

Contents

<i>Illustrations</i>	vii
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	viii
<i>Notes on Contributors</i>	ix
<i>Abbreviations and Acronyms</i>	xiii
Introduction	xvi
<i>Costanza Musu and Nicola Casarini</i>	

Part I The EU in the International System

1 'European' Foreign Policy: A Realistic Aspiration, or an Unattainable Goal? <i>William Wallace</i>	3
2 Europe's Grand Strategy: The Search for a Postmodern Realism <i>Pascal Vennesson</i>	12
3 EU Co-ordination in International Organizations: The Case of the United Nations General Assembly and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe <i>Paul Luif and Mariyana Radeva</i>	27

Part II The EU and the Great Powers

4 European Positions and American Responses: ESDP–NATO Compatibility <i>Bastian Giegerich</i>	43
5 Engaging China – Uniting Europe? EU Foreign Policy towards China <i>May-Britt Stumbaum</i>	57
6 EU Relations with Russia: Partnership or Asymmetric Interdependency? <i>James Hughes</i>	76

Part III The EU and the Management of Conflicts

7	European Union Foreign Policy towards the Balkans <i>Eva Gross</i>	97
8	The EU and the Arab–Israeli Peace Process <i>Costanza Musu</i>	112
9	Congruence without Strategy: Explaining EU Policies towards the Cyprus Conflict <i>Nathalie Tocci</i>	128
10	The European Union and the Western Sahara Conflict: Managing the Colonial Heritage <i>Jordi Vaquer i Fanés</i>	144

Part IV The EU’s Regional Policies

11	‘Conditionality-lite’: The European Neighbourhood Policy and the EU’s Eastern Neighbours <i>Gwendolyn Sasse</i>	163
12	The EU and the Baltic Sea Area <i>Nicola Catellani</i>	181
13	The EU and Euro-Mediterranean Security: A New Departure? <i>Sven Biscop</i>	195
14	The Making of the EU’s Strategy Towards Asia <i>Nicola Casarini</i>	209
	Conclusions <i>Spyros Economides</i>	226
	<i>Bibliography</i>	232
	<i>Index</i>	248

1

‘European’ Foreign Policy: A Realistic Aspiration, or an Unattainable Goal?

William Wallace

States have foreign policies. International organizations struggle to define and maintain common positions, with member governments suspicious either that their secretariats will gain too much autonomy in implementing common decisions, or that the most powerful member state or group of states will succeed in converting the organization into a vehicle for their hegemonic objectives. The European Union operates, often uneasily, between these two ideal types: not a state, lacking many of the attributes that statehood provides as a basis for national foreign policies, but with notably more authority to operate collectively in the world system than any international organization, including a wider degree of autonomy for its collective services, the European Commission, the Council Secretariat, and its various ‘High’ and ‘Special’ Representatives.

In the 35 years since the first meeting in 1970 of the ‘Conference of foreign ministers in the framework of European Political Cooperation’, the intensity of co-operation on foreign policy among member governments of the European Union has grown exponentially. There was, from the outset, a deep ambivalence among five of the six member governments about this French initiative. The Fouchet Plan, launched by President de Gaulle in 1960, had been a direct challenge to American leadership of the Atlantic Alliance; its failure had been followed by the Gaullist attempt to co-opt Federal Germany in support of French ambitions, through the 1963 Elysée Treaty, and then by French withdrawal from the integrated structures of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. All other member governments of the six-member European Communities remained within NATO, consulting on foreign policy issues with the United States through NATO’s Political Committee.

The Hague Declaration of December 1969, which registered the agreement of the six heads of state and government to launch European Political Cooperation (EPC), spoke of paving the way for ‘a united Europe capable of

assuming its responsibilities in the world of tomorrow and making a contribution commensurate with its tradition and its mission', but instructed the six ministers of foreign affairs only 'to study the best way of achieving progress in the matter of political unification'. The foreign ministers' report, nine months later, 'felt that efforts ought first to concentrate specifically on co-ordination of foreign policies in order to show the world that Europe has a political mission'. This modest and hesitant agreement to co-operate 'to ensure, through regular exchanges of information and consultations a better mutual understanding on the great international problems' indicates the degree of scepticism in several national capitals, both about French motives and about how limited 'the harmonization of their views, the co-ordination of their positions, and, where it appears possible or desirable, common actions' might prove. The agenda for the first foreign ministers' conference contained three main items: transatlantic relations, the Middle East, and how to respond to the Soviet proposal for a conference on European security. Given sharp divergences on relations with the US, and the sensitivity of Middle East policies in transatlantic relations, it proved possible to make progress only on the third of these (Wallace and Allen 1977).

1. How much progress has been made?

In many ways the foreign policy structures through which the European Union co-ordinates national foreign policies today have not changed in character since these first hesitant meetings of 35 years ago. Governments remain the key players, with consensus – rather than majority voting, now the formal decision rule on most issues within the 'first pillar' European Community – as the basis for common policy. Working groups of officials prepare ministerial meetings, and follow up their conclusions. Co-ordination of 'second pillar' foreign policy with 'first pillar' external relations remains imperfect, within national administrations as well as in Brussels and in the distinctive roles and competences of Commission Representations and national embassies in third countries. Co-ordination with 'third pillar' policies, on immigration control and anti-terrorism, is also poor. Procedures are slow, responses to crisis often inadequate. Implementation is the responsibility of each national government, as are the costs of actions taken.

On the other hand, the structure has developed far beyond the expectations of the six foreign ministers who met together in 1970. The handful of initial working groups has expanded to cover almost every region and issue with which national foreign ministries are actively engaged. Foreign ministries themselves are in close and constant contact – through secure communications far more sophisticated than the telex network initiated in 1972–73, to replace the intermediary role that embassies had previously played in communications among European governments. The Political and Security Committee, in Brussels, set up under the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997,

has partly displaced the role that diplomats travelling out from national capitals played with a collective body of senior officials resident in Brussels, interacting with the Council Secretariat and the Commission. The Council Presidency rotates in embassies within third countries as well within the EU, with regular meetings of staff, occasional joint representations to host governments, and some joint reporting. The EU operates as a caucus within wider international organizations, as Paul Luif and Mariyana Radeva describe in Chapter 3. There is a small, but expanding, common CFSP budget. A significant proportion of the Council Secretariat works on foreign policy issues, under a Secretary-General designated the 'High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy'.

Even further from the cautious expectations of 1969–70 have been recent developments in defence co-operation within the EU framework. Since the divergence between the United Kingdom and France over the relationship between the EU and NATO was reconciled – at least in part – by the St Malo Declaration of November 1998, a Military Committee has been established, supported by a Military Staff within the Council Secretariat. Slowly and hesitantly, a modest capacity for common military operations is being built, learning from the bitter experiences of earlier failure in Bosnia, and of failure to act in Rwanda-Burundi. In the summer of 2004 an EU-flagged force, predominantly French in composition, deployed in Eastern Congo within days of a request from the UN Secretary-General. In Bosnia itself, a European military command (EUFOR) took over from NATO the same year, working in parallel with an EU police contingent and the EU's powerful special representative. National and multi-national 'battle groups', 1500–2000 strong, were taking shape across the EU, their operational readiness rotating among different contingents: ready for rapid deployment in response to external crisis – provided the national governments from which they were drawn would provide rapid consent.

No other group of states has dreamed of achieving any comparable degree of shared structures and capabilities for common foreign policy. Yet the limitations to current structures remain painfully apparent. Co-ordination across the three pillars is poor, as several of the following chapters illustrate. There has been deep suspicion within the Commission's External Relations Directorate-General about the growth of the Council Secretariat, as representing an intergovernmental challenge to the Commission's supranational ambitions in foreign policy. The Commission's extensive network of missions in third countries parallels, and to some extent duplicates, the activities of national embassies, to the continuing confusion of third governments; the subtleties of Community competence alongside sovereign national policies are, after all, hard to explain.

European Community and national programmes in third countries operate in parallel, often only loosely co-ordinated, promoting democracy, human rights, judicial or educational reform, technical or economic development.

The provisions of the Constitutional Treaty to establish a 'European Foreign Minister' and an 'External Action Service' (EAS) offered institutional answers to sensitive, and unresolved, political questions. Ratification would have been followed by battles for precedence between national foreign ministers, jealous of their turn in the presidency limelight, and the new EU foreign minister, as well as between the Commission, the Council Secretariat and national foreign services over the role and staffing of the new EAS.

Repeated enlargement has further complicated the pursuit of common, or at least convergent, policies. The six West European governments who launched the EEC and the procedures of European Political Co-operation could, in principle, claim to share core international priorities – although the French government was far more sensitive about sovereignty than its partners, the German government more preoccupied with Central and Eastern Europe, the Dutch more Atlantic-oriented, and the French and Italians concerned about the international politics of the Mediterranean. The 25 member states of 2004–5, with two-three more due to join before the end of the decade, had far more diverse interests and assumptions. The EU from 2004 had more member states round the Baltic than facing the Mediterranean – with the prospect after the anticipated accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007–8 of also facing the Black Sea.

Spanish fishing interests around the coast of Africa cut across French and British interests in the political and economic development of Africa's coastal states. Distinctive immigrant communities, and distinctive continuing flows of legal and illegal immigrants, make for greater or lesser attention to Latin America, North Africa, Southern Asia and South-East Asia in national capitals. Historical legacies, of former empire or (in the case of German policy towards the Middle East conflict) of former wrongs, shape national perceptions. The arrival of eight new member states from the former Soviet 'Bloc', close and wary neighbours of post-Soviet Russia, has cut across German and French assumptions about partnership with Russia – as James Hughes notes in Chapter 6. That member governments nevertheless manage to vote together most of the time within wider international organizations, that they succeed in acting together on a number of international issues and openly disagree with each other on only a few, begins in these circumstances to look like a significant achievement.

2. By what standard should we assess what has been achieved?

By comparison with an established major state, the modest achievements of European efforts to define and implement common foreign policies look pitiful. The EU collectively punches below its weight in the international system. Its member governments as a group provide nearly 40 per cent of the UN's budget, nearly 70 per cent (as Chapter 3 notes) of the budget of the

OSCE: yet the United States and Russia play more decisive roles within both organizations. Member governments of the EU constitute the overwhelming majority of NATO members; yet, as Bastian Giegerich notes in Chapter 4, the United States sets the strategic direction of the alliance, and Turkey – and, indirectly, non-member Cyprus – contribute disproportionately to poor institutional relations between NATO and the EU.

Only within the World Trade Organization (WTO) does the EU operate as a coherent and key player, because of the clear allocation of competences over trade policy to the Commission. Even in this field continuing disputes over decisions in areas of ‘mixed competence’, such as trade in services, environmental and labour-related aspects of trade, make the collective European Union an unwieldy and often inflexible actor. The transformation of the EU’s immediate neighbourhood over the past 30 years, through a strategy of conditional enlargement, has similarly demonstrated both its particular strengths and their limited reach. The attempt to extend conditional diplomacy to Europe’s wider neighbourhood, without the incentive of promised membership at the end of the process of adaptation, has proved far more difficult to implement, as Gwen Sasse argues in Chapter 11.

Should our standard for comparison, however, be that of a state’s marshalling of its combined resources for foreign policy – or rather, since many smaller states do not attempt to pursue active foreign policies, should our standard of comparison be with the United States and with other historical great powers? It is easy to criticize the many failings of European foreign policies; but comparison with the indirection of Russian foreign policy over the past 15 years, or the self-centred economic focus of Chinese foreign policy, suggests that its shortcomings have not been unique. The European Union has not learned to behave like a traditional great power. Its member governments have not reached a collective understanding of their preferred global order or of Europe’s appropriate role within it. Its spending on ‘hard’ military power is small – but we should bear in mind that it is not directly threatened, and that the mobilization of substantial expeditionary forces for deployment to other continents would require a shared sense of mission and responsibility that neither EU governments (with the possible exception of the British and French) nor their national publics have learned to imagine. Its collective investments in ‘soft power’ – economic, technical and educational assistance to third countries, support for international institutions, contributions to peace-keeping, national-building and the promotion of stable governance – are high, if blunted in their impact by the looseness with which they are co-ordinated.

Comparison with any other collective state entity suggests, however, that this collective European enterprise has developed ways of working together far beyond those of other groups of states. ASEAN, the Association of South-East Asian Nations, operates as a useful caucus on a very limited number of issues. It has the collective attraction to mount occasional heads of government meetings with the EU, and to form the basis for

wider regional co-operation (through 'ASEAN + 3') with China, Japan and South Korea. But its main achievement has been to limit the influence of outside powers in South-East Asia, rather than to increase the influence of its member states beyond that region. The African Union and the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO) are too new to assess their effectiveness; the Arab League is in disarray. Viewed as a collective enterprise among 25 previously sovereign states, cautiously pooling part of their sovereignty to achieve limited common aims, the EU has real but modest achievement to its credit – the more significant if the observer concedes that some member states (Germany, Italy) began with an aversion to power politics and active diplomacy, from their historical legacies of two generations ago, and that many small member states had only modest and local ambitions in foreign policy. A collective foreign policy is, as Dr Samuel Johnson said in another context, 'like a dog's walking on its hind legs. It is not done well; but you are surprised to find it done at all'.

American dismissal of Europe's collective weakness partly rests on an assumption that hard power is the only power that counts: that a focus on 'soft' power is unmanly, preferring the persuasive charms of Venus to the strong arm of Mars. But it is also based on a dismissal of the United States' own limited foreign policy capabilities for much of the first hundred years of federation. American calls, after the Second World War, for a 'United States of Europe' envisaged the emergence of a federation comparable to what the US had by then become, capable of sharing the burden of Atlantic partnership and world leadership that the US had reluctantly shouldered after 1945 (Cleveland 1966; Grosser 1978). Yet until the Civil War the US controlled only a tiny army and a limited navy, relying primarily on the British to provide the global order from which Americans benefited. American leaders, from George Washington onwards, warned against an over-ambitious foreign policy, as a potential threat to the delicate balance of the federation; the fear persisted, as late as President Eisenhower's farewell speech, that the growth of strong international capabilities and the 'military-industrial complex' to support them would subvert the decentralized democracy of the American federation. Suspicion of Washington remains a powerful undercurrent in contemporary American politics, despite the strong perception of a shared external threat and the appeals to national unity in the face of that perceived threat.

European publics did not perceive a shared external threat throughout the 1990s. Anxieties over immigration, in particular about Europe's Muslim minorities and about Europe's intricate links with the Muslim world, had not converged into any comparable narrative of European solidarity in the face of a common enemy within the first five years after September 2001. There were terrorist attacks, in Madrid and London; but there had been terrorist attacks, from a variety of internal and external sources, before. Suspicions of Brussels, of the perceived remoteness and non-democratic character of Europe's common institutions, remained strong across the EU, even

within its founding member states. Officials and diplomats, military officers and intelligence services, therefore operated together within tight limits of popular understanding or support, reporting to national governments that attempted, uncertainly, to mediate between the two levels.

3. What are the limits to convergence?

European integration was designed to be an elite process, in which enlightened elites upgraded the common interest on behalf of publics who granted, in return, their passive consent (Haas 1958; Lindberg 1963). European Political Co-operation was designed, in turn, as an inter-governmental process, without the mediating role of the Commission to lead national officials to understand how best their interests might be shared. On French insistence, it was also designed so as to exclude a supervisory role for the infant European Parliament; nor were any mechanisms developed to report progress regularly to national parliaments or to meetings of representatives from national parliaments. This was a confidential process, among officials responsible to foreign ministers and heads of government; these in turn would tell their press and parliaments as much, or as little, as they thought wise about what had been agreed.

The chapters that follow illustrate the limits of this elite convergence. Officials in Brussels lack the authority to present the case for common action, except in those limited fields for which Community competence is clear. Multiple voices lay claim to some authority in setting priorities: the President of the Commission, the various Commissioners responsible for different aspects of external relations, enlargement, association and development policies, the 'High Representative for CFSP' and his 'special representatives' for specific issues, the President of the Council of Ministers – now often physically represented by the presidential 'troika' of previous and current ministers and the next in line – and varying groups of ministers of the larger member states. The officials who make this complex system operate have the skills to negotiate its different dimensions; but few outsiders, within member states or in third countries, can avoid confusion. An unavoidably opaque structure for making and implementing policy obstructs wider understanding.

More than this, there is no common discourse, no shared elite debate across national boundaries on foreign policy or on wider issues of European responsibilities in global politics. Each national debate draws primarily on national traditions, historical myths and cultural assumptions. Distinctive national media interpret international news through the perspective of familiar points of reference: one country's Catholic heritage, another's memories of past threats from Turkey, or from Russia. Different languages act as barriers to common discourse: the intellectual audience that *Die Zeit* commands in Germany overlaps only marginally with those who read

Le Monde Diplomatique. Different colonial links, and different minority communities, make Portuguese journalists and politicians more sensitive to East Timor, British more sensitive to Sierra Leone and Cyprus, Dutch to Surinam, Italians to Somalia, French to Algeria and Cote d'Ivoire. National ministers contribute to the shaping of common foreign policy against the background of the domestic audiences to whom they are politically responsible. Long-serving ministers become socialized into working with their colleagues on shared international interests; but their careers depend on them remaining attuned to domestic preoccupations.

Pascal Vennesson, in Chapter 2, traces the emergence of a loosely-defined liberal approach to international order, and its articulation in the European Council's 2003 'strategy' document: *A Secure Europe in a Better World*. Agreement on a common statement of principles for foreign and security policy, 35 years after the launching of European Political Co-operation and over 45 years after the launch of the EEC's external relations and development policies, was a useful advance. It was drafted within the Council Secretariat, under the direction of Javier Solana as High Representative for CFSP, as much for an American as a European audience, in the wake of the bitter disagreements over intervention in Iraq. Between the publication of its first draft, in June 2003, and adoption of a revised draft by the European Council the following December, it attracted little comment from Europe's media, and no serious enquiry from any national parliament. Three consultative sessions were held, in policy institutes in Paris, Stockholm and Rome, engaging almost 200 foreign policy professionals from think tanks, planning staffs and universities: the tiny elite of multilingual 'professional Europeans' who follow the evolution of common policies. The final document, as Vennesson notes, expresses a consensual understanding of European governments' preferred structures for international order – although the accompanying stress on European obligations in maintaining and strengthening international order had been watered down since the first draft. But no member government promoted a national debate on the implications of what had been agreed, or encouraged its parliament to address the issues raised.

Community regulations, European Parliament debates, the interventions of Commissioners and the responses of Councils of Ministers provide visibility for the operations of the European Community within national politics. Much common foreign policy, however, operates beyond the echoes of these sounding boards. The hard-won success of EU policy towards the Western Balkans, which Eva Gross traces in Chapter 7, has attracted much less public attention than the crises and policy failures of earlier years. The successful despatch of a European battle group to the Eastern Congo, in the summer of 2004, in response to an appeal from the UN Secretary-General, received only passing coverage in the European press – except in France, which provided the largest number of troops to the force sent. The evolution of European Security and Defence Policy since 1998 has seemed almost to be a secret

shared among participating defence ministries, hesitant to admit to their parliaments the implications of the commitments they had agreed. Even the number of forces deployed by different member governments outside the EU, on European, UN and NATO missions, is a matter which outside researchers may dig out with difficulty, rather than a shared public statement of how EU member governments contribute to global stability (Giegerich and Wallace 2004).

National foreign policies rest on shared assumptions, common myths and memories, strong institutions and – in most cases – strong leadership. European foreign policy can rely only on weaker institutions and leadership, looser assumptions, and diverse myths and memories. The intensity of interaction that has developed over the past 20–30 years, gradually extended from trade and development to diplomacy, intelligence, threat assessment and military deployment, has built a convergence of working practices – and often of working assumptions – among the officials involved. Small communities of outsiders, in Europe’s foreign policy think tanks, university international relations departments, even to a limited extent within the EU scrutiny committees and foreign affairs committees of member state parliaments, follow developments at European level, downloading documents from the Council Secretariat’s website and reading specialized reports on the Internet.

It is a real achievement that the EU has created this elite network, which now provides the foundation for a limited number of common external policies. As the rest of this book explains, however, the weight of authority on foreign policy remains at the national level, within 25 diverse member states. The governments of these member states have repeatedly declared their aspirations to achieve a common foreign policy; but they have not yet educated their parliaments or publics of the shifts in resources or assumptions necessary before such a goal can be attained.

Index

- Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), 222
Afghanistan, 48
African Union, 8
Albania, 98
Albright, Madeleine, 49, 50
Algeria
 Association Agreement, 197
 EMP, 195
 NATO, 206
 Western Sahara, 144, 145, 146, 148
Allied Forces Southern Europe
 (AFSOUTH), 105
Alliot-Marie, M., 46
Annan, Kofi, 128, 141
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, 90
Arab Human Development Reports, 200
Arab League, 145, 155
Arab–Israeli peace process
 converging parallels, 112–13
 elements of convergence, 115–25
 endogenous variables, 118–25
 ESS, 203
 EU ‘Big Three’, 118–20
 EU policy, xxii, 19, 30, 112–27,
 203, 230–1
 EU strategic culture, 124–5
 France, 118–19
 Germany, 119–20
 Italy, 120–2
 Middle East Quartet, 116, 124
 national interests, 118–22
 Roadmap, 116
 trans-governmental network, 122–4
 United Kingdom, 120
 United States, 116–17
Arctic Council (AC), 181, 185
Arctic Environmental Protection
 Strategy (AEPS), 191
Armenia
 Action Plan, 168
Ashdown, Paddy, 100
Asia
 ASEAN *see* Association of South-East
 Asian Nations
 Asian values, 215–16
 CAEC, 67
 CFSP, xxv
 convergence, 223–4
 CSCAP, 67, 221–2
 cultural renaissance, 215
 East Asian Economic Caucus
 (EAEC), 212
 East Asian Economic Grouping
 (EAEG), 212–13
 economic dynamism, 214–15
 EU policy, xxiv–xxv, 209–25
 European Commission (CEC), 210–11
 European economic security, 217–19
 financial crisis (1997–98), 214, 216–17
 foreign direct investment (FDI), 216
 France, 210
 Germany, 210
 International Monetary Fund
 (IMF), 216
 New Asia Strategy (NAS), xxiv, 209,
 210–11, 220
 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), 214
 security dimension, 219–23
 Trans Regional EU–ASEAN Trade
 Initiative (TREATI), 220
 tripolarization, 213–16
Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM), xxiv,
 62–3, 67, 209, 211–13
Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation
 (APEC), 212
Association of South-East Asian Nations
 (ASEAN)
 ASEAN + 3, 8
 regional co-operation, 7–8
 Regional Forum (ARF), 67, 221–2
Azerbaijan
 Action Plan, 168
Balkans
 Bosnia *see* Bosnia
 Community Assistance for
 Reconstruction, Development and
 Stabilization (CARDS), 109
 Concordia, 106
 conflicts of 1990s, 98–101

- Dayton Peace Accord (DPA) (1995),
100, 106, 108
- ESDP, 97, 98, 104–8
- ethnic cleansing, 100
- EU ‘Big Three’, 101–4
- EU policy, xxii, xxv, 97–111, 229–30
- France, 102–3
- FYROM *see* Macedonia
- Germany, 103–4
- Implementation Force (IFOR), 100
- Kosovo *see* Kosovo
- Ohrid Framework Agreement (2001),
104, 105
- Operation Proxima, 106, 107
- Sarajevo, 100, 103
- Srebrenica, 100
- Stability Pact for South Eastern
Europe, 109
- Stabilization and Association Process
(SAP), 109
- Stabilization Force (SFOR), 100,
107, 206
- stabilization to integration, 108–9
- UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), 99,
100, 103
- United Kingdom, 101–2
- Vance–Owen Plan, 99
- Ballesteros, Angel, 146
- Baltic Sea area
convergence/congruence, 192–3
EU enlargement, xxiv, 181–94
EU presence, 182–6
Germany, 187, 188
see also Nordic States
- Baltic Sea Region Initiative (BSRI) (1996),
xxiv, 181, 184–5, 189, 190, 192
- Baltic States
Russian minorities, 183
technical assistance, 78
- Barcelona Declaration, 195, 199
- Barcelona process, 19, 116, 197
- Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC),
181, 185, 189, 191
- Belarus
Action Plan, 171
ENP, 163, 176–7
- Berlin Plus agreement,
54, 105
- Berlusconi, Silvio, 91, 121
- Bildt, Carl, 189, 190
- Bin Ali, 199
- Biscop, Sven, ix, xxiv, 195–208
- Blair, Tony, 44–5, 49, 52, 60, 90, 91,
102, 103
- Bosnia
EU Police Mission (EUPM), 106–7
EUFOR/Althea, 5, 43, 54, 55, 97, 107,
108, 203, 206, 230
International Police Task Force
(IPTF), 106
Partnership for Peace (PfP), 107–8
Stabilization and Association
Agreement (SAA), 105
status question, 98
sustainable self-government, 106
- Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 100
- Brittan, Leon, 216
- budgets
CFSP, 5
China Country Strategy Paper
(CSP), 62
Common Strategy, 82
EPI, 170–1
European Defence Agency, 46
OSCE, 6–7, 33–4
United Nations, 6, 28
- Bulgaria
EU enlargement, 6
OSCE, 35
- Burns, Nicholas, 54
- Bush, George, 52
- Bush, George W., 52–5, 90, 142, 223, 230
- Casarini, Nicola, viii, ix, xvi–xxv, 209–15
- Catellani, Nicola, ix, xxiv, 181–94
- Central and East European Countries
(CEECs)
acquis communautaire, 80
Atlanticists, 48
conditionality for reform, 79
Europe Agreements, 79
former Soviet Bloc, 6, 77–8
G24, 78
OSCE, 38
post-communism, 77–8, 195
technical assistance, 78–80
- Central European Free Trade Agreement
(CEFTA), 171
- Charette, Hervé de la, 210
- Chechnya, xxi, 77, 79, 80, 90–1
- Chernobyl disaster, 173, 183

China

arms embargo, 57, 59, 68–70, 71, 221
 case studies, 64–73
 CFSP, 57, 58
 chambers of commerce, 66
 China Country Strategy Paper (CSP),
 61–3, 72
 China–Europe International Business
 School, 64
 co-operation scope and drivers, 61–3
 co-operation without
 co-ordination, 67–8
 Denmark, 67, 71
 development assistance, 57, 58, 62
 diplomatic recognition, 59, 60
 economic growth, 218–19
 Economic and Social Reform, 64–5
 Erasmus Mundus programme, 62, 65
 ESS, 57
 EU ‘Big Three’, 58–61, 65–7, 71–2
 EU policy, xx–xxi, xxv, 57–75
 EU–China Civil Society Co-operation
 Programme, 72
 EU–China Co-operation
 Programme, 64
 EU–China Manager Exchange and
 Training Programme, 65
 European Commission (CEC),
 61–2, 71–3
 foreign direct investment (FDI),
 62
 France, 59, 60, 66, 67, 68
 Germany, 59–60, 63–6, 68, 71
 historical background, 59–61
 Hong Kong, 59, 60, 71, 222
 human rights, 67, 69, 70–3
 National Indicative Programme
 (NIP), 62
 One-China principle, 60, 74
 People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 68
 security affairs, 67–70, 220–1, 222–3
 self-centred economic focus, 7
 Sino-European Trade Agreement
 (1978), 59
 strategic partnerships, 60
 summits, 62–3
 Tiananmen Square massacre (1989),
 59, 60, 68
 Tibet, 72
 trade and aid, 64–7

trade deficit, 57, 64
 Trade and Economic Co-operation
 Agreement (1985), 59
 United Kingdom, 60–1, 66, 68, 71
 United Nations, 59
 United States, 69–70
 Chirac, Jacques, 56, 91, 102, 119, 134,
 147, 148
 Christmas tree method, 81–2
 civil-military planning cell, 44
 Clausewitz, Karl Marie von, 22
 Clerides, Glafcos, 141
 Clinton, William Jefferson, 48–53, 142
 Cohen, W., 51
 Cold War
 ending, 23, 29, 195, 209, 228, 229
 military threat, 17, 24
 renewal, 32
 Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), 49
 Commission *see* European Commission
 Common Declarations, xxii
 Common Foreign and Security
 Policy (CFSP)
 Asia, xxv
 Balkans, 97, 98
 budget, 5
 capability-expectations gap, 83
 China, 57, 58
 consensus-driven foreign policy, xxiv
 convergence, 76
 defence, xvi
 eastern neighbours, 163
 ENP compared, xxiv
 intergovernmental method, xviii, 34
 Nordic States, 181
 Qualified Majority Voting (QMV),
 81, 165
 self-contained structure, xxii
 silent procedure, 29
 small-big divide, 39
 UN co-ordination, 28
 Common Mediterranean Strategy, 116
 Common Strategy
 budgets, 82
 Mediterranean, 195, 207
 Moldova, 174
 Russian Federation, 78, 80–5, 87, 92
 Ukraine, 171
 Commonwealth of Independent States
 (CIS), TACIS, 78–9, 83–4, 92, 167

- communications, foreign ministries, 4
- Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), 182
- Congo
Artemis, 5, 10, 21, 43, 54, 206
MONUC, 206
- congruence
convergence compared, xviii, xix, xxiv, xxv
meaning, xviii
- Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, 183
- convergence
Arab–Israeli peace process, 112–13, 115–25
Asia, 223–4
Baltic Sea area, 192–3
CFSP, 76
Common Declarations, xxi
concept, 113–15
congruence compared, xviii, xix, xxiv, xxv
converging parallels, 112–13
elite convergence, 9
ESDP, 44–8
European Constitution (draft), xvi, xviii
limits, 9–11
- Cooper, Robert, 22
- Copenhagen criteria, 109, 135, 142, 164, 173
- Correspondance Européen (COREU), 29
- Council for Asian–Europe Co-operation (CAEC), 67
- Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), 181, 184, 185, 187, 188, 189, 190
- Council of Europe, Venice
Commission, 175
- Council of Ministers
Cyprus, 138
GAERC *see* General Affairs and External Relations Council
lowest common denominator, 82, 83
OSCE Working Group, 36–7
summits *see* European Council
- Council Presidency
embassies, 5
presidential troika, 9, 36, 202
- Council Secretariat, High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, 5, 9, 10, 15, 80
- Council for Security and Co-operation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), 67, 221–2
- Council working group on global disarmament and arms control (CODUN), 28
- Council working group on non-proliferation (CONOP), 28
- Council working group on the UN (CONUN), 28
- Court of Auditors, 84
- Croatia
candidate member, 98, 109
secession, 99
- Cross-Border Co-operation, 184
- Cyprus
accession, 128, 129, 203
Annan Plan, 128, 141
Council of Ministers, 138
enosis, 128
EU Institutions, 137–40
EU policy, xxii–xxiii, 128–43, 231
external factors, 140–2
Greece, 128, 130–1
Member States positions, 132–5
NATO, 7
policy vacuum, 132–7
taksim (partition), 128
United States, 141–2
- Dayton Peace Accord (DPA) (1995), 100, 106, 108
- de Gaulle, Charles, 3
- De Michelis, Gianni, 121
- Debré, Michel, 147
- Denktaş, Rauf, 140
- Denmark
China, 67, 71
EU membership, 187–8
NATO, 188
- Derrida, Jacques, 13
- Donne, John, viii
- East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), 212
- East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG), 212–13
- Eastern Congo, EU operations (Artemis) (2004), 5, 10, 21, 43, 54, 206

- Economides, Spyros, ix, xxv, 226–31
 Edwards, Geoffrey, 120
 Egypt
 EMP, 195
 NATO, 206
 Rafah border crossing, 117, 204
 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 8
 Elysée Treaty (1963), 3
 Erasmus Mundus programme, 62, 65
 EU enlargement
 Baltic Sea area, xxiv, 181–94
 complexity, 6
 conditional enlargement, 7
 Copenhagen criteria, 109, 135, 142, 164, 173
 enlargement fatigue, 110
 fifth enlargement, 133–5, 138–9
 former Soviet Bloc, 6, 77–8
 EU Human Rights and Democracy Programme (EIDHR), 62
 Euro-Arab Dialogue, 116, 123
 Eurobarometer Surveys, 13
 Euro-Mediterranean Charter Peace and Stability, 206
 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)
 acquis, 200
 European Security Strategy (ESS), xxiv, 195–208
 Muslim democracy, 201
 politico-military dimension, 201–7
 re-launch, 200–1
 see also Mediterranean
 Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission (EuroMeSCo), 202, 205
 European Arrest Warrant, 20
 European Commission (CEC)
 Asia, 210–11
 China, 61–2, 71–3
 Cyprus, 138–40
 DG External Relations, 5, 168
 OSCE co-ordination, 37
 priority setting, 9
 representative missions, 4, 5
 trade policy, 7
 UN co-ordination, 28
 Western Sahara, 152–3
 European Community Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), 62, 153
 European Constitution (draft)
 convergence, xvi, xviii
 political issues, 6
 referenda, 13, 110, 137
 European Council
 Barcelona summit (2002), 105
 Brussels (2004), 136
 Cardiff (1998), 142
 Cologne summit (1999), 50, 81, 104, 105
 Copenhagen summit (1993), 79, 107, 109, 166
 Copenhagen summit (2002), 131, 136, 142
 Corfu summit (1994), 131, 133–4, 138
 Goteborg (2001), 90
 Helsinki summit (1999), 51, 90, 130
 Luxembourg summit (1997), 84, 130, 142
 strategy document (2003), 10, 12–26
 Thessalonki summit (2003), 15, 109
 Vienna summit (1998), 81
 see also Council of Ministers
 European Defence Agency
 budget, 46
 capability targets, 44
 European Economic Area (EEA), 164, 167, 182, 186
 European Foreign Minister (proposed), 6, 39
 European foreign policy (EFP)
 aspirations/goals, 3–11
 assessment standards, 6–9
 identity, xvii
 progress made, 4–6
 European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR), 203
 European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), 167, 170–1
 European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)
 Action Plans, 167–73, 175, 176, 185, 198–9, 203, 205
 Belarus, 163, 176–7
 coherence, xxiii–xxiv
 Country Reports, 167, 168, 172
 cumulative conditionality, 168
 eastern neighbours, 163–80
 evolution, 165–9
 grand strategy, 17, 19, 20
 hard conditionality, 164
 incentive structure, 164

- Mediterranean, 166, 197–9
- Moldova, 163, 164, 174–6
- regional security, 116
- Russian Federation, 166–7
- scope and limitations, 169–77
- Ukraine, 163, 164
- European Parliament
- human rights, 72
- supervisory role, 9
- Western Sahara, 150–3
- European Political Co-operation (EPC)
- China, 59
- conference (1970), xvi, 3, 4
- Hague Declaration (1969), 3–4, 226, 227
- intergovernmental process, 9
- European Political Cooperation (EPC), shared priorities, 6
- European security community
- democracy, 25
- domino dynamics, 17, 18
- enemies/emergencies, 22–3
- exportation, 18–19
- failing states, 20, 22, 24
- globalization, 16–17
- good governance, 18, 19, 20, 25
- international jungle, 21–5
- liberal constructivist worldview, 15–21
- neighbourhood, 17, 19, 20
- organized crime, 17, 20, 22
- regional conflict, 17, 22
- sovereignty erosion/institutions promoted, 19–21
- terrorism, 17, 20, 21, 22
- threat perception, 21–2
- unipolar international strategy, 17
- WMD, 20, 21–2
- see also* grand strategy
- European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), 49–51
- European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)
- Atlanticists, 43, 44, 47, 48
- autonomy, xx, 44–8
- Balkans, 97, 98, 104–8
- Bush administration (2001–5), 52–5
- capabilities, 53
- civilian and military crisis management, 43, 46, 50
- Clinton administration, 48–53
- compatibility with NATO, xx, 43–56
- convergence/congruence, 44–8
- Europeanists, 43, 44, 48
- France, 46–7
- Germany, 44, 47–8
- Lebanon, 204
- Mediterranean, 202–5
- Operations Centre, 44
- secrecy, 10–11
- see also* military activities
- European Security Strategy (ESS)
- A Secure Europe* (2003), 10, 12–26, 54
- adoption, 57
- China, 57
- Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), xxiv, 195–208
- liberal constructivism, 16
- military power, 24
- neighbourhood, 167
- pre-emptive action, 18
- see also* grand strategy
- European Union (EU)
- conflict management, xxi–xxiii, 97–160
- great powers, xx–xxi, 43–94
- international system, xix–xx, 3–40
- partial polity, xvii
- regional policies, xxiii–xxv, 163–225
- External Action Service (EAS) (proposed), 6
- Fallaci, Oriana, 22
- Ferrero-Waldner, Benita, 174
- Finland
- Arctic policy, 189, 191
- EU enlargement, xxiv, 190–1
- first pillar *see* Pillar I
- Fischer, Joschka, 47, 71, 72
- Five-Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), 222
- foreign direct investment (FDI)
- Asia, 216
- China, 62
- Fouéré, Erwan, 106
- France
- Arab–Israeli peace process, 118–19
- Asia, 210
- Balkans, 102–3
- China, 59, 60, 66, 67, 68
- ESDP, 46–7
- multiplier of national power, 118

- France – *continued*
 national foreign policy, xx
 NATO, 3, 5, 46–7
 policy assumptions, 6
 Western Sahara, 147–8
- Free Aceh Movement (GAM), 222
- FYROM *see* Macedonia
- Galileo project, 220, 223
- Gas Co-ordination Group, 89
- General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC)
 Burma/Myanmar, 211
 co-ordination, 28, 82
 Cyprus, 138
 Turkey, 130
- Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, 187
- Georgia
 Action Plan, 168
- Gerhardt, Wolfgang, 47
- Germany
 Asia, 210
 Balkans, 103–4
 Baltic Sea area, 187, 188
 China, 59–60, 63–6, 68, 71
 ESDP, 44, 47–8
 national foreign policy, xx, 8
 NATO, 47–8
 Russian Federation, 89
- Ghadaffi, Muammar, 145
- Giegerich, Bastian, ix–x, xx, 7, 43–56
- Ginsberg, Roy, xvii
- Giscard d'Estaing, Valéry, 147
- Global Mediterranean Policy, 116
- global or universal public goods (GPG), 196–7
- globalization, EU policy, 16–17
- Glos, Michael, 91
- Gnesotto, Nicole, 118
- good governance, 18, 19, 20, 25
- grand strategy
A Secure Europe (2003), 10, 12–26, 54
 ENP, 17, 19, 20
 foreign policy preference formation, 14–15
 meaning, 14
 mission impossible, 14–15
 policy institutes, 10, 16
 postmodern realism, 12–26
 strategic action, 12–13
see also European security community
- Great Lakes Region, conflict, 17, 22
- great powers, European Union (EU), xx–xxi, 43–94
- Greece
 Cyprus, 128, 130–1
 national foreign policy, 29, 32
 Turkey, 130
- Gross, Eva, x, xxi–xxii, 10, 97–111
- Guisan, Catherine, 22
- Gulf War (1991), 118, 121
- Habermas, Jürgen, 13
- Hague Declaration (1969), 3–4, 226, 227
- Hassan II (King of Morocco), 145
- High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, 5, 9, 10, 15, 80
- Hill, Christopher, xvii, 83, 115
- Hix, Stephen, xvii
- Holbrooke, Richard, 100, 142
- Howorth, J., 44
- Hughes, James, x, xxi, 6, 76–94
- human rights
 China, 67, 69, 70–3
 core values, 70–3
 EIDHR, 62
 European Parliament, 72
 Russian Federation, 90
 UNGA, 32, 33
- Hunter, Robert, 49, 51
- immigration
 immigrant communities, 6
 Islamic World, 8
- International Atomic Energy Agency, 20
- International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), 99
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 72
- international order, liberal approach, 10
- international organizations, EU caucus, 5
- international relations, war, 22–3
- Iraq War
 demonstrations, 13
 disagreement with US, 10, 53–4
 Mediterranean, 195, 205

- Israel
 Action Plan, 198, 203, 205
 EMP, 195
 Likud, 117
 NATO, 206
 peace process *see* Arab–Israeli peace process
 Rafah border crossing, 117, 204
 Second Lebanon War (2006), 119
- Italy
 Arab–Israeli peace process, 120–2
 national foreign policy, 8
- Japan, tri-polar system, 213
- Jensen, Uffe Ellemann, 188
- Jordan
 Action Plan, 198, 205
 EMP, 195
 NATO, 206
- Karamanlis, Costas, 131
- Kashmir, regional conflict, 17, 22
- Khristenko, Viktor, 87
- Kock, Will (prime minister), 134
- Koh, Tommy, 215
- Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO), 222
- Korean Peninsula, regional conflict, 17, 22
- Kosovo
 KFOR, 206
 Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), 100
 rule of law mission, 97
 status question, 98
- Kranidiotis, Yannis, 130
- Kuchma, Leonid, 172
- Lebanon
 Action Plan, 168
 EMP, 195
 ESDP, 204
 Hezbollah, 119
 Second Lebanon War (2006), 119
 UN Interposition Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 117, 122
- Li Peng, 71
- Li Zhaoxing, 71
- Libya, 144, 145, 156
- Lipponen, Paavo, 185
- Longuet, Gérard, 210
- Luif, Paul, x, xx, 5, 27–40
- Lukashenka, Alexander, 176–7
- Luxembourg Declaration (1991), 154
- Macedonia (FYROM)
 crisis management, 97, 104–6
 European Agency for Reconstruction, 106
 Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), 105
- Macmillan, Harold, xvi, xviii
- Maghreb, 148, 153, 155, 156
- Mahathir, Mohammad, 212
- Mandelson, Peter, 64
- Mauritania
 NATO, 206
 Western Sahara, 144–5, 147, 148
- Mediterranean
 Common Mediterranean Strategy, 116
 Common Strategy, 195, 207
 comprehensive security, 196–7
 confirmation to implementation, 197–200
 ENP, 166, 197–9
 ESDP, 202–5
 Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements, 198, 199
 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), xxiv, 195–208
 Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission (EuroMeSCo), 202, 205
 Global Mediterranean Policy, 116
 MEDA Programme, 199
 Mediterranean dimension, 121
 NATO Dialogue, 206
 PSC, 202
 safer environment, 125
- Member States
 ‘Big Three’, 58–61, 65–7, 71–2, 101–4, 118–20
 Cyprus, 132–5
 foreign policy activities, 7, 8
 national interests, 6, 9–10, 11, 118–22
 neutrals, 32
 no common discourse, 9–10
 nuclear powers, 30, 32
 OSCE differences, 37–8
 Turkey, 135–7
 UNGA consensus, 29–30

- Member States – *continued*
 UNGA distance from
 mainstream, 30–3
 Western Sahara, 146–50
see also national foreign policy
- Merkel, Angela, 48
- Middle East
 oil, 115–16
 UNGA, 30, 32, 33
 Venice Declaration (1980), 113
- military activities
 Bosnia (EUFOR/Althea), 5, 43, 54, 55,
 97, 107, 108, 203, 206, 230
 civil-military planning cell, 44
 Eastern Congo (Artemis) (2004), 5, 10,
 21, 43, 54
 EMP, 201–7
 expenditure, 7
 force/peace, 23–4
 Military Committee, 5, 43
 NATO assets, 43, 49, 54, 105, 206
 rapid reaction/battle groups, xvi, 5,
 10, 43–4
 shared sense of mission, 7
- Milošević, Slobodan, 100
- minimum common denominator,
 xviii, xxii
- Mitterrand, François, 148
- Mohammed VI, 156
- Moldova
 Action Plan, 168, 169, 171, 175, 176
 Common Strategy, 174
 Co-operation Council, 168
 European Neighbourhood Policy
 (ENP), 163, 164, 174–6
 Partnership and Co-operation
 Agreement (PCA), 165, 169
- Moratinos, Miguel Angel, 123, 124
- Morocco
 Action Plan, 198, 205
 EMP, 195
 membership application, 166
 NATO, 206
 Western Sahara, 144–53, 156
- Moroz, Oleksandr, 174
- Musu, Costanza, viii, x, xvi–xxv, 112–17
- national foreign policy
 France, xx
 Germany, xx, 8
 Greece, 29, 32
 Italy, 8
 UNGA voting behaviour, 30–3, 154
 United Kingdom, xx
see also Member States
- neighbourhood
 conditional diplomacy, 7
 ENP *see* European Neighbourhood
 Policy
 former Soviet Bloc, 6
 Northern neighbourhood
 agenda, 183–4
 security and stability, 20, 116
- New Asia Strategy (NAS), xxiv, 209,
 210–11, 220
- New Transatlantic Agenda, 212
- Nordic States
 CFSP, 181
 EU presence, 186–91
 Nordic balance, 182
see also Baltic Sea area
- North Atlantic Council, 49
- North Atlantic Treaty
 Organization (NATO)
 Balkans, 98, 103, 104, 105, 107
 Berlin Ministerial (1996), 49, 50
 burden-sharing, 45
 collective defence, 46, 50
 compatibility with ESDP, xx, 43–56
 Cyprus, 7
 Denmark, 188
 EU membership, 7
 European autonomy, 44–8
 France, 3, 5, 46–7
 Germany, 47–8
 Mediterranean Dialogue, 206
 NATO assets, 43, 49, 54, 105, 206
 Norway, 188
 Operation Essential Harvest
 (2001), 105
 Political Committee, 3
 Prague summit (1999), 46–7
 Response Force (NRF), 46–8
 SACEUR, 105
 Turkey, 7, 135, 203
 Washington summit (1999), 50, 51
- Northern Dimension (ND), xxiv, 84–5,
 90, 181, 185–6, 189–93
- Norway, NATO, 188
- nuclear powers, 30, 32

- Ojanen, H., 184
- Organization of African Unity (OAU), 145, 156
- Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
- Action Plans, 176
 - CEECs, 38
 - Chairman-in-Office, 36, 37
 - chefs de file*, 35–6
 - consensus, 34–5
 - EU budget contribution, 6–7, 33–4
 - EU co-ordination, 33–8
 - like-minded states, 35, 37
 - Member States' differences, 37–8
 - Ministerial Councils, 35
 - participating states, 33
 - Permanent Council (PC), 33, 34, 35
 - political dialogue stifled, 35
 - reform, 38
 - Russian Federation, 7, 34, 38, 90
 - United States, 7, 34
 - vocabulary deliberations, 35
 - voting behaviour, xx
- Owen, David, 99
- Palestinian Authority
- Action Plan, 198, 203
 - EMP, 195
 - see also* Arab–Israeli peace process
- Pangalos, Theodoros, 131
- Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), 130
- Papadouloulos, Tassos, 140
- Papandreou, Andreas Georgios, 130, 131
- Papandreou, George, 131
- partial polity, xvii
- Patten, Chris, 87, 166
- People's Republic of China (PRC) *see* China
- Persson, Göran, 189
- Petersberg tasks, 24, 104
- Pillar I
- Asia strategy, xxiv–xxv
 - Cyprus, 129, 138
 - external relations, 4
 - Middle East, 123
 - right of initiative, 28
- Pillar II
- foreign policy co-ordination, 4
 - Middle East, 123
 - Russian Federation, 80
- Pillar III, co-ordination, 4
- Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring Economies (PHARE), 78, 79, 167
- Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, 80
- Political and Security Committee (PSC)
- Mediterranean partners, 202
 - Priorities Paper, 28
 - role, 4–5
- Pöttering, Hans-Gert, 72
- Powell, Colin, 116
- Prodi, Romano, 70, 122, 166
- Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich, 78, 85, 90, 91, 92, 172
- Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), 81, 165
- Radeva, Mariyana, x, xx, 5, 27–40
- Rapid Reaction Force, xvi, 5, 10
- regional conflict, European security community, 17, 22
- regional policies
- Asia *see* Asia
 - Baltic *see* Baltic Sea area
 - European Union (EU), xxiii–xxv, 163–225
 - Mediterranean *see* Mediterranean
 - see also* European Neighbourhood Policy; neighbourhood
- religious fundamentalism, 21
- Rifkind, Malcolm, 120
- Robertson, George, 45
- Romania
- EU enlargement, 6
 - OSCE, 35
- Rühe, Volker, 47
- Russian Federation
- bilateralism, xxi
 - Chechnya, xxi, 77, 79, 80, 90–1
 - Christmas tree method, 81–2
 - Common European Economic Space, 87, 88
 - Common Strategy, 78, 80–5, 87, 92
 - co-ordinating technique, 82–5
 - energy, 79, 85–91
 - ENP, 166–7
 - EU policy, xxi, 76–94
 - EU–Russia summits, 87, 91

- Russian Federation – *continued*
 Facilitated Rail Transit Document, 87
 Facilitated Transit Document, 87
 foreign policy indirection, 7
 Germany, 89
 history of relations, 77–8
 human rights, 90
 Kaliningrad, 87, 183, 189
 Mid-Term Strategy 2000–10, 85
 OSCE, 7, 34, 38, 90
 partnership, 6, 85–91
 Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA), 78, 79–80, 165
 pragmatism, 85–91
 Ukraine gas dispute, 88–9, 172
 World Trade Organization (WTO), 87
- St Malo Declaration (1998), 5, 45, 49, 102, 103
- Saqiat el-Hamra *see* Western Sahara
- Sasse, Gwendolyn, x–xi, xxiii–xxiv, 7, 163–80
- Schake, K., 52
- Schengen agreement, 164
- Schnabel, Rockwell, 54
- Schröder, Gerhard, 65, 71, 81, 90, 91, 104, 221
- second pillar *see* Pillar II
- security affairs
 Asia, 219–23
 China, 67–70, 220–1, 222–3
 CSP *see* Common Foreign and Security Policy
 ENP, 116
 ESDI, 49–51
 ESDP *see* European Security and Defence Policy
 ESS *see* European Security Strategy
 OSCE *see* Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
 UNGA, 30, 32, 33
see also European security community
- Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO), 8
- Simitis, Costas, 130, 131
- Sloan, S., 52
- Slovenia, secession, 99
- Smith, Michael, xvii
- Soames, Christopher, 59
- soft power, 7, 8, 80
- Solana, Javier, 10, 15, 54, 74, 82–3, 104, 105, 124, 138, 165, 166
- South Eastern Europe, Stability Pact, xxii
- Soviet Union (FSU)
 collapse, 77, 183
 Trade and Co-operation Agreement (1989), 79
see also Russian Federation
- Spain, Western Sahara, xxiii, 144–5, 146–7
- Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (1999), 174
- Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA), 105, 170
- state, Weberian concept, xvii
- Stumbaum, May-Britt, xi, xx–xi, 57–75
- Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), 55, 105
- Sweden, EU enlargement, xxiv, 188–9
- Syria, EMP, 195
- Talbott, Strobe, 51
- Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS), 78–9, 83–4, 92, 167
- terrorism, European security community, 17, 20, 21, 22
- third countries
 diplomatic representation, 4, 5
 soft power, 7, 8
- third pillar *see* Pillar III
- Tiersky, R., 46
- Tito (Marshall Tito), 98
- Tocci, Nathalie, xi, xxii–xxiii, 128–43
- Transnistria, 173, 175, 176
- Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), 4, 63
- Tunisia
 Action Plan, 198, 205
 elections, 199
 EMP, 195
 NATO, 206
- Turkey
 candidate member, 130, 203, 231
 customs union, 130, 136, 142
 EMP, 195
 Greece, 130
 Member States' positions, 135–7
 NATO, 7, 135, 203
 United States, 141–2
- Tymoshenko, Yuliya, 174

- Ukraine
 Action Plan, 168, 169, 171, 172–3, 176
 Common Strategy, 171
 Co-operation Council, 168
 Country Report, 172
 ENP, 163, 164
 EU Action Plan on Justice and Home Affairs, 173
 gas dispute, 88–9, 172
 membership perspective, 171–4
 Memoranda of Understanding, 173, 174
 Orange Revolution, 172, 173, 174
 Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA), 79, 165, 169, 171–2
 Ten Points, 172
 WTO accession, 172, 173
- UN budget, EU contribution, 6, 28
 UN Charter, Chapter VII, 28
 UN General Assembly (UNGA)
 decolonization, 32, 33
 EU co-ordination, 27–33
 EU observer status, 28
 First Committee (Disarmament and International Security), 28
 human rights, 32, 33
 individual Member States, 30–3
 Middle East affairs, 30, 32, 33
 Priorities Paper, 28
 security affairs, 30, 32, 33
 voting behaviour, xx, 29–33, 154
 Western Sahara, 153–6
- UN Interposition Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 117, 122
 UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), 206
 UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), 150, 155
 UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), 99, 100, 103
 UN Security Council, composition, 28, 38
- United Kingdom
 Arab–Israeli peace process, 120
 Balkans, 101–2
 China, 60–1, 66, 68, 71
 national foreign policy, xx
 United Nations
 China, 59
 EU policy, 19
- United States
 Arab–Israeli peace process, 116–17
 Bush administration (2001–5), 52–5, 90, 142, 223, 230
 China, 69–70
 Clinton administration (1998–2000), 48–53
 Cyprus, 141–2
 foreign policy, 7, 8
 OSCE, 7, 34
 transatlantic relationship, xx
 Turkey, 141–2
- US–China Congress Commission, 63
- Valencia Action Plan (2002), 202
 Vance, Cyrus, 99
 Vaquer i Fanés, Jordi, xi, xxiii, 144–60
 Vassiliou, Georgios, 141
 Veldrine, Hubert, 118
 Venice Declaration (1980), 29, 125
 Vennesson, Pascal, xi, xix–xx, 10, 12–26
 Verheugen, Günter, 166
 Voronin, Vladimir, 175–6
- Wallace, Helen, xviii, xix, 113, 114
 Wallace, William, xi–xii, xvii, xix, 3–11, 227
 war, international relations, 22–3
 Washington, George, 8
 weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 20, 21–2
- Weidenfeld (Lord), 119
 Wen Jiabao, 60, 65
 Western Balkans *see* Balkans
 Western European Union (WEU), 49
 Western Sahara
 EU policy, xxiii, 144–60
 European Commission (CEC), 152–3
 European Parliament, 150–3
 France, 147–8
 Frente Polisario, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 153, 156
 ICJ opinion, 144–5
 Member States' positions, 146–50
 MINURSO, 150, 155
 origins of conflict, 144–5
 Saharawis, 144–5, 147–54, 157–8
 Spain, xxiii, 144–5, 146–7

Western Sahara – *continued*

Tripartite Madrid Agreement (1975),
146, 147

UNGA, 153–6

whether decisive policy possible,
156–8

White, Brian, xvii

Wildavsky, A., 14, 15

World Trade Organization (WTO)

ASEM, 212

China, 64

mixed competencies, 7

Russian Federation, 87

Ukraine, 172, 173

Yanukovych, Viktor, 174

Yeltsin, Boris Nikolayevich, 91

Youngs, R., 200, 201

Yugoslavia (former) *see* Balkans

Yushchenko, Viktor, 172, 174

Zoellick, Robert, 69–70