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Introduction

Hanns W. Maull

Since the unification of Germany on October 3, 1990, German foreign policy has represented a paradox: while the end of the east–west conflict transformed Germany itself, its European environment, and even the world at large, German foreign policy has insisted on continuity, and has indeed by and large determinedly stuck to its old course. Thus, Germany has embedded itself even more deeply in the European Communities and has continued to embrace membership in NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and participation in its integrated military structures, willingly trading aspects of its regained sovereignty for other foreign policy objectives, such as reassuring its partners. By supporting both the “deepening and widening” of existing international institutions and the creation of new ones, Germany remained faithful to its almost “reflexive” multilateralism. As for the participation of the Bundeswehr in military operations outside the traditional alliance context, Germany accommodated the demands of its allies and the new realities of international relations with visible reluctance and only after considerable soul-searching. Germany, in other words, continued to adhere to its traditional “culture of reticence” toward the use of force.

The paradox still persists, but the tensions, even contradictions, between its traditional “grand strategy”—or foreign policy role concept as a “civilian power”¹—and a Germany, a Europe, a world of international relations so radically different from what they had been before 1990 have become increasingly apparent. To be sure, German foreign policy has tried to adjust, most visibly in the context of using Bundeswehr forces to prevent, through collective action, genocide and to secure peace and international stability. Yet, up until 2001, overall policy adjustment remained incremental. Even the country’s participation in the NATO war against Serbia over Kosovo, without the international legitimacy provided by a UN Security Council Resolution authorizing the use of force (an action that has been characterized as a “coming of age” of the new Germany), represented in fact a mere modification of (West) Germany’s traditional foreign policy role concept as a civilian power.²

Then came September 11, 2001, and in its aftermath another decisive shift in international relations. Eighteen months later, German–American relations experienced their most serious crisis since 1949, NATO was in deep trouble, and the European Union (EU) was split between an “old” and a “new” camp. Berlin readily seemed all but to abandon its traditional policy of maintaining equidistance between Washington and Paris, and moderating between the two whenever tensions threatened to undermine Germany’s multiple alliances and the two countries’ respective institutions. German foreign policy even showed signs of abandoning its reflexive multilateralism: in the autumn of 2002, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder ruled out any support for military action against Iraq even in the case of a UN Security Council Resolution authorizing the use of force. In late 2004, Berlin refused to permit German NATO officers to participate in a NATO-led mission to train Iraqi security forces, threatening the viability of some of NATO’s planned operations in that context.

Will the paradox of German foreign policy—of policy continuity in a different world—thus come to an end in the era of Chancellor Schröder? It is too early to tell, but signs of change are clearly in the air. First, German foreign policy has shown signs of a loss of coherence, consistency, and above all effectiveness from about 1995 onward,³ and with accelerating speed since mid-1999 (i.e., after the country’s very successful diplomacy during and immediately after the Kosovo war). Moreover, the multiple crises in Germany’s principal alliance contexts, the European Union and NATO, in 2002 and 2003 were not only, and not even principally, the result of incompatible political personalities or specific, unusual configurations, but rather the cumulative result of deep-seated, structural changes in transatlantic relations. In a nutshell, the crisis brought to light how much the world had changed—and how insufficient had been Germany’s foreign policy adjustment to this new world.

The background: what we know about German foreign policy

Since unification, analysts of German foreign policy have been of two minds about their subject. During the Cold War, a broad consensus of scholars had stressed that the foreign policy of the postwar “Bonn Republic” displayed several distinctive characteristics, reflecting the heavy burden of Germany’s wartime history and the “semisovereign” (Peter Katzenstein) nature of the Federal Republic.⁴

In contrast, after unification, there ensued a lively debate, both political and scholarly, about the likely future trajectory of German foreign policy.⁵ Two catalysts triggered this debate: first, historical memories came back to haunt Germany’s European partners and even Germans themselves; the question arose as to whether a unified German nation-state could live in

peace with its neighbors. Second, there was a widespread view that German unification heralded a major shift in the European power equation, not only vis-à-vis the former Soviet Union with respect to Russia, but also within Western Europe.

This debate turned around the issue of “normalization.” Protagonists of normalization argued that the end of the Cold War had altered Germany’s position in the international system. The country had grown in territory, population, and economic output; it was now surrounded by friendly nations and—after the implosion of the Soviet empire and the Soviet Union itself—without a plausible strategic competitor on the continent. Thus, Germany was bound to become the “central power in Europe” (H. P. Schwarz),⁶ a “world power by destiny” (C. Hacke),⁷ or a “power state longing for hegemony” (G. Schöllgen).⁸ Using a variety of realist and neorealist theoretical approaches, these authors held that Germany would shed its multilateral past, would become more competitive both in Europe and beyond, and would seek to maximize its gains within (but also increasingly beyond) international institutions.⁹

Skeptics of the normalization hypothesis, on the other hand, posited that Germany’s postunification foreign policy would not really divert from its traditional trajectory. Continuity, rather than change, was expected because of Germany’s embeddedness in international institutions and its particular foreign policy culture of restraint, which would survive changes both in the strategic environment and in the material base of its foreign policy. In this view, the Berlin Republic’s foreign policy reflected that of a “tamed power,”¹⁰ still seeking to shape its milieu rather than maximizing its positional goals,¹¹ a “trading power”¹² or a “civilian power”¹³ that continued to be committed to deepening European and transatlantic integration, enhancing cooperative and multilateral conflict resolution, and resorting to force only as a last resort—and strictly within the framework of the United Nations.¹⁴

By the late 1990s, this debate had petered out, and a new consensus was emerging: broadly speaking, Germany had indeed remained a civilian power, though there clearly had been some adjustments in the Berlin Republic’s foreign policy.¹⁵ Just when this debate seemed settled, however, German foreign policy displayed unexpected signs of independence, assertion, and recalcitrance, triggered by the shockwaves of September 11, 2001, and the “Bush revolution” in US foreign policy.¹⁶ First, Germany decided to deploy, for the first time ever, ground forces (namely, Special Forces, albeit in very small numbers) in combat missions in Afghanistan to help destroy remnants of Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime—admittedly with a mandate by the UN Security Council, but without the kind of normative, human rights justification that until then had driven Germany’s willingness to resort to force; rather, the decision was motivated by the desire to demonstrate solidarity with the United States. Then, the issue of alleged Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction and how to deal with it divided both NATO

and the European Union, and brought about Germany's defiance of the United States, its refusal to support coercive action even with a UN mandate, and the categorical rejection of any form of military participation in operations on Iraqi territory to subdue the old regime or pacify the country afterwards.

This unexpected departure from established patterns of German foreign policy behavior triggered a lively new debate among German academics and policy analysts.¹⁷ Some academic observers interpreted these events as demonstrating that the "mainstream analysis" of German foreign policy since unification had tended to ignore important developments in the country's foreign policy that neither contradicted nor confirmed the hypothesis of foreign policy continuity; they argued that these developments were of an altogether different nature. While the earlier debate about "normalization" had turned around the substance of German foreign policy—that is, its self-ascribed norms, its perceived interests and objectives, its basic orientations and strategies, and its preferred instruments—the changes now becoming apparent seemed related to a shrinking resource base and to the policy process, as well as to fundamental disagreements with the United States over the future of world order.

What forces of change have been identified in this most recent debate about German foreign policy? Realist scholars have challenged old notions about German gains in relative power in Europe¹⁸ and have pointed to diverging interests, values, and preferred strategies between Germany and the United States.¹⁹ Another set of structural factors that has been identified to account for the Red-Green coalition's foreign policy conduct has been erosion of both material and immaterial resources for its foreign and security policy.²⁰ Thus, budget allocations for the foreign policy sector have diminished by about 40 percent in real terms from their peak in the late 1980s,²¹ and serious structural weaknesses in Germany's economic performance have begun to affect the conduct and also the direction of the country's foreign policy.²² Arguing that parallels exist between foreign policy making and the deep structural impediments to reform in German domestic politics, these authors stress the growing mismatch between the challenges of a rapidly globalizing international environment to foreign and security policy and, by comparison, its rather modest response, constrained by escalating fiscal burdens and misguided political priorities in the allocation of resources through the federal budget. Hence, as illustrated by a continually postponed reform of the Bundeswehr,²³ or more recently by German efforts to loosen the fiscal constraints of the European Stability and Growth Pact, on which it had itself insisted when arrangements for introducing the euro were negotiated, Germany is increasingly ill-prepared to deal with pressing new international problems.

Constructivist and institutionalist scholars have stressed processes of policy learning and socialization to account for changing behavioral patterns

such as increased Bundeswehr participation in out-of-area missions. Thus, Adrian Hyde-Price and Charlie Jeffery argue in their analysis of the “normalization” of the Schröder government’s European policy that, in Germany, policy learning took place against the background of the failure of Western (and, specifically, German) efforts to contain violent conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. Similarly, several authors have stressed the importance of “processes of socialization” through Germany’s membership in the European Union.²⁴

This literature also taps the much broader research on the “Europeanization” of member states—that is, the “emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance”²⁵—arguing that “Europeanization” has changed nation-states, their domestic institutions, and their national political cultures.²⁶ There is indeed evidence that membership in the European Union has modified Germany’s foreign and security policy by limiting policy choices, shifting competences, and creating new understandings of common purpose and institutional mechanisms of compliance,²⁷ and also by enhancing the reach of national foreign policies.

Finally, another development that may account for a more comprehensive change in the Berlin Republic’s foreign policy outlook is generational change. This argument holds that Germany’s leading policy makers, especially those in prominent positions in the Red–Green coalition, do not share the same postwar experiences of “loss and shame” as their predecessors and that they are thus more candid and assertive in expressing German national interests.²⁸ While this “generational hypothesis” has also been applied to the foreign policy positions of other nations, such as the United States, the argument may have particular explanatory power in the German case since the country’s wartime history has played a prominent role in several recent accounts of German foreign, European, and security policies.²⁹

A changing German foreign policy: the puzzles

In this book, we have started with the premise that German foreign policy has indeed undergone subtle but important mutations, some of which seem to go against the grain of the country’s traditional foreign policy orientation as a civilian power. In our view, the debate on whether Germany is a normal country or not has diverted attention away from three persistent and increasing problems in German foreign policy making: first, the growing complexity and intractability of the country’s foreign policy environment and the erosion of the material, institutional, and “soft power” foundations of Germany’s foreign policy both abroad and at home (i.e., the weakening of the EU, NATO, the OSCE (Organization for Security Co-operation in Europe), but also of the Bundeswehr and the diplomatic corps); second, a declining commitment to foreign policy substance by the political class, which allowed subnational actors to capture more aspects of foreign policy and

thus produced uncertainty about the purposes of German foreign policy; and, third, a loss of coherence and consistency resulting from the proliferation of actors and interests in foreign policy.

The evolution of Germany's relative power since unification, and the implications of any shift in power in Europe, are far from obvious. This is our first puzzle: has unification really made Germany more powerful? While there has been a widespread assumption that Germany's power has increased since 1990, even a cursory glance at indicators of the country's relative power base (e.g., the development of the gross national product, of military spending and capabilities, or of demographic trends) suggests that this is dubious.³⁰ Comparing power resources, however, in any case is a notoriously difficult and crude form of measuring power. In this volume, we will pursue a different approach, that of analyzing *policy outcomes*. That is, we will ask: what has been the influence of Germany within its principal institutional contexts?

Our second puzzle concerns the purposes of German foreign policy, its role concept. Is Germany's foreign policy still following its traditional basic guidelines ("never again," "never alone," and "politics before force")? In other words, does the country still behave like a civilian power? Are the changes in foreign policy behavior only minor modifications, reflecting adaptation and adjustment to a different external environment and changed expectations by others? Or have they begun to affect the core substance of German foreign policy, foreshadowing a new, fundamentally different role concept? In other words: how does German foreign policy see itself, and what does it want?

The third puzzle concerns the policy process. How has the performance of German foreign policy been affected by changes in its domestic, regional, and international environment? What has been the effect of resource constraints? How has German foreign policy tried to adjust?

From a theoretical perspective, our arguments will try to shed light on some gaps in recent accounts of Germany's foreign policy. The first gap is the tendency to assume a unitary Germany foreign policy that pursues a coherent strategy, while in fact more and more domestic policy areas are addressed and administered by international institutions such as the European Union, and, partly as a consequence, domestic actors have become much more important for policy makers.

Second, there has been a trend in recent literature on Germany's foreign policy to suppose that there is a stable and somewhat congenial institutional international context and reliable partners for Germany's peculiar foreign policy orientation as a civilian power. However, as international institutions had to address new challenges, such as the proliferation of ethnic conflicts or weapons of mass destruction, the difficult question arose as to how these institutions should be reformed, which institution should fulfill which task, how the moderation of policy conflicts within the institutions could be

managed effectively, and where the necessary political and financial support for these institutions might come from as they are asked to shoulder ever more policy responsibilities from national governments. As a result, international institutions have experienced serious difficulties in adjusting to a new world, weakening their capacity to underpin international cooperation. Similarly, Germany's most important partners—the United States and France—also had to adjust to this new environment. This resulted in a loss of reliability and predictability in those countries' policies toward Germany. The United States, in particular, under President George W. Bush, seemed increasingly reluctant to rely on institutionalized forms of conflict resolution,³¹ and in the aftermath of 9/11 embarked on a new, radically different foreign policy course.³²

Third, while Germany's traditional foreign policy style has included a strong proclivity toward cooperative and common security, expressed by initiatives such as the OSCE, the Balkan Stability Pact, the Petersberg Process for Afghanistan, these and other regional and international institutions have often been incapable of coping effectively with protracted violent conflicts and the complexities of humanitarian intervention and state building, conflict resolution, and the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Many analysts of German foreign policy have tended to underestimate the persistent problems of violence between and within states and the difficulties of containing and resolving them.

Structure of the book

The research objectives of this book will be approached through a series of policy case studies, which are designed to give a comprehensive picture of the evolution of German foreign policy in the decade since the mid-1990s. Part I deals with domestic and European sources of German foreign policy, exploring both constraints and opportunities. The contribution by August Pradetto focuses on the evolution of foreign policy norms and public attitudes; Alister Miskimmon and William Paterson explore the implications of domestic economic constraints and the implications of the Europeanization of German foreign policies. In Part II, we take a closer look at the foreign policy sector in which changes have been most visible and perhaps most far-reaching: (military) security policy. Harald Müller analyzes German nonproliferation policies and finds both substantial changes in the early 1990s and remarkable continuity since then; Martin Wagener explores changing German policies toward the use of force, which he interprets as a process of "normalization," and Marco Overhaus looks into the difficult balancing act German security policy has been trying to conduct between NATO and the efforts to develop a European Security and Defense Policy.

Part III deals with the key core bilateral relationships in German foreign policy with France and the United States, each of which lies at the heart of a

broader, multilateral framework for cooperation and integration, the European Union and NATO. Taking up some of the themes developed by Miskimmon and Paterson in their chapter, Sebastian Harnisch and Siegfried Schieder assess and evaluate new elements in Germany's policies toward the European Union; Hans Stark takes stock of the ups and downs of the Franco–German relationship, while Stephen Szabo and Peter Rudolf look, from their respective sides of the Atlantic, at the turmoil in German–American relations. Ambassador Günther Joetze concludes this part with a reflection on Germany's policies toward the Balkans and Russia, which have been driven by the search for ways to bring stability and prosperity to those as yet unstable parts of the pan-European theatre.

Part IV addresses environmental and economic policy issues (though we are acutely aware of the linkages between economics, the environment, and security, and certainly reject the old distinction between “high” and “low” politics), with Andreas Falke examining changes in German foreign trade policies, Reinhard Wolf assessing policies toward financial markets and exchange rates, Detlef Sprinz analyzing Germany's claim to international environmental leadership, and Friedemann Müller exploring the failure of German and European energy policies to integrate energy, environmental, and security objectives.

Part V starts with an assessment by Peter Molt of German foreign economic assistance policies to promote development in what used to be called the Third World. Martin Beck explores whether German policies toward the Israeli–Arab conflict have been compatible with the role concept of a civilian power, while Jörn-Carsten Gottwald explores a dimension of German foreign policy in which Germany has behaved like a trading, rather than a civilian, power: bi- and multilateral relations with Pacific Asia.

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thoughts with us and to inspire us intellectually. The conference was made possible by the generous financial support of the *Stiftung Volkswagenwerk*, the *Arbeitsstelle Internationale Beziehungen* at the University of Trier, and the *Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung Brühl Conference Centre*, which also graciously hosted the conference. Alfred Schmidt from *Volkswagenstiftung* and Christoph Müller-Hofstede from the *Bundeszentrale* have also given much valuable support and advice. We also recognize gratefully the organizational wizardry and intellectual wit of Stephan Böckenförde in bringing us all together in Brühl. Debi Howell-Ardila has greatly improved the readability of our sometimes somewhat teutonic English, and despite major upheavals in her own life has sub-edited the whole volume with unstinting dedication and truly professional skill. Alison Howson has been infallibly supportive, charming, competent, and patient in shepherding this project through the editorial process. They all deserve much of the credit for what we have achieved together in this volume; blame for errors or omissions, however, should as usual be addressed solely to the editor.

Notes

- 1 For an exploration of the theoretical background of the use of role concepts in analyzing foreign policy generally, and the “civilian power” concept in particular, see Knut Kirste and Hanns W. Maull, “Zivilmacht und Rollentheorie,” *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* (referred to hereafter as ZIB) 3: 2 (1996): 283–312; and Knut Kirste, *Rollentheorie und Außenpolitikanalyse. Die USA und Deutschland als Zivilmächte* (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1998).
- 2 See, for a thorough analysis of the evidence, Hanns W. Maull, “Germany and the Use of Force: Still a ‘Civilian Power’?,” *Survival*, 42: 2 (2000): 56–80; and Kerry A. Longhurst, “Strategic Culture: The Key to Understanding German Security Policy?,” PhD dissertation, Birmingham University, Institute for German Studies, 2000.
- 3 Cf. Hanns W. Maull, “Quo vadis, Germania? Außenpolitik in einer Welt des Wandels,” *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, 42: 10 (1997): 1245–56.
- 4 Cf. Peter J. Katzenstein, *Policy and Politics in West Germany: The Growth of a Semisovereign State* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987). See also Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Die gezähmten Deutschen. Von der Machtbesessenheit zur Machtvergessenheit* (Stuttgart: dva, 1985); Helga Haftendorn, *Sicherheit und Entspannung. Zur Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1955–1982* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1983); and Wolfram F. Hanrieder, *Deutschland, Europa, Amerika. Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949–1994* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1995).
- 5 Thus far, there has been no comprehensive and systematic overview of this debate. For an introduction see, Philip H. Gordon, “The Normalization of German Foreign Policy,” *Orbis*, 38: 2 (1994): 225–43; Gunther Hellmann, “Goodbye Bismarck? The Foreign Policy of Contemporary Germany,” *Mershon International Studies Review* 40/S1 (1996): 1–39, and Gunther Hellmann, “Jenseits von ‘Normalisierung’ und ‘Militarisierung’: Zur Standortdebatte über die neue deutsche

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- 6 Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Die Zentralmacht Europas. Deutschlands Rückkehr auf die Weltbühne* (Berlin: Siedler, 1994).
 - 7 Christian Hacke, *Weltmacht wieder Willen? Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Second edition (Berlin: Ullstein, 1993).
 - 8 Gunther Hellmann, "Rekonstruktion der 'Hegemonie des Machtstaates Deutschland unter modernen Bedingungen'? Zwischenbilanzen nach zehn Jahren neuer deutscher Außenpolitik, Beitrag zum 21." Kongress der Deutschen Vereinigung für Politische Wissenschaft in Halle/Saale, October 1–5, 2000. Available at: <http://www.soz.uni-frankfurt.de/hellmann/mat/hellmann-halle.pdf>. Accessed February 2, 2004; Inge Schwammel, *Deutschlands Aufstieg zur Großmacht. Die Instrumentalisierung der Europäischen Integration, 1974–1994* (Frankfurt am Main: P. Lang, 1997).
 - 9 Cf. John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future. Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security*, 15: 1 (1990): 5–56; Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security*, 18: 2 (1993): 44–79; Rainer Baumann *et al.*, "Macht und Machtpolitik. Neorealistische Außenpolitiktheorie und Prognosen über die deutsche Außenpolitik nach der Vereinigung," *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen*, 6: 2 (1999): 245–86.
 - 10 Peter Katzenstein, *Tamed Power. Germany in Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).
 - 11 Cf. Andrei Markovits and Simon Reich, *The German Predicament. Memory and Power in the New Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997); Simon Bulmer, Charlie Jeffery, and William Paterson, *Germany's European diplomacy. Shaping the regional milieu* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000).
 - 12 Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State. Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World* (New York: Basic Books, 1986), and Michael Staack, *Handelsstaat Deutschland. Deutsche Außenpolitik in einem neuen internationalen System* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2000).
 - 13 Hanns W. Maull, "Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers," *Foreign Affairs* 69: 5 (1990/91): 91–106; Sebastian Harnisch and Hanns W. Maull, eds, *Germany—Still A Civilian Power? The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001); and Henning Tewes, *Germany, Civilian Power and the New Europe. Enlarging NATO and the European Union* (New York: Palgrave, 2002).
 - 14 Cf. Thomas Berger, *Cultures of Anti-Militarism. National Security in Germany and Japan* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Thomas Banchoff, *The German Problem Transformed. Institutions, Politics, and Foreign Policy, 1945–1995* (Ann Arbor: MIT Press, 1999); Longhurst, "Strategic Culture: The Key to Understanding German Security Policy?" (see note 2); Volker Rittberger, ed., *German Foreign Policy since Unification. Theories and Case Studies* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001).
 - 15 Cf. Stephen F. Szabo, *Germany: Strategy and Defense at a Turning Point* (Washington, DC: American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 1999).

- 16 Ivo M. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, *America Unbound, The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2003).
- 17 The debate was conducted in journals such as *WeltTrends*, 42 and 43 (2004); *Die Internationale Politik*, 58: 9 (September 2003) and 60:1 (January 2005), *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B 11/2004 (March 18, 2004), among others. Cf. Gunther Hellmann, "Sag beim Abschied leise servus. Die Zivilmacht Deutschland beginnt, eine neues 'Selbst' zu behaupten," *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, 43: 3 (2002): 498–507; Gunther Hellmann, "Agenda 2020. Krise und Perspektive der deutschen Außenpolitik," *Internationale Politik*, 58: 9 (2003): 39–50; James Sperling, "The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic. The Very Model of a post-Modern Major Power?" *German Politics*, 12: 3 (2003): 1–34; Hanns W. Maull, "Auf leisen Sohlen aus der Außenpolitik?," *Internationale Politik*, 58: 9 (2003): 19–30; Hans-Peter Schwarz, "Von Elefanten und Bibern. Die Gleichgewichtsstörung deutscher Außenpolitik," *Internationale Politik*, 58: 5 (2003): 31–38; Christian Hacke, "Deutschland, Europa und der Irakkonflikt," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B 24–25 (2003): 8–16; Hanns W. Maull, Sebastian Harnisch, and Constantin Grund, eds, *Deutschland im Absseits?* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2003); Kerry Longhurst, *Germany and the use of force, The evolution of German security policy 1990–2003* (Manchester/New York: Manchester University Press, 2004).
- 18 Cf. Sperling, *German Politics* (see note 17).
- 19 Cf. Stephen F. Szabo, *Parting Ways, The Crisis in German–American Relations* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2004).
- 20 Cf. Maull, *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* (see note 3); see also Hanns W. Maull, "Die deutsche Außenpolitik am Ende der Ära Kohl," *Jahrbuch für Internationale Sicherheitspolitik 1999*, Erich Reiter, ed. (Hamburg: E. S. Mittler, 1998), pp. 274–95; also Maull, *Internationale Politik* and Hellmann, *Internationale Politik* (see note 17).
- 21 Frank Sauer, "Daten zu den Ausgaben des Bundes für die deutsche Außenpolitik im Zeitraum 1981–2001, zusammengestellt für den Beitrag von Gunther Hellmann 'Agenda 2020,'" *Die Internationale Politik*, 58: 9 (2003): 39–50. Available at: http://www.soz.unifankfurt.de/hellmann/mat/IP_09_2003_Daten_www.pdf.
- 22 Cf. Szabo, *Parting Ways* (see note 19).
- 23 Cf. Johannes Varwick, "Die Reform der Bundeswehr, Konturen und Defizite einer nicht geführten Debatte," *Gegenwartskunde* 3/2000: 321–32.
- 24 Cf. Hyde-Price and Jeffery, *Journal of Common Market Studies* (see note 5).
- 25 Maria G. Cowles, James Caporaso, and Thomas Risse, eds, *Transforming Europe. Europeanization and Domestic Change* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001).
- 26 Cf. Michèle Knodt and Beate Kohler-Koch, eds, *Deutschland zwischen Europäisierung und Selbstbehauptung, Mannheimer Jahrbuch für europäische Sozialforschung*, Bd. 5 (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2000).
- 27 Axel Lüdeke, *Europäisierung der deutschen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik. Konstitutive und operative Europapolitik zwischen Maastricht und Amsterdam* (Opladen: Leske, 2002).
- 28 Cf. Hellmann, *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* (see note 17).
- 29 Cf. Berger, *Cultures of Anti-Militarism* (see note 14); also Jonathan Bach, "Between Sovereignty and Integration. German Foreign Policy and National Identity after 1989" (Münster: Lit Verlag, 1999. See also Banchoff, *The German Problem Transformed* (see note 14) and Longhurst, *German Strategic Culture: The Key to Understanding German Security Policy* (see note 2).
- 30 What a systematic comparative analysis of the power resource base of major countries shows is mostly the implosion of Soviet/Russian power. Excluding that

factor, Germany's relative position vis-à-vis other Western countries has declined. (Rainer Baumann, Volker Rittberger, and Wolfgang Wagner, *Macht und Machtpolitik: Neorealistic Außenpolitiktheorie und Prognosen für die deutsche Außenpolitik nach der Vereinigung*," Tübinger Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik und Friedensforschung, No. 30 (Tubingen, 1998).

- 31 Cf. John van Oudenaren, "What is 'Multilateral'?", *Policy Review*, 117 (2003). Available at: <http://www.policyreview.org/feb03/oudenaren/print.html>. Accessed on February 1, 2004.
- 32 Cf. Daalder and Lindsay, *America Unbound* (see note 16).

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