

Contents

<i>Acknowledgements</i>	ix
<i>Glossary</i>	x
<i>Brief Chronology</i>	xi
Introduction	1
1 The Unionist Imagination	7
Unionism and nationalism	8
Unionism and tradition	12
Unionism and religion	13
Containment and change	19
2 The Identity of Loyalism	29
Paisleyism	29
Paramilitarism	39
3 Violence and Politics	54
Motivation and structure	54
The UVF	61
The UDA	64
Politicisation	68
4 The Peace Process Part 1: Early Stages and Key Players	74
Initial developments	74
Clergy	80
Chris Hudson: an intermediary	90
The Irish government	94
5 The Peace Process Part 2: Talks	112
Ceasefire	112
Exploratory dialogue	119
Ministerial dialogue	139
6 Towards the Good Friday Agreement	153
Multi-party talks	153
Final stage negotiations	161

7	After the Good Friday Agreement	180
	The decline of the UDP	180
	Omagh	188
	Feuds and intra-Loyalist violence	191
	The Loyalist Commission	200
8	The Media	206
	News and negotiations	207
	Media as conduit and platform	212
	Signalling and advancing positions	214
	Framing and interpretation	217
9	Recent Developments and the Way Ahead	224
	Political background	224
	Internal consultation and change in the UVF	227
	Internal consultation and change in the UDA	234
	Conclusion	246
	<i>Afterword</i>	251
	<i>Bibliography</i>	257
	<i>Index</i>	263

1

The Unionist Imagination

The Unionist experience in Northern Ireland appears to be shaped by both consistent and contradictory outlooks. Consistency is maintained by the desire to remain committed to the Union with Britain, while competing desires and interests influence contradictory reactions to political life and change (Cochrane 1997: 35). What appears noticeable in much of the literature which examines the nature of unionism is the complex interrelationship between varying religious, cultural and political perspectives, which inform difference and resist definitions that emphasise a generalised characterisation of political life (Coulter 1994).

On the subject of political identity, Aughey views unionism as concerned primarily with the role of the state and citizenship (1989: 19), where the rights of citizens are prioritised and where convictions about state values converge with debates about the Union, which is itself idealised through notions of individual liberty and citizenship (*ibid.*: 24). But, given that such concerns are expressed towards a Union that already exists and, because of that, are actual rather than aspirational, it is perhaps unsurprising that political positions towards the Union are routinely articulated around themes of preservation and defence, which are used to maintain pre-existing structures of political control and resist the potential decline of unionism through the threatening presence of Irish nationalism (*ibid.*: 202). By emphasising unionism as diverse and concerned principally with the rights and responsibilities of citizens in relation to state institutions and structures of power, Aughey appears to suggest that anxieties about the union are ostensibly matters of democratic principle, which cannot be realised through the rather monolithic nature of Irish nationalism and its seemingly homogenised approach to politics and society. However, Aughey also hints at a key problem when he mentions that unionism 'conveys little meaning beyond its own narrow confines, for its contradictions reveal it to be essentially self-serving and particular' (*ibid.*: 21), since it is the particularism of unionism which poses problems for the credibility of democratic argument and which displays a noticeable lack of consideration for those who operate outside its 'imagined community'.

Unionism and nationalism

Aughey's argument that unionism should not be seen as nationalism, but as a construct for identity which is concerned with citizenship and the state, is resisted by others such as McGarry and O'Leary, who view the Unionist outlook as a 'variation of British nationalism' (1995: 92). Cochrane expands this point further when he observes that concerns about the preservation of identity, religion, culture and history, which are so keenly asserted by unionism, are also shared by Nationalists (1997: 80), and that imaginations about the state tend to be closely linked with concepts of the nation (*ibid.*: 77). Moreover, since the protracted conflict between unionism and nationalism relies on oppositional concepts of national identity, where Nationalists want to be part of a united Ireland, while Unionists want to remain part of the United Kingdom (generally speaking), it is apparent that nationalistic perceptions are linked in that they inform and sustain notions of irreconcilable difference (Whyte 1990: 172). Just as Nationalists construct self-definition around histories and imaginations of Irish nationality, so Unionists seem to 'feel themselves of British nationality' (*ibid.*: 149), with each position reaffirmed and legitimised by the threat of the other. As O'Dowd notes, the distinction between Nationalists and Unionists is routinely articulated via two separate yet interrelating discourses, where 'Unionists speak the language of universal rights and citizenship while Nationalists are mired in the insular language of identity and self-determination' (1998: 81). Here, unionism constructs this discourse within constraints that 'operate with highly exclusivistic and traditional notions of national sovereignty' (*ibid.*: 89), where citizens are foremost sovereign subjects and where citizenship means adhering to national duty and responsibility (*ibid.*: 82). To indicate the centrality of the Nationalist outlook within loyalism, it is worth referring to east Belfast UDA leader 'Charlie's' comments, which are typical of many paramilitary figures interviewed for this book:

To me this conflict is not about religion, but nationality. The splits and divisions which I have encountered have always been about differences in attitude towards nationality and how it is perceived.

The expansive range of circumstances and conditions which are permeated by the influences of nationalism indicate its scope and elusiveness as an ideological construct. However, one of the more impressive attempts to grasp the rather slippery nature of nationalism is provided by Anderson, who views the nation as an 'imagined political community' (1983: 6), where those outside the community are perceived as a threat to integrative values and shared experience. Aughey's attempt to downplay the role of nationalism in Unionist thinking, on the one hand, neglects its associations with British nationality, and on the other hand, highlights how identity is shaped

by, and inextricably linked to, fears and anxieties about Irish nationalism. Indicating how these distinctions also sustain relations between the two traditions, O'Malley makes an important point when he notes how 'one of the anomalies of the conflict is the fact that the Northern Ireland question is to a large extent a tale of two minorities. Catholics see themselves as a minority in Northern Ireland, while Protestants see themselves as a minority in the whole of Ireland. They both look at things the same way; it is the things they look at that are different' (1997: 138). This difference is both preserved and conveyed by Catholics, who embody a culture which 'has developed into a clearly national consciousness' (Wallis et al. 1987: 301), and by Ulster Protestants, where identity is a mix of Ulster and Irish and where the Northern Ireland problem is seen as 'a conflict between a nationality on the one hand and a dominant ethnic group on the other' (ibid.). Conflict is supported by Catholic and Protestant categorisations where 'one is homogenous and the other mixed' (Whyte 1990: 163), but where both are 'operating within the same paradigm' (ibid.: 172).

That Protestants may tend to define themselves more in terms of what they are not (Wallis et al. 1987: 301) is no less powerful a force in shaping identity than those who confidently express what they are (exclusion and inclusion both being essential for the construction of identity and self-definition). Indeed, this distinction is imperative to the politics of division and the ideological separation of the two communities in Northern Ireland. In trying to emphasise the diverse and democratic nature of unionism by concentrating ostensibly on citizenship and the state, Aughey seems to put distance between unionism and nationalism by stressing a diversity and pluralism which, he suggests, nationalism lacks. However, by not recognising the nationalistic connotations of Unionist belief, he is also overlooking an important influence on the Unionist imagination. Significantly, one needs to recognise that unionism is bound by the same institutions and practices which help form 'a national identity constituted in opposition to Irish identity' (Todd 1988: 11) and acknowledge that there may be parallels between the different historical traditions in Northern Ireland, in terms of both territorial claims and stories about siege (Brown 1985: 8). Furthermore, the conflicts which exist between unionism and nationalism can be seen to derive from 'ideologies of communal assertion and defence' (Ruane and Todd 1996: 91), where for unionism, 'the contemporary language of British political identity, economic progress and liberal human rights' has been used to challenge the Nationalist position while entrenching Protestant claims and interests (ibid.: 88). As McGarry and O'Leary contend, addressing the interlocking interests of Unionists and Nationalists, 'conventional Unionist discourses mirror those of traditional Irish Nationalists. Each blames exogenous agents for the conflict. Unionists blame the Republic, Republicans Britain; both Unionists and Nationalists also blame their own patron-state for being insufficiently committed to their national cause. Just as Nationalists argue

that Unionists are really Irish and are manipulated into thinking themselves British, so Unionists argue that northern Catholics are really capable of being British, and are externally or educationally manipulated into thinking of themselves as the lost tribe of Erin' (1995: 137).

As Billig argues in his book *Banal Nationalism*, the ability of nationalism to shape social attitudes derives essentially from its power to manufacture and sustain differences between 'us' and 'others' (1995: 17). In relation to each, 'loyalty' and 'identification' are constructs which Billig believes are loaded with nationalistic tendencies and underpin the reproduction of ideologies and meanings that sustain common sense images of home and nationhood (ibid.: 16). It is a familiar occurrence, Billig suggests, for nationalism and its extremist implications to be used primarily in order to separate 'us' from 'them', where all imagined communities rely on such categorisations to a greater or lesser extent. The idea that unionism is not nationalistic but Irish nationalism is may be seen as a false differentiation, because as Billig observes, not only is nationalism 'simultaneously obvious and obscure' (ibid.: 14), but in established nation state-type societies, it 'is the endemic condition' (ibid.: 6).

A further complication arises if we think of nationalism not as a single entity, but as one which encompasses a range of influences which change in connection with differing vantage points (Mandle 2006: 36). We might wish to stress that a general view of nationalism needs to be weighed against the specific traits and characteristics of a more specifically focussed and individualistic form. Mandle argues that we can think about the construction of both such types if we use the concepts of 'particularistic nationalism' or 'generalized nationalism'. Particularistic nationalism 'is the thesis that one particular nation or people are specifically chosen and valuable from the moral point of view itself', while generalised nationalism 'says that each individual properly has a morally weighty attachment to his or her nation, whatever it happens to be. On this view, the moral point of view itself does not single out any particular nation for special treatment; rather, it authorises individuals to do so themselves, based on their own identification' (ibid.). Both these definitions may be usefully applied to understanding unionism and cater for fundamentalist as well as more pluralistic determinations of identity and self within the Unionist community. The extent of social solidarity among members of the imagined community clearly has room to shift and incorporate extreme as well as moderate positions, and indeed it is necessary to accommodate such differences in order to maintain the image of democratic freedom which helps distinguish community members as different from those of other less democratically inclined communities (ibid.: 37). Further, since individuals are typically absorbed into a 'national culture', by sharing the constitutive tastes and characteristics of that culture as well as expressing differences within consensual boundaries (ibid.: 38), Unionists can be seen to display Nationalist tendencies just as other imagined communities do.

There are other considerations we might also want to take into account when thinking about how nationalism functions. Firstly, as cultures and communities come into conflict with one another, individuals tend to cling to experiences of ethnicity and nationality in order to (re)define identity and a sense of self (Volkan 1985). In that instance, communities seek to reinforce common notions of territory, history, language and religion, the intensity of which fluctuates in relation to time, place and circumstances of threat (*ibid.*: 223). The shifts and movements of nationalistic expression at such moments also become necessarily adaptive in order to deal with the boundaries of communal life, which both enter a phase of flux and are subsequently reasserted in order to confront the dangers of change. In relation to loyalism, it is clear that this fear of change is a central factor in shaping ideological attachment to self and defining the Catholic threat (Todd 1994: 69). Intersections between ethnicity, religion and nationality influence the shape of both communal cohesion and ideological resistance to opposing communities (*ibid.*: 71). The exercise of nationalistic sentiment acts as a response to the perceived violation of communal existence and may be reawakened or recycled through the symbols of songs (Finlayson 1996), marches (Roshwald 2006: 111–20), murals, sport or commemorative occasions, as part of a process where concepts and images of belonging and nationhood are strengthened. Within loyalism, the historical tendency has been to defend communities rather than address class-based inequalities and segregation (Finlayson 1996: 109–10), and strive to maintain social integration and systematically facilitate that integration (Mason 1985: 411) by drawing from a combination of other influences (social, historical and cultural) and ideas that collectively help contribute to the politics of memory and group formations (*ibid.*: 416). Moreover, Protestant associations with Britain have historically not only provided the reason for defending Ulster, but shaped the conditions under which that defence takes place (*ibid.*: 418). And, systematic activities which have allowed for the reassertion of symbolic expression have functioned to influence both the patterns and preferences of communal formation, as well as provide boundaries within which movement and change take place (*ibid.*: 423).

Arguments which bring into question unionism's relationship with a nationalistic intent show a distinction with Irish nationalism which stresses ethnicity over concerns about nation (Bruce 1998). Unlike Catholicism in Northern Ireland, which may be seen as inextricably linked with nationalism (Wallis et al. 1987: 302), there is no homogenised sense of nationality within Ulster Protestantism, and it is this comparison which perhaps explains why, for some, unionism is seen to be lacking in nationalistic character and orientation (*ibid.*). Yet, it could also be argued that unionism should not be seen as less nationalistic than Irish nationalism because it exhibits a greater diversity of identity, since it is precisely this diversity which is used to recycle and maintain the values of nationalistic belief and emotion, and it is precisely this perceived diversity which is emphasised and

defended as part of the nationalistic discourse. Frankie Gallagher – a representative of the Ulster Political Research Group (UPRG), which is the political wing of the UDA – illustrated the potential for variation in identity by describing himself as an ‘Ulster-Nationalist’ before elaborating:

What you will find is that the majority of England see us as a bunch of Paddies, where we’re all seen as Irish. We also have a problem in Ireland where the majority of people think we’re all Irish as well, but that we haven’t come round to understanding that we are. They are two very problematic ways of thinking because we don’t see ourselves as Irish and we don’t see ourselves as English. We’re certainly not all Paddies. I see myself as British-Ulster.

Unionism and tradition

The belief that one is connected to both Britain and Ulster indicates that there are two traditions which impact on Unionist culture. For Todd, those traditions are Ulster Loyalist and Ulster British (1987). For the Ulster Loyalist, northern Irish Protestantism becomes a focal point for identity, with British influence a secondary consideration. Todd observes how this tradition ‘derives its intelligibility and power from the Evangelical fundamentalist tradition. Its core assumption is that the only alternative to Ulster Loyalist dominance is Ulster Loyalist defeat and humiliation’ (ibid.: 3) In contrast, for the Ulster British, it is Britain which becomes the centre of influence, with less significance attached to Northern Ireland. This position ‘shares many characteristics with liberal ideology but within a social and political context where it is constantly challenged by the realities of Loyalist sectarianism, the policies of the British state and Nationalist grievances and achievements’ (ibid.: 11). Here, Britain ‘is conceived not as a nation but as a sphere of influence which encompasses diversity within it’ (ibid.: 14). In separating the functions of the two traditions, Todd highlights how differences may be best summarised in terms of how each approaches the possibilities of change. Particularly resistant to any moderation, the Ulster Loyalist ideology is seen as ‘a self-contained, closed system’, where the ‘binary structure of thought – purity vs. corruption, domination vs. humiliation – does not allow for any gradual move towards compromise with or understanding of political opponents’ (ibid.: 20). In comparison, the Ulster British ideology also has problems with change and conceptualises ideas of the liberal in narrow and self-interested ways, but offers some scope for a critique of the Union and, potentially at least is more open towards transition (ibid.: 21).

The two traditions which Todd outlines demonstrate a joint approach to perspectives about the Union which McGarry and O’Leary prefer to theorise as *devolutionist* and *integrationist*. Devolutionists argue that ‘Northern Ireland must have extensive devolved self-government’ designed to act as a ‘bulwark

against British treachery', whereas integrationists believe that 'union is best maintained by legal, political, electoral and administrative integration of "the province" with the rest of the UK' (1995: 93). While integrationists want to promote British electoral practice and the idea of a pluralist democratic state which legally binds Northern Ireland into the Union, devolutionists prefer the idea of local majority control and tend to support the principle of devolved power to regions of the United Kingdom (ibid.: 94–5). The contrasting attitudes inherent to these positions may be discerned in relation to the Ulster Loyalist tradition (notably the DUP), where a propensity to declare a loyalty to the crown but less so to parliament exists alongside Ulster Protestants who see themselves in terms of 'no precise national identity' because of oscillations between Britishness and Irishness (ibid.: 112). The scope for (re)interpretation of identity, which these formulations offer, hints at the potential for other discourses of unionism to emerge, which become especially pronounced when changing political and social circumstances come into view. Then, other considerations of how unionism should react may emerge, opening the field of contestation to allow alternative articulations to take place. The development of the PUP and the UDP can be seen as a response to challenges posed by the peace process and introduced debates to the political/public sphere which were critical towards dominant unionism and its preoccupations with the Union, as well as standing in contrast to those obsessed with defending conventional aspects of national identity.

Unionism and religion

Along with the powerful influences of tradition and national identity, the values and meanings which influence and sustain Unionist identity have an interpretive basis that historically draws from the theological traditions of Presbyterianism and Protestantism, and more particularly from principles of order and control which have roots in Calvinism, which emphasises the individual's relationship with God. A system of theological principles developed by John Calvin, a leader of the Reformation from the mid-sixteenth century, Calvinism presents a moral framework for social order by way of dividing society into 'the elect', who are seen to represent God's will, and the 'non-elect', who are both inferior and a threat to the social order supervised by the elect. This order is a product of 'predestination' where social life is a manifestation of God's will, which must be maintained and defended. The idea of change therefore sits rather uneasily with those who strive to adopt a Calvinist approach to life. The relationship between the individual and God is at the centre of Calvinism, where, as Weber observed when addressing the linkage between Calvinism and individualism, the focus is on self-reliance and where the individual 'himself creates his own salvation' in order to achieve 'the systematic self-control which at every moment stands

before the inexorable alternative, chosen or damned' (1930, 2005 edition: 69). The moral certainty which supports this outlook poses obvious problems for compromise since this would mean a dilution of moral goodness and a negation of theological principle. While it is by no means the case that all those who consider themselves as Unionists adhere to such theological orthodoxy (indeed, it is important to recognise how Protestants have played a constructive and moderating role in the Northern Ireland problem (Gallagher and Worrall 1982; Taggart 2004; Power 2007)), Protestant and Presbyterian traditions nonetheless continue to exert influence on the Unionist imagination and reinforce a view of the world which is both introspective and exclusivist. Not surprisingly, efforts to modernise are invariably seen as 'threat or betrayal, performed either through ignorance or with malevolence' (Cash 1996: 139) and stand to violate the fixedness of belief which provides security and clarity.

Paradoxically however, the emphasis on individual conscience, which is particularly dominant among Conservative Protestants, means that interpretation of the orthodoxy is subject to contestation and schism. This disagreement is reflective of Protestantism's association with theological rather than institutional principles (unlike Catholicism), and its adherence to a set of beliefs which shift with individual interpretation, creating inevitable fissures and disputations in the process (McGrath 2007: 15). The certainty and authority of the Protestant tradition is underpinned by changing fears and concerns based on individual responsibility and judgement before God. Although more liberal Protestants are seen to favour reason over faith, Bruce argues that shifts in traditions are largely bound by interpretative differences over the Bible and the lessons of scripture (1985: 599). Constrained by the authority of God, Bruce believes that such contentions demonstrate the importance of 'free thinking', which is highly democratic, if also prone to schism. It is this schism, Bruce suggests, which allows for heterogeneous expression within the Protestant tradition and facilitates the articulation of difference. And it is this articulation of competing interpretations of the world which accounts for the rather contradictory nature of Protestantism and the problem of trying to provide any single or agreed definition of the tradition (Elliott 1985: 21). The sense of superiority which infuses Protestantism and Presbyterianism is underscored by a distrust for authority (*ibid.*: 4), which, more often than not, is seen as a threat to the purity of principle and theological obligation (*ibid.*: 20). Clearly, the certainties of such belief make it much harder to move those who are under its influence towards change and compromise. Even if the individualistic emphasis of Protestantism means that there is perpetual contestation about meaning and conviction, it seems that such discrepancies are bounded by the orthodoxies and expectations of the tradition, and that potential difference does not extend to an imaginative comprehension of the human condition beyond well-established parameters of acceptability (Brown 1985: 8).

The emphasis on individual conscience, which draws from the struggle over civil and religious freedom (Miller 1978), means that Presbyterianism prides itself on the idea of a radical nature. Stewart summarises the Presbyterian as 'happiest when he is being a radical. The austere doctrines of Calvinism, the simplicity of his worship, the democratic nature of his Church, the memory of the martyred Covenanters, and the Scottish refusal to yield or to dissemble – all these incline him to that difficult and cantankerous disposition which is characteristic of a certain kind of political radicalism. His natural instinct is to distrust the outward forms of civil government unless they are consonant with his religious principles. On the other hand, his situation and his history in a predominantly Catholic Ireland have bred in him attitudes which seem opposite to these, making him defensive, intolerant and uncritically loyal to traditions and institutions' (1977, 1989 ed: 83).

Stewart showed considerable foresight when, writing in the 1970s, he predicted that DUP leader Rev Dr Ian Paisley's support would grow as 'Ulster Protestants became more and more threatened, either by Catholic nationalism or the British Government' (ibid.: 100). In contrast to the English assumption that 'compromise is the answer to all disputes', Stewart maintains that 'Ulstermen believe the opposite' (ibid.: 101), where the rigidity and certainties displayed by the fundamentalism of those such as Paisley have historically reaffirmed a sense of security, through resisting compromise or moderation in political attitude (ibid.: 100). In relation to the conflict in Northern Ireland, this way of thinking means that the struggle for political control and authority has been aligned with the 'moral and spiritual battle' of religious belief, where 'in the face of violence and chaos, people are driven back to the comfort and knowledge of righteousness and order' and where 'traditional religion offers both immediate comfort and the hope of triumph' (Morrow 1997: 56).

The ability of Protestant fundamentalism to connect with fear of change and a 'siege mentality' derives from 'its ferocious attachment to the division into sinned against and sinning' (ibid.: 58), and its 'relative durability and reliability as myth sustaining the fundamental division between good and bad' (ibid.: 62). During moments of perceived threat, this more extreme version of Protestant belief becomes the reference point for defiance and throws into relief the symbolism of identity which it aspires to protect and preserve. Moral assurance thus operates as a key component within the emotive power such a position exerts (ibid.: 70). To enter into a process of change ostensibly contributes to a weakening of the fundamentalist position and the admission that the idea of righteousness is not as it seemed. What could be achieved from negotiation with others which will advantage this position? Indeed, to be part of such an interaction can only be disadvantageous and destabilising for the rigid certainties of belief. Only concession and a relaxation of the purity principle can occur here. To negotiate on what is seen as absolute is a contradiction in terms, and it is precisely this

tension which sustains the Protestant fundamentalist resistance to interaction with those outside the tradition. This is why throughout the duration of the Northern Ireland 'Troubles' the question of negotiation has tended to be an anathema for the more extreme religious elements of Protestant unionism, and why this community has shown a propensity to obstruct dialogue even when compromise offers the best chance of a positive social outcome (Dunlop 1995: 101).

Although it is important to point out that Presbyterian beliefs are not held within the wider Unionist population with equal conviction, it would still be fair to say that such beliefs continue to exert influence over popular perceptions of civic values (Dunlop 1995: 12). Moreover, there are certain characteristics which are seen to be indicative of the Presbyterian which shape dealings with others and relate to such values. For Dunlop, the Presbyterian defence of individual freedoms and responsibilities (*ibid.*: 12) tends to produce a certainty about such ideals which correspondingly inspires a lack of tolerance towards difference, or dealing with those not of 'the people'. As Dunlop observes here, 'Presbyterian language does not have too many layers to it; it does not possess too much flexibility. Presbyterians may not be very good negotiators. Their opening statements tend to contain an analysis of the situation along with the bottom line. There is no movement either contemplated or even possible, unless you can convince them that their analysis is wrong. If you can't convince them of that, the bottom line will not move, on principle' (*ibid.*: 101). At the fundamentalist level of religious belief, this has led to a 'political and philosophical rigidity within radical unionism where politics is seen as a struggle to maintain socio-cultural hegemony and liberty', where 'the way to achieve political success is seen in terms of what worked in the past' (Cochrane 1997: 40). There is little room for modification or reflexivity in such an imagination.

One cannot talk of the religious influences on loyalism in Ulster without referring to the fundamentalist Presbyterianism as practiced by the Rev Dr Ian Paisley and his party the DUP, since this party traditionally epitomises the importance of politico-religious ideology within Ulster politics (Smyth 1986). For Bruce, to understand the appeal of Paisley (which will be examined in greater detail in chapter 2) one needs to look at the role of Evangelicalism within Ulster unionism (1986: 249), for it is here one finds 'the core beliefs, values and symbols of what it means to be a Protestant' (*ibid.*: 264) which mark out the distinct and evidently incompatible differences between Protestant and Catholic. It is here too, as Mitchel notes, that one tends to find 'in essence an ethnic, particularist ideology, defined in negative terms and practising exclusion through a combination of means' (2003: 99). These means are supported through intersecting fundamentalist and nationalistic emphases which demand clear separation from opponents by exaggerating the need to respond to the call of defending Ulster (*ibid.*: 204).

A consequence of this calling is the exclusion of those who are seen to betray the Ulster cause by not responding to the sense of 'belonging, uniqueness and emotional commitment' under threat, or by disputing the isolation and exclusivity which such a response requires (ibid.: 206). This particularism logically resists the tendency towards positive interaction with others and, as Mitchel contends, works to maintain 'an insecure identity that needs enemies, fears and conspiracies to sustain its dynamism'. Because of this, Mitchel continues, 'It belongs outside the establishment in that it is inherently incapable of dialogue or compromise – the language of democratic politics' (ibid.: 210).

The emotive power of such extreme religious belief enables it to exert considerable influence over moral values and identity (Mitchell 2006). This sense of projected moral correctness and the obligations of the self which derive from that sense, invariably draw from 'the capacity of biblical discourse', which provides the interpretative framework to 'evaluate political conflict as good versus evil' (ibid.: 96) and perpetuates the narratives and myths which surround notions of righteousness. In order to maintain clear demarcations which insulate the imagined community, it is necessary to develop and perpetuate stereotypes. As Mitchell points out,

Truth versus deceit, honesty versus hypocrisy, clarity versus hidden agendas: these ideas form part of the cultural vocabulary of many Protestants in Northern Ireland today. They are pronounced amongst Protestants with strong theological beliefs, but they also exist amongst many non-churchgoing Protestants, especially those who have been raised in religious families. The constructions of the differences between Protestants and Catholics generalize and simplify; however, they are effective in reproducing class stereotypes of straightforwardness versus sneakiness. They also provide moral evaluations of the communal boundary' (ibid.: 103).

Mitchell goes on to explain that 'religious ideology often sets the boundaries within which politics operates' and that the potency of such belief tends to rise and fall with changing political circumstances, when the possibility of threat or loss is more or less evident (ibid.: 115). She refers, for example, to where Protestants' feelings about loss after the Good Friday Agreement, coincided with a rise in anti-Catholic feeling, and when Sinn Fein failed to make expected moves on decommissioning, so feelings about Catholic dishonesty also increased. In comparison, as conditions are seen to improve for Catholics, so perceptions of victimhood become less prominent within that tradition (ibid.). In explaining key differences between the Protestant and Catholic outlook, Mitchell identifies how oppositions are constructed and carried through concepts of 'communalism versus individualism'. For Protestants, it is ideas about liberty and individualism which have political resonance, whereas for Catholics it is ideas about the community which

have particular salience. It is because of these differences, Mitchell contends, that Protestants and Catholics have 'different understandings and expectations of certain political policies and processes' (ibid.: 139). Elaborating further on how approaches to politics are shot through with historical and religious meaning, Mitchell observes how

the insecurity of Protestant settlement was imbued with religious notions of siege and contractual loyalty. Many Catholics gave meaning to social and economic consequences of invasion through religious ideals of suffering and victimhood. The role of the Catholic Church was enhanced by experiences of struggle as a faith community, as it built alternative social structures to British and Protestant power, and provided resources for identification ... In this context, Protestant fears of going under politically as a community were infused with religious ideas of freedom and individualism versus a seemingly authoritarian Catholicism (ibid.: 139).

It is because Protestants draw from 'religiously informed concepts and ideas, rather than separate religious practices', that the self takes on particular importance in the processes of identification and belonging (ibid.: 135), unlike Catholicism, which views church and communal responsibilities as the foundation of social stability and belonging. The idea of community obligation within Protestantism is constructed through the individual and the preservation of freedoms through an adherence to individual responsibilities. Thus whereas for Protestants the individual provides the focus for ideas about the community, for Catholics it is the community which provides the focus for ideas about the individual. Because of the potency of these differences in relation to social life, it is not surprising that the imaginations which they create have also been constitutive of political separation both in attitude and reason.

One of the dilemmas which arise in relation to this mix of political and religious belief is that if certainty is at the centre of faith, and political change indicates uncertainty, then faith becomes problematised when confronted by shifts in political circumstances. For dedicated Evangelicals (those most dedicated to the fundamentalist expression of Protestant faith) and those who adhere strongly to the more extreme aspects of Protestantism, this brings about confusion which all too often turns into a negation of self and security (Jordan 2001: 140). The tendency at such moments is to turn away from the process of change and return to the predictable security of isolation (ibid.: 172). Moreover, this outlook extends beyond the convictions of those who practice fundamentalist Protestantism or adhere to the restraints of the Evangelical tradition (a tradition which relies on a strong historical link to the Reformation, authority of the scriptures, the cross and resurrection, direct individual encounter with God, conducting belief through the details and routines of daily life and communication of the gospel (ibid.: 19)), by providing the historical backdrop which has historically defined Ulster

unionism, functioning to exclude or hinder tolerance for alternative outlooks and maximising difference in relation to opposing traditions (Bruce 1998: 73).

Containment and change

It is therefore a regular feature of Unionist discourse to equate religious faith with cultural identity and to view the potential erosion of political influence as a threat to religious belief and values (Cochrane 1997: 67). The resulting effect of this mix is invariably one of negativity towards moderation and a tendency to conceptualise any such development in terms of loss, weakness and a violation of the Unionist cause. A fixation with identity differences also means that even community-based projects can be looked upon suspiciously, as evidence of Republican sabotage. As Billy Hutchinson, former PUP politician (now community worker) who represented the paramilitary UVF in the peace talks, put it, when explaining the linkage between religious and political perception:

I would make a distinction between the conflict here being a religious problem and where people's religious beliefs and background impact on conflict attitudes. One of the problems with Protestant communities is that they are very individualistic and that's something that goes back to the Reformation. They practice religion as a very private and individual activity, unlike Catholicism, which is more communal. This also creates problems for trying to involve people in community work and community development, because it's seen as communism and they equate that with republicanism. Protestants think very individualistically and they don't forgive easily; they don't have this sense of confessionals as Catholics do. For Protestants, the thinking is very much that nobody but God will forgive you. There is also a tendency to have two birthdays; the day you were born and the day you gave yourself over to Jesus and became born again. It's then that you are no longer a sinner. Even for those who don't go to church or follow devoutly, there is a strong sense of attitude which comes from religion. The religious connotations of the old testament are about thinking in absolute terms. For Protestants, the influence is that nothing is a grey area and everything is black or white, it's either yes or no, with us or against us, I'll believe it when I see it, that kind of thing.

For PUP colleague David Ervine, this kind of thinking is illustrative of a general negativity in the Unionist imagination which impacts badly on confidence within communities and which obstructs movement towards progressive political positions:

People are very much tribal and if you step outside of that tribe you are labelled a traitor. But the perception that whatever is happening can only be bad news for Unionists is always there. Everyday I hear people saying

that if it's good for them then it must be bad for us. There is a mindset in the Unionist community that if all the bad people would go away this would be a wonderful place. But that also helps with the process of denial and keeping morality in place. It is evident that if there were such a thing as a single overarching morality, there would have been no conflict here in the first place. All Protestants are clairvoyants and it's never good news and because of our experience of the malaise of the troubled mind we seem incapable. There are considerable contradictions with the way we see the world. We call the British government 'betrayers' and then demand that those betrayers look after our interests and the reason for this is because we see ourselves as too moral to deal with bad people. We let the Brits deal with the bad people and it gives us a get out clause because we can then always claim it wasn't us, but the evil betraying government that did it. We want to stand back and say we didn't do it. The celebration of individualism within Presbyterianism is an important reason for why we seem to have more leaders than followers but it also marks us out as people. I remember as a kid shouting 'We are the people' and I had no idea that somebody else wasn't. The deviance we expected or wanted of the 'enemy' was a reaffirmation of the things we were taught. Being told, for example, 'You can't trust them, they're a fifth column, they're devious, the priests sleep with the nuns', these were the stories we were told; always about denegration.

Gary McMichael, who was a representative for the now-defunct UDP which represented the Loyalist paramilitary UDA in talks which led to the Good Friday Agreement, conveyed a similarly critical response in his evaluation of unionism and politics:

The whole demeanour of Unionist politics over the last 30 years has been not about how we achieve X, Y and Z, but how we seek to resist losing X, Y and Z, or at least minimise the threat. It's a very negative ideology in that respect. The paranoia is partly to do with a lack of conviction and there's nothing to work towards. We're continually looking back at something and are unable to unify. The nature of Protestantism is to continue breaking down into smaller factions and in trying to find ways of how different we are to each other. Unionism certainly has a mentality that it can never win, so it's about trying to minimise the damage. It's a very negative view where the glass is almost empty as opposed to even half empty. Even those who support agreements see them in terms to trying to stop the rot. You can never move forward but you can control how much you move back. Within unionism any sign of moving forward or compromise is seen as negative and weak. It's win or lose, where loss is somebody else's gain. In a time of crisis, most will automatically follow Paisley's rhetoric because it very much provides them with the protection

that they need. There's no reaching out and no accommodation. It's easier to put people back in their trenches when they feel under threat. Calming voices and moderation are generally seen as a weakness.

To a large extent, this perspective was also shared by McMichael's UDP colleague David Adams, who in outlining the limitations and problems of unionism argued:

We talk of unionism as if it's this homogenous block of people, but it really isn't. Unionism isn't an actual political philosophy at all; it's just about a constitutional choice. It's not a political philosophy in the same way republicanism, or socialism, or liberalism, or conservatism is. There is a real problem with the idea of change which is self-defeating and to a large extent it's self-imposed. We are encouraged to act like losers, so it's no surprise that outcomes are seen in that way. You have political leaders who present every victory as a defeat, telling you that you are being hard done by, accentuating the negative whilst ignoring the positive. This creates nihilism and erodes confidence. Whilst this wins votes for Paisley it does nothing for the wider society. Unionism needs to stop acting like the football chant 'Everybody hates us and we don't care'. There is certainly a maxim that if it's good for them, then it must be bad for us. Whilst Republicans have successfully worked to sell defeat as victory, unionism does the opposite. There's also a continual jockeying for power within unionism which reinforces its fragmented nature. There is always a clash on issues and this relates to the centrality of individualism within the Protestant tradition. There is a deeply held belief about making up your own mind and voicing your own opinion. On the one hand, the ability to disagree and not follow the crowd is a democratic positive, but continual disagreement makes it impossible to move forward and undermines confidence in the community. It seems that constitutional preference is the only commonality between all the different strands of unionism.

Unionism's tendency to fragment is augmented when confronted by the prospect of political change, when intransigence and disagreement become familiar responses (Cochrane 1997: 35). Under these circumstances, traditional positions and imaginations often become intensified, making the potential for any kind of collective response highly unlikely (*ibid.*: 83). Yet, although the peace process in Northern Ireland and the challenges it poses have brought into relief disagreements within unionism, reflecting the tensions and fragmentations around the problem of how to respond and what to resist, we should remember that through the emergence of Loyalist politics and the more imaginative approach of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) under David Trimble's leadership, there has also existed a

willingness to seriously engage with the idea of change and even to promote it. The development of this pragmatic approach reveals the start of a progressive unionism which stands in contrast to the conventional posturing of resistance which has served to effectively segregate unionism into 'yes' and 'no' camps in relation to the problem of change. Indeed, the development of the peace process has created a situation where unionism has been forced into deciding whether to support those intent on preserving expressions of Protestant Britishness, or work towards a deal with those traditionally seen as enemies (Tonge 2005: 65). The issues raised by this transformation invite two distinct categorisations within unionism which Tonge calls 'rational civics' (those willing to do a deal which recognises Irish involvement in Northern Ireland) and 'orange sceptics' (those resistant to any diminution of Britishness) (*ibid.*). And what has become increasingly evident as the peace process has progressed is that although the latter of these two categories has conventionally dominated Unionist approaches to change in Northern Ireland (particularly with the DUP), it is now the former category which is gaining currency and presenting challenges to the Unionist imagination.

The sense of negativity which pervades the Unionist imagination can be witnessed across the range of political representations in Northern Ireland. As stated, the uncertainties which pervade this thinking derive from a desire to preserve symbols and expressions of identity while promoting fears and anxieties about the constant and growing threat to both. What is apparent, even among politicians of mainstream Unionist parties, is the sense of insularity which is reinforced by the weight of religious influence and its projected values. One representative of the UUP described the Unionist worldview as based on a simplistic 'if you are not with us, you must be against us' outlook (Spencer 2006a: 52). For another UUP respondent, this belief draws heavily from the assumption that 'if God be for us who can be against us?' (*ibid.*: 53). Elaborating further, the respondent continued, 'There's a verse in the Bible which says "Come out from amongst them and be ye separate" and Protestants have taken that to extremes. I represent the Shankill in Belfast and there are about 24,000 people there, but there are something like 27 different congregations. That's 27 brands of Protestantism on the Shankill struggling for recognition. That's the paradox of unionism, together yet divided' (*ibid.*). Such division is further underscored by a distrust of all those who are seen as outside the imagined community and who exert a threat to identity and its preservation (*ibid.*: 53–4). Not surprisingly, this leads to a fear of interference from those with alternative political objectives and creates a situation where obstruction to reform becomes adopted as a central component of political strategy (*ibid.*: 58).

Problematically, the individualism which is espoused as integral to the Unionist psychology operates within narrow limits of acceptability which

are defined by the conventions and characteristics of what it means to be a Unionist. As David Adams explained this process of definition:

Individualism is both a strength and a weakness. It's very hard to get a collective or agreed position, but the flipside of that is that the parameters for disagreement are very narrow because when anyone speaks outside the consensus they are traitors or naïve fools. This contradicts the notion of civic Protestantism where there should be as many disparate voices as possible. The tendency towards individualism doesn't allow an agreed Unionist position to be adopted. Of course, there are a range of individual approaches to a range of issues, but they broadly operate within a consensus about the Union and nobody is allowed to stray very far from that. At the same time, this consensus makes sure that Catholics are not going to be attracted to it. It also sets up a position where if somebody differs from you politically, then they are also likely to be an enemy of your religion as well. The obvious problem here is if you believe you stand for the unadulterated truth then you are not going to move from that position. Compromise is a dirty word. It's seen as moving from the truth. It's a prime example of the indivisibility of religion and politics and it's the centre of hardline support. On the one hand, the Unionist community is very democratic in that there is always room for the voices that are opposed and who are moving to the right, but, there is very little room for the moderate voice, which tends to get stymied. If you are preaching a harder message, you will always find an audience and an acceptance. If you are preaching a progressively softer line, you are an outsider. It's a very specific part of unionism and it's always been there.

Paradoxically, the certainties of the Unionist imagination are held against a growing sense of marginalisation and alienation, and contained by a dominant perception that 'within Northern Ireland, the social and constitutional bulwarks and defences for Protestants are being steadily and persistently eroded' (Dunn and Morgan 1994: 20). This disaffection, for some, is reflective of deeper anxieties around identity which invariably keep the Protestant/Unionist community in a perpetual state of uncertainty and disquiet. For Bowyer Bell, this unease creates a situation where

The Protestants of Ulster, residents of an imagined British Ulster, united in not being Catholics, fearful that they will be melded into the national majority, are still not sure of their identity but only their distastes. Being Protestant is crucial but somehow not enough. What more is there that makes them them? They know not so much themselves as their perceived enemy and their unifying religious commitment. Yet, if they do not know exactly who they are, they know all too well what they do not want to be. (1996: 115)

Others, such as Finlay, go further than this and suggest that the defeatism which permeates the Unionist community is indicative of a lack of identity: 'contemporary Protestant defeatism is less a product of a pre-existing identity than symptomatic of the absence of a northern Protestant cultural identity and, perhaps, of an ongoing attempt to get one' (2001: 4). His reasoning for this is that identity within Protestantism lacks collectivity, and although there may be the potential for such an identity to emerge, it is hindered by the hegemonic identity politics of sectarian division and fragmentation.

But, from another perspective, these fragmentations may be seen as politically strategic and not inherent to meanings which shape Unionist identity. The divisions within unionism, Tonge argues, should not be read as a crisis of identity, but require us to recognise the need to separate 'national identity' from 'political strategy' (2005: 63). In contrast to Bowyer Bell and Finlay, Tonge insists that Unionists do not suffer confusion about identity because 'they know who they are and where they want to be. What concerns Unionists is where they are being taken, however groundless the concern' (*ibid.*: 64). Whereas for Bowyer Bell and Finlay, Unionists are seen to suffer from an identity crisis, Tonge views this identity as somewhat assured, until confronted with the problem of political change and how to handle it. The fragmentations of unionism therefore *are* its identity and should not be taken as evidence of its absence. Fragmentation is the predictable mode of reaction when unionism is confronted by change, with each party attempting to assert its own determination to defend the Union. Invariably, such change presents an opportunity for unionism to not only resist its opponents, but other Unionists, who also struggle to assert their status as defenders of Ulster. It should be no surprise then that the development of the peace process in Northern Ireland has resulted in growing fragmentations and ruptures in the 'existing social order', which has 'brought about a political ideological and discursive crisis within unionism' (McAuley 2003: 69).

But, what is particularly relevant here is that the perceptible dislocation of unionism from traditional security and dominance has also created a space for new articulations about what unionism should do in response to the challenges posed by the shifting political environment. Significantly, the introduction of new voices which critically and constructively engaged with the dilemmas brought about by the peace process has highlighted that unionism at certain moments is not merely a static political monolith, but a 'social movement constantly subject to processes of redefinition and renegotiation' (McAuley 1999: 106). As an example of this, the emergence of the PUP and the UDP might be seen both as evidence of creating a 'context of negotiating the ideological terms within which contemporary unionism seeks to re-express and redefine ideas of a British identity' (*ibid.*: 112), and as offering a progressive politics which promoted the need for addressing concerns of working-class unionism, which had previously been absent.

Of particular interest here is the emergence of pluralistic approaches to the constitutional question and the problem of Unionist receptiveness beyond predictable cultural and liberal expressions, towards civic transformation. A key text which addresses this problem is Porter's *Rethinking Unionism* (1996), which looks at Unionist preoccupation with cultural and liberal thinking (defined by Porter as the cultural emphasis and the liberal emphasis) as an obstruction for dealing with the political realities created by the peace process. For Porter, unionism needs to embrace the concept of civic responsibility in order to play a positive role in the process of political change and realise that obsession with preserving cultural and liberal traditions is not helpful in meeting the difficulties faced by broader debates and shifting arrangements about social life (1998: 52). As a response to such difficulties, Porter asserts it is necessary to address the preoccupation with 'institutions and practices reflecting a Protestant-British ethos' (ibid.: 72), which has little in common with how British citizens see the world, and to re-examine articulations about liberty which are consistently expressed as a form of defence and used to reinforce an identification of loyalty (ibid.: 126). Attending to the challenge of liberal responsibilities, Porter stresses the need to provide a more rational interpretation of political perceptions by recommending 'inclusiveness and plain contractual arrangements' (ibid.: 127), and overcoming the Unionist tendency towards conceptualising the possibilities of political movement on its own terms. As Porter concludes, a re-imagining of liberal and cultural attitudes is necessary in order to confront the 'no compromise' approach to change which unionism generally follows (ibid.: 167). To do this, Porter puts forward a case for articulating a civic unionism which 'comes perilously close to committing the most unpardonable of sins: compromising the Union in the name of unionism' (ibid.: 170). Civic unionism, Porter insists, does not draw from a starting point where preservation of the Union is everything, but seeks to use arguments about that Union as one among others. What takes priority for the civic Unionist is 'the quality of social and political life in Northern Ireland – a Northern Ireland that includes not just Unionists but also Nationalists and non-Unionists of other prescriptions' (ibid.). Here, Porter introduces the idea of a 'thick' conception of citizenship as the basis for engagement with political and social issues. The civic Unionist differs because he/she views 'the North not merely as a site of the Union but as a site of a co-mingling and clash of British and Irish factors all of which have to be accommodated and reconciled' (ibid.: 183). In trying to emphasise the importance of 'difference through openness' via the civic model, Porter aims to get Unionists to look outside of their own immediate and tightly contained worlds, and to recognise that conventional cultural and liberal definitions deny the possibility of co-operation precisely because they determine the possibilities of interaction on their own terms.

However, Porter's emphasis, fresh as it is, is ultimately aspirational and to date, has failed to find significant support within the confines of Unionist politics. Even the emergence of what was termed 'new unionism' – which attempted to re-define the development of a potentially more progressive politics and sought to convey a more positive representation of unionism, as exemplified by Trimble's leadership of the UUP (Walker 2004: 252) – failed to embrace any reciprocal shift from established Unionist positions and principles. Indeed, as O'Dowd argues, the development of 'new unionism' signified alignments with British nationalism as a response to the gains being made by Irish nationalism, where articulations about the value of citizenship were made through the 'universalisation of a particular view of the British experience' (1998: 79). Efforts by the proponents of 'new unionism' to create a more positive public image of unionism, according to O'Dowd, relied on promoting 'a revitalised British nationalism' (ibid.: 70), where notions of citizenship and sovereignty were constructed on the basis of identity themes and the politics of belonging (ibid.: 79). The role of Trimble's UUP in the negotiations which led to the Good Friday Agreement, as well as indicating the possibilities for a flexible and pluralistic approach to dialogue, also reflect attempts to preserve traditional interests by reducing the scope of talks and trying to limit areas for negotiation (ibid.: 91). The intention to obstruct and limit was especially evident in the selection of ministries after the Assembly elections in 1998, when the UUP selected posts in order to contain and obstruct the progress of Irish Nationalists (Spencer 2006a: 58). The end of Trimble's leadership is a clear sign that for other party members and supporters his new approach had failed to halt the advance of Irish Nationalists and, therefore, had failed to prevent a weakening of Unionist power.

Nevertheless, we need also recognise that if the peace process brought pressures and problems to mainstream unionism, it also led to the development of a working-class Unionist politics through the PUP and the UDP, each of which served to move the religious and ethnic preoccupations of traditional unionism towards a 'secular and civic' model of political engagement (Walker 2004: 253). Further, although we can see that such a transition ultimately failed to move unionism away from fixed positions (as the election of the DUP as the biggest Unionist Party from 2003 demonstrates), it is important to view the arrival of the PUP and the UDP as evidence of the possibility for a diverse Unionist response to the challenges posed by the political changes of the peace process. Because of this, we should not assume that mainstream Unionists are not highly critical of the shortcomings and disadvantages for progress which established approaches impose. Research for this book reveals a considerable awareness among Unionist politicians and political representatives of a need to move away from the negative, obstructive siege mentality which has continued to pervade Unionist politics (Spencer 2006a), towards a more forward-thinking model

of political engagement constructed around themes and issues of democratic renewal.

The contention that unionism tends to define itself negatively through what it is not and what it does not want, relates in particular to its relationship with Catholicism. If we need to acknowledge that varying degrees of tolerance towards Catholicism which connect with different social and economic contexts are evident within unionism (see 'A Citizens' Inquiry', The Opsahl Report 1993 pp. 37–47), we need also recognise the pervasiveness of an anti-Catholic ethos and how it has been exercised with some consistency (Brewer 1998). As O'Malley puts it, 'It is this inability or unwillingness on the Unionist side to see Catholics as equals that precludes them from acknowledging any dimension of the problem other than their own' (1997: 145) and which legitimises the refusal 'to examine the basis, and more important the validity, of their own negative attitudes towards Catholicism' (ibid.: 147). For O'Malley, opposition to Catholicism is both an expression of identity and a lack of confidence in that identity: 'the question of identity, particularly among Protestants, is extraordinarily complex. Because they do not have a strong sense of political identity, they fall back on their religion for symbols of identity. And because they take their cohesion in religious matters from an anti-Catholic bias that is common to all their denominations, anti-Catholicism becomes an expression of a shared identity' (ibid.: 151). The social solidarity which is created and sustained by the belief that Catholics will force Protestants to do what they don't want to do (ibid.: 139) means that fears about Catholicism are vital for both maintaining the exclusivist approach to political life and shaping contestations about democratic principles (i.e. being forced to accept changes to political and social order). Although in relation to the latter point, resistance to change may be voiced far less in terms of overt anti-Catholic rhetoric among many mainstream Unionists today, but more through 'a general appeal to the idea of democracy' (Bourke 2003: 273), the perceived dominance of Catholicism still remains synonymous with a democratic deficit and therefore continues to be imbued with anti-democratic credentials which stand in opposition to Unionist principles. If there are differences among Unionists about the extent of threat posed by Catholic dominance in Northern Ireland, it would still be fair to say that such a prospect would be strongly resisted and considered destructive towards the imperatives of a Unionist-determined democracy.

Along with this overwhelming sense of resistance to any suggestion of Catholic control, it is also worth noting that the idea of a united Ireland and a resulting Catholic domination is something that a minority of Protestants during the early stages of the peace process seemed willing to accept (Ruane and Todd 1992: 76–7). The practical disappearance of this position as the peace process has gone on, where for many it is Republicans and Nationalists who are seen to have gained, while Unionists see themselves as having lost

(seen as loss precisely because of perceptions about Republican progress), once more highlights how the Protestant/Unionist imagination is subject to differences and shifts, as well as overriding similarities and commonalities (ibid.). The contrast between individualism and consensus, which inform the sense of crisis and certainty towards change, finds credibility with Aughey's assertion that 'unionism may lack a definite coherence but its identity is multi-layered and variegated, with cross-cutting patterns of experience and emotional attachment' (1990: 193). These layers are particularly notable in work carried out by Ruane and Todd, when examining the possibility for a political middle ground in Northern Ireland. Categorising self-definitions of Protestant identity as British, Ulster or Northern Irish and Irish, the authors concluded 'enormous variation in the positions held by individuals' (1992: 79) towards religious, political and cultural views. This research identified common themes and responses around questions about division and diversity, but also identified that there are three Protestant groups which have political organisation in Northern Ireland: 'Loyalists', 'Unionists' and 'Reconciliationists'. While 'Unionists' are seen as drawn towards mainstream Protestant values and identify with Britishness, and 'Reconciliationists' are viewed as pragmatic on issues of constitutional importance, 'Loyalists' are categorised as those who are drawn to fundamentalist Protestant positions and identify more with the idea of an insular Ulster (ibid.). What is of particular interest with this definition of Loyalists, however, is that it was concluded at a time when working-class loyalism was just beginning to cohere into a progressive force within Northern Ireland politics. It is this transformation and the challenges it posed for conceptualisations about loyalism to which we now turn.

Index

- 'abject and true remorse' (CLMC statement), 114–15, 118–19, 231
- accountability, 109, 183, 226, 231
- Adair, Johnny, 187, 191–5, 197–200, 202, 214, 235, 237, 240, 250
- Adams, David (UDP), 21, 23, 42–3, 70, 72–3, 181–2, 184, 187, 219–20
- in peace talks, 77, 81–2, 84, 105, 110, 112, 116–19, 121, 126–7, 156, 162, 168–71
- Adams, Gerry (Sinn Fein), 50, 74–6, 79–83, 121, 127, 143, 149–50, 163, 213, 226
- 'agreed Ireland,' 110–11
- Ahern, Bertie, 158, 163, 165, 230
- 'Alan' (UDA/UFF), 37–8, 56–7, 67–8, 171, 186, 192–3, 195, 239–40, 244
- Alliance Party, 180
- all-Ireland context, 136, 159, 164, 177
- ambiguity, 133, 141, 159, 215–16
- American involvement, 74, 145–6, 157
- Ancram, Michael (NIO), 121, 139–43, 149, 152, 156
- Anderson, B., 8–9
- Angel paper, 103–4
- Anglo-Irish Agreement, 55, 57, 69, 72, 95, 134
- anti-Agreement positions, 162–3, 175, 178, 181–2, 184, 194–5, 198, 205, 224
- anti-Catholicism, 27, 30–1, 33–8
- anti-state terrorism, 54–5, 60
- Articles 2 and 3*, 135, 145, 159
- Assembly, 126, 136–8, 159, 162, 166–9, 172, 210, 213, 221–2, 232, 236
- collapse (2002), 49
- (re)formation of, 142, 224–8, 230
- role of, 176–9
- see also* elections
- Aughey, A., 7–9, 28, 54, 214–15
- authority, mistrust of, 18, 42
- autonomy in UDA, 65–7, 127, 182, 238
- Bairner, A., 56
- Ballymoney meeting, 184
- Barr, Glenn (UDA), 70
- Bell, Bowyer, 23
- belonging, sense of, 11, 17–18, 26
- betrayal, fear of, 14, 20, 29–31, 35, 39, 202
- Bew, P., 111–12, 136, 148–9, 151, 180
- Beyond the Religious Divide* (UDA), 43
- bi-lateral meetings approach, 165–6, 169–71
- bill of rights proposal, 43, 72
- Billig, M., 10
- 'Billy' (UDA), 57, 193
- Blair, Tony, 144, 157–8, 163, 165–7, 171
- letter to Trimble, 172, 175
- Bloomfield, D., 76, 78
- Boulton, D., 61
- Bourke, R., 27
- boycotting of talks, 151, 154–5, 159
- Brewer, John, 27, 33–5, 52
- British governments
- cf* Irish government, 103–5, 109
- Conservative *cf* Labour, 144, 157–9
- distrust of, 35, 72
- 'no selfish interest' statement, 115, 218–19
- peace talks, 74; Loyalists, 77, 85, 87–90, 97, 99–100; Republicans, 75–6, 79–80, 83 *see also* exploratory dialogue; final stage negotiations; ministerial dialogue
- see also individual departments and ministers*
- British identity, 24, 45, 140, 150
- British intelligence services, 50, 65, 113
- British-Irish Council concept, 178
- British nationalism, 8, 26
- Brooke, Peter (NIO), 75–8, 132, 218–19
- Brown, T., 9, 14
- Bruce, S., 11, 14, 16, 29, 35–6, 39, 54, 61–2, 67, 71
- Bruton, John, 149, 151
- B-Specials, 48

- Building a Permanent Peace* (Sinn Fein), 148
- 'Building Blocks' document, 146
- Cadwallader, A., 196–7
- Calvinism, 13, 15, 31
- Campbell, Gregory (DUP), 29–30
- Canary Wharf bombing, 149–51, 157, 174
- Carroll, John, 32
- Catholics, 9–11, 14–19, 23, 41, 43–5, 48, 59, 61–3
- during the peace process, 81, 87, 113, 140, 146, 155
- post-Agreement, 188, 196, 198–9, 241
- see also* anti-Catholicism; interaction with Catholics
- ceasefires
- 1992, 50, 61, 76–9
- 1994, 84, 87, 89, 91–2, 96–7, 102, 107–9, 112–19, 147–51
- 1997, 155–8
- 2003, 198, 201, 203, 231
- certainty, 14–18, 20, 23, 28, 32–3, 37, 39, 215
- change
- and containment, 19–28
- engagement with, 37–8, 43, 51, 71, 77; UDA, 234–45; UVF, 227–34
- resistance to, 11–13, 15, 18, 21, 27, 32
- 'Charlie' (UDA), 8, 38, 57, 186, 193, 239
- Chastelain, John De, 155, 232
- choreography for media, 206–7, 212–13
- CIA, 190
- CID, 199, 234
- citizenship, 7–9, 25–6, 237
- civic model, 16, 23, 25–6, 34
- civil disobedience, 230
- civilianisation, 227–34
- Clarke, L., 121, 151
- class issues, 28, 32, 39–53, 62, 97, 103, 134, 140, 242, 248, 250
- clergy, 39, 59–60, 79–89, 109, 200–2, 219
- Clinton, Bill, 149, 158
- CLMC (Combined Loyalist Military Command), 78–9, 85, 91–2, 100–1, 106, 112, 114–16, 151, 198–200
- Clonard priests, 79, 81, 84
- CLPA (Combined Loyalist Political Alliance), 77–8
- Cochrane, F., 7–8, 19, 21
- Codes of Conduct, 228–9, 232
- co-determination concept, 161
- Common Sense* (UDA), 43, 57, 70–3
- community work, 19, 38, 41, 46, 51, 57–8, 64–5, 229, 232, 236–7, 240–1, 249
- compromise, resistance to, 14–17, 20, 23, 31, 33
- confidentiality, 96, 107, 202, 217
- consensus, 70, 179, 211, 237, 239
- Loyalist, 66, 88, 115, 174
- Unionist, 23, 28, 43, 133, 168
- consent principle, 182, 199, 230–1
- in peace talks, 95, 111, 131, 134, 136, 139, 141, 143, 159, 161
- Conservative Party, 144, 157–9
- conspiracy theories, 33–4, 40, 72, 134
- constitutional issues, 21, 25, 70, 88, 135, 159, 213
- consultation, 114–15, 118, 127, 133, 142, 164, 175, 183–6, 208, 222
- UDA, 234–45
- UVF, 227–34
- contractual obligations, 18, 25, 30, 34–5
- Cooke, D., 35
- counter-terrorism, 59, 62
- covenantal view, 15, 30–1, 34–5
- Crawford, C., 66–7
- crime and security issues, 47, 122, 124–5, 225, 231–2
- criminal activity, 56, 63–7, 71, 139, 148, 182, 187–8, 192–6, 198–9
- criminality, 50, 55, 63, 66, 68, 122, 222
- post-Agreement, 187, 192–3, 195, 198, 204–5, 228–9, 231–42, 244–5, 249–50
- cross-border bodies, 163–4, 171, 176, 181
- cross-community dialogue, 213, 220, 241–2
- cross-community relations, 43, 49, 52, 57, 69–70, 89–90, 115, 198, 226
- CTI (Conflict Transformation Initiative), 235–8
- cultural issues, 66, 147, 179, 181, 194, 204, 223, 235, 245
- and identity, 8–12, 16–17, 19, 24–5, 28, 39, 44–5, 49, 53
- Cusack, J., 61–3, 65–6, 70–1, 90–1, 194, 196–7, 202

- death threats, 196, 234
- decommissioning, 17
- in the peace talks, 122–4, 133, 141, 144–8, 154–7, 163–5, 168, 170–5, 178, 213, 216
 - post-Agreement, 194, 224–5, 229, 232, 235
- Defence Associations, 58, 65
- defensive positions, 7, 11–12, 16, 24–5, 56–9, 61–4
- and identity, 30, 32, 38–9, 42, 45–6
 - in peace talks, 88, 99, 140
- Delaney, Eamon, 102–3, 111
- demilitarisation, 148, 227–34
- democratic positions, 14–15, 27, 178–9, 231
- deniability, 106, 110
- destabilisation of loyalism, 113–15, 192–3
- devolutionist perspectives, 12–13, 43, 70, 143, 159, 164, 225–6
- DFA (Department of Foreign Affairs), 102–3, 105, 107
- difference, 10, 16–20, 25
- Dillon, M., 39
- disadvantaged communities, 236–7, 240–3
- disbandment, 228, 245, 248–9
- discipline, paramilitary, 62–5, 118, 129, 148, 150–1, 156, 188–9, 191
- dissident Republican groups, 229, 231, 235
- diversity, 11–12
- Dixon, P., 206
- Donaldson, Denis, 234
- Donaldson, Jeffrey, 171, 175, 179
- Downing Street Declaration, 97, 99, 104, 107, 110–12, 114–15, 136, 142, 145, 217
- Drake, C. J. M., 55
- drug-running, 65, 187, 192–4, 198, 205, 233, 239, 244
- Drumcree stand-offs, 146–8, 192, 196
- Dublin campaign plan, 93
- Duignan, Sean, 104–7
- Dunlop, J., 16, 80
- Dunn, S., 23
- DUP (Democratic Unionist Party), 13, 15–16, 22, 208, 210, 220
- Paisleyism, 29–30, 35–9
 - and paramilitarism, 39–52
 - during peace talks, 97, 100, 147, 153–4, 159, 162, 167–8, 175–6, 178–9
 - post-Agreement, 180, 184–5, 205, 224–6, 230, 246–7
- dynamic analysis, 173–4
- Eames, Archbishop Robin, 85–9, 105–6, 108–11, 200
- East-West relations, 169, 178, 226
- education, 10, 46, 83, 94, 115, 125, 133, 222–3, 235–7, 240–4, 248
- elections, 26, 36, 70, 180–1, 224, 226
- electoral issues, 38, 70, 166–70, 220, 222
- Elliott, M., 14
- Elliott, S., 70, 152, 180
- endgames, 75, 78, 184
- Engagement with Republicans* (UVF), 52
- English, Joe (UDP), 74, 117, 121
- EPIC (Ex-Prisoners' Interpretative Centre), 47–8
- Ervine, David (PUP), 19–20, 44, 69–70, 187, 189–90, 198, 205, 210, 227–8
- in peace talks, 90–2, 94, 96, 106–9, 115–19, 121, 127–9, 137–9, 147, 151, 163–5, 175, 177
- Evangelism, 29, 35–40, 52
- exclusion, Loyalist fear of, 71, 75, 87, 90, 92, 108, 183–4
- exclusivity, 9, 14, 17, 27, 35, 70
- exploitation of communities, 233, 237, 243
- exploratory dialogue, 125, 130–4
- Frameworks Documents*, 136–9, 142, 148
 - negotiating strategies, 123–4, 126–36
 - preliminary meetings, 119–21
- expulsions, 55, 159–60
- external influences, shift from, 74–5
- extortion, 56, 205, 233, 244
- Farrington, C., 36, 205
- fear, exploitation of, 30–1, 33, 42–6, 48–9
- Fernhill House statement, 230–2

- feuds, 50, 55, 64, 67, 187–8, 191–9,
227–8, 235, 237
resolution of, 200–5
- final stage negotiations
bi-lateral meetings approach, 165–6,
169–71
decommissioning, 171–5
electoral issues, 166–9
prisoner releases, 164–5
strand two, 161–4, 176–9
- Finlay, A., 24
- Finlay, Fergus, 90–4, 96–8, 100, 103–4,
108, 217
- Finlayson, A., 11, 30
- Fitzgerald, Brian, 94–6
- Flackes, W. D., 70, 152, 180
- flag-flying, 38, 196, 203
- flexibility, 16, 26, 34, 98–9, 109, 123,
127, 131, 138, 144, 210, 215
- forgiveness, Protestant attitudes, 32–3
- 'For God and Ulster' slogan, 29–30
- formation of paramilitary groups, 61,
65, 71
- Forum election, 152, 181
- FPR (Forum for Peace and
Reconciliation), 148–9
- fragmentation, 20–2, 24, 28, 35, 67, 98,
147, 151, 168, 173, 194, 250
- Frameworks Documents*, 136–9, 142, 148
- fundamentalism, 10, 12, 15–16, 18,
29–30, 33, 35–7, 39–40, 49, 52, 246
- Gallagher, Frankie (UPRG), 12, 41–2,
67, 184–5, 235–8, 243–4
- Gallagher, T., 35
- Ganiel, G., 37
- Garland, R., 77, 106–7, 149
- Gibson, Rev. Mervyn (Loyalist
Commission), 200–4
- Gillespie, G., 111–12, 136, 148–9,
151, 180
- 'God and Ulster' slogan, 51
- Good Friday Agreement, 17, 26, 72–3,
133, 152, 176–7, 180–90, 194–5,
207–11, 214–16, 224–5, 230
opposition, 33–4, 36–8, 49–51
- Good, Rev. Harold, 225
- government grants, 240, 243
- Gowing, N., 211
- Graham, B., 52
- Gray, Jim (UDA), 197, 237–8
- Gregg, John (UDA), 197–8, 203, 235
- Greysteel killings, 86
- Ground Rules for Substantive All-Party
Negotiations*, 151
- Hain, Peter (NIO), 239
- Hall, M., 235
- Harkin, G., 234
- harmonisation concept, 137–8, 142
- Hennessey, T., 35, 111, 136, 146, 159
- historical context, 18–19, 30–1, 41,
52–3
- Holkeri, Harri, 155
- Holy Cross incident, 196–7, 202
- Hudson, Chris, 90–4, 150, 190–1,
229–30
- Hume, John (SDLP), 74, 80, 105, 127
- Hutchinson, Billy (UVF/PUP), 19, 44–5,
60–1, 189–90, 194–5, 205, 213–14,
220, 228–9, 232
in peace talks, 109, 117, 121, 127–8,
135–9, 148, 154, 157–8, 162,
164–5, 171, 174–5
- identity, 7, 15, 18, 27
and culture, 8–12, 16–17, 19, 24–5,
28, 39, 44–5, 49, 53
national, 8, 13, 24, 26, 45, 140, 150
negative, 23–4, 28
and Paisleyism, 29–39
paramilitary, 40–3, 46–8, 50–3
- ideology
Conservative, 158
liberal, 12, 25, 31
Loyalist, 20, 24, 30, 47, 52–3, 67
Republican, 183, 214
Unionist, 8–12, 16–17, 183
- IICD (Independent International
Commission on Decommissioning),
157, 225, 229, 231–2
- image of loyalism, 57, 65, 71, 187, 192,
194–7, 205, 220–2, 245
- imagined communities, 8–10, 23
- IMC (Independent Monitoring
Commission), 232–3, 244
- inclusivity, 39, 70, 167, 243
- Independent Unionist Group, 180
- individualism, 13–23, 28, 32,
242, 246

- informal peace talks, 80–9, 95, 97
informants, 233–4
Ingram, M., 234
initial developments in peace process, 74–80
INLA (Irish National Liberation Army), 39
insularity, 22, 28, 36, 93
integrationist perspective, 12–13
intensification of violence, 66, 78–9, 86, 92, 113–14
interaction with Catholics, 35–6, 43, 51–2, 57, 69–71
interface areas, 57, 66, 196
interpretation, 214–15, 217–23
intra-communal violence, 56, 191–9, 203
intransigence, 21, 32, 37, 69, 127, 146, 150, 159, 210, 213, 216, 220, 246–7
intra-Unionist conflict, 153
introspection, 14, 32
IRA (Irish Republican Army), 47, 57–61, 63, 90, 181, 198–9, 222, 224–5, 228–9, 234
in peace talks, 112–13, 115–16, 144, 149–51, 155–8, 160, 176
see also dissident Republican groups; PIRA (Provisional IRA); Real IRA
Irish governments, 65
cf British government, 103–5, 109
and Omagh bombing, 188–90
peace talks, 74–5, 79; Loyalists, 85, 88–100, 102–11, 216–17, 229; Republicans, 80–1, 83
see also individual departments and ministers
isolation, 17–18, 33, 184
‘It’s Your Choice’ slogan, 180
John Gregg Initiative, 235–45
Johnston, K., 121, 151
Johnston, William, 232
Joint Declaration, 97, 99, 104, 107, 110–12, 114–15, 136, 142, 145, 217
joint statement (Paisley/Adams), 226
Jordan, H., 195, 197, 199
journalists, 171, 175, 217
Kearney, V., 147
Kelly, Gerry, 124, 164
Kennaway, B., 29, 39
Kirkham, Tommy (UDP/UPRG), 64, 71, 121, 184, 236
‘Kitchen Cabinet,’ 77
Labour Party, 144, 157–8
law and order, 46, 48, 55
Leach, Stephen (NIO), 123–6, 128–30, 154–5, 166, 172, 178–9, 208–9, 216
Leeds Castle talks, 224, 247
legitimation, 54–6, 58–9, 69, 231
liberal ideology, 12, 25, 31
liberty, individual, 7, 15–17, 34
LINC (Local Initiatives for Needy Communities), 46, 227–8
Lisburn bombing, 156–7
Lister, D., 195, 197, 199
lobbying groups, 236, 248
loss, perception of, 48–9, 55, 169, 178–9, 181–2, 185–6, 199, 250
Loughinisland killings, 92
‘Loyalism in Transition,’ 240
Loyalist Commission, 200–5, 229
LPA (Loyalist Political Alliance), 110
LVF (Loyalist Volunteer Force), 39–40, 128, 147–8, 156, 161, 191, 194–5, 197–8, 200–1, 203, 228
McAllister, I., 49
McAuley, J.W., 24, 52–3, 63–5, 67, 69, 71, 188, 223
McCabe, Chris (NIO), 119–24, 137
McCartney, Bob, 162, 168, 180, 222
McCord, Raymond (junior), 233
McCrea, Rev. William, 39, 147
McDonald, H., 61–3, 66, 90–1, 194, 196–7, 202
McDonald, Jackie (UDA), 49–50, 66, 185, 193–4, 222–3, 241–2
McGarry, J., 8–9, 12–13
McGrath, A. E., 14
McGuinness, Martin (Sinn Fein), 75, 121, 143, 151, 163, 174, 213, 227
McLaughlin, Mitchel (Sinn Fein), 74, 113

- McMichael, Gary (UDP), 20, 42, 58,
70–2, 182–5, 187, 211–13
in peace talks: exploratory, 119–21,
126–9, 134–5, 137–8; final stage,
163, 165–7, 169, 176, 178;
ministerial, 139, 149–50; multi-
party, 153–6, 158–60; preliminary,
77–9, 81, 84, 112, 116–18
- McMichael, John (UDA), 71
- McSweeney, B., 36
- MacIver, M. A., 30–1
- Mac Ginty, R., 39
- Magee, Rev. Roy, 84–7, 100, 106, 110,
120
- Maginnis, Ken (UUP), 212–13
- Mahood, Jackie (PUP), 121, 128–9, 147
- Major, John, 87, 104–5, 107, 120, 137,
144, 150, 156
- Manchester bombing, 155–6
- Mandelson, Peter (NIO), 192
- Mandle, J., 10
- Mansergh, Martin, 85, 105–7, 190
- marches, 66, 146–7, 191, 195
- marginalisation, sense of, 23, 49, 52,
181
- Mason, D., 11
- Mayhew, Patrick (NIO), 96, 120–1,
143–5
- media, 169–70, 172, 175, 192, 196–7,
199, 205–7
as communications conduit, 212–14
framing and interpretation, 217–23
and negotiating process, 207–12,
214–17
- mediation courses, 236–7
- mending communities, 239, 243
- MI5, 50, 113
- military perspectives, 91, 93, 186, 201,
222
- military strategies, 62, 66–8, 78–9
- Miller, D. W., 15
- ministerial dialogue
disruptive tactics, 145–51
Michael Ancram, 139–43
Patrick Mayhew, 143–5
towards multi-party talks, 151–2
- Mitchell, Billy (UVF/LINC), 46–7, 227–8
- Mitchell, C., 32, 39
- Mitchell, George (American Senator),
146, 153, 155, 157–9, 162–4, 176,
179, 206–7
- Mitchel, P., 16–18, 39
- Moloney, E., 35, 74
- Molyneux, James (UUP), 104, 144, 146
- moral certainty, 14–15, 17, 20, 32–3, 37
- Morgan, V., 23
- Morrissey, M., 86
- Morrow, D., 15
- motivation, paramilitary, 45, 54–61,
90–4
- Mowlam, Mo (NIO), 124, 160, 206
- multi-party talks, 151–61, 212–13
- Murphy, Paul (NIO), 164, 168, 206–7,
209, 215–16, 221, 242, 247
- Nally, Dermot, 106
- nationalism, 7–8, 10–11, 26, 181,
195–7, 199, 208–9, 214–16,
229–31, 242
and Loyalist identity, 29, 33–4, 40–1,
43, 46–9
and the peace process, 74–5, 77, 81,
90–1, 95, 99, 105, 109–11
and the peace talks, 113–14, 125,
131–2, 135, 138, 140, 147, 155,
164, 176, 178
and political violence, 56–7, 59, 63,
68, 70
and unionism, 8–12, 16, 25–7
- Nationalist interests, 74, 229–30, 242
- negativity, 19–22, 27, 44, 47–50, 91,
140, 162, 183
- negotiating process, 131–2, 137–9, 158,
161–6, 169–71, 207–12, 214–17,
226
- negotiating strategies, 202, 207–8, 210
- exploratory dialogue, 123–4, 126–36
and media, 206–7, 212–17
ministerial dialogue, 141–2, 145
- Nelson, S., 61–2
- neutrality, 135, 228, 230
- Newell, Ken, 81–4, 150
- New loyalism, 52
- news coverage of negotiations, 207–12
- New unionism, 26
- Nicoll, David (DUP/UPRG), 40–1,
184–5, 236
- NIO (Northern Ireland Office), 112,
119–21, 151, 166, 239–40, 242–3
- NIWC (Northern Ireland Women's
Coalition), 162, 169, 180, 207
- no claim, no blame policy, 160

- 'no first strike' policy, 155
 'no guns, no government' slogan, 171, 175
 'no selfish interest' declaration, 115, 218–19
 'no surrender' slogan, 34, 144
 Northern Bank robbery, 222
 North-South relations, 135–8, 142, 159, 161–4, 171, 176–8, 182, 216, 226
 nuanced communications, 93, 99, 102, 172, 210, 217, 234
 NUPRG (New Ulster Political Research Group), 70
- obstructionism, 19–20, 22, 26, 50–1
 O'Dowd, L., 8, 26
 O'Heffernan, P., 212
 O'Kane, E., 172
 O'Leary, B., 8–9, 12–13
 O'Malley, P., 9, 27, 31–2, 34
 O'Neill, Captain Terence, 35, 44–5, 61
 Omagh bombing, 188–91
 oppositional concepts, 8, 39, 49, 184, 222
 Orange Order, the, 39, 146–8
 orange sceptics, 22
- Paisleyism, 29–39
 and working-class Unionists, 39–53
 Paisley, Rev Dr Ian, 15–16, 29, 61, 65, 148, 162, 170, 176, 185–6, 208, 226–7, 246–7
 paramilitarism, 19–20, 37–8, 56, 126, 159–60, 167, 173, 185, 200, 240
 and communities, 57–9, 61, 233, 237, 239, 243
 dialogue with clergy, 80–9
 discipline, 62–5, 118, 129, 148, 150–1, 156, 188–9, 191
 motivation and structure, 45, 54–63, 65–8, 90, 94, 127–8, 182, 238, 249
 in a non-violent society, 227–34, 248
 psychology of, 90–4
 recruitment, 54, 57–8, 62, 64, 68, 203–4
 secrecy, 60, 64, 68, 93
 and security agencies, 64, 233–4
 and unionism, 39–53
see also individual organisations
- Parkinson, A. F., 220
 particularism, 7, 10, 17
- Paths to a Political Settlement* (FPR), 148–9
 patrols, paramilitary, 56–8
 Patten Report, 38
 Patterson, H., 164, 181, 191
 pipe bombings, 196
 PIRA (Provisional IRA), 74, 78, 87–8, 98
 pluralism, 9–10, 13, 25, 29, 36–7, 43–4, 53, 69, 71, 140
 polarities, religious, 15, 17–18, 31
Police Ombudsman Statement, 233
 Policing Board, 226
 policing issues, 122, 148, 165, 184, 190, 225, 229, 233–4, 239, 244
 political issues, 146, 148, 178, 199, 201
 political representation, Loyalist, 200, 205, 239, 248
see also individual parties
 political strategies, 22, 24, 49, 208
 Loyalist: development of, 52, 65, 68–73, 77–9, 84, 93; lack of, 45–51, 55, 60–2, 235
 Republican, 74, 78, 88–9
 Unionist, 30–1, 33, 42–6, 48–9
 politicisation of loyalism, 52, 65, 68–73, 77–9, 84, 93, 198
 politics and religion, 34–5, 37–8, 40, 43, 51–3
 Pollak, A., 35, 77
 populism, 209, 223, 228
 Porter, N., 25
 Powell, Jonathan, 165–6
 power-sharing, 43, 49, 57, 65, 69–70, 72, 135, 162, 179, 199, 224–6, 247
 power struggles, 55, 65–6, 147, 188
 pragmatism, 22, 37, 158
 Presbyterianism, 13–14, 16, 20, 33
Principles of Loyalism (PUP), 40
 prisoners, 83, 95–6, 115–18, 124, 130, 135, 160–1, 170, 174, 186, 242
 releases, 164–5, 178, 182, 212–13
 sentences, 58, 60, 197, 199
 proactivity, 57, 235
 pro-Agreement Unionists, 181
 procedural issues in talks, 153–5
 propaganda, 180–1
 proportional representation, 70, 72, 136, 167
Propositions on Heads of Agreement, 159
 proscription, 65
 pro-state terrorism, 54, 56, 61
 protection concept, 31, 57–9, 61

- Protestantism, 9, 12–19, 31–3
see also Calvinism; Evangelism;
 fundamentalism; politics and
 religion; Presbyterianism;
 Puritanism
- PSNI (Police Service of Northern
 Ireland), 226, 229, 234
- psychology, paramilitary, 90–4
- publicity, 91, 118, 180, 187, 193–4, 202
- punishment, paramilitary, 55, 204, 233
- PUP (Progressive Unionist Party), 13, 19,
 24, 26, 69, 77, 79, 82, 89, 94, 108
 and the media, 207, 213–14, 220, 222
 and paramilitary identity, 40, 44,
 46–8, 50, 52–3
 in peace process, 113–14, 119–23,
 127–9, 135, 139, 141, 148–52,
 155–7, 162, 165–7, 171, 175
 post-Agreement, 180, 191, 194, 198,
 205, 227, 229–30, 247–8
- Puritanism, 32–3
- Purvis, Dawn (PUP), 222
- racketeering, 62, 65
- radicalism, 15
- reactivity, 47, 55–61, 86–9, 93, 102, 106,
 118, 143–4, 150, 155–6, 189, 222
- Real IRA, 188–90
- reconciliation, 28, 31, 43, 57, 71, 236
- recruitment, 54, 57–8, 62, 64, 68,
 203–4
- Red Hand Commando, 68, 115, 196–7,
 200, 204, 230–1
- referendums, 141, 145, 151, 180
- Reid, Father Alec, 74, 79, 81, 84, 105,
 109–10, 115, 150, 225
- Reid, John (NIO), 204
- religion and politics, 13–19, 34–5, 37–8,
 40, 43, 51–3
- Republican News, 76, 219
- Republicans, 19, 44, 58, 61
cf Loyalists, 97–8, 102–3, 122–3,
 130–1, 133, 140–1, 183, 186,
 207–9, 214–16, 221–2, 241–2
 dissident, 191, 229, 231, 235
 in peace talks, 75–6, 79–81, 83
 political strategies, 74, 78, 88–9
 targetting of, 63, 78, 92, 151
- responsibility, 69–70, 72, 118, 243
- restitution to victims, 55
- revenge killings, 86, 92, 101
- Reynolds, Albert, 85, 97–8, 104–8, 110,
 150
- Reynolds, Father Gerry, 81–2, 84, 150
- rigidity of belief, 14–16, 32, 39
- riots, 58, 64, 192
- Roadshow, the, 227–34
- Robb, Lindsay (PUP), 121, 128–9, 147
- Roberts, Tom (UVF/EPIC), 48, 64
- Robinson, Peter (DUP), 225
- Roshwald, A., 11
- Rotary Club Speech (Brooke), 76
- Rowan, B., 52, 191, 194, 197
- Ruane, J., 27–8
- RUC Special Branch, 199, 234
- Ryder, C., 147
- Scappaticci, Freddie, 234
- schools charter, 204
- Scottish Presbyterianism, 30–1
- ‘script factory,’ 102
- SDLP (Social Democratic & Labour
 Party), 74, 81, 83, 109, 149, 159,
 162, 165–7, 175, 180
- secrecy, 60, 64, 68, 90–1, 93, 106–7
- sectarianism, 62–71, 84, 86, 188, 192,
 194–8, 236, 240, 247
- Section 47 of Frameworks, 136–7
- secularism, 31, 36–40, 50–2
- security agencies, 54–5, 83, 195, 197–8,
 228, 232, 244
 and paramilitaries, 64, 233–4
 perceived failure of, 55–6, 59
- self-determination, 8, 29, 136
- self-interest, 181–2, 238, 244
- sensational reportage, 218, 220, 222
- Shankill bombing, 63, 86, 92, 100–1
- Sharing Responsibility* (PUP), 69–70
- Shirlow, P., 40
- Shoukri, Andre (UDA), 197, 237–8
- siege mentality, 15, 18, 31, 40
- Silke, A., 55–6
- simplification in the media, 217–18
- Simpson, ‘Jimbo,’ 197
- Sinnerton, H., 77–8, 147, 205
- Sinn Fein, 17, 38, 44, 47, 50, 61
 and the media, 206–10, 219–20
 in peace talks, 74–5, 80–2, 90, 112,
 124–5, 134, 143–4, 148–51,
 153–60, 164–6, 172–5, 178
 post-Agreement, 180, 184, 189, 199,
 205, 224–6, 230, 234, 241–2

- siren systems, 59
 Six Principles, 97, 100–1, 105–6, 110, 230–1
 slide programme, 227–8
 Smallwoods, Ray, 77, 81, 84, 86, 103, 114, 116, 119
 Smith, William ‘Plum’ (UVF/EPIC), 47, 117
 Smyth, C., 16, 30
 Smyth, Hugh (PUP), 117, 119–21
 Smyth, M., 86
 Snodden, Martin (UVF), 45, 59
 Social Development Dept (NIO), 240, 242–3
 socialism, 48, 52–3, 69
 social issues, 37, 41–2, 47, 51, 62, 135, 138, 213, 232, 235–7, 239–43, 248
 social solidarity, 10, 40, 46, 244
 Southern, N., 37
 Special Branch, 199, 234
 Spence, Gusty, 61, 79–80, 96, 106–9, 117–19, 230–1, 233
 Spencer, G., 22, 26–7, 181, 188, 206–10, 212, 215–16, 219–20
 Spring, Dick, 89, 91, 93–4, 96, 98–101, 105, 149, 217
 stalemate, military, 74, 76, 80
 St Andrews Agreement, 224–7
 Steele, John (NIO), 123–4
 stereotypes, 20, 31, 57, 187, 214, 222
 Stevens Inquiry, 65
 Stewart, A. T. Q., 15
 storage of weapons, 232
 Stormont *see* Assembly
 street violence, 58, 64
 strikes, 65
 Strobel, W. P., 211
 structure of paramilitary organisations, 54–63, 65–8, 127–8, 182, 238, 249
Sunday World boycott, 220
 Sunningdale Agreement, 65
 superiority, sense of, 14, 31, 33, 70
 Tartan Gang Youth Wing, 58
 Taylor, M., 65, 70–1
 Taylor, P., 74, 77
 television, 52, 170–1, 212–13
 ‘terms of engagement,’ 122
 territorial interests, 29
 texts, negotiation around, 166, 171
 theological interests, 14, 29, 35, 52
 Thomas, Quentin, 123–4, 130–4, 151–2, 167, 173–4, 207–8
 Thomson, A., 29–30, 36
 three-stranded approach to talks, 131–2, 137–9, 158, 161–4, 226
 Tilley, J.R., 32, 39
 Todd, J., 9, 11–12, 27–8
 Tonge, J., 22, 24, 65–6, 179, 181, 224
 ‘totality of relationships,’ 110–11, 159
 tradition and unionism, 12–13
 training of paramilitaries, 61
 tribalism, 50
 Trimble, David (UUP), 21–2, 26, 44–5, 181, 184, 200
 in peace talks, 144, 146, 153, 162–3, 166–8, 171–3, 175
 Troy, A., 196
 truth, notion of absolute, 23, 29–31, 35
 twin-track approach, 146, 149
 Tyrie, Andy (UDA), 70
 UDA (Ulster Defence Association), 8, 12, 20, 37–8, 41, 43, 49–50, 52–3, 56–61, 72–3, 220
 autonomy within, 65–7, 127, 182, 238
 cf UVF, 109–10, 127–8, 211–12
 history, 64–8
 during peace talks, 79, 116–19, 123, 126, 141, 150, 156, 160; talks with clergy, 81, 83–6, 89; final stages, 161, 165–7, 169, 171, 175
 post-Agreement, 181–5, 187–8, 191–8, 200, 204, 228, 233–45, 247, 249–50
 UDP (Ulster Democratic Party), 13, 20–1, 24, 26, 40, 42, 58, 70–3
 and the media, 207, 211, 219–20, 223
 in peace talks, 78–9, 81–2, 112–14, 119–23, 126–7, 129, 141, 152, 155–6, 159–62, 165–9, 171
 post-Agreement, 180–8, 191, 234–5
 UFF (Ulster Freedom Fighters), 37–8, 56–7, 65, 67, 77, 86, 151, 159, 171, 193, 195, 235
 UKUP (UK Unionist Party), 153–4, 159, 162, 180
 ULDP (Ulster Loyalist Democratic Party), 70
 ‘Ulster says no’ slogan, 49–50
 Ulster Unionists, 40–1

- Ulster Young Militants, 57
 uncertainty, 39, 88
 undermining of peace process, 153–7,
 159, 176, 181, 187–8, 192, 195,
 197, 199
 unionism
 containment and change, 19–28
 and nationalism, 8–12
 and paramilitarism, 56, 59–62, 65,
 69–73
 and peace talks, 74–83, 91, 112–15,
 126–7, 131–42, 144–7, 149–50,
 152; Irish government, 94–9,
 101–5, 107–11; multi-party and
 final negotiations, 153–5, 157, 159,
 161–4, 168–70, 172, 174, 176–9
 post-Agreement, 180–6, 198, 208–9,
 211, 213–16, 218–20, 224, 230,
 236, 241–2
 religious tradition, 12–19
 see also Paisleyism
 Union, the, 7, 12–13, 23–5, 33–5, 47,
 49–50, 57, 59–62, 220, 231
 and peace talks, 88, 90, 114, 131–3,
 144, 151, 169, 174
 united Ireland concept, 8, 27, 31, 34,
 37–8, 47, 50, 58, 181, 184, 214
 and peace talks, 84, 88, 99, 111–12,
 134, 137–8, 142, 145, 162, 169
 UPRG (Ulster Political Research Group),
 12, 40–2, 52, 58, 64, 67, 71, 184,
 235–7, 248–9
 UUP (Ulster Unionist Party), 21–2, 38,
 46, 49, 51, 180–1, 183, 207–8, 220–1
 in peace talks, 133, 146, 149, 153,
 159, 162, 165–7, 171–2, 175,
 178–9
 UVF (Ulster Volunteer Force), 19, 29,
 45–9, 53, 56, 68–9, 73, 219, 222
 cf UDA, 109–10, 127–8, 211–12
 consultation and change, 227–34
 history, 61–4
 Number One, 50, 59–60, 63, 77–8,
 84, 113–15, 147, 186–9
 Number Two, 50–2, 60, 90, 92, 101,
 171, 174–5, 190–2, 211–12, 227,
 230, 234
 during peace talks, 79–80, 85–6,
 106–7, 116–19, 129, 138–9, 141,
 148–51, 156, 161, 165
 in peace talks, 89–94
 post-Agreement, 185, 194, 196,
 199–200, 203–4, 225, 247–9
 U.V.F. Policy (UVF), 62
 UWC (Ulster Workers' Council), 65
 vigilantism, 55–7, 59, 204
 violence, 54–5, 58, 60–2, 64–7, 69,
 71–3, 133–4, 233
 intensification of, 66, 78–9, 86, 92,
 113–14
 intra-communal, 56, 191–9, 203
 and nationalism, 56–7, 59, 63, 68, 70
 during peace talks, 81, 159–61
 see also feuds
 Volkan, V. D., 11
 VPP (Volunteer Political Party), 69
 Walker, G., 26
 Wallis, R., 9
 Warnock, Stephen (LVF), 197
 Weber, M., 13–14
 Wells, R. A., 80
 Whitbread Speech (Brooke), 76, 218–19
 White, John (UDP), 117, 121, 170, 187,
 191, 197–8
 Wolfsfeld, G., 217
 Women's Coalition, 162, 169, 180, 207
 Woods, I. S., 65, 67–8, 199–200, 220
 working-class unionism, 24, 26, 28,
 39–53, 62, 97, 103, 248, 250
 Wright, Billy 'King Rat' (LVF), 39, 50,
 128–9, 146–8, 192
 written constitution proposal, 72
 Youth Wing, Tartan Gang, 58
 zero-sum approach, 44, 49