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1

Introduction: Interactions Between the Universal and the Local

A. G. Hopkins

Prologue

Presidential elections are not the first examples that come to mind in considering the history of globalization. Since World War II, however, national elections have increasingly reflected global as well as local issues. The re-election of President Bush in 2004 is a case in point. The campaigns of both candidates centered on the powerful universal and local forces that are the subject of this book, though the President, it might be said, was more successful in appealing to both in equal measure. The universal dimension was forcefully publicized in the commitment to prosecute the “war on terror,” to eliminate evil, and to spread freedom and democracy throughout the world. The local aspect was clearly delineated in representations of the folksy man of the people who could be counted on to uphold small-town values. This image remained strong in part because the President’s patriotism had not been compromised by any special affiliation with the imperfectly understood but self-evidently dangerous world beyond America’s shores.¹ From one perspective, the President of the United States is now closer to being the ruler of the world than any previous claimant to the office; from another, his re-election was decided ultimately by voters in a few districts in two or three swing states in one country.

At first sight, the universal and the local appear in this example as antonyms: the universal stands apart from and above the local and spreads its

influence far beyond its centre of origin; the local, in many pluralities, is impinged upon and reshaped by superior forces. This characterization is not wholly mistaken; if it were, the terms “universal” and “local” would lose their meaning and it would be impossible to order our thinking about the world to reflect asymmetrical relationships of size, structure, and power. For these reasons it makes an appropriate appearance in the pages that follow. Nevertheless, to formulate the connection in this fashion leads readily to the view that the world order is the product of challenge and response, of actors and reactors, and of victors and victims. Everything we now know about the history of the non-Western world suggests that these dualisms are at best inadequate and at worst misleading. Additionally, everything we have come to understand about the West suggests that it displays attributes that used to be assigned to other, supposedly less advanced peoples. The resurgence of ethnic claims and the accompanying advance of separatist movements in parts of Western Europe is one striking example; equally telling, if less dramatic, are the ways in which custom and connections exert powerful influences on societies that are supposed to exemplify modern principles of rationality and merit.

The re-election of President Bush shows how readily reality crosses these divides. The universal and the local, though formally opposites, combined purposefully in November 2004 to produce a more powerful electoral force than either could have done on its own. Moreover, on close inspection, the universals promoted by the United States reveal the depth of their local roots. Definitions of terror and evil, like concepts of democracy and freedom, are not self-evident, free-standing notions; they acquire meaning only when they have been given specific content, which is provided by the beliefs and interests of the power that promotes them. Other nations configure the same generic terms differently. Similarly, what is conventionally designated as “local” may to some degree be the product of supra-regional and supra-national influences. The creation of localities by these means can be seen in the migrations that brought settlers, and ultimately voters, from Europe to the United States. They appear, too, in the priorities of the locality, as expressed, for example, in the swing state of Ohio, where in 2004 a number of important industries depended on world demand for their products.

The intermingling of universal and local may also blur their separate identities. Influences coming from one direction can be absorbed, reprocessed and even re-exported to the center of origin. They may be presented as if they were trade marks of a set of universal principles or patents of local identity, but they are often hybrids. The artifacts of American culture – from apple pie to Southern music – are home-grown in one sense but also transplants in another, less direct sense because their

distant origins include ingredients from abroad.² The botanical metaphor serves the analysis of globalization particularly well: Linnaeus devised his celebrated classification of plants, set out in his *Species Plantarum* (1753), from evidence that enabled him to discern relationships among flora whose seeds had been transmitted across the continents, irrespective of political or other barriers.³ This silent but momentous act of globalization created difference out of commonality, species from genus, local from universal.

This prologue introduces, in the most compressed form, the main subject matter of this study. The commentary that follows unpacks these summary remarks and examines them under four headings: historiography, analysis, history, and application.

Historiography

The study of history develops in two ways. One impulse derives from revisions proposed by the scholarly body itself as a result of dissatisfaction with dominant approaches and interpretations; the other reflects the influence of events in the wider world, which help to give each generation of historians its priorities and distinctive character. When the two influences are brought together, conditions are set for fundamental historiographical change. We are now at such a moment. Two interlocking developments have opened the way for fresh approaches to the past. Postmodernism, the main stimulus to fresh historical thinking for a decade or more, has now been assimilated; its limitations have also become apparent.⁴ At the same time, the dramatic assault on the Twin Towers in 2001 and the subsequent “war on terror” redirected scholarly attention to material forces, geo-politics, and the long historical roots of contemporary discontents. This combination of internal skepticism and external trauma has begun to shift the focus of historical research and, by implication, has raised questions about the way history should be taught in the twenty-first century.

If there is one concept that captures both the spirit and the content of the trend that is beginning to appear, it is globalization.⁵ This subject has been debated among social scientists for more than a decade, but the events of what has become known as Nine Eleven gave it greater visibility and urgency, and also brought it to the attention of historians. Globalization involves the extension, intensification and quickening velocity of flows of people, products and ideas that shape the world. It integrates regions and continents; it compresses time and space; it prompts imitation and resistance. The results alter and may even transform relationships within and among states and societies across the globe. Evidently, globalization is a capacious concept that requires careful unpacking. A full consideration of

its definitions and diversity cannot be pursued here, nor is it necessary to do so because accessible discussions of both are now readily available.⁶

What matters for present purposes is that the literature on globalization presents historians with new opportunities. It offers the prospect of rehabilitating branches of history, such as economic history, that have fallen out of favor in recent years while also presenting considerable scope for political, social and cultural historians. The research agenda offered by globalization ought therefore to eliminate the familiar contest between the subspecialisms of historical study. The themes captured by globalization also respond to a developing need, expressed by students in universities throughout the Western world, for courses and research topics that rise above the national epic. These students include the next generation of professional historians. Irrespective of their occupations, they are all citizens, and increasingly citizens of the world. The study of history will be remiss if it does not adjust to this fact – and teaching cannot change until new history books have been written.⁷

Until now, what might be called supra-national history has been dealt with in two ways. One, termed international history, is long established; the other, world history, is a more recent development – at least as far as teaching is concerned.⁸ International history covers relations between states, principally during the modern era, and in practice has concentrated chiefly on diplomatic and economic relations. World history, on the other hand, is by definition comprehensive. It seeks not only to understand other societies but also to place them in a schema that makes sense of the whole.⁹ The problem is how to make this noble goal operational. The burden of information is daunting; the organizing principle is not easily found. In skilled hands, the study of world history can turn admirable intentions into substantial achievements. In less capable hands it can fall victim to two temptations. One reduces the subject to loosely linked encyclopedia entries; the other reformulates the evidence to produce a disguised version of the Rise of the West, and its luckless accompanist – the Fall of the Rest.

It should be said at once that the literature on globalization does not provide a ready-made solution to these problems.¹⁰ Globalization is not a general theory in the sense that modernization theory, the dependency thesis and Marxism are general theories because it lacks a central proposition that is capable of embracing the constituent social sciences. Globalization is better thought of as a process or set of processes requiring exploration rather than as a hypothesis awaiting refutation. Accordingly, we refer here to the literature on globalization in general and to theories of globalization in the plural. The literature is huge; the theories are disconnected. Economists debate the merits of free trade; political scientists discuss the future of the

nation state; sociologists examine the consequences of increased information flows. Like ships that pass in the night, they sail in parallel lanes but rarely see one another.

Nevertheless, the history of globalization has the potential to overcome the limits of existing approaches to supra-national history. It is more comprehensive than international history because it seeks to capture all supra-national connections and encompasses themes such as environmental change, the movement of ideas, and the spread of disease that have little or no place in traditional studies of international relations. It offers new analytical starting points to world historians because it draws upon a substantial body of existing social science literature that has already generated a range of organizing principles.¹¹ The fact that the literature has produced clusters of testable hypotheses attached to different facets of the process of globalization rather than one overarching theory should make it attractive to historians because it enables them to formulate arguments that relate more readily to case studies. As yet, few historians have engaged with this daunting literature, though an increasing number are now inserting the term “globalization” into the titles of books and articles. Using the term catches the eye but does not necessarily enlarge the analysis. The present work hopes to make a firmer and more explicit connection between the literature on globalization and the study of history by demonstrating how themes derived from the former can be connected to detailed research of the latter.

A previous volume, *Globalization in World History*, also edited by the present writer, attempted to show how historians could both use this literature and contribute to it. As this was the first book on the subject to be written entirely by historians, it seemed appropriate to discuss a wide range of general issues relating to globalization and to offer an agenda for future historical research.¹² The book reached two main conclusions. One established the antiquity of globalization and put forward a set of categories and sequences to explain its character and evolution. The other demonstrated that, historically, globalization was a multi-centered phenomenon and that, even today, it can be understood fully only by recognizing that it is not simply the result of a dominant center activating lesser peripheries, but is jointly produced by all parties to the process. The present volume incorporates these findings but has a new and more specific focus, which is expressed in the sub-title. Exploring interactions between the universal and the local enables historians to join the discussion of globalization at the point it has now reached. It also shows that historians, whose training is embedded in local case studies, do not have to distort or desert their discipline in order to join their research to the very wide issues raised by the process of globalization.

The debate on globalization has moved through two broad, overlapping phases. In the early 1990s, when serious discussion of the subject began, it was widely assumed that the global trend was towards uniformity. Free trade would deliver economic development; democracy would bring freedom and peace. The eventual result was thought to be a happy homogeneity, as measured, variously, by the withering away of competing ideologies, the rise of a common consumer culture, and the decline of international conflict. This confident and optimistic view of the coming world order was encouraged by the spirit of triumphalism that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and by the economic boom of the late 1990s. These events also reinforced the long-standing assumption that standardization would take place as other societies assimilated themselves to Western ways. This was a comfortable and comforting thought for those who happened to live in the West: other values and habits would have to change but not those of the dominant minority; benign expansion would uplift and mold the rest of the world while simultaneously benefiting the major powers. These presuppositions were very similar to those espoused by the advocates of free trade in Britain in the mid-nineteenth century and by the proponents of modernization theory in the 1950s and 1960s. These precursors attracted little attention in the 1990s, which may help to explain why the commentators of the time failed to see the limitations of their own vision.

Globalization does indeed have homogenizing tendencies, and these have been well documented. However, from the close of the 1990s the literature began increasingly to emphasize the heterogeneous consequences of globalization as it became apparent that, under certain circumstances, the process reinforced rather than destroyed local affiliations, and that local influences could be recycled in ways that shaped the originating and supposedly universal impulse.¹³ In retrospect, the shift of emphasis is readily explained. The decolonized empire demonstrated that it could strike back, as it did on Nine Eleven, by turning the weapons of globalization against its advocates. The subsequent “war on terror” drew a dark and immobile cloud across international skies. The collapse of the “dot.com” boom shook confidence in the economic power of the West. At the same time, it became evident that the recipients of globalization did not always gain from the process and might even resist it. The mood of triumphalism faded; history, in the sense of competing ideologies, refused to come to an end. Difference dominated, whether in the supposed “clash of civilizations,” in the sharp contrast between the rich in the West and the multitudinous poor among the Rest, or in the disjunction between growing economic integration and resurgent forms of nationalism. We are therefore joining the debate at an apposite moment. As the universalizing ambitions of the day break on the sharp rocks

of reality, historians, who have a special interest in micro-studies, are especially well placed to examine the pieces.

Analysis

Historians generally use the terms “universal” and “local” in a broad, commonsense manner that appears to need little definition. The use of the terms in this book, however, calls for further explanation because they are key words in the analysis of globalization.¹⁴

“Universal” is a weighty term with a long history. It can be traced back to Plato’s concept of timeless, ideal types and it remains a central concern in philosophy today. A consideration of universals also enters theology, psychology, linguistics, law, and aesthetics, and is found in one guise or another in many other disciplines including, as noted earlier, botany.¹⁵ Each of these subjects employs the term in ways that have created distinct lines of enquiry. For present purposes, however, the term has one general meaning that is found in all applications: the concept of commonality. This idea refers to processes that are held to be applicable to the world as a whole, whether they involve ideas, institutions, or people, or all of these combined. According to this view, commonality exists because human beings have shared dispositions. In Kant’s formulation, for example, man is endowed with reason and enjoys rights; the two create a single moral community. Kant expected that this community would eventually take political shape through the creation of a league of states spanning the world. Today, the concept of human rights enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations is based on related assumptions about commonality.¹⁶ The International Criminal Court exemplifies the belief that there are rules of justice that apply throughout the world and take precedence over state law.¹⁷ Globalization can be regarded as a manifestation of universal principles to the extent that, whether by intention or result, it realizes commonality by increasing homogeneity and reducing diversity. The phrase “the global village” refers not only to ways in which the world is becoming smaller, but also to ways in which it is becoming more uniform.

This formulation allows two further refinements to be made. The first is a distinction between universal and global. It is evident from what has been said so far that the term “universal” means more than the totality of things found in the world, even if they interact at various points. A universal, that is to say, has to be global, but global phenomena are not necessarily universal because interactions among them may not be expressions of commonality. This distinction draws attention to the fact that universals carry normative connotations: if commonalities exist, they ought to be realized.

In Aristotle's illustration, it is only when acorns become oaks that universal "oakness" is achieved. As formulated by philosophers and commentators in the eighteenth century, universal principles found popular expression in the language of natural rights, such as liberty, equality, fraternity, and the pursuit of happiness. These ideas were carried forward in the nineteenth century and represented in various notions of progress or, in the language of the day, "improvement." Similar normative aspirations are attached to the discussion of globalization. Those who favor globalization, like those who oppose it, hope for a world that will realize human potential by expanding political freedom and raising living standards. Their disagreements concern means rather than ends.

The second refinement is expressed in the term "cosmopolitan." This term, too, has a classical, Western ancestry and varied uses. Historians of the modern world often use it as a synonym for universal, both in the very general sense and in the specific sense of commonality (with its attendant moral imperatives). There is impressive support for this position, which runs in a wavy line from the Stoics to Augustine and on to Erasmus and Kant. However, there is an additional meaning of "cosmopolitan" that distinguishes it from the definition of "universal" employed here. Universalism, the search for commonality, implies exclusivity: the local and the particular are to be transformed into a higher, more advanced state, whether by persuasion, conversion, or conquest. Cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, may also involve a willingness to respect diversity.¹⁸ From this perspective, a cosmopolitan would support multi-culturalism rather than assimilation and would be inclined to favor relativism over a universalism that seeks to spread a common set of supposedly superior values.

These positions are not always as clearly separated as this stark formulation suggests. Kant's hope that commonality would be realized politically through the creation of a league of states fell short of the unified world government advocated by others in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.¹⁹ Accordingly, we have adopted the term "universal" in this study to avoid confusion with the second meaning of "cosmopolitanism." However, the second meaning is valuable if it is used to refer to movements that extend beyond a society or state and interact with different localities while respecting their differences.²⁰ Diasporas are interesting examples of this type of cosmopolitanism because they are not created by universalist impulses. Indeed, as ethnic groups in dispersal they can be thought of as mobile regional or even global localities that interact with host societies without seeking to impose their own sense of commonality on them.²¹

Our treatment of the local takes its cue from the preceding discussion of universals. In this context "local" appears as an antonym, the particular,

which has accompanied the discussion of universals from classical times to the present and gained particular impetus following the growth of liberalism in the nineteenth century. It appears in philosophy in various types of nominalism and individualism, and in the emphasis placed in historical studies on singular case studies, on individual actions, and on a denial of various forms of historicism. The principle is clear; the practice, as with universalism, is less so. Locality, like centrality, is partly a matter of degree and partly a matter of perspective. The degree depends on relativities of size and power. Perspective is important because what one observer regards as a locality or a periphery may be, for an inhabitant, a center – even the center.

The definition of localities, like the identification of universals, therefore includes a subjective element. To the extent that the exercise can be made objective, the outcome may be decided by power as well as by inclination. That is to say, a designated locality may have a view of the cosmos – its cosmos – that could well be exportable but is confined by the lack of material means of doing so. Conversely, where localities or peripheries acquire the means of expansion and thereby become centers in their own eyes and in the regard of others, they invariably promote universals that are then projected on the wider world in the shape of free-standing, self-evident truths. States and nations exhibit this tendency; empires epitomize it.²²

The diverse strands of thought relating universals and particulars come together in the assorted concepts of modernity that have influenced Western thought so profoundly from the eighteenth century down to today.²³ Amidst their many differences, Enlightenment thinkers agreed on the need to apply reason to human affairs so that universal good of one kind or another could be realized. This enterprise was linked to a new emphasis on empirical enquiry that fostered the counting, mapping and classifying world that emerged in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These influences have left their imprint on all the important surges of development thinking during the last two centuries.²⁴ Each school of thought elaborated its own holistic imagery linked to concepts of progressive stages of growth that ran from Smith to Marx and on to the modernization theorists of the mid-twentieth century.²⁵ Imagery of this kind gained popularity during the first half of the twentieth century as a result of the growing penetrative power of technology, which made greater integration possible, and the crises of two world wars, which seemed to make it necessary.²⁶ The threat of chaos spurs the creation of new grand designs for creating world order, and sometimes of a new Leviathan to preside over it. When Francis Fukuyama advanced his claim that liberal democracy constitutes the final form (or, as Lenin might have said, the highest stage) of human government, he was writing against the background of the collapse of the Soviet empire.²⁷ Fukuyama was also

influenced by Hegel's theory of historical development, which in turn was rooted in Christian conceptions of a providential order.²⁸ On this interpretation, the United States is the fifth and last of the divinely ordained world empires. Modernity, it seems, has very ancient roots.

It is true that theories of globalization also incorporate influences from schools of thought that claim, in one form or another, to be postmodern, but elements of postmodernism have been traced to the nineteenth century, and therefore mark less of a break with the past than is often supposed.²⁹ The antiquity of the origins of globalization theories, though rarely emphasized in the standard texts, suggests that, while they may be distinctive, they are not entirely new. As Roger Hart observes in his discussion of Hegel,³⁰ every major contribution to development thinking claims to be both superior and universal, yet turns out to be historically more specific and intellectually more parochial than its advocates imagine. The claims and especially the errors of the past now seem transparent; those of the present often remain opaque until they become history. An awareness of historiography can help to distinguish between what is new and what has been carried forward, and thus between the issue of the day and the riddle of the ages.

There is merit, then, in placing the literature on globalization in the context of previous attempts to devise development policies of universal application. This exercise provides a congenial way for historians to approach the subject of globalization. It also fashions a specific intellectual framework for the substantive chapters of this book, all of which deal with the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and so fall within the period covered by the Enlightenment and theories of globalization.

In making this connection, however, it is equally important to avoid creating an unhistorical great chain of intellectual being leading from low-level beginnings to the latest summit – on which we stand.³¹ This judgment requires us to move beyond over-generalized and historically detached representations of the Enlightenment that have gained popularity in some academic circles in recent years. Enlightenment thinkers advanced universalist doctrines, but in doing so engaged with localism and explored relativism, not least because they were concerned to find anchors for individual rights.³² Locke and Rousseau spanned the many prominent thinkers who grappled with the problem of providing a universal foundation for individual liberties in an age of divine right and absolutism. D'Alembert tried to find ways of reconciling the universal and the local.³³ Eminent historians of the period complemented his endeavor by adopting a cosmopolitan (rather than a universalist) approach to national history.³⁴ Diderot began by exploring universal claims but decided that they were ethnocentric and therefore relative.³⁵ His conclusion followed a long-running debate on relativism

initiated by Montaigne, who asked why cannibalism was morally wrong and why, dogmatic injunctions apart, Frenchmen did not (and should not) eat one another.³⁶ Recognizing the diversity and subtlety of Enlightenment thinkers makes it possible to draw legitimate connections between their agenda and that of subsequent schools of thought that have wrestled with the problem of modernity – including, today, theories of globalization.

History

The assessment of historiography at the outset of this chapter showed that the subject has developed to the point where globalization is now seen to produce diversity as well as uniformity. The discussion of analytical issues that followed suggested how key terms can be defined and then combined in the debate over modernity so that they, too, encompass both diversity and uniformity. The next task is to draw these findings together and make them operational by investigating the historical forms taken by the interaction of universal and local forces. The number and range of the possibilities are so large that it is tempting to settle immediately for a conclusion that emphasizes the formidable complexities of the case. To do so, however, would be to surrender too readily to uncertainty, albeit of a judicious, scholarly kind. The chapters that follow recognize complexity but avoid adopting it as the default position. Instead, they identify and trace specific ways in which the universal and the local have interacted.

The relationships that emerge extend over two centuries, span different parts of the world and deal with a variety of historical themes. The ensuing chapters demonstrate that all branches of historical study can be connected to wide-ranging literature on globalization. Accordingly, the contributions made here cover political, diplomatic, economic, social, cultural, and intellectual history. In the spirit of globalization, the contributors pursue ideas across academic borders; in accordance with historical practice they present detailed research whose underpinnings of source and method can be recognized by other historians, even if they are unfamiliar with the subject matter.³⁷ At the same time, we readily acknowledge that the topics treated here are less than comprehensive. Large parts of the world have been omitted; a number of important themes, such as gender, science, and the environment, have been deferred for future treatment. Comprehensiveness, however, is not the goal. The idea is to make a start on a new subject by showing how the literature on globalization can be used to connect historical topics as diverse as Navajo weaving and Japanese political economy, thus elevating them above the national and regional frameworks that conventionally contain them.

The discussion that follows begins by identifying the fictive and applied forms of universalism that appear in the case studies that ensue. Fictive forms of universalism are found in claims that are held to be unbounded, eternal truths. These claims are produced by specific historical actors in particular places. Once launched, however, they orbit the world as apparent abstractions and acquire a dynamism of their own that is removed from their origins. The most widely publicized of these ideas today, such as freedom and democracy, achieve the status of honorary concepts that are accepted unquestioningly – at least by the society that promotes them. Wherever they land, however, universal claims assume a material presence and are applied through official policies and informal influences that aim to translate ideals into realities. It is at this point, as we shall see, that gaps appear between the proclaimed universality of a principle and the stubborn facts of time, place, and alternative ways of organizing the world.

Although the majority of the universals considered in this study originate in Europe and the United States, our collective story is far from being another version of an old tale, the rise of that imagined entity, the West. The universals referred to here did not act alone or in isolation but in competition with other claimants. Far from imprinting themselves on inanimate localities, they were accepted selectively, reshaped and sometimes recycled with the result that it is now hard to distinguish source from recipient. We hope that this approach will provide a fresh and fully global perspective on some familiar and conventional themes.

Every chapter gives prominence to a weighty universal, whether fictive or applied or both. Erika Marie Bsumek shows how the Navajo, having avoided Spanish expansionism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, became caught up in the “manifest destiny” of the United States in the second half of the nineteenth century, when the moving frontiers of commercial capitalism and cultural supremacy threatened to roll over them. Roger Hart’s re-examination of Hegel’s *Philosophy of History* deals with a universal in its idealist form, the concept of ‘spirit,’ whose purpose was to attain freedom – in the special sense of realizing the identity and self-sufficiency of individuals within a modern, that is rational, state. Mark Metzler looks at the reception of Western economics in Japan by focusing on the less publicized branch associated with Friedrich List rather than, more conventionally, on Smithian free-trade doctrines. Tracie Matysik’s examination of the Universal Races Congress of 1911 shows how the delegates wrestled with the problem of creating what, today, would be called a global civic consciousness by trying to work out ways of defining and underpinning human rights.³⁸ Karl Miller traces the globalization of the music industry at the start of the twentieth century following the rise of the large firm, which

had the ability to stretch across the world, and the advance of technology, which produced the magic of the phonograph. Geoffrey Schad assesses the consequences of applying the universal principle of self-determination to the Middle East (and to Syria in particular) following World War I. Mark Lawrence sees the Cold War and its expression in Vietnam as a phase in the history of globalization that was driven by a renewed effort to assert universal liberal values after 1945. Philip White's wide-ranging survey traces the use and abuse of the term "nation state" and relates its shifting meaning to different phases of European history.

All of these universal principles, including Hegel's seemingly abstract "spirit," acted on or were closely related to specific localities. But some of them also had to engage with powerful competitors. Mark Metzler's account of Japan's economic "miracle" following the Meiji restoration in 1868 is a case in point. Metzler gives refreshing prominence to the ideas of Friedrich List, who opposed what he termed the "cosmopolitical" school of liberal economics with his own brand of national economics. List's alternative path has had universal and lasting appeal. It influenced economic policy in the United States as well as in Germany and France in the nineteenth century. It resurfaced in the twentieth century in the neo-mercantilist policies adopted during the 1930s and later on by many newly independent states in the ex-colonial world. It entered the thinking of dependency theorists in Latin America after World War II, and it is present today (though largely unrecognized) in the arguments of the anti-globalization lobby.

The dispute undoubtedly opened up a huge gap in Western development thinking. Yet the relationship between the two streams of thought is more complicated and more creative than this summary suggests. Smith did not deal with industrialization or the nation state because both were still on the horizon when he published *The Wealth of Nations* in 1776.³⁹ List was writing more than half a century later, when the problem, as he saw it, was to promote industrialization in "late-start" countries that were also struggling to become modern states. List thought that national unity was the best means of overcoming backwardness: as state boundaries consolidated the nation, so too they improved the prospects for applying protectionist economic policies. In formulating his theory, List, like Hegel, had the unity of the German states in mind, though his main work does not refer to Hegel or to "spirit." However, List also believed that protectionism was a stage that would eventually give way to universal free trade. To this extent, it can be said that he and Smith were ultimately in accord. In historical terms, however, the difference between them was considerable and it continues to the present day.

Lawrence, writing of a much later period, also gives prominence to

competing universals – in this case Western liberalism and Soviet communism – that had common roots in European thought. Marx, like List, dissented from Adam Smith in fundamental ways but drew on his thought too, just as he transformed Hegel's dialectic and, in effect, grounded 'spirit' in class. Yet, it need hardly be said, the disagreements were profound: they acquired powerful political shape after the Russian Revolution in 1917 and became more assertively international after World War II. Lawrence picks up the story after the turmoil of war, when the United States was trying to put in place a peace settlement that would install the universal liberal values of free trade and self-determination. The closest parallel here is with the development plans devised by the British after 1815.⁴⁰ Britain, too, designed a postwar settlement that moved towards free trade while also supporting liberal, that is progressive but not radical, governments throughout the world. Both countries were reacting not only to the upheaval brought about by devastating wars but also to a period of protectionism that both preceded and accompanied them. Adam Smith dismembered mercantilism in his work, but it lived on during his life and was extended during the long wars with France. In the same way, the United States tried to change course after 1945 by moving the world away from the protectionist policies that had initiated a period of what has been called deglobalization during the 1930s.⁴¹ The main difference was that, after 1815, Britain was unchallenged, whereas after 1945 the United States had to deal with a powerful ex-ally and new rival, the Soviet Union.

There was a moment in 1945 when the United States seemed to be willing to support Cordell Hull's universalist blueprint for the United Nations. However, when Truman replaced Roosevelt, military interests persuaded the administration to adopt a more nationalist stance towards international issues.⁴² The onset of the Cold War confirmed that there would be no single world order. Lawrence recasts the contest in terms of a struggle between two competing universals that carried the combatants to hitherto remote parts of the world and in this way extended globalization, albeit in plural forms. One of the unanticipated consequences of the Vietnam War, as he points out, was to increase civic consciousness about global issues. In the Western-dominated part of the world globalization spread through the resumption of world trade, the rise of trans-national companies, the increase in governmental and non-governmental international organizations, and the acquisition of self-government by colonial and quasi-colonial states.⁴³

This economic and political program received comprehensive ideological backing from modernization theory, which aimed at pulling traditional societies, as they were called, into the modern world. Elements of modernization theory had already appeared in the Age of Manifest Destiny, which

had encompassed the Navajo, in the Spanish-American war, and in the person of President Wilson, but they reached their highest stage in the 1950s and 1960s in the context of the Cold War. Modernization theory was based on an elaborate panoply of antonyms and abstractions that supported a mountain of empirical research and a plenitude of impressive footnotes. In the end, however, the antonyms turned out to be false and the empirical research was shown to be mainly an exercise in remaking the world in the image of the United States.⁴⁴ The universal assumptions of the West could accommodate neither the Soviet Union nor Vietnamese nationalism. The ironic and tragic result was that the attempt to achieve perpetual peace created tensions that appeared to be leading to perpetual conflict. The subsequent retreat from this type of foreign policy idealism in the 1970s and 1980s was followed by its revival in the 1990s and its expression in Iraq after Nine Eleven. These oscillations in American foreign policy have a long and well documented history, though this is a case where knowledge appears not to affect practice.⁴⁵

Schad's chapter on the Middle East deals with a competing universal of an entirely different kind: the world of Islam. This engagement has received considerable publicity recently in the shape of a titanic "clash of civilizations," in which the progressive and universal values of the West are opposed to the illiberal and resolutely conservative traditions of the Islamic world.⁴⁶ Modernization theory, it would appear, had not died but was simply awaiting resuscitation. As Schad demonstrates, the "clash of civilizations" is a gross and misleading formulation. The Middle East can be understood only if the issues of the present are placed in a historical perspective that sees the region as having long engaged with globalizing processes and as responding in ways that have tried to balance adaptation with the maintenance of core values. In the eighteenth century the bureaucratic-agrarian empire of the Ottomans was strong enough to contain pressures for change.⁴⁷ In the nineteenth century the empire responded to external demands with much the same mixture of resistance and cooperation that characterized other parts of the world. The universal principles promoted by the French Revolution and imposed by British free-trading liberalism involved the region in far-reaching political and economic reforms.⁴⁸ Ottoman reformers sought to adapt secular ideas of modernization to an alternative ideology that reflected indigenous traditions in the hope of promoting changes that would also limit Western penetration.⁴⁹ At the turn of the twentieth century, the Young Turks constructed an Islamic tradition of constitutionalism to give their reform program popular appeal.⁵⁰ The "self-strengthening" movement in China had a similar purpose in seeking to incorporate Western ideas into a vision of a new Chinese-designed world

order.⁵¹ Japan, as Metzler shows, was engaged in the same exercise after the Meiji restoration in 1868.⁵² On this evidence alone, it is hard to sustain a case for Ottoman or Muslim “exceptionalism.”

The net result of the reforms in the Middle East (and in China too, though not in Japan) was to introduce destabilizing elements that weakened Ottoman independence.⁵³ The empire was dismembered after World War I and its component parts, as we shall see later, were made into new localities in the interests of nation-building.⁵⁴ For immediate purposes it is sufficient to conclude that Europe and the Middle East were already too entwined by 1918 for the stark contrasts contained in the “clash of civilizations” thesis to represent reality. The corollary is that the most commonly observed problems of the Middle East today are joint products of the interaction of the two regions and not the responsibility of one alone.⁵⁵

The competing universals considered so far were tangible and combative, so it is worth inserting some remarks on what might be called unreported universals. The illustration offered here refers to China and serves as a reminder that future work on the history of globalization needs to move further from its Western centre.⁵⁶ Hart’s chapter shows how dismissive Hegel was of China’s history and achievements. Hegel was reacting partly to the sinophilia that had captured Enlightenment thinkers earlier in the eighteenth century, but he was mainly concerned to show that “spirit,” having hovered briefly over China, had long since departed and was winging its way towards the German states. Hegel’s metaphysical leaps and bounds enabled him to skip over Chinese history without giving it serious consideration. The Macartney mission, which Hegel was familiar with, might have caused him to reconsider his basic assumption about the nature and location of “spirit.” Macartney’s attempt to open trade with China in 1793 failed. In doing so, it exposed a conflict between two imperial systems, each with “universalistic pretensions” that were supported by “complex metaphysical systems.”⁵⁷ Had Hegel discarded his verificatory procedure and examined the literature available to him with greater objectivity, he might have been obliged to recognize the possibility of an alternative Chinese universal.⁵⁸

We also know that elements of this Chinese universal were exported to Europe by Jesuit agents in the seventeenth century and attracted the attention of political economists in the eighteenth century. Confucian ideas of the natural order and how to realize it had a particular influence on the physiocrats, who were concerned to revive the prosperity of French agriculture. Exactly how far Confucian thought penetrated European ideas of political economy in Europe remains speculative. It is clear that physiocracy (literally the “rule of nature”) was well developed in China itself. Heavy

emphasis was placed on the centrality of agriculture in the economy and on its self-regulating character.⁵⁹ Trade was highly controlled, as it was in mercantilist France, but ideas of what has been called “nascent economic liberalism” had also emerged by the eighteenth century.⁶⁰ Quesnay himself acknowledged his debt to Chinese sources, so much so that he was known to contemporaries as the “Confucius of Europe.”⁶¹ It has even been argued that the concept of *wu-wei* (“action by non-action”) inspired Quesnay to formulate the principle of *laissez-faire*, which in turn influenced Adam Smith.⁶² This particular claim is insufficiently documented to be treated as more than a suggestive idea, but there is no doubt of the general influence of Chinese thought on the political economists of the day.

The story does not end there. Confucian conceptions of the universal natural order gained ascendancy in Japan in the eighteenth century at the same time as Confucian ideas were being warmly received by Enlightenment philosophers in Europe.⁶³ A fresh set of policies for dealing with mercantilist issues (such as the balance of trade) was also being developed in Japan in the eighteenth century.⁶⁴ The discussion and experimentation of the time contributed to indigenous principles of political economy that could be applied to both mercantilism and free markets. Mercantilist principles included a vision of a state-controlled economy as part of a program of national economic development, as formulated by Sato Nobuhiro (1769–1850), who prepared the first economic development plan for the Satsuma domain in 1830. Market principles included the idea, in line with Confucian thought, that freedom of trade imparted order and harmony to human society – an invisible hand, it might be said.⁶⁵ When List’s *National System* was translated at the start of the Meiji era, its message fitted into an indigenous tradition of thought that favored state intervention and the creation of a national economy. When Japanese scholars translated Adam Smith’s *The Wealth of Nations* at about the same time, they were making available liberal ideas of political economy that already had a place in their own tradition of economic thought.

All the universals featured here, whether acting independently or in conjunction, interacted with localities of very different shapes and sizes. The requirement that comparisons should match like with like cannot be met where the Navajo stand at one end of the spectrum and Japan at the other. But it is possible to identify different types of interaction and their varied outcomes, which range from cases where universal impulses helped to sustain localities to those where they undermined them. Similarities can be pointed out, too, even though they may not pass the most rigorous tests of comparative history.

Bsumek’s chapter deals with the ways in which the Navajo have held on

to their social cohesion and cultural identity without seeking to retreat from the globalizing world that now embraces them. Bsumek follows this process through the history of weaving, which remains a major Navajo industry today, as it has been for centuries. The Navajo acquired sheep (and thereby wool) from Spanish agencies in the seventeenth century while also managing to avoid direct Spanish rule. Subsequently, they built up a substantial weaving industry, which included exports to neighboring peoples and those further afield. The most serious challenge to their independence came in the second half of the nineteenth century, when they were threatened by Euro-American settlement, which encroached on their land, and by assimilationist policies, which imperiled their culture.

The Navajo responded in ways that were similar to the reactions of other native American peoples as well as to societies elsewhere in the world where indigenous peoples were confronted with the prospect of colonial rule. Militant resistance, the first line of defense, ended in 1868, though small, sporadic rebellions occurred down to 1913. Pacific resistance, which lasted longer and was more successful, took various forms, including a sustained commitment to cultural symbols and artifacts. As the Navajo became incorporated into the United States, weaving acquired additional significance as part of what might be called a cultural resistance movement. The value of weaving, as Bsumek emphasizes, already extended beyond the market price of cloth and rugs because the act of manufacture was also an expression of cultural identity. The craft was intimately linked with Navajo myths of origin; weaving rugs was a symbolic way of weaving the social order so that the parts cohered and the patterns pleased. The Navajo attempted to sustain their culture and economy by engaging with the wider world. Their weaving captured the attention of a new generation of American consumers who were keen to buy “native” products before they died out. Expanded demand led to the codification of Navajo rugs and cloth to safeguard the interests of both purchasers and producers. Today, the export of Navajo rugs has become so successful that they have generated the sincerest form of flattery: imitation. Navajo products have been copied and indigenized elsewhere, notably among the Zapotec, with the result that their authenticity has been called into question.

The history of the Navajo suggests two general conclusions. The first is that the universal impulses represented by the spread of US commerce and culture promoted Navajo weaving throughout the twentieth century. This benign outcome carries no guarantees. The Navajo might have been overrun by assimilationist policies in the late nineteenth century; their weaving industry might be jeopardized in the present century by cheaper copies made elsewhere. The second conclusion is that to attribute this outcome to

the success of free trade in opening up backward economies is to fail to give proper weight to the antiquity of Navajo entrepreneurship and its continuing dynamism today. Moreover, to cast the encounter solely in terms of economics is to miss the vital cultural component that underpins Navajo enterprise. In this respect, as in many others, the story of the Navajo can be generalized well beyond their borders.⁶⁶

The local was also sustained, and indeed enhanced, when the American music industry began its global expansion at the start of the twentieth century.⁶⁷ Initially, as Miller shows in his chapter, the industry aimed to make Western music the universal idiom. The combination of enterprise and technology, in the shape of the large firm and the phonograph, appeared to be irresistible.⁶⁸ Soon after the turn of the century, the industry embarked on a program of “cultural uplift” that was designed to convert listeners to the supposedly superior sound of the classics. Cultural assimilation was seen to be partner to national unity. Consumers in the Northern states faced the commercial counterpart of the assimilationist policies that the Navajo confronted in the South-west. The strategy failed, and the limited market for classical music was soon saturated.

In these circumstances the music industry was forced to explore markets overseas. While still trying to promote classical music, the industry’s agents stumbled upon local music. They disdained what they took to be its primitive form, just as they looked down on popular music in the United States. But they were obliged to develop it because the market for Beethoven (or even Gilbert and Sullivan) was even more limited in Bengal than it was in Illinois. The wholly unintended result was that the industry preserved and popularized local music across large parts of the world. In improving their balance sheets, the record companies inadvertently assisted the rising cause of colonial nationalism by adding to the store of indigenous cultural traditions. A recent study of India has explored the process by which Northern and Southern music became differentiated in the first half of the twentieth century and shown how indigenous musical forms were codified, thus greatly improving their ability to represent distinctive traditions in the regions concerned.⁶⁹ The music industry’s experience overseas was then relayed to the United States, where it was used to create a market for home-grown local music, beginning by responding to demand in the immigrant communities and later extending to marketing music from the Southern states.

Miller’s analysis places the origins of the globalization of the music industry at the beginning of the twentieth century instead of towards its end, as is conventional.⁷⁰ Consequently, any attempt to link these developments with “late capitalism” or the postmodern era is misplaced: they were there,

at the creation of the industry, one hundred years ago. From the perspective of this study, Miller shows that trans-national enterprise sustained local cultural forms, which in turn provided vital support for their own enterprise. The weavers of the Navajo and the musicians of the Carnatic have in common the fact that globalization promoted their activities.⁷¹ They may now share a local burger too because MacDonald's has responded to cultural differences by adapting the universal burger: local varieties now contain regional ingredients.

The example of Japan also shows how an idea with universal claims, in this case in the field of economic policy, was adopted in ways that added to existing policy options and strengthened the economy. However, as Metzler unravels the relationship between List's thought and that of one of his most prominent advocates in Japan, Takahashi Korekiyo (1854–1936), it becomes evident that this was far from being a simple case of a happy meeting of otherwise wholly different minds. List's own mind was formed far more by the university of life than within the ivory tower.⁷² His considerable knowledge of the German states outside his native Württemberg was acquired largely while on the run from conservative rulers who were angered by his numerous and well publicized proposals for reform. He arrived in the United States as a refugee but soon caught the eye and patronage of President Jackson, who eventually returned him to Europe in an official capacity. List's "national system" therefore had cosmopolitan origins, and his recommendations acquired universal pretensions partly because of his wide knowledge of the predicament of late-start countries that were attempting simultaneously to develop their economies and create strong modern states.⁷³

It is equally clear that Takahashi was not sitting quietly at home waiting to be uplifted by superior Western knowledge. He grew up at a time of intellectual ferment, when Western ideas of all stripes were entering Japan and mingling with existing modes of thought. Takahashi himself traveled widely: he learned English in California and observed the operation of protectionism in the United States. As Metzler shows, Takahashi was advocating a type of "national system" in Japan before List's work was known there, and his views were also influenced by Japanese theories of political economy that were first formulated in the eighteenth century.⁷⁴ In this instance, universal and local had cosmopolitan origins that merged to produce national policies.

List adopted the common assumption among his contemporaries, including Adam Smith and Karl Marx, that development would take place across the world in stages. This was undeniably a universal proposition, and it influenced development studies, including modernization theory, in the

twentieth century. List's principal interest was in the developing states of Western and Central Europe and the United States, which were trying to catch up with Britain. Although his theories later appealed to countries outside the Western world too, List himself said very little about these regions and what he did say was unflattering, though in line with other post-Enlightenment views of his time. The rest of the world, in List's judgment, was far from the stage where protectionist policies were appropriate. Turkey was a "corpse"; the remainder of Asia was "mouldering."⁷⁵ Their regeneration required a long period of "care and tutelage" through an infusion of "European vital power."⁷⁶ Backward regions like these should be opened to free trade so that they could begin the development process by exporting agricultural products. "Wild and uninhabited" countries elsewhere needed a stiff dose of European colonial rule.⁷⁷ As a prediction of the shape of things to come, List's prescription was not far off the mark, but his Eurocentric view of what was later called the Third World also helped to perpetuate misconceptions that hampered the development he wished to see.

The final illustration of how a universal idea melded with, and was realized in, the particular returns us, briefly, to Hegel. In Hegel's view, history was the means by which spirit developed increasing self-consciousness. This process occurred in successive stages and was driven by a dialectic that gave prominence to different parts of the world at different times. Hart shows how spirit, which in principle could be lodged anywhere, was in practice to be found in the Protestant, Germanic nations. To accomplish this feat, Hegel was obliged to discount the history of much of the rest of the world, including China. This was a congenial task. Hegel was keen to elevate the German states because he wanted to see them regrouped and strengthened after the upheaval of the Napoleonic wars. He was also reacting to the sinophilia of Leibniz, Voltaire and others, who saw in Confucianism ways of grounding ethics without relying on religious injunctions, and thus support for their own universalizing moral and political programs.⁷⁸ However, Hart's analysis moves beyond the question of how Hegel transformed the local into a false universal. His more important concern is to alert us to the insularity and subjectivity inherent in the exercise of devising and promoting principles that are held to be universal. The lesson is one to be carried forward: what we can now see in Hegel might also apply to current, enveloping claims about the merits of globalization.

The remaining four chapters deal with cases in which the universal undermined the local or at least proved unable to support it. The clearest example of the latter is the Universal Races Congress (URC), which Matsyik examines in her chapter. In the broadest historical context, the

URC reminds us of the continuing presence, in an age of rampant nationalism and imperialism, of strands of humanitarian internationalism that reach far back into the nineteenth century to the anti-slavery movement and to Cobden's brand of liberal, free-trading cosmopolitanism. In the context of contemporary globalization, the URC stands as an early example of what are now called international non-governmental organizations. The aim of the Congress, which met in 1911, was to promote international understanding and cooperation and in particular to find common ground amidst racial differences. The delegates were driven by two conflicting forces: heightened tension among the great powers, which threatened war, and rapid advances in communications, which held out the promise of greater integration, and – so it was hoped – peace.

In the event, the URC's good intentions could not bridge the gap between advancing universal ideals and respecting local differences. When it came to practicalities, the URC struggled to find alternative models to the nation state, which entrenched difference at the expense of commonality, and to colonial rule, which dispensed inequality. It is interesting to note that one of the prominent participants, Paul Reinsch, later played a part in helping to devise the mandate and trusteeship system, which he saw as means of managing the transition from colonial rule to independence.⁷⁹ At one level, the URC can be regarded as the vehicle of a group of liberal progressives whose moderation prevented them from stepping outside the system they wished to change. At another level, however, they can be seen, as Matysik sees them, to have grappled with a problem that stands before us today in a world in which universal human rights jostle with multiple cultural differences – still within the framework of the nation state.

More generally still, it is possible to fit the URC into the development of the social sciences in the United States in the late nineteenth century. A central theme of the day was the need to devise a set of universally valid rules of social conduct at a time of rapid economic change and energetic nation-building. The anthropologist, Franz Boas, who was a prominent participant in the URC, played a major role in this endeavor.⁸⁰ Thinking of this kind tends to conflate the ideal and the real. The rules that were devised were founded on “universalistic abstraction” and accompanied by ahistorical approaches, which in turn can be traced to founding assumptions about American exceptionalism.⁸¹ To the extent that the URC was part of this process, it pointed the way towards the abstractions of the future, but it should also be credited with recognizing that diverse realities impeded the application of lofty ideals. A less modest stance was taken by President Wilson, when he proclaimed in 1918 that freedom and democracy were American principles that were also principles of mankind and could and

should transform the world.⁸² Not for the last time, universal ideals collided with immovable realities, and rarely more tragically than in the Middle East and Vietnam, as Schad and Lawrence show in their respective chapters.

As we have seen, the Ottoman Empire had long struggled to work out an accommodation with acquisitive foreign powers, notably Britain, France, Germany, Austria and Russia. By 1914 the experiment had undermined Ottoman finances and eroded the empire's political authority. The "sick man of Europe" died during World War I, and was cut into pieces at the peace settlement that followed.⁸³ The Middle East was then reordered to fit the universalist ideals of President Wilson and the material interests of Britain and France.⁸⁴ The victors set in motion a new phase of compulsory experimentation with Western ideals in the shape of an ambitious program of nation-building that has consumed much of the energy of the region ever since. Schad's analysis of this long and draining experiment shows how it cut across existing affiliations both to the old Ottoman Empire and to the vibrant force of Islam. The Ottomans had ruled by recognizing local differences. Until the late nineteenth century, Muslims had lived largely peacefully alongside Christians in the Balkans and Jews in Constantinople. The new Arab states, however, required uniformity. But they also lacked legitimacy and ethno-linguistic homogeneity. In these unpromising circumstances, self-determination, the new prescription, was guaranteed to handicap them at birth. The attempt to develop national affiliations produced authoritarian central governments with close ties to the military while also retarding the development of a commercial middle class whose interests lay in markets beyond the national boundaries. The alternative strategy was to develop pan-Arab nationalism and pan-Islamic affiliations, which drew upon long-established ties but also ran counter to the demands of the new "nation" states.

When viewed from this angle, it is evident that the experiment with nation-building in the Middle East had little chance of success. The principle of self-determination can be applied only by creating localities and giving them borders. But this exercise runs the risk, and perhaps courts the certainty, of installing governments and ideologies that respect neither minorities within their borders nor commonalities above and beyond them. The URC pondered this issue; the attempt to install democracy to Iraq is entangled with the same problems today. Indeed, one of many ironies in the current situation is that the constitution planned for the new Iraq will transfer power back to three provinces of the old Ottoman Empire. This, it might be said, is nation-building in reverse. All that remains is to revive the Ottoman Empire itself to oversee regional defense and free trade. This revanchist solution is now out of time, but it is worth noting, if not too

wistfully, that under other circumstances Ottoman cosmopolitanism would have been well suited to the needs of globalization, and that the world of Islam is also one that rises above mere territorial boundaries.

Schad's analysis of the Middle East is complemented by Mark Lawrence's reappraisal of Vietnam. Both regions were occupied by contending universals; both were sites of experimental nation-building following the upheaval caused by world wars that felled imperial overlords. The main difference was one brought about by the passage of time: the victors of 1918 had to remake long-established affiliations; the victors of 1945 had to deal with the newer demands of colonial nationalism. In neither case, it seems fair to say, did the dominant foreign powers understand or even recognize the forces that confronted them. In these circumstances the recipients were blamed rather than the plan – a miscalculation that can be traced to the ease with which policy-makers merge abstract ideals with their own experience, thus leaving little room for the experiences of others and less still for their aspirations.⁸⁵

Lawrence's chapter centers on interactions between the universal claims of the leading protagonists in the Cold War and the ambitions of the two branches of the nationalist movement in Vietnam led by Ho Chi Minh and Bao Dai respectively. Seen from the outside and from the standpoint of diplomatic relations, the contest is usually portrayed as a struggle to win hearts and minds. The rhetoric of universal principles validated the mission and fortified its agents while also advancing pragmatic goals. Seen from the inside and from local perspectives, the question was how to harness external forces to the nationalist cause. The two nationalist leaders selected and recycled the idealist principles pressed upon them by the major powers. They added their own contributions, too, from their cosmopolitan experience of travel in Europe and the United States, as did the Japanese statesman, Takahashi Korekiyo, referred to earlier. Ho worked in Paris; Bao Dai played there. One absorbed the universal principles that underpinned anti-colonial nationalist movements everywhere; the other acquired a taste for the high life associated with the most affluent reaches of Western consumer culture. Ho died in Hanoi in 1969; Bao Dai died in Paris in 1997, where he had lived for nearly half a century.

Unsurprisingly, Ho Chi Minh was more adept than Bao Dai at co-operating with the protagonists in the Cold War while also giving assurances that registered with his political base at home. More important, Ho's program appealed to local people and their values, and his organization was effective in harnessing peasant villages to the political and military cause.⁸⁶ Bao Dai, the former Emperor of Vietnam, enjoyed visibility and status. But the pliability that recommended him to France and the United States alienated him from the Vietnamese people, and he soon became a lingering symbol of the

old regime in an age of new nationalist aspirations. Nevertheless, Ho's endorsement of the principles enshrined in the American and French revolutions was insufficient to retain the backing of the United States, which was alarmed by his communist sympathies and hampered by a commitment to uphold France's ambition of regaining its position in Vietnam. From 1948 Ho turned increasingly to the Soviet bloc for support, thus setting the scene for the deadly confrontations that were to follow.

Matysik's study of the URC noted that humanitarian internationalism did not thrive in an era of heightened nationalism and expanding empires. Lawrence shows that the same conditions pertained after 1945, when nationalism was channeled into the Cold War and a final effort was made to reinvigorate Europe's imperial mission. The seemingly benign universals promoted by the West and the Soviet Union alike were domesticated only after they had been transformed by the fire of war. Rivalry between the two super-powers warped Ho Chi Minh's nationalist movement and destroyed large parts of the region and its people. Ho eventually succeeded in setting Vietnam on the path to independence, and in due course it emerged as an amalgamation of the forces that had made it, including a centralized and authoritarian government with a strong military base. Self-determination has produced weak states, rogue states and a good many more that fail to live up to their founding principles. As Schad and Lawrence show, the rivalry of the great powers in the Middle East and Vietnam contributed to the fragmentation of borders and loyalties, and to the instability that ensued. These problems are products of the imperial age of globalization rather than of its recent postimperial form.⁸⁷ The idea that these conditions can be put right by a new style of "benign imperialism," as has been advocated recently, omits the evidence of history, and now, it might be said, the evidence of experience too.⁸⁸

White's contribution, the last of main chapters, provides a broad discussion of the term "nation state" and its accompanists, "nation," "nationality," and "nationalism," which appear in specific forms in many of the preceding chapters. These terms are, of course, both well established and highly controversial, but few historians have considered them in the context of the new literature on globalization. It is probably fair to say that historians use the term "nation state" far more often than they define it. White's analysis shows that an awareness of this literature can contribute to the study of history by reminding historians that "nation state" and its accomplices are shifting, slippery terms that need to be defined if discussion is not to begin and end at cross-purposes. Social scientists, on the other hand, have long struggled to nail down appropriate definitions. If their efforts have met with limited success, they have undoubtedly pointed to possibilities and pitfalls

that historians need to consider. These are especially important in studying the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when states were being taken apart and remade to an unprecedented extent, and when, as we have seen, attempts were being made to create new nation states in Japan, the Middle East and Vietnam. The acts of nationalizing and renationalizing identities have also had a profound influence on the methods and priorities of modern, professional historical studies since the mid-nineteenth century.⁸⁹ List criticized Adam Smith's "boundless cosmopolitanism" and its "disorganizing particularism" because it excluded the nation, with its historic ties of language and custom.⁹⁰ The historical profession, which has been concerned to remedy the omission ever since, now faces the challenge of shifting its attention to the "boundless cosmopolitanism" created by globalization.

The study of history can contribute further to this issue by showing how different ethnic and civic conceptions of the "nation state" have evolved, often in parallel but with fluctuating degrees of popularity. These differences are inherent in applying the universal principle of self-determination, which requires particularity if it is to be made operational. The devil, as they say, is in the details. White's analysis here supplements McNeill's wide-ranging interpretation of what he terms polyethnicity, which has been unjustly neglected by historians and social scientists alike.⁹¹ White shows that both ethnic and civic conceptions of nation and nationality long predate the nineteenth century and were far more fluid than reconstructions of the past from the standpoint of the present allow.⁹² Ethnic claims associated with nation-building in Europe then achieved prominence between 1789 and the end of World War I, when the principle of self-determination reached a peak of popularity – at the moment, it will be recalled, when the Ottoman Empire was being divided into new states.

Even so, the ideal of an ethnically unitary state was rarely achieved. The best example, Japan, is also exceptional; the United States and Britain, to cite just two of many contrary cases, developed civic conceptions of nationality because the ethnic ideal was considered to be impractical or undesirable – or both. Thereafter, the experience of two world wars cooled enthusiasm for supporting ethnic claims to self-determination, and in Europe for nationalism of any kind as well. Nevertheless, the nation state remained the only model of political development available, and it was puffed up and exported during the era of decolonization that followed World War II – with consequences that we have seen in Lawrence's study of Vietnam. The hope was that the civic conception of nationality would harness diversity without destroying it. The reality was that the late twentieth century witnessed an unexpected and sometimes lethal revival of the idea and politics of ethnicity.

Writing in 1986, McNeill suggested that what he termed polyethnicity would resume its historic role as the predominant basis of state formation. Twenty years later, White has reached the same conclusion, even after taking account of the resurgent politics of ethnicity. The reason, in both cases, is that ethnic nationalism is ultimately incompatible with economic forms of globalization, which require increased flows of migrants across state borders. As for the question of whether globalization is strengthening or weakening the nation state, it ought to be clear by now that much depends on whether the term is equated with ethnic homogeneity or regarded as a contractual, civic, imagined state.⁹³ The merit of White's contribution is to direct our attention to the crucial importance of defining the terms of the debate.

The relationship between universals and particulars is indeed complex. However, the chapters that follow have made it possible to lay out a spectrum of relationships and outcomes. At one end stand examples of universal principles that interact with particular localities to joint, if not always equal, advantage. This does not imply either the existence of an iron law of ever expanding universals or the operation of a benign, civilizing mission to uplift the fallen. In the cases under review, universal principles made headway because mutual interest dictated a compromise that harnessed the energy and enterprise of the locality instead of subverting it. Navajo weavers, Indian musicians, and Japanese politicians have this much in common. The corollary is that universals fail to extend their domain, or else destabilize the locality in the attempt, when they refuse to concede a sufficient degree of validity to the region and peoples concerned. The Middle East and Vietnam stand together as examples of such intransigence, which is enhanced when the power of the state is mobilized to support a universal ideology.⁹⁴ But Hegel, too, was intransigent: his universal succeeded, to his own satisfaction at least, not by trampling upon the opposition but by dismissing it. The Universal Races Congress, on the other hand, recognized and respected the problem of diversity, but in doing so failed to produce a universal blueprint that could also deal with difference.

Two general conclusions can be drawn from these studies. The first is that there are few, if any, pristine universals. Wherever universals appear, they bear the marks of the locality that produced them and of the contributions made by other sources, which might be both distant and unacknowledged. For the most part, universals are jointly produced and sometimes recycled, which, put another way, is to say that we have lived in a globalized world for longer than we realize or perhaps wish to recognize. The second conclusion is that, once we understand the longevity and extent of these interactions, it becomes harder to trample on or dismiss the values of

others because we can see more clearly that we share the basic predicaments of what Hannah Arendt called the human condition.⁹⁵ Universals succeed best, it seems, when they tolerate difference, concede validity to others, and thus contribute to a cosmopolitan outcome.

Application

“Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe.” So wrote H. G. Wells at the close of his *Outline of History*, published in 1920.⁹⁶ Wells was writing in the immediate aftermath of the devastation brought about by World War I. He saw around him, as did Norman Angell and other commentators, forms of integration that today would be classified as evidence of globalization.⁹⁷ Europe had developed what Wells called economic “fusion.” Economic growth allied to technical advance was drawing the world together. The process had thrown up new issues, such as arms control, the spread of disease and the need to manage global airways, which were beyond the jurisdiction of any one state. The state, indeed, was part of the problem: economic integration was pulling different countries together; political considerations were pushing them apart; national rivalries had just wrecked them. Wells saw only one way forward: “Nationalism as a god must follow the tribal gods to limbo. Our true nationality is mankind.”⁹⁸ Existing states needed to be placed under a federal world government if the disaster of the recent past was to be avoided and the issues arising in the postwar world addressed. Only by this means could basic needs be assessed and a “rough equality of opportunity” given to the children of the world. Education had a crucial part to play in this process by developing what today would be called a “global civic consciousness.”

We do not have to agree with Wells’s proposed solution to acknowledge that he had a good grasp of the problem. In the immediate aftermath of Nine Eleven and amidst the “war on terror,” we survey a world that is even more integrated economically than it was a century ago. Yet it is still subject to much the same national rivalries, to which have now been added a layer of supra-national forces such as terrorist organizations and a presumed clash of whole civilizations. Today, it is not only capital that knows no boundaries. As for the solution, leaving aside the promise or threat of a federal world government, Wells was surely right in allocating a key role to education. Even so, we need to proceed carefully: the difference between education and propaganda is the difference between a friend and an enemy, and the two are not always distinguished easily. Accordingly, it would be unfortunate if a book like this, which tries to unmask a number of claims to

universal truth, should fail to be aware of the danger of seeing others in the image of ourselves. Equally, we would be naïve to suppose that the literature on globalization provides a universal template of its own that fits neatly over the study of history.

Nevertheless, in recognizing these difficulties, we have tried to make a case for a new type of history, one that rises above the nation state and itself becomes part of the process of globalization. The modern, professional study of national history began with the formation of nation states in the nineteenth century. Now that we live in a globalized world, it is appropriate, and we would argue necessary too, that we should rethink the way we study the past to take account of the much changed present. The literature on globalization has a part to play in this enterprise in amplifying the contributions already made by studies of world history and international history. The intellectual purpose of the explorations undertaken here should now be self-evident: to enquire as systematically as possible into relations between the study of history and the new literature on globalization. In pursuing this enquiry, we have tried to make aspects of this literature accessible while also adhering to the requirements of professional historical research. We hope to have shown that the exercise produces gains for both parties. Historians can take up, apply and amend hypotheses that have been generated by social scientists whose principal concern is with contemporary globalization; social scientists can enlarge their understanding of the present by incorporating a larger historical dimension into their work.

We also hope that this study will be of practical value in contributing to the way in which history is taught. There is no doubt that the interests of the current generation of students are moving beyond the study of national history, important though it is. The students of today travel across national boundaries far more readily than their parents did. Their e-mails circumnavigate the globe in an instant, sustaining imagined communities on a scale that not even H. G. Wells's science fiction envisaged. Television brings them war, famine, politics, and sport from the four corners of the world. Curiosity and logic, if combined, ought to lead to a rethinking of the content, presentation and status of world history. Progressive departments of history are beginning to explore ways of altering their programs to take account of these developments.⁹⁹ However, the message is not as self-evident as it ought to be. There is also opposition, whether to adjusting established priorities in general or to promoting world history in particular.¹⁰⁰ If the study of history is to bear some relationship to the world we live in, world history needs to be seen as more than low-level preparation for high-level specialization that, once achieved, absolves practitioners from communicating with others beyond their own narrow domains. The literature on globalization provides

a means of advancing the study of world history. It is not a talisman or a quick fix, but it is an opportunity that should be taken.

In this connection we are especially fortunate that William McNeill, the pioneer and untiring advocate of world history, has contributed an "Afterword" to this book, thus adding an independent voice to a work that otherwise is written entirely by members of the Department of History at the University of Texas at Austin. McNeill recalls us, appropriately, to a longer and larger tradition of thinking about the "great transformation" that is both a preface to and a part of the process we consider here under the heading of globalization. His example, which shows how the universal of American culture helped to destroy the "age-old local way of life" in the Greek villages he studied, provides a further instance of the diverse outcomes of globalization. In this case, it seems, globalization is producing uniformity by creating urban man. Bsumek's study, which McNeill refers to, shows how local communities can maintain their way of life by harnessing the process of globalization for their own purposes. McNeill's final appeal reminds us of the importance in the new century of studying the "interconnected whole" of human history. Our book tries to promote that study and also advance the means of teaching it.

We have tried to practice what we here advertise by showing that colleagues in one department can rise above their separate specializations and develop a sense of collective purpose that joins together widely different and seemingly disparate pieces of research without sacrificing their individuality. In this way, we have become a microcosm of the world we have studied. Our quest for commonality has flowed into distinct localities without, we hope, submerging them. The result, if we have been successful, has been to reconstruct elements of a world whose interacting parts need to be understood both for the sake of their own past and for their relevance to the present.

Notes

- 1 It is possible that his opponent, John Kerry, was damaged by his knowledge of the world, especially his connections with France, because understanding implied sympathy and sympathy suggested a possible division or at least dilution of loyalties.
- 2 Richard H. Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated and Transformed American Culture since World War II* (New York, 1997); and Karl Miller's contribution to this volume (Ch. 6).
- 3 Two good introductions are: James L. Larsen, *Interpreting Nature: The Science of Living Form from Linnaeus to Kant* (Baltimore, MD, 1994); and Lisbet Koerner,

- Linnaeus: Nature and Nation* (Cambridge, MA, 1999). The analogy could be expanded in ways that fit the analysis of this book – not least by inserting subsequent modifications of Linnaean theory showing, for example, that there were multiple centers of diffusion rather than one. See James Larson, “Not without a Plan: Geography and Natural History in the Late Eighteenth Century,” *Journal of the History of Biology*, 19 (1986), pp. 447–88. Linnaean universalism, like present-day globalization, also had a strong moral (and in his case spiritual) imperative. See Lisbet Rausing, “Underwriting the Oeconomy: Linnaeus on Nature and Mind,” *History of Political Economy*, 35 (2003), pp. 173–203.
- 4 A thorough and balanced account is Ernst Breisach, *On the Future of History: The Postmodernist Challenge and its Aftermath* (Chicago, 2003).
 - 5 The social science literature is as extensive as the historical literature is sparse. Helpful introductions for historians include: David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture* (Cambridge and Stanford, CA, 1999); David Held and Anthony McGrew (eds), *The Global Transformations Reader* (Cambridge and New York, 2000); David Held and Anthony McGrew, *Globalization/Anti-Globalization* (Cambridge and Malden, MA, 2002); and Manfred B. Steger, *Globalization: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford, 2003).
 - 6 Convenient and necessary expansions of the definition can be found in Held et al., *Global Transformations*; and A. G. Hopkins (ed.), *Globalization in World History* (New York, 2002), pp. 18–25.
 - 7 At the time of writing, there are few general studies that treat the subject from a historical perspective. See, for example, Hopkins, *Globalization in World History*; Jürgen Osterhammel and Niels Petersson, *Globalization: A Short History* (Princeton, NJ, 2005); Bruce Mazlish and Akira Iriye (eds), *The Global History Reader* (New York, 2005). See also the important, though more specialized work of Kevin H. O’Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, *Globalization and History: The Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Economy* (Cambridge, MA, 1999).
 - 8 Bruce Mazlish, “Comparing Global History to World History,” *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 28 (1998), pp. 385–95. An excellent guide to the current state of teaching world history is Patrick Manning, *Navigating World History: Historians Create a Global Past* (New York, 2003).
 - 9 The pioneering work is that of William H. McNeill, *The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community* (Chicago, 1963; new ed. 1991). See also his reflective essay, “*The Rise of the West* after Twenty-five Years,” *Journal of World History*, 1 (1990), pp. 1–21.
 - 10 Indeed, globalization has challenged the social sciences, as well as history, to think beyond the framework of the nation state.
 - 11 Hopkins, *Globalization in World History*; Bruce Mazlish and Ralph Buultjens (eds), *Conceptualizing Global History* (Boulder, CO, 1993).
 - 12 Hopkins, *Globalization in World History*.

- 13 An introduction to these issues is Ian Clark, *Globalization and Fragmentation: International Relations in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford, 1997).
- 14 It might be added that theorists of globalization have not provided suitable definitions either, so the present discussion may be of value to them as well as to the historians to whom it is primarily addressed.
- 15 The growth of universalism as a religious doctrine (that all men can be saved) in Britain and the North American colonies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is outlined by Geoffrey Powell, "The Origins of Universalist Societies in Britain, 1750–1850," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 22 (1971), pp. 35–56. A striking account of the universal Christian empire is James Muldoon, *Empire and Order: The Concept of Empire, 800–1800* (London, 1999).
- 16 Richard Falk, *Human Rights' Horizons: The Pursuit of Justice in a Globalizing World* (New York, 2000); Micheline Ishay, *The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era* (Los Angeles, 2004).
- 17 A notable discussion of international distributive justice can be found in Onora O'Neill, *Bounds of Justice* (Cambridge, 2000). For a study relating to non-governmental organizations see the discussion of *Médecins sans frontières* and *Médecins du monde* in Bertrand Taithe, "Reinventing French Universalism: Religion, Humanitarianism and the 'French Doctors,'" *Modern and Contemporary France*, 12 (2004), pp. 147–58.
- 18 It has also been used in a derogatory sense that is not implied here. References to cosmopolitanism in Eastern Europe in the nineteenth century commonly referred to intellectuals and Jews as individuals whose loyalty to the nation state were thought to be suspect.
- 19 Such as Friedrich List, as noted by Mark Metzler in Ch. 8. H. G. Wells was among those who popularized the idea early in the twentieth century. See his *The Outline of History*, Vol. 4 (London, 4th ed. 1922), Ch. 41.
- 20 Relationships between universals, nation states and cosmopolitanism in the present-day, multi-cultural world are considered in Pheng Chean and Bruce Robbins (eds), *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation* (Minneapolis, MN, 1998).
- 21 A helpful review of the literature, though one dealing more with migration than with diasporas, is M. Kearney, "The Local and the Global: The Anthropology of Globalization and Transnationalism," *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 24 (1995), pp. 547–65.
- 22 A fuller statement than is possible here would examine the ways in which empires projected universals that also acquired a cosmopolitan character as a result of interacting with diverse localities.
- 23 A lucid introduction is Peter J. Taylor, *Modernities: A Geohistorical Interpretation* (Cambridge, 1999). See also Gilbert Rist, *The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith* (London, 1997).
- 24 Tracie Matysik notes in this study (Ch. 5) how Felix Adler, one of the prime movers behind the Universal Races Congress of 1911, was influenced by

- Kant's universalism, while others in the movement leaned more towards Benthamite utilitarianism.
- 25 Ronald Meek, *Social Science and the Ignoble Savage* (Cambridge, 1976); Terence W. Hutchison, *Before Adam Smith: The Emergence of Political Economy, 1662–1776* (Oxford, 1988); Walt Whitman Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge, 1960).
 - 26 Jo-Ann Pemberton, *Global Metaphors: Modernity and the Quest for One World* (London, 2001).
 - 27 Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York, 1992).
 - 28 Muldoon, *Empire and Order*, pp. 140–1.
 - 29 My position here is in accord with that outlined by Bruce Mazlish, "Global History in a Postmodern Era?," in Mazlish and Buultjens, *Conceptualizing Global History*, pp. 113–27. For nineteenth-century elements of postmodern thought see Pemberton, *Global Metaphors*, Ch. 2.
 - 30 Ch.3.
 - 31 Kerwin Lee Klein, "In Search of Narrative Mastery: Postmodernism and the People without History," *History and Theory*, 34 (1995), pp. 275–98.
 - 32 An important recent exploration of these themes is Claudia Moscovici, *Double Dialectics: Between Universalism and Relativism in Enlightenment and Postmodern Thought* (Lanham, MD, 2002). Patrice Higonnet, *Sister Republics: The Origins of French and American Republicanism* (New York, 1988) explores the tensions between universalism and individualism in these movements.
 - 33 Moscovici, *Double Dialectics*, Ch. 3.
 - 34 See the valuable study by Karen O'Brien, *Narratives of Enlightenment: Cosmopolitan History from Voltaire to Gibbon* (Cambridge, 1997). To make matters even more complicated, the connection could run in the opposite direction too, as in (Abbé) Guillaume Thomas Raynal's *Histoire philosophique des deux Indes* (1770), which started from a cosmopolitan standpoint and ended with a vision of a universal society united by trade. *Ibid.*, p. 236.
 - 35 Moscovici, *Double Dialectics*, Ch. 4.
 - 36 Maryanne Horowitz, "Montaigne's 'Des Cannibales' and Natural Sources of Virtue," *History of European Ideas*, 11 (1989), pp. 427–34. Montaigne, writing in the late sixteenth century, was also largely responsible for introducing the idea of the noble savage into European thought.
 - 37 One chapter (9), by Philip White, is predominantly historiographical, but it seems apposite that a book concerned with the changing nature of historical studies should include at least one study of this kind – and in this case the theme of the chapter, the nation state, is central to both modern history and to the literature on globalization.
 - 38 On this subject see Ernest Gellner, "Civil Society in Historical Context," *International Social Science Journal*, 43 (1991), pp. 495–510.
 - 39 Hiram Caton, "The Preindustrial Economics of Adam Smith," *Journal of Economic History*, 45 (1985), pp. 833–53. Smith used the term "nation" to refer generally to forms of political organization as varied as "the savage nations of

- hunters and fishers,” and the “civilized and thriving nations” of Europe. *The Wealth of Nations* (New York, 1937 ed.), pp. lviii–lix.
- 40 A. G. Hopkins, “The ‘New International Order’ in the Nineteenth Century: Britain’s First Development Plan for Africa,” in Robin Law (ed.), *From Slave Trade to Legitimate Commerce* (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 240–64; P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism, 1688–2000* (London, 2001), especially Chs 8–13.
- 41 Jeffrey G. Williamson, “Globalization, Convergence and History,” *Journal of Economic History*, 56 (1996), pp. 277–306; Harold James, *The End of Globalization: Lessons from the 1930s* (Cambridge, MA, 2001).
- 42 Thomas M. Campbell, “Nationalism in America’s UN Policy, 1944–1945,” *International Organization*, 27 (1973), pp. 25–44.
- 43 John Boli and George M. Thomas (eds), *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875* (Stanford, CA, 1999); Akira Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley, CA, 2002).
- 44 Michael E. Latham, *Modernization as Ideology* (Durham, NC, 2000); Jefferson P. Marquis, “Social Science and Nation-Building in Vietnam,” *Diplomatic History*, 24 (2000), pp. 79–105; Mark T. Berger, “Decolonisation, Modernization and Nation-Building: Political Development Theory and the Appeal of Communism in South-East Asia, 1945–75,” *Journal of South-East Asian Studies*, 34 (2003), pp. 421–48.
- 45 A lively collection of relevant essays is in Lloyd C. Gardner and Marilyn B. Young (eds), *The New American Empire* (New York, 2005).
- 46 The primary source is Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York, 1996), which developed from a debate in *Foreign Affairs* in 1993.
- 47 Sevket Pamuk, “The Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century,” *Itinerario*, 24 (2000), pp. 104–16.
- 48 Joseph Klaitis and Michael H. Haltzel (eds), *The Global Ramifications of the French Revolution* (Cambridge, 1994), Chs 7–8. The best short guide to the reforms is Donald Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700–1922* (Cambridge, 2000).
- 49 Ussama Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism,” *American Historical Review*, 107 (2002), pp. 768–96.
- 50 Nader Sohrabi, “Global Waves, Local Actors: What the Young Turks Knew about Other Revolutions and Why it Mattered,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 44 (2002), pp. 45–79. The complexities of the movement are explored by M. Sukru Haioglu, *Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902–1908* (Oxford, 2001).
- 51 Charles Desnoyers, “Towards ‘The Enlightened and Progressive Civilization’: Discourses of Expansion and Nineteenth-Century Chinese Missions Abroad,” *Journal of World History*, 8 (1997), pp. 135–56.
- 52 Ch. 4.

- 53 The best concise guide is Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire*. On the consequences of economic penetration see Cain and Hopkins, *British Imperialism*, Ch. 12; Jacques Thobie, *Intérêts et impérialisme français dans l'Empire Ottoman, 1895–1914* (Paris, 1977).
- 54 A short guide to the last days of the Ottoman Empire is A. L. Macfie, *The End of the Ottoman Empire, 1908–23* (Harlow, 1998).
- 55 A valuable guide to the historiography is Zachary Lockman, *Contending Visions of the Middle East* (Cambridge, 2004).
- 56 As argued in Hopkins, *Globalization in World History*.
- 57 James L. Hevia, *Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Mission of 1793* (Durham, NC, 1995), p. 25.
- 58 Unsurprisingly, sinologists are divided on this issue. Some claim that Chinese philosophy is too deeply embedded in its particular context to be exportable to other cultures; others disagree. Roetz, for example, has argued recently that the Confucian concept of *ren* (humanness) is a good candidate for being an enlightened universal. Heiner Roetz, *Confucian Ethics of the Axial Age* (Albany, NY, 1993).
- 59 Gang Deng, *The Premodern Chinese Economy* (London, 1999), pp. 87–99.
- 60 Helen Dunstan, *Conflicting Counsels to Confuse the Age: A Documentary Study of Political Economy in Qing China, 1644–1840* (Ann Arbor, MI, 1996), p. 332.
- 61 J. J. Clarke, *Oriental Enlightenment: The Encounter between Asian and Western Thought* (London, 1997), pp. 49–50.
- 62 *Ibid.*, p. 50. See also Christian Gerlach, “Wu-wei in Europe: A Study of Eurasian Economic Thought,” *Global Economic History Network Working Papers*, 12 (2005).
- 63 Tessa Morris-Suzuki, *A History of Japanese Economic Thought* (London, 1989), pp. 8–14.
- 64 The economic history of the period is covered by L. M. Cullen, *A History of Japan, 1582–1941: Internal and External Worlds* (Cambridge, 2003), Chs 3–4.
- 65 Morris-Suzuki, *A History of Japanese Economic Thought*, pp. 14–43.
- 66 See for example, James O. Gump, *The Dust Rose Like Smoke: The Subjugation of the Zulu and the Sioux* (Lincoln, NA, 1994), *idem*, “A Spirit of Resistance: Sioux, Xhosa, and Maori Responses to Western Dominance, 1840–1920,” *Pacific Historical Review*, 66 (1997), pp. 21–52. For ritualized resistance see Dominic J Capecci and Jack C. Knight, “Reactions to Colonialism: The North American Ghost Dance and East African Maji-Maji Rebellions,” *Historian*, 52 (1990), pp. 584–601. See also the articles on globalization in the special issue of *Ethnohistory*, 52, Winter (2005).
- 67 For an overview see John Joyce, “The Globalization of Music: Expanding Spheres of Influence,” in Mazlish and Buultjens, *Conceptualizing Global History*, Ch. 9.
- 68 The role of the firm in the emerging global economy is explored by Geoffrey Jones, “Business Enterprise and Global Worlds,” *Business History*, 3 (2002), pp. 581–605; and Alfred D. Chandler and Bruce Mazlish (eds), *Leviathans: Multinational Corporations and the New Global History* (Cambridge, 2005).

- 69 Lakshmi Subramanian, "The Reincarnation of a Tradition: Nationalism, Carnatic Music and the Madras Music Academy, 1900–1947," *Indian Economic and Social History Review*, 36 (1999), pp. 131–63.
- 70 Jocelyne Guilbaut, "On Redefining the 'Local' Through World Music," *The World of Music*, 35 (1993), pp. 33–47. The whole of this issue (No. 2) is relevant to the discussion of globalization and world music.
- 71 And Chinese musicians and consumers too, if we include the complementary study by Andrew F. Jones, *Yellow Music: Media Culture and Colonial Modernity in the Chinese Jazz Age* (Durham, NC, 2001).
- 72 The standard biography is W. O. Henderson, *Friedrich List: Economist and Visionary, 1789–1846* (London, 1983).
- 73 In addition to the German states and the United States, List was also familiar with Belgium, France, Austria, and Hungary.
- 74 Henderson, *Friedrich List*.
- 75 Friedrich List, *The National System of Political Economy* (London, 1885 ed.), p. 419.
- 76 Ibid.
- 77 Ibid. pp. 420–1.
- 78 David E. Mungello, *Leibnitz and Confucianism: The Search for Accord* (Honolulu, HI, 1977); Walter W. Davis, "China, the Confucian Ideal, and the European Age of Enlightenment," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 44 (1983), pp. 523–48.
- 79 Michael A. Schneider, "The Intellectual Origins of Colonial Trusteeship in East Asia: Nitobe Inazo, Paul Reinsch and the End of Empire," *American Asian Review*, 17 (1999), pp. 1–48.
- 80 Mauricio Tenorio Trillo, "Stereophonic Scientific Modernisms: Social Science Between Mexico and the United States, 1880s–1940s," *Journal of American History*, 86 (1999), pp. 1156–87.
- 81 Dorothy Ross, *The Origins of American Social Science* (Cambridge, 1991); and for the application of these principles to the study of history, idem, "Grand Narrative in American Historical Writing: From Romance to Uncertainty," *American Historical Review*, 100 (1995), pp. 651–77; and Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream* (Cambridge, 1988).
- 82 Margaret Olwen MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World* (New York, 2002).
- 83 The history of this well known phrase is covered by Alan Cunningham, "The Sick Man and the British Physician," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 17 (1981), pp. 147–73.
- 84 MacMillan, *Paris 1919*.
- 85 Ross, *Origins of American Social Science*.
- 86 Mark W. McLeod, "Indigenous Peoples and the Vietnamese Revolution, 1930–1975," *Journal of World History*, 10 (1999), pp. 353–89.
- 87 There is a discussion of these issues in Clark, *Globalization and Fragmentation*, pp. 188–91.

- 88 Among many examples, which already read like echoes from another age, see Sebastian Mallaby, "The Reluctant Imperialist," *Foreign Affairs*, 81 (2002), pp. 2–7, and Kenneth M. Pollack, "Next Stop Baghdad?," *ibid.*, pp. 32–47.
- 89 The variety of this historiography, as it has affected the history of Germany, Britain, France and Italy, is fully explored in Stefan Berger, Mark Donovan and Kevin Passmore (eds), *Writing National Histories: Western Europe since 1800* (London, 1999).
- 90 List, *The National System*, p. 174.
- 91 William H. McNeill, *Polyethnicity and National Unity in World History* (Toronto, 1986).
- 92 Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford, 1986); also *idem*, *Chosen Peoples* (Oxford, 2003). The key study of the diversity and fluidity of ideas and practice is by the medievalist, Patrick J. Geary, *The Myth of Nations: The Medieval Origins of Europe* (Princeton, NJ, 2002). David R. Roediger traces the changing meanings of race and ethnicity in the United States in the twentieth century in *Working Towards Whiteness: How America's Immigrants Became White* (New York, 2005), Ch. 1.
- 93 A clear, accessible guide to these issues is Robert J. Holton, *Globalization and the Nation-State* (New York, 1998). Contrasting points of view can be found in Susan Strange, *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy* (Cambridge, 1996), and David A. Smith, Dorothy J. Salinger and Steven C. Topik (eds), *States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy* (London, 1999).
- 94 McNeill's "Afterword" (Ch. 10) provides a further example of a universal (US influence) that overwhelmed the local (Greek villages) after World War II.
- 95 Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago, 1958).
- 96 The quotation is from Vol. 4 of the 4th ed. (London, 1922), p. 1305.
- 97 Angell made the mistake, repeated by others, of assuming that increasing integration would make war impossible. See his *The Great Illusion* (London, 1910). Also J. D. B. Miller, *Norman Angell and the Futility of War: Peace and the Public Mind* (New York, 1986).
- 98 Wells, *Outline of History*, p. 1290.
- 99 Examples are now becoming too frequent to list. Sample illustrations include: a two-day program of seminars and discussions held at the University of Rochester in April 2003 to explore "educational programs that various colleges and universities around the country have organized under the 'global studies' rubric," a three-day conference organized by graduate and postdoctoral students in Cambridge (UK) in March 2005, and a program sponsored by the Center for Historical Analysis at Rutgers University during the academic year 2005–06 on "Approaching World History in an Era of Globalization."
- 100 William H. McNeill, *The Pursuit of Truth: A Historian's Memoir* (Lexington, KY, 2005), pp. 131–2, records how world history was closed down after his retirement from the University of Chicago in 1987. Patrick Manning, who

founded the World History Center at Northeastern University in 1994, also had to oversee its closure in 2004 for lack of support. See Manning, *Navigating World History*, pp. viii, xi–xiii. The Chicago story may have a happier ending because Michael Geyer, McNeill's successor, has moved increasingly into world history and is now teaching as well as writing about the subject.

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