Contents

List of tables ix

List of abbreviations x

Acknowledgements xi

1 Introduction: research as contentious **1**
Introduction 1
Research-mindedness 2
Evidence-based practice 4
The qualitative–quantitative divide 7
The paradigm debate 9
Conclusion: the contentious nature of social research 15
Structure of the book 17
Main points 18
Stop and think 18
Taking it further 18

2 Ethical research and social justice **19**
Introduction 19
Research ethics for social work 19
Codes of ethics 20
The concept of social justice 24
Reflexivity in research 28
Putting it all together 30
Conclusion: appropriate ethics for social work research 30
Main points 32
Stop and think 32
Taking it further 32

3 Experimental ways of knowing **33**
Introduction 33
Origins of experimental approaches 34

Principles of experimental methods 35
Examples of experiments in social work and social care 38
Drawbacks of experimental research 41
Conclusion: experimental methods and social justice 45
Main points 48
Stop and think 48
Taking it further 49

4 Participatory research 50
Introduction 50
Origins of PR 51
Principles of PR 52
Examples of PR in social work and social care 55
Other models of PR 60
Drawbacks of PR 62
Conclusion: PR and social justice 66
Main points 68
Stop and think 68
Taking it further 68

5 Action research 69
Introduction 69
Origins of action research 70
Principles of action research 72
Varieties of action research 74
Examples of action research in social work and social care 78
Drawbacks of action research 83
Conclusion: action research and social justice 85
Main points 86
Stop and think 86
Taking it further 86

6 Case study research 87
Introduction 87
Origins of case studies 88
Principles of case study research 89
Examples of case study research in social work and social care 95
Drawbacks of case study research 100
Conclusion: case study research and social justice 101
Main points 102
Stop and think 103
Taking it further 103

7 **Critical social research** **104**
Introduction 104
Origins of critical social research 105
Principles of critical social research 106
Examples of critical social research in social work and social care 109
Drawbacks of critical social research 117
Conclusion: critical social research and social justice 118
Main points 119
Stop and think 119
Taking it further 119

8 **Discourse analysis** **120**
Introduction 120
Origins of discourse analysis 120
Principles of discourse analysis 121
Examples of discourse analysis in social work and social care 126
Drawbacks of discourse analysis 131
Conclusion: discourse analysis and social justice 132
Main points 133
Stop and think 133
Taking it further 133

9 **Ethnographic research** **134**
Introduction 134
Origins of ethnographic research 134
Principles of ethnographic research 136
Examples of ethnography in social work and social care 139
Drawbacks of ethnographic research 143
Conclusion: ethnography and social justice 147
Main points 150
Stop and think 150
Taking it further 150

10 **Social surveys** **151**
Introduction 151
Origins of social surveys 152
Principles of social survey research 153
Examples of surveys in social work and social care 158
Drawbacks of social surveys 164
Conclusion: social surveys and social justice 165
Main points 167
Stop and think 167
Taking it further 168

11 **Evaluation research** **169**
Introduction 169
Origins of evaluation research 170
Principles of evaluation research 171
Examples of evaluation in social work and social care 180
Drawbacks of evaluation research 185
Conclusion: evaluation research and social justice 186
Main points 187
Stop and think 188
Taking it further 188

12 **Conclusion** **189**
Introduction 189
Choosing methods that are ‘fit for purpose’ 190
Rediscovering research methodologies for social justice 192
Main points 194
Stop and think 194
Taking it further 195

References 196

Internet resources 211

Index 213

chapter 1 Introduction: research as contentious

Introduction

This is a book about research methods for social work and social care practice. The emphasis on the need for students to understand research approaches and for practitioners to be 'research-minded' is an important development for the profession and one to be welcomed. The book is intended as a practical contribution both in enhancing awareness of studies that inform practice and in offering tools to those who conduct their own studies. There are a number of good books on research methods that are used widely on training courses (see, for example, Bell, 1993; Denscombe, 2003; Mark, 1996; Royse, 2003; Sheppard, 2004) and that offer detailed practical instructions for conducting research projects. I have resisted the temptation to write another text that is solely a 'how-to-do-it' manual, because no human activity is uninfluenced by particular ways of viewing the world, and research no less than any other activity is always in the interests of some social group or other. It is as well to acknowledge that at the outset, and to declare what this means for the rest of the book.

In constructing the content therefore, it has been my aim to set the book firmly in a framework of social justice and thus to take a position which sees social research not solely as a range of neutral approaches to the examination of social problems, but as itself a profoundly political exercise, and as having potential to contribute to social change for good or ill. In describing a range of methodologies available to social workers and social work researchers, I offer a critique of them in relation to their use towards transformation in the conditions of poverty and oppression experienced by many of those who find themselves in the system of welfare.

The book is aimed at qualifying students who are required to demonstrate that they understand the methods and debates advocated for practitioner-researchers, at practitioners who are increasingly urged to evaluate their practice and to pursue continuing

professional development, at academics who are responsible for teaching and research in social work and social care, at managers who are accountable for the work they supervise and at policy makers who often set the terms of research undertaken. It is also an appeal to service user groups who increasingly carry out their own research, or demand a say in that of dominant institutions, or for whom an informed critique of research affecting them is crucial to their future. Although the content of the book is written from the UK social work and social care context, many of the themes – epistemological and methodological debates, 'evaluation', 'evidence-based practice', 'research-mindedness', for example – as well as the methods presented, will be relevant to concerns in the social and health professions in the wider global economy, and I hope will contribute to a critical rethinking of practice in this field.

This introductory chapter and the following chapter are used to set the context of research in social work, and to address some of the key themes readers will need to appreciate in the effort to grasp the implications of the methods and approaches described later. For this reason it is important for readers not to skip these chapters, but to persevere in the intellectual effort to understand the complexities of the notion of research-mindedness, the concept of evidence-based practice, competing research paradigms and generally the politics of social research, as these form the building blocks for what comes later.

Research-mindedness

In recent years social workers and other professionals have been encouraged to develop 'research-mindedness', both informing themselves of research findings and applying them to their practice, and undertaking their own research where appropriate, though the tradition of research in social work has a long history. Dominelli (2005) offers a full discussion of this and of the background to the contemporary interest in research. Briefly, in the UK the government has insisted on this in a number of ways, notably through the Quality Assurance Agency statement about expectations of standards of degrees in social work (QAA, 2000), within National Occupational Standards, the requirements for the degree in social work and in post-qualifying training. The remit of the Social Care Institute for Excellence (SCIE) is to promote 'useful and relevant knowledge' (Walter et al., 2004, Preface). Along with this have been established a number of government-supported organizations, and the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) has brought universities into a UK Network for Evidence-based Policy and Practice. But research-mindedness is not a straightforward notion, and is caught up with

competing definitions of the nature of 'knowledge', what counts as 'research', whose interests are served by it, and so on. This debate about what counts as research and knowledge, and who decides on what is acceptable as methods and data, is at the heart of concerns of social researchers. There are many kinds of knowledge, and in our society some are regarded as more acceptable than others, in research as in other aspects of life. In the hierarchy of knowledge, certain perspectives are privileged over others, and it is important for social work and health professionals not to be naïve about the politics of social research that affects their practice. For example, managerial and government priorities are focused on urgent answers to practical problems – what will work in changing behaviour? What resources are needed? What are the costs involved? (see Butler and Pugh, 2004) – often to the exclusion of explanations as to why the issue became a problem in the first place, or the meaning of behaviour to individuals and groups. In this scenario 'best-practice' research-mindedness is concerned with targets, budgets, resources. On the other hand some have argued that research-mindedness is 'best practice' when it inquires into inequalities and injustices that result in problematic behaviour, and indeed when it questions why such behaviour is regarded as problematic (Webb, 2001). Here research-mindedness requires a commitment – even a passion – on the part of practitioners and researchers, which will lead them towards thinking that is beyond common-sense, taken-for-granted and instrumental knowledge, where they explore perspectives on social issues that they care deeply about.

Research-mindedness in social work is meant to refer to the need for practitioners to be aware of research findings and to apply these in their daily practice. It also entails social workers involving themselves in evaluating their own practice and in making appropriate changes to it. However with regard to the first of these, a complication is that research findings are seldom clear or straightforward and indeed can be conflicting, so 'application' is a matter of interpretation within organizations, which will have their own priorities and interests. Practitioners should not accept these interpretations uncritically. In situations where practitioners or students are engaged in their own research or evaluation of practice it is important to be aware that there will always be a number of ways of defining the problem to be researched, even where one is apparently collecting statistics about client need and services. Therefore a key ingredient of research-mindedness is a questioning attitude that asks why, and to what purpose. Jo Campling, in the foreword to Everitt et al. (1992) offers a vision of research-mindedness that widens the official definitions of it to include dimensions linked to ethics and justice. Her three principles are:

- a participatory/developmental model of social work, as opposed to a social control model;
- anti-oppressive values;
- striving towards a genuine partnership between practitioners and those whom they serve. (p. vii)

In Campling's view, research-mindedness should be explored in an holistic way:

> Problem formulation, data collection, data analysis and evaluation are not treated as discrete stages in the supposedly linear process of research. Instead each of these is addressed using the same framework: values, purposes, ethics, communication, roles and skills. Anti-oppressive practices and developmental principles also anchor the process from beginning to end. (p. vii)

For the research-minded practitioner, the taken-for-granted is opened up to critical scrutiny. Always in mind is the way in which values and interests pervade research studies, the knowledge produced by them and the policies that are implemented as a result of them.

Evidence-based practice

Evidence-based practice is a dimension of research-mindedness, referring to the application of research findings to practice, instead of practitioners operating simply on what is common sense, or their own whimsical or preferred methods of intervention. Increasingly official statements about helping professions assume evidence-based criteria as a building block of practice (e.g. Audit Commission, 1996; ESRC, 2001). Research that takes place in health and social care, and indeed in all other settings, should be credible, rigorous and methodologically sound, and should provide a basis that can guide and underpin practice. Across the professional and political spectrum the model is applied, 'evidence-based medicine, evidence-based education, evidence-based social work, evidence-based policy making and evidence-based practice . . . evidence-based everything' (Oakley, 2000, p. 308). This seems desirable and straightforward, but as with 'research-mindedness', there are complexities. It needs to be said that (i) what 'evidence' is, is not straightforward and (ii) 'evidence' is seldom if ever clear, definitive and unambiguous. This means there are different views about what it is legitimate to call evidence (e.g. expert observations? Research participants' experiences and understandings?). Evidence is also open to a range of interpretations that can result in very different action being taken. In social care research a debate is going on about what kinds of research are appropriate and

legitimate. There is a view that the government and social care organizations prefer a scientific approach, conducted by experts and based on experiments as used in the physical sciences, and on 'hard' data. This is set in opposition to the 'soft' data that result from qualitative interviewing and include the meanings, opinions and stories of the people who are being researched (see Butler and Pugh, 2004). The following definition was developed in the field of health, but contains the key ingredients of this scientific approach:

> Evidence-based practice is the conscientious, explicit and judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients, based on skills which allow the doctor to evaluate both personal experience and external evidence in a systematic and objective manner. (Sackett et al., 1997, p. 2)

Newman et al. (2005, p. 4) spell out what they understand by 'conscientious' (governed by a sense of duty where professionals can justify their claims to knowledge); 'explicit' (distinctly expressing all that is meant, by making clear on what basis decisions about interventions are made); and 'judicious' (exercising sound judgement grounded in experience). Few people would argue with the view that available evidence helps us in decision-making in the best interests of service users (although there are always questions about what it is actually telling us). However, there have been concerns that the model of research that currently dominates social work and social care is the scientific model that meets managerial priorities to find urgent answers to practical problems, mainly concerned with what works in regulating people's behaviour with the expectation of identifying definitive interventions in the attempt to measure change and productivity. As a result a more qualitative approach that produces evidence about the context in which problems arise, as well as the views of those who are most affected by them are dismissed as too subjective. Nevertheless one criticism of scientific approaches to evidence-based practice is that they are biased because they are unable to take account of the wider socio-economic and cultural contexts that have relevance for behaviour. They therefore distort the evidence by presenting only a partial view. Thus this advocacy of a very limited definition of social need and social research is seen as political because it poses questions and engages methods that exclude an examination of both the messiness of practice and the social structures that form the context for all our lives (see Humphries, 2003 for a fuller discussion).

A second criticism of the dominant model of evidence-based practice is as I have noted above: there is often conflicting evidence and little by way of 'proof' or certainty that allows a smooth process from

'clear findings' to application to practice. This leads to misleading beliefs that it is possible to produce reliable evidence in a way that will guide practice. This approach emphasizes the application of scientific models of measurement, normally used in controlled laboratory-type conditions, and that are not universally accepted as appropriate for research with people. The approach rests on a belief that (i) changing behaviour is a priority in the social care professions and that (ii) the best tools for understanding what works in achieving this are experiments – 'scientific observations taken in carefully controlled conditions' (Webb, 2001, p. 62). Thus if a programme of behaviour change is found to 'work' in one setting, it can be replicated and can achieve similar results elsewhere. Yet there is no certainty that successful interventions with, for example, girls thought to be at risk of delinquency in a particular housing estate will 'work' in another housing estate (see Oakley, 2000 for other examples). Later in the chapter I discuss the controversies surrounding the philosophical assumptions inherent in this model (see the section on research paradigms), but here suffice to say that it is criticized for ignoring the complex processes involved in social work and other professional interventions that are not dependent only on rational decisions. Nevertheless the view that evidence-based practice is scientific and its methods objective is a 'value-laden belief which is being constantly fostered in social work practice and government policy' (Webb, 2001, p. 74), leading to a technical view of practice that excludes professional discretion. Yet there are many factors at play in any decision about policy or intervention. For example, the belief that 'prison works' has resulted in an increase in the numbers of 18–21-year-old men imprisoned, and ignores research that suggests locking up young offenders increases the risk of youth crime (NACRO, 2001; Ramsbotham, 2001). This suggests that other influences such as political expediency are influential in the process. We also know that attempts to impose change are unlikely to work unless they have the co-operation of the people upon whom they are focused. Evidence-based practice is at risk of leaving human agency and will out of the equation. Webb's very useful critique claims that social work simply does not and cannot work in the way evidence-based practice suggests, that the methods involved are too mechanistic and that what is required are models that recognize complexity and instability in the dynamic processes of interconnections between human beings. This is an argument for keeping research options open, and for placing greater value on a range of approaches to studying human beings.

This debate is at the heart of the discussion of research models considered in this book. They are each underpinned by philosophical

assumptions that make different claims as to their effectiveness in conveying a 'true' picture of human activity, and this will be addressed as the book proceeds. So the question of whether to use qualitative or quantitative methods is not solely one of which is appropriate for a particular study. Different researchers hold strong views about the appropriateness, the effectiveness and the legitimacy of each of them and the philosophical assumptions that inform them.

The qualitative–quantitative divide

Much of the debate about competing methods centres on which are best – quantitative or qualitative methods. Since at least the 1970s researchers have argued about their beliefs in the predominance of either qualitative or quantitative approaches. Sarantakos (2005, p. 46) sets out the comparisons (see Table 1.1).

The main perceived differences are that

- Qualitative methods claim to be 'subjective' (i.e. they are concerned with the perspectives of the research subjects) and bring the researcher close to the subjects; they are flexible and can be adapted according to the context; and they see data as mutually constructed between the research subjects and the researcher.
- Quantitative methods claim to be 'objective' (they attempt to remove the researcher's views and values from the study); they emphasize cause-effect linkages; they are based on a model of the physical sciences and on strict, inflexible rules; they distance the researcher from the research subjects.

Quantitative and qualitative methods are not only different approaches to research, in the controversies around them they are

Table 1.1 Qualitative versus quantitative approaches

Quantitative	*Qualitative*
Sets researchers apart from reality	Sets researchers close to reality
Studies reality from the outside	Studies reality from the inside
Uses closed questions	Uses open methods of data collection
Employs a fixed research design	Employs a flexible research design
Captures a still picture of the world	Captures the world in action
Employs scientific/statistical methods	Employs naturalistic methods
Analyses data only after collection	Analyses data during and after collection
Chooses methods before the study	Chooses methods before/during study
Produces most useful quantitative data	Produces most useful qualitative data

Source: S Sarantakos, *Social Research*, 2005, 3rd edn. Reproduced with permission of Palgrave Macmillan.

valued differently, with each camp dismissive of the other (see Butler and Pugh, 2004; Sarantakos, 2005; Webb, 2001). The heated debate involves qualitative researchers criticizing quantitative methods as inadequate and inappropriate for research with human beings; and quantitative researchers seeing qualitative methods as 'a soft option', unsystematic and without rigour. It must be said however, that quantitative research designs appear to be those that are most favoured by governments because of their apparent potential to deliver statistically reliable answers quickly and relatively cheaply. When we speak of 'quantitative' and 'qualitative', we are not solely discussing methods, but are invoking deeper questions of what philosophical paradigms or what sets of assumptions about the social world are appropriate for the social sciences. I address these questions later under a heading of 'research paradigms'.

Meanwhile, in fact both methodologies may be used within any single research study. For example in a study of school, community and family influences on successful pathways through middle childhood, Kreider and Mayer used a mixed-method approach that included (quantitative) questionnaire surveys of the children's primary caregivers and teachers, as well as in-depth (qualitative) case studies of a sample of the children (Greene, Kreider and Mayer 2005). In spite of this, very often the ways mixed-method studies are written up reveals that the writers regard one as superior to the other, usually in the form of using qualitative studies as preliminary work to the 'real' quantitative substance of the research. Sheldon's (2001) riposte to Webb's (2001) critique of evidence-based research in social work reveals this attitude. Sheldon, while conceding that some qualitative approaches may 'have a place' (p. 806), is clear that these are no substitute for the scientific basis of the quantitative evidence-based approaches he espouses. This attempted assimilation of qualitative approaches is not a satisfactory resolution to the debate.

These debates arise because in the world of science and social science, traditional definitions of what knowledge is have lain in the domain of 'experts'. They have in general been suspicious of and have excluded from legitimate knowledge forms of knowing not originating from the quantitative domain, such as autobiography, oral history, fiction and storytelling – accounts that focus on the quality and meaning of individual experiences.

Nevertheless some writers who may lean towards one approach recognize the contribution of the other. Oakley, a feminist researcher who has advocated qualitative methods to capture women's experiences of oppression, and indeed remains suspicious about *experimental* methods, says:

> As to quantitative methods more generally, the very charting of women's oppression required quantification surely: we needed figures for women's schooling and education *vis-à-vis* that of men, the distribution and work of women in the paid and unpaid labour markets, women's earnings, the burden of health problems and so forth, in order to say to what extent the situations of men and women were (are) structurally differentiated. (2000, p. 19)

In other words, if it had not been for the large-scale quantitative studies, the reality of women's oppression (and that of other groups) might have remained at a level of individual women and might easily have been dismissed as not a common experience. The availability of data on the bigger picture makes such dismissal less likely. The goal, she argues, is for 'a democratization of ways of knowing . . . and also a synthesis of these, so that the focus is on choosing the right method for the research question' (p. 21).

Nevertheless, as is clear in the discussion about the evidence-based practice movement, there is a long way to go to reach this goal. Officially there continues to be approval of and preference for quantitative, particularly experimental or quasi-experimental, approaches and for the production of 'hard' data about 'what works'. In social work, as elsewhere, this has provoked much antagonism and debate in the literature (see, for example, Butler and Pugh, 2004; Humphries, 2003; Humphries, 2004a; Sheldon, 2001; Webb, 2001), a debate that is not new in the wider social research community, indeed has raged over decades, and is likely to go on and on.

The paradigm debate

The debate about methodology is incomplete if it is pitched only in terms of the qualitative/quantitative divide. It is symptomatic of the deeper quarrel about research paradigms.

The notion of paradigms in social research has been discussed in a variety of ways (see, for example, Hammersley, 1995). Here, for simplicity, I have identified two broad paradigms and categorized them as 'constructivist' and 'realist', though 'positivist' is used frequently, with a similar meaning to 'realist', and 'phenomenological' or 'post-positivist' have broadly similar meanings to 'constructivist'.

Thomas Kuhn defines a paradigm as a general conceptual framework that reflects a set of scientific and metaphysical beliefs within which theories are tested, evaluated and revised if necessary (see Audi, 1995). A paradigm guides people within a discipline in formulating questions deemed to be legitimate, identifying appropriate

techniques and instruments and building explanatory schemes for the phenomena under consideration. It offers a framework within which individuals or groups choose certain research directions and approaches to accomplish their research ends.

Central to the concept is the notion of belief – people's choices of paradigm depend on their values and convictions, and are influenced by historical context. The debate revolves around the incompatibility of realist and constructivist paradigms. The belief that research should aim as far as possible to exclude personal and other influences and to strive only towards the pursuit of (quantitative) knowledge is based on the realist or positivist (see Hammersley, 1995) view that the physical sciences provide the ideal model to be adopted by the social sciences. This model holds that social reality is external to the researcher, to be grasped and understood through appropriate methods that are rigorously examined and applied to remove all kinds of bias, including the prejudices of the researcher. Its 'gold standard' method is the experiment, which entails controlling the environment so that intervening variables do not contaminate the research.

This approach has been challenged by constructivists on a number of grounds. First, it is argued that research models based on the physical sciences are not appropriate for the study of human beings, who cannot be controlled in laboratory settings in the same way, and as sentient, thinking people bring their own meanings and interpretation to events. Methods that are appropriate to capture this reality must be naturalistic – that is, they must observe people going about their daily lives rather than in laboratory-type conditions, and discuss their understandings in some depth and in different settings. Moreover, it is argued that researchers are also thinking, interpreting humans contributing to the construction of reality, which may vary at different times and in different contexts. Their actions, words and understanding of events are also regarded as phenomena to be studied in detail in their own right, but are not to be removed from their environment and its influence on behaviour. Reality is not 'out there' but is actively and inevitably being constructed by both research participants and the researcher. The researcher's location in all this is as important as that of those being researched, and needs to be made available for examination and interrogation.

A constructivist paradigm recognizes the existence of multiple perceptions and plurality of world-views that can best be represented as an intricate network of human constructs. In contrast, a realist paradigm contends that there is only one independent and ordered reality, whose elements are governed by immutable natural laws of cause and effect, and which is the ultimate focus of all research

activities (see Guba, 1990). In summary, what we have are two contrasting accounts of how it is that people 'know':

> While researchers in one camp think they are studying the real world, which consists of things that it is feasible to try to find out about, those in the other dispute the idea that there is a single reality to be known, and regard the pursuit of 'hard data' as impracticable and unachievable. What for one side is a set of 'facts' is for the other a complex and impenetrable kaleidoscope of heavily constructed social meanings. Researchers in one paradigm leap in with all the faith derived from (something called) logical positivism that they will (providing they specify and measure and count enough) indeed be able to establish the truth; whereas their counterparts in the other paradigm walk much more lightly, aware of the shifting ground of human social interaction and identity, and doggedly bound to the apparently more modest goal of reproducing faithfully and democratically whatever it is they think they may have found. (Oakley, 2000, p. 25)

I have included this long quote from Oakley because it describes succinctly the opposing positions. What is signified is not so much a disagreement about techniques (e.g. quantitative and qualitative), but more *a divergence about theories of what knowledge is – ways of framing knowledge as well as means of obtaining it.* Constructivists believe that the people who are the subjects of research have knowledge about their situation, and the task of the researcher is to find ways of making that knowledge available. Realists see research subjects simply as providers of information that is analysed by the researcher and interpreted against a pre-selected set of theories – a dichotomy of 'expert' knowledge and 'lay' knowledge (this exaggerates the difference to make the point. The role of the constructivist researcher in interpretation is not as clear as this characterization suggests).

So is there no convergence between these positions? The associated question is whether the favoured methods associated with these approaches are incommensurable (having no common measure and therefore incompatible). Gendron (2001) explores this question by delineating the two paradigms according to four interconnected axes – ontological (concerned with the nature and essence of things), epistemological (the study of theories of knowledge), methodological (systems of methods and rules) and teleological (concerning the end or purpose) – in order to examine the incompatibility argument, and to help researchers to clarify and articulate their paradigmatic

assumptions. Gendron argues that a paradigm's coherence results from the interdependence of the four axes and the overlapping of their respective domains. I have adapted Gendron's model to formulate Table 1.2.

Gendron's depiction does suggest the incompatibility of constructivist and realist paradigms, and of the qualitative and quantitative methods for the most part identified with them. This raises questions for social work research. On the one hand are government policies that insist on the participation of service users in research and practice, a position that suggests qualitative and participatory research (see Chapter 4) as appropriate for studies in community care, mental health, health promotion and child care, for example. This is explicitly with a view to the transformation of services, to ensure they are relevant, appropriate and what the consumer demands. The implication here is of the active involvement of service users, practitioners and researchers at every stage, and one would expect that appropriate methods would be within a constructivist paradigm. A qualitative approach is more readily adaptable to contemporary policies of transformation in public services.

However, the currently favoured methodological approach to research in all these areas is one that draws on a realist paradigm, with an essentially quantitative approach by a neutral researcher, separate from subjects and their interests, as in the evidence-based model of practice discussed earlier. This is an approach that demands to know 'what works?' so that 'effective practice' can be replicated nationwide (Butler and Drakeford, 2001; Humphries, 2003, 2004b). As Hammersley has noted, increasing social research has focused on

> practical inquiry, geared directly to providing information that is needed to deal with some practical problem, so that the immediate audience for research reports is people with a practical interest in the issue; notably but not exclusively, policy makers and occupational practitioners. (2000, p. 224)

Not only so, but the 'practical problems' that are envisaged here are concerned with changing 'deviant' and 'anti-social' behaviour, and focused on individuals rather than social structures. The urgent teleological demand for definitive answers to social problems has led social research and social work research into a situation that ignores ontological (the nature of things) and epistemological (theories of knowledge) inconsistencies, and towards methods exclusively concerned with changes in individual behaviour.

But perhaps the arguments about incommensurability have been over-stated? We saw above an example of mixed-method inquiry,

Table 1.2 Gendron's model

Axis	*Description*	*Constructivist*	*Realist*
Ontological	Nature, constitution and structure of reality	Existence of multiple perceptions of reality	Only one independent and ordered reality
Epistemological	Defining features and limits of legitimate knowledge	Pluralist and subjectivist; knowledge is a constructed representation subject to continual change; researcher is implicated in the construction of knowledge	Knowledge is meant to reflect a world regulated by causal laws; researcher attempts to remain separate from the observed object
Methodological	Methods, procedures and techniques for perceiving the world and that allow the generation of findings and conclusions	Methods based on processes of association and relationships; multiple representations of world-views emerge. Meanings are negotiated with the various actors involved	Focus is on reductive methods in order to describe, predict and control. Observable and measurable facts and their potential replication lead to expressions of natural truth, the single reality postulated by a realist ontology
Teleological	Intentional agents are self-organized to gain their ends. This determines the course along which projects develop, and reveals the interests of adherents	Researchers share responsibility for meanings and interpretations, and are accountable for the use or misuse of knowledge. They thus participate directly in the transformation of world-views	There is no other purpose of a study other than the production of objective knowledge that can be generalized and used by others

Source: Adapted from S Gendron, 'Transformative alliance between qualitative and quantitative approaches in health promotion research', in I Rootman et al. (eds) *Evaluation in Health Promotion: principles and perspectives, Part 2, Perspectives*, 2001.

and in social work Sheldon has argued that although his evidence-based research is largely experimental, he has used qualitative methods in the same studies, to supplement quantitative approaches (Sheldon, 2001). Does this simply reflect methodological pluralism? Realists do not deny that social reality may be socially constructed. Neither do all social constructionists deny the existence of an external, independent reality.

In any case, researchers do see themselves as pragmatic, searching for and using a combination of those methods that are most suited to their research aims, whatever their philosophical origins. This is what constitutes the notion of triangulation – the use of a range of different methods in order to gain a holistic view of a research problem (Denzin, 1970). However the use of triangulation has come to be dominated by a realist paradigm in that it is commonly understood as the joint use of qualitative and quantitative methods in order to cancel the errors inherent in each and so ensure greater validity in respect of the object studied and its underlying single reality.

In her discussion of the possibility of complementarity of methods, Gendron (2001) notes that approaches that may be fundamentally different, even antagonistic, may interact to contribute to innovative research, and that such a process should not be suppressed. Lincoln and Guba (1985) call this 'multiparadigm inquiry'. They make the point that while this enables researchers to combine features of qualitative and quantitative approaches, such a combination interweaves the approaches, rather than fusing them. In critical approaches to social research for instance (see Chapter 7), researchers are interested in collecting objective data about social structures and institutions and how these act in the interests of some classes and social groupings, and against the interests of other groups in terms of class, gender and ethnicity (set within a realist paradigm). But they also insist in the legitimacy of the point of view of these oppressed groups and use methods that will make available the meanings to them of their situation (set within a constructivist paradigm). The elements composing each paradigm remain distinct and operational, and researchers have to live with the uncertainty and contingency, and the messiness this brings. Thus the importance of meaning and subjectivity can be asserted, while not denying the authority of realist ways of knowing. The question, what should be the purpose of social work research – the production of knowledge or the transformation of world-views – is answered by 'both, not one or the other'. This position would not be without methodological tensions. Transformation of world-views may require political rather than rational-technical engagement, leading researchers to abandon

pretensions of neutrality and to take sides that go far beyond debates about paradigms and methodologies.

Meanwhile the debate between constructivist and realist research paradigms continues, and is reflected in all the methods selected for presentation in this book. Moreover, it is not possible to argue that one paradigm more than the other, *per se*, is suited to research with a concern for social justice. The paradigm argument may be over-stated on a practical and technical level. Nevertheless we should not lose sight of the function of the paradigm war as a metaphor for the powerful and the powerless. In this sense, then, it is a concern in the struggle for social justice.

Conclusion: the contentious nature of social research

One conclusion from the above discussions about research-mindedness, evidence-based practice and competing methods and paradigms must be that research is both contentious and political. Conventional views of research insist that it should be value-free, politically neutral and concerned only with uncovering truth, even if that truth reveals facts and conditions that prove inconvenient to some groups. Nowadays this stance is widely regarded as naïve, and it is acknowledged generally that research never can be ‘pure’, without inherent presuppositions and external influences. Research is more than a case of ‘checking evidence’ through systematic inquiry, or concerned with cause and effect or cost-effectiveness. It is a deeply political process where competing agendas and interests are at work. There are two main ways in which research is political.

1 Inherent presuppositions

All research and indeed all human activity, is premised on beliefs or assumptions about the nature of reality. The traditional view of research, embodied in the notion of ‘objectivity’, is based on the assumption that research in the social sciences is essentially the same as research in the natural sciences, and that the same rules should apply. That means it should aim to be scientific and value-free. As we have seen in the paradigm debate, critics of this approach argue that these goals are impossible. Feminist critique for example, has shown how for many years research was dominated by male views of the world, resulting in findings that have either excluded women and made universal statements about all people based on studies of males only, or have distorted women’s experiences to the detriment of their interests (see Humphries, 2004b). In other words it is important to ask questions about where the research is coming from and who is

carrying it out, in order to examine the assumptions that impact upon any study. The presence of such presuppositions is inevitable. There is another dimension to this. Even where it is agreed that value-free social research is an unrealistic goal, there is still dispute as to whether research *should* be value-free as demanded by a realist paradigm, whether instead researchers should openly declare whose side they are on, and in whose interests they carry out their work. Some of the approaches considered in the rest of the book are explicitly concerned with social transformation. This leads us to consider external influences.

2 External influences

The other, more obvious way in which research can be regarded as political is where stakeholder interests set its agenda. Stakeholders may be government, organizations, universities, funding bodies, service users and researchers themselves, whose sectional preoccupations compete to control the direction and outcomes of the research. Even the ways research questions are asked reveal the interests of those who ask them. Think for example about the implications of these two questions: 'What are effective ways to change offending behaviour?' and 'How do offenders explain their offending behaviour?' The first is born out of a need for social order and control and thus is tightly framed, the second out of a desire to understand the perspective of the offender and is potentially more open and wide-ranging.

Some versions of research, explicitly designed to be political and to give disadvantaged groups an influence on research design, are clearly partisan. Standpoint feminism for example, holds that women's experiences are potentially more complete and less distorted than those of men, and can be made 'to yield up a truer (or less false) image of social reality' (Harding, 1987, p. 185). This idea is a controversial one, certainly not acceptable to all feminists. The disability movement has also insisted on the appropriation of research for the emancipation of disabled people (Beresford and Croft, 2004), and service users are generally more ready to challenge the expertise and the priorities of researchers, insisting on (and being encouraged by government in this) having a more controlling role.

This is not to say that social research was not political before it was politicized by these groups. There have always been vested interests in the doing of research, with obvious consequences for the autonomy of researchers. Across countries the increasing dependence of universities and social care organizations on the state, and the

involvement of business interests and corporate management practices, have brought powerful social interests more centrally into the equation, in the service of national economic goals.

The research approaches considered in this book will not avoid these complexities in the business of doing social work research, but will evaluate the extent to which the interests of those on the margins and the relatively powerless are addressed through this growing dimension of social work. Readers are invited to keep these debates in mind in reading about different approaches and to make use of them in evaluating the methods presented.

Structure of the book

The range of methods included in the book are inevitably a choice from a wider possible selection, and I have tried to include those that are most commonly used in social work, and those that appear to lend themselves to a model of research that is committed to social justice. Chapter 2 examines the moral framework of research, available to us through codes of ethics, and asks whether these are robust enough to be useful towards an aim of social justice in social work research. It also looks at the notion of justice itself and examines the ways it is understood in social work. The chapters that follow consider research based on experimental, participatory, action, case-study, critical, discourse, ethnographic, social-survey and evaluation approaches, offering a critical appraisal of each one. Each chapter is structured around a short introduction, the origins of the particular method of interest, the principles underpinning it, examples of its use in social work and social care, its limitations and its potential to contribute to social justice. The main points are then summarized, readers are asked to 'stop and think' by considering some questions, and are offered annotated suggestions for further reading. At the end of the book I offer a number of useful internet sites for other resources.

Taken altogether the book attempts not only to offer a guide to discrete and unconnected research methods, but also to be a resource for politically committed researchers in a variety of settings struggling to make their research count towards transformation of an unjust society.

main points

- Research-mindedness is increasingly important in social work practice, and it can have many different meanings
- A commitment to social justice is central to social work research
- The 'evidence' informing practice is not straightforward because
  - there is disagreement about what 'evidence' is
  - 'evidence' is seldom clear and unambiguous
  - it is open to a number of interpretations
- Qualitative and quantitative methods are valued differently by different research communities
- Research paradigms reflect our beliefs about the world, and influence researchers' choices about the questions asked, the methods used and the conclusions drawn
- Research is always contentious and political and in the interests of particular groups

stop and think

- What do you understand by 'research-mindedness' and why is it important?
- What values might inform research that aims towards social justice?
- What are some of the problems raised by the idea of 'evidence'?
- What part do research paradigms play in choosing research topics?
- Do you agree that research is always contentious, and if yes, why?

taking it further

- Butler, I and Pugh, R 'The politics of social work research', Chapter 3, in R Lovelock, K Lyons and J Powell (eds) *Reflecting on Social Work – Discipline and Profession* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004)
  A major critique of evidence-based practice in social work.
- Humphries, B 'Research mindedness', Chapter 7, in M Lymbery and K Postle (eds) *Social Work: a companion for learning* (London: Sage, 2007)
  Explores a number of dimensions of the idea of research-mindedness for social work research.
- Sarantakos, S *Social Research*, 3rd edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), Chapter 2
  An introductory and accessible discussion of qualitative and quantitative methods and the concept of paradigms.

Index

Aaron, H J, 192
abuse of children, 162–3
action, 52, 53–4 *see also* participatory action research
  cooperative action inquiry, 82
  critical action research, 75–6
  research cycles, 79–80
Adams, R, 178
age, ageing, ageism, 104, 159–60
AIDS, 160
Alston, W, 77
anti-racism, 104
Aris, R, 114
asylum seekers, 109–12 *see also* refugee children
Atkinson, P, 135, 143
Atweh, B, 83
Audi, R, 9
autobiography, 128–9

Baldwin, M, 55–6, 81–3
Barclay, A, 109–12
Barnes, C, 51, 57
Beattie, A, 153
Becker, H, 35
Bell, J, 1
Benhabib, S, 25
Benson, D, 135, 136, 139
Beresford, P, 16, 52, 57, 178
Bernard, C, 109, 11–17
Bloom, M, 183–4
Blumer, H, 137
bodily integrity, 26
Bond, M, 70, 71, 72
Booth, C, 152
Boruch, R F, 45
Bourgois, P, 146, 148
Bowles, W, 77
Bradbury, H, 76, 77
Brewer, C, 39
Briskman, L, 19, 27
British Association of Social Workers (BASW), 20
Brown, B, 44
Bryman, A, 35
Bullock, R, 78
Bulmer, M, 20
Burton, S, 161
Butler, I, 3, 8

Cameron, D, 27
Campling, J, 3–4
Carabine, J, 130–1
care, carers, 25, 160
  day care, 55–6
case, cases
  collective, 90–1
  instrumental, 90–1
  intrinsic, 90–1
  studies, 87, 129
causality, 37, 38
cause and effect, 36, 162
Cealey Harrison, W, 149
Centre for Citizen Participation, 52
child protection, 161–2
Chambers, R, 60
Chelimsky, E, 169
Cicourel, A, 135, 141–2
Clarke, A, 136

cognitive-behavioural approach, 46, 183
Cohen, L, 28, 72, 75, 78, 84
community, 64, 65
  care assessment, 81–8
  development, 181
  health, 180–3
consent, forms, 81–3
  informed, 22
contradiction, 105
control, 41–4
  group, 37
convenience, 38
conversation analysis (CA), 122–3
Cooke, B, 66
Corbin, J, 144
Cornwall, A, 50, 60, 65
covert methods, 135
Craig, G, 24–5
Crawford, P, 44
Cree, V, 129, 141–2
crisis, 105
critical conversations, 79
  dialectical, 107
  discourse analysis (CDA), 123–4, 131–2
  pluralism, 107
  theory, 104, 179
Croft, S, 16
cultural bias, 160

David, M, 89, 94, 157
Davidson, N, 153
Davies, R M, 135
Davis, A, 135
deception, 23
decision making, 163–4
deconstructive textual analysis, 117
de Koning, K, 52
Denscombe, M, 1, 190
Denzin, N K, 14, 136, 144–7, 149
  (DELTA), 54, 61
dialogue, dialectic, 75
disability, 104
discourse analysis, 129
  analytic research,121–2
  counter, 130
Dockery, G, 52
DoH, 19
domestic abuse, 88
  survivors, 114
domination, 106
Dominelli, L, 2, 109, 192
Drakeford, M, 12
Du Bois, B, 34

Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), 20, 191
education, 52, 53–4
Edwards, R, 29
elderly people, 39
Elks, M, 187
Elliott, J, 29, 71
emancipation, 105, 179
emancipatory mode, 72–4
empiricism, 36
empowerment, 67, 78
epistemology, 13
ethical research, 19
ethics, 44–5
  codes of, 20
  situated, 27
ethnicity, 161–2
ethnographic, ethnography, 89, 134, 142, 147–9
  crises in, 145–7
ethnomethodology, 139
evaluate, evaluation, 72, 74
  for accountability, 169
  for development, 169
  for knowledge, 169
  formative, 175
  fourth generation, 171
  outcome, 173–6
  participatory, 178
  process, 173–6
  reflexive, 173
  summative, 176, 181
  utilization-focused evaluation, 171
Evans, C, 57
Everitt, A, 3, 170, 191
evidence-based practice, 4–7
existential sociology, 136
experimental group, 37
experiments, 33
external influences, 16

fact-finding, 70
Fairclough, N, 123, 124, 126–8
Fawcett, B, 108, 109, 117
Felton, K, 70
feminism, feminist, 104, 114–16, 129
Ferguson, I, 31, 109–12
Finch, J, 93
Fine, M, 135
Fisher, M, 57
fit for purpose, 190
focus groups, 94, 110
Fook, J, 28, 108, 125
foster care, carers, 39–40, 78–9
  gay, 95–7
  lesbian, 95–7
Foucault, M, 67, 124–5, 131, 121, 131
Fowler, F J, 155
Frankfurt School, 105
Franklin, A, 163–4
Fraser, N, 27, 104
Freed, A O, 29
Freire, P, 52
Friedson, E, 20
Frith, H, 123
Fuller, R, 170, 189

Garfinkel, H, 138
Gaventa, J, 63
gay men's health, 59–60
Gendron, S, 11, 13
genealogical analysis, 124–6, 130
generalisability, 36, 153
generalisation, analytic, 10
  statistical, 100
Geoghegan, M, 95
Giddens, A, 106
Gillman, M, 87
Glaser, B, 143
Glasgow Association for Mental Health, 112
goals, terminal, 186–7
  instrumental, 186–7
Goldberg, M, 39
Gomm, R, 37, 94, 157
Gould, N, 179
Graham, H, 112–14
grand narratives, 118
Green, L W, 171
Greene, J C, 8
grounded theory, 143–4
Grundy, S 69, 72–3
Guba, E G, 11, 14, 171
Guy, W, 165

Habermas, J, 105
Hague, G, 109, 114–16
Hall, B, 28, 51, 53
Hall, S, 124
Hammersley, M, 12, 135, 143, 144, 149
Hardiker, P, 142
Harding, S, 16, 70, 193
Hart, E, 70, 71, 72
Harvey, L, 104, 107, 118, 155–6, 157
Hayes, D, 6
health inequalities, 112–14
Healthy Gay City (HGC), 59
Hepworth, J, 34
Heritage, J, 122
Hicks, C, 44
Hicks, S, 95–7
Holt, N L, 144
Hood–Williams, J, 149
hooks, b, 193
Horobin, G, 135
Howarth, D, 132
Hudson, S, 160
Hughes, J A, 135, 136, 139
Humphreys, C, 78–81
Humphreys, L, 135
Humphries, B, 21, 26, 40–1, 47, 106, 173, 186, 194
Hungler, B, 44
hypothesis, 36

identity, 26
insider (information), 79
interdependence, 25
International Association of Schools of Social Work (IASSW), 19
International Federation of Social Workers (IFSW), 19
interpreters, 29

interpretive communities, 140
sociology, 135
interview, interviews, 89, 92–4, 110
interviewer effect, 42
intimacy, 25

Jewkes, R, 50, 60, 65
Jones, C, 31, 192
Jones, J H, 34
Jones, M, 109
Jordan, B, 31, 47
Jordan, C, 47

Keider, H, 8
Kelly, E, 135
Kelly, L, 109, 161
Kemmis, S, 70, 71, 74, 83
kinship, 95
Kirk, S A, 151,158
Kirkhart, K, 187
Kirkpatrick, S A, 33
Kitzinger, C, 123
knowledge, nature of, 63
Kotari, U, 66
Kreider, H, 95
Kreuter, M W, 171
Krug, G, 34

Lait, J, 39
Land, H, 160
language, 127, 131
Lather, P, 147, 149
Lavalette, M, 31
legitimation, crisis in, 146
Leonard, P, 108
Levitas, R, 165
Lewin, C, 28, 69, 154, 155, 157
Lincoln, Y, 144
Lishman, J, 169–70
Lyle, C, 55–8

Macdonald, G, 40, 46
Macdonald, M, 155–6, 157
Maguire, P, 52, 65
Manion, L, 28, 72, 75, 78, 84
Mark, R, 1
Martin, M, 21, 52, 64, 65
Marxism, 104, 130
Max-Con-Min rule, 37
Mayer, E, 8, 95
Mayhew, H, 152
McKie, L, 180–3
McLaughlin, K, 31
McTaggart, R, 70, 71, 74, 78
measurement, 154
mental health, 109–12
Mercer, G, 51, 57
Metcalfe, F, 78–81
methodological questions, 62–6
methodology, 13
Mienczakowski, J, 53, 61
Mooney, G, 31
Moran, R, 191
Morgan, S, 128–9
Morpeth, L, 78
Morrison, K L, 28, 72, 75, 78, 84
Morrow, R A, 105, 107
Mort, F, 152
Mosse, D, 66, 67
motherhood, unmarried, 130
mothers, 162–3
black, 116–17
Mullender, A, 109, 114–16

narrative methods, 139–40
National Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders (NACRO), 47
National Occupational Standards, 2
natural, naturalistic methods, 89, 134, 138
need, assessment of, 142–3
New Deal for Lone Parents, 130
New Labour policy, 126–7
Newman, T, 5
Noble, C, 19, 27
non-reactive techniques, 138

Oakley, A, 4, 9, 11, 152, 166, 193
objective, objectivity, 36, 62, 69, 153
objectivist tradition, 136
O'Brien, J, 55–8
observation, non-participant, 114
Office for National Statistics, 112
Ong, B N, 61
ontology, 13

Onyett, S, 110
Orme, J, 5

paradigm, 9–15
  constructivist, 9–15
  multiparadigm inquiry, 14
  realist, 9–15
Park, P, 54
Parker, H, 135
participant observation, 88, 135
participation, 25, 52, 53–4
  collaborative, 50
  collegiate, 50
  consultative, 50
  contractual, 50
  nature of, 163
  service-user, 114
  tyranny of, 66–7
participative inquiry, 81
participatory action research (PAR), 55, 77–8
participatory mapping, 60
Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), 54
Patton, M Q, 144, 70, 186
Pawson, R, 172, 174
Payne, G, 74
Payne, J, 74
Pease, B, 108
Petch, A, 170
phenomenology, 136
Phillimore, P, 53
Pitcairn, K, 56
Platt, J, 87
Plummer, K, 139–41
policy makers, 47–8
political questions, 64–6
Polit-O'Hara, D, 44
population, 36
  bisexual, 59
postmodernism, 104, 136
post-test, 37
Potts, M K, 159–60
Powell, F, 95
power, 74, 117, 122, 124, 131, 192
practical mode, 72–4
practitioner-researcher, 183
praxis, 106
  crisis in, 147
precision, 38
prediction, 38
presuppositions, inherent, 15
pre-test, 37
privacy, 22
Pugh, R, 3, 9

qualitative methods, 7–9
Quality Assurance Agency (QAA), 2
quantitative analysis, 157
  methods, 7–9, 115, 152
questionnaires, 93, 114, 155–7, 163

Ramsbotham, Sir D, 6
randomised control trial (RCT), 34
Reason, P, 51, 76, 77
recognition, 27
redistribution, 27
reflection-in-action, 82
  -on action, 82
reflective practitioner, 75, 179–80
reflexivity, 28–30, 75, 108, 144, 194
refugee children, 97–100 *see also* asylum seekers
Regan, L, 161
Reid, W J, 88
Reinharz, S, 35, 45, 151
reliability, 36, 62–3, 153
replication, 38, 153
representation
  crisis in, 145–6
  of reality, 120
representativeness, 43, 153, 163
research
  emancipatory, 51
  evidence, 25
  feminist, 52
  mindedness, 2–4, 189
  process of, 43–4
  strategies, 190–1
  user-controlled, 56–9, 109
researcher effect, 135
resistance, 106
Roberts, H, 40
Robson, C, 171, 175, 177–8
Rokeach, K, 187
Rootman, I, 52, 171, 172
Rose, H, 35

Rossiter, A, 26
Rowntree, B S, 153
Royse, D R, 1
Rundall, T G, 45
Rutter, J, 97–100

Sackett, D L, 5
sample, 36
sampling, 59, 154–5
  cluster, 155
  frame, 165
  opportunity, 155
  purposive, 155
  simple random, 154
  snowball, 59, 155
  stratified, 154
  systematic, 154
Sarantakos, S, 38, 41, 76, 84, 89, 100, 157, 176
Schön, D A, 75, 179
Schostak, J F, 91
Schutt, R K, 157
Schutz, A, 138
secondary analysis, 113, 166
sexual abuse (of children), 116–17
sexuality, 105
Shadish, W R, 169, 174
Shaw, A, 24
Shaw, I, 24, 170, 171, 172, 174
Sheldon, B, 8
Sheppard, M, 1
single parents, 40–1
  system design, 183
situational analysis, 136
Smith, A, 88
Smith, G, 135, 142–3
Social Care Institute for Excellence (SCIE), 2
social impact, 21
  justice, 19, 24–7
  practice, 69, 126
  supports (in retirement), 159–60
social services departments (SSDs), 163
Somekh, B, 28, 157
Soper, P, 163–4
Soydan, H, 161–2
spiral of (research) cycles, 69
Stake, R E, 90
stakeholders, 171, 174–5
Stanley, L, 22
Stapf, K H, 37
Stark, S, 87
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), 157
statistics, 151, 157–8
  official, 165
Strauss, A, 143
subjectivist tradition, 136
surveys, 151, 164
Sutton, C, 89, 94, 157
symbolic interactionism, 136, 137–8, 139–40

Tandon, R, 53
Taylor, S, 120, 121–2, 144
teacher-as-researcher, 70–1
technical mode, 72–4
technical questions, 63–4
teleology, 13
Temple, B, 29, 191
textual analysis, 128
Theatre for Development, 54, 61
theory–practice divide, 70
Third Way, 126
Tilley, N, 172, 174
Torrance, H, 87
Townsend, P, 53
transnational welfare, 26
triangulation, 14, 95, 98–9
Trinh, T M-la, 144
Truman, C, 20, 23, 50, 59–60
Tuck, V, 162–3
Tuhiwai-Smith, L, 52
Turner, S P, 34, 57

validity, 36, 62–3, 153
Van Dijk, T, 123
Vanstone, M, 38
variables, 154
  dependent, independent, 36–7
vignettes, 99, 161
voice, 25, 26
volunteers, 40–1

Walshe, K, 45
Walter, I, 2

Weatherell, M, 120
Webb, S A, 3, 6
Weber, M, 134
Weeks, J, 194
Weeks, P, 83
Weiss, C H, 47, 171
Weiss, L, 135
Welbourne, A, 60
welfare reform, 127–8
Western Isles, 180
Weyts, A, 78
Whyte, W F, 75, 135
Wilkins, P, 5
Williams, C, 161–2
Williams, F, 25–6
Wiltshire and Swindon Users
Network, 57
Wiltshire Independent Living Fund
(WILF), 57–9
Wodak, R, 132
Wooffitt, R, 122

Yar, M, 27
Yates, S J, 120, 121
Yin, R K, 88, 91, 100–1, 190
Young, I M, 27