269, 311  
 public realm 203–4, 222–4, 321  
 public reason 83, 312  
 public space 154, 220, 221, 307, 340  
 Puerto Ricans 102  
 Pufendorf, S. 183, 192  
 Pythagoras 20
- Quebec 4, 90, 102, 185–93, 232, 343, 379
- race 35, 45, 71, 128, 139, 225–6, 270, 314–15, 375  
 racism 47, 71, 178, 310, 315–16  
 racists 137, 169, 255, 266, 293, 325, 343  
 Rahner, K. 32  
 Ramanujan, A. K. 377  
 rationalism 35, 54, 56, 59, 65, 357, 360, 361, 368  
 rationality 33, 39, 52, 70, 116, 309  
 Ravich, D. 380  
 Rawls, J. 10, 12, 80–3, 86–9, 90, 101, 110, 200–11, 237, 307, 310–12, 322, 346, 352, 363, 368, 376–7, 382  
 Raz, J. 12, 48, 80–2, 90, 91, 93–4, 98–9, 100, 104–5, 107–8, 110, 114, 156, 165, 177, 368, 377  
 reason 17, 19, 21–3, 35–6, 39, 42, 51–5, 59, 60, 69, 85, 88, 98, 103, 116, 121, 127–9, 131, 146, 247, 263, 270, 277, 284, 305, 308–9, 310, 312, 314, 322–3, 327, 332, 334, 346, 356, 360, 361, 376
- recognition 1, 2, 8, 9, 12, 22, 134, 211, 260, 342, 343–4, 345, 366, 367, 384  
 redistribution 345, 365, 366, 367, 384  
 reform 175–8  
 refugees 108–9  
 relativism 12, 64, 70, 72, 75, 80, 91, 126, 127, 349, 358, 359  
 religion 26, 28–9, 30–2, 42, 49, 53–5, 57–9, 60, 65, 112, 147–8, 164, 169, 198, 203, 233, 249, 253–4, 257, 259, 260, 263, 276–7, 281, 296–7, 299, 303–4, 310–11, 313, 316–17, 320–4, 327–9, 330, 331–2, 334–5, 359, 370, 372, 382  
 Renner, K. 374  
 respect 1, 2, 9, 12, 48, 133–5, 145, 176–7, 185, 196, 215, 221, 240–1, 314, 317, 329, 335, 337, 340, 350, 351, 352, 358, 360, 361, 362, 366  
 Rex, J. 379  
 Richter, M. 62, 64–5  
 Ridge, M. 373  
 rights 9, 34, 36, 45–6, 55, 89, 100, 103, 109, 134–5, 166–7, 174, 176–7, 182–3, 187–8, 197, 208–9, 211, 213, 216, 218–19, 233, 236, 240, 242, 257, 260, 262, 268, 278–9, 281, 289, 312, 319, 326, 333, 340–2, 346, 360, 374  
 right to exit 96–7, 102, 216, 218  
 Romania 233  
 Roop Kanwar 280  
 Roosevelt, T. 5  
 Ross, D. 21–2  
 Rousseau, J. J. 86  
 Rushdie affair 13, 258, 306, 310–12, 317, 382

- Rushdie, S. 159–60, 295–6, 299,  
303–4, 317–19, 321, 372
- Safran, W. 373
- Said, E. 159–60
- Sandel, M. 245, 315, 377, 382
- Satanic Verses* 159, 295–8, 300–1,  
304–5, 310–12, 317, 320
- sati 280, 281, 293–4
- Saudi Arabia 171
- scepticism 12, 54, 67, 339
- Schiller, F. 166
- schools 112, 202–3, 254–7, 265,  
327, 329, 331–3
- Schlegel, A. 376
- Schlegel, F. 376
- Schleiermacher 376
- Schlesinger, A. M. 373, 380
- Scorsese, M. 302
- Second Vatican Council 31–2
- secular 42, 147, 198, 208, 254,  
301, 321–5, 327–8, 339, 382
- secularism 225, 335, 370, 372
- self 122, 169, 295
- self-respect 130, 132, 140, 241,  
320
- Serbia 233, 380
- sexism 87, 137, 169, 266, 282, 293
- shared value 265–6, 268
- Shklar, J. 56, 65
- Sikhs 193, 216, 232, 237, 241,  
243–9, 256, 261, 265, 346, 347,  
351, 355
- Singapore 136–7
- Skinner, Q. 378
- slavery 7, 56–7, 66, 70, 75, 97,  
103, 134, 158, 229, 328, 330
- Smith, A. 374
- socialism 2, 112, 338–9, 377
- social justice 2, 8
- Socrates 54
- solidarity 138–9, 156, 160, 171,  
237, 246, 300, 322, 339
- Sophists 10
- South Africa 328
- sovereignty 182, 194–5
- Spinner, J. 224, 380
- Spruyt, H. 180
- state 8, 9, 28, 39, 60, 71, 76, 82,  
112, 134, 138–9, 179, 180–3,  
185, 189, 190–1, 193, 200, 202,  
210, 234, 246, 254–5, 259, 260,  
305, 322, 326–7, 329, 330, 333,  
353, 354, 372, 379
- Stoics 16
- Suarez, F. 181
- Sudan 197, 205, 217, 343
- Svensson, T. 378
- Swift, A. 377
- symbol 244, 246, 251–3, 259, 278,  
303
- sympathy 171, 227–8, 253, 294,  
311
- Syria 381
- Tagore, R. 383
- Tamir, Y. 160, 235, 374
- Tang, J. T. H. 378
- Taylor, C. 342–3, 352, 356, 374,  
378–9, 383
- teleology 53, 71, 111, 114
- territory 36, 38, 103, 172, 178–9,  
180–2
- terror 58, 62
- Thailand 233–4, 236
- theologians 23, 25, 69, 380
- theology 29, 33
- theory 14, 73, 75–6, 81–2, 104,  
106, 109, 114, 116, 120, 123,  
143, 191, 374
- Thompson, D. 382
- Timms, N. 382
- Tocqueville, A. de. 33, 35, 46–7,  
71, 319, 322, 365, 375
- tolerance 204, 288, 309, 340

- toleration 1, 27, 59, 95, 113, 154,  
170, 200, 205, 264, 272, 288
- torture 130, 134–5
- tradition 6, 11–13, 26, 34, 47, 52,  
61–2, 67, 72, 77, 87–8, 121,  
126, 134, 141, 150, 158–9, 175,  
220, 247, 259, 266–7, 281–2,  
293, 337, 339, 378
- transgression 150–1
- Treaty of Westphalia 180–1
- Trinidad 274
- trust 160, 208, 215, 287, 291
- Tuck, R. 21, 34, 378
- Tully, J. 37–9, 374, 378
- Tunisia 292
- Turkey 5, 7, 65, 301
- UN Declaration of Human  
Rights 133–4
- unique 42–3, 50, 74, 77, 287
- United States 5, 93, 102, 190, 204,  
217, 223–4, 228, 237, 242, 246,  
275, 312–3, 323, 328, 344, 349,  
353, 359, 380–1
- unity 9, 12, 196, 201, 203, 209,  
231, 246, 343
- universalism 359, 365, 368
- universal moral values 136, 139,  
141, 275–6, 284, 293
- untouchability 97, 158, 191, 217,  
224, 309, 330
- values 13, 41, 46, 48, 51, 59, 64,  
71–2, 75, 77, 83, 88, 91–2, 94,  
100, 102, 106, 112, 126–9, 133,  
136, 140, 142, 159, 160–1, 167,  
174, 177, 185, 220, 224, 231,  
237, 264–9, 270–2, 278, 291–3,  
309–10, 318, 325, 329, 331,  
340, 347, 348, 352, 357, 358,  
359, 362, 364, 365, 369
- Varshney, A. 212
- Vertovec, S. 380
- Vico, G. B. 10, 12, 24, 50–5, 67–8,  
72, 77–8, 126, 374
- Vienna Conference 136
- violence 8, 62, 178, 189, 262, 321,  
330
- Viroli, M. 342
- virtue 20–1, 28, 40, 42, 47–8, 51,  
53, 59, 60, 67–9, 85, 138, 170,  
205, 277, 340, 344
- Vitoria, F. 181
- voluntary associations 161–2, 329
- Walzer, M. 49, 175, 230, 346, 352,  
363, 378
- war 38, 153, 229, 243, 283, 310
- Wasserman, L. 302
- way of life 16, 17, 19, 20, 25, 28,  
33–4, 36, 39, 40, 42, 44, 46–9,  
67, 77, 90, 99, 101, 106, 111,  
127, 167, 170, 176, 179, 191,  
200, 253, 259, 272–4, 276, 281,  
303, 338, 375, 380
- Weale, A. 382
- Weber, M. 151, 379
- Weinstock, D. 168, 380
- Weldon, F. 302
- well-being 8, 90–1, 93–7, 100,  
132–3, 156, 177, 214, 217–19,  
240, 315, 340–2, 375
- western society 9, 13, 112, 178,  
278, 282, 284, 339
- Wilberforce, W. 364
- Williams, M. 381
- Williams, R. 37, 144
- wisdom 22, 106, 159, 300
- Wolfe, A. 384
- World Council of Churches 31
- worth 129, 130, 132, 142, 177
- Yack, B. 383
- Young, H. 301
- Young, I. M. 221, 381