Contents

List of Tables x

List of Figures xiii

Foreword xiv

1 Germany in Comparative Context 1
- 1.1 Introduction 1
- 1.2 Why compare? 2
- 1.3 Rationale of the study 3
- 1.4 Book structure 13

2 The Development of Social and Political Cleavages in Germany before 1945 16
- 2.1 Introduction 16
- 2.2 Cleavage theory 17
- 2.3 The Lipset–Rokkan model 21
- 2.4 Germany in comparative perspective 23
- 2.5 Summary 33

3 Social and Political Cleavages in the Second Reich and Weimar Republic 35
- 3.1 Introduction 35
- 3.2 Development of political cleavages in the Second Reich 35
- 3.3 The Weimar Republic 42
- 3.4 Summary 46

4 Social and Political Cleavages in the Federal Republic, 1945–2002 49
- 4.1 Introduction 49
- 4.2 The re-emergence of political cleavages: 1945–49 50
- 4.3 The Federal Republic: 1949–69 53
- 4.4 De-alignment and electoral instability: 1969–90 54
- 4.5 Post-unification Germany, 1990–2002 59
- 4.6 The 2002-Bundestag elections 67
- 4.7 Summary 71

5 Partisan Identification, Value-Orientation and Economic Voting 73
5.1 Introduction 73
5.2 Partisan identification 75
5.3 Value-orientation 91
5.4 Economic voting 104
5.5 Summary 111

6 State Structures, Electoral Systems and Party Systems 113
6.1 Introduction 113
6.2 State and administrative structures 116
6.3 Electoral systems 124
6.4 Party systems 128
6.5 Summary 137

7 Political Parties 139
7.1 Introduction 139
7.2 Problems of establishing a single classificatory scheme 141
7.3 Fifteen 'species' of political parties: German parties in comparative context 145
7.4 Genus 1: Elite-based parties 147
7.5 Genus 2: Mass-based parties 148
7.6 Genus 3: Ethnicity-based parties 155
7.7 Genus 4: Electoralist parties 156
7.8 Genus 5: Movement parties 169
7.9 Summary 174

8 Competition and Co-operation 178
8.1 Introduction 178
8.2 Political competition 178
8.3 Political co-operation 196
8.4 Summary 224

9 Conclusion 227
9.1 Introduction 227
9.2 Combining the German politics and comparative politics literature 228
9.3 Applying key comparative politics concepts, models and approaches 228
9.4 Problematising the trade-off between depth and breadth, micro- and macro-level explanation 233
9.5 The balance between the singularities of the German *Sonderweg* and the commonality of characteristics shared by Germany and other nations 234

9.6 Finding a consistent theoretical framework: assessing the 'political marketplace' metaphor 243
9.7 Final remarks 246

Notes 248

Bibliography 250

Index 266

1

Germany in Comparative Context

1.1 Introduction

This book examines the phenomenon of party politics in the Federal Republic through comparison across time and space. In other words the book is both a diachronic and synchronic study and, as a result, draws upon two distinct literatures that crosscut the disciplines of political science, political sociology and political history. The first tradition is the German-language and Anglophone literature that focusses specifically on German politics and society. The second is a predominantly (but by no means exclusively) Anglophone comparative politics literature that eschews the depth and specific focus of the single country studies in favour of a broader lens that is capable of defining and explaining patterns of political development and behaviour across cases. By-and-large these cases are to be found in the advanced industrial democracies of Europe, North America and South-East Asia, but it will become apparent to the reader as the book unfolds that useful comparisons can also be drawn with political systems and phenomena in the developing world as well.

The broad purpose of this exercise is two-fold. First, by drawing on a wider literature than is generally found in single-country studies the book will shed new light on political phenomena and suggest new nuances or even explanations to students of German politics (and perhaps country specialists more generally). Second, it is also intended that the book will allow students of the comparative method to apply some of the key concepts, models and approaches with which they are familiar to the rich context of a single-country study. In performing both functions it is hoped that the book will problematise the trade-off in such a study between depth and breadth, micro-and macro-level explanation, rich description and abstraction, inductive and deductive reasoning, and so on. These are quite ambitious aspirations and it is up to the reader to decide how successfully the book fulfils them.

More specifically, however, the reader will discern that the book has two strands of debate – one empirical and the other theoretical in nature.

The dominant and recurring empirical debate problematises the balance between (1) the singularities of the German *Sonderweg*, or 'special path', by which the reasons behind the (often uniquely tragic) course of German social and political development can be 'read off' against the warp and weft of German history, culture and norms; and (2) the commonality of characteristics shared by Germany and other nations. The balance between the two strands goes to the core of the book's purpose – for if we can find robust explanations for the way party politics works in Germany today simply by referring back to some notion of the *Sonderweg*, then there is very little rationale for a comparative study such as this. It follows, therefore, that this book starts from the assumption that the *Sonderweg* narrative is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the analysis of party politics in Germany. More specifically, the study aims to make greater use of more comparative data, more often than has been the norm in single-country studies of this type.

Now our discussion of the rationale for the use of comparative data leads us to the second, theoretical, strand to the study. Once again, this relates back to the balance between the narrative of the *Sonderweg* and the need for comparison. For if we can construct robust explanations using the logic of the *Sonderweg* alone, then we are essentially working in the realm of 'thick description' in which, although theory is often used to great effect, it is not always essential. If, however, we are to use the comparative method then the abstractions of theory become central to our study – in order to impose order upon – and harness the explanatory power of – an often diverse set of data. These points are returned to later in the chapter, but first let us return to our motives for using the comparative method in this study and explore in greater detail the potential benefits from using a comparative politics approach.

1.2 Why compare?

Having read the previous two paragraphs the reader might be forgiven for asking whether using the comparative politics approach is not making life harder than it really needs to be. Why not work solely within the single-country format? It is clear that there is already a rich German politics literature available, primarily written in German but augmented by Anglophone scholars in the United States and United Kingdom, for instance. It is not necessary to name names at this point but a quick glance at the bibliography to this book will give the reader some idea of the fine scholarship to be found in this field of study. Moreover this book is only about party politics and as such the literature cited is only a sub-set of a much wider canon. But it is for this very reason that the book attempts to offer a slightly different perspective to the German politics mainstream – an approach that is designed to be complementary to it, has its own reasons for existence, and brings its own benefits.

And what are those reasons? Landman suggests that there are four of them (Landman, 2000: 4). First, that the comparative method provides 'contextual description' that allows us to deepen and widen our understanding of the political world. Second, it is a driver of classification, in that we are forced to render the political world less complex through the refinement of our classificatory schemes. Third, the generation of comparative data is a powerful tool for hypothesis-testing. Finally, the process of comparison and generalisation generates predictions that can be tested on other countries and datasets. The benefits that are generated are also four-fold. First, the comparative method makes social science more accessible and relevant to more people both within and outside the academy. Second, comparison helps explain and generalise findings across a range of settings. Third, it stimulates the process of hypothesis-building and refinement. Finally, when done well it has a positive impact on the researcher. In particular, it can challenge and break down the residual ethno-centrism of the researcher and force her to re-assess her understanding of the political world – not just in other countries but also on her doorstep. It is perhaps something we should all engage in from time to time.

1.3 Rationale of the study

It was noted earlier that the book has two strands – one empirical and the other theoretical. Let us begin with the dominant empirical strand. Broadly speaking there are five different techniques of comparison. These are, first, global statistical analysis; second, case studies; third, focussed comparisons; fourth, diachronic studies; and finally, pooled comparative research (Lijphart, 1971). These can be divided into two categories of comparison – 'large *n*' and 'small *n*' studies. Large *n* studies are quite simply studies that rely on a large number of observations, as a rule of thumb 50 or more (Sartori, 1970). The word 'observation' is used advisedly as we are not necessarily talking about cases or countries, although in comparative politics this is very often the case. For practical reasons – in other words, the need to frame, order and make sense of such a large number of observations – data generated by such studies is generally quantitative in nature and is often used to derive some form of statistical inference about the relationship between variables. Thus, large *n* studies tend to work at a relatively high level of empirical abstraction. By contrast, small *n* studies rely on fewer observations and work at a lower level of abstraction but make up for this with a more culturally specific (and culturally sensitive) strand of 'thick description' intended to draw out the nuances of a given political phenomenon. Such studies are more reliant on qualitative data but not exclusively so.

In practice, however, a great deal of comparative research does not fall neatly into such taxonomical categories but rather combines methods. By-and-large there are two reasons for this. On the one hand, restricting one's research to one particular method may not allow the researcher to address all aspects of the research question, whilst on the other, the use of multiple methods allows one to enhance the validity of the research – because each method serves as a check on the other (Read and Marsh, 2002: 237; see also Hopkin, 2002). For these reasons a great deal of comparative research deliberately combines different types of data or even distinct methods in order to achieve a 'triangulated perspective' (Denzin, 1970). Thus this book explicitly triangulates between quantitative and qualitative data and between the five techniques of comparison noted above. In terms of quantitative data the book draws upon primary data from recent Bundestag elections, as well as secondary data including statistical analyses of voter choice, value orientation, and other socio-economic data. In terms of qualitative data the study uses primary data from recent party publications and other official documents – including election manifestos and coalition agreements – as well as secondary data from the two literatures discussed earlier in the chapter. Moving on to techniques of comparison it will become apparent to the reader that the book uses all five techniques. It will be recalled that the purpose of the study is to examine party politics in Germany through comparison across time and space in such a way that will (1) add value and augment the German politics literature and (2) provide a single-country study with which to apply and test models and approaches from comparative politics. In order to fulfil the first objective the book uses the diachronic technique as well as the synchronic techniques of global statistical analysis, focussed comparisons, and pooled comparative research. And it will become apparent to the reader that the specific mix of the two techniques of comparison varies from chapter to chapter, as appropriate to the focus of study. But in order to fulfil the second objective the dominant research design is that of the case study – in this case party politics in Germany, as a sub-set of the wider phenomenon of party politics.

Sartori draws a distinction between case studies as a comparative method *per se* and as a method with some merit within the context of a wider comparative analysis (Sartori, 1994: 23). By this he means that case studies can only be regarded as a good method of comparison if a well-defined and operational theoretical framework informs them. This is echoed by Rose, who argues that it is the presence of such an operational framework – capable of application across cases – that makes a study comparative (Rose, 1991: 449).

Lijphart divides case studies up into five ideal types. These are (1) interpretative case studies using existing theory; (2) hypothesis-generating case studies; (3) case studies used to interrogate or test a theory; (4) studies used to confirm a theory; and (5) so-called 'deviant' studies (Lijphart, 1971: 691–3). Again, this is a useful taxonomical exercise but such classifications do not always apply in practice. In particular, as Mackie and Marsh observe, Lijphart's first category of case study is not strictly comparative anyway and the other four ideal types are not necessarily comparative either. They can only be considered comparative if 'they use and assess the utility of concepts developed elsewhere … test some general theory or hypothesis, or generate concepts to be of use elsewhere' (Mackie and Marsh, 1995: 177). As will become apparent, this study does just that – using and testing the utility of concepts developed elsewhere and covering three out of the five categories. Obviously the use of existing models and approaches to comparative politics is interpretative rather than comparative, in keeping with Lijphart's first classification, but the study also conforms to the third ('theory informing') and fourth ('theory confirming') ideal types. This discussion is returned to in the conclusion to the book.

It must be remembered, however, that the triangulation of data in the manner described above means that the study uses different levels of analysis and poses two questions that must be resolved. On the one hand it raises the possibility that the study is vulnerable to the problem of individualist and/or ecological fallacies. As Landman point out, this occurs 'when inferences are drawn about one level of analysis using evidence from another' (Landman, 2000: 49). In order to resolve this problem the book uses the 'principle of direct measurement' (Scheuch, 1969). This means that conclusions about individual-level phenomena such as partisan orientation are only drawn from individual-level data, such as sample surveys and censuses, and those relating to ecological-level phenomena such as political culture or the degree to which a state is authoritarian are only drawn from ecological-level data, such as aggregate data from electoral districts, sub-national tiers of government, and so on. This principle is all the more important given that the book draws upon such a diverse secondary literature. As a result much is made of 'non-editorialised' data from tables and figures that are re-interpreted by the author.

The debate above leads us to the second question that must be resolved, namely the underlying ontological and epistemological position of the book. And obviously this leads us to a discussion of the second, theoretical, strand of the study. The consequences of one's chosen mix of micro-political analysis, using individual-level data, and macro-political analysis, using more ecological data, are part of the so-called 'structure–agency' debate (Hay, 1995). Studies that adopt micro-level explanations are implicitly making claims about the primacy of agency in explaining political phenomena, whilst those that use predominantly macro-level data tend to be focussed on the role of structure. Although not universally considered to be important, some scholars make very strong claims about the need to have a consistent position in this regard and make it explicit (see Marsh and Furlong, 2002). In principle they are right, but in practice it is not always possible to make one's position as explicit as one would wish. This is because the type of explanation one makes is to a great extent driven by the type of data available. Thus, the underlying position of the book is that political agency lies at the heart of political phenomena, but that political agents are constrained by the institutional setting within which they operate. Therefore, where possible the book uses individual-level data from Germany and further afield but, as is discussed in Chapter 2, those elements of diachronic analysis in the book are heavily reliant on macro-historical accounts, most notably the work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967). Similarly the book is grounded in the idea of rational action on the part of individuals (voters and non-voters, party members and members of elites) and uses models and approaches (post-materialism, economic voting, political elites, deductive models of coalition behaviour, and so on) appropriate to this position. At the same time, however, the idea of institutions as constraints upon political agency includes structural variables (such as political culture, socio-economic development and class structure, etc.) and therefore draws upon work (for instance, relating to cleavage structures and voter alignments) that are appropriate in that respect. In other words, the approach of the book is in line with the idea of Weale's concept of 'idioms of analysis' (Weale, 1992). As Weale observes, one's choice of 'idiom' depends upon the extent to which it 'provide(s) a way of talking about, and therefore understanding, political processes'. In contrast to Marsh and Furlong's position, Weale argues that not only are such idioms not mutually exclusive but that their internal components are often only loosely related to each other. As a result, Weale suggests that the analyst may have to draw upon a quite heterogeneous literature, given that 'there sometimes is no canonical source to which one can go' (Weale, 1992: 38). It will become clear to the reader that in the case of this study there is certainly no canonical source on which the book draws. In the end, the study is carried out in the knowledge that what is important is that one is aware of and makes explicit the underlying epistemological tensions inherent in its approach and makes sure one does not compare apples with oranges.

Having said that, however, we do need to impose some form of loose theoretical framework upon the study in order to make clear what it is we are examining, why we consider it to be important and what specifically we are trying to say about it. In other words, we need some form of heuristic theoretical device that will knit together our diverse models and data into a coherent narrative. But what kind of theoretical framework are we looking for and what are our ambitions for the framework? Moreover, can we find a framework that satisfies our theoretical ambitions and yet is able to stand up empirically?

A good starting point would be to consider trying to embed our account of party politics in Germany within the narrative of normative democratic theory. Ware (1987a) provides a thorough account of how this has been done elsewhere in the literature (and, incidentally, also highlights how the empirical study of party politics has become somewhat disinterested in the normative dimension of party activity over the last 40 or 50 years). Although by no means identical to this study, Ware's book addresses many of the theoretical and empirical issues that are engaged with in this volume and therefore the next few pages draw heavily upon his original discussion.

Ware's analysis was built around three questions. First, what are the different elements of democracy? Second, what are political parties? And third, how have theorists seen the role of parties in facilitating or constraining democracy in society? (ibid: 7). Let us deal with each in turn.

In terms of the first question, Ware argues that the debate between political theorists can be framed within three elements – (1) interest optimalisation; (2) the exercise of control; and (3) civic orientation. Beyond that, however, there is little agreement over the relative importance of these elements and how they should relate to each other. In terms of the first element, Ware uses the assertion of Thompson that the key to democratic legitimacy is the ability of the state to 'satisfy the interests of the greatest possible number of citizens' (1970: 41) as a starting point but observes that this leaves open the question of what are citizens interests and how can they be satisfied? Some theorists would argue that it is the 'outputs' of the political process that are important, focussing for instance on the distribution of resources in society (Irish and Prothro, 1971) or the degree of match between individual preferences and collective choice (Arrow, 1951). Others would argue that it is the procedural or 'input' side of the equation that is important and that all that is required is 'some degree of freedom of communication and organisation … (as a) … necessary condition for the formation, expression and aggregation of political preferences' (Barry, 1979: 156–7). Thus, although there must be some link between procedures, preferences and outcomes, the process and outcomes of collective choice in complex democracies will not necessarily – indeed cannot in practice – accurately reflect the distribution of preferences (Riker, 1982). This leads us to the second element of democracy, namely the exercise of control over the government and ancillary organisations by the people – and again, we find that theorists disagree on *what* and *the degree to what* can be controlled by citizens. At what we might label the minimalist (some might use the word pessimist) end of the spectrum we find scholars such as Riker (1982), Sartori (1962) and Schumpeter (1943) who argue that a democracy needs little more than the minimum requirement that citizens are able if they so wish to remove governments at periodic elections. In most cases this would imply electoral competition but taken at face value Sartori at least would argue that this is not necessary as long as individual leaders can be removed. A more elaborate (or optimistic) view of democracy would argue that mechanisms must exist that enable citizens to exercise other forms of participation and control. But again there is disagreement about the nature of preferences and whether these mechanisms exist to reflect existing preferences or – in their more participatory manifestations – to actually help form and enhance the nature of citizens' preferences (Ware, 1987a: 9–10). Which leads us to the third element, that of civic orientation – or in other words what kind of objectives should citizens be pursuing in the field of the 'political'? Here it is possible to follow in the footsteps of Rousseau and argue that participation is the means by which individuals'

Weltbild becomes less self-regarding and acquires an other-regarding character. Alternatively, one might argue the classic liberal case and assert that the nature of individuals' preferences is of little or no interest and that it is the ability of individuals to express and promote their preferences, subject to certain restrictions on the externalities of these actions, which is important. Crudely put, therefore, the debate about civic orientation can be seen as a choice between 'the general will' and 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness' – with the former approach attaching more weight to the participatory element of the democratic process.

Let us now move on to Ware's second question, what are political parties? As Ware rightly points out, this is not an easy question and he reminds us that there is a danger of setting too narrow a definition – and thus excluding certain organisational forms – or coming up with something that is so wide and amorphous that it is of little or no analytical value. Ware uses Janda's definition of political parties as 'organisations that pursue a goal of placing their avowed representatives in government positions' (Janda, 1980: 5) in order to demonstrate this problem. As Ware observes, not all parties want to place their members in government and, even if we relax the assumption to mean merely to 'exercise control' over government, then organisations that are not parties, such as the Christian militias in Lebanon of the 1980s, would fall into this category. Alternatively, we might want to specify a certain set of means by which political parties pursue control over government – thus discriminating between, say, the IRA and Sinn Fein (admittedly a distinction that has at certain times and places been somewhat blurred). On the one hand we can see how this specification would work. On the other, however, Ware demonstrates that this would exclude the Chinese Communist Party during its period of conflict with the Kuomintang in the 1920s and 1930s when, although its operational posture was overwhelmingly military, it never ceased to be regarded by itself and others as a political party. Under conditions of repression, moreover, political parties are often forced to eschew many orthodox political-party activities and operate more like a 'sect', using secrecy and a restricted membership to maintain their activities. Paterson (1976) for instance describes how the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) survived the Third Reich in this way and how, after the collapse of National Socialism in 1945, party members queued up with their membership cards to bring their subscription cards up to date. Indeed, some even dug up party banners that had been buried in back gardens and allotments during the Nazi years. Buttressed by a provisional leadership in exile, the SPD was clearly a party that maintained a continuity of existence between 1933 and 1945 – albeit not in the form that would have been the case under democratic conditions – and any global definition of political party must be able to encompass this. Finally, Ware makes it clear that, although control over government within a specific state might be the immediate objective of a political party, for some parties this is more of a means rather than an end.

Thus, before the fall of the Soviet Union, national Communist parties saw themselves as part of a wider internationalist revolutionary project, of which taking control of the nation-state in which they found themselves was just a part. Similarly, according to Ware, the German Greens 'conceives itself as the German wing of a wider movement' (Ware, 1987a: 18).

We now move on to third of Ware's three questions – how do parties advance democracy? It should be pointed out at this juncture that this question is especially important in the German context. There are three reasons for this. First, in the Federal Republic there was until relatively recently a strong sense that German democracy had shallow roots and that the German state was compelled to harness all means possible in order to protect and nurture them. This manifested itself in the constitutional doctrine of 'militant democracy'. Second, and more specific to this study, the Federal Republic is the first fully – fledged party democracy in German history in which parties have been placed at the centre of the state and society – in a manner that was not the case under previous constitutional settlements. Finally, because of both the doctrine of militant democracy and the central role afforded to political parties, the collective fortunes of both the parties and the state itself are seen as inextricably linked (see Paterson, 1987). As a result any lack of legitimacy or sub-optimal performance on the part of political parties is regarded by elites as a potential threat to the democratic settlement and even of the German state itself. These arguments are returned to and examined in more depth elsewhere in the book.

Leaving the German case to one side, then, what are Ware's arguments in relation to the role that political parties play in enhancing democracy? Let us start with the first element of democratic practice – the optimalisation or aggregation of interests. Focussing in on those approaches that consider interest aggregation as the key element of democratic practice, Ware identifies three distinct strands of thought (ibid: 23). First, scholars working within the New Right or neo-liberal tradition and who advocate as small a state as possible would regard organised political parties, and sometimes even the wider mechanisms of representative democracy itself, as antithetical to the workings of the market by which individual preferences are most efficiently satisfied. Thus parties act as intervening institutions that distort the aggregation of individual preferences and serve to undermine the process of collective choice. Moreover, once in power, elected politicians find it hard to resist the temptation to manipulate the political economy in order to secure re-election – thus further skewing the market clearing of interests (see Tufte, 1978, for instance). Second, we find the pluralist and neo-pluralist schools that argue that political parties perform a useful role in structuring the vote, but that the principal organisational platform for articulating preferences within the polity is the interest group (Truman, 1951; Dahl and Lindblom, 1953; Dahl, 1956, 1961). Third, there is the school of thought that would argue that it is the electoral process itself that is central to the aggregation of preferences and that the party system(s) and the individual parties play a crucial role in structuring voter choices, eliminating irrelevant alternatives and thus preventing electoral cycling and instability (Shepsle, 1979; see also Weale, 1984; Shepsle and Weingast, 1989). In these accounts it is the number of parties within the party system that is often crucial and, in keeping with the idea of 'responsible' party government, two-party majoritarian systems tend to be favoured over multi-party systems because (1) they offer clearer alternatives to voters; and (2) there is a more transparent link between the aggregation of voters' choices and governmental outcomes. As will become apparent elsewhere in this study, the German party system does not conform to this ideal type and governmental outcomes tend to be determined in the 'smoke-filled rooms' of coalition negotiations rather than on election day. Thus, they are only tangentially linked to the aggregation of voter choice.

We now move on to the second element of the democratic process, namely the exercise of popular control by citizens over the government. In theory there are two ways in which political parties might help or hinder this process. On the one hand they might drive 'their' governments on to exceed their remits and pursue unpopular policies, whilst on the other they can provide a buffer between government and the electorate, thus providing the breathing space for government to do its job. In more recent years, however, focus has shifted to the degree to which the internal decision-making processes of parties serve as a check on governmental power (see Katz and Mair, 1995; also Lees, 2001) and a normative strand of theory has emerged that advocates 'weak' party structures in order to prevent the 'capture' of party organisations by unrepresentative groups. In particular, there has been a fear that the bureaucratisation and professionalisation of political parties have made them vulnerable to capture by groups with an interest in the extension of state power (Brittan, 1975). Once again, it will become clear to the reader that this is an issue that is highly pertinent to conditions in the Federal Republic where, as already noted, the penetration of the state by political parties is part of the post-1949 constitutional settlement.

Finally, let us consider Ware's third element of the democratic process – that of civic orientation. Amongst scholars who consider this element of democracy to be crucial, we find a division between those who consider political parties to be unnecessary and divisive barriers to individual participation and development and those who regard political parties as crucial conduits for participation and the development of other-regarding values and behaviour. In particular, this latter school regards political parties as also performing a disciplinary role in educating the public about societal interests and the limits of personal preferences. As will become apparent later in this study, this disciplinary/educative function is central to the theory and practice of democracy in the Federal Republic, where political parties were used overtly in the post-war years to inculcate and consolidate democratic values and practice after the fall of the Third Reich.

So, having discussed in general terms the role of political parties in the democratic process, what approach does this study take? In the broadest terms the approach is as follows. First, the book places greatest emphasis on the 'input' side of the equation and examines the role by which political parties, operating within a multi-party system, articulate and aggregate citizens' preferences within a complex modern industrial democracy such as Germany. It goes without saying, therefore, that it is assumed that individual preferences matter and that, although there are undeniably strong intervening variables associated with socio-economic location, voters are not 'cultural dupes'. As a result, therefore, a substantial amount of the book is dedicated to examining voter behaviour and related issues such as partisan identification, post-materialism and economic voting. In other parts of the book, however, a more macro-historical approach is taken but it is made clear that this is used (1) because the lack of individual-level data makes it impossible to draw many conclusions about individual preferences and (2) as it is a useful device for exploring the social and institutional variables generated by the course of German historical development and the constraints they impose upon the political marketplace. At no time, however, is it assumed that voters in this historical context are not reflective and capable of evaluating parties on the basis of their programmes. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that voters' preferences were less individualistic and more group-oriented than today and that the information available to them in exercising party choice was less and more likely to be filtered through the lens of socio-economic location and the institutions (Trade unions, churches, etc.) associated with that location.

This leads us back to our assumption that political parties respond to voters' preferences. And here it will be made clear that, although in an ideal world parties should be highly responsive to – and be held to account by – voters, the reality is that parties are only partially responsive and tend to do as much as is necessary to avoid an electoral backlash from their voters. In this sense political parties can be regarded as firms that compete with one another to sell their product (party programmes and, where appropriate, records in government) in the marketplace (the party system) to potential customers (the voters). It is assumed that the first objective of these firms is survival in the marketplace and that participation in government, whilst highly desirable, is secondary to this. In other words these are firms that often 'satisfice' (Simon, 1965) rather than maximise market share – not least because the institutional and normative environment within which they operate constrains them in this regard. At the same time, however, these same institutions and norms also constrain entry into the political marketplace and therefore create oligopolistic market conditions. Such market conditions make it easier for established firms to pursue their first objective of survival and give them more leeway vis-à-vis their customers. For their part, customers are not given unrestricted choice but rather often have to choose between a number of sub-optimal alternatives. It is assumed that in multi-party systems such as Germany's there are more alternatives on offer than in two-party majoritarian systems but, nevertheless, it is in this restriction of choice that paradoxes and cycles are avoided and voters are 'educated'. Thus, the output issue of civic orientation is touched upon in the study, but by-and-large as an externality of political competition. And in addition to political competition, the often normal practice of coalition governance in multi-party systems such as Germany's means that parties must sometimes co-operate in order to achieve their secondary objective of participation in government. They will also occasionally co-operate to exclude new competitors from the market. Finally, beyond the issue of civic orientation, the output side of the equation is considered to be part of the product offered to voters by parties of government. Thus policy outcomes are important if political parties are to maintain credibility with their customers.

The epistemological basis of the market metaphor that drives this study can be traced back to Anthony Downs' (1957) analogy of party systems as markets, with parties as firms competing with each other for voters who, in turn are analogous with consumers. However, its use in this study is somewhat more heuristic than the rigidly deductive approach laid out by Downs and, in as far as the deductive approach remains, some of the a priori assumptions as to how the political marketplace works have been modified. In the Downsian universe, the policy dimension is laid out uni-dimensionally along a single left/right continuum (although later models have often supplemented this with an additional dimension, based on, for instance, a authoritarian/libertarian or materialist/post-materialist dimension). Under normal circumstances, it is assumed that the individual voter will have one ideal position along the continuum and that voters' preferences are fairly evenly distributed along it. Theoretically, the distribution of these preferences in normal party systems resembles a classic bell-curve, with the aggregate reaching an equilibrium (and thus effectively a consensus) around the median of the distribution. Downs assumed that it is around this point, occupied by the 'median voter' that office-seeking parties will manoeuvre in order to maximise votes. The median voter, who has an equal number of voters on each side, is in a privileged position because he/she can vote down alternatives to both the right and the left. The ideal point of the median voter is the equilibrium outcome under majority rule – and it is expected that parties that form governments will be representative of the preferences of the median voter and thus the majority of voters' preferences. However as will become clear in this study, although some political parties do seem to mobilise the median voter, others do not and are content to carve out a niche position along the bell-curve – which is why office-seeking is assumed to be secondary to survival.

Moving on to the political marketplace, party systems display various degrees of differentiation: defined in such terms as the degree of concentration or deconcentration, partisan alignment or dealignment, dominant or cross-cutting cleavages. Moreover, the opportunity costs of entry into the party system differ across time and space, not only because the appeal of a given political product differs, but also due to system attributes such as voting rules (plurality versus proportional systems), barriers to representation (such as the five per cent hurdle at the Federal level in Germany), laws regulating internal party democracy, and so on. Thus it is important to note that party systems are constrained arenas, and cannot be likened to conditions of perfect competition.

This last point is important because although neo-classical economic theory often assumes the existence of perfect competition within markets, in practice this is rarely if ever the case. As is assumed to be the case in this study, markets are often oligopolistic and in some instances they are characterised by the presence of cartels – groups of firms that co-operate together in order to rig the market and shut out potential competitors. The analogy of the oligopolistic market is easily applied to the German party system – especially at the Federal level. In the three decades after the inception of the Federal Republic in 1949 the political marketplace became increasingly dominated by a limited number of parties. Elsewhere I have called this state of affairs a ‘party oligopoly’ (Lees, 2001). However, the last two decades have been marked by two systemic junctures that have served to undermine this party oligopoly to some extent. The first, in 1983, took place when the Greens entered the Bundestag following the federal elections of that year. The second, in 1990, took place after the first all-German Federal elections, when the PDS entered the Bundestag. Thus the development of the party-political marketplace in the Federal Republic over the last half century or so has been one of (1) party oligopoly, dominated by the two big *Volksparteien*, and (2) two systemic junctures which have served to break down this party oligopoly and shift the centre of gravity within the party system towards the political left. This account will become more apparent to the reader as the book progresses – and is returned to in some detail in the conclusion to the study.

1.4 Book structure

So let us now examine how the book does progress. As discussed, the book is framed within the idea of party systems as political markets, but with institutions and norms acting as constraints upon political agency. It builds up from the social basis of party politics to the more formal institutions that are the arenas for political action and interaction between political agents, most notably political elites. Each chapter is to some extent freestanding and includes an initial discussion of the theoretical approaches used to frame the data. Chapter 2 draws upon the social cleavage literature and examines the development of political cleavages in Germany through a primarily diachronic lens. The chapter is divided into four sections. First, there is a general discussion of the social cleavage literature. This is followed by a further discussion of Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) account of the development of cleavage structures in Western Europe, with an emphasis on Germany where appropriate. Third, the chapter moves on to an analysis of social and political cleavages in Germany in a comparative perspective. This approach is extended into Chapter 3, which provides a diachronic account of the development of social and political cleavages in Germany from the Reformation, through the Second Reich, and on to the Weimar Republic. The chapter starts with an account of the development of political cleavages in the Second German Reich (1871–1919), which established a pattern of party competition that persisted into the early years of the Federal Republic. Second, there is a discussion of the social base of party politics in the Weimar Republic (1919–33) – Germany's first ill-starred experience of popular democracy, which ended in the horror of Nazism.

By contrast, Chapter 4 plots the erosion of social and political cleavages in post-war Germany and assesses the impact of this process on party politics in the modern Federal Republic. As a result, it signals a shift from macro- to micro-level data. The chapter opens with an account of the re-emergence of political cleavages after the Second World War and examines how these cleavages stabilised and structured the party system during the first 20 years of the Federal Republic. The chapter then moves on to the period 1969–90, leading up to the unification of Germany, with an emphasis on how the impact of secularisation and economic change eroded social cleavages and led to greater electoral instability and partisan dealignment. This is followed by an account of the social base of party politics in post-unification Germany, as well as an up-to-date analysis of the social base of contemporary German party politics, drawing on data from the 2002 Bundestag elections.

Chapter 5 takes a different tack and explores some of the key models of voting behaviour and their impact on party politics. Thus we return more explicitly to the idea of the voter as a reflexive individual – and therefore with individual preferences. It starts with an examination of the idea of partisan identification and the account it provides of support for political parties over time, before looking at the concept of value-orientation and value-change as the drivers of political choice. The chapter then provides an assessment of the economic voting literature, which serves both as a critique of the psychological and sociological approaches and also as a framework for empirical research. All three approaches are used widely in studies of voting behaviour in the Federal Republic and use some of the most developed technological and methodological tools in political science (Schultze, 1997: 603). All allow for more complex and potentially less deterministic accounts of the interaction between social structures and party politics than that provided by the social cleavage literature, but are reliant on the wealth of data that is only widely available in advanced democracies, and even then only really since the Second World War.

Having established the social basis or setting for party politics, Chapter 6 moves on to the arenas in which political agency takes place. The chapter examines the impact of three institutional structures on the political marketplace in Germany and in a comparative perspective. These are, first, the structure of the state; second, the electoral system(s); and, third, the party system(s). This is followed in Chapter 7 by an analysis of the key political agents within the realm of party politics, the political parties themselves. Because of this, Chapter 7 is possibly the most explicitly comparative of the chapters. It starts with a review of the political parties literature and the problems associated with establishing a single classificatory scheme that is able to function both in a comparative perspective and in a way that is appropriate to the German context. The chapter then moves on to such a single scheme, primarily based on degrees of variance in the extent or 'thickness' of party organisation. This is followed by the bulk of the chapter, in which this classificatory scheme is used to frame a discussion of the main parties in the German party system in a comparative perspective.

Chapter 8 then goes on to examine the patterns of action and interaction between the firms in the political marketplace, in this case that of competition and co-operation between political parties. The chapter first looks at competition between parties in Germany and in a comparative perspective and focusses on parties' programmes, in other words the parties' 'product', and the campaign strategies used to promote the product, namely the 'message'. At the same time, the chapter discusses some of the theoretical and empirical claims that underpin the literature associated with this field of research. The chapter then goes on to look at the antithesis of party political competition, that of co-operation, and places a strong emphasis on coalition politics at the national and sub-national levels, in Germany and in a comparative perspective. It is at this point that the book places more emphasis on the output side of the political equation. It should be noted that both sections of the chapter, and the second section in particular, include new data on 'Red–Green' coalitions between the SPD and Greens, both in the *Länder* and at the Federal level.

Finally, Chapter 9 concludes the book by discussing the empirical and theoretical implications of the study. In empirical terms it concentrates upon the balance between the singularities of the German *Sonderweg* and the commonalities shared by German party politics and similar phenomena in comparative perspective. In theoretical terms it returns to the analogy of the political marketplace discussed above. Both the empirical and theoretical strands are used to assess the amount of 'added-value' the use of the comparative method (defined in terms of both data and theoretical framework) brings to the study of German party politics specifically and single-country studies more generally.

Index

Adenauer, Konrad, 52–3, 115, 152, 161, 165, 173, 202, 212–13, 236
Australia, 31–2, 87–8, 190–1, 242
Austria, 24–30, 36–7, 87, 117, 126–7, 140, 151, 158, 169, 191, 205–6, 210–12, 219–20, 224, 242

Baden-Württemberg, 127, 135–6, 204
Bad Godesberg, 161
Basic Law, 118, 121–2, 144, 200–1, 230, 241, 246
basis democracy/*Basisdemokratie*, 171, 186
Bavaria, 38–9, 43, 50–1, 67, 118, 122, 124, 132, 135–6, 148, 152, 158, 166, 170, 204, 207, 248
Belgium, 24–7, 29, 33, 94, 102–3, 117–18, 126, 151, 191, 205–6, 211–12, 219–20, 224, 243
Bismarck, 23–4, 35, 38–42, 47, 115, 248
Brandt, Willy, 162, 202
Brazil, 117–18, 120–1, 123, 148
Bremen, 118, 135–6, 162, 190, 204
Bundesrat, 37, 42, 118–19, 121, 137, 163, 201, 223
Bundestag, 4, 13–14, 49, 57–8, 62–9, 71, 86, 88–91, 97–8, 103–4, 110–11, 118–19, 121–2, 127, 132–4, 136–8, 162–8, 171–4, 183–6, 195–6, 201–2, 209–10, 213–15, 221–3, 232–3, 236, 238
Byski, Lothar, 168

Canada, 25, 87–8, 190–1, 242
candidate(s), 39, 63, 75–7, 79, 83–4, 86–91, 125, 139, 146, 157, 162–4, 166, 169, 179, 189, 191, 194–6
Catholic(s)/Catholicism, 21–3, 25–8, 30, 32, 39, 41–3, 45–6, 51, 53–6, 60–5, 68–9, 84–5, 148, 151–2, 164, 166, 235, 237–8
CDU/CSU, 50–8, 60–6, 68–71, 77–8, 84–91, 98, 104, 110–11, 118–19, 121–3, 130–6, 142, 150–4, 157–62, 164–7, 172–6, 184–7, 192, 194–6, 202–4, 207, 209–10, 213, 218, 221–3, 225, 232, 236–8, 242–3, 248–9
Centre Party/*Zentrum*, 38–9, 41, 43–5, 50–1, 53, 150, 175, 235
Chancellor, 37, 39, 42, 46, 52, 63, 76–7, 79, 83, 89, 115, 119, 123, 152–3, 161–4, 194–6, 201–3, 213–17, 221–2, 235, 249
church(es)/religion, 11, 17, 19–24, 26–8, 30–32, 37, 39–42, 47, 51, 53, 55, 62, 65, 67–8, 223, 238
coalition(s), 15, 24, 121–2, 128, 134, 137, 156, 162–3, 178, 186, 197–9, 201–3, 207, 209–10, 212–14, 217–19, 221, 224, 226, 232, 243, 246, 249
Croatia, 154
Czech Republic, 31–2, 166, 242

dealignment/realignment, 6, 13–14, 21, 28, 30, 49, 54–5, 59, 64, 66, 70–2, 76, 134, 138, 232, 237, 245
Denmark, 25–7, 29, 37, 94, 126, 191, 205–6, 211–12, 219–20, 224, 240, 243
DVU, 109, 135–6, 172–4, 176, 204, 231, 242

election(s)
  Bundestag/Reichstag/Federal/General, 4, 13–14, 38–41, 43–4, 46, 49, 57–8, 62–9, 71, 86, 88–90, 97–8, 103–4, 110–11, 122, 131, 133–41, 161–8, 171–4, 179, 180–90, 193–6, 201–7, 210, 214–15, 221–3, 232–3, 236, 238
  European Parliament, 170
  Land/Local, 46, 136, 164, 170–1, 190, 202, 217, 221, 223–4, 226
  other, 4, 7, 9–10, 74–5, 82, 87–8, 96, 105–7, 125–6, 130, 144, 149, 167–8, 179–81, 189–90, 192, 201, 203–5, 207, 219–20, 232, 243
  systems, 18, 47, 210–12
  Volkskammer, 60–2

employees/employed/workers
  agricultural, 22, 32, 39, 63–5, 69, 98, 151
  manual, 31–2, 51, 54–7, 60–6, 68–70, 98, 206, 238
  self-, 46, 54–5, 57–61, 63–4, 69, 98, 238
  white-collar, 31–2, 39, 43, 54–8, 63–6, 69–70, 98, 237
Erhardt, Ludwig, 115

FDP, 50–2, 54, 57–8, 60, 62, 64, 66, 69–71, 77–8, 98, 110, 118, 121, 130–1, 133–6, 142, 158–60, 162, 166–8, 172, 175–61, 185–7, 201–4, 209–10, 213, 218, 221–2, 225, 236–8, 242
Finland, 25–9, 126, 191, 205–6, 211–12, 219–20, 224
Fischer, Joschka, 9, 134, 172, 186–7, 217
France, 21, 25–30, 35–7, 44, 87–8, 94–5, 99–103, 126–7, 148, 158, 192, 205–6, 210–12, 219–20, 224, 240, 243
Frey, Gerhard, 174
funnel of causality, 75–6, 84, 86, 91, 104

Greece, 25–7, 29, 94, 126
Greens, the, 9, 13, 15, 57–8, 62, 64, 66, 69–70, 89, 96–9, 110, 118, 121–3, 130–8, 150, 158–60, 162–4, 169–72, 174, 176, 178, 183–7, 196, 202–4, 206–10, 213–18, 221–3, 225–6, 231–2, 236, 238, 242–3, 245–6
Grotewohl, Otto, 161
Gysi, Gregor, 154, 168

Hamburg, 118, 135–6, 165, 168, 175, 204
Hannover, 163, 174
Hesse, 122, 135–6, 162, 167, 190, 204
Hitler, 163, 174
Hungary, 31–2, 158, 167

India, 117, 120, 123, 155–6, 242
inflation/unemployment, 44–5, 90, 103–4, 106, 108–9, 174, 222
institution(s)/institutional/ism, 6, 9, 11, 13, 15, 16, 20–2, 24, 29, 30, 33, 40–1, 46–7, 50, 53–4, 60, 77, 84, 105, 111–16, 119, 121, 123–4, 127, 129, 137–41, 144, 169, 171, 180–1, 187, 199–200, 212–13, 218, 225–6, 229–32, 239–40, 244, 246–7, 249
Ireland, 25–9, 31–2, 94–5, 126, 191, 205–6, 211–12, 219–20, 224
Italy, 25–9, 31–2, 36, 94, 125–7, 140, 151, 168, 170, 191, 205–6, 211–12, 219–20, 224–6

Japan, 127, 190–1, 242

Kaiser, 37, 42
Kiesinger, Kurt, 202
Kohl, Helmut, 89, 107, 119, 162–5, 190, 202–3, 213
KPD/SED, 43, 45, 50–1, 131–2, 151, 153, 160–1, 168, 175, 242

Lafontaine, Oskar, 119, 163–4, 190, 192, 195–6
life-cycle events, 77–9, 111–12
Lower Saxony, 118, 121–2, 127, 135–6, 162, 164, 167, 195, 204, 214
Luxembourg, 26–7, 29, 94, 126–7, 205, 211–12, 219–20, 224

materialism/post-materialism, 6, 11, 31, 85, 92–5, 98, 100–4, 138, 199
Mecklenberg-West Pomerania, 135–6, 163, 204
media/media effects, 74, 76–7, 79–80, 83–5, 112, 157, 176, 179–80, 188–9, 192–4, 221, 240
median
  legislator/Mparty/Mparty(k), 134, 198–200, 207, 229, 243, 248
  voter, 12, 124, 130, 160, 207
Merkel, Angela, 165
ministers/ministries/portfolios, 37, 52, 123, 134, 137, 154, 163, 165, 168, 197, 201, 211–20, 232, 248–9
Möllemann, Jürgen, 167

Netherlands, the, 20, 24–9, 33, 94–5, 102–3, 126, 151, 156, 158, 191, 205–6, 210–12, 219–20, 224
North Rhine-Westphalia, 118, 135–6, 162, 167, 190, 204
Norway, 25–9, 31–2, 126, 191, 205–6, 211–12, 219–20, 224, 243
NPD, 136, 172–4, 176, 231, 242
NSDAP, 45–7, 154–5, 175, 242

office/policy seeking, 12, 105, 143, 197–9, 215, 223, 225, 243–4, 248

partisanship/partisan identification, 5, 11, 13–14, 21, 28, 30, 49, 54–5, 58–60, 63–7, 70–3, 75–89, 91, 105, 110–12, 122, 138, 142–3, 157, 159, 177, 180, 218, 220, 229, 232, 237, 239–40, 245
party(ies)
  campaigns, 15, 63, 67, 76, 83, 88–9, 91, 149, 156–7, 160, 164, 167–70, 172, 174, 177–81, 184–5, 187–96, 207, 224, 226, 238, 242–3, 245, 249
  catch-all/*Volkspartei*(*en*), 46, 55, 58–9, 84, 111, 130, 134, 143, 146–7, 151–3, 157, 160, 162, 164–7, 176, 186, 188–9, 203, 206
  class-mass/mass-based, 143–53, 155, 157, 159–61, 164, 166, 176, 242
  communist, 8–9, 19, 32, 43, 59–60, 62, 125, 134, 141–2, 153, 161, 207, 230, 238
  competition, 7, 12–16, 18–20, 22, 30, 35, 45, 47, 50–1, 56, 62–3, 70, 73, 75–6, 84, 89, 111, 117, 119, 121–2, 128, 132–3, 135, 138, 143, 169, 177–8, 180–1, 183, 187, 200–1, 205, 224, 234–5, 237, 224–5
  conservative, 38–44, 50, 77–8, 115, 141, 148, 152, 248
  co-operation, 15, 124, 132–3, 135, 138, 170–1, 177–8, 183, 187, 196–7, 206, 214, 216–18, 221, 224–5, 243, 248
  electoralist, 145–6, 156–7, 160, 168, 176, 242
  elite-based, 145–8
  ethnicity-based, 166, 173–4, 180, 223, 235, 248
  family(ies), 37–8, 141, 151, 175, 231
  fascist, 141–2, 154, 170, 174
  as firms, 11–13, 15, 105, 124, 139, 149, 156, 167, 175, 178, 244–6
  flanking, 131–3, 135, 148
  green, 125
  ideology, 19–20, 31, 46–7, 75, 79–80, 84, 109, 146–7, 150–1, 153–5, 160, 163–4, 166, 168–9, 174–5, 178, 180–1, 240
  left/right-wing, 12–13, 22, 28–30, 39–45, 47, 51–2, 58, 70, 76–77, 84–5, 92–97, 100, 102–3, 109–10, 124–5, 130–6, 141–3, 146–7, 149–55, 161, 163–5, 167, 169–74, 176, 190, 198–9, 207, 214, 218, 231, 235, 238, 240, 245
  liberal, 24, 36–41, 43–4, 47, 50–1, 57, 78, 133–4, 141, 148, 162, 165, 167, 170, 186, 235, 248
  mainstream, 30, 33, 55, 58, 140, 153, 163, 167, 171–2, 175–6, 183, 187–8, 192, 203, 240
  manifesto(s)/programme(s), 4, 11, 15, 150, 160, 178–85, 224, 226, 233, 242, 244
  movement, 9, 145–6, 160, 169–71, 174–6, 242
  organisation(s)/structure(s), 8, 10, 15, 66–7, 71, 75, 83, 112, 116, 140–50, 152–7, 159–61, 165–6, 168–72, 175–6, 181–2, 188–9, 192–4, 196, 223, 231, 241–2
  policy, 12, 30, 37, 39, 45–6, 52, 55–6, 58, 71, 97, 105, 122, 124, 132, 134, 139, 141–3, 152, 155, 161, 164–5, 183–7, 192, 194–200, 210–12, 214–218, 220, 222–3, 225, 232, 243–6, 248–9
  social democratic, 29–30, 124, 141–2, 150, 166, 221, 242
  strategy(ies)/strategic, 45–6, 91, 105, 128, 134, 145, 147–9, 155, 163–4, 167, 171, 174–5, 194, 196–7, 207, 232, 241, 248–9
  system(s), 10–18, 21, 23–4, 33, 37–9, 41–3, 45, 47, 49–54, 59, 66, 71, 73, 75, 82, 87, 93, 95, 105, 113, 115–17, 122–4, 128–35, 137–9, 141–3, 147, 151, 155–6, 162, 170–1, 173–6, 200, 202–3, 205–6, 225, 232, 235–6, 244–6, 248
Party of European Socialists, 141
party state/*Parteienstaat*, 55, 122–3, 137, 142, 186–7, 241
PDS, 13, 61–2, 64, 66–7, 69–71, 98, 110, 122, 130–6, 138, 154, 158–60, 162, 166–8, 172, 175–6, 192, 201, 203–4, 207, 210, 236, 238, 242, 245–6
Portugal, 25–9, 94, 126, 205–6, 211–12, 219–20, 224, 243

preferences, 7–12, 14, 16–17, 20, 28, 30–5, 40, 42, 46, 49, 54, 60–8, 70, 72–4, 77–9, 82, 86–91, 99–101, 104, 106, 111–12, 115, 119, 124, 127–8, 130, 132, 156, 160, 179–81, 183, 187–8, 198, 207, 214, 223, 232, 236–9, 241, 244–6
President/Minister President
  German, 163, 200, 204
  Other, 75, 88, 120, 190–1, 243
PRO, 168, 203–4
Protestant(s)/Protestantism, 17, 21–3, 25–7, 32, 35–6, 40–1, 46, 51, 53, 60–4, 68–9, 85, 165–6, 206, 235, 238
Prussia, 22, 24, 36–7, 40, 44, 53, 61, 235

re-distribution, 30, 93
Reformation/Counter-reformation, 14, 18, 21–2, 26–7, 35, 47
Republicans/*Republikaner*, 109, 135, 172–4, 231, 242
Rhineland Palatinate, 135–6, 171, 204
Russia/Soviet Union, 9, 19, 23, 43, 50, 127, 151, 153, 161

Saxony, 127, 135–6, 204
Saxony-Anhalt, 122, 135–6, 163, 204
Scharping, Rudolf, 163, 190, 195
Schäuble, Wolfgang, 164–5
Schleswig-Holstein, 127, 135–6, 204
Schönhuber, Franz, 173
Schröder, Gerhard, 89–91, 119, 162–4, 166, 186, 195–6, 202–3, 213–14, 217, 221–2, 249
Schumacher, Kurt, 50, 52–3, 236
Slovakia, 31–2
Sonderweg, 2, 15, 23–4, 33, 48, 112, 114–15, 227, 230, 234–5, 239, 246–7
Spain, 21, 25–30, 36, 80–2, 94–5, 119–20, 126
SPD, 8, 15, 24, 28, 30, 38–45, 50–8, 60–6, 68–71, 77–8, 84–7, 89–91, 97–8, 104, 109–11, 118–19, 121–2, 130–6, 142, 148–53, 157–64, 166–7, 170–2, 174–6, 178, 184–7, 190, 192–6, 201–4, 206–10, 214–18, 221–3, 225–6, 232, 235–8, 242–3, 245–6, 248–9
SSW, 131, 135–6, 142, 150, 204
Stoiber, Edmund, 89–90, 122, 166, 204
Strauss, Franz-Josef, 166
structure-agency/structure-agency debate, 5–6, 13, 15–18, 20, 35, 72, 114–15, 225, 229, 239, 246
study(ies)
  case, 1, 3–4, 9, 18, 20, 25, 28–30, 32–3, 48, 63, 75, 82, 94, 97, 111, 113, 121–2, 125, 127, 137, 144, 147, 161, 181, 203, 206–7, 209–10, 212, 219, 224–6, 233, 242
  diachronic/synchronic, 1, 3–4, 6, 14, 18, 115, 233
  large *n*/small *n*, 3, 64, 73, 189, 232–4
Sweden, 21, 25–9, 36, 102–3, 126, 156, 191, 205–6, 211–12, 219–20, 224, 243
Switzerland, 21, 23–9, 126, 191, 226

Taiwan, 167, 242
Thailand, 168
Thuringia, 135–6, 204
trade unions/trade unionism, 11, 20, 28–30, 47, 51, 56–7, 65–6, 68–70, 72, 75, 84–5, 140, 144–5, 149, 153–4, 237–8, 248

Ukraine, 127
Unification, 14, 27, 33, 49, 59–62, 67–8, 71–2, 88, 95, 101, 104, 118, 127, 132, 138, 158, 168, 171–3, 237–9, 245
United Kingdom/UK, 18–20, 22–5, 30–2, 39, 77–8, 80–2, 99–101, 242
United States/USA, 2, 18, 25, 31–2, 75, 77–8, 80–3, 87–8, 99, 106, 117–18, 120–1, 123, 148, 174, 188, 190–1, 221, 240–2, 248

value(s), 4, 10, 14, 16–17, 21–2, 31, 41, 54–5, 58, 72–6, 86, 91–9, 101–4, 111–12, 114–15, 154, 163–4, 170, 173, 184, 229, 233, 236–7, 239–40
vote/voters/voting, 4, 6, 9–12, 14, 16–20, 28, 30–5, 39–42, 44–7, 49, 53–113, 118, 120, 124–5, 127–30, 132–3, 135–6, 142–5, 147, 149, 151, 156–7, 160, 162, 164, 167–8, 170–3, 176, 179–81, 183, 186–90, 192–9, 201–3, 207, 214–15, 221, 223–5, 229, 232–3, 235, 236–42, 244–7, 249