

Contents

<i>Preface</i>	vii
<i>Notes on the Contributors</i>	viii
1 Introduction <i>Valpy FitzGerald, Frances Stewart and Rajesh Venugopal</i>	1
2 Global Economic Influences and Policies towards Violent Self-Determination Movements: An Overview <i>Frances Stewart</i>	20
3 Global–Local Cultural Links: Diaspora, Transnationalism, Solidarities and the Media <i>Sandra Dudley and Cathie Lloyd</i>	48
4 Global Financial Information, Compliance Incentives and Conflict Funding <i>Valpy FitzGerald</i>	72
5 Self-Determination in the Global Context <i>Rajesh Venugopal</i>	95
6 Why Congo Persists: Sovereignty, Globalization and the Violent Reproduction of a Weak State <i>Pierre Englebert</i>	119
7 Somalia: State Failure and Self-Determination in the Shadow of the Global Economy <i>William Reno</i>	147
8 Multiple Causes of Conflict in Algeria: National Identity, Inequality and Political Islam <i>Cathie Lloyd</i>	179
9 ‘External’ Aspects of Self-Determination Movements in Burma <i>Sandra Dudley</i>	203

10	Sri Lanka: The Global Dimensions of Conflict <i>Rajesh Venugopal</i>	225
11	Conclusions <i>Valpy FitzGerald, Frances Stewart and Rajesh Venugopal</i>	247
	<i>Index</i>	261

1

Introduction

Valpy FitzGerald, Frances Stewart and Rajesh Venugopal

Globalization, self-determination and violent conflict

Economic and cultural globalization is the defining characteristic of our world in the early twenty-first century. Yet in the closing decades of the previous millennium the apparent end to conflicts between the major powers was accompanied by continued and increasing pressure for 'self-determination' in developing and transition countries – usually accompanied by violent conflict. The opening years of this new century have already seen similar events, ranging from the conflicts in Bolivia, Chechnya, Ivory Coast and Sudan to the attacks by Al Qaeda and similar groups in the US, Indonesia, Spain and the UK. This process has not been halted – and indeed may be stimulated – by the temporary dominance of a single super-power technically capable of military interdiction across the globe in a 'unipolar moment'.

This book explores the connections between these three phenomena of our time: that is, how global factors have affected violent conflict and movements for self-determination. In doing so we seek both cultural and economic explanations, focusing particularly on how these two interact to affect the politics of self-determination. Our central propositions are three:

- that the global economic and cultural dimensions of 'self-determination movements' (SDMs) are far more important than previously recognized, and cannot simply be reduced to the 'criminal greed' of rival local elites or to age-old 'ethnic rivalries';
- that SDMs have an essentially political dimension that involves both the contestation of state power and the construction of legitimacy, both of which have international dimensions and that cannot simply be condemned as 'terrorism';
- and that both concerted action from the international community and extensive institutional change are essential in order to reduce the violence of both SDMs and incumbent states, of which the main victims are the poor and vulnerable.

This book aims to provide the evidence upon which these propositions are based, while this chapter provides the analytical framework within which the individual contributions should be understood. We start by explaining how the concept of self-determination has been constructed in the specific historical context of changing global institutional conventions, which have moved from colonial and territorial concepts towards a definition based on human rights and the representation of peoples. Our own definition extends and clarifies this logic in order to encompass movements aspiring to fundamental social transformation as well as territorial autonomy. The history of SDMs is bound up with the successive geopolitical phases of colonialism, the cold war and the present unipolar hegemony that seems to have reduced the space for self-determination. However, the processes of economic and cultural globalization have also tended to strengthen SDMs both by weakening existing states and generating spontaneous popular reaction to change. We thus explore the nature of violence as an inherent dimension of self-determination, the way that this dimension has changed over time, and how globalization itself has altered the political and cultural role of violent conflict. Such a discussion also demands a clear conceptualization, which we attempt to provide, of the form that war takes in developing countries, in terms of the way in which it is waged and the consequences for the population.

This chapter also summarizes the arguments of the four cross-cutting studies in this book of the mechanisms by which the spread of a single global trading, financial and cultural system affects self-determination movements. We show that the relationship is not simple, and that global hegemonic forces are effectively contested and undermined at the local level, while SDMs find ways to turn global tensions and rivalries to their own advantage. Our five country studies of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Algeria, Burma, and Sri Lanka are not representative of all SDMs or even of their geographic spread. This is for two reasons: first, because the cases of the Balkans and Palestine have been studied in great depth in the academic and policy literatures; and second, because our chosen cases illustrate the central economic, social and cultural characteristics of self-determination and violent conflict in developing countries subject to the pressures and constraints of globalization. In consequence, it should be possible to generalize our findings to other regions.

In order to address such a complex issue, we have combined a number of scholarly disciplines and research methodologies. On the one hand, the research team combined backgrounds in development economics, social anthropology, political sociology and political science. On the other hand, we have combined selected country cases from across the globe with cross-cutting thematic studies of global influences. This approach has a number of obvious strengths, but we are also conscious of a number of problems that it creates in comparability, and in drawing simple inferences from our

case studies. The various streams of academic literature on globalization that have emerged across the social sciences have developed quite distinct conceptual categories to address their specific theoretical, methodological, and empirical preoccupations. The explanation that follows of what we understand by key concepts such as 'self determination', 'globalization' and 'violence' thus serves to clarify not only the way they are used in this book, but also how distinct disciplinary approaches to these issues can be reconciled.

Self-determination

The concept of self-determination can be understood at two very different levels. The first is drawn from the reality of existing *movements* for self-determination, which have been among the most dynamic and important factors in the reshaping of world politics over the past century. The second relates to the way the term self-determination has itself been abstracted and interpreted, often with great ambiguity and inconsistency, within the conservative realm of international power politics and international law. Our focus here is predominantly on the former aspect, although the latter forms an important part of the global dimensions that we seek to explore.

We understand an SDM to be an organized popular movement which aims to institute fundamental structural changes bearing ideological, representational and/or territorial consequences for an existing state or states. This change may take the form either of the creation of a new sovereign state entity from within existing empires or multi-national states, or that of the substantial replacement of the constitutional structure and social functions of the state within its present territory. In many cases the two are combined.¹

The first type relates to the issue of self-government for groups defined by distinct linguistic, cultural, ethnic or religious identities. For the most part, such SDMs have emerged either in the context of colonial rule or representing dissatisfied minority groups within large multi-ethnic states. The second type of 'replacement' refers to movements that seek to institute radical ideo-political transformations in societies that may or may not be already considered self-governing. During much of the twentieth century this form of self-determination involved revolutionary socialist movements that sought the transformation of state power in order to institute far-reaching socio-economic changes. Such movements continue to form the basis of a number of contemporary insurgent wars, for example in Colombia and Nepal. However, other types of 'replacement' have since arisen, and the end of the twentieth century was marked by the replacement of 'real socialism' by capitalism (Eastern Europe), the overthrow of dictatorships in favour of liberal democracy (Ukraine, Philippines, Chile) and the transformation of states that institutionalized the racial supremacy of a colonial-settler

minority (South Africa, Zimbabwe). Finally, the establishment of theocratic states (Iran, Afghanistan) has returned as an objective, most vividly under the rubric of 'political Islam' in its many forms.

For both types, self-determination implies changes at the level of the state, not just a change of government. The very fundamental nature of the socio-political or territorial agenda of self-determination movements means that they are almost by definition pitted in sharp and often violent political conflict against an existing state or states. Indeed, unresolved disputes over self-determination have formed the basis for the vast majority of violent conflicts in the world since 1945, mostly in the developing regions of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Some examples of varying duration over these six decades are: Indonesia (1945–50), Vietnam (1948–75), Kenya (1952–6), Cuba (1952–9), Algeria (1954–62), Mozambique (1962–92), Angola (1962–02), Colombia (1964–), Nigeria (1967–70), East Pakistan (1971), Zimbabwe (1971–9), Ethiopia (1974–91) and Sri Lanka (1983–02). After the end of the cold war, such processes of self-determination and state-transformation in the developing world continued and even accelerated, as is evident in a number of new conflicts that have erupted since 1990, such as in Algeria (1992), Democratic Republic of Congo (1996), Chechnya (1994), various parts of Indonesia (1997) and Bolivia (2004).

As an explicitly recognized internationally legitimate claim, the concept of self-determination is usually attributed to US President Woodrow Wilson at the Versailles negotiations after the First World War. Self-determination was intended to be a new democratic principle for the definition of states and their political borders, in explicit contrast to territorial conquest, dynastic inheritance or diplomatic treaty, and was one of the cornerstones upon which the League of Nations was established. The League itself, of course, foundered on the reefs of renewed global war, but it did mark a clear historical break from the previous system of *de facto* recognition of territorial conquest by states independently of the wishes of the populations concerned. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the UN Charter recognized the 'principle' of self-determination and the duty to support legitimate claims. Later, the UN General Assembly Resolution on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Territories and Peoples (1960) made an even more explicit recognition of self-determination as a right under international law, further confirmed in subsequent covenants over the following decade.

However, these apparently radical advances in international law² had important limitations and ambiguities that meant that they were in effect extending support to only one category of SDM (anti-colonial movements), and that too, at a time when decolonization was already a *fait accompli*. Although 'all peoples' were held to have the right to self-determination, there remains to this day no clear sense of who or what could comprise such a people, and which, if any, agency would enforce such a right. This

ambiguity in itself did not lead to any subsequent clarification of the requisite criteria, but rather to a blanket limitation on the right to self-determination in cases where they interfered with the territorial integrity of existing states. In effect, the prestige of the title 'self-determination', and the weight of international legitimacy, support, and advocacy came to apply not to 'all peoples' as such, but to 'all territories'. Self-determination thus came to describe the formalistic process by which 'non-self governing territories' were converted into 'self-governing territories', irrespective of the depth of popular participation, or the extent of state transformation that this process actually embodied.

Since 1945, more than 80 territories held under colonial rule and trusteeship have achieved independence, and at the turn of the century, there remained only a handful of 'non-self governing territories' left on the agenda of the UN Decolonization Committee – most of which are small, thinly populated islands in the Caribbean and Pacific.³ With the substantial completion of the decolonization process, the predominantly territorial aspect of self-determination has effectively been exhausted, and international law has come under pressure to reflect better the reality of actual SDMs and their demands.

The limitations imposed on the applicability of self-determination were first breached by the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971, and then even more definitively by the unilateral declarations of independence by Yugoslavia's constituent units in 1991. Furthermore, with the dramatic change in the international superpower equation following the end of the cold war, the consensus on issues such as self-determination is shifting still further through the challenges to state sovereignty posed by the human rights agenda, the doctrines of humanitarian intervention and pre-emptive military action. We would also argue that this changing consensus and the reshaping of norms should take into account the claims of SDMs. As we shall argue in Chapter 11, these evolving issues are central to the policy proposals derived from our study.

Globalization and self-determination

Contemporary explanations for violent conflict have tended to be rooted in local events, often presented as the product of the economic aspirations of some and the losses of others ('greed and grievance')⁴ or else simply ethnic rivalry.⁵ When global developments are considered, it is cultural explanations that predominate in the so-called 'clash of civilisations'.⁶ In contrast, we argue that both cultural and economic factors are involved, at both local and global levels, and that a better understanding of the relationship between globalization and self-determination is essential in order both to reduce the human costs of conflict and promote sustainable development.

While the external dimensions of an internal conflict are more readily visualized in terms of such diplomatic or military interventions by outside powers, localized conflicts are increasingly networked to the outside world through a plethora of less visible forms of external intervention.⁷ We do not argue that such conflicts are uniquely and directly caused by globalization, but rather that it is essential to take the global into account in understanding contemporary conflicts and developing policies towards them.

We understand globalization as the process by which a single market system spreads across the world and integrates all societies into a single system of production and exchange. This process has been under way for many centuries, and was one of the main products of colonialism and imperialism. It was, however, interrupted for some seventy-five years between 1914 and 1989 by the two world wars and the installation of regimes antagonistic to this process from both the left and right of the political spectrum. In consequence, although the renewed integration process in recent decades is often seen as something new, in fact it is not.

This overtly economic process of globalization is most evident in patterns of trade and investment. Trade in goods is now virtually liberalized worldwide, with few import quotas and trade taxes remaining. A new system of international trade law and arbitration has been established under the auspices of the World Trade Organization to regulate this system, and all countries are now members or aspire to become so. There are of course exceptions, particularly in areas of interest to developing countries such as agricultural and textile products, where developed countries still protect their declining industries and low productivity employment. Interestingly, trade in services is less integrated because distinct legal and regulatory systems are exercised by national states, so that much of the integration in this field is in fact implemented through foreign investment.

A similar, but less institutionalized process is under way with respect to capital flows. The spread of multinational corporations out of their traditional natural resource enclaves in developing countries, into industry, banking, transport, public utilities and entertainment has made their presence much more apparent, and their influence on local societies much greater than in the past. There is no global regulator for this flow as there is for trade, but international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Bank for International Settlements in effect ensure that capital is able to move freely and that investment contracts are enforced.⁸ As in the case of trade, all countries are now committed to freedom of capital flows, although the degree of regulation varies with considerations such as national security and macroeconomic stability.

The implications of this renewed and accelerating globalization of trade and finance for SDMs are considerable. First, the establishment of a single world system of rules has the effect of constraining the ability of developing states to direct the domestic economy in support of their own legitimacy

and stability, by protecting specific production sectors (and thus regions of the country) or directing public expenditure towards particular social groups. In the case of those middle-income countries classified as 'emerging markets' these rules are reinforced by the sensitivity of international capital flows to any policy not approved by the IMF. These constraints are strengthened by the conditionality imposed by 'donors' of development assistance led by the World Bank in the case of less-developed countries.

Second, the increased visibility of multinational corporations in developing countries and the support for liberalization from domestic elites tends to mobilize opposition among trades unions and small producers who are (or feel) threatened by the rapid modernization of production systems and the exposure to world markets. Third, the liberalization of world trade and reduced transport costs have also facilitated cross-border smuggling and international transactions in 'unregulated' products, ranging from narcotics and gems to arms and timber, creating a large and porous informal trading system in which SDMs can generate their own funds without relying on the exploitation of the local population. A similar process has taken place with financial flows, where unregulated channels such as offshore tax havens and informal transfer systems provide SDMs with the means to fund international operations.

The cultural dimension of globalization is closely linked to market integration. At the most immediate level, the spread of global consumer brands and explicitly cultural products has a direct and visible impact on local cultures. Such images also transform the aspirations of the young and portray a 'modern' view of social values – particularly gender roles. The communications technology revolution – first radio, then television and now the internet – allow people in developing countries not only to consume new images, information and ideas but also to communicate directly with the world without the intermediation of local authorities. This is not just an incidental product of economic globalization: it is a necessary foundation. Advertising is crucial to market integration and thus access to the media is intrinsic to globalization. The effect, in some cases, is to reduce the appeal of cultural nationalism – particularly among urban youth – and, in other cases, to intensify the attempt to protect 'traditional values'. This latter has been a potent source of legitimacy for some SDMs – particularly those associated with religious movements.

Because globalization is as much an ideological as an economic concept, for it to become legitimate – particularly in the form of open markets and liberal democracy – there must be a cultural shift in the national elite of developing countries, if not the population as a whole. Such a cultural shift does not occur naturally. To be effective, dedicated institutions such as universities, the media and international development agencies must deliberately transfer the new liberal economic doctrine.⁹ This transfer generates social reactions rooted in the dislocations and vulnerability associated

with globalization, which may take a variety of forms ranging from new political opposition movements to religious fundamentalism. These in turn cross frontiers and become in effect globalized through international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) which have become the main 'informal' and unregulated transmission mechanisms for non-hegemonic ideas. These INGOs, of course, include not only those concerned with poverty reduction and human rights, but also religious organizations and political parties, and have become a vital link between SDMs and the outside world.

Finally, while the market in goods, capital and ideas has become increasingly globalized, the global labour market is still very asymmetric. Fundamentally, there is global freedom of movement for citizens of industrialized economies only. However, the domestic elites of poorer countries can and do send their children to study abroad, and they can then move freely if they become employees of multinational corporations or international agencies. The poor cannot move so easily, except as temporary workers to a limited number of richer countries, although the informal flow of international 'economic' migrants is clearly increasing. Although the flows of 'forced migrants' from conflict zones are allowed to move on humanitarian grounds, the vast majority of these only reach neighbouring poor countries. Nonetheless, the accumulated size of these 'diaspora communities' is considerable both in developed countries and within developing regions. These communities provide a means for SDMs not only to raise funds but also to get information to the press and civil society in other countries.

In sum, the political history of SDMs is bound up with the successive geopolitical phases of colonialism, cold war and the present unipolar hegemony. This last would seem to have reduced the space for self-determination. In contrast, the process of economic globalization seems to have the opposite effect. It tends to strengthen SDMs both by weakening the ability of the state to control its own economy and by providing means of funding armed conflict and generating international political support. However, by generating spontaneous yet complex popular reaction to change through the spread of universal cultural concepts such as human rights, democratic representation and gender equality on the one hand, and through defensive response to the impact of global culture on local values on the other, the cultural effect of globalization on SDMs is more ambiguous.

The changing role of violence in self-determination movements

We have sought to direct the analytical focus of our study to those cases where movements for self-determination are combined with situations of violent conflict. While these share many of the characteristics of those operating in more peaceful environments, the atmosphere of violent conflict and civil war significantly affects the character and operations of

many self-determination movements: for example, much of their political and economic activity is illegal and underground; they generate special financial needs for the support of military activities; they generally give rise to forced migration which leads to diasporas; and they have a more disruptive economic and social impact.

Almost all political conflicts relating to self-determination in developing countries are embroiled in violent conflict, or contain a latent potential for an escalation to violence – hence our focus on this phenomenon. Our understanding of violence in this context is not restricted to killing or wounding (whether of civilians or soldiers) or indeed the use of arms, but extends to the coercion of civilians by threat of force, imprisonment or even starvation to do the bidding of particular groups – whether by the incumbents of the state apparatus or those in opposition to it. This violence is by definition non-democratic but can exist in nominal democracies where representation – or even basic human rights – is denied to particular subordinate groups. Indeed, self-determination movements are often excluded *ab initio* from the political process, or become so because the majority (or even a minority) consider their claims for autonomy to be illegitimate, ‘unconstitutional’ and ‘unpatriotic’. Thus violence – real or potential, by state or opposition – is likely to occur among self-determination movements.

Violent conflicts over self-determination in developing countries do not involve formal military operations in the usual sense of pitched battles for specific territorial positions and the objective of forcing formal military surrender of the enemy. They are thus not easily fitted into the formal rules of war established in international law in general and the Geneva Conventions in particular. Armed conflict in developing countries today – leaving aside military intervention by foreign powers – involves lightly armed ground troops in small units, few if any pitched battles and extensive involvement of civilians and paramilitaries on both sides. These wars are relatively inexpensive in the sense that weapons are assault rifles and mortars, communications technology is based on cellular phones, transport relies on civilian-type vehicles and both sides ‘live off the land’ to a considerable extent. The main victims are civilians, but not (apart from some thankfully rare incidents of genocide) by direct involvement, but mainly through hunger and sickness due to the disappearance of commercial networks, forced migration and the collapse of public services.¹⁰

These ‘low intensity conflicts’ may seem like a new phenomenon to aid agencies and academics whose point of reference is the Second World War. But they were well known as ‘small wars’ by colonial administrators (in order to distinguish them from ‘proper wars’ between the Great Powers) before 1939, and as ‘counter-insurgency’ during the cold war. Moreover in developing countries (as in developed countries in the past) everyday life is intrinsically violent, and the borderline between ‘peace’ and ‘conflict’ is thin and hazy. Over a lifetime, a person’s direct experience of violence may

cover the whole spectrum from robbery and rape, through forced eviction from land and housing, and police repression of strikes and demonstrations, to military coups and regional uprisings to full-scale civil war and foreign intervention. Only this last pair is usually classed as ‘conflict’ by researchers, but from the point of view of ordinary people (both rich and poor) violence and the threat of violence is an endemic aspect of social and political relations.

We obviously reject the simplistic view that all political violence is irrational (or criminal and simply motivated by personal gain) but we have tried to avoid the opposite danger of seeing it in merely instrumental terms as a Clausewitzian extension of politics by another means. This is for two reasons. First, because the use of violence by an SDM or incumbent state is never a simple choice or even strategy – rather, it is the outcome of specific historical circumstances that build up over time to produce (and legitimize) the armed confrontation. Second, because violence cannot be employed by either side without a considerable degree of social support – in the form of either political legitimacy for military repression by the incumbent or the provision of support networks for the rebels. It is true that any one point in time both sides may choose non-violent or violent means to pursue their ends, but effectiveness of either depends on specific circumstances.

Violence has generally been central to the construction of ‘national’ cultures. In the history of almost all societies (European ones in particular)¹¹ the imagined national identity is closely related to a collective picture of a violent past, whether as state expansion, collective defeat or individual heroism. In SDMs as well as national liberation movements and anti-colonial struggles, military gestures and selfless martyrs are usually an integral part of the iconography, literature and songs passed on from one generation to the next. It is essential therefore not to underestimate the symbolic role of violence, which often has a far greater political effect than any direct military damage. On the one hand, dramatic acts of violence against the state – of which the attacks on the Twin Towers and Pentagon are only the latest examples – are intended to undermine the sense of invulnerability of those in power and hearten the opposition. On the other hand similarly symbolic acts of torture and repression – of which Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo are only the latest in a long tradition – are intended to do the exact opposite.¹² Both have been illuminatingly termed ‘the theatre of violence’.¹³

The persistent use of violence clearly has a corrupting effect on both sides in the conflict for a number of reasons. The sense of impunity generated by the repeated breaking of social rules can frequently become a justification for criminal behaviour and repressive leadership within both state and SDM. The individuals concerned become psychologically conditioned to violent behaviour, which they find difficult to abandon subsequently. Last but not least, the mounting toll of victims on both sides makes it difficult to agree to a compromise settlement that might, as it were, betray the dead.

It is, of course, the case that ‘non-violent’ movements based on mass mobilization and civil disobedience can be very effective in achieving change, but this is only true when the incumbent state is already very weak and unable to repress the movement, or where in fact only a change in government (as opposed to a major social change or a territorial separation) is involved. Important examples in recent decades have been the collapse of communist regimes in Central Europe on the one hand and the transition from military dictatorship to parliamentary democracy in Latin America on the other. However, in the case of territorial separation in particular, the armed forces will usually defend the status quo even if they will not defend a particular government, because their own corporate cohesion and identity are in question. Again, while the regime change itself can be relatively peaceful, it is usually preceded by armed conflict, which has resolved the issue by making change inevitable – as in the case of South Africa.

Moreover, there is some reason to believe that the role of violence in SDMs has changed in recent times. The Enlightenment concept of human rights has been a long time in taking root, but has gradually spread from the industrialized democracies to the developing world – and to the interventions of the former in the latter. The establishment of the United Nations was a key step in this process, and the recent international recognition of human rights over and above state rights has profound implications for the use of violence by SDMs.¹⁴ While the cold war (and now the ‘war on terror’) made progress difficult, the defence of human rights has increasingly been taken up by non-governmental organizations, trades unions and other social organizations. This has undoubtedly curtailed the ability of many governments to use overt violence against civilians, and limited the legitimacy of SDMs to do the same. In this context, the modernization and globalization of the media – starting with the radio but particularly television and internet – have allowed such human rights pressure to be exercised more effectively. On the one hand, television – much more than newspapers, its predecessor in this respect – has allowed the nature of violence to be conveyed dramatically and directly to voters in the industrialized countries. On the other hand, the internet – whose predecessor in this context was the radio – has allowed SDMs and other subordinate groups in developing countries to communicate directly with other news media, and indeed with the electorate of the developed world. This means that acts of violence by either side can be used as propaganda almost in real time.

From global to local

In Chapter 2, an overview on the global economic dimensions of self-determination, Stewart examines how the global economy interacts with the fundamental political causes of SDMs, and the subsequent effects of the

global economy on the resourcing of conflict. Two opposing views are considered: that globalization reduces the probability of conflict due to the economic opportunities it offers to opposing groups and the democratization that international culture promotes; or that globalization promotes conflict due to the economic marginalization of groups without financial or human capital, and the reduced ability of the state to redistribute resources domestically. She concludes that globalization has both positive and negative effects, but the balance varies in different parts of the world, so that those areas that have been negatively affected have seen high and rising levels of violent conflict. Moreover, the growth of the global economy generally provides easier access by contending parties to arms and finance through diverse sources such as natural resource rents, emergency aid and diaspora remittances.

Economic conditions of stagnation, high inequality, widespread unemployment, and cutbacks in social services occurred in many countries: but not all experienced violent conflict. Where they did so, it was generally because cultural, political and ideological factors were also present, serving to mobilize large numbers of people. Strong and developing horizontal inequalities – where the gains from aid, natural resources or growth are unevenly distributed among different groups – have been particularly likely to generate violent conflict. Stewart notes that international efforts have been mainly targeted at the interdiction of financial resources such as ‘conflict diamonds’, with less attention to addressing fundamental economic factors such as economic stagnation, poverty and inequality. Measures to control the financial sources are not only inherently difficult to institute and monitor, but they are highly unlikely to be effective in preventing or stopping SDMs without measures to address the structural causes of conflict.

In Chapter 3, Dudley and Lloyd consider the principal ‘pathways’ for global influences on SDMs, including diasporas, transnational movements and the global media. The objectives and methods of SDMs are continually being redefined and renegotiated. Crucial to this process are power, education, language and culture that together shape the channels through which ideas about identity and purpose are communicated. Migration and transnational solidarities, strengthened by the new media, are pathways of multidirectional cultural influence between the local, regional and global. They suggest that although the pathways themselves are broadly common to all SDMs, the global cultural influences that travel along them are myriad, while the self-image and contested vision of the world constructed by the SDMs themselves is similarly complex. Dudley and Lloyd show that an essential component of this self-image is the notion of a shared bond of suffering. Nationalism and religion exert a powerful hold over certain social groups and play a key role in these processes of identity formation and reformation. They can also have major impact upon how outsiders conceive and interact with members of SDMs, and thus ultimately upon the strategy

and trajectory of SDMs themselves. Global media networks thus play important roles in this process of SDM identity formation by shaping perceptions of, and responses to, SDMs in a transnational context, and thus become in turn the object of political control by powerful states.

FitzGerald explores conflict finance further in Chapter 4, examining the difficulties experienced by the international community in policing such flows due to systemic features inherent in the global financial system. Conflict-related funds are easily transmitted within international unregulated (or 'informal') systems, such as offshore financial centres used by global wealth holders and *hawala* transfer networks that service expatriate and migrant worker populations. There also exist numerous weak links – such as correspondent banks – within the regulated financial networks that have historically been exploited for money laundering and other clandestine 'civil' purposes, and also thus provide cover for conflict finance.

In the period following the 9/11 attacks in the USA, international regulatory authorities sought to monitor both formal and informal networks as a means to interdict potential terrorist finances, imposing much more stringent reporting requirements on financial institutions. However, FitzGerald shows that systemic features of the international financial system resulting from the process of globalization render this effort ineffective. Multilateral regulatory efforts in this direction have had limited success largely because of the economic disincentives involved in the disclosure of transactions by wealthy individuals (who seek to evade tax) and the high cost of international banking to migrant workers (who use informal transfer mechanisms) – both of which, along with the narcotics and arms trades, underpin the 'global informal financial sector' within which clandestine conflict funding can move. Established and broad-based SDMs with known and visible international networks of sympathisers and representatives are a much easier target for financial interdiction – which leads in turn to undemocratic governments exploiting the tide of international anti-terrorism in order to neutralize popular opposition movements.

In Chapter 5 Venugopal shows how the profusion of state collapse and civil wars since the end of the cold war has been largely blamed on internal causes, or due to an absence of adequate external integration or intervention. Instead, he argues that such conflicts should be viewed as a result of the way in which countries and groups have been integrated into the global system. First, global circumstances and developments can contribute towards (or inhibit) the rise and sustenance of self-determination movements through economic, cultural, ideological, or other means. Second, the global dimensions of self-determination relate to how the actual content of statehood is defined, fashioned and constrained globally in economic, political and normative terms, and how this in turn determines the shape and scope of self-determination movements. The first mechanism is illustrated by the case of Colombia, where the dynamics of a long-standing rural insurgency

are closely embedded within the global drug economy and global political-military interventions. The second is exemplified by East Timor, which underwent 'self-determination from above' under UN auspices, followed by the construction of new state institutions by the international aid community.

From local to global

In contrast to the first five chapters, designed to assess the importance of global influences on SDMs, the next five contain in-depth country studies designed to distinguish external from internal factors and thus understand how the interaction between the global and the local works out in different historical contexts. The five case studies – three in Africa and two in Asia – were chosen in order to reflect the multiple dimensions of SDMs, including: religious (Algeria) and ethnic (Sri Lanka, Burma) drivers in strong states; weak states that have broken up (Somalia) or survived (Congo); and the quest for democratic representation (Algeria, Burma). To the extent that these countries have all been exposed to broadly similar global economic and cultural forces, these case studies allow us to identify the interaction between these forces and domestic dynamics.

In Chapter 6, on the Democratic Republic of Congo, Englebert explores the relationship between global norms and self-determination by examining the paradox of the Congolese state. Despite a history of secessionist insurgencies with numerous ethnic divisions, the military occupation of large areas by regional powers, and a bankrupt state offering almost no public services, security or economic development there are as yet no serious movements that seek to pursue political independence either through secession or fundamental replacement. Rather, a fragile state persists and is reproduced in weak, dysfunctional form. It lacks authority or territorial control and yet it still commands the support both of predatory political elites and the large mass of Congolese.

The explanation Englebert suggests for this paradox lies in global cultural norms of statehood and global flows of aid and investment. Despite lacking territorial control or functioning institutions, the Congolese state continues to enjoy the prerogatives of international recognition, and the attendant benefits of a sovereign state. Sovereignty grants the weak state a powerful source of external legitimacy that is a valuable resource for state elites as it both provides them with access to foreign aid and legitimizes their plunder of Congo's resources, obviating the need to cultivate domestic legitimacy. Ethnic elites realize that they stand little chance of gaining international recognition for a secessionist state, and have instead found it more beneficial to negotiate for the spoils arising from the monetization of international sovereignty within a weak state. Thus, the violent conflicts in the Congo's periphery revolve around the terms of the rebels' integration with the state rather than over the nature or composition of the state itself.

Does the example of Congo suggest that there is a trade-off between external recognition and internal substance? In Chapter 7, Reno presents a compelling counter-factual to the Congo that might answer this question in the affirmative. Following the violent collapse of Somalia in 1991, the south remained embroiled in violence and uncertainty while an apparently enduring, stable and peaceful political authority has arisen in the far north under the self-declared state of Somaliland. What accounts for these divergent post-collapse outcomes?

Reno argues that Somaliland's success in re-establishing order is due precisely to its marginality in the colonial and post-colonial periods. The continuing violence in the south is a legacy of the centralized patronage politics of the 1970s and 1980s, based on the selective distribution of economic opportunities arising from the export trade and foreign aid. But northern entrepreneurs and clan leaders remained largely marginalized from the failing regime's political and economic networks. Consequently, northern clan leaders were forced to preserve local sources of legitimacy that later proved useful in exerting authority over armed groups. Northern entrepreneurs developed clandestine business opportunities outside the regime's patronage networks, and forged early links with local clan leaders and local armed groups to protect themselves. Reno argues that the differences between the north and south relate to the social control of violence and economic opportunity. International economic links can be disruptive to this relationship as can international mediation efforts.

In Chapter 8 Lloyd identifies two distinct forms of cultural global influence in Algeria as new axes of conflict opened between the West and the Muslim world after the cold war. On the one hand, the world-wide movement of political Islam inspired and sustained the rise of the *Front Islamique du Salut* (FIS). On the other, Western (predominantly French) identities influenced the perceptions, objectives and actions of both the military backed government and the ethnic Berber movement. Algeria's search for a post-colonial and post-cold war identity has thus engendered tensions that cannot be understood without reference to these global forces. Gender relations, language and religion all reinforce the cultural roots of conflict; but behind these lies an acute economic crisis. Algeria's vast gas and oil resources have cushioned the regime but the impact of rapid demographic growth and economic liberalization on youth unemployment and reduced standards of living for unskilled groups have proved fertile ground for mobilizing protest.

Lloyd demonstrates that global cultural forces heavily influence the identities constructed or strengthened by local leaders in Algeria. The single most important global cultural force has been political Islam, which spread through a variety of 'informal' channels, such as Standard Arabic teachers from Egypt who were influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood. However, while culture and ideology defined the contested arenas of conflict, popular

disillusion arising from mass unemployment and deterioration of social and economic conditions undermined the legitimacy of the regime and thus its ability to contain or resolve these conflicts.

The problematic impact of external sources of legitimacy upon domestic actors also informs Dudley's analysis of the relationship between the state and the pro-democracy movement in Burma in Chapter 9. Since the cancellation of the 1988 election results, Burma's military government has come under world-wide condemnation, while the opposition pro-democracy movement has enjoyed strong world-wide recognition and support: its leader, Daw Aung Sang Suu Kyi, has become a global media icon. The growth of electronic media and the expansion of international civil society groups in the past decade have fuelled international activism from exiled Burmese and non-Burmese solidarity activists against the military regime. In response the Burmese government has sought to capitalize on the international popularity and legitimacy of their opponents by stigmatizing them as foreign in inspiration and support.

Dudley also discusses the role of international non-governmental organizations on Burma's ethnic separatist movement, particularly with respect to refugee camps on Burma's borders. Foreign aid workers in these camps have provided refugee populations with a window to the outside world that has heightened awareness of their own identity and of their place in the larger world. The presence of INGOs lends authority and legitimacy to the Karenni political groups in charge of the camps, while on a more subtle level it is influencing and changing the perceptions of what it means to be Karenni. Paradoxically, the spread of electronic media has increased the distance between those outside groups who have gained legitimacy from it and those on the inside who lack almost all access to world opinion and support.

In Chapter 10, Venugopal shows how the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka spanned a number of distinct historical phases in global and regional politics, all of which played an important role in its dynamic. He locates the trajectory of the conflict within different phases in the integration of the Sri Lankan economy into the global market, from the dirigisme of 1956–77 to the subsequent market reforms of the 1980s, and the way that these have affected the advancement of the political conflict through a variety of mechanisms. The Sri Lankan conflict was also affected by regional developments in the South Asian subcontinent in a number of ways, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1971, India's support for the secession of East Pakistan changed the geopolitics of South Asia, and triggered anticipation that a similar scenario could unfold for Sri Lanka's Tamils, who enjoyed close cultural ties with India's much larger Tamil population. With the onset of civil war in 1983, hundreds of thousands of Tamil refugees sought refuge in India, and this led to a massive escalation of India's role in the conflict – both as war-maker and peace-maker – that ended in much rancour in 1990.

In the post-cold war period, India's abrupt withdrawal from Sri Lanka dramatically changed the internal and external dimensions. For this entire period, the remaining Tamil insurgent organization, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) survived without any overt state patronage by tapping into new sources of external economic, diplomatic and military support. An important element was the huge Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora, accounting for almost a quarter of all Sri Lankan Tamils, comprising substantial communities in countries such as Canada, Britain, USA, France and Australia. At the same time, the Sri Lankan government worked hard to disrupt the LTTE's external network and has benefited more recently from the growing force of international anti-terrorism, as a result of which the LTTE was proscribed in the US and UK.

The international policy response to self-determination and violent conflict

As the previous two sections have demonstrated, the studies in this book are designed to assess the importance of global influences on violent SDMs, to explore the mechanisms through which these influences operate, and to analyse the interaction between the economic and the cultural. However, our aim as researchers is not just to establish the truth – or at least a convincing version of it – but also to identify realistic policies that are derived from our findings and that might reduce the human costs among vulnerable peoples in countries and regions with contested SDMs. Global influences are already so pervasive – or to put it another way, SDMs form such an integral part of the global polity – that we cannot frame international policies in terms either of avoiding any global influence, or only in terms of local outcomes.

A new approach is thus likely to require both institutional reforms and changed objectives at the global level and these are the topic of the concluding chapter of this book. Chapter 11 argues that although local conditions are critical in the development of SDMs, global forces – economic and cultural – condition the resulting trajectory as much as overt political or military interventions, even though the latter have appeared to be dominant since 9/11. Potentially, global actors can help contain and channel the conflicts over self-determination towards less violent means, and reduce the incidence of violence on the poor and vulnerable. But this will require major changes in international institutions, particularly a more central role for the United Nations as the only representative global institution. Above all we argue that it will be necessary to influence attitudes and beliefs in the North as well as the South, and to do so requires challenging official discourse and shifting the dominant paradigm, a long-term task which has as much to do with education and culture as with policy choice and global governance.

Notes

1. For instance, the indigenous movement in the Andes is mobilized around both the creation of separate territorial state (*Collasuyo* – one of the regions of the Inca empire comprising parts of Bolivia, Peru, Argentina and Chile) and a distinct social, economic and political organization based on pre-capitalist communitarian principles.
2. On this complex topic, see Dixon (1993), Duursma (1996) and Falk (2002).
3. With the notable exception of Western Sahara.
4. See Keen (1998), Berdal and Malone (2000), Collier and Hoeffler (2000).
5. DfID (2001).
6. Huntington (1996).
7. Such as those mapped by Duffield (2001) or Kaldor (1999).
8. See FitzGerald (2001).
9. For a study in depth of how liberal economic doctrine has been transmitted over the last two centuries in Latin America and then contested and embedded, see FitzGerald and Thorp (2005).
10. See Stewart and FitzGerald (2000).
11. Schoolbook 'national heroes' such as Washington and Lincoln, or Nelson and Wellington, or Napoleon and de Gaulle were all military commanders of course.
12. The bombing campaign against Iraq before the 2003 invasion was officially named 'Shock and Awe' (Woodward 2004).
13. See Foster and others (2005) on this interpretation of violence in South Africa.
14. It also has profound implications for the role of international organizations in protecting the victims of conflict, as we shall argue in Chapter 11.

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Index

- Abrams, Elliot 108
advocacy, international 238–40
AFDL 134, 136
Afghanistan 34, 39, 64, 97
Africa 29, 142–3
 Sub-Saharan 27
 West Africa 97–8
 see also under individual countries
African Union 197
agriculture
 Algeria 182
 Colombia 103, 105–8
 Somalia 150–2, 157
 Sri Lanka 228
aid 42, 255
 Burma and 211–12
 certification process 107
 Colombia 107
 conditionality 42
 and conflict finance 30, 35–9, 41
 Congo 132, 133, 135–6
 East Timor 113–14
 Somalia 152, 156–8
 sovereignty and 126–7
 Sri Lanka 229
Air France Airbus hijacking 188–9
Aissaoui, A. 187–8
Al-Jazeera 63, 251
Al-Muhajiroun 62–3
al-Qaeda 84, 196
Algeria 15–16, 38, 179–202, 249
 diaspora 192–4, 197, 250
 historical background 180–3
 impact of economic and cultural
 global flows 190–1
 international linkages 191–2, 197
 Kabylie 189–90
 new media 194–5
 radical political Islam 183,
 195–6, 197
 war of independence 180–1
 years of violence 183–9
Algérie Press Service (APS) 194
American Banking Association
 (ABA) 83
Ancient Order of Hibernians
 (AOH) 56
Andarko 192
Anglo-American 127
Angola 31, 33, 39
Annan, Kofi 109
Antananarivo Conference (1961) 138
Arab States 26
arms procurement 238
ASEAN 208
Asian Development Bank 113
Asian Xpress 64
asset stripping 125–6
Association el Qiyam 195
ATCAR (*Alliance des Tshokwé du Congo,*
 Angola et Rhodésie) 139
Ato, Usman 153, 162
Aung San Suu Kyi, Daw 16, 203, 204,
 207, 210–13, 215, 216
Australia 88, 110
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia
 (AUC) 103
autonomy strategies 132–4
Aydeed, General Mohammed 153, 162,
 166–7

Bakhri, Omar 63
bananas 151, 152, 153
Bangladesh 5, 231
Bank for International
 Settlements 6
banks, international 75–7, 88–9
Banyamulenge, the 141–2
Barcelona Declaration 192
Barotseland secessionists 143
Barre, General Mohamed Siyyad 147,
 156–63, 165–6, 173, 174
Bechtel 192
Beissinger, M. 142
Belgium 130
Bemba, Jean-Pierre 121
Benhadj, Ali 184, 185, 186
Berber Spring (1980) 189
Beur FM 194–5
Black Sea region 95
Blair, A. 97
bond of suffering 64–5
Boudiaf, Mohamed 186, 188
bourgeoisie 182
Britain *see* United Kingdom (UK)
BRITAsian 64

- Burma 16, 86–7, 203–24, 238, 247, 249, 252
 background 204–7
 China and South and Southeast Asia 208–9
 CMC 213–20; nature of
 Burma-focused CMC 214–16;
 using Burma-focused
 CMC 216–17; virtual
 communities 217–20
 conflict finance 32, 33, 39
 economic and humanitarian
 problems 205–6
 ethnic groups 206–7
 self-image and external links 209–13
 the West and 207–8
 Burma Fund 215–16
 Burma Project 215–16
 BurmaNet 214–18
 businessmen 162–3, 169
- Cambodia 32, 36, 39
 capital flows 6–7, 127, 136–7
 Casamance separatists 143
 Casey, Michael 113
 Caucasus 95
 Chadli Bendjid 185–6, 195
 charities 83
 China 26, 101, 208
 Chokwe of Katanga 139–41
 Chopra, J. 111, 114
 civil servants 122–3, 157–8
 clan based credit systems 164
 clan politics 150, 153–5, 159–61
 clandestine economy 158–61, 162–3,
 173, 182, 191
 ‘clash of civilizations’ 96, 247
 ‘CNN effect’ 243, 251
 coca cultivation 103, 105–7
 Cohen, A. 21
 Cohen, R. 59–60
 cold war 104–5, 233, 251
 post-cold war world 96–8
 Colombia 13–14, 34–5, 39, 87–8,
 102–8, 249
 colonial rule
 Algeria 180–1
 Somalia 150–2, 154–5
 COMIEX 123
 community 62
 virtual communities 217–20
 community mediators 52
 compliance, incentives for 88–90
 computer mediated communication
 (CMC) 213–20
Concorde Civile 191
- Conference for the Economic
 Development of Eastern Kasai
 (CODEKO) 134
 conflict finance 43, 101, 254
 global finance and 13, 72–94
 private profiteering and 29–41;
 aid 30, 35–7, 38–9, 41; diamonds 30,
 31–2; diasporas 30, 37–9;
 drugs 30, 34–5, 41; oil 30, 33–4;
 timber 30, 32–3
- Congo 14, 31, 119–46, 249, 252
 different nature of 142–3
 failure of ethnic salience
 to translate in ethnic
 self-determination 138–42
 globalization, sovereignty and
 self-determination 132–8;
 resurrection of weak state 134–8;
 state dilution and autonomy
 strategies 132–4
 multifaceted paradox 119–22
 preference for nationalism 128–32
 weak sovereign state 119, 122–7;
 benefits of sovereignty 125–7;
 benefits of weak state 122–5
- Congo National Liberation Front
 (FNLC) 131–2
- Connolly Association 55
 consumption 65–6
 Continuity IRA (CIRA) 86
 corruption 123–4
 counter-insurgency 9
 cultural barbarism 97, 98
 cultural globalization 7, 12–13,
 48–71, 253
 Algeria 190–7
 ethnic and other forms of
 identity 48–50
 international policy design 255–7
 migration and diaspora 50–8; the
 Irish 51, 54–6; the Kurds 56–8
 roles of media and new
 media 60–6; cyber-Islam 61–3;
 satellite TV and print
 media 63–4
 self-determination and linkage
 mechanisms 247–9, 250–1
 transnational political and religious
 networks 59–60, 251
 cyber-Islam 61–3
- Daallo Airline 169–70
 Dahab Shiiil 165, 170
 Danitz, T. 218
 De Beers 30, 31
 decolonization 4–5, 99, 102

- democracy 42
 Algeria and 186–8, 198
 Burma and 216
 transition to 29
 Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) 114
 Dev sol 87
 diamonds 30–2
 diaspora newspapers 64
 diasporas 8, 50–8, 250, 256–7
 Algeria 192–4, 197, 250
 Burmese 217; CMC 217–19
 conflict finance 30, 37–9
 identity formation 64–5
 the Irish 51, 54–6, 59, 65, 250
 the Kurds 56–8, 60, 64, 87, 250
 Somaliland 170–1, 250
 Tamil 17, 37, 86, 236–7, 250;
 LTTE-diaspora nexus 237–9
 see also remittances
 diplomacy 240–2
diya-paying groups 155
 Djibouti 164, 169
 double taxation agreements 78
 Dravida movement 231–3
 Dresch, P. 62
 drugs
 Burma 86–7, 207
 Colombia 87–8, 103, 105–8
 conflict finance 30, 34–5, 41
 US war on 107
 DynCorp 107

 East Timor 14, 88, 109–15
 Eastern Europe 99
Eastern Eye 64
 Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM or ETIP) 87
 Echeverri, General García 104
 economic globalization 6–7, 8, 11–12, 20–47, 253
 Algeria 190–1
 fundamental economic causes of
 violent conflict 21–3; global
 influences and 23–9
 global policies to reduce fundamental
 sources of conflict 41–2, 254–5
 private profiteering and global
 financing of conflicts 29–41;
 aid 30, 35–9, 41; diamonds 30, 31–2;
 diasporas 30, 37–9; drugs 30, 34–5,
 41; oil 30, 33–4; timber 30, 32–3
 self-determination and linkage
 mechanisms 247–9, 249–50
 economic growth 23, 24–5, 28–9, 205
 economic migrants 53

 Economic and Social Security Council (ESSC) 258
 economic transformations 228–30
 Eelam movement 231–2
 see also Liberation Tigers of Tamil
 Eelam (LTTE)
Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) 87,
 103, 108
 elections
 Algeria 184–6, 198
 Burma 204, 207
 Eritrea 143, 172
 Ethiopia 156–7, 159, 160–1, 164–5
 ethnic minority/immigrant
 associations 51–2
 ethnicity 48–50
 ethnic differentiation in Congo 138–42
 ethnic groups in Burma 206–7
Etoile Nord-Africaine (ENA) 181
 Etukomalau, Maurice 141
 Euro-Med process 192, 197
 European Union (EU)
 Algeria 190, 191–2, 197
 integration amid disintegration 95
 terrorism financing 82, 85, 90
 exiles
 Burmese 217, 219
 see also diasporas
 external intervention 253
 and causes of violent conflict 96–8
 sovereignty as shield from 126

 failed states 22–3
 federalism 138–9
Feyka (Federation of Cultural
 Associations of the Patriotic Workers
 of Kurdistan) 58
 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 75,
 76–7, 79, 80–1, 86
 financial intermediaries 74
 Financial Stability Forum (FSF) 79
 Finlay, A. 55–6
 Finucane, Pat 59
 First International Bank of Grenada
 (FIBG) 127
 FNLC (Congo National Liberation
 Front) 131–2
 food aid 36–7
 Force Research Unit (FRU) 59
 Ford, Gerald 110
 foreign direct investment 6–7, 127,
 136–7
 Foster, R. 65–6
 Fox, R.G. 66
 Fox News 251
 fragmentation 150–4, 174

- France 51, 58
 Algeria 180–1, 192; diaspora 192–3
franco valuta system 161, 163
 Free Burma Coalition (FBC) 215, 216
 Friend, J. 186
Front des Forces Socialistes (FFS) 185
Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) 15, 38, 183, 184–8, 191, 195, 196, 198
Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) 38, 181, 182, 184, 185, 187, 188, 193
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) 87, 103, 105, 108
 Fuller, G. 187
 fund-raising 237–8
- G7 81
 G8 81
 G20 81
 Gandhi, Indira 231
 Gandhi, Rajiv 236, 243
 García Márquez, Gabriel 104
 Gécamines 124
 Germany 51–2, 58
 global economy
 Somalia and integration into 174–5
 see also economic globalization
 global finance 13, 72–94
 antecedents for the interdiction of financial transfers 75–9
 economic incentives for compliance 88–90
 interdiction of terrorist funds 84–8
 interventions during first year of ‘war on terrorism’ 80–4; multilateral 80–2; unilateral 82–4
 global policies 17
 policy design 248–9, 252–8; cultural policy 255–7; economic policy 254–5; reform of global institutions 17, 257–8
 to reduce fundamental sources of conflict 41–2
 global political environment 251–2
 globalization 1–3
 cultural *see* cultural globalization
 economic *see* economic globalization
 and self-determination 5–8
 government revenue 23, 27–8
 ‘greed vs grievance’ hypothesis 22, 101, 247
 Gross, J. 194
 group motivation 21
Groupe Islamiste Armé (GIA) 188–9
Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat (GSPC) 195–6
 growth, economic 23, 24–5, 28–9, 205
- Guermah, Massinissa 189
 Gulf Wars 97, 186, 196–7
 Gulfstream Aerospace 192
 Gunaratna, R. 242
 Gusmão, José Alexandre ‘Xanana’ 109
- Habibie, B.J. 110
 Haddan, Anwar 196
 Hadj, Messali 193
 Hamza, Abu 62
 hawala networks 77–8, 80, 82, 83, 89, 168–9, 173–4
 Hersi ‘Morgan’, General Mohammed Said 153
 Hidouci, Ghazi 185
 horizontal inequalities 21, 23, 25–7
 Hudson, M. 63
 human rights 11, 256
 Burma 204, 205–6, 207
 Huntington, S. 96
 Hussan, Sayyid Mohamed Abdille 154
- identity
 cultural productions of 66
 ethnicity and in Congo 138–42
 forms of 48–50
 SDMs and identity formation 64–5
 ideo-political system 256
 Iléo, Joseph 128
 immigrant/ethnic minority associations 51–2
 incentives, compliance 88–90
 income growth 23, 24–5, 28–9, 205
 India 101, 102, 208
 and Sri Lanka 225, 230–6, 239, 240
 Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) 235–6
 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord 235, 239
 Indonesia 88, 101, 109, 110
 Indonesian model of government 208
 inequality 21, 23, 25–7
 Algeria 182–3
 international policy and tackling 254–5
 see also globalizational inequalities
 infant industry protection 42
 informal financial systems 77–8, 80, 82, 83, 89, 168–9, 173–4
 information asymmetry 74
 information and communication technologies (ICTs) 60–4, 194–5, 213–20
 information exchange 79
 insulation 51
 integration 51
 amid disintegration 95
 intellectual property 42

- interdiction of terrorist funds 13, 72–94
 antecedents for 75–9
 creating compliance incentives 88–90
 impact on funding of SDMs 85–8
 inclusion of SDMs in 84–5
 interventions during first year of ‘war on terror’ 80–4
- international banking system 75–7, 88–9
- International Coalition of NGOs for a Just and Effective Policy of Drugs 35
- International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 257
- International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 100
- International Crisis Group (ICG) 35
- international institutions 168
 financial 6; *see also under individual names*
 reform of 17, 257–8
- International Labour Organization (ILO) 207
- International Monetary Fund (IMF) 6, 7, 113, 190, 212, 255, 258
- international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) 8, 16, 59, 60, 251
 and Burma 211
 and Sri Lanka 239–40
- international policy *see* global policies
- international support 110–11
- international terrorism *see* terrorism
- Internet 61–3, 170
 Burma-focused CMC 213–20
- inter-state reciprocity 84–5
- investment 6–7, 127, 136–7
- IRA 86
- Iran 187
- Iraq 97, 186
- Iraqi Kurdistan 57
- Ireland 52
- Irish diaspora 51, 54–6, 59, 65, 250
- Isaaq 161
- Islam 250
 Algeria 181, 182, 184–9; radical political Islam 15, 183, 195–6, 197
 cyber-Islam 61–3
- isolation, Burma and 204–5
- Isonga-Songa Mutuelle* 141
- Israel 26, 38
 secret agencies 234
- Italy 150–2, 157
- Jayawardene, J.R. 233
- Jazouli, Adil 193
- Jess, Colonel Omar 153, 165–6
- Jewish diaspora 38
- Kabila, Joseph 121
- Kabila, Laurent-Désiré 123, 127, 129
- Kabylie uprisings 189–90
- Kachin Independence Army (KIA) 206
- KADEK 87
see also PKK
- Kadrigamar, Lakshman 242
- Kalonji, Albert 131
- Kaplan, R. 96–8
- Karubi, Kikaya Bin 126
- Kasai 131, 133–4
- Kasavubu, Joseph 128, 130
- Katanga 128, 130–3
- Keen, D. 21–2
- Keeny Meeny Services 234
- Kepel, Gilles 185
- Khmer Rouge 32
- Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) 31–2
- Kissinger, Henry 110
- Kivu regions 141–2
- Komkar* (Federation of Associations of Kurdish Workers) 58
- Kulivwa Mutuelle Culturelle* 140–1
- Kurdish diaspora 56–8, 60, 64, 87, 250
- Kurdistan 56
- Kyungu Wa Kumwanza, Gabriel 132–3
- labour 8
- land distribution
 Colombia 103, 104, 106
 Somalia 152
- LDC status 203, 209
- League of Nations 4
- Lewis, I.M. 153, 154, 160
- Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 17, 37, 86, 225–6, 232, 237
 conflict with IPKF 235–6
 international advocacy 239–40
 LTTE-diaspora nexus 237–9
 media coverage 243
 Sri Lanka’s international diplomacy and 240–2
- Liberia 32, 39, 143
- linkage mechanisms 247–9
- lists of terrorist sponsors 85
- livestock tariff 163–4
- local customs, undermining of 150–4
- Lomé Convention 151
- Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) 86
- Luluabourg Constitution 138
- Lumumba, Patrice 130, 131, 133
- Lunda, the 139–40

- Ma Thanegi 211
 Maastricht Treaty 95
 Madani, Abbasi 185
 Mahdi, Ali 162
 Mammeri, Mouloud 189
 marginality 154–6, 158, 163–5, 167,
 171–2, 173
 new Somaliland identity 169–72
 market reforms 229–30
 Massachusetts 218
 MED-TV 64, 251
 Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) 211
 media 11, 194–5, 251
 CMC and Burma 213–20
 coverage of conflict in Sri Lanka 242–3
 cultural globalization 60–4, 65–6
 Mengistu, President 164–5
 Mexico 26, 61
 migration 50–8
 see also diasporas
 Military Professional Resources
 International (MPRI) 107
 Millennium Development Goals 255
 minority rights 255
*Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies
 au Congo* (MONUC) 135
 MNA 193
 mobilization 52–4
 Mobutu Sese Seko 120, 125, 129, 132
 money laundering 75–7, 79, 80
 money transfer networks, informal
 (MTNs) 77–8, 80, 82, 83, 89,
 168–9, 173–4
 Morocco 187
 Moussaoui, A. 181
Mouvement algérien des officiers libres
 (MAOL) 189
Mouvement National Congolais
 (MNC) 131
 Mozambique 39
 Mulelist rebellion 131
 Multilateral Investment Guarantee
 Agency (MIGA) 127
 multinational corporations 6
 Muslim Brotherhood 195, 250
 Myanmar *see* Burma
 Myanmar-list 219–20

 national identity 10
 National League for Democracy
 (NLD) 204, 211, 212, 215, 216
 'national question' 99
 national unity 121
 nationalism 49
 Congo and preference for 128–32
 Sri Lanka 228–9
 nationalist ideologies 66
 natural resources 120
 and conflict financing 30, 31–5, 38–9
 see also diamonds; drugs; oil; timber
 Negroponte, John 108
 neo-fascism 59
 Netherlands, the 51–2
 networks
 money transfer networks 77–8, 80,
 82, 83, 89, 168–9, 173–4
 transnational social movements
 59–60, 251
 see also diasporas
 new media 60–4, 194–5, 213–20
 New Mon State Party (NMSPP) 206
 news 216–17
 Nezzar, Major General Khaled 186
 Nguza Karl I Bond 132–3
 Nicaragua 40
 non-governmental organizations
 (NGOs) 60
 international *see* international
 non-governmental organizations
 (INGOs)
 'non-violent' movements 11
 Northern Ireland 37–8, 85–6
 see also Irish diaspora
 Nur 'Gabeeyow', Adan Abdullahi 153

 Ocalan, Abdullah 57
 OECD 26, 78
 offshore business intermediaries 169–70
 offshore financial centres (OFCs) 78–9
 Ogadeeni refugees 160
 Ogaden 156
 oil 103, 181, 192
 conflict finance 30, 33–4
 Onusumba, Adolphe 121
 Orange Volunteers 86
 Orchestra Burma 215
 organized crime 86
 'orphaned conflict' argument 96–7
 Oryx 31
 Østergaard-Nielsen, E. 60
 Ottoman Empire 180
 Overseas Private Investment Corporation
 (OPIC) 127

 Pakistan 82, 231
 Palestine 26
 parallel economy 158–63, 173,
 182, 191
 Patriot Act 2001 (US) 82–3
 patronage politics 156–60, 173
 peace 96
 pro-peace global connections 256

- peace conferences 174
 Petrol Authority of Thailand 209
 PKK 57, 87
 Plan Colombia 107
 PLO 90
 policy design *see* global policies
 Polisario Front 33–4
 political disintegration 96–7, 98
 political entrepreneurs 158–61, 173–4
 controlling 166–7
 political Islam 195–6, 250
 Algeria 15, 183, 195–6, 197
 cyber-Islam 61–3
 political networks, transnational 59–60, 251
 political refugees 53
 post-cold war world 96–8
 poverty 23, 27, 28–9, 97, 98
 Powell, Colin 108
 Prabakharan, V. 226
 predation 123–6
 Premadasa, R. 243
 Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) 1974 (UK) 55
 print media 64
 private motivation 21–2
 private profiteering 21–2, 123–6
 global financing of conflicts 29–41
 privatization 190, 191
 profiteering *see* private profiteering
 pro-peace global connections 256
 protect, responsibility to 257
 Prunier, Gerard 167

 questionnaire 81

 radical political Islam *see* political Islam
 radio 194–5
 Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA) 169
 Ramachandran, M.G. 232
Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) 127, 128–9, 141
 Rawls, J. 256
 Real IRA 86
 Red Hand Defenders (RHD) 86
 referendum 109, 111
 refugees, Burmese 16, 206, 209
 regional inequalities 26–7
 Reich, Otto 108
 religious networks, transnational 59–60, 251
 see also Islam

 remittances 77–8
 Algerian diaspora 193–4
 conflict finance 30, 37–9
 Somalia 161, 165, 171
 Sri Lanka 237–9
 see also diasporas
 Reno, W. 22
 replacement 3–4, 72–3
 repression of SDMs 253
 responsibility to protect 257
 Rex, J. 51
 roads 124
 Rodrik, D. 24, 28
 Rome Platform 191
 Round Table of 1960 128, 138
 Ruberwa, Azaryas 128–9
 Rwanda 36, 40, 126
 and Congo 120, 134, 136–7, 141–2
 Rwandan Patriotic Army 137

 satellite television 63–4, 251
 Saudi Arabia 187
 Security Forces of Somaliland 169
 self-defence groups 189, 191
 self-determination 3–5
 changing role of violence in self-determination movements 8–11
 defining self-determination movements 3–4, 72–3
 in the global context 13–14, 95–118;
 Colombia 102–8; concept of self-determination 99–102;
 East Timor 109–15
 global influences and linkage mechanisms 247–52
 globalization and 5–8
 globalization, violent conflict and 1–3
 interdiction of terrorist funds:
 impact on self-determination movements 85–8; inclusion of SDMs in 84–5
 repression of SDMs 253
 Sendwe, Jason 133
 Senegal 143
 separation 3–4, 72
 Shaba invasions 131–2
 Shan State Army (SSA) 206
 Sierra Leone 31, 40, 97–8, 143
 Simba rebellion 131
 Singapore 209
 Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism 228–9, 232–3
 Sinn Fein 56
 small farmers 103, 106, 108
 Smith, M. 207–8, 210

- social contract, failure of 22–3
social protection 23, 27–8
Societa Agricola Italo Somala (SAIS)
150–1, 152
solidarity, transnational political/
religious 59–60, 251
Somali-Abo Liberation Front
(SALF) 156
Somali African Muki Organization
(SAMO) 153
Somali National Front (SNF) 153
Somali National Movement
(SNM) 164–5, 166
Somalia 15, 37, 40, 143, 147–78,
249, 252
clandestine markets 158–61,
162–3, 173
creeping state collapse 156–8
destruction of southern elite
autonomy 158–61
marginality and a new Somaliland
identity 167–72
marginality in the north 154–6
patronage politics 156–60, 173
political economy of social autonomy
in the north 161–6
political entrepreneurs 158–61,
173–4; controlling 166–7
self-determination in the shadow of
globalization 172–5
state collapse and fragmentation in the
south 150–4
Somaliland, Republic of 147, 149,
167–72
Somaliland diaspora 170–1, 250
Somtel 170
South Kasai 131
sovereignty 14
benefits of 125–7
globalization, self-determination
and 132–8
Soviet Union 95, 99
Sri Lanka 16–17, 37, 40, 86,
225–46, 249
economic transformations 228–30
India and 225, 230–6, 239, 240
international advocacy 239–40
international diplomacy 240–2
media coverage 242–3
Tamil diaspora 17, 37, 86, 236–7,
250; LTTE-diaspora nexus 237–9
Tamil Nadu 230–6
Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) 228
state
failed states 22–3
reduced role 249
transformation and SDMs 3–4, 72–3
weak in Congo *see* Congo
state-building 114–15
state collapse 150–4, 156–8
state dilution 132–4
State Law and Order Restoration Council
(SLORC) 204, 210–11
State Peace and Development Council
(SPDC) 204, 210–11, 219–20
statehood 101–2
East Timor 109–15
international norms of 256
Steinberg, D. 205, 208, 209, 212–13
Stora, B. 180, 181
Straw, Jack 242
Strobel, W.P. 218
structural adjustment 229
Stubbs, P. 219
Sub-Saharan Africa 27
subsidy withdrawal 228
Sudan 33, 36–7, 40, 143
suffering, bonds of 62–3
Suhrke, A. 114
Supporters of Shari'ah (SoS) 62, 63
symbolic role of violence 10
Taiwan 172
Talabani, Jalal 57
Talisman 33
Tamil Nadu 230–6
Tamils 16, 17, 225, 228–9, 230, 236
diaspora 17, 37, 86, 236–7, 250;
LTTE-diaspora nexus 237–9
taxation
global 42
offshore financial centres 78–9
withholding tax 89–90
Taylor, Charles 32
Taylor, R.H. 204–5, 210, 212
terms of trade 42
terrorism 73, 100, 253
interdiction of terrorist funds *see*
interdiction of terrorist funds
international terrorism
paradigm 251–2
Sri Lanka's diplomacy and
international 240–2
war on *see* war on terrorism
Thailand 209, 238
timber 30, 32–3
TotalFinaElf 33
trade 6–7, 42, 106, 163–4
Trans-Juba Livestock Project 163–4
transnational social movements
(TSMs) 59–60, 251
Transparency International 76

- tribalism 139–41
- Tshisekedi, Etienne 132
- Tshombé, André 121
- Tshombé, Moïse 128, 130–1
- Tunisia 187
- Turkey 52, 57, 58, 64, 87
- Tuur, Abdirahmaan Ali 166–7
- Uganda 40, 120, 126, 136–7
- Ugandan People Defence Forces 137
- Ulster Defence Association (UDA) 86
- Ulster Loyalists website 56
- Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) 86
- unemployment 183, 190
- unilateral intervention 82–4
- Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens* (UGTA) 183–4
- UNITA 31
- United Arab Emirates (UAE) 82, 169
- United Kingdom 52
 - colonial rule in Somalia 154–5
 - Irish diaspora 54–6
 - Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) 1974 55
 - Sri Lanka 234, 241–2
 - and terrorist financing 82, 83–4
- United Nations 4, 11, 17, 22, 90, 99, 147, 258
 - Burma 204, 211, 212
 - conferences and NGOs 239–40
 - Congo 134–5
 - East Timor 109, 111–14
 - General Assembly resolutions on international terrorism 241
 - High Commission for Human Rights 191–2
 - Security Council 257
 - Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Myanmar 207
 - and terrorist funding 76, 81–2
- United Nations Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Financing 81–2
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 29
- United Somali Congress 153
- United States (USA)
 - aid to Somalia 157
 - Al-Jazeera 63
 - Algeria 192, 197
 - and Burma 207, 213
 - Colombia 105, 107–8
 - East Timor 110
 - global hegemony 253–4
 - Irish diaspora 54, 56
 - OPIC 127
 - Patriot Act 2001 82–3
 - Sri Lanka 233, 234, 241
 - and terrorist financing 81–5
 - war on drugs 105, 107–8
- United Wa State Army 87
- Unocal 209
- unregulated money transfer networks (MTNs) 77–8, 80, 82, 83, 89, 168–9, 173–4
- UNTAET (UN Transitional Administration in East Timor) 111–14
- Uribe Velez, Álvaro 108
- Versailles negotiations 4
- vertical inequality 23, 25–7
- Vieira de Mello, Sergio 112
- violent conflict 1–3, 4
 - changing role of violence in self-determination movements 8–11
 - external intervention and sources of 96–8
 - finance *see* conflict finance
 - fundamental economic causes 21–3; how global influences affect 23–9
- virtual communities 217–20
- war on terrorism 72, 84–5, 256
 - interventions in the international financial system during first year 80–4
- weak state *see* Congo
- websites, Burma-focused 215–16
- West Africa 97–8
- Western Europe 57–8
- Western governments, and Burma 207–8
- Western Sahara 33–4
- Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF) 156, 160
- Willett, S. 24
- Wilson, Woodrow 4
- wire transfer operators 80
- withholding tax 89–90
- Wolfsberg Principles 76
- women 183
- World Bank 6, 7, 113, 114, 127, 190, 255, 258
- World Conference Against Racism (WCAR) 240
- world tax organization 90
- World Trade Organization 6, 253, 258
- World Vision 211

Yare, Jaama Mahamed Ghalib 167
Young, C. 142
young people 183–4
Yugoslavia 5
Yusuf, Colonel Abdulahi 159, 161

Zambia 143
Zapatista movement 61
Zeroual, President 191
Zimbabwe 33, 120, 136–7
Zoubir, Yahia 186