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# 1

## Introduction

On 29 June 2000, the Parti Québécois government of Quebec created the Commission des États généraux sur la situation et l'avenir de la langue française au Québec (Commission of the Estates general on the situation and future of the French language in Quebec). Fearing that the future of French in Quebec might be threatened by such new realities as increased ethnic diversity and globalisation, the government armed the Commission with the following mandate (Gouvernement du Québec 2001a: i):

- to identify and analyse the main factors which influence the situation and future of the French language in Quebec;
- to determine the relevant avenues and priorities for action;
- to examine the sections of the Charter of the French language concerned;
- to make recommendations that aim to ensure the use, scope and quality of the French language in Quebec.

To carry out their task, President Gérald Larose and his team of nine commissioners and one secretary held a series of regional and national public hearings, themed conference sessions and an international conference in the last two months of 2000 and the first few months of 2001, which resulted in a long list of submissions and presentations which informed the Commission's deliberations.<sup>1</sup> In its final report, the Larose Commission, as it was commonly known, had become convinced that:

more than ever, the language question must not be dealt with in a one-dimensional manner. Quebec is a plural society, and French, the official, common language, is a key factor in its social cohesiveness. Quebecers are ready to move on to another phase. There is a common will to work towards an inclusive social project, to construct a common life space and to lower the barriers that divide Quebec society according to ethnic origin. (Gouvernement du Québec 2001a: 4)<sup>2</sup>

While many of its 149 recommendations have not been acted upon, the report of the Larose Commission nonetheless constitutes a milestone. More than any other previous document, it squarely places Quebec language policy and planning within the framework of the new civic approach to national identity which seeks to unite Quebecers of all ethnic origins. As such, the report lays the foundation for a new approach to language policy and planning which is better suited to the realities of Quebec in the twenty-first century. That the Larose Commission has already served as an inspiration in this respect is evidenced by the new directions proposed in the recent publication *Le français au Québec. Les nouveaux défis* (French in Quebec: The New Challenges) (Stefanescu and Georgeault 2005).

### 1.1 Aims, methodology and structure of the book

Using the report of the Larose Commission as a point of departure, the present book wishes to contribute to the wider debate about the new civic approach to national identity within a global perspective. Much of the discussion has been dominated by the disciplines of political science, political philosophy and sociology. The authors seek to complement these perspectives by making a contribution informed by sociolinguistic preoccupations. Unlike some other studies not inspired by sociolinguistics, the present book thus never underestimates the role of language, which is regarded here as an important and inevitable component of national identity. Moreover, language is considered in all its dimensions: not only does the book focus on the macro issues of the sociolinguistic situation in Quebec (e.g., language planning, language attitudes), it also examines the micro level (e.g., linguistic variation, the standardisation of Quebec French), which is usually neglected in non-sociolinguistic treatments of language issues.

While other disciplines can benefit from a sociolinguistic contribution, sociolinguistics itself can also learn from other fields. In recent years, there has been a wave of sociolinguistic publications on national identity, nationalism and the nation. However, many of these make no mention of the useful theoretical paradigms that have been developed in other fields. One of the aims of the present study is therefore to do precisely this. In short, it is hoped that the pluridisciplinary approach adopted here will lead to a more comprehensive understanding of the complex relationship between language and national identity, not only in Quebec, but also in a broader sense.

Indeed, Quebec constitutes a unique laboratory for studying the relationship between language and nation in general, hence the reason why it is often cited in literature on the topic in other contexts around the globe. The amount of reflection on questions of language and/or national identity in Quebec is undeniably impressive. In the words of one commentator, '[f]rom a comparative point of view, there are not many places in the world where there have been so many innovative reflections about the politics of identity'

(Karmis 2004: 81). Some cynics may claim that this is a sign of Quebec's obsession with itself. Considering the highly critical nature of the debate at times, however, it is more likely that it is a sign of the search by Quebec society as a whole for some kind of social harmony.

Without a doubt, Quebec has a lot to teach the world; but it can learn a lot from the world too, and at times one cannot help but notice that a comparative dimension is lacking in the domestic debate. Another aim of the present study is therefore to introduce some elements of comparison with other contexts (albeit limited by space constraints), especially those about which the authors have first-hand knowledge. Moreover, while the perspective of insiders is crucial to obtain an in-depth understanding of the intricacies and subtleties of the situation, the role of outsiders is equally valid, ensuring, as it does, a more objective perspective. In this sense, the authors of the present study can benefit from being neither Quebecers nor English-speaking North Americans, at the same time as they are proficient enough in both French and English to be able to engage in the debate from both sides. Together with writing in English, this puts them in good stead to address a challenge identified by the Larose Commission:

In Canada and abroad, Quebec language policy is too often perceived negatively. The business world and the media in particular know little about it. For their part, the Americans remain opposed to legislation which to them appears to reduce individual liberties and limit the use of English. For them, language and culture are two separate elements; they have difficulty seeing how the protection of Quebec culture also includes the protection of the French language, even though 25 American states have adopted declarations proclaiming English to be the official language. We therefore need to encourage the perception that Quebec culture is part of the North American heritage and needs to be protected. It is equally important to correct the erroneous perceptions regarding Quebec language legislation and its application. (Gouvernement du Québec 2001a: 184)

The research on which the present book is based made use of two methodologies. The main methodology involved the synthesis and analysis of primary and secondary materials. Primary sources included official publications and empirical studies; secondary sources included academic articles and monographs as well as debates in newspapers such as *Le Devoir*, *La Presse* and *The Gazette*. As a complement to the main methodology, the research also made use of semi-structured interviews with officials from various Quebec government bodies as well as academics specialising in fields of interest to the project (see Acknowledgements). These interviews were not the object of analysis *per se*, but rather served predominantly to obtain a more impressionistic idea of where Quebec is at and the direction in which it is heading with regard to questions of both language and national identity.

To be sure, it is possible to identify common ground in these areas, despite a variety of political opinions amongst the Quebec population at large. For example, with regard to language policy and planning, Gervais (2001) notes the fundamental similarities between the three main political parties in Quebec: the Parti Québécois (PQ), the Parti Libéral du Québec (PLQ) and the Action démocratique du Québec (ADQ). For the purposes of this book, it is thus of no major significance that a PLQ government was elected barely two years after the publication of the Larose Commission's report (see Appendix for the dates of office of recent Quebec premiers, as well as of federal prime ministers). Even if they disagree on detail, all three parties in fact favour state intervention in matters of language, efforts to improve the quality of French spoken in Quebec, the learning of other languages and increased powers for Quebec concerning immigration (the latter, as will be seen, concerning questions of language policy and planning as well as national identity). As for attitudes towards national identity in more general terms, despite the obviously varying degrees of affiliation to Quebec and Canada respectively, it has often been noted that '[even] Quebec federalists are Quebec nationalists, first and foremost' (Lucien Bouchard, former premier of Quebec, cited in Beiner 2003: 178). While the views of individual parties and/or governments are stressed in those cases where there are clear differences of opinion (e.g., regarding the notion of a Quebec citizenship), the relative overall consistency both in matters of language and national identity explains why mention is often made in this book simply to 'Quebec' or 'the Quebec authorities'.

Irrespective of political persuasion, Quebec as a whole is caught between two movements: an affirmation of difference, in its fight to promote an identity distinct from that of Anglophone Canada and the United States, and an opening up to the 'other', as immigration brings with it increasing ethnic and linguistic diversity, and as Quebec increasingly seeks some form of reconciliation with Aboriginal peoples and a rapprochement with Anglophones in the province. The challenge of finding the right balance between these movements is more important now than ever and is reflected in the main research questions of this study:

- In its effort to maintain a distinct national identity, how is Quebec dealing with the new realities of ethnic diversity and globalisation?
- What is Quebec doing to forge a sense of common identity through language?
- To what extent is official policy concerning these issues compatible with the diverse experiences of minorities in Quebec?

These three research questions form the basis of the three parts of the book. As the first of the three chapters included in Part I on the new challenges of ethnic diversity and globalisation, Chapter 2 traces the development of the civic, territorial conception of Quebec identity that began in the wake of the Quiet Revolution, when Quebec society underwent a major transformation

as a result of modernisation and secularisation. In the post-1995 referendum period, this new civic identity has come to define itself predominantly in terms of citizenship, in particular the idea of a Quebec citizenship to exist alongside Canadian citizenship, and designed to foster an integrative attachment to Quebec and unite Quebecers of all ethnic origins.

Chapter 3 addresses the question of national identity in a more theoretical way, by examining some of the better-known and more developed models of nation that have been proposed for Quebec. The ethnic conception of nation especially prominent in the past has provoked attempts to redefine the nation in strictly civic terms. These latter, highly abstract conceptions of the nation have in turn triggered models which seek to reintroduce ethnic elements into an overall civic framework.

In addition to the challenge of accommodating ethnic diversity, contemporary Quebec also faces the realities of a globalising world where English is the global *lingua franca*. Chapter 4 evaluates to what extent Quebec is able to take advantage of the opportunities that globalisation throws up to 'act locally' through global cooperation, in order to further its own linguistic and cultural ends. The chapter focuses on significant linguistic and cultural issues raised in the two major global arenas of importance for Quebec, that of the Americas, as a site of linguistic and cultural plurality, and that of *la Francophonie*, viewed as an alternative global linguistic network to the English-speaking world.

As the first of two chapters included in Part II on the use of a common language to forge a sense of common identity, Chapter 5 examines the effect that the new civic approach to national identity in Quebec has had on efforts to maintain and promote the status of French there. Following a brief outline of the main milestones of status planning in Quebec, the chapter examines how the authorities hope to encourage the adoption of French as the language of public communications amongst a growing number of immigrants, the group of Quebecers upon whom the future of French is now understood to depend.

Chapter 6 focuses on the debate over the variety of French to be promoted in Quebec: French as commonly used in Quebec (also called *français d'ici*) or French as used in France (often confused with the notions of *français standard* and *français international*)? From the original myth of a French Canadian patois that arose in the nineteenth century, French-speaking Quebecers have suffered from a sense of linguistic insecurity because of the perceived lack of quality associated with their variety. With the more recent civic approach to Quebec identity, questions are now being asked about the kind of French that Quebec should offer its new immigrants and whether French-speaking Quebecers need to give up their particular variety and adopt a so-called 'international French' in order to be truly civic.

Part III contains three chapters which focus on the diverse experiences of minorities in Quebec. Chapter 7 examines specifically how immigrants

themselves understand their relationship to Quebec society and explores the range of meanings that belonging can have for Quebecers of immigrant background, not least a sense of attachment to Montreal, rather than Quebec, and to multilingualism, rather than French alone.


Chapter 8 focuses on the extent to which Anglophone Quebecers can truly feel a sense of belonging to Quebec, and inversely whether the Francophone majority can fully accept Anglophones as 'true' Quebecers. The chapter also discusses the blurring of boundaries between the two groups, through growing bilingualism and mixing, particularly among the younger generation of Anglophones.

Chapter 9 examines how well official rhetoric on the linguistic rights of Aboriginal peoples in Quebec, as set out in policy documents and new agreements between the provincial and federal governments and various Aboriginal nations, squares with the vitality of Aboriginal languages within Aboriginal communities themselves.

A final chapter summarises the findings in terms of the three main research questions posed above. In addition, it considers how these questions may play out in the future, and suggests how the Quebec experience in these matters can inform other contexts around the globe. Before this book proceeds any further, however, it is necessary to define the main concepts that underpin the discussions in the various chapters: social identity, ethnic identity, ethnicity, ethnic group, national identity, nationalism, nation, globalisation and citizenship. These basic concepts are extremely complex and are the object of intense investigation themselves. Given space constraints, the treatments provided here focus on those aspects which are of most relevance to the topic at hand.

## 1.2 Social identity

If the word 'identity' derives from the Latin *idem* meaning 'same', the construction of identity is first and foremost about difference. Indeed, all identity is defined in contradistinction to other identities of the same type, a dynamic which is clearly demonstrated with regard to identities of a group or social nature (Eriksen 1993: 10, 62): Canadian identity is largely defined in contradistinction to American identity, gay identity in contradistinction to heterosexual identity, etc. This differentiation of oneself from the 'other' lies at the heart of theoretical considerations of social identity. Developed in the field of the social psychology of intergroup relations, social identity theory (Tajfel 1974, 1978; Tajfel and Turner 1986), for example, relies on a series of concepts which are linked together in a causal sequence. As part of the overall socialisation process, individuals learn from an early age to categorise themselves and others into social groups. From the individual's perspective, people either belong to the same group (ingroup) or another group (outgroup). The awareness that individuals have of their own social group and



**Figure 1.1** The process of constructing social identity (according to social identity theory)

the positive or negative values associated with membership in that group is known as their social identity (Giles, Bourhis and Taylor 1977: 319). According to the theory, when comparing social groups, individuals will favour the ingroup and discriminate against outgroups. This ingroup-centric behaviour, which makes use of popular myths and stereotypes, seeks to generate or maintain a state of psychological distinctiveness, which in turn leads to a positive social identity. A basic assumption of the theory is that social groups in Western societies strive to create and maintain positive identities. Moreover, identity is not something static; the phenomenon in question is better understood as an identification process (Hall 1990: 222; 1996: 4). As it is forever ongoing, the process of constructing social identity described above is thus naturally cyclical (see Figure 1.1).

Social identity theory also makes use of a distinction between ‘secure’ and ‘insecure’ identities (Tajfel 1978). Social comparisons and identities are said to be secure when ‘status relations are perceived as immutable, a part of the fixed order of things’ (Tajfel and Turner 1986: 22): the dominant group remains dominant and the minorities remain subordinate. More frequently, however, social comparisons and identities can be considered as insecure. The existence of ‘cognitive alternatives’ (Tajfel and Turner 1986: 22), which render other states of affairs conceivable, is what made it possible, for example, for French speakers in Quebec to become *maîtres chez eux* (‘masters in their own home’) by means of a struggle in the early 1960s known as the Quiet Revolution (see Section 2.1). But insecure identities do not only apply to subordinate groups, they can also affect majority groups: ‘Any threat to the distinctly superior position of a group implies potential loss of positive comparisons and possible negative comparisons, which must be guarded against’ (Tajfel and Turner 1986: 22). In insecure situations, dominant groups regarding their superiority as legitimate tend to intensify the existing differences to maintain their psychological distinctiveness and resulting

positive social identity. This intensification of differences is usually manifested by a heightened sense of identity amongst the dominant group, and increased discrimination against minority outgroups. As for these latter groups, an insecure identity implies that the group no longer accepts its subordinate status. Attempts are made to improve this status and generate a more positive identity by employing one or more of the following identity strategies (Tajfel and Turner 1986: 19–20): individual mobility, social creativity and social competition.

Individual mobility refers to an individual's decision to dissociate him or herself from the ingroup and assimilate to the dominant outgroup. This is a strategy frequently observed amongst immigrants. For example, immigrants in Quebec tended in the past to assimilate to the English-speaking elite. Following language legislation introduced in the 1970s (see Chapter 5), more and more immigrants began to assimilate to the French-speaking (and now dominant) majority. Even though emphasis is today placed on integration as opposed to assimilation, individual mobility continues to be a strategy used by many immigrants, especially those of second and later generations (see Chapter 7).

As for social creativity, this is a strategy at the group level which can take three main forms. First, previously negatively-viewed symbols can be redefined in a more positive light. For instance, while indigenous populations, such as the eleven Aboriginal nations that exist within Quebec's territories (see Chapter 9), used to be dismissed because of their 'primitive' lifestyles, these same lifestyles can now be considered more ecological than those of consumer-orientated Western societies. Second, new positively-viewed symbols may be created: marginalised groups find new ways to distinguish themselves by creating new counter cultures. Such a strategy was observed by Roosens (1989) in his work on the Hurons in Quebec, in particular concerning the reinterpretation of history by Huron leaders in order to revive their dying culture:

[T]hese Indians [*sic.*] had set out deliberately to develop a Huron *counterculture*. When I compared the characteristics of this neo-Huron culture with the culture depicted in the historical records, most of the modern traits, virtually everything, were 'counterfeit'; the folklore articles, the hair style, the mocassins, the 'Indian' parade costumes, the canoes, the pottery, the language, the music. (Roosens 1989: 46–7)

The last form of social creativity involves the selection of alternative, less favourable outgroups for comparison. For example, a minority may consider itself as the most dominant within a hierarchy of minorities in a given society. Indeed, Rosenberg and Simmons (1972) found that Blacks who made comparisons with other Blacks, rather than Whites, demonstrated a more positive social identity. Alternatively, social comparisons can be made on other dimensions, such as class rather than ethnicity.

The third strategy used by groups to generate a positive identity is known as social competition. Unlike social creativity, which has as a goal the improvement of the group's *subjective* social status, this strategy involves the competition for *objective* resources (Tajfel and Turner 1986: 20). A good example of this strategy was the desire of French speakers in Quebec to reverse the socio-economic inequality of the past: while in 1961, French Canadians were at the bottom of the salary scale of 14 ethnic groups, just above Italians and Aboriginal peoples, by 1980 a bilingual Francophone was earning on average more than a bilingual or monolingual Anglophone (Dion 1991: 297). As such resources are scarce, social competition can lead to conflict and antagonism between the groups in question. It is pursued nonetheless because of its ability to generate more favourable social comparisons, which in turn result in a positive social identity.

While social identity theory was designed to explain those instances when individuals choose to act as a group, it is nonetheless recognised that individuals sometimes desire to stress their personal identity, or even an identity at a higher level. Self-categorisation theory (Turner 1985; Turner *et al.* 1987: 42–67; Turner and Oakes 1989), which can be used in conjunction with social identity theory, was developed precisely to determine the level of identity – personal/individual, social/group or human – that a person emphasises at any given moment. Contrary to what one might initially think, social identity theory can also accommodate what is often called ‘multiple identities’. This term is sometimes used to denote an individual's ability to simultaneously enjoy different social identities: he or she may belong to a certain ethnic group, but at the same time feel part of a larger religious community, a member of a certain socio-economic class, of a particular gender category, etc. (see A. D. Smith 1991: 4–8). Such phenomena pose no challenge to social identity theory, however, as the identification processes occur concurrently at these various levels of identity. The ‘multiple identities’ of interest here are those which exist *at the same level of identification*, when individuals belong to multiple groups *of the same nature*, for example when they are perceived to have two or more ethnic identities. On the surface, these are problematic for the theory, which implies that there is one positively-viewed ingroup, while all outgroups are considered unfavourably. What of those Quebecers, for example, who do not have difficulty in reconciling their Quebec and Canadian identities? Social identity theory would seem at first to assume that one of these identities must be viewed negatively. This would be the case if indeed we were talking about two separate identities, but in fact the term ‘multiple identities’ is somewhat of a misnomer: while one can indeed speak of multiple affinities or loyalties, individuals only ever have one identity. As Maalouf (1998: 34) stresses: ‘identity is made up of multiple allegiances; but it is essential to equally stress the fact that it is one, that we experience it as a whole.’ Even if they are hybrid in nature, so-called ‘multiple identities’ are nonetheless separate entities distinct from other

identities. In practice, this means that the identity of a Quebecer who feels both Quebecer and Canadian is constructed in contradistinction to the identities of both those who feel only Canadian and those who feel only Quebecer.

### 1.3 Ethnic identity, ethnicity and the ethnic group

As a form of social identity, ethnic identity is constructed in opposition to other ethnic identities. Indeed, '[t]o speak of an ethnic group in total isolation is as absurd as to speak of the sound from one hand clapping' (Eriksen 1993: 9).

A community which enters into no contact whatever with other races, languages, and cultures thinks of itself as representing the human species rather than any of its branches. This fact is reflected in the ethnic names which primitive [*sic.*] peoples like to give themselves when asked who they are: 'men.' On first contact with people of another breed, the initial reaction is to treat them as ancestors. (Pipes 1975: 454)

Such an observation raises questions about the very nature of ethnicity. Primordialist approaches insist that ethnicity is a 'given' of human existence, the product of blood ties, meaning that ethnic identity is an immutable property of the group (Shils 1957; Geertz 1973). As such, primordialism has today 'acquired pejorative connotations of fixity, essentialism and naturalism' (A. D. Smith 2001: 53). By contrast, situational or constructivist accounts view ethnic identity as malleable, varying with the particular situation and dependent on how individuals wish to portray themselves at particular times (A. Cohen 1974a). The latter approach opens the way for an instrumental or political use of ethnicity, for example by elites who wish to mobilise large groupings to support their pursuit of power (Brass 1991; see also A. D. Smith 1991: 20; Bulmer 2001: 71). However, as many commentators point out, if ethnic identities were created wholly through political processes, then it would be possible to convince individuals that they were of another ethnicity: 'Since such a feat is evidently not possible, ethnicity must have a non-instrumental, non-political element' (Eriksen 1993: 55). Clearly, a combination of both primordialism and situationalism must be included in any definition of an ethnic group, such as that given by A. D. Smith (1991: 20):

An ethnic group is a type of cultural collectivity, one that emphasizes the role of myths of descent and historical memories, and that is recognized by one of more cultural differences like religion, customs, language or institutions. Such collectivities are doubly 'historical' in the sense that not only are historical memories essential to their continuance but each such ethnic group is the product of specific historical forces and is therefore subject to historical change and dissolution.

Somewhat related to the primordialism/situationalism debate, another difficulty involved in the definition of ethnicity concerns its relationship with culture. At one extreme are those narrow definitions of ethnicity which clearly distinguish it from culture on account of its putative link to biological descent (e.g., Poole 1999: 39). Not only is this view supported by certain scholars, it also tends to dominate in certain languages. For example, '[t]he connotations of *ethnie* ("ethnic group") in French are sometimes uncomfortably close to obsolete notions of race or reifying notions of "cultures" ' (Eriksen 1993: 161). The reality is that most ethnic groups cannot speak so much of biological descent as a *mytho*-biological descent, a 'fictive' or 'metaphoric kinship' (Eriksen 1993: 34, 68; see also A. D. Smith 2001: 52). At the other extreme are those commentators who collapse ethnicity and culture completely. For example, A. Cohen (1974b) argues that London stockbrokers can be considered as an ethnic group since they are relatively endogamous (they tend to marry within the same socio-economic class) and share a sense of culture. To be sure, it is often difficult to draw the line between the two concepts. As G. Bouchard (1999: 26) points out:

it seems that there does not exist a precise definition of ethnicity which clearly brings out its specificity in relation to culture in a global sense. Consequently, these two notions overlap and it is never clear to what extent realities which pertain to one are also included in the other. (see also G. Bouchard 1997: 128)

In light of this difficulty, the present study adopts a position halfway between the two extremes described above by understanding ethnic identity in a broad sense, which implies a significant amount of overlap with cultural identity. It nonetheless clearly distinguishes the two concepts because of the myth of common descent, the '*sine qua non* of ethnicity' (A. D. Smith 1986: 24).

That common descent should be understood in mythical terms highlights the fact that ethnic identity relies to a great extent on subjective attributes. Indeed, other characteristics of ethnic groups, such as shared historical memories and the attachment to a certain territory that is sometimes present, also have a largely mythical and subjective quality (A. D. Smith 1991: 22–3). Owing to the importance of this subjective dimension, a useful way of looking at ethnic identity is in terms of boundaries (Barth 1969). This approach has the effect of shifting the emphasis from objective cultural content, which is in fact quite fluid over time, in order to focus on the subjective attitudes and representations of individual group members. As such, 'Barth further argues that cultural variation may indeed be an *effect* and not a *cause* of boundaries' (Eriksen 1993: 39). In a sense, Barth's approach can thus be considered situational in nature; it explains how cultural content can be manipulated or politicised in order to maximise psychological distinctiveness *vis-à-vis* other ethnic groups. As the sociologist explains himself, 'some

cultural factors are used by the actors as signals and emblems of differences, others are ignored, and in some relationships radical differences are played down and denied' (Barth 1981: 203).<sup>3</sup>

With the help of social identity theory, Barth's observation can explain, for example, why it is language which has become the primary attribute of Quebec culture. Since the Quiet Revolution, when Quebec underwent a rapid process of liberalisation and modernisation (see Section 2.1), many French-speaking Quebecers feel that the only thing that separates them from Anglophone Canadians both inside or outside Quebec is their language (Dion 1991: 304): 'language provides the best fit for self-categorization in terms of maximising the contrast in differences between and similarities within groups in contemporary Québec' (Sachdev and Bourhis 1990: 218–19).

A final consideration about ethnic identity is that it is not merely for minorities. Even if they prefer to speak of national identity or patriotism (see Section 1.4), 'majorities and dominant peoples are no less "ethnic" than minorities' (Eriksen 1993: 4). As such, we can speak of both an English and a French Canadian ethnic group (Breton 1988). With the decline of the concept of French Canada (see Section 2.1), some commentators have rejected the latter, considering the term 'French Canadian' as outdated and laden with negative connotations. There has been much debate about what to call the ethnic majority in Quebec instead; alternatives include *Québécois* (as opposed to 'Quebecer') (Adelman 1995; Feldstein 2003: xvii–xviii), 'Francophone Quebecers' (Bouchard, Rocher and Rocher 1991), 'Franco-Quebecers' (G. Bouchard 2001a: 31) and 'Quebecers of French-Canadian background' (Létourneau 2001: 61). The first of these terms merely perpetuates a uniquely ethnic definition of Quebec identity as a whole. Since it cuts across the efforts of successive Quebec governments over the last few decades to create an open, inclusive society, it is not used in the present study, which refers only to 'Quebecers'. The second alternative does not refer to ethnicity so much as language. As Juteau (2001: 211) points out, '[i]t is important to distinguish between French Canadians and francophones, as there are Quebec francophones who are not French-Canadian' (see Sections 3.4 and 5.3 for further discussions on the importance of recognising the ethnic identity of the majority group in Quebec). The third suggested term is ambiguous: does 'Franco' refer to the French language or a 'French' ethnic group? As for the fourth option, while this is technically correct, it is somewhat awkward on account of its length. In the present study, reference is simply made to 'French Canadians' for two main reasons. First, as the study is limited to Quebec, there can be no confusion with French speakers in other parts of Canada. Second, and more importantly, it is recognised that the French Canadian ethnicity of former times is not the same as French Canadian identity today. This is the argument used by Juteau (2001: 125), who also favours the reintroduction of the term 'French Canadian' to designate the ethnic majority component of the Quebec nation.

## 1.4 National identity, nationalism and the nation

As another type of collective cultural identity, national identity is somewhat akin to ethnic identity, in the same way that nations overlap conceptually with ethnic groups. Like ethnic identity and ethnic groups, national identity and nations do not rely solely on objective characteristics (e.g., language, religion, customs, territory, institutions); they also depend on subjective features (e.g., attitudes, sentiments, perceptions), making the nation a kind of 'imagined community' (Anderson 1983). Nations are equally subjected to the same primordialism versus instrumentalism debate, linked to which is the question of whether they are either perennial or a product of the modern era, however defined (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1992), or in fact both of these, namely modern phenomena that are nonetheless based on pre-modern ethnic cores (A. D. Smith 1986, 1991: 37–42). But while the nation and the ethnic group share many attributes (see upper part of Table 1.1), they can also be distinguished from each another by their important differences (see lower part of Table 1.1).

Nations can thus be distinguished from ethnic groups in so far as they typically have a public culture common to all members and usually occupy their territorial homelands (which may or may not form a state); they also have common legal codes with common rights and duties for all, and exhibit a common division of labour or economic unity (see also A. D. Smith 1991: 40). As it meets these criteria, Quebec clearly constitutes a nation and only a minority of people attempt to claim otherwise (e.g., Nemni 1998).

In studies of the nation and nationalism (understood here broadly as any expression or manifestation of national identity<sup>4</sup>), it is customary to distinguish two ideal types: the so-called ethnic variety and the so-called civic variety. Ethnic nationalism considers the nation very much as an extension of the ethnic group. As is the case for the latter (see Section 1.3), however, the common origins shared by members of the nation are usually understood in a metaphoric sense. This is the reason why this type of nation is sometimes called the cultural nation. At the other extreme of the often-cited

**Table 1.1** Attributes of ethnic groups and nations

<b>Ethnic group</b>	<b>Nation</b>
Proper name	Proper name
Common myths of ancestry, etc.	Common myths
Shared memories	Shared history
Cultural differentia(e)	Common public culture
Link with homeland	Occupation of homeland
Some (elite) solidarity	Common rights and duties
	Single economy

Source: A. D. Smith (2001: 13).

dichotomy is civic nationalism, which unites people from various ethnic groups around common values and institutions, thus giving rise to a nation which is more territorial or political in nature (see Renan 1990).<sup>5</sup> Some commentators argue that this is not nationalism at all, but rather patriotism, 'an emotional attachment to one's state or country and its political institutions' (Connor 1993: 374).

Despite its continued popularity, the ethnic/civic dichotomy has been the object of much criticism in recent years, not least in Quebec in the context of the debate about which model of nation to adopt. For example, Venne (2001b: 8) speaks of a 'false dichotomy [that] has been largely superseded', while Bourque (2001: 98) claims that 'the outdated opposition between the civic and the ethnic is no longer an adequate starting point for understanding Quebec nationalism'. Perhaps the most vociferous critic is Seymour, who, together with his colleagues, argues that the dichotomy has given rise to accounts that 'trace a truncated picture, and yield in important ways a distorted understanding, of the complex phenomenon that nationalism has become' (Seymour *et al.* 1996: 2). The main objection of these and other commentators, such as Taylor, is that the dichotomy leads to essentialist interpretations which obscure the fact that most nations function in reality on both ethnic and civic dimensions:

[T]he famous distinction between 'ethnic' and 'civic' regimes [...] does not apply to our situation, as most democratic societies these days are in fact hybrid creations. While strongly rooted in a 'republican' liberalism, they also define themselves according to their core ethnic group or groups. (Taylor 2001: 20)

Schnapper (1996: 233) makes the same observation as Taylor, noting that 'different nations are all both "ethnic" and "civic", but are differently "ethnic" and "civic".' But while Schnapper is of the opinion that one needs to move beyond the ethnic/civic opposition, by using these terms herself she paradoxically affirms the view of her opponents in the debate who claim that the dichotomy remains nonetheless a 'very useful analytic and heuristic tool' (A. D. Smith 1996/1997: 9). The fact that all nations exhibit varying degrees of ethnic and civic elements is not a reason to reject these notions; it is not the dichotomy *per se* which is outdated, rather the belief that nations can be exclusively ethnic or civic. In other words, the dichotomy remains of value, as Schnapper demonstrates, not to categorise nations as either ethnic or civic in an absolute sense, but rather to describe the different dimensions of a single nation, the multitude of objective and subjective components used to construct it throughout different periods in time.

It is also useful at this point to separate the concepts of nation and nationalism. While there is no such thing as a purely ethnic or purely civic *nation*, the terms 'ethnic' and 'civic' can still be used to describe the different *nationalisms*

or conceptions of a single nation that exist either at various points throughout history (e.g., compare the different conceptions of the nation promoted by successive governments) or at any one point in time (e.g., compare the different representations of the nation at the grassroots and official levels). As will be seen in Section 2.1, there are diachronic differences between the variants of nationalism promoted throughout Quebec's history. The existence also of synchronic differences is clearly observed in the following document drafted by the Bloc Québécois, the political party at the federal level devoted to the promotion of sovereignty for Quebec:

A Quebecer is someone who lives in Quebec. This definition is inclusive. It links Quebec identity to the act of belonging to the same political community. It bases this identity on citizenship. However, this conception has not been completely internalised by the population. There still remains a too widely held view according to which being a Quebecer means: 'old-stock French-speaking Quebecer' or Quebecer of French Canadian origin. (Bloc Québécois 1999, cited in Canet 2003: 136)

Instead of *transcending* the ethnic/civic dichotomy outright, one should therefore be attempting to *reconcile* its two poles: the ethnic and the civic should not be considered as mutually exclusive, but rather as acting in tandem, notwithstanding an irreducible degree of tension between them. Seymour *et al.* (1996: 6) argue that such attempts at reconciliation remain nonetheless 'under the spell' of the dichotomy and merely serve to enhance its importance (see also Karmis 2004: 81, 92). Yet even these fervent critics of the dichotomy cannot resist making reference to it themselves, either explicitly or implicitly, throughout their writing, such is its usefulness and general acceptance by many.

## 1.5 Globalisation

As evidenced by the abundance of literature on the topic, there is a great desire amongst scholars in a wide range of disciplines to understand globalisation, the phenomenon that has all but become the 'cliché of our times' (Held *et al.* 1999: 1). Yet the more this concept has become an object of study, the more its meaning has become vague and difficult to define (Meyer and Geschiere 1999: 1; Nederveen Pieterse 2004: 8). Much of the confusion results from the different realities that scholars are in effect describing; in many cases, '[i]t is not clear whether the different parties invoking globalization mean the same thing or even if they are addressing the same issue' (Ferguson 1992: 69). Moreover, globalisation is often confused with, or at least not clearly distinguished from, internationalisation (see Jucquois 1995: 80). However, as Giddens (1998: 137) explains: 'Globalization, it should be stressed, is not the same as internationalization. It is not just about closer ties

between nations, but concerns processes, such as the emergence of a global civil society, that cut across the borders of nations.'

Considering the confusion with internationalisation, it is understandable that opinions differ greatly about when globalisation first began.<sup>6</sup> Following Giddens, the present study considers it as a more advanced stage of internationalisation (see also Jucquois 1995: 317, 322), and therefore as a relatively recent phenomenon. The emerging global – as opposed to international – order which the advent of neo-liberalism helped create was boosted by the 'opening-up' of Eastern Europe that followed the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, a time when the word 'globalisation' first began to appear in academic and media circles (Giddens 1998: 28).

With regard to culture, which is of interest here, reactions to globalisation can be grouped according to three categories (Held *et al.* 1999: 3–10). 'Hyperglobalizers' (e.g., Hamelink 1983; Reich 1992; Ohmae 1995) consider that the impact of Western media and consumerism will lead to cultural homogenisation. Whether this homogenisation is welcomed as a means of creating a 'global village' (McLuhan 1962), or rejected as a form of Western cultural imperialism, both positions agree that the world is moving rapidly towards uniformity. Indeed, it would be impossible to deny that the global flow of mass cultural consumption has already resulted in some degree of homogenisation, which many consider synonymous with global Americanisation (Schiller 1985; Hall 1991: 28; Ritzer 1997). However, this extreme view of globalisation 'fails to take into account the ways in which cultural products are locally consumed, locally read and transformed in the process' (Held *et al.* 1999: 373). Unlike hyperglobalisers, 'transformationists' (e.g., Giddens 1990) thus predict the 'indigenisation' (Appadurai 1990: 295) of global culture, or the emergence of new 'creolised' (Hannerz 1990, 1991) or 'hybridised' (Nederveen Pieterse 1995, 2004) cultures. Finally, there are the 'sceptics' (e.g., Hirst and Thompson 1996), who question whether the impact of global culture has been, and will continue to be, as profound and enduring as is often assumed.

The present study situates itself somewhere between the last two positions, those of the transformationists and the sceptics. In other words, it considers that the theories of globalisation advanced by hyperglobalisers have tended to neglect the importance of culture, and in particular the power of cultural identity (Castells 1997). As more attention has progressively been paid to the sociocultural dimension of globalisation (e.g., Featherstone 1990; Hannerz 1991; Robertson 1992; Appadurai 1996; Tomlinson 1999; Nederveen Pieterse 2004), it has become increasingly clear that the homogenising tendencies that appear inherent to globalisation paradoxically encourage 'continued or even reinforced cultural heterogeneity' (Meyer and Geschiere 1999: 2). As one scholar explains, 'ethnic and cultural fragmentation and modernist homogenization are not two arguments, two opposing views of what is happening in the world today, but two constitutive trends of global reality'

(Friedman 1990: 311). In other words, '[g]lobal and local are the two faces of the same movement' (Hall 1991: 27; see also Beiner 2003: 23), so much so that Robertson (1995: 26) even suggests the replacement of the term 'globalisation' with 'glocalisation'.

By 'local' is often meant 'regional' nationalist movements, such as those in Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland (Giddens 1998: 31–2). According to some commentators (e.g., Nguyen 1998: 103), these movements are weakening the nation-state from below. Such a threat was implied by the then Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pierre Pettigrew, when he described the intervention of what he termed 'non-states' as one of the main characteristics of globalisation, as opposed to internationalisation (*Le Devoir*, 2 September 2005). Indeed, Canadian federalists lament what they perceive as the decline of the Canadian nation, at the same time as they paradoxically try to convince Quebecers of the irrelevance of the Quebec nation in an era of globalisation. The fact is that globalisation has not been shown to have undermined national sentiment in any context around the world. On the contrary, in a study of national identity conducted in 1998 amongst 2,500 young people in Quebec as well as France, Belgium, Burundi, Poland, Russia and Zaire, it was found that the nation was still the 'place of belonging' and 'primary reference point', a 'springboard from which to cast oneself elsewhere' (Létourneau 1998: 412–13).

The continued or even increased relevance of national identity at the present time can be regarded as a perfectly natural and predictable consequence of globalisation. Giddens (1985: 218) considers a stronger nationalist sentiment as a reaction to the 'ontological insecurity' of modern times whereby individuals resort to 'regressive forms of object-identification', such as the classic symbols of national identity (e.g., national languages, religions, currencies, flags, anthems, etc.). Not all would agree, however, with Giddens' choice of the term 'regressive' to describe such instances of nationalist sentiment: 'Nationalist movements [...] are not anachronistic manifestations but rather extremely modern signs. They are not the relic of a disappearing past or a banal primitive remnant, but foreshadow the future of our societies' (Dieckhoff 2000: 31).

In other words, the greater the homogenising pressure that globalisation exerts on national cultures in the future, the more nations are likely to accentuate the differences which remain. This tendency can already be observed in Quebec where, according to what has been termed 'Tocqueville's paradox' (Dion 1991), the convergence of attitudes and life-styles amongst Quebecers and other Canadians witnessed in recent decades has been accompanied by a greater awareness of a distinct Quebec national identity (Taylor 1992: 181–214; Kymlicka 1995: 88; Norman 1995: 141–2). Such a reaction is completely consistent with social identity theory (see Section 1.1): a heightened sense of national identity can thus be explained in terms of a desire to express national distinctiveness, a condition which is especially

important considering the shift from an era characterised by internationalisation to one marked by globalisation (Oakes 2001: 147). Not only does globalisation encourage a heightened sense of national identity; the increased awareness of ethnic diversity which has accompanied it also raises questions about who belongs to a given society, that is, questions about citizenship.

## 1.6 Citizenship

Ever since the French Revolution and the birth of the modern nation centred on the state, citizenship has tended to be regarded as synonymous with nationality (in its legal or political sense).<sup>7</sup> No longer did sovereignty lie with the monarch; the democratisation of politics now placed sovereignty with the people, who had become 'nationally defined citizens' (Heater 1999: 96–7). Historically and conceptually, however, there is an important distinction to be made between the two terms. Nationality in its legal or political sense has to do with the state to which one belongs. It has traditionally been acquired according to the principles of *jus sanguinis* ('blood right') or *jus soli* ('soil right'), a distinction similar to that between ethnic and civic nationalism (see Section 1.4). By contrast, citizenship in its classical sense refers to certain duties and rights associated with one's membership of the polity. It has traditionally not been granted automatically to all nationals: initially, only those 'possessing sufficient reason and property' were considered eligible for citizenship; even today, 'the mentally disabled and minors are not citizens, although they are nationals' (Fieschi and Varouxakis 2001: 22).

Far from being an anachronism, the distinction between citizenship and nationality is becoming relevant again as multiple and transnational citizenships become increasingly visible for a variety of reasons, many of which are associated with globalisation (see Section 1.5): the rise of neo-liberalism and the effect it has on the equity of citizens, accelerated human migrations, greater nationalist awareness amongst some minorities, and regionalism such as European integration that is perceived by some as a threat to the legitimacy of the nation-state (Heater 1999: 2–3). The new circumstances have naturally led to questions being raised about the criteria for belonging to a given society. Such concerns are not limited to ethnic and national minorities, but also to those groups that differ in terms of religious beliefs, gender and sexual orientation. As J. A. Cohen (2001: 109) notes:

Citizenship here refers to the political logic at work in the management of diversity – that is, to the modes of recognition or nonrecognition of distinct identities within the broader fabric of a national mode of cohesion, when indeed such cohesion holds true.

With its emphasis on inclusion, citizenship thus pertains to the social and political relationship that an individual has with a given society. Weinstock

(2000: 16–17) explains that there are at least three dimensions to this relationship. First, citizenship is a judicial status:

A citizen, unlike a mere resident, is the bearer of certain rights. In principle, only a citizen has the right to vote or stand for public office. And, again ideally, only the citizen of a political entity can profit from economic and social benefits provided by the political entity in question: a citizen also has certain responsibilities which do not apply to the mere resident. For example, only the citizen can be called upon to sacrifice himself or herself in times of war. In this way, even if the mere resident and the citizen are linked to a political entity by certain common judicial ties (they both pay taxes and are subject to the same criminal code), the citizen benefits from certain rights and carries certain additional responsibilities. (Weinstock 2000: 16)

Second, citizenship also refers to a series of practices: ‘A citizen is someone who, beyond his or her mere judicial status, actively participates in the life of political institutions and in the shaping of the common good’ (Weinstock 2000: 16). Depending on their level of engagement, individuals can thus be content with a ‘passive’ or ‘minimal citizenship’ or opt for a ‘supererogatory citizenship’ that entails a much more active participation than required by law. Third, citizenship comprises an identity dimension:

This dimension of citizenship is fully realised when the attachment to a collectivity designated by citizenship status is of subjective importance to the individual, when he or she is prepared to act on various situations, or to react to them, at least in certain cases as a citizen of such and such a collectivity rather than, for example, as a member of such and such a gender or class, etc. In other words, a fully-fledged citizen according to this affective dimension is someone who, in the event of a conflict, will at least on a good number of occasions give priority to the citizenship dimension of his or her identity, as opposed to other politically relevant dimensions of it. (Weinstock 2000: 17)

Not only do these three elements of citizenship interact causally, they can also be arranged in a variety of ways so as to give rise to different conceptions or models of citizenship. In Western political philosophy, two conceptions of citizenship have traditionally dominated: the liberal and the civic republican (Heater 1999: 4; Weinstock 2000: 18).

The liberal conception of citizenship places emphasis primarily on the judicial dimension of citizenship:

Citizens are above all bearers of certain rights, which allow them to commit themselves actively to the public sphere if they so desire, but which

nonetheless have the main function of protecting their autonomous private sphere from the encroachment of fellow citizens and, especially, from the state itself. This conception thus minimises the importance of truly civic activity and recognises that the activity of the citizen will be focused on the economic as well as the private spheres. (Weinstock 2000: 18)

As for the identity dimension, this is, at least in principle, also kept to a minimum in the liberal model of citizenship: 'there is no sense that the state has any organic existence, bonding the citizens to it and to each other' (Heater 1999: 6); 'it is considered as perfectly normal that citizens identify first and foremost with their family or profession' (Weinstock 2000: 19). Such a minimal or procedural definition of citizenship was facilitated by the rise of capitalism in the late eighteenth century, in particular the right of individuals to acquire property (Heater 1999: 7–9). Since then, it has progressively been developed as a concept to include other types of rights. In his famous essay *Citizenship and Social Class* first published in 1950, T. H. Marshall defines citizenship as being composed of three types of rights: civil (e.g., freedom of movement and expression, and the right to property), political (e.g., the right to vote and hold public office) and social (e.g., the right to welfare and to partake in the heritage of society) (Marshall and Bottomore 1992: 8). More recently, the liberal conception of citizenship is represented in the work of theorists such as Rawls (e.g., 1999).

The other main conception of citizenship in Western political philosophy is the civic republican:

By 'republic' is meant a constitutional system with some form of sharing out of power to prevent concentrated arbitrary and autocratic government; and 'civic' means the involvement of the citizenry in public affairs to the mutual benefit of the individual and the community. (Heater 1999: 44)

Unlike liberal citizenship, this model of citizenship thus places great emphasis on 'the citizen's direct participation in the collective debate on questions of public interest and on his or her active participation in the pursuit of the common good' (Weinstock 2000: 19). While the liberal interpretation of citizenship 'emphasises rights', civic republicanism thus 'places its stress on duties' (Heater 1999: 4). Not surprisingly, a relatively high degree of identification with the state is also expected from citizens in the latter model: together, the state and its citizens form 'a community, an organic society, not merely a collection of individuals' (Heater 1999: 55). The civic republican conception of citizenship is much older than the liberal one, with its origins in the work of Aristotle and Cicero, and later in that of Machiavelli during the Renaissance. Thanks to Rousseau, it became particularly popular in the eighteenth century, before being eclipsed by the liberal

conception. It was kept alive in the nineteenth century by such figures as Hegel and Tocqueville, and is currently experiencing a revival 'as a counter-balance to the perceived defects of liberal citizenship' (Heater 1999: 51–2). With its concern for collective rights, Quebec is also experiencing a renewed interest in this model of citizenship, as will be seen in Chapter 2.



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