

Abdication

The voluntary relinquishing of the throne by a reigning monarch. Not the simple thing that it appears to be, since the monarch is *head of state and, in a *constitutional monarchy, possesses discretionary powers that are vital to the functioning of government (*see* *prerogative). The monarch will normally have been trained to exercised these powers in council, and his accession to the throne would have been associated in the popular mind with their *legitimacy. Abdication casts a shadow, therefore, over the legitimacy of government, and may lead to a national crisis, as did the abdication of Edward VIII in the UK in 1936.

abnormality

A deviation from a *norm. Abnormality is to be distinguished from eccentricity, which is the presence of noteworthy and uncommon characteristics in a *normal individual. Eccentricity is usually permitted if harmless, abnormality often regarded with suspicion whether harmless or not. Different political arrangements draw the line between the two in different ways, and the problem of defining what is normal in human nature makes dispute inevitable. Moreover the human desire to hold others responsible for the characteristics which distinguish them gives a motive to confusion. An abnormality is not part of the moral character, but part of the amoral circumstances, of the person who possesses it. To represent it as a harmful eccentricity is to justify

treatment intended either to conceal the victim, or to force him to change. This thought has been extremely important in *politicized theories of *psychotherapy. The idea of the individual as essentially *responsible for his eccentricities underlies some doctrines of *authenticity.

abortion

The issue of abortion is intractable, partly because of the absence of any other case to which it can be assimilated. The relationship between a woman and her unborn child is both non-transferable and original: the child comes into existence in and through the woman, and the question of its rights and welfare cannot be considered in complete isolation from the question of the rights and welfare of its mother. Some deny that an unborn child is a *person, and on that ground deny it the *right to life. On this view the only question of *rights* is that which concerns the woman: does she have a 'right to choose' whether to give birth? If the pregnancy is unwanted, what right has another to compel her to proceed with it? It seems arbitrary, however, to say that the divide between person and non-person occurs at birth. The alternative positions are many. some see the foetus as a person, but believe that the case is one of *conflicting* rights. Others argue that the language of rights is wholly inadequate to capture the nature of the *obligation towards the unborn child.

In the US abortion has become a defining issue in politics. The decision

absolutism

of the Supreme Court in the case of *Roe v. Wade* (1973) conferred what is tantamount to a constitutional right to abortion. According to the leading judgement in that case, delivered by Mr Justice Blackmun, the foetus has no rights at all under US law, since it is not a citizen, while the mother has a *right to *privacy (not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution) which would be violated by the attempt to forbid abortion. Many liberals defend the decision, and are prepared to campaign vigorously to prevent the Supreme Court from qualifying it, while conservatives tend to believe that the case was wrongly decided, or at any rate decided on grounds that are without authority in the Constitution. As a result the issue of abortion has become a political battleground in the United States, with implications for social policy, sexual relations and constitutional law of a kind that go to the heart of the conflict between the liberal and conservative visions of modern society. The decision in *Roe v. Wade* is now under challenge, with some liberals prepared to concede that the case was wrongly decided, and that 'abortion rights' should be granted by the legislature rather than read into the Constitution by the Supreme Court. This has been the procedure in other jurisdictions that permit abortion, and many Americans, both liberal and conservative, are wary of attempts by the Supreme Court to pre-empt the legislature over matters that are so profoundly controversial.

Whatever the rights and wrongs of abortion, there is no doubt that its acceptance in modern societies indicates a radical change of attitude towards the unborn, who are no longer protected as other human beings are protected. Some conservatives argue that a society which adopts this attitude to future generations has

discarded the feeling of *piety, and compromised its chances for survival. Liberals often retort that there is no place for piety in a secular society, and that the issue must be settled by considering the rights of existing citizens. Feminists in particular have campaigned for the right to abortion, by way of affirming the feminist principle that it is the woman, and no one else, who has rights over her body.

See, in general, *consequentialism, *rights, *judicial activism.

absolutism

The theory and practice of absolute *government, i.e. government which is not *limited by any *agency internal to itself. Absolute government should be distinguished from absolute *power. Power is always contained, limited or diverted by other powers within the state; but government can be absolute even without possessing absolute power. It is so whenever there are no constitutional *checks and balances, so that no exercise of government can be criticized or opposed in the *name* of government. The principal limitation of government is the law. Defenders of absolutism, such as *Bodin and *Hobbes, have often been motivated by the thought that all government requires *sovereignty – meaning a body of decisions which cannot be questioned. Since sovereignty must be exercised through law, the sovereign himself cannot be criticized *by* the law, which is no more than his own command. On this view law is authoritative simply by virtue of the status of the agent who commands it, and not by virtue of its content or of its moral or intellectual credentials.

Absolutism must be distinguished from *totalitarianism. It involves, not the total supervision by a central power of all the functions of society, but simply the possession of an unfettered

power of government, which may or may not be used, and which need not be applied universally, or in every area of social existence. Sometimes, as in the European absolutism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, this power may be used in order to limit the concentration of power in bodies that are not themselves sovereign, such as the nobility, the church, or the empire. Sometimes it may be used to eliminate *opposition and to establish a complete *dictatorship, as with Hitler and Stalin. Absolute rule may vest in an individual, in an *office (absolute monarchy), in a party (*democratic centralism), or in a system of administration (classical Chinese *bureaucracy).

abundance

Goods are abundant in a society whenever any member of it can obtain such of those goods as he desires by working no more than he wishes. It is sometimes thought to be a criterion of *welfare that all goods which people need should also be abundant, and that the economy should have this abundance of necessities as its aim. (See *need.) The view that human needs expand indefinitely leads to scepticism about this criterion. It is also sometimes argued that the abundance of luxuries (i.e. goods which are not needed but only desired) may be an evil: see *consumerism.

academic freedom

1. Freedom to pursue teaching, learning and research without regard for the public utility of what is taught or studied, and unconstrained by external directives (whether from the state or from elsewhere) as to the form, content or conclusions of the subject. This freedom includes the freedom to publish the results of research.

2. Specifically, the freedom of an educational body to provide its own constitution, appoint its own staff and

students, and determine its own curriculum, whatever the *ideological content of what is taught. It is a disputed question whether this specific freedom does exist, or can or ought to exist. It implies that those who buy or provide the services of academics should have no power to prescribe the nature of the service rendered. Hence the provision of academic freedom requires the abolition of any contractual relation between the academy and the public.

The issue of academic freedom is to be distinguished from that of whether academic institutions ought to raise their funds, and recruit their students, without aid or direction from the state. On the other hand, it is naive to suppose that the state will provide the funding for an institution over which it exerts no right of control.

Academic freedom has been defended by *classical liberal thinkers such as *J.S. Mill, on the ground that knowledge advances best when freely pursued, and when released from the need for political or ideological conformity. Moreover, the best guard against error is the freedom to question, and this freedom is at the root of the academic life. That vision of 'the advance of knowledge', as *Bacon called it, seems to be only imperfectly endorsed in Western universities today, where pressures to ideological conformity in the name of *political correctness are constantly in the news. On the other hand, those pressures are felt most strongly in departments of the *humanities, and it is sometimes argued that these departments are, by their very nature, devoted less to the 'advance of knowledge' than to the propagation of moral and intellectual *values. Hence it is difficult to know exactly what would be meant, by teaching in the humanities in which ideological conclusions are avoided.

acceleration principle

acceleration principle (or: accelerator principle)

The hypothesis in economics, that investment in an industry varies according to the rate of change (rather than according to the level) of its output. Under standard conditions a certain amount of capital will be required to produce a particular rate of output. If this rate of output changes then, *ceteris paribus*, the amount of capital invested must also change. It is, however, not possible to assume that the relation between them is one of direct proportionality.

This hypothesis plays an important part in theories of the *trade cycle. It implies that an increase in demand for any product brings about an increase in demand for the machines etc. used to make it. Thus a small change in the output of consumer goods tends to result in a much bigger (i.e. accelerated) change in the output of the goods used to make them. Conversely a small fall in the output of consumer goods may result in a much larger fall in the output of capital goods. It is also argued that the 'accelerator' can be brought into play by a very slight *variation* in the rate of change of output of a consumer good. Thus if output of a particular product increases by five per cent in one year and continues to increase, but only by four per cent, in the next year, this may precipitate an actual *fall* in the output of capital goods, and in the amount of capital invested.

access

The concept of access has become increasingly important in sociological studies of political power, since, it is argued, 'power of any kind cannot be reached by a political interest group or its leaders without access to one or more key points of decision in government' (David B. Truman: *The Governmental Process: Political Interests*

and Public Opinion, 1951). Access is the probability of obtaining the attention and influencing the decisions of the relevant officers of government. 'Effective access' is usually given as a function of three variables: the strategic position of the group within society, the internal characteristics of the group, and the nature of the institutions of government. A group may be without access (such as the lowest *caste in a caste system), with effective access, or with 'privileged access' (which arises when decision makers automatically take a group's interests into account). The UK aristocracy has had privileged access, and also 'direct' access, to power through the House of Lords, whereas most other classes have had varying degrees of effective but indirect access.

Sociologists further distinguish 'loose' from 'taut' patterns of access, the first existing when there is a multiplicity of points of access to political decisions, the second when there are defined channels of *representation through which groups exert their influence. Access seems to have shifted, in the US and postwar Europe, from *party to *pressure group, perhaps as a result of modern *bureaucracy, and of the decline of trust in representation.

accession

The act of joining the *European Union through a 'Treaty of Accession' with the existing member states. The Treaty requires the 'accession state' to adopt a *rule of law, to respect the *European Convention on Human Rights, to be democratic and with a competitive *market economy, and to accept the **acquis communautaire* of the EU. Often interim arrangements and periods of adjustment form part of the Treaty, which must be ratified by all member states.

accommodation

1. In sociology, the state or process of social adjustment to conflict. To be distinguished from adaptation (structural changes brought about by biological variation and selection), *assimilation (the process whereby two groups or cultures fuse), and *acculturation. Accommodation allows two groups to harmonize overtly, while leaving the real source of conflict unresolved. Thus first generation immigrants may be accommodated by adopting the food, clothes etc. of the country in which they find themselves, but they may not be acculturated, where this implies full participation in the culture of the native population.

2. In politics, accommodation is usually distinguished from *confrontation and from *conciliation. It is the process whereby hostile powers establish a *modus vivendi* which enables each to fulfil as many of its purposes as it can without overt *aggression towards the other.

accountability

Sometimes distinguished from responsibility. A is accountable to B if B may sanction and forbid his actions. It does not follow that B is responsible for A: chains of responsibility run downwards by *delegation, chains of accountability upwards; if the two chains coincide, then this is a political achievement.

acculturation

The process whereby an individual or group acquires the cultural characteristics of another through direct contact. Acculturation is a one-way process, whereby one culture absorbs another, and is to be distinguished from the two-way process of *assimilation, in which homogeneity results from changes in both. The phenomenon is of increasing political significance, as

war, communication and migration force the states of the world to decide whether to open or to close their frontiers to one another. Their decisions may often be affected by the extent to which acculturation of new arrivals is considered possible.

accumulation

The amassing of *capital, for purposes of either investment or consumption expenditure. If there is to be a 'means of production' over and above what is provided by nature, then there must be accumulation, in the form of 'produced means of production'. In a *capitalist economy accumulation is in private hands; in a *socialist economy, in theory, every accumulation of any significance is *socially owned. In between those two, infinite varieties of *mixed economy can be envisaged.

Moral and political discussions of *private property often involve objections to certain levels of accumulation. Some think that all accumulation gives the person who has *control over it a further control over the lives of others. (See *exploitation.) Some also believe that the laws of inheritance ought not to permit constant accumulation of property across generations. Nevertheless it is difficult to envisage systems of private property rights without rights of transfer of property, and if transfer is permitted, then accumulation is always possible. Modern uses of *taxation can often be seen as attempts to permit maximum mobility of private property through exchange, while preventing accumulations beyond a certain level. (See also *primitive accumulation.)

acquis communautaire

The legal, political and procedural inheritance of the European Union, acquired through the process of union, and by the centralisation of powers and procedures hitherto exercised by

act of state

the member states. The term was formally adopted by the EU only in the *Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which made clear for the first time that the *acquis communautaire* denotes an irreversible process, so that powers once lost to the European process cannot thereafter be retrieved from it. The *acquis* now amounts to 100 000 pages of legal and regulatory edicts.

act of state

1. Philosophical. Any act which can be attributed to no single citizen or group of citizens, and which is done for reasons connected with the interests, rights, privileges etc. of a *state, can be considered to be an act of state. Thus a declaration of war, while conveyed between statesmen and usually through diplomatic channels, is the act of one state towards another, it being impossible for any *agency less than the state to declare war. Some acts of state are directed towards other states, as in the example. Others are directed towards citizens and subject associations. It is the state that punishes the criminal, that expropriates the property owner, that nationalizes industries and enacts laws. The state can act through its officers, or through a monarch; it may also endorse or *ratify the actions of private citizens undertaken independently (as when the state annexes as a colony land captured by an adventurous citizen). In general a state has all the capacities for agency that an individual person has. Its actions may be intentional or unintentional, reasonable or unreasonable, moral or immoral. It may also *have* reasons for what it does, and respond to reasons for or against courses of action (the idea of a 'process' of government). Thus, it is often said, the state has will and responsibility, and this is one argument for thinking that, like a company in law, it is to be regarded

more as an autonomous person than as an organic aggregate of subjects. This thought is given elaboration in the philosophies of *Rousseau and *Hegel.

2. Legal. Acts of state are usually defined legally so as to include only actions *between* states. Thus in English law an act of state is an act of the sovereign power performed by virtue of the *prerogative, and in the course of its relations with other powers or with the *subjects of other powers. It cannot be challenged in the courts since it lies outside their jurisdiction. Hence in English law (as also in US law), there can be no act of state against an individual citizen or subject (i.e. one who owes allegiance), and the plea of act of state can never be used by government officers in defence of an encroachment on a subject's rights. Certain provisions in other constitutions might be interpreted as allowing the same effective immunity for government actions against citizens as is granted to government actions against other states: e.g. rights to enter and search without warrant, to imprison without trial, and so on, in cases of sedition.

activism

The German *Activismus* was used at the end of the First World War to denote the active engagement of *intellectuals in political transformation. 'Activists' are distinguished by the extent of their involvement in politics, and by the methods that they are inclined to sanction in pursuit of transformation, rather than by the nature of their views. They are not necessarily *extremists, nor are they necessarily opposed to constitutional forms of political change. *Sorel, however, defended activism in terms that also sanction extremism, arguing that activism is a necessary part of any serious political standpoint, since doing is

everything, and thought only a *rationalization of what is done. On such a view it is incoherent to present a recipe for, or exhortation to, political transformation in advance of the attempt to precipitate it. Activism becomes essential to politics, and, Sorel thought, essentially violent.

actually existing socialism

Term used in the former communist countries to describe them as they really were, rather than as the official theory required them to be. Its use was largely ironical, and more or less confined to the writings of *dissidents.

addiction

A condition in which desire for some specific object of consumption becomes deep-rooted, recurrent and immovable, despite all rational considerations that weigh against it. The term is used somewhat loosely, to cover the habits of smokers, alcoholics and drug-abusers, as well as cravings for sex, music, television or even affection. It is important to distinguish those habits that significantly alter the physiological processes of the addict – such as heroine-addiction – from those which merely stimulate the craving for pleasure. The first replace vital functions of the body, and so cannot be set aside without painful and often fatal withdrawal symptoms. Some addictions seriously affect character – alcoholism, for example, and heroin addiction. Hence almost all governments have adopted policies to combat this kind of addiction. Others merely damage the body, like smoking or the addiction to fast food, though so far only the first of those has incurred legal restrictions. The most contentious instance, politically speaking, is television. Recent research seems to establish that television is genuinely addictive, setting up reward patterns in the brain that need to be

constantly stimulated, and also that it has an adverse effect on character (enhancing belligerence and impatience) and also on learning (shortening the attention span, and rendering abstract argument more difficult to absorb). The potentially disastrous long-term effects are probably not susceptible to political remedy, however.

additional member system

A system of *proportional representation in which members of the chamber of deputies are allotted to parties from two lists of candidates: those who stand in the *constituencies, and who must be voted in by the local electorate; and additional candidates whose numbers are chosen in order that the party representation in the chamber will be proportional to the total number of votes cast in its favour, regardless of its performance in the constituencies. Each party submits a list of candidates from which these additional seats will be filled, and can thereby guarantee the presence of its key members in the chamber, even if they could not be elected in any constituency. The system is used in Germany and also in the Czech Republic and Hungary.

adjudication

The settlement of a dispute by judicial decree, hence, in English and US law, the judgement or decision of a court.

More broadly the term is used to refer to the process of settling disputes peacefully by referring them to some body with authority to make a decision or award binding upon the parties. Thus it covers awards made by mixed commissions and arbitral tribunals as well as those made by the courts. It is a method of resolving conflicts, to be contrasted with such processes as *arbitration and *mediation, in that it issues in a statement of

administered prices

*rights under the law. Its nature is of great concern to students both of *jurisprudence, and of politics. It represents a particular style of government that may not exist in all places and in all times, and which may be criticized and defended for the characteristics that distinguish it. Some argue that the settling of all disputes by adjudication may confer legislative power upon judges, and thus violate the supposed requirement of a *separation of powers. Others argue that disputes should be capable of settlement by less tortuous or costly means, and that too great an emphasis on adjudication serves to limit the possibilities of settlement. Advocates of the politics of *confrontation may argue that adjudication is a way of ensuring the peaceful victory of the powers that be, through their servants, the *judiciary. Advocates of the politics of *conciliation, by contrast, value adjudication as one among many possible means of translating powers into rights while avoiding *violence. (See *judiciary, *law.)

administered prices

*Prices which are determined by the policy of some agency which can control them, rather than by *market forces, or by whatever other less deliberative mechanism might be held to determine them. Prices can be administered by a *monopoly, by an *oligopoly, by a *cartel, or by a government.

administrative law

The branch of law which governs the activities of state administrative bodies, such as ministries, state departments, local government, commissions, and agencies. To be distinguished from *constitutional law, which is concerned not with the subordinate organs of government but with the supreme executive and legislative bodies. (There is also a large grey area between the

two.) In modern government there is increasing *delegation both of government power, and, through delegated legislation, of government authority. Hence the question arises of what remedy the citizen has against a body which acts, or purports to act, with the authority of the state. In France, as a result of traditional centralization, reinforced by Napoleonic edicts, administrative bodies are now subject to strict control by special administrative courts, and by the *conseil d'état*. Hence no special remedy is provided whereby the aggrieved citizen can obtain relief from an ordinary court of law. In the UK and the US there are, by contrast, established procedures of appeal to the courts, regarded as important parts of the constitutional freedom of the subject.

In the US, the supervision of the Supreme Court can prevent administrative bodies from acting **ultra vires*, it being always possible for the aggrieved citizen to seek *judicial review on the grounds that he has been denied *due process of law. In the UK the courts can overturn administrative decisions by special prerogative writs. These are summonses issued to the administrative body on behalf of the aggrieved party, calling on it in the name of the Crown to account for its actions. Among such writs is the celebrated *habeas corpus, and also mandamus (ordering a public officer to perform some neglected function), and certiorari (asking for the records of a decision to be submitted). (As the Latin names testify, these writs are of ancient provenance, and were partly responsible for the emergence of the English style of government, in which the Crown is represented as the servant of the subject against his oppressors.)

Of particular relevance in any subsequent proceedings are the principles of natural justice: has the

administrative body effectively 'stood in judgement' on the plaintiff? If so, did it allow him the right of hearing? Did it review the relevant evidence? And so on. This survival of the doctrine of *natural justice in administrative law is vital if the state is to be seen as dealing at all levels on open terms with its citizens.

Adorno, Theodor, W. (1903–69)

German philosopher, social theorist and musician, who developed a Marxist critique of popular culture. A founding member of the *Frankfurt school, Adorno emigrated to the US upon Hitler's rise to power. The 'commodity culture' by which he found himself, in his new home, surrounded, elicited from him many acerbic and often penetrating pages of condemnation, and even if the Marxist trappings of his thought now seem dated, his defence of musical *modernism against musical *fetishism has had a lasting impact on Western culture. Adorno argued that 'late capitalism', as he called it, has generated, as part of its *ideology, a 'mass culture', the function of which is to distract people from the truth of their condition, and to provide them with a blanket of sentimental clichés. By contrast modernist art is concerned to see through the 'fetishized' products of popular culture, and to reveal the exploitation and oppression on which they depend. *See also* *authoritarian personality, *critical theory, *progress.

adversarial system

The mode of legal procedure in criminal cases whereby the prosecution (the state) acts through a counsel who is opposed in court by another counsel acting on the instructions of the accused. Each party is 'represented' before a third (the judge and jury) whose impartiality is necessary to justice, and whose existence and

independence are often taken to be fundamental constituents in the *rule of law. The adversarial system is to be contrasted with the *inquisitorial system common in countries with Roman-law or Napoleonic jurisdictions, and with systems that involve 'confessional' trials, trials by ordeal, and *show trials, where the individual is pitted directly against the state as his accuser and required to exonerate himself or be condemned. In show trials prosecutor and judge are identical, although this identity might be masked – for example by the presence of a judge who is acting under instructions from the prosecution. Some argue that there can be no true adversarial system unless the defendant who cannot afford a lawyer to represent him has an automatic right to public defence (US) or legal aid (UK).

The expression is sometimes used to describe a political system in which *opposition has a recognized function, with a place within the institutions of government, perhaps supported from public funds.

advertising

The declaration that goods or services are available for purchase, usually accompanied by attempts to persuade the public to buy them. The nature of advertising changed radically during the course of the twentieth century, with the development of new techniques of persuasion. Advertising has helped to form the character of *capitalist societies, and achieved a place in the life of the individual not unlike the place accorded to *propaganda in communist systems. It is the object of controversy on many grounds. Some argue, for example, that advertising is an economic evil, since it creates a barrier to entry into a market, preventing firms which cannot afford expensive advertising campaigns from selling their products. Others retort

aesthetics and politics

that advertising promotes competition, and permits the emergence of self-supporting media of communication, thereby eliminating the need for state funding and promoting freedom of information.

Some of the hostility to advertising reflects the view that it radically alters the perceived quality of purchase and exchange, by imbuing them with acquisitive and *fetishistic impulses. Thus products become desired not because of their ability to satisfy human needs, but for reasons wholly unconnected with that, such as the desire for enhanced *status, the sense of a 'magic' power, the desire merely to have and to hold that which one is taunted for not possessing. Many go further and argue, with Vance Packard (*The Hidden Persuaders*, 1957) and *Galbraith, that advertising *creates* the wants that it offers to satisfy, and whose satisfaction it keeps just beyond our reach, by making sure that new wants are always created in the place of old. Thus it has an 'enslaving' effect, not unlike that described by nineteenth-century theories of *alienation. To this argument it may be replied that advertising provides useful information to consumers which they could easily obtain in no other way. It therefore enhances economic freedom. Moreover, the evils complained of by Packard and Galbraith are due less to advertising than to the particular styles and the particular media employed by it.

In the case of risky products, such as tobacco, alcohol and junk food, governments have begun to institute advertising bans, on the assumption that the appetite for these things is partly the result of advertising, which glamorizes the product and endows it with a false aura of sophistication. Against such bans it is argued that advertising does not sell the product but only the brand, and the effect of a

ban is simply to freeze the market, so abolishing competition, while actual consumption remains unaffected. All such claims are hotly disputed; as a result advertising remains a serious subject of political controversy.

From the economic point of view advertising is sometimes seen as a form of indirect *taxation, whereby the mass media are subsidized by the consumer: hence the association of the two in the term 'admass', coined by J.B. Priestley in 1955, in order to describe the emerging tyranny of the mass media and advertising. However, advertising has a far older history than the mass media, and has produced its own art forms, such as the shop signs and street cries of medieval Europe.

aesthetics and politics

The term 'aesthetic', introduced into modern philosophy by A.G. Baumgarten (1714–62), is now normally used to denote a kind of imaginative experience, whose object is conceived as an end in itself. It arises from the contemplation of appearances, in which questions of ultimate purpose and scientific truth are held in suspension. It was plausibly suggested by *Kant that such experience is not only essential to the life of a *rational being, but also itself inherently rational, issuing in judgements held forth as objectively binding. Moreover, despite its abstraction from particular purposes, aesthetic experience provides an intimation of the inherent 'purposiveness' of reality. Two questions arise: what are the political consequences, and what the social and political causes, of aesthetic *values so conceived?

(i) The political consequences. Some argue that, despite its non-functional character, aesthetic experience is essential both to understanding and to acting on the world. In every action appearance has a dominant part to play, since it is largely

through appearances that we respond to our environment. Hence the saving of appearances may be a persistent political purpose: it is this, for example, which explains much of the concern of 'conservationists' for landscape and townscape. When people agitate on behalf of some valley that is threatened by development, they are certainly not agitating on behalf of its rights. Nor are they truly concerned with the rights of themselves or future generations. The beauty of the landscape itself seems to give sufficient reason to act. Some argue, however, that such aesthetic activism has its ultimate *raison d'être* in social life. The regard for beauty reflects a deep need for social harmony, and in agitating on behalf of aesthetic values people are really agitating on behalf of the forms of life which are consonant with them. It is certainly indisputable that appearances are of overwhelming importance in social existence, and that the sense of manners, etiquette, and 'good form' are both intimately related to the aesthetic, and also integral to our understanding of one another as persons. Hence demands for aesthetic continuity can plausibly be seen as extensions of a sense of social 'belonging'; aesthetic values seem to nourish our understanding of the ends of social existence, and therefore inevitably qualify our pursuit of the political means. Such arguments were very popular in the nineteenth century, for example among *cultural conservatives, among certain kinds of pastoral socialists, and among thinkers like *Ruskin, *Morris and the critics of *industrialism. Such thinkers also extolled the aesthetic interest of the cognoscenti, as an index of the social needs of the common people. Their vision of the political significance of aesthetic value formed part of a general theory of the interdependence between high and common *culture.

The early twentieth century also saw the rise of an 'aestheticised' politics, in which the role of artist was consciously adopted by politicians as a model. This aestheticizing of politics was particularly influential in the birth of Italian fascism, with Mussolini expressly promoting himself as a 'sculptor whose material is humanity'. The futurist Marinetti, who saw all life as an opportunity for aesthetically interesting gestures, lent his support to this kind of politics, and it found exemplary expression in the poet Gabriele d'Annunzio's expedition to capture and hold the city of Fiume (now in Croatia), after the First World War, in defiance of Italy's obligations under the Treaty of Versailles. D'Annunzio reigned in Fiume for 15 months, decorating himself with titles, and dramatizing the process of government to give it the air of a work of art.

(ii) Social and political causes. It is evident that aesthetic values may reflect *ideological commitments. Some argue that the 'aesthetic' way of seeing things arose, like its name, in the *bourgeois period of Western civilization, as part of the *ideology (in the Marxist sense) of capitalist society. Aesthetic values arise in the mind of the person who wishes to consolidate his economic position by a species of passive and 'functionless' contemplation that shows to be harmonious what is in reality far from being so. This is then seen as part of an ideological attempt to *naturalize reality with consoling representations; other social orders will not require, and therefore will not produce, this kind of mystery. (Thus Bertolt Brecht: *The Messingkauf Dialogues*, 1939, published 1967. The theme has been taken up in our time by the literary critic Terry Eagleton (*The Ideology of the Aesthetic*, 1990) and the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (*Distinction*, 1988).) That is one example of a theory which tries to find the

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causes of our love of beauty in social and political circumstances. Others, unpersuaded by that, may nevertheless see individual aesthetic outlooks as reflecting both particular political arrangements, and also the position of the individual within them. The eighteenth-century aesthetic of nature, for example, may be represented as an offshoot of aristocratic control exerted over the landscape. In contemplating the beauty of nature, the aristocrat was consoled by a vision of the 'natural' quality of his power. (See also *architecture, *art.)

affirmative action

Action taken in order to advance, rather than merely to conform to, the political vision underlying a doctrine of legal rights. Thus, if it is determined that, in matters of employment, blacks and women are to be given the same rights as white men, then affirmative action on the part of an employer involves not merely conforming to the code by giving equal consideration to all candidates independently of race and sex, but also actively seeking applications from women and blacks, so 'affirming' the underlying political vision which, if merely 'conformed to', might result in the perpetuation of existing inequalities. Affirmative action is sometimes defended as a necessary part of enforcing just distribution, sometimes criticized as a form of unjust discrimination in favour of those whose position is advanced by it. It is to be distinguished from a system of 'quotas', which requires a particular outcome, rather than a particular effort, and also from the practice of *reverse discrimination. Affirmative action is also sometimes justified as a way of correcting historical injustices, by giving favourable consideration towards people who belong to groups that have been discriminated against in the past.

affluence

The condition in which all human needs are easily satisfiable and generally catered for, and in which productive activity is directed increasingly to the production of luxuries (i.e. goods for which there is no natural *need).

In *The Affluent Society*, 1958, J.K. Galbraith argued that, when widespread poverty and want are abolished, people come to have a standard expectation of comfort. In such a society received ideas of economic theory (which tend to involve the assumption that at least *something* necessary is also scarce) cannot be applied. It is no longer rational for the *private sector to pursue increasing production or for the *public sector to refrain from interference in the economy. In fact, however, firms continue to seek the expansion of demand, and continue to see the public sector as an obstacle to the needed diversion of resources. This unbridled private expansion can persist only by the creation of artificial or 'synthesized' demands, through *advertising and the expansion of the credit system. Because of the neglect of public works the result is a condition of private affluence accompanied by public squalor: private cars but not enough roads for them, private wealth but insufficient police to protect it, and so on. Galbraith's argument seemed more plausible when it was first published, since it appeared at a time of rapid economic growth, before the necessary public adjustments had occurred. Since then Western societies have had to come to terms with affluence, and the pressures that it places on natural resources, on the environment and on cultural traditions.

In all discussions a distinction must be drawn between affluence that is concerned only with *consumption, and that which directs itself towards a style of life, involving, say, sumptuous

ceremony and display. It is contended, e.g. by *Veblen, that the latter is simply a conspicuous version of the former. However, Veblen also argues that such conspicuous consumption provides part of the motive of accumulation and so cannot be eliminated from the productive process, which requires accumulation if it is to proceed at all. Others argue that, until naturalized by the trappings of civilization and leisure, conspicuous consumption is merely the object of envy, and so of social discontent.

'Aflaq, Michel (1910–89)

Syrian writer and political activist, educated in French schools in Syria and at the Sorbonne, of Greek Orthodox extraction, who founded the *Ba'ath movement for the 'resurrection' of the Arab peoples, with a view to uniting the Arabic-speaking world behind a reforming nationalist ideology, and in opposition to the colonial ventures of the European nation-states. 'Aflaq was a defender of free speech, civil rights and secular law, and was briefly, in the 1950s, minister of education in Syria. He argued in favour of an Arab, as opposed to a merely Muslim, identity, and hoped to reconcile Muslims, Christians and Jews in the foundation of viable jurisdictions in the post-colonial era. However, the movement that he founded, which took power in Syria and Iraq, soon found his views unacceptable and he retired from political life. When he died in Iraq he was granted a monumental funeral by the Ba'athist regime of Saddam Hussein, and the message was put out that he died a convert to Islam, having recognized that his defence of an Arabic politics dictated such a course. This message is now doubted, however, since 'Aflaq's voluminous writings have a strong undercurrent of attachment to the Christian legacy, and he continued to defend

**laïcité*, as a precondition of reconciliation between the faiths.

agency

The faculty of action. Changes are divided into things that happen and things that are done, and philosophers and jurists dispute over the grounds and significance of the distinction. Only some forces in the world are also agents: the wind, for example, does nothing, although it causes much to happen. Some argue that the distinctive feature of agency is that it involves intention or decision: this is disputed by others, who argue that the crucial idea is *responsibility, so that things done include many of the consequences of negligent but unintentional behaviour.

Agency belongs to many bodies and organizations besides human beings: e.g. to companies, states, committees and meetings. Perhaps this is because all such bodies are also *corporate persons; or perhaps agency and personality are independent ideas. The distinction between actions and happenings is of immense importance: the first are justified, and criticized, by reasons; they define the responsibility and answerability of an agent; they give grounds for reciprocal actions which punish, repair, restore or reward. The political problems are typified by *revanchism, which holds a present generation responsible for things done by its ancestors, and takes revenge accordingly.

agenda

Latin: things to be done, but used in English as a singular noun. A well-conducted meeting needs an agenda, meaning a list of matters to be considered or decided. But the term is now more widely used, to denote the goals which animate people in their thought and action, and which may not be immediately apparent. In politics it is

aggregate demand

very important to know, not only the thoughts and declared policies of a party, but also its underlying agenda.

A 'hidden agenda' is one that is deliberately concealed, usually by adopting another, harmless-seeming agenda which is designed to deceive outsiders. Communist Parties have acted on the principle that the real agenda should be revealed only to those who can be trusted to act on it, and that it must be kept hidden from all opponents until resistance is futile.

aggregate demand

The total demand for goods and services produced within a single economy, including demands of households for consumer goods, of firms for investment, of government for goods, investment etc. and export demands. Many economists hold that aggregate demand determines the level of production and hence employment. Followers of *Keynes, in particular, believe that the analysis of aggregate demand is essential to the understanding of *national income and *unemployment. Whether aggregate demand has an automatic tendency to achieve the level giving full employment of labour and of productive capacity is, however, a central point of controversy within economic theory.

aggregate supply

The total supply of goods and services to meet the *aggregate demand within an economy; i.e. domestic products + imports.

aggression

A term fundamental to international disputes, which, since the First World War, has come to replace the idea of an 'offensive' act. It is argued that 'an acceptable definition of aggression and a reliable procedure for determining when an act of aggression has

occurred are essential to a practicable system of collective security' (W.M. Honan: *International Conflict and Collective Security*, 1955). However, the United Nations Charter failed to define aggression, stipulating only that the Security Council and the General Assembly are authorized to call *specific* actions aggression. Two definitions were put forward in 1933, one by the Committee on Security Questions of the Disarmament Conference, the other by a 'Convention for the definition of Aggression', subscribed to by Afghanistan, Estonia, Latvia, Persia (Iran), Poland, Romania, Turkey, Yugoslavia and the USSR. While the subsequent history of those states may be held to illustrate the futility of definitions in international politics, certain distinctions were made that have been incorporated into more recent definitions. It is now normal to distinguish direct aggression between states (e.g. armed invasion, whether or not preceded or accompanied by a declaration of war) from indirect aggression (e.g. the provision of arms and relief to an existing aggressor); aggression may be military or, as in a blockade of ports or an embargo, economic – although to what extent a blockade may go without being an act of aggression is a matter of dispute (*see* **pacific blockade*). Aggression may involve regular armies answerable to the sovereign power, or more or less autonomous groups of guerrillas. All attempts to arrive at a definition are motivated by the desire to outlaw aggressive war (*see* **just war*), under the supposition that if there were no aggressors, but only states prepared for 'self-defence', then there would be no wars. Aggression is, therefore, the initiating act expressive of an intention to fight. The problem is to identify its instances, in particular to show how indirect aggression is manifested by such complex agencies as states.

Moreover, the adoption of pre-emptive measures by a peace-loving state, in order to avert a threat from a potential belligerent, may involve violent military intervention, but with the intention of preventing, rather than initiating, a fight. The problems of definition in this area have therefore come very much to the fore in the aftermath of the American-led invasion of Iraq.

agitprop

The acronym for the Department of Agitation and Propaganda, set up in 1920 as a section of the Central Committee Secretariat of the Soviet Communist Party, and which gradually spread its influence into all areas of Soviet life and into many of the spheres of international politics, where it advanced behind *front organizations. Now often used as a general term for left-wing agitation and propaganda, when these involve any substantial degree of organization, and also for certain kinds of cultural activity designed to establish a widespread acceptance of leftwing *ideology.

agrarian movements

Movements, popular in the early to mid-twentieth century, which extol the rural way of life as a model to be followed, and which represent the countryside and its economy as a source of wholesome values that have been eroded by technology and urban lifestyles. To a great extent literary in inspiration, the agrarian movements have been influential in France (led by the writers Jean Giono and Gustave Thibon), in England (under the influence of the *Soil Association and the writer H.J. Massingham), and in the American South (led by the Southern Agrarians and the poet Allen Tate). The *Wandervogel* movement in Germany, which began life as a youth movement at the end of the nineteenth century,

becoming an indigenous answer to the Boy Scouts after the disaster of the First World War, injected a strong agrarian streak into German politics, and was in due course hijacked by the Nazi Party, to become part of the 'blood and soil' ideology that was soon to lead to another and yet more disastrous war. As a result agrarian movements are viewed with suspicion in modern Germany, and have given way to *green politics, which attempts to distance itself from all forms of rural nostalgia and to see the land and its culture as simply one aspect of the global environment.

agrarian parties

Parties founded expressly in order to represent rural interests. Unfamiliar in the British context (although the Conservative Party has always had rural leanings and disproportionate rural support) and unknown in the US, agrarian parties have nevertheless been a familiar feature in agricultural countries with large rural populations. Their influence is now declining, as parties seek to free themselves from association with particular classes, groups or interests so as to appeal to the nation as a whole. In Poland, Hungary and Romania, however, 'peasant' or 'smallholders' parties are for the time being major forces in the political process, while traditional agrarian parties still have considerable following in Scandinavian countries.

agribusiness

A term introduced to denote the new kind of food production, in which large estates – often owned by non-resident or corporate landlords – are devoted exclusively to the production of crops or livestock, and in which the land is treated as a capital asset like any other, to secure the maximum return on investment. Agribusiness favours large holdings, mechanized

agriculture

production, a minimal labour force, and the use of fertilizers and pesticides to secure a reliable production of foodstuffs. It has become an object of controversy among those who believe it to be destructive of the natural and social ecology of the countryside. Others argue that the economies of scale introduced by agribusiness will facilitate the diversion of resources to environmental protection, as well as stimulating a viable rural economy.

agriculture

A term which should perhaps be contrasted with *agribusiness, so as to denote the small-scale production of food by resident farmers, whose interest in the land is also an interest in their home and in the place where they have settled with their families. Agriculture is not so much an economic function as a way of life, and the movement to maintain that way of life in the face of adverse economic trends has been an important force in recent politics – notably in Europe, under the *Common Agricultural Policy. The deliberate destruction of agriculture, and its replacement by state-controlled agribusiness, has been widely regarded as the primary social and economic disaster of the communist system. (See *collectivization.) In so far as the *agrarian movements survive today, it is in the guise of attempts to 'put the culture back in agriculture'.

ahistorical (sometimes anhistorical)

A theory is described as such when it treats its subject-matter either as though it had no history, or as though its history played no important part in the explanation of its nature. It is often said that the *liberal theory of human nature and political institutions is ahistorical. The intention is to accuse liberalism of describing our social and political nature without reference to the fact that these develop

historically, or to the fact that historical development determines both what is politically possible and what is politically justified. Marxists often go on to add that this ahistorical vision is itself the reflection of a particular set of historical circumstances – say, those which obtained in eighteenth- or nineteenth-century Europe, and perhaps even now in America. Such circumstances (it is argued) enable people to envisage a universal human type, whose essence, while in fact the product of a particular phase of historical development, is perceived as changeless, sempiternal, the common property of every economic and political order.

Some confusion results from the fact that any description of the essence of something (be it human nature or the nature of a plant or animal) must have universal validity: i.e. it cannot be specific with relation to time. If it is of the essence of human nature to develop through time, then this is a timeless truth about human nature. A liberal theory may well rely on just such a timeless truth in constructing its fundamental theory of rights and duties, without incurring the charge of being 'ahistorical': yet this charge is sure to be levelled at it, simply on account of its search for universality.

aid

On the assumption that the world divides into 'developed' and 'developing' nations, and that it is better for a nation to be developed than not, the idea of international aid has come to have considerable importance in political thinking. (See *development.) It has been argued before the UN Conference on Trade and Development that growth in real terms in nations recognized as 'developing' can be secured only by a level of imports which exceeds their capacity to export. Hence, without foreign aid, they must inevitably

decline further in real income level, as a result of the very process of trade that promises to improve their status. This idea has been used to suggest a variety of conclusions, for example: (i) that it is an inevitable effect of free trade to impoverish further the poorer nations (an argument analogous to Marx's attempt to show that private ownership of the means of production inevitably leads to the creation of a propertyless class); (ii) that there is a moral duty on richer nations to provide aid; (iii) that development is impossible without actual colonization. Others (e.g. P.T. Bauer: *Dissent on Development*, 1971) argue that the economic theories underlying the accepted wisdom concerning aid and development are in fact contentious, that it is aid which, in removing the incentive to exploit resources, leads to impoverishment, and that aid merely lines the pockets of a ruling élite, without producing a real investment. See also *North/South divide, *thirdworldism, *three worlds theory.

akrasia

A term of ancient Greek philosophy, normally translated as 'weakness of will', and indicating an area of philosophical difficulty in the understanding of human motivation. As rational beings we choose what we think to be good. So how can we think something to be good and not choose it? One answer is that our will is 'overcome' by other and non-rational forces, so that, when we choose something that we also condemn, we are not acting rationally. But in that case, are we really *choosing*? This problem, which sometimes seems sophistical, was identified by Aristotle as a major obstacle to a comprehensive theory of rational agency.

al-Banna, Hassan (1906–49)

Egyptian schoolteacher, *Islamist and political activist, founder of the

*Muslim Brotherhood. Stimulated by the British occupation of Egypt into resisting both foreign government and foreign ways, al-Banna was deeply preoccupied with the condition of the new urban poor who had migrated from the countryside to the shanty towns of twentieth-century Egypt. He believed that they were being uprooted from a way of life which was essential to them, that they must be provided with education, resources and the religious instruction that would enable them to form coherent communities, and that they should be guided along the path of righteousness and organized in the pursuit of an Islamic state. The Muslim Brotherhood was to be both teacher and vanguard of this disenfranchised proletariat, and by acts of violence directed against foreigners, infidels and the traitors within, it was to secure an Islamic Republic that would serve as a model to the Arab world. Under al-Banna's leadership the brotherhood grew to a mass movement, with half a million members in Egypt and branches in other Arab countries. It also began to embark on selective assassinations – including, in 1948, the Prime Minister of Egypt. In 1949 al-Banna was himself assassinated, many assume by the Egyptian secret services, which were attempting to bring the Brotherhood under control.

alien

A person who, by the law of one state, is not a national or citizen of that state, though he may be resident there. The decision whether to admit aliens falls within the privilege of each sovereign state, and no state can be forced by international law to do so. The matter is, however, a subject of fierce domestic disagreement. The *jus gentium* in *Roman law evolved partly in order to determine the political rights of aliens, and most states now

alienation

recognize some standard of humane behaviour towards aliens on their soil.

The legal idea of an alien is bound up with those of *jurisdiction (i.e. the idea that a state has sovereign authority over a particular *territory*) and *allegiance (i.e. the idea that persons owe duties to *specific* sovereign states). In some versions of liberal internationalism, for which jurisdiction and allegiance ought to aspire to be international, the idea of an 'alien' is inherently retrograde. (See *Kant.)

The legal idea should be distinguished sharply from the social and political conception that certain people, classes, or races are 'alien' from the point of view of a society by which they are surrounded. In the legal sense a person is 'alien' to the state; in the socio-political sense he is 'alien' to society. That is to say, his customs, allegiances, behaviour (perhaps even the colour of his skin), mark him out as something strange, and perhaps unacceptable, in the consciousness of those with whom he must mix.

alienation

A term used to describe a state of mind or of being, and owing its modern significance to three related ideas, all of them with discernible medieval antecedents:

1. In *Hegel two terms tend to be translated as 'alienation': *Entäußerung* (objectification), and *Entfremdung* (self-estrangement). The theory – which is not particularly associated with either term – occurs as part of a general account of the progress of spirit (**Geist*) towards knowledge of, and unity with, the 'Absolute Idea'. Spirit begins in subjectivity, and proceeds towards objective existence; spirit creates its world in the act of knowing it, and both history and individual development are to be seen as the construction and overcoming of successive 'objectifications'. At a

certain 'moment' of consciousness, the spirit divides the world into good and bad, ideal and reality, saved and fallen. This divorce is experienced as a divorce between the self and the objectifications which it has 'posited' as not-self. The fracture between the ideal objectification and the fallen self is experienced as a thoroughgoing imperfection in all conscious life: Hegel calls this state the 'unhappy consciousness'. Estrangement from the self is conjoined with estrangement from others. Since it is the essence of spirit to identify itself with the ideal, the world is seen as devoid of spirit, which lies beyond humanity, and not in it. Men are seen as objects, while spirit is seen as realized only in the being of a transcendent God. The practice of religion is the attempt to overcome this rift, to see man as no longer trapped in nature, and no longer aspiring hopelessly to overcome it. Alienation is overcome by the recognition of the immanence of God, and the self-transcendence of man, through the sacramental customs of religion. Hegel had Christianity in mind, and in particular the doctrine of the incarnation of God in Christ, who reconciles in his person the human and the divine.

2. In the early writings of *Marx, alienation (*Entfremdung*) is alienation from *species-being (*Gattungswesen*) – a term borrowed from Feuerbach (see *Young Hegelians) to describe the distinctive character of human social existence. Feuerbach had secularized some of the theological ideas of Hegel, and thus paved the way for Marx's view, according to which alienation is no longer inherent in man's 'being in the world', but only in his being in a *particular historical* world. Man's essence lies in his species-being, so that alienation from species-being is alienation from the human essence, and hence from self. This process

occurs when people are compelled to see themselves as objects, as means to ends, with no satisfactions that they can identify as their own. They then cease to have reality for themselves; instead they project their essence and value into the objects which they pursue. Human life is seen only as a means, whereas objects are seen as ends, with an intrinsic value which in reality cannot belong to them. Since the prime activity of species-being is *labour, the primary mode of alienation is alienated labour, through which people are compelled to instill the world with the forms of alienated consciousness. Marx saw this state as associated with *private property, which compels the *division of labour, and the institution of the *wage contract. By forcing people to sell themselves (i.e. in another, legal, sense, to 'alienate' their *labour power), it also compels them to engage in the production of goods which have no *use-value for them, but only *exchange-value. Such goods do not reflect back to the producer an image of himself, since they bear the imprint of no natural satisfaction. In pursuing and producing them, a person sees himself as a means to an end that is not his own. Hence he becomes an object to himself, and looks on others likewise. Only with the abolition of private property will man be restored to himself, and to the 'species-being' which constitutes his satisfaction. *See also* *master and slave.

3. In *Freud and post-Freudian psychology, alienation is seen as the condition in which people are placed by civilization, through the necessity to conform to roles and expectations, and to *repress and transform vital instincts and impulses, so that in becoming acceptable to others they become strangers to themselves.

Many modern thinkers (e.g. *Marcuse and Erich Fromm (1900–80))

attempt to synthesize the Marxian and Freudian ideas. For them 'capitalist man' is a being crippled through the fatty degeneration of the will, driven to see himself always as an object and never as the originator of his acts, a person who is no longer a true person because he cannot be what he really is: he loses interest in life because it is not *he* who lives it. In this speculative social criticism alienation is often contrasted with an ideal of *authenticity or *self-realization. In none of the established usages is the notion very clear, but in all of them it expresses the search for a theory that will describe the condition of the modern self, and also explain its sense of being 'separated' from some truly human way of being.

allegiance

The bond which attaches the subject to the sovereign, and also to fellow subjects. This bond can be conceived in two ways. First, as a power, consisting in emotional attachment to certain familiar conditions and expectations, of which the state is the symbol and expression. Secondly, as a duty towards the sovereign power. In the latter construction, it gives rise to the well-known problem of *political obligation: how can allegiance be *owed*, and what justifies us in asserting this? Liberals and others have attempted to find the answer in theories of the *social contract; Marxists and anarchists have looked forward to the creation of a state of affairs in which the problem of political obligation would not arise, believing that the highest form of society is one without sovereignty, and therefore with nothing towards which allegiance might be owed.

Conservatives, by contrast, have made the concept of allegiance, conceived as a power, fundamental to their description of the experience of

alliance

society. Allegiance becomes the inescapable precondition, both of the contract which liberal thinkers suppose might justify it, and of the renunciation of sovereignty to which the anarchist aspires. Allegiance is an emotional condition, which creates the possibility of political obligation, but has no independent ground. Some – for example Hegel in *The Philosophy of Right* – have tried to argue that the power and the obligation are one, and both examples of piety. On this view the attempt to found political obligation in contract or consent is based on the spurious view that voluntary activity is the only thing that can put a citizen under an obligation. But it is essential to many institutions – for example the family – that people should recognize and defer to obligations which do not arise through voluntary action. This sense of obligation towards what is safe and familiar is an ineliminable part of social consciousness and cannot be further justified. According to such views, allegiance is the true fact of the matter in political life, and any attempt to replace it with contract, consent, or some unforeseeable alternative (such as would be involved in the total abolition of sovereignty) misrepresents the fundamental bond of society, and misdescribes the subject-matter of politics. The problem for such views lies partly in determining the object of allegiance: is allegiance towards individuals, towards society, towards the state, or what? Moreover, how can it be brought into being if it does not already exist? Also, while 'allegiance' may describe the citizen's sense of obligation towards the state, it does not seem to describe, on this theory, any proven obligation.

All those problems have come to the fore in current disputes over immigration. How do we secure the allegiance of immigrants who retain

their old customs, old affections, and old sense of belonging in another and differently governed place? At least, if allegiance is based in a contract, we can persuade them to sign; but if it lies deeper than rational choice, and is rooted in custom, proximity and lifestyle, we cannot assume that an immigrant will possess it.

alliance

Specifically, a nation is an ally of another if bound to it by some treaty for mutual defence. More loosely, 'allies' are those who recognize the threat of a common aggressor, and agree under certain terms to take concerted action, diplomatic, economic, or military, to counter it. 'The Allies', used to name the association of nations fighting the Axis powers during the 1939 war, is a term the emotional resonance of which survives in 'The Western Alliance'. This now names the loose association of nations united to some extent by treaty (e.g. NATO), to some extent by a common apprehension of danger, most of all by similar conceptions of political legitimacy, and by mutually dependent economies. It is disputed whether the creation of alliances is beneficial either to world peace or to the common interests of the international community, but even without the existence of alliances, the division of the world into blocs, spheres of influence, and spheres of coercion and domination would presumably produce similar effects.

al-Qa'eda

Arabic: the base. Name bestowed by its founder, Osama bin Laden, on a worldwide Islamist movement whose ostensible purpose is to free the holy places of Arabia (specifically Mecca and Medina) from all taint of heathen occupation, but which has expanded to become the major network of international terrorism in the contemporary

world, recruiting disaffected Muslims from all over the globe, in a terminal struggle against Western civilization and *jahiliyya. The name indicates that the pious Muslim, who has resolved to give his life to the cause, has found a sufficient foundation for his life wherever he should choose to be, and has no need of a domicile, a nation, a jurisdiction or any law other than that laid down by the Holy Koran. His duty is to love his fellow believers, to hate the infidel and if possible to die in the cause. The principal intellectual influence on al-Qa'eda has been *Wahhabism, and its doctrine of the unity of God and the inviolability of his commands.

alternative society

A term used in the popular exposition of a certain kind of extreme liberalism (fashionable in the US and other highly developed urban-industrial societies during the 1960s), according to which the aim of individual life is to lead an 'authentic life style', achieved through independent personal choice. There is no reason to conform to the 'structures' of the 'system' into which one is born that is more compelling than the impetus to enact the authentic life style of one's own devising, and so to create, in community with one's fellows, the 'alternative society' and its associated *counter-culture. This counter-culture will be offensive to the guardians of the 'establishment', since it will threaten the easy solution by which they have chosen to live. (The terms in inverted commas are part of the rhetoric that confers on the original thought the appearance of system.)

The advocacy of the alternative society derives in part from *Sartre's existentialism, in part from the psychotherapeutic doctrines of *Reich and R.D. Laing, and in part from the radical social criticism of *Marcuse.

Criticized from the right by the defenders of traditional order, it was also fiercely denounced from the left, for example by *Lasch.

alternative vote

The system of *proportional representation in which voters rank candidates in order of preference. If no candidate has a majority of first preferences, then the least successful candidate is eliminated, and the second preferences of his supporters added to the initial totals. The re-allocation of votes is repeated until a winner emerges.

Althusser, Louis (1918–90)

*Neo-Marxist French philosopher, who attempts to combine 'scientific Marxism', with the *structuralism of *Lévi-Strauss. Althusser argues, in *For Marx* (1965), that there is a fundamental discontinuity ('epistemological break') between *Hegel and Feuerbach, on the one hand, and Marx on the other. He dismisses the early (pre-1845) writings of Marx as 'humanist', and finds the true, 'scientific' Marxism in the writings that follow. Althusser's major deviations from Marx's historical materialism may be attributed to his conception of 'structural causation', which he argues to be implicit in the mature 'scientific' theories of Marx. Revolution and all social transformation are brought about through *contradiction, and the 'principal contradiction' is that identified by Marx, between *productive forces and *production relations. However, this principal contradiction is 'inseparable from the total structure of the social body in which it is found'. The social body contains other contradictions, existing at several distinct levels within the *superstructure, and interacting systematically, as they struggle to align themselves: so contradictions pass from one level to another. Because the various contradictions

altruism

develop unevenly it is possible that an economically backward country might present the sudden confluence of contradictions necessary for successful revolution (the case of Russia). Althusser calls this 'fusion of accumulated contradictions' 'over-determination', borrowing a term from *Freud. Thus while the economy may exert a powerful sway over social conditions, it alone can never be taken as the cause of social transformation (although Althusser affirms somewhat half-heartedly the thesis of *Engels, that 'economic necessity . . . in the last analysis always prevails'). Althusser was briefly influential, but suffered an eclipse during the 1980s, and is now increasingly regarded as an historical curiosity. His dense, paranoid prose style, and blindness to any debates other than those current in the French Communist Party suggest, at the very least, an obsessive personality. In later life Althusser developed a psychotic illness which caused him, in 1981, to strangle his wife.

altruism

The disposition to care for others, or to act knowingly in their interests. The term has been appropriated by ethologists, to describe organisms which exist partly through giving help to members of their species. In *game theory, altruistic strategies are contrasted with selfish strategies, such as that known as 'tit-for-tat', in which every hurt inflicted by one party is answered with a hurt inflicted by the victim. Axelrod and others have tried to show that, in the long run, organisms that adopt an altruistic response to their kind are better able to adapt to competition than those who play tit-for-tat, and that the emergence of altruism is therefore a long-term effect of natural selection. *Sociobiologists have attempted to extend ethological theories of the 'altruistic organism' to

the human species, in order to explain our liking for each other as a convenient evolutionary device. Whatever the value of such explanations, it is clear that altruism is a serious motive in human affairs, and one that must affect the calculations of politicians and economists. Some economists argue that *classical theorists such as *Smith did not take sufficient account of it; others try to integrate altruism into economics by ascribing to it a distinctive function, whereby it generates the *optimum economic behaviour in a group. (See, e.g. E.S. Phelps (ed.): *Altruism, Morality and Economic Theory*, 1975.)

Philosophers distinguish two distinct motives that go by the name of altruism: the emotional motives, of love, liking and *friendship, whereby another's interest is automatically mine; and the moral motive, of respect or considerateness, whereby another's interest becomes a reason for me, while not necessarily becoming mine. See *charity, *Kant.

amendment

The process of legislative amendment has become increasingly important in modern democracies. Bills introduced into the legislature by governing parties are gradually subjected to dilution or qualification, through the influence of individual members and *committees, and often in response to organized *pressure groups. It is therefore impossible to predict the precise form of the legislation that will emerge, even from a determined government with a strong majority.

Amendment has played a decisive role in US history and government, since it was by the process of constitutional amendment that the Declaration of Rights was incorporated into the Constitution, with incalculable results. (See *Bill of Rights.)

amnesty

From the Greek meaning oblivion or forgetfulness. An amnesty is a general determination that whole classes of offenders shall not be prosecuted. It is juridically distinct from a pardon, which is the annulment of a penalty already prescribed. Only the criminal consequences of the absolved act are destroyed, and third parties may still have recourse to a civil action for damages.

Amnesties are offered to prisoners of war and of conscience, or to *political offenders. They may be general or particular, absolute or conditional. There is considerable dispute over who, and in what circumstances, is entitled to offer them. In the US, it seems undecided whether an amnesty is an executive rather than a legislative act. The first theory attributes the power of amnesty to the President, the second attributes it to Congress.

The term is also used, as in 'Amnesty International', to denote the general overlooking of accusations founded merely in differences of opinion between the accused and the state. Liberty of *conscience, it is thought, requires that a sincerely held belief cannot be sufficient grounds for punishment.

anarchism

The belief either that government is intrinsically evil, or that historical circumstances have conspired to make it so, together with the further belief that it is preferable and possible to abolish government, either completely, or at least in part. The anarchist believes in a *society without the institutions of a *state, and tends, also, to reject all forms of *authority that interfere with the spontaneous actions and associations of individuals. Typical anarchist beliefs are these:

(i) People are benign by nature and corrupted by government.

(ii) The state is exploitative, and oppressive, whereas society is natural and free.

(iii) Man is a social animal, fulfilled through voluntary cooperation, but frustrated by all *coercion.

(iv) Reforms 'from above' bear the imprint of the authority that initiates them, and are therefore worthless.

(v) Social change must be brought about through revolutionary action, perhaps even *violent action.

Not all those beliefs are held by every anarchist. *Godwin, for example, believed in a society of small producers, united by cooperation, but without a state, and sought to achieve this by enlightened social reform. The Russian anarchist *Bakunin advocated 'anarchism, collectivism, atheism', in a synthesis that required immediate violent revolution. Others could be called anarchists despite rejecting all of (i) to (v): *Nietzsche, for example, who lauded the strength and egoism of the individual will, and sought to free it from all attachment to the 'herd-like' necessities whereby the multitude are governed. Much nineteenth-century anarchism was hostile towards private property, or towards some kinds of private property, as a kind of concealed slavery. *Proudhon, who attempted to make anarchism into a conscious mass movement, proposed the maxim that 'property is theft'. However, he also thought that property is a necessary part of freedom, and therefore attacked *monopoly and usurpation as the principal evil forms of it. Bakunin advocated *common ownership of the means of production, but was prepared to concede private ownership in the 'means of consumption'. Godwin accepted most kinds of private ownership, on a small scale. Modern thinkers influenced by anarchism (e.g. the non-anarchist *Nozick) are usually of a *liberal persuasion, and are therefore

anarcho-capitalism

more tolerant towards private property, on account of the interference in freedom that its abolition seems to entail.

Another important aspect of nineteenth-century anarchism was the hostility towards organized religion: Tolstoy, for example, who believed in a society of love, argued that 'true' religion involves a complete negation of the state and all its institutions. Most anarchists have either accepted that position, or gone further, and argued that no religion is true. Violent anarchists, such as *Sorel, have been influential during the twentieth century, and the nineteenth-century anarchists were extremely important in providing concepts to *Marx, whose '*withering away of the state' is directly inspired by their ideals.

In all its forms anarchism must assume that there is a condition of human society (or even human solitude) in which material needs and collective responsibilities will be met spontaneously, without coercion. Most anarchists are therefore disposed to reject the view of Hobbes, that the life of man outside the protection of the sovereign is 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short'. The objections contained in Hobbes's remark are endorsed by many, who also see history as confirming them. Without violence, it is argued, the destruction of the state is inconceivable, and with violence, a new state must immediately replace that which is destroyed. Furthermore, the advocacy of violence seems to go against those very assumptions about human nature on which anarchism bases its vision of a new society. In the face of such difficulties certain anarchists assert that the social condition of man has first to be improved by the massive discipline of industrial production before the state can wither away and 'true human nature' reassert itself. Perhaps the view

most radically opposed to anarchism is *Hegel's, that 'true human nature' requires the state, not only as the means to its security, but as the highest expression of its freedom.

anarcho-capitalism

A theory advanced by the American economist and political scientist Murray N. Rothbard (1926–95), who believed that capitalist production, left to itself and without the interference of the state, would generate all the laws and procedures necessary to peaceful and prosperous coexistence. The market would generate a consensual morality, a law of contract and tort, and an allocation of responsibilities and liabilities that would be sufficient to rectify injustices and to maintain a mutually profitable equilibrium among its participants. Interference from the state is the great enemy, not only of a free economy, but of the more fundamental freedoms from which social responsibility spontaneously emerges. At a certain stage in his career Rothbard suggested an alliance between libertarians of the right, such as himself, and those of the left with genuine anarchist tendencies.

anarcho-syndicalism

A movement arising in the later nineteenth century from a fusion of anarchist and *trade union (syndicalist) principles, and led at first by James Guillaume, a Swiss disciple of *Bakunin, and later guided and endorsed by *Sorel. Anarcho-syndicalism advocated the use of trade union power, in order to oppose and destroy state power in all its forms. In Sorel's hands it was exhorted to *violence, and action (culminating in the final and decisive 'general strike') which would be tantamount to violence. Sorel's philosophy is often thought not to be a genuine *anarchism, since he advocated the use

of organized groups in order to overthrow the established order. (See further *syndicalism.) The anarcho-syndicalist movement thought of trade unions as the nuclear bodies of a future society, which must prepare themselves as cohesive fighting units, in order to work for the overthrow of the capitalist state. It formed the basis of pre-Francoist trade unionism in Spain, and of the US 'Industrial Workers of the World' (the 'wobblies'), but it was opposed in the UK by the existing trade union formations. Its ideals have persisted, even though the movement has perished, and in France *industrial action may still sometimes be viewed as a direct or indirect *confrontation with the state, whether or not the state is also the employer against which the action is directed.

Anglicanism

The system of religious doctrine and practice upheld by Christians in communion with the see of Canterbury, and hence by the Church of England, and its offshoots in former colonies and dependencies. The doctrine is derived from a fusion of evangelical authority and respect for local custom. The proof of doctrinal validity is to be sought in the first four centuries of Christian teaching, before the institutional structure of the Roman Catholic Church had diverted that teaching to its own peculiar usage; while in all matters of liturgy, ceremony, and the legal and social status of religious belief, local custom and tradition are respected as containing the only objective authority. Anglicanism thus comes to stand for a particular vision of the social role of the church. The 'Church of England', is not only common to Englishmen (and, by extension through the (Episcopal) Church of Scotland, Church of Ireland etc., to Scots, Irish etc.), but also legally established

within, and influenced through, a national government. It thereby attempts to incorporate into its constitution a vision of the harmony between secular and religious obligations, encapsulated in the doctrine that the head of state (the sovereign) is also the leader of the church. In the UK constitution some bishops hold seats in Parliament as of right, and all bishops are appointed by the sovereign with the advice of the Prime Minister. Equally, liturgical and doctrinal reforms require the consent of the sovereign in Parliament, a fact that has recently been resented by the Anglican Church on the grounds that it provides an impediment to reforms dictated by its evangelical mission. Clearly, the coexistence of that mission with a respect for established usage, and the incorporation of both into a legal and political superstructure of the kind currently existing in the UK, are delicate social and political artifacts. The social order that they reflect remains an object of *nostalgia on the part of some English conservatives, although others argue that it is either extinct or on the verge of extinction. (See *common prayer, *liturgy.)

The spread of Anglicanism through the British Empire has led to the existence today of a world-wide Anglican communion, officially under the tutelage of the see of Canterbury, but severed from the political allegiance implied in the role of the Queen, as simultaneously Head of the Church and Head of State. This strange state of affairs has generated considerable strain, as the American branch (called Episcopalian) tends towards the new secular causes, such as *gay marriage, while the African branch retains much of the fervent Evangelical faith with which Anglicanism was first preached on that continent.

animal liberation

animal liberation

The movement for 'animal liberation' exists in many forms. At its most radical it involves a complete identification with the animal kingdom, a refusal to eat animals or to use them in any way that involves constraint, together with agitation – even violent agitation – on behalf of a new social and political order in which animals will finally enjoy their 'rights'. This radical form is a reincarnation of the revolutionary spirit, with animals taking the place of the proletariat; as such it belongs to the *victim culture of the modern city. Less radical forms of the movement may be content merely with *pressure groups, working towards legislative control of the way in which animals are reared, slaughtered or hunted. See *animals.

animal rights

See *animals.

animals

Movements to protect animals from mistreatment began in the early nineteenth century and have gathered momentum in recent years, giving currency to many controversial ideas. Some argue that animals, like people, have *rights and that it is therefore morally unacceptable to use them for our purposes. Against this it may be held that creatures have rights only if they also have duties, and that it makes no sense to attribute duties to non-rational animals. Moreover, the assumption that animals have rights would make them full members of the moral community, bound by the very same morality that constrains our own behaviour. On this view, predators would live under a permanent cloud of guilt, and the whole animal kingdom would be crying out for justice against its criminal members.

These philosophical difficulties do nothing to avert the charge that

animals are often used cruelly and in morally unjustifiable ways. The question has therefore arisen as to *how* exactly they are to be treated, what laws should govern our behaviour towards them, and to what extent animals are to be protected by the state. Clearly, animals are not citizens, and play no part in the political process. Nevertheless, they are indefinitely vulnerable to human mistreatment, and most people favour some kind of legal framework to guarantee their protection. However, the case of wild animals must be distinguished from that of domestic animals.

There are two common motives for protecting wild animals: concern for the individual animal, and concern for the species. Someone might be opposed to angling or *hunting on the grounds that the animals suffer unduly and merely for the sake of human pleasure. An ecologist might favour angling and hunting on the grounds that these practices serve the long-term interests of the hunted species by endowing human beings with a motive to preserve their habitats. Legislation to protect endangered species is now common throughout the civilized world; and proposals to abolish hunting and shooting have met with favour in several European countries, notably Germany (under the Nazis) and more recently Belgium, Holland and (in the case of hunting) the United Kingdom.

Domestic animals are already under our protection. For many people, therefore, the question of how we should treat them is more urgent than the question of hunting and fishing. How should farm animals be reared, for example, and how should they be slaughtered? Should we use animals as the subjects of painful or crippling experiments – for example when testing drugs? How, and to what extent, should animals (horses and

dogs, for example) be trained in order to satisfy our interests?

Arguments in this area are clouded by emotion. Unless we are able to determine how we differ from the animals, and how we resemble them, we shall be unable to know the extent of our moral duties towards them. The religious view that human beings have an immortal soul, capable of good and evil, which will be judged for all eternity, whereas animals are merely alive, gives grounds for a coherent moral distinction. But it is a controversial view, and those who do not accept it may find themselves at a loss to know *why* they should view animals so differently from people. Indeed, the loss of the religious worldview is one explanation for the upsurge in the movement to protect and favour animals. (*See also* *ecology, *speciesism.)

annexation

Primarily a term in *international law, denoting the *act of state whereby territory not previously held under the sovereignty of that state is acquired. Annexation confers all powers of use, exclusion, alienation, titles to public property rights, etc., on the annexing state. Allegiance of the inhabitants of the annexed territory is automatically assumed by the new sovereign, and although existing law and *local government organization in principle remain intact, they do so only in so far as this does not conflict with the interests of the annexing state. Thus annexation is to be distinguished from the establishment of a *protectorate, or military occupation, these latter procuring for the dominant state an extension of authority, but not full *sovereignty. It is also distinct from colonization, in that actual occupation either by the authorities of the annexing state or by its citizens is not required.

Within international law annexation can only be validated when

consented to by the state whose territory is annexed (in whole or in part), or (in the case of a territory not formerly held by another state) when consented to by the international community. The consent of a predecessor state may be given tacitly, under *coercion, or in the form of a *treaty. In either case, the inhabitants of the annexed territory are without rights of *self-determination. Originally annexation was intended as a mechanism whereby the discovery of new land could be both facilitated and credited to the adventuring state; it is now simply one among many means whereby major powers incorporate the territories of smaller powers.

anomie (also: anomy)

Greek: without law. 'Anomy' appeared in English in the sixteenth century and was frequently used in seventeenth-century theology to mean disregard of law, particularly divine law. The French *anomie* was appropriated by *Durkheim to denote the social condition in which no established code prevails or is accepted as objectively binding, either because traditions of social conformity have broken down, or because the sense of an authority independent of the individual impulse has been dissolved. *Anomie* may be a form of personal disorganization, when the individual can recognize no social *norm as constraining him, or a form of social disorganization, when norms are in conflict or have lost authority. Durkheim argued (*Suicide*, 1897) that *anomie* is a characteristic of an immature industrial society, that has yet to develop a suitable moral climate. However, in a late essay (*The Dualism of Human Nature*, 1914) he seemed to admit the possibility that the *anomie* which he discerned in modern society, where the *division of labour isolates every individual from his fellows, and

anthropology

where authoritative institutions exert no necessary influence, may not be overcome, and may become perpetual.

Anomie may be described as the public aspect of *alienation and also as a reaction to *disenchantment.

anthropology

The science of man, which has divided into several distinct but related studies, and developed an emphasis upon societies considered to be either *prehistorical or in some way removed from too much interaction with the modern world. Anthropology has tended to concentrate on such *primitive societies, not because they are thought to require analysis in ways inapplicable elsewhere but, on the contrary, because of the assumed ease with which they might generate universal conclusions. In studying what is unfamiliar and difficult to conceptualize, the anthropologist hopes to discover hypotheses concerning *human nature and society everywhere. The following distinct branches are now recognized:

(i) physical anthropology, which merges with human biology, and deals with the physical characteristics of the species;

(ii) cultural anthropology, which studies the artifacts of separate *cultures, and looks for their general function or significance in the lives of those who make use of them;

(iii) social anthropology, which probably includes cultural anthropology, but ranges more widely, in order to explore all aspects of man's social existence, and to explain the forms which it takes;

(iv) philosophical anthropology, which is not so much a branch of anthropology as an extension of philosophy to the universal but disputed truths of human nature, in order to provide the basis for moral and political theory.

Social and cultural anthropology tend to be comparative, and this has led to the ascendancy of cultural *relativism in anthropological studies. The two principal modern schools are *structuralism, associated with the work of Lévi-Strauss, and 'functionalism', associated with Bronislaw Malinowski (1884–1942). The first looks for 'meanings', the second for *functional explanations. The method of functional explanation – whereby social characteristics are explained in terms of their functional relation to the well-being of society – has impinged on *sociology and had considerable influence in all areas of political thought. Other notions important to anthropology also have wide political significance, among them *custom, *culture, *myth, *ritual and *tradition. Anthropology has *organicist adherents, who emphasize the fragility of primitive communities and conclude that social order is organic, change in one part having unforeseeable and perhaps dangerous consequences in another. It is common for anthropologists to caution themselves against conservative conclusions, however, since what is unforeseeable to them may not be unforeseeable to the people they study, and the sense of organic complexity may be no more than an ignorance of function or a blindness to significance.

anthropomorphism

The tendency to see non-human forms and animals as endowed with human characteristics, both physical and mental, but especially with will, emotion and intelligence. It is variously held to be good, bad and indifferent that men should project their own natures into their surroundings, but it is almost universally agreed that such is inevitable (at least under 'existing social conditions').

anti-

A prefix often used to denote a form of hostility supposed to express something other than a reasoned aversion to its object. Usually – as in some of the examples that follow – the explanation of the hostility is held to lie in social and economic circumstances, perhaps because these might show not only that the aversion is unreasoned, but also that it is unreasonable. *See also* *-phobia.

anti-Americanism

Hostility towards the material success and military power of the US, often accompanied by contempt towards the culture and institutions that they have protected. Anti-Americanism is a growing phenomenon, despite the fact – or maybe because of the fact – that the vast majority of people who wish to emigrate from their country of origin, wish to emigrate to the US. French anti-Americanism has a pronounced cultural slant, involving hostility to the *kitsch of American popular culture, and to the supposed naivety of US dealings with people from other cultures. Islamic anti-Americanism seems to have other and more frantic causes, related to the ability of the American media to project the sensuous attractions of the Western way of life around the globe. (*See* *jahiliyya.)

anti-clericalism

A liberal movement, which aims to reduce the political influence of the clergy and of religious institutions. Anti-clericalism is evident in much medieval literature, but its origins as a political movement lie in the eighteenth-century *Enlightenment. It became an active force during the French Revolution, and in the Third Republic, was deeply intertwined with Italian, Spanish and other forms of *nationalism, inspired Bismarck's *Kulturkampf against the Catholic church, and currently appears

both outside the church and within it (in the *secularization of religious practice and doctrine).

anti-communism

The aversion towards *communism, specifically in the US, has been thought by many, whether or not themselves communists, to have a character so intense and hysterical as to be insufficiently explained by the sincere belief that communism is a bad form of government. *McCarthyism, for example, has sometimes been thought to be not merely opportunistic but also founded in self-deception. It has been accused of concentrating on obnoxious deviations from communist principles (such as *Stalinism) and ignoring the genuine and perhaps redeeming ideals which those deviations mark, in order to generate an atmosphere of hysterical fear and hatred. Explanations of this alleged hysterical character vary; some invoke the threat that communism poses to private property, others invoke its anti-individualistic message (thus explaining the prevalence of anti-communism in the US and its relative absence from Europe). The thought that communism, properly understood, could not be loathed *as such* is perhaps a curiosity of mid-twentieth-century American liberalism, although it has had widespread influence.

antinomianism

General name for the view – specifically advocated by *Gnostics and again at the Reformation – that Christians are set free by grace from the need to observe any moral law. Hence any view that claims absolute right of action on the grounds of absolute truth of doctrine.

anti-semitism

The most notorious form of *racism in politics, which has had a long history,

anti-social behaviour

culminating in the Nazi *holocaust, and continuing as a vital force in the modern world, e.g. in Eastern Europe (notably Poland), in the former Soviet Union, and in the Middle East, where it is partly the effect, and partly the cause, of opposition to *Zionism.

Anti-semitism has many forms. It may attribute to the Jews a debased and subject moral character, or a character of innate degeneracy (as in the Nazi ideology); it may equally accuse the Jews of cunning, success, power and conspiracy; or of a disposition to accumulate benefits through usury and injustice. Anti-semitism must be distinguished from the religious hostility to the Jews as those who had denied, and continue to deny, Christ. The two hostilities may fuel one another but, strictly speaking, the religious hostility is removed by conversion to the Christian faith, while racism remains indifferent to any change that is within its victim's power (which is one reason why it is comforting: the enemy will never deceive you by turning out to be your friend). Explanations of anti-semitism are as varied as the phenomenon. It is sometimes thought to be based on the hostility of the *petit bourgeois* towards those of his own social class who are able to obtain a livelihood through capital investment; on this view it is the hostility of the borrower towards the lender (made acute by hyperinflation) which tries to rationalize its own intensity by finding an irredeemable moral, rather than a redeemable institutional, fault. Others (e.g. *Sartre) have tried to explain the phenomenon in terms of fantasies of the Jew's sexual prowess, thus aligning anti-semitism with some kinds of hostility towards those judged to be 'primitive'. No explanation seems wholly satisfactory. Some account must be taken of habit: once a particular group which cannot defend itself is picked out as the

enemy, the habit of so identifying it begins to grow. Moreover there seems to be an inveterate need for societies in a state of acute crisis to look for the 'enemy within' who causes it.

None of those theories accounts for the growth of anti-semitism in the Muslim world today or for the renewed spread of anti-semitism across the European continent. Both those phenomena correspond, however, to the state of mind that Nietzsche called **ressentiment* – the desire of the weak and inadequate to pick on a victim yet weaker than themselves.

anti-social behaviour

A euphemism that refers to the breakdown of social feelings in modern societies and the indifference with which people – and young people especially – view their own immorality, and the disorder and suffering that it causes. The search for the cause of anti-social behaviour has led in many directions, though the hypothesis that it is one result of the decline of religion gains some credibility from the fact that it is frequently cured by conversion to a disciplined faith. This has been made apparent in the US by the success of religious movements in overcoming socially destructive behaviour in the inner cities. Others attribute anti-social behaviour to the breakdown of the family, and in particular to the rise of the fatherless family, in which no model of discipline and stability is provided to the children. See *underclass.

antitrust

Originally US legislation designed to control large business groupings and to prevent the formation of uncompetitive markets through *monopolies (which were often known in the nineteenth century as *trusts on account of their legal status). Antitrust legislation is now adopted as a substantial part of

much European company law, as a result of EU legislation and policy. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act 1890 marked the first significant break with the practice of **laissez faire* in the US, and indicated the widespread admission that law can create and control the conditions of a market, and that it may be in the public interest for the state thereby to exert substantial indirect control over the economy. *See also* **oligopoly*.

apartheid

Afrikaans term meaning 'aparthood', and denoting the policy of racial segregation as practised by the National Party in South Africa between 1948 and the late 1980s. Officially it was a policy of 'separate but equal development'; it involved legislation controlling places of residence, schools, universities, and recreational facilities; as well as laws prohibiting mixed marriages, and controlling voluntary associations. The major intention was to allow political power only to the white population, and to deny to the remainder all rights that would be tantamount to political **access*, including the right to vote at an election. Blacks were confined to certain autonomous 'homelands', alleged to be their 'true' historical places of residence, leaving the remaining areas to be enjoyed by whites in untroubled sovereignty. The substantial difference between the natural assets and **infrastructure* of the two kinds of area was often noted; the historical justification were for the most part considered to be either lies or **myths*. The myths used to support the withholding of political rights from blacks had no application to the situation of the 'coloureds' who, having nothing where they were, suffered the additional grievance of having nowhere to go. (The coloureds are Afrikaans-speaking, and for the most part Calvinist people, descended

from Malaysians brought to the Cape Colony as slaves; the category also included others of mixed descent, including many who are indistinguishable in every observable respect from blacks or whites.)

apolitical

A stance is called apolitical if it does not have, as part of its main purpose, intentions regarding the political order: i.e. regarding the institutions through which power is exercised. Since all social change is likely to have some *effect* on those institutions, and may even cause a necessary revision in their structure, it is always possible to give a political interpretation of a stance that is apolitical. On some views every social act or gesture also has a political meaning, in the sense of intimating some measure of criticism or acceptance of established institutions, and some idea, however sketchy, of institutions that would bring it to fulfilment. On this view there may be no important differences between those acts that have a political *intention*, and those which merely have political consequences. Typically, practices that regard **opposition* as an unacceptable feature of government do not recognize the possibility of apolitical associations.

apologetics

Originally the branch of theology concerned with making religious doctrine acceptable to non-believers. All **doctrine* stands in need of apology, and it is one of the characteristics of modern political thought that substantial analogues of Christian apologetics have been associated with it. It is normal for apologetics to require 'sacred texts' that are both definitive (when rightly interpreted) and also open to interpretation (and so applicable even when apparently false). It then attempts to establish the public

apparat

possibility of beliefs associated with those texts. Thus French **gauchisme* of the 1960s and 1970s managed to make Marxism acceptable to the **consumer* society by rewriting it as a status-conferring intellectual **commodity*. Apologetics should be distinguished from **propaganda*, which seeks to make doctrine not acceptable but accepted. Propaganda always simplifies, where apologetics complicates and sophisticates, its subject.

apparat

The class of full-time servants of the Communist Party (the *apparatchiki*, those belonging to the apparatus), which evolved in the USSR as a distinctive feature of **Lenin's* 'party of the new type'. Professional communists with unquestioning loyalty to the party were sought throughout the USSR and its satellites as the core of the **civil* service, and the necessary means of achieving and maintaining government by the Communist Party. However, you could be an apparatchik without being a member of the party and increasingly, as time went on, the loyalty of the apparat was purchased by privileges, rather than recruited through belief.

apparatchik

See **apparat*.

appeasement

Used in the 1920s to denote policies aiming to remove by common agreement the grievances generated by the peace settlement of 1919 – especially the grievances felt in Germany. The policy of appeasement, systematically pursued in the UK, facilitated Hitler's accumulation of power in the 1930s and the USSR's accumulation of power after the Second World War. Appeasement involves concessions in response to explicit or implied threats; it acts to the detriment of a power

that does not threaten, and to the benefit of a state which makes **non-negotiable* demands.

appropriation

Taking something as property. The term has various technical usages, e.g., in law, the setting aside of property or money for a particular purpose (as in bankruptcy proceedings). It also denotes a state action authorizing expenditure of public funds to be made for stated purposes. In the US appropriations are authorizations to make expenditures from the general funds of the Treasury, or from the various special funds. In the UK, by the Appropriation Act, Parliament appropriates the supply which it grants to particular purposes. Both are in theory **legislative* acts, but whereas the US Congress has a relatively free hand in determining what appropriations shall be, the UK Parliament may only decrease or delete items. Thus, so long as the **cabinet* commands a majority in the House of Commons, and may make any appropriation vote a matter of confidence, it can determine the outcome. Hence appropriation in the UK has some of the character of an **executive* act. The legislative nature of appropriation in the US is illustrated by the distinction between the enabling act, which establishes policy and authorizes an executive agency to do things, and the appropriation which is necessary to provide money in support of it.

approximation of laws

The policy of states, subject to treaties of commercial intent, whereby laws governing or influencing commercial transactions are aligned, thus founding common expectations and facilitating trade across frontiers. The Treaty of Rome provides extensively for approximation, involving what some regard as an effective abrogation

of *sovereignty on the part of its signatories, since laws dealing with highly sensitive domestic issues – such as taxation and mobility of labour – are subject to amendment and *ratification under the terms of the treaty. *See also* *European Community, *European Union.

Aquinas, St Thomas (1226–74)

The greatest of medieval theologians, who attempted to synthesize the newly rediscovered philosophy of *Aristotle with the articles of Christian faith, and so generated an authoritative system of theological, moral, and political doctrine, known after its inventor as Thomism, which has served as the foundation for *Roman Catholic teaching. His political philosophy consists largely of an exposition and development of the theory of *natural law.

There are four kinds of law: eternal law, natural law, divine law, and human law (or *positive law). Eternal law is another name for God's conception of the ends of creation; natural law consists of the principles that rational beings will recognize and obey by nature – i.e. it is that part of the eternal law that is revealed to reason in its earthly condition. Divine law consists of God's commandments, as revealed in the scriptures, and human law (positive law) consists in the particular legal enactments that rational beings make for the good government of their institutions. Unlike the later thinkers who regarded positive law as filling in the gaps left by natural law, Aquinas often seems to argue as though natural law is sufficient in itself to generate all positive laws. If we conjoin it with the particular 'determinations' that characterize this or that social or political arrangement, then the natural law will generate the human laws which, in those circumstances, uniquely specify what

is just. Thus by the natural law, all property belongs to men in common, provided that no one has been induced to labour in anticipation of a right of ownership. Once such anticipations arise, however, and once the institutions are created through which they are expressed and transmitted, the natural law generates a human law of private property, which can be violated only at the cost of injustice. A positive law that is unjust is, by this standard, felt not to be binding, indeed, not to be a genuine law, so that tyrannical law is not so much law as the perversion of law.

Aquinas favoured limited *monarchy as the ideal form of government. He also repeated arguments, to be found in Aristotle and elsewhere, for the primacy of marriage and the *family in social order, and for the primacy of *offices in forming a political *constitution. Since there is a limit set by reason to the forms of legitimate political constitution, a constitution is legitimate only when each law is a 'dictate of reason in the ruler', in which case the proper effect of law is to lead the subject to his true *virtue. In the state 'each person is related to the entire community as the part to the whole', and the state is 'the perfect community'. This Aristotelian conception of the organic perfection of political order was taken to considerable lengths. Thus Aquinas was prepared to argue that 'the individual is to the perfect community as the imperfect to the perfect', thus foreshadowing *Hegel's view of the state, as in some sense the completion and fulfilment of man's earthly existence. However 'man is not ordained to the body politic in respect of all he is and has': i.e. there are limits to what a sovereign may legitimately require of his subjects. For example, all subjects have a right to resist government that has become severely oppressive. More

arbitrage

importantly, the state cannot claim authority in matters of religion, so that, within the limits of legitimacy, it is necessary that the division between church and state be upheld, the former possessing the authority of the eternal law, the latter the authority of man's local and particularized attempts to conform to it. The church can therefore stand in judgement over princes, but cannot legislate for them except in so far as they are disposed to transgress nature's commands.

Aquinas is noteworthy for his attempt to extend the concept of natural law into the sphere of international relations, first by discussing the answerability of all princes to divine authority, secondly by laying down rules of just dealing between states. For example, he attempted to define the nature of a *just war, insisting on the distinction between war entered into in a just cause, and war prosecuted according to innate principles of just dealing between enemies (*jus ad bellum*, and *jus in bello*). This distinction and its application underlie much of the intellectual structure of the modern law of war.

Aquinas also redefined and extended the theory of the *just price, and had much to say concerning property rights, favouring local production for use over international trade, and justifying slavery, provided it were merely a form of economic domination, and did not violate principles of natural justice. (His view here was in part an apology for Aristotle, in part the expression of the theory that some people could not flourish without being guided and even controlled by others.)

arbitrage

One of the forces bringing about equality of price between markets. If goods sell in one *market at a price lower than their price in another, then

'arbitraging' may occur: that is, goods may be bought in the first market and sold in the second. The effect of this is to raise the price in the first market and lower it in the second, so that the two tend towards equality. The key element in arbitrage is that the amount of profit be determined with certainty. Because arbitrage profits involve no risk, they are hard to obtain, and such profits as do exist are normally no more than a recompense for the detailed attention and time involved in seeking out the opportunity. If that were not so goods would automatically have found their way to the market where they could most profitably be sold.

arbitrary

The exercise of *power is called 'arbitrary' when no independent reason can be given for its exercise which has weight for anyone other than the person who wields it. A power applied according to a law is not arbitrary, although someone may wish to question whether the law which validates it has any independent *authority. (See *autocracy.)

arbitration

The submission of a dispute, whether commercial, industrial or international, to the decision of a person or body other than a court of competent jurisdiction. Arbitration is to be distinguished from *conciliation and from *mediation on account of its quasi-judicial nature, and on account of the fact that the award rendered in arbitration is, in substance, final. Arbitration may be voluntary or (as sometimes when a government intervenes in an industrial dispute) compulsory. In either case the terms of the final settlement will normally be enforced by any subsequent judicial proceeding, unless it can be shown that they were formally defective, e.g. on account of a

breach of *natural justice. Despite this, it is an unsettled question whether arbitration is itself a kind of *adjudication: there are similarities of form, and of result; but it seems that the courts can enquire into proceedings of arbitration and adjust the result in ways that are not normally available to a court of appeal.

In international relations arbitration is a much more obviously judicial procedure. It has been significant since classical times (as exemplified in the habit of small independent cities of submitting disputes to the senate in Rome). The precedent in modern international relations was set by the Jay Treaty between Britain and the US in 1794, allowing for arbitration by mixed commission. In 1899 The Hague conference erected at The Hague the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which has settled some 20 important issues. It is disputed whether arbitration by this court is the same as 'judicial settlement' by the International Court of Justice. Some argue that it is in effect the same, and that it is necessary to assert this if arbitration is to have the intended effect. The proposal to make arbitration obligatory was voted down at The Hague conference, but states may elect to make arbitration obligatory in dealings between them.

architecture

Described by *Ruskin (*The Seven Lamps of Architecture*, 1849) as the most political of the arts, and embroiled in political controversy throughout modern times. Being public, overt and semi-permanent, architecture exerts a certain dominion over the visual life of people; this enables it to translate political dogma into symbolic form, and to validate stylistic expression through the perceived association with political ideals. Neo-classicism – the stylistic affectation of a discipline and order intrinsic to the buildings of

Greece and Rome – has been the standard architecture of the political demagogue, being associated with the French Revolution, national socialism, fascism and Stalinism, and valued for its solemn logic, and for its representation of existing public institutions as timeless and changeless. (Though in America neo-classicism has retained another meaning, as the style of cities, so that every American shopping mall will have details lifted from the classical repertoire, as a way of suggesting an urban settlement rather than a temporary set of warehouses around a parking lot.)

By contrast, the gothic style was propagandized in the nineteenth century as the symbol of a civil society which neither required nor tolerated the decrees of an absolute ruling power, but which arose organically out of common expectations, common beliefs and a shared experience of labour. Socialist thinkers such as Viollet-le-Duc in France and *Morris in England thus advocated the gothic as the symbolic form of natural, classless labour, working outside the tyranny of private property and enforced public order. Ruskin, too, advocated the gothic style, though he valued it as the expression of a hierarchical and religious community, in which labour was sacred, and building an act of *piety.

The Modern movement of Le Corbusier, the Russian constructivists and the Bauhaus was influenced by neo-classical ideas, and also by vaguer political aspirations based on the desire totally to remake the human environment, in order to erase the images of luxury and decadence that characterized humanity's former incompetence.

In all such ideas the assumption is not just that architecture symbolizes a political expectation, but also that, by imposing itself on public perceptions, it helps to realize that expectation.

In modern times theories of a 'func-

Arendt

tionalist' kind have been influential. These may take two forms: first, that function is the primary requirement that a building must fulfil, and aesthetic standards are subordinate to it; secondly, that aesthetic standards are fulfilled simply *by* fulfilling function, perhaps in the most visually explicit way. The second view is certainly false; the first highly disputable. Some argue that such ideas have led to a decline in respect for aesthetic values among architects, and that, in the absence of that respect, the true function of a building can never be known. Aesthetic implications are present in every human endeavour, and attention to them is necessary if the final purpose is to be understood. On this view, architecture illustrates in most vivid form the intrinsic relation between aesthetic value and social and political action. (See *aesthetics* and *politics*.)

Widespread dissatisfaction with the buildings of architectural *modernism* has recently led to the emergence of *postmodernist* styles, which are more playful, more tolerant of ornamentation, and more in keeping with the classical layout of our cities. Some value these styles for their eclecticism, and for their supposed endorsement of the *postmodern* culture which gave rise to them. There has also been a powerful movement of reaction against modernist ideas of *planning*: see *New Urbanism*.

Arendt, Hannah (1906–75)

German-born philosopher, social critic and historian, whose *Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951) was the first major attempt to come to terms with a distinctive feature of modern politics, and to trace the causes of the greatest political catastrophe that humanity has ever suffered. The work emphasizes the role of nineteenth-century *nationalism* in feeding the *collectivist* aspirations of modern politicians, and has

been criticized for its insufficient emphasis on *Lenin* and the 'party of the new type' which he introduced, and which was to be the model followed by all subsequent totalitarian governments. But it remains influential, partly because of the breadth of learning, culture and observational powers that it displays.

Arendt's most important philosophical work is *The Human Condition* (1958), which offers a hierarchical vision of the active life, with the statesman at the top, the craftsman and artist as intermediaries, and the labourer at the bottom. The ascending hierarchy of labour, work and action implies that freedom and autonomy can be realized only in a fully political existence, in which a shared public life gives meaning to our private endeavours. This vision of politics is reminiscent of *Plato*, and was further expanded in *On Revolution* (1963) and *Between Past and Future* (1961, 1968).

In 1963 Arendt published *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, an account of the new form of evil introduced by bureaucratic forms of government, in which crime becomes a de-personalized routine, and people are reduced to things, and disposed of as things. The 'banality of evil' which we have seen in modern times is, for Arendt, a kind of consummation of evil, and the most terrifying lesson of modern politics. The book, which was also a commentary on the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem, caused great controversy, and led Arendt to consider the whole question of human freedom and responsibility, in her final work, *The Life of the Mind*, published posthumously in 1978. See also *essence/appearance*, *people*, *revolution*, *work*.

aristocracy

Greek: rule by the best. *Aristotle* contrasted aristocracy, in which virtue is the title to power, with *oligarchy*,

in which the title resides in wealth. Both are forms of 'rule by the few', but only in the former case is rule by the few in the interests of the many. Aristotle's concern was with an *ideal type; nevertheless it is normal to make a corresponding distinction among actual governments, between those where power belongs to a minority *class with hereditary privileges (aristocracy), and those where power belongs to a minority group or party, without hereditary restrictions on membership (oligarchy). In this sense, there are two kinds of aristocracy: that of some Greek city-states, and related arrangements, in which the *ruling class held power without the sanction of a *monarch; and that familiar in Europe, in which aristocratic entitlements have generally been conferred or confirmed by the sovereign. The second is the more familiar, and has three aspects:

1. The legal-political aspect. The dominant features have been (a) a ruling class identified first through the possession of land and secondly through rules of succession (usually by *kinship); (b) the consequent conferring of dignities and entitlements by the sovereign which confirms a given aristocrat and his successors in the political position acquired; (c) a title bestowed on the aristocrat, signifying that, just by virtue of being successor to the powers identified in (a) and (b) (however time may have depleted and exhausted them) he may hold office in government (e.g. he may take his place in a house of *peers, or become a member of the sovereign's privy council). The net result is the existence of a hereditary *establishment and hereditary entitlements to land, goods and offices. It has usually been possible for outsiders to gain access to the aristocracy, although *social mobility in this respect has varied from place to place and time to time.

2. The economic aspect. It is almost universally accepted that the above pattern of legal relations is associated with, and perhaps also explained by, economic relations. In Marxian theory, for example, 1. is the description of a legal and political *superstructure which expresses and is explained by relations of power, in particular, by the power of the person who controls land over the person who is forced to work on it. Hence this particular kind of aristocracy is seen as an expression of *feudal relations of production, surviving as a genuine concentration of influence only to the extent that landed property confers powers distinct from those conferred by movable goods (in particular, petty sovereignty over a segment of *territory). The Marxian explanation is often criticized, mostly because it fails to explain the persistence of European (and especially British) aristocracy after the abolition of feudal tenures. (*But see* *nobility.)

3. The social aspect. This is perhaps most vivid in the popular imagination, which identifies aristocracy with all hereditary privilege and the leisure, luxury and manners generic to it. Hence aristocracy comes to stand for an idea of 'breeding', which has sometimes served as a rationalization of hereditary entitlement. There are aristocratic virtues and vices, and these have a distinct character in imaginative and moral thinking, exemplified in the mysteries of title that made it necessary for Dracula to be a count.

The old sense of aristocracy as 'rule by the best' is sometimes attached to the arrangement described, perhaps on the ground that, given the necessary imperfection of all human beings and human arrangements, the best we can hope for is that a class should be bred with the habit of power, and rewarded with the dignities and privileges necessary to make it accept the

Aristotle

limitation of that power, and the responsibility of office. The main question is whether or not hereditary entitlement furthers rule in the interests of the many. (See **hereditary principle*.)

Aristotle (384–322 BC)

Greek philosopher and pupil of **Plato*, who gave, in his *Politics* and elsewhere, a renowned and subtle account of political institutions. Aristotle held that man is a rational animal and, as such, also a political animal: it is inevitable and right that he should seek to fulfil himself through living as part of a state (Greek: **polis*). Only in the perfect state can perfect human **virtue* be exercised, and each kind of state will have its own peculiar virtues and vices. Aristotle classified states according to two variables: who holds power? And: in whose interest is it exercised? There are three politically possible answers to the first question (one, some and all), two politically possible answers to the second (the holder of power, and everyone). The ideal is **aristocracy*: the state in which the best, who are inevitably few in number, exercise power in the interests of all. However, since that ideal is hard to achieve, and even harder to sustain, Aristotle advocated a form of mixed government, or 'polity', in which all citizens 'rule and are ruled by turn', and power is monopolized by no particular class. Aristotle was a vigorous critic both of **democracy*, and of the kind of collective **education* advocated by **Plato*. He defended the family as the nucleus of political organization, and argued for a connection between family and **household*, and therefore for the necessity of **private property*. He also argued that some men are naturally slaves in that they depend upon the will of others for their guiding force, so that the **division of labour* required in every state may be both natural and just.

Aristotle defined a citizen as anyone who can 'hold office', and his description of the ideal system of offices provides the foundation for many modern forms of **constitutionalism*. The power of individuals in government is both curtailed and guided through offices, which are in turn governed by law, so that, in the Aristotelian polity, laws are supreme, and the outcome of the concentration of power in offices is a **rule of law*. Moreover, government is given a character that endures from generation to generation, despite the successive changes in office holders, so that settled expectations begin to arise, and the bond between the rulers and the ruled becomes intelligible to both. In the context of his account of citizenship Aristotle raised in its modern form the question of **political obligation*. He argued that political obligation is founded in distributive **justice*, which is the principle that unites citizen to citizen and all to the state. Distributive justice involves 'treating equals equally'. This is possible only in the context of judicial procedure, together with the means to determine the individual rights and duties with respect to which citizens are to be compared. Aristotle favoured, as a source of such rights and duties, custom and customary law over the written statutes that can be made and remade by fiat of those in power. His defence of custom and his emphasis on the value of political stability are underpinned by a conception of the state as 'organic'. The whole, he argued, is 'prior to' its parts, which therefore depend upon it. In politics this means that the individual is incomplete until he takes part in political organization. When that organization is not merely political but also just, then the citizen may be not only complete, but also fulfilled.

armies

These take many forms. It is normal to distinguish the standing army (where an organization of armed men is kept permanently ready for war), the professional army (in which soldiers are regarded as committed to the army as to a *profession, usually with a long contract of service), the conscript army (in which citizens are 'called up', i.e. obliged to leave their occupations for some limited, or in war unlimited, period of 'military service'), and the *guerrilla army. The last fights without an overt structure of military institutions, and without subscribing to the conventions and laws of international war. It may not have a defined hierarchy of officers, it may not have uniforms, and it usually fights not openly but covertly, selecting targets so as to cause maximum damage with minimum *confrontation.

Countries with large standing armies and compulsory military service in effect subject all their citizens (or at least all their male citizens) to some years of military discipline, thus giving them a taste of the attitude to *authority and to social life that is characteristic of highly disciplined institutions with violent purposes. This was the *Spartan ideal of education, which is still adopted both as a means to an end, and also as an end in itself. The soldier acquires a distinct attitude towards officers and those holding them, towards discipline and social order, and towards actual, potential or imaginary 'enemies of the state' (or, in modern parlance, 'enemies of the people'). It is characteristic of tyranny to exploit that attitude. Conversely, the drafting into the army of men imbued with civilian values can radically change the ideology through which military institutions are guided.

Armed forces, being a symbol of national or imperial power, are among

the most important components of the state. The existence of strong external purposes, together with a discipline which attaches the soldier to them, makes it both necessary for an army to be subject to the sovereign power, and possible for it not to be. In times of civil strife and disorder an army will always take power, not because it wants to, but because power will attach to it for a longer time than power can attach to anything else. This thought was important in motivating *Trotsky's formation of the Red Army.

armistice

The suspension of fighting pending a definite peace settlement: the term refers either to an agreement between belligerents, or to the condition existing during the term of that agreement. Armistice must be distinguished from *capitulation and *surrender, in that it is essentially bilateral, with mutual concessions and mutual restrictions, and from a treaty of peace, in that it does not end the legal state of war. It is valid only when made by the highest authorities in belligerent states, and may be repudiated if made, e.g., by military commanders.

A war that ends without armistice (e.g. those against Germany and Japan in the Second World War) ends to the disadvantage of the vanquished, though not necessarily to the advantage of the victor.

arms control

Expression introduced in the 1950s by US strategists, to denote all the ways whereby one or more states may intentionally restrain the development, testing, deployment, and danger of armaments, with the aim of reducing the likelihood and the hazards of warfare. It covers disarmament, agreements for restraint (such as the SALT agreement between the US and the

Arnold

USSR and the 1968 non-proliferation treaty), and unilateral acts, such as the decision by the US and others in 1969 to suspend research into biological weapons and to destroy stocks of them. Some include under 'arms control' all attempts to 'neutralize' other states, i.e. to prohibit them from joining particular military alliances.

Arnold, Matthew (1822–88)

English poet, critic and social theorist, and foremost nineteenth-century advocate of *cultural conservatism. In *Culture and Anarchy*, 1869, Arnold defined *culture as 'a pursuit of our total perfection by means of getting to know, on all matters which most concern us, the best which has been thought and said in the world, and, through this knowledge, turning a stream of fresh and free thought upon our stock notions and habits'. Arnold argued that culture, and access to culture, were essential for the right direction of political power, and that, without them, there could be no true conception of the ends of human conduct, but only a mechanistic obsession with the means. He criticized many of the 'stock notions' of nineteenth-century *liberalism and *utilitarianism, both on account of their materialistic and rationalistic visions of human progress, and also on account of their *individualism. The concept of *freedom upon which so much liberal thought depends seemed to Arnold to be too abstract – 'a very good horse to ride, but to ride somewhere' – and to contain no serious reasons for opposing the state in its name. The state, he argued, is 'the representative acting-power of the nation', and therefore must have power to act both in the name of freedom, and in the name of order. Without it public life must always be diverted towards the interests of one

or other class (of which Arnold distinguished three, the 'barbarians' (aristocracy), the 'philistines' (middle class) and the 'populace' (working class)). When this happens, the result is anarchy; however, within each class there is a spirit opposed to anarchy, and dedicated to the common good and public order: this is the spirit that culture awakens, nourishes and refines. To achieve political order, therefore, the state must guarantee that the conditions for *humane education are as widely available as possible.

Arrow's theorem

A theorem in the theory of *social choice which demonstrates that it is impossible to design a 'constitution' that will generate complete and consistent rankings of alternative states of a society according to the preferences of its members, while satisfying certain further conditions. Due to the mathematical economist K.J. Arrow (b. 1925), this theorem is one of the most important theoretical results in welfare economics. The proof begins from the idea of a *social welfare function (interpreted as a set of rules for transforming the desires of individuals into concrete social choices). It then proceeds to lay down certain plausible-seeming conditions that such a function should satisfy – for example, that no member of the group should be allowed to dictate the outcome. It is shown that no such social welfare function can meet those conditions. Some economists have rejected one or more of Arrow's conditions, others have disputed their interpretation, or their applicability to politics, while others have accepted his result as showing the inherent impossibility of legislating on the basis of social choice. Others have read the result as indicating the need for a wider informational base for social

choices, going beyond Arrow's use of individual preferences without any interpersonal comparison of utilities.

art

1. There are three major views concerning the political significance of art: (i) that it is, can be, or ought to be an *expression* of political consciousness; (ii) that it is, can be, or ought to be an *agent* of political transformation; (iii) that it is, can be, or ought to be **autonomous* in a way that denies the possibility of a political meaning.

Advocates of the third view defend their position from the philosophical premise that art must be appreciated not as means but as end, so that the attempt to subordinate it to political aims and ideologies is an attempt to deny its nature. Theories and practices such as **socialist realism* and **fascist neo-classicism* exhibit the inevitable degeneration, vulgarity and bad taste that ensue upon the attempt to **politicize art*. According to R.G. Collingwood (*The Principles of Art*, 1938) this attempt turns art into magic, and so destroys it.

Defenders of the first view may well accept that art must be treated as end and not means, while suggesting that to appreciate an object as the expression of a state of consciousness is not necessarily to treat it as a means. It is hard to imagine art that does not gain at least some of its significance from its expressive power. And how can there be an expressive activity that is divorced entirely from social and political consciousness? (i) and (iii) may therefore be compatible.

It is characteristic of modern **totalitarianism* to believe some variant of (ii). Art has an overwhelming influence on the minds and opinions of the educated. Hence it has been regarded as an important political force, perhaps even as one of the ferments that create the 'subjective conditions'

of revolution (*see *cultural revolution, *Lenin*). The difficulty for that view lies in drawing the line between art and **propaganda*, and in doing justice to the extreme complexity of our responses to the first in comparison with the simplicity of our responses to the second. Conservatives and revolutionaries have alike found confirmation for their views in Shakespeare, and the great artistic rumination on the tyranny of **exchange-value* – Wagner's *Ring* – has always had as many admirers on the Right as on the Left, eliciting in both the sense that this work has, as Wagner put it, the 'ring of truth'.

2. Political constraint on art. Art brings about peculiar transformations of human consciousness. Attempts to diagnose the effect also lead to proposals to restrain it. **Plato* would have banned all art from his Republic – save only those forms of music that seemed suitable to moral development. Plato's recommendations have sometimes been followed – notably during the 'Cultural Revolution' in China. But it is more common to pay lip-service to artistic freedom, and to argue that political interference in artistic activity is unwise or impossible, except in so far as it falls under the idea of legitimate **censorship*.

3. Marxist theory of art. For classical Marxism art is part of **ideology* and therefore has the unspoken but discoverable function of consolidating the political **superstructure* out of which it is created. This explains why, e.g., modernist literature has so often concealed a highly conservative message (as in T.S. **Eliot's Four Quartets*, or in Joyce's covert vindication of bourgeois values in *Ulysses*). It is part of the **romantic* character of contemporary **neo-Marxism* that it accepts this view with reluctance, believing that art, because it must always revolutionize itself, cannot fail

Asiatic despotism

to be an agent of revolution. Hence the idea (see, e.g., Ernst Fischer: *Art Against Ideology*, 1955; Raymond Williams: *Marxism and Literature*, 1977) that art, or true art, is essentially 'anti-ideological', concerned not to consolidate the existing political structure but rather to give expression to a 'truth' beyond ideology, a truth that in some way subverts the complacencies of bourgeois society.

4. Decadence. Theories of artistic decadence have emphasized *sentimentality, *kitsch, and the coarsening of moral and spiritual values under the influence of mass communication. Conservatives like *Arnold and Eliot have joined Marxists like *Adorno and *Benjamin and liberals like Croce and Lionel Trilling in seeking for an explanation of decadence, and a discipline that will stand firm against it, so as to rescue art from the diseases of popular culture. These thinkers have in consequence had a powerful influence on political thinking in the twentieth century, as intellectuals have sought to come to terms with a democratic culture that most of them find hard to share and harder still to enjoy. Briefly influential too was the Nazi attack on *entartete Kunst*, the supposedly decadent art of the modernists – an art attacked equally by Stalin and his successors in the name of popular culture. In this way artistic decadence has been an important theme in modern political thought, with widely divergent views as to what is and what is not an instance of it.

Asiatic despotism

Probably synonymous with *oriental despotism. A name sometimes given to the various forms of *despotism exemplified in Asia, from the time of the Mongol invasions onwards, in which rigid institutions combined with close surveillance of all citizens, were used to uphold unstable and

therefore ruthlessly *autocratic power. The ruling class of bureaucrats was dominated by a sovereign whose powers depended mainly on the army, but also on the sanction of religious institutions, of which he was the nominal head. All insubordination was suppressed by terror, law was not respected, and decrees and institutions would be put aside as the sovereign required. This form of government was related by *Marx to *Asiatic modes of production, since the constant dissolution and refounding of the state and the unceasing changes of dynasty left the economic order untouched by the 'storm clouds in the political sky'. East European *anti-communists (e.g. *Milosz) sometimes describe the government that was imposed on the states of Eastern Europe by the communists as a form of Asiatic despotism.

Asiatic modes of production

Description often given of the self-sufficient communities of Central, Southern and Eastern Asia, in which village economy persists with minimum *division of labour, and in which production of food and other necessities ossifies around traditional forms, remaining resistant to innovation.

assimilation

The process whereby an immigrant community adopts the outward forms and political allegiance of a host community, without necessarily absorbing the majority culture or adopting the majority religion. (Cf. *acculturation.) Unassimilated minorities, which define their allegiance either in contrast to, or in opposition to, the allegiance of the majority, constitute a potential threat to social and political stability, as recent events have amply demonstrated. The received view in Europe is that assimilation is therefore

necessary if immigration is to be acceptable. Note, however, that anybody who said as much 20 or even ten years ago risked the charge of *racism. That peculiar fact needs an explanation; so far none has been provided.

association

The forming of a *society. A *state determines a *civil society, and within that civil society there are usually many subject associations. Lawyers, sociologists and philosophers have debated over the nature and variety of these associations, and the distinctions which they make are of the first importance in politics, in providing the models for various views of the state, and in upholding and criticizing conceptions of the role and importance of subordinate institutions. The following distinctions are particularly important:

(i) Voluntary and non-voluntary. A voluntary association (e.g. a club) is one that is constituted by the willing acceptance of its members. A non-voluntary association (e.g. a *family) exists and persists whether or not accepted. (Children may be unable to give consent, adults unable to withhold it.) In law, therefore, obligations attaching to voluntary association are contractual, whereas those of the family are not.

(ii) Purposeful and purposeless. Some associations (e.g. businesses, sports clubs) have specific purposes and expire when those purposes are fulfilled or removed. Others do not, and persist even in the absence of an identifiable aim. Among the second kind of association one must again include the family, together with certain clubs and societies of a purely conversational and friendly character. The point here is not that the family generates no purposes, or that family activities are without purpose, but

rather that there is no *external* purpose, nothing that some *other* association might have fulfilled just as well. What purposes there are have to be defined by reference to the family, and not vice versa. Some sociologists theorize the distinction here in terms of **Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. See also *friendship.

(iii) Incorporated and unincorporated. A legal distinction between an association that has formed itself (usually by 'articles of association') into a *corporate person, with liabilities, assets, rights, obligations and *agency of its own, and associations which have not made that transition, and in which responsibility and accountability still remain with the individual members. The law chooses to regard all unincorporated associations as based in a contractual relation between members, property being vested in trustees, and legal action effected through representatives. (See *further* *incorporation.)

(iv) Constituted and unconstituted. An association may have a *constitution directing its procedures, or it may vary in accordance with the wishes and conflicts of the day. A club exemplifies the first condition, a family the second. In the former case there is an analogy of *positive law, in the latter case there is only *natural law.

All those distinctions are different and none of them is simple. The complexity partly explains the difficulty of the question, What kind of association is a state? The state might, for example, be voluntary, purposeful, and unconstituted, as some *social contract theories suggest that it is or ought to be. Or it might be non-voluntary, purposeless and constituted, as some followers of *Hegel prefer to argue. In either case it may have some of the characteristics of an autonomous legal person. If we think of the state as irreducible to its members this might

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be because we think that there are associations which create new entities out of old ones, as a new legal person is created by a partnership. In which case some kinds of association may be 'ontologically creative'. But which kinds, and why? These questions are considered under various headings in this dictionary. (See *institution, *state.)

Many theorists of *absolutism (e.g. *Hobbes) are suspicious of large associations, on account of their ability to challenge the sovereign power. For related but different reasons *totalitarianism aims to bring all associations within the orbit of the state, so that they take their nature, constitution and purposes from the central power. The 'freedom of association' is therefore an important issue in modern politics, sometimes taken to concern a basic *freedom without which elementary *human rights cannot be respected. The issue is inextricably bound up with that of the *autonomous institution. Institutions are associations which have achieved an identity independent of their members, and which can therefore become active forces which change the purposes of their members. In order to deny institutional *autonomy, it is usually necessary to restrict the freedom of association. Many who disapprove of totalitarian government may nevertheless seek this restriction, in order to abolish, e.g., private education, or monopoly.

Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA)

A US-based coalition of lawyers, law professors and others, which describes itself as 'working to promote justice and fairness for injured persons', and which has actively resisted *tort reform in the US. ATLA's members include many who earn large fees from 'class actions', such as those involving

asbestos, in which people join together to file suits for compensation against firms chosen as much for their ability to pay as for any faulty behaviour. In view of the negative attitude towards this kind of legal action on the part of the US Republican Party it is not surprising that ATLA is a major funder of the Democratic Party in Congressional elections.

asylum

A place of refuge. States can grant asylum to citizens of foreign jurisdictions, which means to offer them protection from threats made by that jurisdiction by conferring a right of residence. The UN Convention on Refugees and Asylum of 1951 obliges its signatories to offer asylum to migrants who are fleeing from oppression in their homeland, under certain conditions. This Convention was signed at a time when there were few migrants in the world. It is currently invoked by tens of thousands of 'economic migrants' coming to Europe in search of a better life, since it offers a quick and legal route to a right of residence. The Convention enables dictators to export their opponents without earning the bad name that comes from killing them. And it has filled the cities of Europe with people who, while claiming asylum from their hosts, are also actively preparing **jihād* against them. Hence the UN Convention has come in for serious criticism as an example of the way in which transnational legislation can undermine the preconditions of stable national government.

asylum-seeker

An immigrant, legal or illegal, who is seeking to take advantage of the UN Convention (see *asylum) in order to claim residence in the country to which he has come.

Atatürk, Kemal (1880–1938)

Turkish military leader and statesman. See *Eastern question, Kemalism, Laicism.

atavism

1. The theory that ancestral types may appear as 'throwbacks' (based on a hypothesis of the geneticist Grygor Mendel, sometimes given as grounds for *racist ideology, and influential in nineteenth-century *criminology).

2. The tendency of primitive forms of consciousness to emerge (in various disguises) in the thoughts and actions of otherwise civilized beings, as when black skin is regarded as testimony to a 'black' character, or ownership of property is regarded as sufficient grounds for assault. The first case shows a survival of what Sir James Frazer calls 'contagious magic' (*The Golden Bough*, 1900), while the second shows a return to the ancient idea of 'hubris', according to which pride and power offend the gods and bring down judgement.

Athenian democracy

The form of government that existed periodically in Athens during the fifth and fourth centuries BC. All adult male citizens were able to vote in the assembly, where, in most cases, officials were chosen by lot, in boards of ten, one from each tribe. The chief administrative officials were the *archons* (ceremonial), the *strategoi* (military), and the *tanai* (treasurers); but there were others, and Athenian democracy is remarkable for its proliferation of offices and for the seriousness with which official duties were regarded. Three other features should be noted: the power of orators (such as Alcibiades and Demosthenes) who were able to sway opinion in the assembly, and had the kind of influence on political life that is today attributed only to the *media; the

absence of any independent political and economic status for women; the economic and political dependence of the state upon *slavery; and the *ostracism of prominent citizens, which served as a safety-valve for *envy. Slaves, not being citizens, had no vote. Nevertheless the Athenians were proud of their constitutional freedoms, and of the respect for the individual which allowed them to be, in the words attributed to Pericles by Thucydides, 'free and tolerant in our private lives, in public affairs obedient to the law'.

Aufhebung

See *dialectic.

Augustine, St (354–430)

Augustine of Hippo was a doctor of the church, and the first thinker to attempt a systematic Christian philosophy of society. He exerted a profound and lasting influence on all Christian thought and practice, invented confessional literature, and was a political thinker of considerable consequence. In the *City of God* he attempted to reply to the pagans who had attributed the fall of Rome in 410 to the abolition of heathen worship. Augustine set out the fundamental contrast between the law of this world and that of the heavenly city towards which all citizens should aspire. From this description of the 'Kingdom of God' he derived an ideal system of laws and offices, adapted to the temporal world. The state mediates, or ought to mediate, between the earthly realm of sin and disharmony and the heavenly realm of absolute righteousness. All institutions of the state are forms of dominion (sovereigns over subjects, owners over property, masters over slaves) and dominion, in so far as it is a form of order, is good, although it is an order conditioned by the relative unrighteousness of its participants.

Austin

The ideal order of property, for example, is that everyone should possess everything in common. Its actual order is determined by the need to subject property to the discipline of justice, in a world infected by the imperfections of avarice and greed. The state is necessary to this discipline, but not all states are equally acceptable. The ideal is rule of free men by free men through deliberation (which is the rule prescribed both by nature and by God); when that rule is displaced by masters whose authority is purely coercive, then natural order and divine law are simultaneously violated. The absolute righteousness of the City of God is an idea that corresponds to the ideal of justice given in Plato's *Republic* (by which Augustine was considerably influenced); it is also the ancestor of Christian theories of *natural law. The relation of the temporal city to the City of God is not a sequential relation. Augustine argues instead that the righteous already inhabit the City of God, and that it is present among us, as a noumenal reality to which we can reach out through our own moral and spiritual efforts.

Augustine attempted to discover principles of international dispute, and presented an interesting analysis of *peace, as containing three degrees: the peace of God (*see* *pax), the peace of the just, and the peace of the unjust (i.e. of those who would make war if they were not afraid of the consequences). He also gave a theory of history which attempted to reconcile God's *providence and foreknowledge with the metaphysical *freedom of human agency.

Augustinianism is the general name for the tradition of Christian politics inspired by the *City of God*, and in particular for the attempts to extract from Augustine a coherent doctrine and policy governing relations between *church and state.

Austin, John (1790–1859)

English legal philosopher. *See* *command, *jural relations, *law, *philosophic radicals, *positivism.

Austrian school

A school of economic thought originating in the work of Carl Menger (1840–1921), who developed the still widely influential *marginal utility theory of *value. His work was further developed by Friedrich von Wieser (1851–1926), Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk (1852–1914) and *Mises (1881–1973), and the tradition has continued into our own time, gaining renewed political influence in the thought of the philosopher-economist *Hayek, who has tried to combine the original empirical theory of value with philosophical considerations concerning freedom, the nature of the state, and the structure of markets, so as to provide an elaborate philosophical underpinning for modern liberal *capitalism. (*See also* *calculation debate, *capital.)

autarchy

Greek: self-government. Ambiguous term which may mean either absolute government (*see* *absolutism), or self-government (*see* *autonomy, political), or self-sufficiency (*see* *autarky).

autarky

Self-sufficiency; etymologically distinct from *autarchy. Now used primarily in an economic sense to denote the fact or the aim of national self-sufficiency in food, raw materials and production. The aim of autarky is part of the politics of *isolationism, and goes with resistance to *free trade, and to any form of economic or political dependence on other sovereign powers. It was defended as an essential part of national sovereignty by *Fichte.

authenticity

The ideal, associated with the *existentialist philosophies of *Sartre and

*Heidegger, according to which an individual must create himself in and through his own decisions. His freedom lies precisely in the fact that his identity is not (or need not be) determined by any arrangement external to himself. The 'inauthentic' individual is the one who abandons the responsibility to make himself what he really is and takes refuge in an external command, precept, role or moral code, wrongly imagined to be objectively binding, but in fact simply masking, without overcoming, the 'anxiety' of being (usually written 'Being'). Anxiety is confronted and overcome only in the choice that wills, not only the act, but the whole person implied in it. This ideal of authenticity, freed from its metaphysical overtones, often occurs as one of the postulates of modern *liberalism. It has been given a new lease of life by the Canadian political philosopher Charles Taylor who argues, in *Sources of the Self*, 1992, that the search for political order and the search for a freely constituted and responsible sense of self are, in the last analysis, one and the same.

authoritarian personality

Sometimes identified as a distinct human type (e.g. by *Adorno, in *The Authoritarian Personality*, 1948), and one which has made a substantial negative contribution to politics in modern times. The authoritarian personality is the one who introduces questions of authority into all areas of social life, and in particular into areas where they are inappropriate or unnecessary, with the result that nothing happens by willing cooperation or natural sympathy, but only by command and obedience. The martinet, the unbending father, the dictatorial schoolmaster, the bullying sergeant-major – life and literature abound in relevant examples, and there is no shortage of theories to

explain and criticize what may in fact be a natural and necessary human feature. Probably there is no more vivid example of the authoritarian personality in the field of artistic and musical criticism than that of Adorno himself.

authoritarianism

1. The advocacy of government based on an established system of *authority, rather than on explicit or *tacit consent. Authoritarians believe either that it is good that government should be ordered in this way, or at least that it is necessary. The sources of both beliefs are to be found in two common thoughts: first, that people need authority, and secondly that authority is not the outcome but rather the precondition of consent. More radical authoritarians may sometimes argue that there is no rational source of *political obligation, and hence there is a need to ensure stability against the advance of sceptical reflections; respect towards established institutions is thought to be at least necessary, if not sufficient, for this end.

2. The state of mind, and habits of action, associated with the *authoritarian personality.

authority

That feature of a person, role, office or government which authorizes (i.e. makes legitimate, either in reality or in appearance) the acts and commands exercised in his or its name. Authority attaching to a person, not as the holder of an office, but as the particular person that he or she is, is sometimes said to arise from *charisma. This suggestion derives from *Weber (*Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, 1922), who distinguished three kinds of authority: legal-rational (in which acts are authorized by normative rules), traditional (in which immemorial tradition confers legitimacy), and

autocracy

charismatic. This classification is made from a sociologist's point of view, and distinguishes not so much kinds of authority, as explanations of the *belief* in it.

In all cases authority must be distinguished from *power*, being a relation *de jure* and not necessarily *de facto*: authority is a right to act, rather than a power to act. It may be accompanied by power, and so upheld, or without power, and so ignored. One of the most important powers that uphold authority is the power of people's belief in it thus, in a sense, authority can create its own power, and this gives rise to a disposition to use the two terms as though they were synonymous.

From the philosophical point of view three questions must be distinguished: (i) what causes the belief that certain individuals, institutions etc. have authority? (ii) What, if anything, shows that belief to be true? (iii) What, if anything, shows that people ought to subscribe to it?

Questions (ii) and (iii) are not identical. Many who do not think that there is such a thing as authority, nevertheless think that we ought to preserve our belief in it, perhaps on grounds of utility, or public order. The following three observations relate severally to the three questions distinguished:

(i) The causes of the belief in authority are more varied than Weber's division suggests. *Habit* is one cause, *custom* another (both subsumed under *tradition* by Weber). It may even be that the rational perception of a genuine and objectively existing *right* of government is also the explanation of the belief in it. Or it may be, by contrast, that the best explanation is *functional*: i.e. the belief is held because it performs a function, say, in upholding an economic order, or in upholding the

individual's security within it. (See *ideology*.)

(ii) The grounds of the belief in authority are explored by theories of *political obligation*. Theories of *social contract* and *consent* argue that rights of action must be conferred on institutions, offices or persons by willing agreement of those subject to them, while theories of *prescriptive right* argue that, in appropriate circumstances, history alone is sufficient to confer legitimacy. About this question many remain wholly sceptical.

(iii) Some find the value of the belief to stem from its being a necessary condition of government, and hence of the security brought by government. Others argue that people need to believe in an external authority if their lives are to possess inner order, the moral life being impossible without the external symbols of its objectivity. (This second view was perhaps *Hegel's*.) Others, perhaps confusing authority with the power which it requires for its enactment, regard all authority as either valueless (because arbitrary) or deleterious (as an interference, or attempted interference, with *freedom*). It is often said – in particular by conservatives – that modern societies suffer from a deficit of authority, and that this is the true explanation of both *alienation* and *anomie*.

autocracy

Literally self-rule, used to mean rule by an agent who holds all power himself, and who exercises that power in an *arbitrary* manner. There may be a constitution and laws which *seem* to limit or guide his power, but in fact these can be revoked at will by the autocrat, and also disobeyed by him, there being no independent mechanism for enforcing them. Most theorists hold that true autocracy requires

the concentration of power in a *single* person, and not, for example, in a *party or *caucus. Although parties may rule in a manner that admits no limitation by law, their multiple agency serves partly to restrict their power.

The principal feature is that the ruler may affect each of his subjects at any time in any way that he pleases, and in a manner that admits of no redress. Autocracy should therefore be seen as the perversion of *absolutism, in which power is not only absolute but also arbitrary.

autonomy

Greek: living under one's own laws; hence self-government. The following are important political applications of the idea:

(i) Autonomy of the individual. This is captured by the doctrine that the *rational individual may, in the words of *Kant, 'will the maxim of his action as a law for himself'. It is held that rational beings (or *persons) do not merely respond to the promptings of appetite and desire, but also to self-imposed commands, and this is what distinguishes free action from subjection to the 'laws of nature'. Kant argued that a rational being not only may, but also must, be autonomous in this sense, and that he can be so only if his action is governed by a universal law. *Freedom thus becomes a kind of *obedience. Kant's discussion of autonomy underlies much political theory, both *liberal and anti-liberal, since it seems to generate an idea of freedom that is distinct from *licence. Moreover, it connects the freedom of the individual with a philosophy of the nature of the individual, and this philosophy, or some variant of it, has emerged in the present century as fundamental to some liberal conceptions of man. (See also *authenticity.)

(ii) Autonomy of the state. The autonomy of a state is partly a matter

of power (of whether it has the external and internal strength to make and enforce its own laws), and partly a matter of recognized *authority (whether it is regarded by other states as the *legitimate government in a particular *territory). The first is a matter of degree: clearly, the power of a *satellite country or a *protectorate to make its own laws is limited by the surveillance of a more powerful external influence, as the power of every state to enact laws is limited by the variable tolerance of its citizens. The second is absolute in international law, since it is tantamount to the legal idea of *sovereignty. Sovereignty is both the necessary and the sufficient condition for the legal existence of a state.

(iii) Regional autonomy. The idea of autonomy has recently been extended to discuss the politics of *devolution. By granting or recognizing a power to make laws to local bodies (e.g. councils, regional assemblies), a state confers or recognizes regional autonomy. All such grant or recognition is on sufferance, since a lawmaking power that cannot be overridden by the central government tends to produce a separate state (perhaps united by *federation) rather than a regional government. Hence complicated examples of regional autonomy often present an appearance of federation. Consider the states of the US, or the striking legal status of Scotland: such quasi-states are immensely difficult to describe. (See *devolution.)

(iv) Autonomy of *groups, and *minorities. Unlike regions, groups and minorities have no necessary claims to territory, hence they cannot be granted *jurisdiction over territory, even of a modified kind. However, it has been argued that religious organizations manifest a genuine law-making power that is independent

autonomy

both of territory and of the state (*see* *church and state); from the legal point of view, therefore, they are said to provide the only true examples of autonomy within a jurisdiction. (*See also* *millet system.)

(v) Autonomy of institutions. An institution may be called autonomous for any one of three reasons: (a) when it has the capacity to make its own statutes and byelaws; in this sense universities are usually autonomous; (b) when it is outside the direct control of some higher political body (such as a *party or government agency): in this sense universities are autonomous only to some extent and only in certain places and disciplines; (c) when it has its own peculiar or internal aims and purposes: i.e. when there is something that it does which could be done by no other institution. (All universities are autonomous in this sense, as are football teams and families.)

The maintenance of autonomous institutions of all three kinds, with their own traditions of thought, feeling and action, is often put forward as a central aim of some kinds of social *conservatism. The persistence of such institutions is regarded as guaranteeing a social and political continuity which is not enforced (but only subsumed) by the state. Thereby, it is hoped, two conservative ideals – *limited government and social continuity – which seem to be in conflict, might be reconciled. (For an important application of this view, *see* *Tocqueville.)

Specific demands for autonomy, in particular regional autonomy, will reflect the prevailing political tensions of an epoch. It is often argued that a measure of regional autonomy is always necessary when there are *separatist tendencies, since, without it, local feelings will take an overtly nationalist form.