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1

Introduction

I think globalization is the taking over of society by a few key people in big companies.

It [globalization] can be good and it can be bad . . . it can be good because it can work for people . . . because we all care about things like international solidarity . . . that couldn't happen without globalization.

It's a way of using and abusing a lot of the people who don't have a lot of power in their hands, and a lot of the third world, and a lot of the people who are more humble. I think its very organised, that's why I'm here, because I feel its time that we got organised also to combat it.

I just think it means that the world's shrinking in terms of communication . . . And really, you know good technology.

I've got nothing against it [globalization], I think it's probably inevitable . . . But what globalization isn't and shouldn't be is uncontrolled and unregulated.

– Lyons 2001

These five statements by Australians demonstrating outside the World Economic Forum Conference in Melbourne in September 2000 (Lyons 2001) indicate a range of views amongst activists as to the meaning of globalization. These views come from individuals and groups expressly mobilized over the meeting of an elite organization of corporate and government decision-makers. The processes to which they draw attention – economic and political, technological and cultural – remain matters of controversy, clamour, and debate. They lie at the heart of the myriad of aspirations felt and decisions made by individuals, households, communities, and governments. These affect employment and consumption, whether to move or stay put, how to achieve security with freedom and justice, whether to go to war or to resist.

Globalization for many signifies a major root cause of inequality, human misery, and injustice, while for others it is seen as a way of addressing these social ills. The polarization of much debate is important, but it should not drown out those who see globalization as good and bad, those who remain baffled as to what exactly it means, and finally

those who are sceptical as to whether it exists at all, except in the minds of social observers. Whether we are dealing with a fateful force for better or worse, or an unnecessary and misleading piece of academic or marketing jargon, requires serious investigation. This book is one contribution to this end. It is, however, a book written from a particular perspective.

The title *Making Globalization* carries with it two equally significant meanings. The first centres on the idea that the social changes that have come to be called globalization are actively made by human actors, rather than fateful forces that are out of control. This is not to say that globalization is simply a wonderful world of opportunity, since inequalities of power are endemic. The picture is rather one both of opportunity and of constraint, and this book attempts to emphasize both aspects in a manner that is neither excessively optimistic nor unduly pessimistic. The perspective from which it is written is one of critical scepticism towards both would-be globalizers and their critics.

This book is above all a critique of fatalism. It rejects the view that globalization happens, driven variously by markets or technology, leaving human actors to adjust as best they can. Rather globalization is seen both as an outcome of and as a context for human activity. We make ourselves, to paraphrase Marx, as much as we are made. Globalization, in its various manifestations, has been made, and by implication can be un-made or re-made. To say this is to identify with a long tradition of thought from Marx and Weber to E.P. Thompson and Pierre Bourdieu, which places human agency at the heart of social change. In this approach, people attempt to actively make and shape their destiny, engaging with evolving structures of power, knowledge, and cultural meaning. Notwithstanding imperfect knowledge of the situations in which they find themselves and the unintended consequences that actions often have, we may say the same of globalization, as E.P. Thompson (1963: 9–10) said of the English working class, namely that globalizing processes are embodied in relationships between people, whose experiences are registered in ideas, institutional forms, and traditions.

In this study, I chart very different kinds of human agency across the fields of culture, politics, and economic life and across time and space; activities within which people have engaged with and participated within the making of globalization, whether as active proponents, through rejection or reform.

The second meaning in the book's title has to do with the terms we use to analyse, make moral judgements, and act within the world. *Making Globalization*, in this second sense, refers to the making of concepts and

ways of thinking about the world, many of which now centre on the idea of globalization. Concepts are made, un-made and re-made too. Is globalization a worthwhile way of understanding the world, or is the concept rapidly approaching its use-by date?

In this book, attention is given to both these senses of *Making Globalization*. Its subject matter is both contemporary and historical, since much about globalization that is claimed to be new has longer-term roots stretching back hundreds if not thousands of years. It is concerned with the people, networks, organizations and social processes that have been involved in the making of globalization, whether intentionally or unwittingly. In meeting this aim, many puzzles, problems and unexpected paradoxes emerge. These extend throughout economic, political and cultural life, implicating civil society and religion as much as markets, states, and technology.

Understanding globalization demands an approach that is both multi-disciplinary and multi-cultural: multi-disciplinary in the need to combining insights from a range of intellectual sources, and multi-cultural in the sense that human experience from all parts of the world must be drawn upon. It is only through such multi-disciplinary and multi-cultural perspectives that issues like the changing social organization of time and space, global inequalities and opportunities, or the complex articulation of the global with the national and local can be adequately explored.

In reviewing what others have said and felt about globalization, one is immediately struck by the significant moral and emotional discourses involved; as much if not more than any recourse to a well-researched and substantiated analysis. Globalization evokes a range of reactions from anger to pride, and from enthusiasm to fear. Both the word itself and the realities that it is taken to represent provoke strong opinions and powerful emotions. While many are incensed at global inequality, poverty and deprivation, others take pride in the unprecedented post-war expansion of economic growth, technological dynamism and very recent revolutions in communication. While some people feel global or believe in globalization, for others it is an anathema. These reactions apply across leading world languages, where, as Scholte (2000: 43) has noted, equivalent terms such as 'globalisierung' (German), 'globalización' (Spanish), and 'Quanqiuhua' (Chinese) engender similar effects and controversies.

Moral evaluations of globalization are then typically polarized. Those involved in global non-governmental organizations like Greenpeace International are heroes to some but undemocratic activists to others. Similarly corporate leaders and those who operate the International

Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) are seen as arrogant exploiters of the poor by many, while for others they are taken as engineers of economic advance, essential to a prosperous and stable world. The moral resonances of globalization therefore run the whole gamut from exploitation and sin to human emancipation and saintliness. Anger, pride, and polarized rhetoric are nonetheless shaky foundations upon which to base an understanding of global society. The danger is that moral rhetoric predominates over analysis. Polarization between those who see globalization as either automatically good or necessarily bad also tends, as Amartya Sen (2001: 1–2) points out, to create a kind of passivity of the moral imagination. ‘The optimist finds resistance unnecessary while the pessimist finds it to be useless.... The opposite viewpoints unite in resignation (1).’ An ethics sensitive to global inequalities and opportunities can be a major casualty.

Contemporary scholarship and globalization

The polarization in contemporary debates around globalization is also often reflected in profound disagreement among scholars. For Vandana Shivu, founder and director of the Research Centre for Science, Technology, and Ecology in New Delhi ‘globalization is a project of domination by the North over the South, by corporations over citizens, by patriarchal structures over women, by humans over other species’ (Smith 2003: 88–89). For Vernon Smith, joint Nobel Prize winner for Economics in 2002, ‘Globalization, profit and exchange should be seen as good words, peaceful words’ (ibid.).

Some maintain we are talking about a process designed to benefit the world’s rich at the expense of the world’s poor – a force that undermines the integrity of local community, erodes social welfare provisions and destroys the sovereignty of the nation-state. Global inequality is seen as unquestionably growing in multiple forms associated with class, gender, and ethnicity, while nation-states remain morally indifferent, multinational enterprises pursue self-interest in an unregulated manner, and global regulatory bodies are seen as captured by corporate interests. This view is sometimes combined with a strong element of fatalism, whereby globalization appears as a Juggernaut beyond human control. *Runaway World*, the title of a book by Anthony Giddens (1999), encapsulates this feeling. Where the purposive role of human agency is recognized, it is typically in the form of elite control and exploitation of global processes. This sense of elite domination and popular marginalization

is a powerful and continuing theme within the angry street protests that occurred in Seattle in 1999, and subsequently in many other cities hosting conferences of global economic organizations.

For others, a more positive optimistic global future is emphasized. For many economic liberals, globalization is associated with the wealth-generating effects of free trade and the free movement of capital, the liberating effects of new information technology on human communication and exchange. Much global poverty, as seen in many parts of Africa, is claimed to be the result of local conflict, civil war and corruption, that is *too little* globalization rather than too much. Bring in the market and de-regulation, and an upward trajectory of growth and development will, it is claimed, emerge. Meanwhile many commentators on contemporary technological change emphasize the potential of the Internet both as a source of virtual community and as a means of improving the quality of democracy. For their part, cosmopolitan globalizers draw attention to the emergence of cosmopolitan virtue in global movements and networks that seek to create a more tolerant, just and peaceable world – a new global civil society with the potential to stand above social division and resolve conflict. Among optimists these three approaches may be held in common, though it is more usual to find adherence to one of the three strands and indifference or opposition to the other two.

In threading our way through existing approaches to globalization, it is helpful to think in terms of *three* broad waves of analysis, namely *hyper-globalism*, *scepticism*, and a third option, which might be called *post-scepticism* (for similar typologies see Hay and Marsh 2000, Held and McGrew 2003). This tripartite schema is intended as a preliminary way of understanding the general contours of scholarly debates, rather than a rigid template into which all writers may be neatly fitted. What is at stake in the debates between these three positions is not simply what globalization means, but whether, and in what senses, it is present at all. One way of summing up the set of questions involved is encapsulated in Jan Arte Scholte's question, 'What is global about globalization?' (Scholte 2000: 41ff.).

While it is conventional to begin studies of a particular subject with an initial definition, the considerable doubt about the meaning and very existence of globalization makes this procedure extremely difficult. There are, for example, many misgivings about whether the idea of globalization is any more than a modish piece of jargon. It lacks precision, has been applied to a seemingly endless variety of social phenomena, and invites highly rhetorical responses. Yet for all this scepticism, the word itself shows no sign of diminishing in its visibility and usage. We therefore

begin with three waves of thinking about globalization before attempting a working definition.

Much of the initial debate around globalization (and a good deal of popular thinking too) took what may be termed a 'hyper-globalist' position. This was organized around a set of arguments dealing with trends in the world economy, in the institutional arrangements of the nation-state as well as global cultural patterns. Like many pioneering contributions to a new area of debate, much work in this genre was conjectural in method. It was presumed that globalization can be easily defined, has a singular logic that leads in a specific direction, and, for those interested in evaluation, can be seen as progressive or repressive, good or bad. The basis of evidence on which it drew was generally limited.

The major propositions associated with *first-wave* thinking are to do with cross-border processes of change, resulting forms of trans-national inter-dependency, and the consequences of these processes for human welfare, democratic politics and cultural identity. Cross-border economic relationships engendered by free trade, and the increased mobility of capital and labour were believed to be rendering national economies outmoded, and undermining the sovereignty of the nation-state whose lifespan was now threatened by imminent demise (Ohmae 1990, 1996, Reich 1992). This in turn generated arguments that the erosion of the welfare state was underway (Gill 1992, Hoogvelt 1997). Meanwhile global corporate power was creating globalized mass markets that brought low-cost goods to many but, for critics, threatened to undermine local culture and produce global cultural homogenization (Levitt 1983, Sklair 1991). A final plank of much first-wave thinking also stressed the relative historical novelty of globalization. This depended in large measure on hype surrounding new information technology, the Internet, and impending shifts to e-commerce.

Sharp differences of opinion are nonetheless evident among first-wave thinking. They centre, in the main, on distinctions between liberal and critical thought. While economic liberals typically see economic globalization as a positive contribution to economic growth and human welfare, critics see it as a cause of worsening global poverty, and hence as a threat rather than solution to the welfare of most of the world's populations unable to access the potential benefits of markets (compare WB 2003 with Hoogvelt 1997). While liberals see globalization underwriting successful social progress and a healthy democracy, critics see it as undermining democracy through challenges to the sovereignty of the nation-state, and the pursuit of labour market and social policy

de-regulation (for further detail of this debate see Held and McGrew 2002 and Chapter 7).

It should also be noted that a number of influential scholars, also interested in cross-border inter-dependencies, chose to work without seeing any need to develop or make use of the concept of globalization. The most notable example is the work of Immanuel Wallerstein and world-system theorists (Chapter 3), who helped to stimulate, as well as work in parallel with, the critical wing of first-wave global thinkers.

The major difficulty with first-wave thinking is not that many of the arguments put forward lack empirical foundation. Cross-border inter-dependencies are clearly growing in significance evident in a diverse range of processes from free trade and capital mobility to the expanding number of global organizations and social movements, and through chain migration processes and diasporic social networks to the development of global consumer brands from McDonalds to Coca-Cola. There is then much evidence that appears consistent with the propositions listed above. The problem is rather that there is also much counter-evidence too, the significance of which is downplayed or ignored among those with a preference for simple unidimensional accounts of social change. Much of the difficulty here is posed by the contested role of the nation-state in a globalizing world. Are nations being rendered thoroughly outmoded by cross-border movements of power, resources, technology and identity? Types of counter-evidence include the robustness of the world of individual nation-states embracing areas such as inter-national diplomacy, or national systems of law and social regulation. Equally, nationalism and various forms of ethnic particularism appear as resurgent features of social life.

For many, nation-states remain the predominant institutions and points of cultural reference within and between which cross-border movements and inter-dependencies take place. Thinking in this vein may think of the world as both a single space of intensified interconnection, and equally as one inhabited by nation-states. Inter-nationalism based on national representation is after all how the UN and the bodies like the World Health Organization (WHO) are constituted, as are major world sporting events such as the Olympic Games or the World Cup organized. Ostensibly 'global' organizations turn out to have a strong national resonance.

These data re-bound on the coherence of globalization as a distinct trans-national social process. They suggest that inter-national phenomena have often been conflated with trans-national phenomena under the common hyperbolic heading of globalization. They also indicate that

globalization is nowhere near as easily defined or understood as first-phase thinking assumes. This is not only because the trans-national and the inter-national require analytical separation, but also because of a growing sense that the two may sometimes be linked rather than being seen as two conflicting processes. The UN or the Olympic Games, somehow involve vague senses of cross-national feeling and the projection of a single global world order, even while being inhabited by nationally organized bodies, which is one reason why some nationalists oppose inter-national organization. The same ambivalence applies to those globally active corporations, labelled variously as multi-national or trans-national, which somehow combine a trans-national reach across border and multi-cultural workforces with a legal domicile in a particular country of origin.

Phenomena grouped under the heading of globalization are, then, often very complex and paradoxical. And it cannot be emphasized enough that this is not simply a matter for academic debate, but something that effects the activities and choices facing all individuals, families, communities, nations and peoples, together with public policy-makers, regulators, corporations, and social movements. If social groups and populations are to make intelligent and sustainable choices about their welfare and future then an alternative to the comforting simplicity of enthusiastic over-generalization is required.

Thinking about globalization has then moved on through two further waves. The *second* symbolized by Hirst and Thompson's study *Globalization in Question* (1996) and Rugman's book *The End of Globalization* (2001) is highly sceptical of first-wave thinking. Their claim is that evidence from the key domain of corporations does not support trans-nationalism as a feature of the world economy. Corporations, for example, typically remain embedded in the institutions and culture of the country of origins. Hirst and Thompson (1996) use evidence on the operation of multi-national companies to challenge ideas of an emerging trans-national global order. They argue that theories of hyper-globalization have mistakenly concluded that cross-border activity is intrinsically trans-national. Nations remain alive and well. Even if some functions are lost, others are gained (Mann 1993). National markets, and national policies in domains such as education, training and infrastructural planning remain of considerable importance, also throwing doubt on theories of the imminent decline of the nation-state (see also Weiss 1997).

Another important and related aspect of *second*-wave scepticism is that globalization does not mean the demise of the welfare state in a simplistic way. Rather many relatively open economies (e.g. in

Scandinavia) have higher levels of social spending than is the case in some more closed economies (Rodrik 1996, Therborn 1999b). This argument attacks one of the rhetorical certitudes of the anti-globalization camp. It may be linked with a further point that globalization has not created high levels of convergence in either welfare state systems (Esping-Anderson 1990) or patterns of economic activity, such as the importance of foreign trade within national economies (Berger and Dore 1996).

These arguments are also linked with a historical perspective critical of the assumption in much business literature that globalization is novel and unprecedented. Hirst and Thompson counter with evidence that levels of free trade and capital mobility were higher in the period leading up to the First World War than those achieved for most of the post-1945 period (see also O'Rourke and Williamson 1999).

Other themes in the second wave of debate include the economic effects of free trade on employment and inequality. Here some scepticism has been directed at over-generalized forms of optimism among free-trade globalizers. Research here indicates that free trade may have positive effects on employment and incomes in some contexts and for some groups, while in other contexts it may be less beneficial or unambiguously harmful (Rodrik 1996, 1999, Stiglitz 2002). Martin Khor, director of the Third World Network (2001) notes that many poor countries appear not to have gained at all from free trade, while also arguing that many of the reasons for this have to do either with rich-country protectionism or with the lack of 'infrastructural, human, and enterprise capacity' to develop new exports in the poorest nations (33–35). Other research throws doubt on the idea that economic globalization uniformly creates greater inequality between nations (O'Rourke 2002).

Further second-wave criticisms have been applied to ideas of global cultural homogenization. Both Barber (1996) and Huntington (1996), for example, have countered with theories of polarization. For the former, this pits McWorld (symbolizing the globalized consumerism of McDonalds, MacIntosh computers and Music Television [MTV]) with Jihad (symbolizing for Barber at least, ideas of righteous tribalism and cultural fragmentation). For Huntington, by contrast, the spectre is one of wars between civilizations, seen in his case as the West versus the 'Islamic–Confucian' world. The events of 9/11 certainly lay to rest any global assumption of cultural homogenization around consumerism.

Second-wave thinking therefore has had a good deal of success in scrutinizing and evaluating speculative propositions against more considered

accounts better grounded in evidence. It has also begun a process of seeking out clearer and more plausible concepts in an effort to avoid the pitfalls of applying simplistic theories to very complex social changes. This has required a measure of scepticism towards propositions that are regarded as self-evident by many and cherished as articles of faith by some. More sophisticated empirically grounded work has emerged, though it is not clear how far this has connected with the clamour of public debate. All of this is no guarantee that such work is free from error or intrinsically reliable. It is itself liable to criticism and re-evaluation, the main difference being that such debates may occur to a greater degree than before on the basis of conceptual rigour and empirical plausibility.

Thinking about globalization may nonetheless need a more thoroughgoing overhaul than the sceptical empirically grounded second-wave accounts have provided. One example of the mood of restless dissatisfaction with existing conceptual approaches to globalization may be found in the work of James Rosenau (1996: 249–250). ‘Does globalization’, he asks, ‘refer to a condition, an end-state, or to a process/Is it mostly a state of mind, or does it consist of objective circumstances? What are the arrangements from which globalization is a departure? ...’.

His extensive list of questions goes on to include substantive issues such as whether globalization means homogenization, whether it is unidirectional, and whether it derives from some causal prime mover. Any definition should somehow assist the explanation of specific social processes, but Rosenau, like many others, finds it hard to offer a succinct operational definition for all analytical purposes. His most generic comments nonetheless focus on boundary broadening processes with respect to territory and territorially based identity, as distinct from localizing boundary-heightening process. These affect people, goods, information, norms, and institutions.

A more radical proposal, advanced by Hay and Marsh (2000), is to call for a *third* phase, based on the re-thinking of core concepts and indeed the very definition of globalization. Their own version of this exercise requires thinking of globalization neither as a singular and inexorable process causing change nor as a Juggernaut beyond human control. Rather they see globalization as a trend, the effect of a range of processes such as cross-border interconnection and inter-dependence, but a trend which is reversible by counter-trends. Globalization is the *explanandum*, which means that which is to be explained, not the *explanans*, which means the explanation of change. Globalization, in short, is an effect not a cause.

Theorists of long-run processes of social change are well aware of the pitfalls of confusing *explanans* with *explanandum*. One classic example is the debates over the origins of capitalism and market society (Holton 1985). Here capitalism has often been treated both as the phenomenon to be explained and as the explanation of this phenomenon. This creates the logical absurdity of capitalism being responsible for its own emergence. Hay and Marsh are right to introduce some logical rigour into the globalization debate by distinguishing *explanans* and *explanandum*.

The work of David Held and his associates organized around the idea of 'global transformations' (Held *et al.* 1999, Held and McGrew 2002, 2003) represents another powerful statement of the *third-wave* position. This line of argument is critical of certain aspects of both first- and second-wave approaches. Put simply, their position is twofold. First, much second-wave scepticism about first-wave thinking is correct. Much that is called globalization or trans-nationalism is really still contained within inter-national relations, while counter-trends to globalization are ignored. Nation-states do not wither away, nor are the economic consequences of globalization either as dire or as positive as the respective critical and liberal forms of first-wave thinking assume.

Second, however, second-wave thinking is too sceptical. The world of nation-states cannot contain or structure many significant elements of global life, including the ordering of territory. This was dramatically registered in 9/11, when Al Quaida, a trans-national network of terrorists, struck successfully at the heartlands of the world's number one super-power, using techniques very different from the geo-political wars of territorial states. The case for using the term 'Globalization' is that it enables us to understand the extent to which many forms of transformation are no longer containable within or fully controllable by inter-national arrangements. These include mobilities of finance and technology creating and re-creating complex spatial divisions of labour, global communications technology, and the operation of global social movements (Held *et al.* 1999). Proponents of the third-wave approach, therefore, takes globalization as trans-nationalism seriously, while being aware of its limits.

Held sees globalization as a fluid set of processes amenable to the impact of human agency and the design and re-shaping of social institutions. The contemporary forms of globalization are not immutable, suggesting that globalization is neither necessarily unjust nor undemocratic. This position links normative issues such as the desirability of a cosmopolitan democratic world order with empirical issues, such as the emergence

of what might be called proto-cosmopolitan trends in areas such as the inter-national law of human rights, and the ideals of many global social movements.

Another profound element in third-wave thinking is that we should study the limits of globalization (Scott 1997, Reiger and Liebfried 2003), as much as its seemingly ubiquitous scope. Such limits may be set either by non-global preconditions upon which globalization processes may depend (e.g. national legal, infrastructural and welfare state provision) or by counter-trends and resistance (e.g. nationalism and localism). They may also be identified with historical phases of de-globalization as those occurred between the pre-1914 and the post-1945 periods (James 2001). In addition, laying to rest the demonic myth of Globalization as unstoppable Juggernaut also makes it easier to bring human agency back into the analysis, a theme common to third-wave thinking.

The plea to bring human agency back in is a refreshing move away from abstract conjectures, which draws on multi-disciplinary research assembled by historians, anthropologists, sociologists, and practitioners of cultural studies. Some of this is centred on questions of globalization and cultural identity, pursuing alternatives to the idea of global cultural homogenization (e.g. Hannerz 1992). In addition, studies of economic actors in multi-national corporations (Sklair 2001), traders, warriors, and cosmopolitans across world history (Hopkins 2001), labour (Munck 2000) and social movements (Cohen and Rai 2000), and global advocacy, policy and knowledge networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998, Holton 2002, Stone 2002) have emerged. All these in their different ways focus not on passive victims of globalization, but rather on the active role of human agents in the making of the global world – whether intentionally or unwittingly.

Another feature of third-wave thinking is the idea of multiple, different, or alternative globalizations. This has become a more prominent element in debates over globalization in the last 10 years (e.g. Therborn 1999a, Geyer and Paulmann 2001, Hopkins 2001, special edition on ‘Different Globalizations’, *Policy, Organisation and Society*, 20(2), 2001). For Therborn, the distinction is between globalizing structures, including markets, finance, culture, and human rights, and what he calls the interactive ‘world stage of actors’ very often operative within nations through cross-cultural interchanges or experience of global governance. As with all such structure/agency contrasts, however, the danger remains of treating structures as if they are somehow distinct from human interactions, rather than formed, reproduced, and challenged through processes of human agency.

Geyer and Paulmann (2001), by contrast, distinguish between two kinds of global human agency: the one organized, formal, and intent on creating global arrangements; the other a more informal set of polycentric processes that somehow push ahead of the formalized world. Examples given include the distinction between the establishment of formal world scientific congresses and the more diffuse world of scientific opinion. This distinction is a useful reminder that globalization is not simply a matter of activities that bear an explicitly global name or strive for an explicit global outcome, whether centred on the UN, G8 group of leading economic nations, or the World Trade Organisation (WTO). It is equally a matter of polycentric global processes such as markets, cultural exchanges, and cross-border communication via new information technology. We shall return to this point later in discussing the development of global civil society.

The most influential distinction between the types of globalization is the contrast between 'elite globalization' or 'globalization from above' and 'globalization from below'. The former is represented by the activities of multi-national corporations and regulatory bodies like the IMF and WB. The latter is associated with global social movements such as Amnesty International, or Friends of the Earth, and in global citizen and civil society movements.

Once we think in terms of different globalizations it is easier to see that many of those who take part in anti-globalization protests are really opposed to market-oriented economic globalization, or even more specifically to Americanization through economic globalization, rather than necessarily opposed to any kind of globalization (Lyons 2001). While defence of national sovereignty or local community values have been invoked in protest against these forms of economic globalization, what is interesting is how alternative ostensibly global ideas have also been enunciated. These include human rights (including human rights for perceived victims of economic globalization) and ideas of global social justice. They also sometimes involve notions of inter-national civil society as a 'bottom-up' community-centred rather than 'top-down' corporate-centered or IMF-WB-centred version of globalization.

The idea of different globalizations has certainly not gone unchallenged. One argument, advanced by both Castells (1996) and Bauman (1998), is that global society is in the process of a profound re-stratification. Here a mobile cosmopolitan elite is able to enjoy the fruits of globalization, while a peripheralized set of economic victims is doomed to local immobility. For Bauman this means globalization for some, localization for others. The difficulty with this argument is not that the benefits of

globalization are very unequally distributed. It is rather that spatial mobility and cosmopolitanism are by no means the privilege of the rich and well-connected. Global migration proceeds on a massive scale (Castles and Miller 1993), while cosmopolitan identity is multifarious and culturally diverse in origin (Gilroy 1993, Cheah and Robbins 1998, Holton 2002). This reflects the widespread availability of global imagining as a cultural resource, and directs our attention to global consciousness as a dimension to be built into any agent-centred account of the making of globalization.

Defining globalization

We have so far proceeded without a systematic definition of globalization, preferring to note significant trends that might be built into a definition, while also identifying reasons why any stable meaning of the concept is so hard to identify. Definitions may of course serve different purposes at the same time. Moral, political, and commercial functions exist alongside, and may easily be entangled with analytical ones. When Anita Roddick, founder of the Body Shop retail chain, referred to globalization as ‘the latest name for the conspiracy of the rich against the poor’, she evoked both moral concern about global inequality, and the commercial positioning of her business as economically responsible in its global sourcing policies vis-à-vis poor countries (Roddick 2001). This kind of rhetorical approach is not, however, very helpful in constructing a definition for analytical purposes.

A more sophisticated approach is to be found in Bourdieu’s (1998) account of globalization as a ‘myth’ or ‘discourse’ used by neo-liberal ideologues to dismantle welfare-states and construct a universe of individualistic consumers. This discursive definition draws attention to the use of the word globalization within ideological understandings of contemporary trends. However, it offers too arbitrary a foreclosure on the multiple ways the term has been used including those that attempt an empirically grounded analysis of processes, institutions and identities.

A suitable third-wave agent-centred definition of globalization – drawing on the themes of interconnection, inter-dependence (Held 1995), and global consciousness (Robertson 1992) – involves the following:

- (a) The intensified movement of goods, money, technology, information, people, ideas and cultural practices across political and cultural

- boundaries. Such movements combine cause and effect. They implicate the interests and activities of merchants and bankers, migrants and religious leaders, media representatives and activists.
- (b) The inter-dependence of social processes across the globe, such that all social activity is profoundly interconnected rather than separated off into different national and cultural spaces. Once again inter-dependence arises out of human activity and involves particular agents, whether global entrepreneurs or regulators, medical professionals or lawyers, social movement activists or world musicians. It involves formally organized undertakings as well as those embodied in networks and looser forms of co-operation and conflict.
 - (c) Consciousness of and identification with the world as a single place, as in forms cosmopolitanism, religion or earth-focused environmentalism. This approach, pioneered by Roland Robertson (1995) embraces global imaginings and is thus also centrally concerned with initiative and undertaking. Cosmopolitanism, moreover, is not an exclusively Western orientation (Cheah and Robbins 1998, Holton 2002) and this alerts us to the multi-cultural roots of global consciousness.

This set of three elements is of course a composite account of ongoing processes, which may or may not be interlinked. Globalization remains in the making, and may indeed be subject to periodic forms of un-making or re-invention. If globalization is an unfinished process, then it is surely premature to speak of the arrival of Global Society. To speak this way is to treat Global Society as if it were an end-state, a global condition that has finally arrived, where the only remaining task is for latecomers to catch up with or be guided towards the blessed state achieved by those 'mature' others, who have already arrived.

The position argued in this book is that globalization is an ongoing set of processes shaped by human agency, and far too complex to be encompassed within a single master process. The definition offered above does not specify whether one specific element is more crucial than any other, or tie globalization too narrowly to a particular context in time and space. Globalization can certainly be defined more narrowly (e.g. as contemporary Western capitalism). This procedure, however, tends to divert attention away from globalizing phenomena outside the West, and global themes other than the familiar focus on economic processes and elite actors.

Structure of the book

The book is structured around a set of themes each of which draws attention to issues of human agency in the making, shaping, and resistance to globalization, pursued within a third-wave perspective.

In Chapter 2 we focus on the question ‘When did globalization begin?’ If globalization began in the West in association with capitalism, we might perhaps look for its origins in the 1940s with the foundation of the UN, WB, and IMF. However, one could equally go back 100 years to the epoch of free trade and the Gold Standard, 250 years to the Enlightenment and Adam Smith’s economic liberalism, or 500 years to the voyage of Christopher Columbus to the Americas. If the Western focus is relaxed, we might however go back even further as McNeill (1990) and Frank (1990), and Frank and Gills (1993) encourage us to do across millennia to empires, long-distance trade and expansive religion. All of these are relevant to cross-border movement, inter-dependence and global thinking, that is as forms of (partial) globalization prior to recent more complete forms of Western globalization.

In Chapter 3, issues of power and social organization touched on in the historical survey are investigated more explicitly. One influential way of thinking about power and globalization is encapsulated in Wallerstein’s World-System theory. This approach is based on extensive empirical research (see especially Wallerstein 1979, 1991) as well as conceptual and theoretical ingenuity. It was developed as a way of shifting social science thinking about social change away from a national to a world focus. Whereas world empires once represented the main historical form in which social life was organized across political and cultural boundaries, a new more economically focused capitalist world system has now taken their place. This is a system but not in the sense of an entity that is self-subsistent with respect to an environment. Rather it functions as a highly patterned social organization capable of generating global economic development and social change, as well as global inequality and resistance. This is achieved through processes of capital accumulation and social exchange that create spatial structures of inequality separating a capitalist metropolitan ‘core’ from ‘peripheral’ and ‘semi-peripheral’ regions and countries.

One of the major puzzles with this approach, to be explored further in Chapter 3, is the extent to which the idea of system is the most useful metaphor through which to analyse the making of globalization. For one thing, world system connotes a unitary process dominated by a single logic, and extensive in time and space to the exclusion of all else. For

Wallerstein (1990a,b), even the contours of resistance become incorporated into the system. This point of view has been criticized for economic reductionism, whereby the characteristics of culture and politics are simply read off from the economy (Boyne 1990). It may similarly be criticized for an excessively deterministic approach, whereby structures of global power dominate and re-model human agency. Reference to core and periphery also suggests patterns of global power that are centralized around a few metropolitan centres. Political empires may have declined with the rise of a capitalist world system, yet the major actors in this system are still seen as core nation-states, whose military machines and core ideologies predominate. This 'top-down' mode of thinking has little place for the global networks and webs through which individuals, households, social movements, professionals, and other experts have sought to influence, promote, protest, or re-shape global processes. It also failed to adequately anticipate the mass 'anti-global protests' of the last 5 years.

The excessively unitary and deterministic characteristics of world-system theory contrast with the wisely used metaphors of network or web that abound in more recent literature on globalization. These connote a more complex multi-centred loosely coupled approach, one that is more sensitive to human agency. The technological invention of the World Wide Web, symbol of interconnectivity, is only the most obvious instance of these widely used metaphors. Castells (1996, 2001) theory of Network Society manages to encompass the reality of capitalist economic power, the autonomy of new information technology from any overriding social purpose such as capital accumulation, and the reality of systematic resistance to capitalist forms of globalization.

In Chapter 3 we also explore the utility of web and network as ways of understanding globalization, and of understanding the operation of power within global arrangements. What, first of all, are the most significant kinds of networks? Much popular attention has been given to elite networks such as the World Economic Forum, connected with large corporations, governments, regulatory bodies like the IMF and WB, and economists. To restrict the focus to elites, however, produces a skewed picture of what is a complex multi-dimensional area. One well-researched example of this complexity is that of 'knowledge networks'. These include, as Diane Stone (2002) has pointed out, a range of organizations and looser patterns of association around scientific and professional associations, development agencies, universities, and foundations. By this means a range of ideas, research findings and policy options are circulated, diffused and addressed. In the process, such networks intersect with

advocacy and issue-based networks, embracing social movements, and with policy networks, including official as well as unofficial actors. Amongst unofficial networks, the figure of the 'activist' has become a major point of reference and controversy in current accounts of the contemporary global polity. In Chapter 3 a more extensive classification of network types, mechanisms of operation, and impact will be attempted.

Globalization: Space and time

Globalization is clearly a process of profound consequence for both space and time as we shall discuss in Chapter 4. In a spatial sense, it has been argued that the intensified development of cross-border communications in virtually instantaneous time renders geography redundant. New information technologies allow the transmission of text, speech, video, and other data in real time in an instant. De-regulation of global financial, and capital markets means that huge volumes of finance flows remorselessly around the world in search of profitable use, while the data mining of information on consumers and individual citizens is available at multiple points in the global arena, rather than being monopolized by states.

The mobility and fluidity of processes and people within global space is, as Urry (2000) points out, perhaps the defining feature of contemporary society within the imagination as much as the production and distribution of economic resources. The development of instantaneous time alongside globally oriented actors with the power or desire for mobility has clearly compressed space (Harvey 1996). Physical distance is no longer in and of itself a critical obstacle to social exchange except for the world's poorest populations, unable to move far through hunger while simultaneously unable to access the telephone, let alone the Internet, as a result of poverty. In much first-wave thinking about globalization, all this led to the supposition that time had destroyed space.

Yet, as many subsequent researchers have pointed out, there are a number of senses in which geography still matters. Even within a mobile world, a great deal depends on where and how nodules, residues, or resistances form within global space. Sassen (1994) has pointed out that while information technology may permit decentralization of the sites of production, economic and financial power is still concentrated within global cities. The existence of a complex and constantly shifting global division of labour does not mean that fluidity destroys spatial inequalities of wealth and power. Particular spaces, better-termed places,

also matter. This is obvious in the politics of culture where the burgeoning of nationalist movements and identity politics is organized around either real or idealized spaces. But it is also to be found within the heart of global economic arrangements.

O' Riain (2000), in an ethnographic study of Irish software development engineers working for a US multi-national, shows how the specific Irish workplace was largely controlled according to the dictates of central office received in instantaneous time via the Internet and conference calls, and enforced via project deadlines. Rather than being dissolved into cyberspace, the highly educated workers involved faced an intensification of time-space relationships. They were both intimately bound together as a workgroup creating co-operative technical networks within a particular local space, and at the same time being subjected to pressures towards individual spatial mobility, which are characteristic of career paths in this sector of the industry. Globalization therefore does not mean an end to place even though the interconnection between places becomes deeper and more intense. The global economy operates rather through networks that link particular places with 'patterns of mobility of people, information and resources' (198).

Naming the world's spaces and places has, however, been made harder by the unevenness of global economic and technological change, as well as the complexities of cultural change. The tripartite distinction between First World, Second World, and Third World is a prominent casualty here. The largest problem here is with the term 'Third World' (Kamrava 1995) developed to encapsulate the African, Asian and Latin American world beyond Europe and North America, and their settler extensions around the globe. The idea of a Third World, homogenous in its lack of economic development and power, and subservient to other worlds, has, however, been profoundly undermined. This is not because the worst global economic inequalities has been corrected – far from it. It is rather because of a striking divergence in the situation of different nation-states lumped together in the Third World category. China, parts of Southeast Asia, and parts of South and Central America have achieved significant levels of growth and development over the last decades. While this has not been without periods of crisis, none have fallen back into the position of the poorest and least powerful, rendering the original idea of a Third World redundant. Increasing reluctance to use the idea of a simple First World–Third World split may be seen as another victory for more recent thinking over what went before.

Even if economic and social geography is not dead, it may nonetheless be necessary to examine other ways of understanding space beyond the

conventional political and juridical boundaries between nations and regions. One way of doing this, elaborated further in Chapter 4, is to think in terms of pacified and feral spaces defined in terms of levels of social order, examples of which may be found equally in the West and the world beyond (Friedmann 1994). Different sets of globalizing actors may, within the same global city such as Los Angeles, help to create pacified spaces within which to locate core elements of market-driven economic activity and elite residential housing, and at the same time supply illegal drugs that contribute to feral social disorganization in other parts of the same city.

Notions of time, meanwhile, are equally problematic when one considers the complex multi-dimensionality of globalization. A superficial examination that focused solely on the contemporary information technology revolution might lead one to suppose that there was one global time. Building on the standardized measures of time developed towards the end of the 19th century, modern digitalized communications technology appears to render instantaneous time as the predominant mode of temporal organization. Information travels in small fractions of a second. Yet human consciousness, human bodies, cultural forms, and the natural environment do not. This raises the puzzle of the simultaneous existence of multiple times, and the possibility of collisions between them. In Chapter 4, the discussion involves the identification of a variety of times, and the ways in which human actors within the global arena both make time for their activities and are simultaneously shaped by it.

How then do people live in the era of accelerating globalization? And how do patterns of opportunity and constraint influence global life-chances? If human actors shape globalization as much as being shaped by it, how far is access to innovative and effective activity constrained by structures of power, and what are the mechanisms through which global actors operate? These fundamental questions will be explored in the next three chapters.

The global, the regional, the national, and the local

Many of the questions regarded as settled in the first-wave debates over globalization remain unresolved. One of the most important of these is the question of the viability of nation-states in an epoch of globalization. Do they simply wither away in the face of globalization, or is it possible for national and global institutions and identities to complement and

reinforce as much as they conflict with each other? The complex ways in which the global, the regional, the national, and the local intersect, conflict, and sometimes complement each other will be explored in Chapter 5.

The issue of relationships between national, global, and other levels of social life cannot, as we shall see, be resolved conjecturally or be deduced from some general theory of the nation-state. This is partly because nation-states vary in size, power, resources, and institutional coherence. The US or Japan are far larger, more powerful, and have many more resources than Bangladesh or Tanzania. Nor are the relatively stable institutional structures of Western states easy to compare with post-colonial quasi-states (Jackson 1991) of Central Africa based upon somewhat arbitrary colonial boundaries and riven by civil war.

Another complicating issue – arising from the development of the European Union (EU), and to a lesser extent the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) – is that of regionalism. Is regionalism to be seen as the erosion of individual states which cede power to regional states, or a way by which nation-states may secure their future by pooling sovereignty and resources? And what of regional states themselves? Are they run simply as inter-national entities, where the national members govern the region, or do they develop trans-national principles, rules of operation, and organizations that increasingly stand above nation-states?

Globalization processes may both rely on aspects of the nation and in some circumstances help to constitute or re-constitute nation-states. Multi-national companies, for example, often prefer to locate production in stable national societies with stable legal systems able to protect property rights and public policies that, inter alia, provide educated labour forces. These, along with issues of access to the largest markets, provide some of the reasons why foreign direct investment (FDI) by multi-nationals is concentrated in North America, Europe, and Japan. This is not to deny that multi-nationals have also located in areas of cheap labour, or conducted resource-extraction in poor under-developed countries ruled by corrupt regimes with whom some accommodation is reached to protect mutual interests. What is significant in either case is not the disappearance of the state, but the making and re-making of states that suit particular global and national interests. The only systematic anti-state interests are probably to be found in the orbit of organized crime, notably the inter-national drugs trade, which seeks to de-stabilize the capacity of nation-states for law enforcement.

Economic globalization may also not be the sole aspect of globalization that impacts on nation-states and processes of state-building. Global concern for human rights was one major element in inter-national debates and actions around the recent establishment of the independent state of East Timor. Here colonial independence from Portugal had been followed by imperial annexation by Indonesia, and a new independence struggle. This had the support of some external groups, movements, and individuals, the number of which swelled after the UN supervised vote for independence. Many of these interests, including the UN and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), have become involved in the process of state-building and reconstruction of civil society in the aftermath of the armed conflict between East Timorese and Indonesia. The significance of this issue is both that the formation and development of the new East Timorese state required inter-national intervention to succeed, and that this intervention was legitimized in relation to both the trans-national idea of human rights and the notion of national self-determination. In this case we are dealing with an inter-national project to globalize the nation-state rather than abolish it.

A further way of thinking about the interconnection between large 'macro-level' global processes, and smaller 'micro-level' local processes is introduced – based on the ideas of the 'Glocal' and 'Glocalization'. To be 'glocal' means the combination of global and local elements within human activities. Examples include local marketing by global corporations, or the environmentalist practice of thinking globally but acting locally. Glocalization, meanwhile, is the process whereby glocal fusions take place.

The idea of Glocalization is a very striking and productive way of moving debate away from *first-phase* theories pitting the global against the national and local as alternative, contrasting, and conflictual forms of social organization and cultural life. The term 'glocal', while not widely used in academic or popular debate, nonetheless has a significant presence in a range of areas from business and management, to city-to-city collaboration and social movements seeking to empower civil society to combat market-based globalization and the power of multi-national corporations (the Google search engine on 8 December 2003 throwing up about 28,700 instances of the term).

Amongst the disparate array of examples are The Glocal Forum and Annual Glocalization Conferences within which city mayors from around the world seek to encourage city-to-city collaboration between richer and poorer cities in collaboration with agencies like the UN Food

and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the WB. For Uri Savir, former head of the Israeli Foreign Service, co-architect of the Oslo Peace Accords, and founder of the Glocal Forum, glocalization is a process that re-inserts local concerns and networks within global arrangements that have hitherto excluded too many sections of the world's populations (Savir 2003).

In Chapter 5 we pursue the question of how useful it is to think and act glocally. Could the idea of glocalization be a coherent and useful way of drawing attention to fusions of global and local institutions and activities, whether states, cities, or social movements as much as business strategy, cultural identity, and social movements? Thinking glocally would in this way avoid the excessively polarized assumptions associated with ideas of the global and globalization, whereby the global and the local are seen as mutually exclusive and necessarily in conflict. This would, at the very least, prevent the polarized discourses of first-wave thinking, whereby hyper-globalizers foreclosed the long-term viability of the nation-states and nationalism at the same time as the realist school of political science foreclosed the possibility that trans-national developments were creating anything significantly new.

Global civil society

In Chapter 6 we move on to look more directly at the idea of global civil society and the people that constitute it. This term, as John Keane (2003: 1–2) has recently pointed out has entered the vocabulary of globalization both in the West and beyond. The term itself has been used in a number of ways, both analytical and normative. These may be linked, as in the idea that global civil society is co-terminous with a global citizenry that somehow stands above national or ethnic divisions (e.g. Akami 2002) – a development that is both real and desirable. This usage draws attention to the ways in which many self-styled internationalists and cosmopolitans have seen themselves as a progressive force over the last 200 years. There is, however, a wider sense in which the idea of global civil society can be used, of which inter-nationalists and cosmopolitans are one important sub-set. This broader approach includes all those people involved in non-state modes of mobility, communication, and exchange across borders. This embraces this world of immigrants and diasporic groups, traders and business people, scientists and professionals, pilgrims and sportsmen and sportswomen. Such people are sometimes autonomous travellers, businessmen and tourists,

sometimes workers employed by multi-national companies, and sometimes members of networks of trade, migration, or global crime and terrorism. Activities may be individual and inter-personal or more collective and formal, embracing the writing of letters and emails, making telephone calls and sending text messages, publishing newspapers and books, opening up new markets and conducting global research, or establishing bonds of long-distance friendship and love.

The point here is that it does not take a committed cosmopolitan or world citizen to make global civil society. To restrict attention to the latter is to ignore the paradox already noted above that most globally active people retain ties to one or more particular places and histories. Chapter 6 will then move on to consider the implications of this point for individual identity, and in the process attempt to determine the extent and limits of global civil society.

While there is a literature on the general limits of globalization, there has been comparatively little empirical research into the limits to global civil society. For many, it is sufficient to rehearse general points about the resilience of nationalism and ethnic conflict, or to draw attention to anti-global protest in the name of local community or national democratic institutions – allegiances that are sub-global in scope. The difficulty with this approach is that it fails to take account of the interpenetration of the global and the particular in social life. The most obvious examples of this are where those promoting the particular interests of an ethnic or national or religious group, or simply protesting against globalization, use global ‘means’ to promote what are seen as ‘non-global’ or ‘anti-global’ ends (Keane 2003). Chapter 6 will conclude with an attempt to make sense of this paradox by specifying different ways in which the global and the particular interpenetrate and intersect.

Globalization and its discontents

In Chapter 7 we return to current controversies over globalization and human welfare. Having established the significance of different kinds of human agency in the making of globalization, it is now possible to challenge much of the over-generalized and abstract rhetoric surrounding debates between globalization’s supporters and opponents. In place of ideological clamour that demonizes global actors as either elite manipulators or irresponsible activists, a more balanced assessment is possible of the claims and counter-claims advanced by proponents and critics. A number of recent studies have, in particular, picked up the

theme of 'globalization and its discontents' (see especially Sassen 1998, Stiglitz 2002) as a way of taking criticisms seriously while equally identifying positive trends and developments. This current of thought has also proven sensitive to the many paradoxes and contradictions evident in the development of global processes. Foremost of these, as pointed out by Amartya Sen, is the co-existence of a world of 'unprecedented prosperity' and 'staggering inequality'.

Within this context, the angry clamour of anti-globalization protest has increased rather than decreased since the Seattle protest of 1999. And criticism is not confined to pressure from below. If a global elite had been running globalization according to what came to be known as the Washington Consensus of free-market policy-settings and privatized loosely regulated economic activity, then even key elite figures such as George Soros, the financier, and Joseph Stiglitz, former senior WB advisor, have broken ranks to call for fundamental reform of global economic architecture. There is thus a widening agenda of both failures of economic globalization, and policy changes required for reform. Elite opinion cannot provide a unitary front on global policy issues, and can no longer dominate the discussion of where globalization is and should be heading.

Chapter 7 starts off by reviewing the literature on global inequality, poverty, and economic welfare, so as to identify the interplay of opportunity and constraint in the ways in which the global economy operates. An outstanding issue here is the unresolved debate as to why economic growth is capable of increasing overall prosperity, but is unable, by itself, to guarantee freedom from poverty, hunger, insecurity, and arbitrary and oppressive government. Attention then turns to the operation of global economic institutions, notably multi-national corporations and regulatory organizations; two of the more contentious elements in the global arena. What objectives, policies and visions animate key actors in such institutions, do they operate uniformly or in a variety of ways, and how far do they enhance or constrain opportunity and a more equitable distribution of global wealth? And how far, lastly, have Soros or Stiglitz type reforms progressed?

Such questions about economic globalization are not of course purely economic. They are intrinsically connected with both the politics of global governance and government, and the cultural variations in the *ends* that individuals, organizations, and a diverse range of social groupings set themselves. One influential way of thinking about modern society is through notions of differentiation and integration. Differentiation of economic, political, and cultural activities arguably allows specialization

of functions through distinct institutional forms (e.g. markets, democratic political organizations, cultural activities freed from state controls) and greater capacity to meet different kinds of objectives. Nonetheless, differentiation brings with it challenges of integration. How far, for example, can markets be left free from political or cultural regulation? How far can a pluralistic or multi-cultural set of cultural objectives be promoted through market-based means, and what are the limits to markets as guarantors of human welfare.

Attention shifts in the second part of Chapter 7 to the broad policy positions that are evident within practical debates and controversies over globalization. Here may be found a contrasting set of answers to the question ‘What should be done about global inequality and injustice?’ The responses of human actors vary from continued enthusiasm for market liberalism and isolationism, to statism, global reform, and support for alternative versions of globalization. These options are evaluated in the light of the arguments developed and evidence presented in the body of the book.

The argument of the book

Chapter 8 returns to the leading themes of the book and re-affirms the importance of the major themes of this study. The first of these sees globalization as a set of processes that do not add up to a singular integrated system, but are better understood in terms of a multiple set of processes that inter-relate but sometimes conflict with each other. Put another way, forms of economic globalization are by no means identical to forms of political, cultural, or technological globalization. One consequence of this line of argument is that the polarization of political and policy debates over globalization into simple dichotomies – for and against – is profoundly misconceived.

The second theme emphasizes that globalization, in its various manifestations, is a product of human agency, reflection and activity, and conflict and co-operation. This point arises from both long-run historical approaches to globalization and analysis of the contemporary world. The kinds of globalization we have may not always be the products of human intention, but they are capable of re-shaping and even reversing under certain circumstances. This leads into a third theme, namely the dynamics and limits to globalization processes, and the possibility of resistances and reversals as much as a continuation, ever onward and upward of the kinds of globalization we currently have. Globalization

processes, insofar as they widen the differentiation of economy from polity and culture, have created enormous social strains. These have produced both a crisis of legitimation for economic globalization and anti-global reactions that may well usher in a phase of de-globalization. Meanwhile, the fourth and final theme is the emphasis given to reformers and re-shapers of globalization, forms of action that may help to create an alternative to de-globalization in the search for the construction of a more just, sustainable, and secure global world.

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