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# 1

## Britain in Europe and Europe in Britain

*Ian Bache and Andrew Jordan*

The reason why the issue of Europe has been so persistent and so divisive is that there is a lot at stake. For the future of British politics there is no more important issue, involving as it does a reassessment of British identity, security and political economy, and a judgement about the relative priority to be given to Europe as opposed to other relationships, particularly those with America. Such choices occur rather rarely but when they do they often trigger political realignments which can constitute major turning points in the life of parties and states. (Gamble, 2003: 114)

### **Introduction**

The relationship between the European Union (EU)<sup>1</sup> and its member states has long been central to the study of European integration. Classic debates involving federalists, intergovernmentalists and neofunctionalists have revolved around both normative and analytical concerns relating to the power and autonomy of the state<sup>2</sup>. Nowhere have these debates had greater resonance than in Britain. So much so that the EU has become central to the practice and academic study of contemporary British politics.

Even a cursory glance at the domestic political developments in the period since Britain joined the EU in 1973 would amply confirm this view. The EU is implicated in such landmark events as Labour's long period in opposition from 1979, the fall of both Margaret Thatcher and John Major and the ensuing crisis in the Conservative party, and the origins and core political project of 'new' Labour. The political effects of Britain in the EU, or, more properly, of EU membership on Britain, have been profound. The European issue is emotive, politically charged and highly sensitive. Yet, for those seeking political power it is an issue that must be confronted.

Despite this, there is a curious imbalance in the academic literature on the subject of 'Britain and Europe'. While there is an extensive literature

on Britain's relationship with the EU (*inter alia*, Baker and Seawright, 1998; Buller, 2000; Daddow, 2004; Geddes, 2004; George, 1992 and 1998; Northcott, 1995; Young, 1998), there are relatively few detailed studies of the domestic impact of membership. The last significant contribution of this type (Bulmer *et al.*, 1992) has now been overtaken by events. Instead, there have been numerous studies of specific issues and sectors that, until now, have remained isolated from each other.

Moreover, the study of British politics more generally continues to marginalize the European dimension. While an increasing number of academics reject a focus on the traditional organizing perspective of the Westminster Model (Bache and Flinders 2004; Gamble, 2000; Hay, 2002; Pierre and Stoker, 2000; Rhodes, 1997; Richards and Smith, 2002; Wilson, 2003) for its narrow conceptualizations of power (for example prime ministerial vs. cabinet), its obsession with the machinations of Whitehall and Westminster and its neglect of the international context of British politics, the integration of the international dimension into the study of British politics has lagged behind other advances, such as the alternative lens of the 'governance' approach. The EU, in particular, continues to be often treated as an optional extra on British politics courses, both reflecting and reflected by its treatment in most textbooks as a stand-alone chapter somewhere near the end of the volume, following discussion of the 'key' issues. There are some exceptions to this treatment, which should be acknowledged. In particular, Gamble's (2003) book, from where the epigraph of this book is taken, puts analysis of Britain's relationship with Europe at the centre of the debate on the future of British politics. This is where we believe it belongs.

In this volume we bring together both established academics and a new generation of scholars all of whom are actively involved in researching the domestic impact of EU membership. Moreover, these scholars are collectively neither 'Europeanists' nor British politics specialists. While some authors are predominantly associated with one field or the other, many are active in the study of both the EU and British politics, while others approach their subject thematically. This mix hopefully ensures that we do not privilege either the domestic or EU dimension in our approach and analysis. On this, of course, the reader will ultimately decide.

## **Britain in Europe**

Britain's relationship with the EU has generally been variously described as 'awkward', 'reluctant' or 'semi-detached'. Prominent among these descriptions is George's (1990, 1994) notion of Britain as an 'awkward partner', built on Britain's early abstention from membership and subsequent behaviour as a member. This characterization has resonance with the British public's deep scepticism towards the European integration process. This mood of

alienation has not been helped by the failure of British political elites to promote the advantages of integration. Instead, a largely hostile press has been given free rein to highlight the weaknesses of EU membership and in so doing deepen the sense of scepticism. Divisions within and between parties on the EU have stymied the development of a more sophisticated and informed debate on the merits (or otherwise) of integration. This domestic dynamic has shaped a distinctive British approach to Europe, which needs to be understood when attaching the epithet 'awkward'.

There has certainly been a relatively consistent line taken by successive British governments in terms of the key elements of European integration. At its core, the British position has been consistently in favour of an enlarged and mostly intergovernmental EU, led by independent states. One of the alternative visions – federalism – is such a dirty word in British politics that no ambitious mainstream politician uses it in public. Equally consistent has been successive governments' desire to remain closely engaged with the United States. Churchill's words to de Gaulle, as the Second World War came to a close, are striking:

The Americans have immense resources. They do not always use them to the best advantage. I am trying to enlighten them, without forgetting, of course, to benefit my country. (cited in Bogdanor, 2005: 689)

Similar words might so easily have been uttered by many subsequent prime ministers, not least Tony Blair in the context of the post-9/11 decision to support the US invasion of Iraq. Others, notably Thatcher, may have been less pragmatic and more ideologically motivated in their support for the United States. The consequences, though, are essentially the same: at key moments Britain's relations with the United States and the EU respectively have created tensions, which have generally been resolved to the detriment of its pro-European credentials.

Alongside the classic view of Britain as an awkward partner is a similarly orthodox view that late membership has been to Britain's great cost. Because Britain joined the European club late, so the argument runs, the rules had already been set in favour of the founding member states. These were not merely technical constraints, but 'reflect the fact that the constitutional attitudes and political practices of the founding fathers were very different from those to which the United Kingdom was accustomed' (Bogdanor, 2005: 695). The constitutional foundations of the EU are based on the separation of institutional powers and political coalitions rather than the British traditions of a centralized state, informal constitution and an adversarial 'winner-take-all' style of party politics. Moreover, by 1973 policies across a range of crucial sectors had already been developed that – as this volume demonstrates – diverged from settled British practices.

Britain's initial reluctance to join the EU is explained partly by its 'special relationship' with the United States, but also by its commitment to the

remnants of its Empire and the evolving commonwealth of independent states. Together with Europe, these were seen as three 'spheres of influence' through which British foreign policy could most effectively be organized in the post-Second World War period. To commit to Europe at this early stage would, it was thought, reduce Britain's influence over the other two spheres of influence. Only as the realities of British post-war influence became clear, in particular through growing awareness of relative economic decline and the shortcomings demonstrated at Suez in 1956 (see Oliver and Allen, Chapter 12), did Britain apply for EU membership. However, its applications in 1961 and 1965 were vetoed by de Gaulle because he perceived British entry as a 'Trojan Horse' for US interests in Europe. The third application, lodged in 1970 following the resignation of de Gaulle the previous year, finally led to British accession in January 1973 (along with Denmark and Ireland).

These three applications spanned both Conservative (1961) and Labour (1965 and 1969) governments, with accession taking place under the Tory leadership of Edward Heath. It was Heath who recognized the need to do a political deal with Paris, and in particular to reassure the French that Britain would not act as the US representative within the EU: something the Heath government, if not its successors, faithfully carried out. It was the change of government in 1974 (from Conservative to Labour) that signalled the first significant challenge post-membership. Wilson's Labour party was divided on membership and, as a compromise, had campaigned for a renegotiation of the terms of entry. In the end, a cross-party alliance of political elites ensured a positive vote in favour of continued membership.

If the 1975 referendum was an illustration of British discomfort, the post-1979 Thatcher governments demonstrated greater awkwardness. Yet, even this was really a case of selective rather than complete awkwardness. On the question of securing a rebate on British contributions, Thatcher was relentless. She was undoubtedly 'awkward' in demanding reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and in her opposition to the development of effective redistributive (social and regional) policies, believing these to be an insidious form of 'socialism through the backdoor'. But on market reform generally and the single market programme specifically, Thatcher was a leading advocate and Britain a willing implementer of EU measures. In short, Thatcher's approach to Europe was not simply pragmatic – like her embrace of the Reagan Administration in the United States – but had a distinct ideological component.

While Thatcher's approach to Europe cemented her reputation as an 'iron lady', it was also instrumental in demonstrating her ultimate fallibility. Her inability to compromise on European issues both with other EU leaders and within her own party, along with misjudgements in areas of domestic policy, was central to her downfall. As Bulmer (1992: 1–2) notes, Thatcher managed to lose four cabinet ministers over European issues in the last four years of her period as prime minister.

Yet, we should not be too quick to see this as just a failing of Thatcher's leadership. It is true that her leadership style and the centralizing thrust

of her governments could not have contrasted more with the political and institutional patterns in Brussels. It is also true that after over a decade as prime minister, Thatcher had begun to believe in her own 'iron lady' image and appeared unaware of her increasing political vulnerability. However, the issues raised by European integration went to the core of the Conservatives' conception of sovereignty, political identity and particular brand of market economics (see Geddes, Chapter 8).

Her successor, John Major, fared little better and, with a much smaller parliamentary majority than Thatcher following the 1992 election, limped his way to defeat in 1997 following a succession of wounds inflicted by internal critics over Europe. This was despite Major winning a leadership election mid-term that he had called to silence these critics. Major's European problems were not simply inherited from Thatcher, because he in turn developed his own style of 'awkwardness' in the form of the Maastricht opt-outs on Stage 3 of monetary union (the euro) and the social chapter. Under his leadership, awkwardness metamorphosed into pure obstructionism following the 'mad cow' disease in 1996, when the government threatened to veto all non-essential EU business unless concessions were made on the ban on the export of British beef.

The defeat of Major in 1997 was followed by successive Conservative general election defeats in 2001 and 2005. The party remains divided, and while the big issues for British politics of Euro membership and the draft Constitutional Treaty have dropped down the political agenda, Europe is still the issue that most divides the Conservatives. All the indications are that unless the 'Europe issue' is resolved – or in some way or another finessed – the Conservative party may find it difficult to again persuade the electorate of its suitability for government. In 2005, the new leader David Cameron made a symbolic gesture to the Euro-sceptics in the party by withdrawing the British Conservative MEPs from the European People's Party (EPP) grouping in the European Parliament. That this may have damaged the party's relations with key players in the EU, was not Cameron's immediate concern: securing internal support was. Temporarily at least, Cameron had managed to 'finesse' the issue within the party: how long this would last once the 'big issues' of Europe re-emerged remained to be seen.

### **New Labour, New Europe?**

Despite continuing reluctance in some areas, Labour's position on Europe was transformed in opposition. The advocacy of withdrawal, along with its anti-nuclear position, was central to the biggest electoral defeat in the party's history in 1983. From that moment on, Labour began its long haul back to office with a succession of internal reforms and policy changes, complemented and driven by progressively moderate leaderships. The overwhelming vote in favour of Blair's leadership election in 1994 was illustrative of the scale of transformation that had taken place within the party. The

years of powerlessness in opposition, while radical Conservative governments led Britain further away from Labour's values both domestically and internationally, forged a pragmatism that was ultimately celebrated by the majority of the party and driven with gusto by Blair under the doctrine of the 'third way'. Large parts of the labour movement, trade unionists and local councillors in particular, had slowly turned to Brussels in the 1980s and 1990s. The Conservatives had closed the door firmly in their face when they sought more effective social and redistributive policies through national channels. In the 'new' Labour party headed by Blair, the EU was a friend, not a foe. Britain's interests were best served by working with and not against the key players. Of course, this new position did not eliminate the Atlanticism of the past. Rather, the third way involved transcending such dilemmas; that is, under Blair's leadership, Britain would be a bridge between the Europe and the United States.

The election of the Blair government in May 1997 was widely celebrated in Brussels. In opposition, Labour had spoken of the damage done to British interests by the Conservatives in Europe and promised a 'step-change' in Britain's approach to dealing with the rest of the EU. For Europhiles in the party, however, Gordon Brown's subsequent announcement just a few months later that Britain was not ready to join the single currency, did very little to put this promise into action. However, New Labour's decision to sign and implement the social chapter rejected by the Tories was an important symbol of positive intent.

But, New Labour's ability to 'bridge' the USA and the EU was tested to breaking point following 9/11. After widespread European support for the US invasion of Afghanistan, New Labour's decision to support the US invasion of Iraq soured its relations with key EU partners, particularly France. However, in an enlarging Europe, New Labour had more allies than in an EU of 15. Thus, while Iraq exposed old fissures in the old EU, it highlighted the prospect of a different balance of power between what the US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld infamously termed 'old' and 'new' Europe.

Yet, New Labour's scope for influence in the EU is not connected exclusively to its Atlanticism. New Labour's ideas, and particularly its relatively successful record of managing the economy, have become increasingly attractive to other EU states as they have come to face the economic pressures and attendant policy dilemmas that Britain had largely addressed in the 1980s. Moreover, some European partners acknowledged that Britain had moved from an Anglo-American model of capitalism under the Tories to an Anglo-Social model under Blair. The latter, with a strong emphasis on social protection illustrated by policies like the guaranteed minimum wage and working family tax credits, is more palatable to those member states seeking to restructure their economies in less Thatcherite ways.

But, this alternative model is still either misunderstood or rejected in some quarters. A key issue in the French rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in

May 2005 was the perceived British influence over its content that threatened social and welfare policies. Ironically, the vote in France (and subsequently the Netherlands) may have strengthened the British position within the EU and enhanced the prospect for a new European model shaped by New Labour. Not only did the vote damage the French, but it also allowed Britain to postpone indefinitely a vote on the Constitution that the government seemed certain to lose. In so doing, Britain was once again crowned Europe's 'awkward partner', although for once, there were many other candidates.

### **Still awkward?**

For four years, the Blair government tried to take Britain closer to the 'heart of Europe'. Things changed after 9/11, but British influence within Europe was not eviscerated and, if anything, experienced a slight upsurge following the French referendum. Constructive relations between Britain and member states hostile to the Iraq invasion had been rebuilt.

However, the prospects for British leadership remained constrained by its non-participation in the euro. On this issue, the outlook remained uncertain. The five economic tests set by Gordon Brown were in some respects a camouflage to disguise the real test: whether the government could win the promised referendum on entry. However, there was a further complication relating to both Brown and his department, the Treasury. Brown long coveted the New Labour leadership and so sought to create maximum autonomy to make an impact as chancellor. This political dimension was compounded by the Treasury's long-standing reputation as one of the least Europeanized Whitehall departments (see Bulmer and Burch, Chapter 3). Should Brown succeed in taking over the New Labour leadership and become prime minister, at least the political dimension would be neutralized. This would, of course, leave the considerable problems of confronting Treasury interests and mobilizing popular support for entry.

So how did the balance sheet stand on British awkwardness in 2005? Most observers would accept that the Blair government was the most pro-European since Heath's in the 1970s. Yet, fault lines persisted within the Labour party and British politics more broadly that kept Britain one step removed from the heart of Europe. While New Labour had high-profile 'red lines' written around the social security and tax harmonization parts of the draft Constitution, abstention from the euro remained the single most important issue. If this made Britain an awkward partner, it was no more or less awkward than Sweden and Denmark, who were also outside the Eurozone. Moreover, the relative Europeanism of the Blair government on issues such as defence and social policy served to expose how much British obstruction in the past allowed other states to hide their opposition to integrationist measures. Allen (2005: 129) illustrated this in relation to France and Germany, which vetoed the extension of qualified majority voting in a number of areas supported by the Blair government in 1997. If we add

to this the French and Dutch votes against the constitution, we should perhaps conclude that Britain should no longer be considered *the* 'awkward partner'. At most perhaps it might be considered a member of an 'awkward squad' in the EU whose composition fluctuates according to the issue and its relation to perceived national interests. In the concluding chapter, we return to consider notions of awkwardness in the light of the contributions to this volume. More specifically, we address the contrasting themes of continuity and change in the British approach to Europe, not least since 1997.

## Europe in Britain

As noted above, most of the scholarship on Britain–EU relations has focused on Britain's behaviour in the EU, to the relative neglect of the intrinsically related issue of how EU membership has affected Britain. The reasons for this neglect are to be found partly in the academic division of labour between Europeanists, who focus on the EU system, and comparativists, who focus on the study of individual member states. Of particular importance has been the dominant position of the 'Westminster Model' in the study of British politics, which celebrates the longevity and supremacy of national institutions (see also Chapter 2). But it also reflects a widely held belief, perpetuated by politicians eager to dispel fears about power being 'lost' to Brussels, that changes to British practice would be and have been insignificant. Wallace (1973: 91), for example, noted the feeling of quiet confidence in Whitehall before accession that Britain would 'not have much difficulty in coming to terms with the requirements of Community membership'. Earlier, Heath had fought hard to portray the EU to the British public as an organization which posed little serious threat to sovereignty and whose practices accorded with those of Britain's (Young, 1998: pp. 214–256).

In the first major empirical study of domestic adaptation to EU membership, which was undertaken almost twenty years after membership (George, 1992), Britain was characterized as a 'semi-detached' member of the EU, playing a full role in some areas but not in others. In the study, Bulmer (1992: 16) summarized the key features of Britain's semi-detachment as:

the reluctance or aversion to relinquishing national sovereignty despite the realities of economic interdependence; the slowness of British political forces in adapting to EC membership; and the unwillingness to confine foreign and foreign economic policies to the European arena.

Yet, alongside these features of awkwardness or reluctance were found examples of cooperation. Here, Britain's record on faithfully implementing the single-market programme was a key example. Moreover, the argument was made that Britain's assiduous approach to implementation contributed to its perceived awkwardness in EU negotiations: 'the principle of not

agreeing to any proposal unless it can be implemented, which may seem obstructive in Britain's European partners, is a product of the UK administration's legalistic attitude to enforcement' (Butt Philip and Baron, 1988: 639).

More generally, the study identified the different rates of adaptation amongst key actors and institutions: central government, local government, the political parties and pressure groups. Much of the adaptation had taken place on a 'technical level' as 'civil servants and interests groups learned how to operate in the EC process, rather than resulting from or leading to a political conversion among political actors in favour of the EC' (George, 1992: 203). The study concluded that Britain's political institutions had been particularly ill-suited to adapting to EU membership for reasons touched on above, namely: an aversion to ceding national sovereignty; an attachment to the United States; a pattern of economic activity that distanced Britain from other European states, particularly in the sense of having more global commercial links; and an impatience with visions of an 'ever closer union' to which other member states were attached.

On issues of coordination, the study found that European policy was in the hands of the European Secretariat in the Cabinet Office and, although the Foreign Office view sometimes prevailed, at other times the Treasury view was more influential. This was particularly the case under Margaret Thatcher, whose view 'more frequently coincided with that of the Treasury than with that of the Foreign Office, which she suspected of being too pro-EC' (George, 1992: 205). Both the Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food (MAFF) and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) were found to be influential on issues that directly affected them. The study concluded that the appearance of semi-detachment given by British policy might in part be the consequence of this institutional pluralism within the central state, given the tight mandates given by British negotiators. Despite this pluralism, the study found that 'a sustained attempt had been made by successive Governments of different political persuasions to play a "gatekeeper" role, preventing the process of European integration from dissolving their control' (George, 1992: 205).

While there was a 'steady' rate of adaptation at the technical level, the process of adaptation was found to be uneven across the administrative and political spectrum, as well as across different policy areas. On the latter dimension, it was found that 'the less high-profile and politically sensitive the sector, the more smoothly has British policy adapted to working in a "normal" Community manner' (George, 1992: 5). However, the study was concerned primarily with understanding the importance of domestic politics for Britain's European policy, what in the Europeanization discourse would be considered 'uploading' (see Chapter 2). As such, it did not explore adaptation in great detail and had no case studies of different policy sectors, save for an introductory overview.

With the relative exception of the Liberal Democrats, the political parties have spectacularly failed to try to persuade the public of the benefits of EU

membership. As George (1994: 255) noted, ‘not even the Heath Government made any real effort to convert the British people to Europeanism’. The fault lines within the major parties have been discussed above, but the biggest fault line in British politics over the EU is the one between political elites and the public. While there is scepticism over Europe at the far ends of the political spectrum, which overlaps the outer reaches of the Labour and Conservative parties, the political elite as a whole is far less cynical of European integration than the general public.

In this context, even relatively pro-European governments are heavily constrained in how they engage with the EU. As Allen (2005: 130) said of the Blair government ‘a Europeanized government has been forced to cut its cloth to suit a non-Europeanized polity’. One consequence is that in order to get things done, pro-European politicians end up speaking in one tone in Brussels and in another at home, thereby compounding the sense of public cynicism still further. The role of the press here is pivotal, most of which is largely hostile to the EU and prone to sensationalism in its coverage. In short, nowhere is the public debate over European integration and its effects more emotive, politically charged and, above all, plainly distorted than in Britain.

The George study adopted the ‘domestic politics approach’ developed by Simon Bulmer (1983). This approach emphasized the importance of political process and not just rational calculation in shaping EU-member state relations. It argued in essence that ‘Britain’s economic and political relationship with the world system is mediated by its national political system . . . *British politics matters*. Different economic structures, political traditions, institutional forms all culminate in different national patterns of European policy’ (Bulmer, 1992: 2, 25). In applying this approach to the study of Britain, the conclusion was that British semi-detachment was not a ‘policy dreamt up in Whitehall’, but rather one that had a ‘strong institutional logic permeating the political system, economic markets, and public administration’ (Bulmer, 1992: 29). This institutional emphasis remained prominent in the debates on Europeanization (Chapter 2).

### **Europeanization: a new analytical departure**

While the main aim of this volume is to document and better understand the domestic impact of EU membership, we do so in a way that seeks to add to our theoretical understanding of Europeanization more generally. As noted in Chapter 2, Europeanization has emerged as a central theme in the study of European integration because it raises new and important questions about the nature of the integration process and its effects on member states. Moreover, it emphasizes the interactions between the two: in short, scholars cannot fully understand either the nature of the integration process or its relationship to the politics of member states unless they understand both.

Featherstone (2003: 5–6) illustrated the growth of interest in the concept through the increasing number of academic articles focusing on ‘Europeanization’ and, through an analysis of these articles, argued that ‘the increasing usage of “Europeanization” appears to reflect a shift in the research agenda, as well as of fashion’. Bulmer and Radaelli (2005: 339) also noted the tendency of some scholars to use the term to ‘rebrand’ existing research themes. However, they identified in addition a number of ‘real world’ developments that have shifted the research agenda in the direction of Europeanization. These included: the institutionalization of the internal market, involving many new regulations for domestic actors to contend with; the advent of economic and monetary union (EMU), creating not only a single currency and an interest rate regime for the participating states, but also greater interdependency in a range of related policy areas; the increase in regulatory competition between states resulting through increased marketization; and, finally, the process of enlargement, which has necessitated a ‘colossal exercise in policy transfer’ (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2005: 339).

By the early 2000s, the field had started to consolidate around a set of distinctive perspectives, each of which has a particular understanding and definition of Europeanization. These perspectives, which are summarized in Chapter 2, have been tested in a range of empirical contexts. For example, scholars have recently looked at Europeanization in different sectors within one country (for example Germany – see Dyson and Goetz, 2003; Italy – see Franchino and Radaelli, 2004; and the new member states from Eastern Europe – see Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). Attempts have been made to explore Europeanization in a range of states within one sector (for example for environmental policy, see Jordan and Liefferink, 2004) or across a mix of sectors and countries (Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003). Much of this work is summarized in a number of books and chapters that seek to map out the state of the art in Europeanization analysis (for example, see the chapters in Bulmer and Lesquesne 2005a; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003; as well as Lenschow, 2006 and Radaelli, 2004).

The Europeanization literature is, as Chapter 2 explains, still relatively underdeveloped, and predominantly institutionalist in its orientation. The ‘political’ dimension, which we highlight in Chapter 2, is one that – given our discussion above – we expect to have some significance for at least some of our cases. We address the findings on this in our concluding chapter. To date though, the Europeanization literature has identified three headline findings, which are widely agreed upon.

Simplifying greatly, the first finding is that some aspects of member state structures and activities appear to have been more deeply affected (that is, ‘Europeanized’) by the EU than others. In particular, existing scholarship suggests that polities (that is, national administrative structures such as departments, parliaments and implementing agencies) and politics are relatively resilient in the face of Europeanizing pressures, whereas national

policies have been much more deeply transformed (Anderson, 2002; Jordan, 2003; Radaelli, 2004: 22). The second is that Europeanization is not the same as convergence. Some elements of national systems are said to be converging, whereas others seem to be resilient to centripetal forces, thus producing a highly differentiated pattern – what Cowles *et al.* (2001: 1) refer to as ‘domestic adaptation with national colors’, and Börzel (2005: 61) terms ‘clustered convergence’. The third main finding which is generally agreed on by scholars is that, despite the focus on the downward impact of the EU on member states, Europeanization is, in some respect or another, also a two-way process in which states also seek to upload their preferences to the EU level. Bulmer and Radaelli (2005: 339) suggest, ‘the challenge is to model the impact of European integration on domestic policy, knowing that at the same time domestic politics is a major factor at work in EU political change’. In Chapter 2, we show that scholars remain divided on precisely how to handle this in their definitions and models of Europeanization.

Finding explanations for the first of these two core findings continues to challenge Europeanization scholars. Olsen (2002) argues that they are in turn related to the flow of influence coming down from the EU as well as the pre-existing structure of member states. Olsen argues that EU pressures are more likely to have an impact in the domestic arena under the following circumstances: ‘the more precise their legal foundation; when they are based on hard law rather than soft law; when the affected parties (constituent units) have been involved in developing the arrangement; the greater the independence of their secretariat; if the secretariat is single-headed rather than multiple-headed; and the greater the financial autonomy of the institution or regime’ (Olsen, 2002: 933). These have in turn been related back to variations in the nature of the EU initiative or decision (the EU tends to disseminate policies as opposed to administrative systems), the malleability of different features of national practices (policies generally being seen as more adjustable than machinery of government issues) and the degree of fit between EU and domestic preferences and practices. The second explanation points to different characteristics at the national level, which mediate the pressures coming down from the EU. Because of these, the overall response at national level is highly differential, because:

the most standard institutional response to novelty is to find a routine in the existing repertoire of routines that can be used. External changes are interpreted and responded to through existing institutional frameworks, including existing causal and normative beliefs about legitimate institutions and the appropriate distribution, exercise and control of power. (Olsen, 2002: 932)

Our own approach to dealing with the third empirical finding – the potential for two-way causality – is summarized in Chapter 2.

## **The purpose and structure of the book**

Despite the 'Europeanization turn' in EU scholarship, there are surprisingly few studies of single member states across a range of sectors and institutions (the main exception is Dyson and Goetz (2003)), that systematically analyse and compare developments across a range of domains.

The contributors to this volume consider Europeanization in relation to the three dimensions of polity, politics and policy. This is not only a useful subdivision of the broad category of 'politics' that allows us to draw comparisons across the three domains, but also mirrors the approach taken in the comparable study of Germany. This study (Dyson and Goetz, 2003: 386) found that 'the overall pattern of Europeanization is characterized by the contrast between progressively Europeanized public policies, a semi-Europeanized polity, and a largely non-Europeanized politics'. Moreover, it identified an 'at best' loose linkage between effects in the three domains. More generally, Dyson and Goetz found that while Germany continued to engage intensively in all aspects of integration, its power to influence (or 'upload' to) the EU level appeared to be in decline. Consequently, the pattern of Germany's relationship with the EU was shifting 'from co-existence and co-evolution to co-evolution and contestation' (Dyson and Goetz, 2003: 367). We return to this study in our concluding chapter, where we draw comparisons with the British experience.

The contributors to this volume are experts in their respective fields who have actively been engaged in empirical research on Europeanization. While they have been asked to provide an overview of developments in their field, their contributions are original and research-led and thus go beyond the standard textbook approach of summarizing the existing literature. To ensure a common approach, they all agreed to work with a shared definition of Europeanization and a common set of questions. These are summarized in Chapter 2. We hope that this editorial guidance, along with the participation of all of the contributors in the activities of a three-year study group supported by the University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES) and a related Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) seminar series, gives this volume added coherence.

Our main audience is those involved in all aspects of teaching and learning connected to the EU and British politics, but we hope that it will also better inform the public debate about the effects of EU membership. The issue of 'Europe' in British politics has never been higher on the agenda, yet the debate still remains surprisingly ill-informed, refracted as it is through the distorted lenses of party politics and the mass media.

In the next chapter we discuss the concept of Europeanization and set out our conceptual framework in more detail. In Part II of the book, we present our first set of case studies on the Europeanization of the British polity, with chapters covering central government (that is, Whitehall), the

Foreign and Commonwealth Office, government in Scotland, the English regions and local governance. Part III moves on to consider the Europeanization of the politics dimension, with contributions covering political parties, organized interests, trade unions and the third sector. Part IV presents a cross section of policy studies, namely, foreign affairs, monetary, competition, environmental protection and regional policies. In the final part of the book we present our comparative conclusions and reflect specifically on the themes and issues raised in this and the next chapter.

## Notes

1. While noting that the EU has developed from bodies previously described as the 'EEC' and 'EC', for sake of convenience and consistency we use EU throughout the volume except for where citing material that uses these other descriptions.
2. 'Britain' here is used as shorthand to refer to the United Kingdom of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. For an informed discussion of the development of the United Kingdom, see Gamble (2003: 42).

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