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1

Disciplinarity and the Production of Psychological Individuality

[T]he individual is the result of ... procedures which pin political power on the body. It is because the body has been 'subjectified,' that is to say, that the subject function has been fixed on it, because it has been psychologized and normalized, it is because of all of this that something like the individual appeared, about which one can speak, hold discourses, and attempt to found sciences.

(Foucault, 2006, p. 56)

Introducing disciplinarity

If we are to grasp the psychological from the perspective of a Foucauldian analytics, we will need to make recourse to a mode of history able to outline the emergence of psychological individuality as a nodal point of political and epistemic concerns in modernity. The particular history that we will need to trace – in following Foucault's lead – is that of a set of mechanisms and apparatuses that take the 'somatic singularity' of the body as their target and whose most significant effect is a series of investments, a 'core of virtualities', that we may refer to as the soul. What such a history will ultimately yield is the blueprint of a transferable technology that enables the production of individual, psychological subjects. What is required, in short, is an account not only of the workings of a disciplinary technology, and a review of the broader array of characteristic procedures, assumptions and strategies that characterize the more general domain of disciplinary power – which I refer to here as disciplinarity – but a description also of the privileged role of the psychological in this distinctive modern economy of power.

The first section of this chapter offers a historical backdrop to the advent of disciplinarity, and does so by discussing two pre-modern technologies of power: sovereign rule and the order of humanistic reform. The second section is devoted to outlining the core features of disciplinarity and with foregrounding the means through which such a mode of power enables the *production of psychological individuality*. While remaining faithful to the terms of Foucault's critique of the disciplinary practice and study of psychology, I have also suggested – perhaps paradoxically – that his analysis of power could be usefully advanced with a more developed category of 'the psychological'. I close by offering a series of critical speculations. Rather than repeating a set of standard critiques brought against Foucault's notion of disciplinary power, I have elected to query whether an implicitly psychological account of power can in fact effectively dispense with all psychological modes of description and analysis.

I

Power before discipline: The era of sovereignty

The paradigmatic example of punishment in the monarchical era of sovereignty is, for Foucault, the spectacle of the scaffold. This is a highly violent and demonstrative form of power, a type of physical retribution acted out on the body of the criminal and staged for the benefit of the public at large. In this early era of power, a breach of the sovereign's law was tantamount to an act of war. Such an infringement was to be understood as an act of aggression committed against the person of the king, whose body had (figuratively) been attacked in the action of the crime. Accordingly, the body of the criminal had to be attacked, tortured, often dismembered or mutilated, in a symbolic display of the sovereign's power.

As dramatic a deterrent as such spectacles proved to be, they were nevertheless limited in their efficacy. This was a discontinuous and performative type of power; each time the law was broken, a display of ritual atrocity had to be re-enacted. As spectacular and brutal as this mode of punishment was, its influence was incomplete; it did not saturate all possible spaces of illegality. The crimes that afforded the spectacle of ritual atrocity were typically of a more dramatic sort; a wide range of minor infractions – indeed, an entire spectrum of ongoing illegalities – were left unchecked. Such spectacles also made for a fundamentally unstable form of power; they risked the insurrection of

the gathered masses who might (and often did) choose to sympathize with the punished criminals rather than with the presiding authorities. It is for these reasons that Foucault (2006) states that sovereignty requires not only the activation of the distinctive mark, but a 'cyclical game of ceremonies... the reiteration of a profound memory', namely that of the threat of violence which is always behind the relationship of sovereignty, for, after all 'the other side of sovereignty is... war' (p. 43).

Instability of the 'subject-function': Disjunctions of the body and power

One of the conclusions that Foucault draws from his historical observations of the era of sovereignty is that the 'pinning of the subject-function to a definitive body' takes place only in a contingent manner, in ceremonies, in those moments when the body is marked by insignia, by gestures, or in 'the violence with which sovereignty asserts its rights and forcibly imposes them on... its subjects' (2006, p. 43). Subjects are thus only infrequently 'brought into power', and only by virtue of a discontinuous set of moments and actions. The 'subject-function' of the definitive fixing of bodies to power is both rare and less than guaranteed; the correspondence of 'somatic singularities' with activated relations of force cannot be assured. Part of the reason for this, claims Foucault, is that the relationship of sovereignty does not naturally apply to physical individuality but rather to multiplicities (families, communities), which lie above the level of somatic singularity, or, to fragmentary aspects of individuality presumably lying beneath this level of specification. There is hence a disabling disjuncture apparent within this mode of political control, a certain looseness in the matching up of bodies and power.

The effects of this disjunction – which, crucially, results in a lack of individualization – are reversed in the case of the sovereign. If, for Foucault, individualization is absent at the base of the population, it is most certainly present at its summit; there must, after all, be a single, individual point of arbitration and judgement atop this set of power-relations. The sovereign's body supplies this point of convergence. However, given the importance of this body – which holds together all the diverse and conflicting subsidiary relations within this pyramidal structure of sovereign authority – it cannot be allowed to decline within the failing physical attributes of an ageing king – it must rise above the level of somatic singularity. More than just this, the king's body is subject to multiplication; it is at least double – as in the case of a consolidating body politic, the idea of the population *as* the king's body.

These speculations lead Foucault to two conclusions. Firstly, although the relationship of sovereignty does connect political power with the body, such an attempt at co-ordination is marred by continuous disjunction – bodies and power are not coterminous entities in this era of power. Secondly, we are as such confronting a form of power without a broadly individualizing function, a political mode which outlines individuality only in the figure of the sovereign, and even then at the cost of paradoxical multiplication of the body. As such – and here a characteristically Foucauldian counter-intuition – ‘We have bodies without individuality on one side, and individuality but a multiplication of bodies on the other’ (2006, p. 46).

Bridges to disciplinary: Humanizing power

The second order of pre-disciplinary power identified by Foucault is that of the humanist reformers, an era that begins at the end of the eighteenth century, with a series of protests against the inhumane excesses of the scaffold. Challenging the sovereign’s absolute prerogative in matters of punishment, the humanist reformers advocated an art of manipulating representations, a ‘curative’ or restorative economy of punishment that was taken to be the means of the correct re-ordering of social life.

Punishment must now be an art of effects, a ‘complex of signs’ that ‘reduce the desire that makes the crime attractive’ (Foucault, 1977a, p. 106) and that creates an automatic association between crimes and the inevitable response of the law. In the first of a series of principles that anticipates disciplinary, humanist reformers maintained that punishment could be justified only insofar as it plays a role in preventing the repetition of crimes; deterrence must be its paramount objective. Punishment, furthermore, must obey the maxims of moderation and the humane; calculated and measured punishments must be devised; analogical penalties must be adopted; crimes must come to be matched to didactic modes of punishment that undo the logic of the criminal act.

Several consequences of this transformation in the rationality of power are worth emphasizing. The spectacle of the destruction of the body of the criminal is now abolished as an indefensible excess of power. Crime is not to be understood as an assault on the person of the king, but as an attack on society *as a whole*. Justice, furthermore, is no longer an issue of revenge and the singular prerogative of the sovereign; the responsibility to punish consequently came to lie with the most appropriate representatives of the social body. Crucially, the standard

of justice was now that of 'humanity', a joint humanity that all parties of the social contract were understood to share.

With humanistic reform, a type of quasi- or proto-psychological knowledge became a crucial component in exercising relations of punishment. This was true both of the demonstrative role of the punishment – which needed to suit the crime and the details of its intent – and of the pedagogic strategy adopted in the attempt to eradicate the roots of the crime. (I say 'quasi-' or 'proto-psychological' because the notion of psychology has as yet to receive the discursive and institutional weight that follows its establishment as a human science discipline). Proto-psychological concepts, issues of the criminal's will, their tendencies, dispositions, their recurring habits hence take on an increasing prominence. From this point, decisions regarding the penalty for a crime had to consider that which hitherto had not been considered: the individual defendant themselves, their intrinsic nature and way of life, their *attitude of mind*. '[P]sychological knowledge', notes Foucault 'take[s] over the role of casuistic jurisprudence' (1977a, p. 99). The intimation here is clear: one of the first instrumental appearances of 'psychological' knowledge occurs in a way that is intimately tied to the exercising of power.

Not only did the parallel classification of crimes and punishments now become a necessity – a guard against arbitrary sentencing – considerable attention was also paid to techniques of individualizing correction. This push towards individualization, this customizing of power so as to make the best correctional fit led to powerful collateral processes of objectification. Objectification, the generation of a particular problem-categories – as in the case of delinquents, perverts, homosexuals, hysterics, and so on – through which experts might know and predict the behaviours of deviant subjects, would become an crucial component of disciplinarity. The delinquent, to take one of Foucault's (1977a) examples, becomes a species to be studied and understood, an object to be *known*; the act of the crime something to be exhaustively coded and classified. For proper intervention to be made, as Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) insist, the object (be it criminal or crime) needed to be fixed as an individual entity and *known in great detail*. It is thus in the realm of punishment that the first step towards a study of 'man', and 'his' behaviour and social environment is taken, and taken in the direction of a science of society that would treat 'men' as objects.

Knowledge – and for the most part a proto-psychological knowledge – thus came to operate as a crucial component of power. The complex reciprocity of these terms, the fact that power and knowledge came to be exercised in mutually reinforcing ways, stands as one of the

cardinal features of disciplinary power. Foucault (1977a) couples these terms, and speaks of *power-knowledge*, thus emphasizing the fact of their dynamic co-investment. This practical inseparability results in new modes of control in which the growth of human science knowledge, the innovation of intricate disciplinary technologies and the production of the psychological subject all came to be linked. The epistemic and political coherence of the individual subject – a somatic singularity that comes increasingly to coincide with those effects of power projected upon them – takes on a new substantiality, a substantiality that in future years will prove impossible to refute.

Returning though to a focus on the era of humanist reform, it is no longer primarily the body, but souls or minds that increasingly come to be seen as the primary targets of correction, targets treated not through the means of pain, but through signs and representations. The scene is thus set for disciplinary: emphases on humanization, individualization, objectification (in linked categories of deviant actions and deviant subjects) and, perhaps most vital of all, the quasi-psychological focus on problematic souls or minds, all pave the way for a revolution in the procedures and logic of punishment. I should emphasize here that for Foucault such humanizing initiatives served not so much to establish a more equitable system, but rather to create a better economy of the power to punish. Rather than punishing less, these initiatives punished better; power is rendered more effective, more constant, while at the same time its political and economic costs are diminished. Foucault's argument thus is that humanism, in all its guises, has 'enabled the insertion of power ever more deeply into the social body' (1977a, p. 82). This rationale of humanity would go on to prove indispensable to the spread of disciplinary procedures. Each of its discrete technologies would come to take this, the principle and value of the human, and of *the humane*, as their governing principle; it is from this formidable moral and philosophical basis that disciplinary practices would come to dispense a variety of curative, rehabilitative and punitive operations.

Discussion 1.1: The prime values of humanism

Given the prominence of humanism in what follows, and indeed, the vehemence of Foucault's critique thereof, it proves useful to sketch out a series of key ideas that inform this cluster of values. The most important assumption here is perhaps that of an essential distinctive individuality marking each human subject as a unique being. This is matched with a commitment to the idea that such individuals should themselves be the focus and principle of knowledge. Put differently, not

only should such distinctive individuals prove to be primary subjects of the generation of knowledge, we should also endeavour to grapple with the world as it is understood and received by unique subjects. Along with such a belief in the epistemic and psychological primacy of the individual, we find attached a series of personal rights and prerogatives (the notion of 'human rights' springs immediately to mind as an example) automatically accorded to each subject. Core here also is the notion of consciousness, that is, a commitment to the substantive existence of a kind human interiority or psychology, a belief in the faculties of introspection and personal judgement and a prioritization of the 'freedoms of subjectivity' thus afforded. The notion of freedom makes for a third factor. Individual human liberty is treated as sacrosanct, as an inherent and universal value; hence the proliferation of invectives against forms of constraint or repression that are taken to impede intrinsic human goodness.

Foucault (1977f) argues that each of these basic commitments is linked to an inviolable principle. The notion of individuality becomes connected to the truism of Human Right, for example, just as the idea of consciousness comes to be attached to the rule of Human Truth, and the notion of freedom coupled to a sense of the goodness of Human Destiny. A variety of related ideals – justice, equality and community – play their part in this assemblage of values. Foucault's (1977f) point is not to suggest we eschew all such notions in preference rather of an antithetical set of values, but rather to question how each of these rationalities of the human come to operate as formidable routes, rationales and justifications for measures of power.

Moreover, claims Foucault, we see in such 'prime values' of humanism the promise of a kind of agency, be it that of human rights, the power of truth, or the prerogatives of liberty, despite that such relations of authority and control are centred elsewhere, in systems of power beyond the level of the subject. We have thus a series of 'pseudo-sovereignties' – in which psychological formulations, along the lines of notions of consciousness, play a key role – a series of apparent inviolable human prerogatives which appear to be centred upon the human subject but which generally operate at a different level of benefit and efficacy: that of modern disciplinary systems of power.

A structure and focus for an emerging sciences of 'man'

By the beginning of the nineteenth century, claims Foucault, one is able to trace the blueprint of a particular power-relation, that is, a structure of correction as exemplified in relations between criminals and those in a position to discipline them. We see in this blueprint a simultaneous arrangement of subjectification (i.e. the production of individualizing knowledges about singular subjects) and objectification, the pattern of which would come to be duplicated throughout the human

science disciplines. Knowledge, as a modality of power, thus grew in two different directions at the same time, producing profiles of troublesome persons and related behaviours, while simultaneously refining the techniques of measurement, comparison and surveillance able to render such problematic individuals in ever more detail. This led to a circular relation: objectifying knowledge came to persuasively sanction prescriptions of expert intervention, which, in turn, intensified the procedures of individualization able to capture the problematic facets of deviant subjects.

The epistemic growth of the psychological is nurtured by a particular need – overcoming the failure of previous regimes to adequately co-ordinate somatic singularities with subjectifying effects of power. There is a pertinent role for psychological explanation here: joining such bodily singularities to individualizing types of knowing which tie this subject to a network of power-effects. To draw on an example of Foucault's, every criminal offence came to carry with it the legitimate suspicion of insanity or anomaly. Every sentence, more than being a legal decision that laid down punishment, came to bear with it 'an assessment of normality and a technical prescription for a possible normalization' (Foucault, 1977a, pp. 20–21). The point is not simply to suggest that there can be no psychology without disciplinary, although this itself is a defensible claim. One should emphasize, in addition, that the prominence and accelerated growth of the discipline, the very fact that it has not been confined to the narrow parameters of a purely *academic* exercise, must be seen in the context of a new culture of power that massively prioritizes the docility of individual subjects.

What is signalled here is not only an explosion of conceptual sophistication in penal matters; there is also a flourishing in the industry of punishment. Parallel 'judges' multiplied around legal judgement; psychiatrists, criminologists and educationalists all came to play a part in informing such judgements. With the benefit of such expertise, legal judgements could now entail far more detailed prescriptions of corrective efficacy than was the case in mere sentencing. Not only did this mean that the assertion of guilt turned into a strange 'scientifico-judicial complex', it also led to an incredible expansion, that of 'a whole field of recent objects, a whole new system of truth... a mass of roles hitherto unknown in the exercise of human justice' (1977a, p. 23). The great 'corpus of knowledge, techniques, and "scientific" discourses' thus formed – here the real focus of *Discipline and Punish* – 'becomes entangled with the practice of power to punish' (p. 23).

What is of interest to Foucault is not only the switch of objects in punishment – a change from a primary focus on bodies or representations to a prioritization of *the individuality* of offenders – neither is it simply the move from the logics of retribution or didactic moral insight to the privileging of a more holistic type of correction, modification, or rehabilitation. Foucault's interest also lies with the technological innovations – instruments and mechanisms of supervision, surveillance, calibration and modification – that accompany these shifts. It is in these ways, the bringing into view of a new object, the development of new types of intervention, innovations of technological means – all of which enabled a far more reliable and exacting correspondence of the somatic singularity with particular subject- and object-effects of power – that a new mode of psychological power-knowledge finds its feet. It is invaluable in

inscribing offences in the field of objects susceptible of scientific knowledge... [in] provid[ing] the mechanisms of legal punishment with a justifiable hold... not only on offences, but on individuals; not only on what they do, but also on what they are, will be, may be.
(Foucault, 1977a, p. 18).

Discussion 1.2: The examination and psychologico-moral discourse

The examination is a mode of disciplinary scrutiny that Foucault studies in considerable detail. As Davidson (2003) remarks, 'The examination is that form of knowledge and power that gives rise to the "human sciences" '(p. xxiii). Why the examination represents such a crucial advance in the technology of power is that it functions as a measure of *potentiality*. The examination is not limited to the past, to the single deviant or criminal act that has already taken place, it is a measure of the subject's *future capability*, their prospective dangerousness to society. While legal punishment, strictly speaking, bears on an act, the broader array of punitive techniques needs to bring into focus the details of an entire life: the subject must be linked to their offence in a variety of ways, by reference to questions of instincts, drives, tendencies, their character and so on (Foucault, 2003b). The role of psychological knowledge is obviously crucial in this respect. An infraction is not to be understood simply in terms of prohibited relations between individuals, but with reference to 'the opening up of [the] domain... of thought, its irregular and spontaneous flow... its images, its memories, its perceptions... impressions' (2003b, p. 189).

We have then, as Foucault (1977a, 2003b) is at pains to point out, a transfer in the point of application of punishment, from *the offence* defined by the law to *criminality* evaluated from the perspective of psychologico-moral discourse. Foucault speaks of a type of doubling here, referring to a whole series of psychological objectifications that it becomes possible to presuppose on the basis of the act itself – ‘psychological immaturity’, ‘a poorly structured personality’ and so on – objectifications which, in a tautological way, enable authorities of punishment to move from the singular act to a set of relatively stable traits, from an isolated instance of conduct to personality dispositions and inevitable tendencies, from the offence to *an entire way of being*. In this way, Foucault (2003b) remarks that the individual resembles his crime before he has committed it.

Initially psychological and legal discourses sit uncomfortably alongside one another; the disciplinary specificity of each is potentially compromised by this combination. Nevertheless, this juxtaposition, no matter how awkward, is ultimately functional – its inconsistencies must not be resolved. No one institutional intervention will do – if it is a case of merely psychological engagement with the ‘individual to be corrected’ then only therapeutic prescriptions will result; if it is exclusively a matter of legal intervention, then the authorities would be limited to the act itself in considering punishment. It is hence the corrective force of *the combination* of these two institutions that Foucault prioritizes. This collaboration ensures a far more extensive permeation of power through the problematic subject: not just their past but their future, not simply an isolated act but their entire life; indeed, the full ambit of their dangerous potentiality is thus all made accessible to legal consideration.

II

The advent of disciplinary

The era of disciplinary power extended certain priorities of the reformist era – the rationale of humanism, the principles of objectifying and subjectifying knowledge and the proto-psychological notion of the soul – while definitively breaking with others. Perhaps most notably, whereas both the ritual of torture in sovereignty and the punitive demonstrations of the reformers had been ostentatious public spectacles, the new schema of punishment would require secrecy, and more than this, an autonomy of its own specialized means. In a reversal of the situation in sovereign power, where power itself was put on display and the masses were kept in the shadows, disciplinary power would be exercised through a kind of practical invisibility. Its mechanisms and rituals

would remain out of sight even as it exposed its subjects to conditions of permanent surveillance, to saturating regimes of visibility. The need to glean a modicum of a quasi-psychological knowledge is a motivating factor in this regard – disciplinary systems strive to make surveillance an integral part of their schedules of production and control such that the individual subject can be precisely and comparatively observed. An additional factor is apparent here, namely subjects' consciousness of their own visibility; this is a type of self-awareness that makes such subjects – in a classic phrase of Foucault's – 'themselves assume responsibility for the constraints of power'(1977a, p. 187).

In an extension of an initiative of humanist reform, the era of disciplinarity ensures an increasing professionalization and fragmentation in the field of rehabilitative expertise. The rights of punishment and modification in disciplinary times are entrusted only to the most suitable authorities and specialists. Even though the disciplinary subject is more active than ever before – inscribing in themselves, as we shall see, 'a power relation in which they are the principle of their own subjection' (1977a, p. 203) – this internal functioning of power is matched and supported by the spread of a new kind of professional agent of power, the teacher, the doctor, the analyst and the counsellor. Such authorities of discipline – authorities that would come to require specialist training, competence in particular procedures of practice and proficiency in technical vernaculars – occupied a unique position between juridical authority and society. So, as in the case of the 'individual reclamation' of convicts, such authorities would exert a curative force, a 'concerted orthopaedy... isolated both from the social body and juridical power' (1977a, p. 130). What Foucault wishes to impress upon us is not simply that advancements in the treatment of deviance are accompanied by a parallel growth in the powers of disciplinary agents, he wants to emphasize how a whole new and autonomous domain of treatments, corrections and specializations is opened up: a zone of moral orthopaedic enterprises comes to be engendered in this way.

Technologies of discipline

Rather than the asymmetrical coupling of levy-expenditure in sovereignty – in which the sovereign, by divine right, imposes a levy on products, harvests and goods – there is no dualism in disciplinarity, no threat of war. The sovereign's fragmentary hold of power, conditioned promises of violence and the need of a continual reactivation of ceremonial affirmation cannot compete with the total hold of disciplinarity, which 'tends to be an exhaustive capture of the individual's body,

actions, time and behaviour' (Foucault, 2006, p. 46). We have, in disciplinary, not a periodic seizure of goods or services, but a continuous seizure of the body and of the soul. As Foucault makes clear in *Psychiatric Power*, the efficacy of the control exercised by the disciplinary agent is contingent on a basic requirement: their power must be a total power, undisturbed by any third party and able to entirely envelop its subject. Foucault (2006) provides examples of what such an autonomy of control might mean in institution of the asylum. Here it was necessary not only to cede the psychiatrist final authority in issues of treatment, but to completely divorce the patient from their usual familial and societal domain, delivering them thus into a domain of absolute order where the force of a controlled and intensified reality would become the principle of cure.

A given agency of disciplinary power would thus need to maintain 'its own functioning, its own rules, its own techniques, its own knowledge; it needed be able to fix its own norms and decide its own results' (Foucault, 1977a, p. 129). Furthermore, a relation of secrecy, particularly in relation to matters of technique, also proved to be an imperative. This is not just about a protected society of discourse, not just about procedures of initiation into particular domains of disciplinary practice; it is about consolidating the full force of a set of modificatory dynamics, which must be understood in combination and only appropriately applied within certain protocols of practice, within the regulated confines of a specialist discourse.

Discussion 1.3: An analytics of the psychotherapeutic: Auditory surveillance, subjectivizing talk

It benefits our discussion here to make recourse to a series of observations drawn from a study of the operation of power in psychodynamic psychotherapy (Hook, 2001, 2002). The study in question was not explicitly Foucauldian in design; it did not aim merely to apply or verify Foucault's concepts of power, nor did it adhere to a (historical) methodological frame derived from his work. Nevertheless, it may be taken as an example of a Foucauldian analytics inasmuch as it eschews existing theoretical explanations and seeks to grasp the minutia of a potentially productive form of power as implemented at a micro- (or face-to-face) level. Likewise, although the implicit focus was on how power flows from a psychotherapist to a patient, the analysis – aware of Foucault's injunction against exclusively repressive or top-down models of power – did not assume this to be the only possible direction of therapeutic power. Furthermore, by attempting to discern the instrumentality of psychotherapeutic power – that is, by isolating a

set of regularly occurring tactics, mechanisms and skills of practice, each of which may be given as an example of therapeutic efficacy – the study was open to the idea that the psychotherapist's repertoire of interventions could be likened to a human technology. The methodological template for the study was drawn from a constructionist revision of Glaser and Strauss's (1967) grounded theory approach (Pidgeon, 1996; Pidgeon and Henwood, 1996). Some of the results of the study:

- The first category of psychotherapeutic power identified in the analysis, perhaps unexpectedly, was *listening*. Although apparently a passive and facilitative process, and while no doubt therapeutically operative, the results of the study suggested that therapeutic listening might be considered an exertive behaviour, indeed, a *purposeful and goal-directed form of action* performed by the therapist. The performance of therapeutic listening functioned as a form of inspection, a means of observing, *assessing, monitoring*; an *auditory surveillance* designed to elicit and sustain patient disclosure. Such performances seemed instrumental not only in eliciting compromising personal expositions, but in encouraging a confessional mode of exposition. Furthermore, like the doctor's gaze, that yields knowledge and prescriptions of intervention on the basis of visual analysis (an imposition of discourse through the act of perception), so the attentive ear of the psychotherapist brought with it a series of psychological knowledges and interpretations, an evaluative or diagnostic frame of intelligibility (the imposition of discourse through the act of listening).
- A second apparent category of psychotherapeutic power concerned the 'therapeutic talking' of patients. At its most basic, this therapeutic talk of patients was that of a personal narrative – self-attending, self-focused, often strongly problem-focused – of which the patient was both the author and the protagonist. In this way, such narratives were marked by a fundamental self-attention, a strong 'I' foundation and pivot. A central component of these 'talkings' was thus the provision of a reflexive attitude, which, while often vague at first, soon grew in strength. This self-focus was in many ways the outcome, of the 'inactive intervention' of therapists, who, through explicit refutation of typical conversational structures, and through the strong prioritization of patient subjectivity, came to discretely promote and encourage this self-attending orientation. As therapy progressed, therapists 'slimmed down' their contributions to a bare minimum, enforced a guarded and tactical form of conversational detachment such that the therapeutic narrative came very close to resembling the therapeutic *monologue* of the self-monitoring patient. The placement of such a premium on the development of patient subjectivity and reflexivity was a strong feature of all analysed protocols. The patient's *self* increasingly became a level of awareness

and a surface of intervention that needed to be prioritized; it became the vessel through which therapists could repeatedly appeal to the patient's agency, to *their* own personal prerogative and responsibility, to change.

Disciplinary technologies hence advance, as Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) affirm, by taking what were essentially *political* problems (problems of control), removing them from the domain of political discourse, recasting them in the neutral language of science and transforming them into *technical* problems for the sole attention of specialists and experts. The constructive role that power has played in the constitution of such problem domains is thus elided in the humanist attention to the refinement of various specialist technical domains of treatment. The aptness of the terminological choice of 'technology' needs to be emphasized, despite, as Rose (1991) points out, being a term not often associated with the human. We may thus understand 'human technologies' as discrete sets of practicable knowledge and expertise, as disciplinary arrays of technical skills and analytical procedures. Such technologies necessarily entail their own professional vocabularies – discrete languages of codification and control – along with their own regimes of treatment and analysis. They remain in the hands of select experts; they maintain a particular form of change or betterment as their stated objective; their implementation, as Foucault frequently emphasizes, brings about an increase in the productivity, the efficiency and the effectiveness of given relations of power.

The physicality of the soul

The physicality of the disciplinable body so neglected by humanist reformers returns in disciplinary as power's first point of purchase, as *the* surface upon which discipline would focus its powers, at least, as Miller (1994) notes, in the earliest stages of its deployment. What is at stake here is not the destruction of the body as in sovereignty, but rather the analytical reconfiguration of the body's productive components – the body that is a point of concentration for a set of generative interventions – the body broken down, rearranged and then put to work. Foucault reiterates the vital importance of the body to disciplinary when he asserts that 'the historical moment of the disciplines was born when an art of the human body was born' (1977a, p. 137).

This emphasis on physicality remains paramount; the material insistence of this form of power cannot be dissolved in a focus on representation, language or discourse. It is possible, in this respect, to read *Discipline and Punish* sub-textually, as Foucault taking issue

with prevailing intellectual fashions at the time he was writing. Rather than the activities of variants of (post)structuralism – deconstructive, linguistic, semiotic modes of analysis which remain preoccupied with signification, meaning and textuality – he is insisting that we be aware of the complex relations between materially or bodily exercised regimes of power and the representational or discursive orders that spring from them. The growth and articulation of bodily implemented force-relations – ultimately the terminal forms of any regime of political control – must prove a focal point in the analysis of power.

A remarkable refinement of punitive measures follows on from this advance in power. Not only is it the case that penal intervention must operate in essentially corrective, orthopaedic or therapeutic modes, it is also the case that each corrective involvement is tantamount to an investment, which must yield a return, an increase in the subject's productivity. Each rehabilitative measure needs result in a proportional increase of obedience and productivity; docility *and* aptitude are always to be generated together.

The importance of the body as power's target must not, however, be viewed as total: power needs be traced upon the body *precisely in order to create a more lasting order of soul-effects*. A crucial factor in the renewed bodily focus of disciplinarity is found precisely in the imperative of fastening the 'somatic singularity' of distinguishable subjects to particular subjectifying effects. As I have tried to emphasize in the epigraph of this chapter: 'It is because the body has been "subjectified" ... that the subject function has been fixed on it, because it has been *psychologized* and *normalized* ... [that] the individual appeared, about which one can speak, hold discourses, and attempt to found sciences' (Foucault, 2006, p. 56, my emphasis).

One can hence appreciate how a localizing, subjectifying function might be said to lie behind a variety of bodily procedures and operations for Foucault, how his seemingly excessive preoccupation with the physicality of control must be linked to the formation of a series of related and contingent subject-positions and psychology-effects. The disciplinary body is the body fixed in regimes of time, space and practice, the body as it is trained, educated, rehabilitated and healed. This is a surface of power that needs be viewed in conjunction with the correlate soul-effects that are thus established, a 'body-function' that must be grasped in the terms of the self-regulations, the norms, the expanding set of personalized lessons and self-knowledge – the psychology-effects in short – that it subsequently comes to emit, to recreate, to maintain and implement over itself – this is the body in discipline.

We must be careful to do justice to this double focus of disciplinary, indeed, to the complexity of the relation between these two factors, neither of which can be collapsed into the other. The 'psychology-effects' of a soul are contingent on a certain positioning; there are no 'soul-effects' without the location of somatic singularities in space and time, in the absence, that is to say, of specific measures of productivity, or protocols of surveillance; programmes of disciplinary betterment require a physical locus of scrutiny. Similarly, power must have a soul, a series of lasting 'subject-effects', otherwise, interventions on the body are transient, impermanent and lasting only as long as their initial physical implementations. Something tantamount to a learning must take place here; these effects need to be inscribed, I would argue, in the form of a *psychological series*, that is, as an automated, self-implementing pattern or 'identity', as a regime of self-awareness and observation in which a series of physical procedures and attentions are taken up and *integrated* at a different level, at a level of power that cannot be reduced to isolated bodily attentions, to a mere physicality of practice.¹ Foucault's position is that the refined, technically elaborated return to the body in disciplinary yields a 'surplus power'. This surplus power gives reality to the notion and indeed, *the experience* of the soul:

It would be wrong to say that the soul is a illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by a functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished... on those one supervises, trains and corrects... This is the historical reality of this soul, which unlike the soul represented by Christian theology, is not born in sin and subject to punishment, but is born rather out of methods of punishment, supervision and constraint. This real, non-corporeal soul is not a substance; it is the element in which are articulated the effects of a certain type of power and the reference of a certain type of knowledge, the machinery by which the power relations give rise to a possible corpus of knowledge, and knowledge extends and reinforces the effects of this power.

(1977a, p. 29)

The soul here is the reality-reference upon various concepts and domains of analysis have been constructed; notions of self, psyche, ego, personality, personal subjectivity and consciousness number amongst these constructions. Upon such a variously re-articulated 'soul' 'have been built scientific techniques and the discourses and moral claims of

humanism' (1977a, p. 30). It is this soul – at once both a structure of reflexivity, an observant, regulative and judgemental relation to oneself, and an endlessly extended, varied product of psychological-knowledge production – which Foucault proclaims, in a reversal of Plato's formula, is now the prison of the body.

Discussion 1.4: Auto-therapeutic roles, voluntary confession and self-evaluation

A striking feature of the study of power in psychodynamic psychotherapy (Hook, 2001) was the degree to which its clients took on strongly proactive 'patient' roles and behaviours. Clients themselves were willing, at times, to impose direction and to offer explicit forms of self-evaluation, this was particularly surprising given the apparent lack of a more directive or didactic role on the part of the therapist.

An interesting correlate to the therapeutic objective of patient 'subjectivization' identified above (Discussion 1.3) was the development of an 'auto-therapeutic' narrative on the part of patients who appeared to take up both (patient and therapist) roles in their therapeutic talk. By taking on the speaking function of the therapist – a function determined not only by content, but by its structuring and enquiring qualities – clients started to conduct the facilitative, explorative and 'knowing self' therapeutic tasks in a relatively autonomous manner. The talk of patients in late stages of therapy was increasingly 'auto-therapeutic'; patients were not only able to adopt self-listening and self-assessing roles, but were also able to query and question themselves, to explore their own narratives, to attain new levels of self-realization. Patients were thus able to 'work upon themselves', to lead their own narrative with questions of a self-probing nature, even to provide self-assessments, self-recommendations and personal suggestions of reparative behaviour.

One of the most difficult factors to account for in the analysis of psychodynamic interchanges was the tendency of patients to willingly confess to wrongful or questionable actions or inclinations. The regularity of this phenomenon across protocols was unexpected, as was the seemingly *automatic* nature of 'confession-making'. Cross-case comparisons between published examples of psychodynamic dialogue suggested that such confessional forms of 'externalising conscience' were a characterizing feature of effective therapy. This near unailing tendency of patients to disclose shameful or potentially deviant acts and then implicitly relate them to current norms of what might be considered normal/abnormal, deviant/ordinary, soon came to represent something of an explanatory crisis. Part of the frequency of this phenomenon seemed to lie in the fact that patients generally assumed that the therapeutic environment was an evaluative space, a place where their 'normality' would be assessed, even if only implicitly. Often

this assumption accounted for patients' anxieties about entering psychotherapy, and therapists often expended a good deal of effort trying to persuade patients to the contrary. An early speculation on the part of the researcher was that the 'surveillance' of therapeutic listening, together with the patients' understandings and expectations of the role of the clinical environment, incurred within patients an implicit leaning towards normative values and standards.

It soon became apparent, in attempting to understand the 'normative evaluations' set in play by the context and operations of the psychotherapy, that it was necessary to look beyond the overt role of the therapist. The results of the analysis did not suggest that therapists forced or demanded confession of their patients, any more than they suggested that therapists were, in any obvious manner, guardians of normal or socio-politically dominant values. What became clear as the analysis proceeded was that the power of the therapist was apparent not only in the terms of what they actively *did*, but perhaps more importantly, in terms of what they managed to set in motion by *not doing*. In other words, as became a key hypothesis throughout the latter phases of analysis, the provision of a non-judgemental and non-moralizing attitude appeared to elicit far more private, far more 'confessional', secretive or 'well-guarded' material than an overtly evaluative attitude would have. The very suspension of normalizing or moralizing attitudes on the part of the psychotherapist appeared to induce such attitudes on the part of patients. What this seemed to imply was that certain therapeutic functions – for example, the location of self relative to a set of normative values – could be 'displaced functions' taken up by patients themselves precisely because such expected functions were not more explicitly implemented by the role of the therapists.

Despite the indirect or 'inactive' influence of therapists, the factor of patients' own initiative still proved crucial in understanding such self-evaluative procedures. One of the basic conclusions of the study was that *psychodynamic psychotherapy functioned to elicit, with impressive regularity and through non-directed or explicit means, a powerful impetus to normative self-evaluations on the part of patients*. The effectiveness of this process stemmed from the fact that it was the patient that ultimately took forward the implementing of such therapeutic initiatives, despite that such initiatives may initially have been induced as a function of the psychotherapeutic context. A second conclusion reached: *the process of locating self relative to social norms quickly became an automatic and self-implemented task for patients within psychodynamic treatment*.

Soul production

Never reducible to regimes of bodily treatment, disciplinary technologies dispense a thoroughly *moral* orthopaedics, a mode of treatment that has spread through an incredible range of institutions. The production

of souls is, as one might put it, diffusely managed, not only through relations of supervision and constraint, but also through healings, treatments, medical interventions and the advice of experts. The logic of humanism is a crucial ally here; disciplinary power no longer operates through diminishing its subjects or extracting life. It is, by contrast, a force of betterment; it cultivates the productive capacity of individuals, it heals, it advances, it nurtures that which is most human. Furthermore, as McNay (1994) makes clear, the mechanisms of discipline are characterized by an extraordinary mobility; as a set of techniques rather than a solid institution, such technologies can be easily applied across a number of settings without being reduced to them. Employed by pre-existing authorities or apparatuses, used in conjunction with other modes of power without supplanting them, disciplinary techniques permit an endless variety of adaptations and customizations. This ease of incorporation has meant, historically, that their use has spread from prisons to other disciplinary sectors, to other administrations of control, other places of reform, rehabilitation and education. A diversity of souls is thus subject to varying applications of disciplinarity.

Foucault thus leaves little room for doubt regarding psychology's complicity in the procedures and agendas of disciplinarity. The parapsychological entity of the soul, whose design, deployment and management is central to disciplinary control, is both the subject- and object-effect of psychology. Psychology's subject, 'knowable man [*sic*] (soul, individuality, the self, consciousness, conduct...), is the object-effect of this analytic-investment, of this domination-observation' (Foucault, 1977a, p. 305). In disciplinarity then we have something like a constitutive condition, a historical surface of emergence, which also sets in place certain fundamental epistemic and discursive prerequisites, for the appearance and ongoing substantiation of psychological individuality. It lends a profound personal, scientific and political reality to this object-/subject-effect of individuality, and not only to it, but to a spiralling variety of psychological constructs and procedures predicated upon it (see Rose, 1991, 1996a for a more detailed discussion of the discursive explosion of psychological individuality). As Nikolas Rose (1991) indeed argues, psychological theories have proved indispensable in the birth and spread of the concept of the self, just as psychological methods have been at the forefront in the elaboration of the practices and techniques through which modern selves are understood, developed and remodelled.

Moral reflexive capacity: The psychological functioning of power?

It is worth pausing for a moment here to query Foucault's conceptualization of the 'soul-effects' of disciplinaryity. The soul here is 'a trace of power', something possessed of a forceful reality, even if its underlying basis is little more than that of a reflexive loop, a folding whereby induced effects of power lend a functional reality to an internalized set of capacities. One might ask: Has Foucault selected the most appropriate analytic term in this respect? A secular audience might find this loose ontology of the soul somewhat puzzling within the frame of an ostensibly materialist analysis, especially given that a variety of less theologically loaded terms might prove better descriptors of this point of folding, this reflexive function of power within the subject.²

There are however a series of good reasons for the use of this term. For one, Foucault is able to emphasize that disciplinaryity is not to be reduced to an 'anatomy-politics' (Deleuze's term, 1988) of bodily manipulations; his choice of term makes apparent that there is a surplus 'subject-effect' which results from the practicing of such measures. As intimated above, the reflexive (or, as we might put it, *psychologized*) subject, brought about through a disciplinary mode of subjectification, might be taken to be discipline's most impressive product. The term also has the benefit of joining a variety of contemporary moral orthopaedic measures ('tracings') to earlier attempts within the apparatuses of Christianity to establish a regime of moral authority tantamount to a governing of souls (as Foucault (2003b) discusses in *Abnormal*). Consequently, this concept is able to link problems of sinfulness with those of deviance and abnormality, a regime of spiritual ordering with a regime of normal conduct.

Then again, surely there are a variety of terms that may more sharply evoke something of this productive moral reflexive capacity, this 'I-relation' as it is posed in terms of normalizing disciplinary power? Might there not be terms derived from theoretical psychology that could compliment and extend Foucault's conceptualization? One such term, suggested by Judith Butler, is the psychoanalytic notion of the ego-ideal. In the psyche, she points out, the subject's ideal corresponds to the ego-ideal; this is the benchmark by which the ego is measured by the superego, the 'position' of the subject within the symbolic realm, 'the norm that installs the subject within language and hence within available schemes of cultural intelligibility' (1997, p. 86). Foucault's 'soul' would thus seem to have much in common with this ego-ideal, especially in reference to its evaluative, self-regulatory dimension. In the

light of this comparison, we may ask of Foucault whether his notion of the 'soul' – so carefully distinguished from the subject of Christian theology, so warily de-psychologized – is not exactly a metaphor for the psychological functioning of power?

The charge that might be taken up against Foucault here is that he uses a deliberately non-psychological term to describe what is, to all intents and purposes, a *psychological* process – that operation whereby effects of power are enfolded into the subject, subjectified along the lines of reflexive identification. Van Zyl (1990) puts this bluntly: the novelty of Foucault's account, she claims, is to demonstrate that modern power is essentially psychological in form. We are seemingly presented here with a prime example of a political process taking a psychological route. Put differently, is this not a case of the 'subject-function' working within the dynamics of recognition and self-awareness, operating precisely on the basis of a consciousness of how one appears to the others of power? More to the point, is this not an overtly political process whose complex mechanisms might be best mapped and traced with recourse to psychological concepts?

Despite the descriptive utility of a psychological lexicon, these are precisely the terms that Foucault cannot make reference to. Not only would they flatten the historical range of his analysis – committing to a psychological vocabulary inevitably means the projection of contemporary systems of knowledge onto the past – such a frame of reference would also, presumably, align Foucault to a meta-psychology, a view of consciousness, which brings a variety of humanist concepts and epistemological assumptions in its wake. More obviously, this would require the utilization of a conceptual repertoire drawn from exactly the style of thinking and the mode of power that he is attempting to historicize and to critique. We might take this as a case in point of the ability of individualizing psychological humanism to over-ride other factors of explanation. This is an apolitical and anti-historicist discourse, a language of comprehension in which the factors of political influence and the manifold constructions and subjectifications of disciplinarity are easily naturalized and given permanent residence, as one might put it, within the universal structures of psychological individuality.

Discussion 1.5: Internal routings: A different analytics of power

Despite that one may fully concur with Foucault's choice to avoid descriptive reference to psychological discourse, it does seem difficult to deny that power

is internalized in disciplinarity, that it is lent something akin to a 'psychological' dimension and mode of operation. A degree of strategic reference to the language of 'the psychological' might thus profit the analysis of power. There are at least two routes that one might take in this respect, depending on the degree to which one is willing to risk reifying a series of psychological constructs. One might opt to perform a careful tracking of how psychological concepts produce particularized souls, aiming thus to link the jargon and methods of particular schools of psychology to the emergence of different selves and distinctive technologies of betterment (as is the case in the work of Rose 1991, 1996a). Maintaining the genealogist's distance from the concepts that are being re-historicized, there can, from the standpoint of this approach, be no descriptive recourse to psychological language.

On the other hand, one might take the route of the examination of 'the psychic life of power' in Judith Butler's (1997) phrase, a perspective willing to grant the fact of the disciplinary production of individuality, a perspective that insists that subjectification precedes psychological subjectivity. I should be emphatic here: this is an approach which refutes the ascendancy of psychologistic modes of explanation that presume an individual psychological subject *existing prior to* the constitutive forces of political, material and bodily factors. Nevertheless such an approach is still eager to query the vicissitudes of an internalized power, to press ahead with questions concerning the psychic mechanisms of *subjectivization*, mechanisms that are perhaps not adequately apprehended without a strategic reference to psychoanalytic discourse in particular.

Properties of the soul

What are the principles of disciplinarity made possible by virtue of the soul-effects it is able to produce? Perhaps the easiest of these to anticipate is the principle of *potentiality*, of *pre-emptive intervention*. Unlike the interventions of sovereignty which are intermittent, violent and which are typically obliged to take the form of *response*, disciplinary power has 'an inherent tendency to intervene at the same level as what is happening, at the point where the virtual is becoming real' (Foucault, 2006, p. 51). In other words, disciplinary interventions are, ideally, pre-emptive, occurring prior to the translation of intention into act. The soul is the explanatory vehicle that can best enable the necessary order of predictions; the soul moreover, and the chain of associated psychological terms through which it must now be understood, is precisely the point at which the virtual in the subject can be apprehended before it is realized. The 'psychological' is thus a privileged domain of intervention: 'Disciplinary power must intervene somehow... before the body,

the action, or the discourse, at the level of what is potential, disposition, will, at the level of the soul' (p. 52).

A second principle of disciplinarity stemming from its ability to produce and affect souls is the principle of *differential individualization*. Here the double focus of disciplinarity emphasized until now – of bodily intervention and the linked generation of related types of subjecthood – needs to be complimented by a third pole, an epistemological one. It is likewise important here to link surveillance and knowledge technologies, to make clear that the disciplinary state of permanent surveillance that Foucault so frequently reiterates must not be reduced merely to a condition of ongoing visibility. Indeed, what is implied here is not simply an optical regime of control, but the imperative to produce *maximal and penetrating knowledges about the subject*. For Foucault then, individuality was introduced into the field of knowledge just as power fixed individuality in the field of observation. The drive to surveillance 'proceeds towards a centralized individuation' whose main support and instrument is documentation 'and a continuous punitive action on potential behaviour that behind the body itself, projects something like a psyche' (2006, p. 52). Disciplinary mechanisms are able, in other words, via extractions, productions of knowledge, to produce a kind of singularity of the individual. This individualizing capacity, crucially, works differentially; rather than bending its subjects into a single uniform mass, disciplinarity cultivates differences, it separates and distinguishes, it makes unique.

The endless generation of knowledge upon which the progressive individualization of disciplinarity depends is itself reliant on continuous assessment, on the accumulated details of personal histories, the 'volunteered' expositions of confessions. Hence the time devoted in Foucault's genealogical analyses to the 'fixing of the individual in writing', to the testing, measuring and examining of subjects, to the comparative analytical scrutiny that makes the many dimensions of individuality possible. This generative aspect cannot be overestimated: it is this productive influence, the precise observation, calibration and comparison of disciplinary activity, this isolation 'to the point of necessary single units' that succeeds in training 'the confused, useless, moving multitude of individual elements' (1977a, p. 170). It is the combined efforts of such technologies which, Foucault claims, forms modern individuals who are simultaneously the outcomes of disciplinary knowledge and its recursive 'instrument-effects'.

To be sure, the monitoring, recording and surveillance technologies of such individualization procedures must enable a psychological

'thickening' of the subject. They must ensure an expanding basis of subjectification, that is, a broadening and deepening of something akin to a 'psychological core' of subjectivity that will allow for potentially endless elaboration. Foucault has in mind here not only the generation of scores and rankings (intelligence quotients, diagnoses of pathology, assessments of personality, aptitude), or just the future and historical orientation of such enquiries (the enabling of predictions, the re-visitation of personal histories). He is alluding also to a proliferating set of accounts, references and assessments which means that the psychological individuality produced is both potentially endless (it always permits further re-articulation) and endlessly distinctive (disciplinary individuals must be unique, always discernable from one another). Paradoxically then, an advance in the technological apparatuses of individualization guarantees a proportionate increase in the complexity of human psychology; the greater the sophistication of such instruments, the more intricate the psychology of analysed individuals. Disciplinary methods of knowing the human psyche thus relate to it – to borrow from Butchart (1998) – 'not as a means of discovery against an object waiting to be known, but as a productive power towards an object that is also its effect' (p. ix).

It is important, I think, to emphasize that we are not concerned here merely with the *discursive* production of individual difference, or simply with the marking of somatic singularities into separable units of control. We are concerned also with the fact that these processes lend an unprecedented depth and dimension to subjectivity. These comments help me in drawing an important distinction – one deserving of more attention in Foucault – between subjectification and subjectivization. In terms of the former, I have in mind – as discussed above – the promotion and elaboration of a thoroughly individualizing set of knowledges about the singular subject who is effectively normalized and psychologized as a result. The knock-on effect of such practices, the feeding back of such knowledges to a subject who comes to apply such notions, to understand and experience themselves in the terms of subjectification, is what I understand as *subjectivization*. This, in short, is the difference between being accorded a subject-position, and what it might mean to take on, to assume or personalize, such a subject-position.³

Individualization, in all of the capacities discussed above – as a function of subjectification and subjectivization alike – remains for Foucault a contingent phenomenon, an after-effect of the functioning of modern disciplinary power. He is insistent in this respect: 'we cannot say that the individual pre-exists the subject-function, the projection of a psyche, or

the normalising agency... [I]t is only insofar as the somatic singularity became the bearer of the subject-function through disciplinary mechanisms that the individual appeared within a political system' (2006, p. 56).

There is a third important principle made possible by the fact that disciplinarity takes the soul as its prime object-effect. This is the ideal of the *saturating influence* of disciplinary technologies. The maxim of disciplinarity that one might devise in this respect is that of the 'exhaustive capture' (Foucault's term) of the body, actions and time of subjects. This ideal overlaps with another: the hope that disciplinary interventions might become self-perpetuating. The operation of discipline must look forward, as Foucault puts it, to the time when only virtual supervision and instruction will be necessary, to the moment when discipline *keeps going by itself*, when its acquired skills become self-implementing, automatic, indeed autonomous functions of the subject. This, incidentally, is one of the reasons that Foucault is often reticent to limit the focus of his analyses to the obvious agents of discipline; if disciplinary interventions are designed such that ultimately they can work independently then 'the person in charge... its director, is not so much an individual as a function that is exercised' (2006, p. 55). In short then, the best means of guaranteeing the degree of total influence that disciplinary technologies aim at is if they become self-implementing systems, functions of a subject's reflexive relation to self.

These adjoined principles of self-perpetuating activation and endless, complete influence make for an overwhelming priority of disciplinarity power. All of its mechanisms aim to ensure that subjects adopt certain fundamentally reflexive, self-monitoring and self-assessing relations to *themselves*. This self-observing, self-policing quality is famously exemplified by Foucault in the figure of the Panopticon: a watchtower structure at the centre of a prison that grants warders a permanent visibility over the inmates, despite that the prisoners themselves cannot see if they are being watched; such a structure assures that the prisoners know at all times that they *may* be under surveillance. Prisoners, or 'souls' more generally, thus come to operate as if under constant surveillance, taking on the role of controlling observer upon themselves. Power-relations are thus implemented and reproduced from an internal position. Subjects can thus be said to 'inscribe in themselves a power relation in which *they* are the principle of their own subjection' (Foucault, 1977a, p. 203).

As argued above, disciplinary technology cannot be reduced to a set of corporeal measures, to a mere materiality of power. Disciplinarity is, as Foucault repeatedly emphasizes, more flexible, more profound and

more permanent in effect than earlier technologies of power. This, I would argue, is partly due to the fact that such modalities of power entail, as a fundamental condition of possibility, something tantamount to a series of psychological operations – the ‘soul-effects’ of power, in Foucault’s terms, as detailed above – operations, which I would suggest are not adequately understood merely as *after-effects* of power. Importantly, what is illustrated by the example of the Panopticon is not just a relation of self-consciousness, or a relation of continuous self-awareness, what is also implied is a complex relation of virtuality to action, of the present to the future, a relation, in other words, of self to potentiality.⁴ What I am trying to suggest here is that in each of these relations we are dealing with a relatively complex process; in each case we are faced with a form of repetition and learning, indeed, with a type of *mediation* that cannot be completely explained by structural factors alone.⁵ The psychological component to disciplinary is an issue I will return to.

Discussion 1.6: Producing problems: The co-construction of therapeutic meanings and affects

Returning to the study of psychotherapeutic power, a crucial category of the analysis proved to be the role of the therapist in directing and encouraging client verbalization. Therapeutic talking was guided and facilitated by therapists in a number of ways; producing an impetus to disclosure proved a clear priority of psychodynamic clinical technique. A variety of minimal contributions on the part of therapists – encouraging gestures, supportive expressions, affirmative sighs and vocalizations – facilitated the flow and direction of the emerging clinical narrative. Therapists’ use of tactical questioning was perhaps the most prominent of such mechanisms, although a variety of associated techniques, prompting, redirecting, reflecting and ‘echoing sentiments’ were also a part of a clear clinical directive – that of locating a substantive ‘problem focus’ for the therapy. The use of an unbroken sequence of related questions, the building-up of a ‘momentum of enquiry’ was particularly useful in this respect, in probing for evidence of emotional disturbance, dysfunctional traits or indications of underlying psychopathology, as in the following example:

Th. Are you completely satisfied with your present life and adjustment?

Pt. Yes...

Pt. No.

Th. Your mother thinks you ought to get treatment. I wonder why?

Pt. I don’t know.

Th. Maybe you’re angry that she sent you here if you don’t need treatment.?

Pt. I'm not angry.

Th. Mmm. (pause) But there must be some area in which you aren't completely happy.

Pt. Well... (pause)

Th. Are you satisfied with the way everything is going in every area of your life?

Pt. (pause) No, not exactly.

Th. Mm hmmm. (pause)

Pt. It's that I don't go out much, not much, I don't go out with boys... (Wolberg, 1977, p. 463).

Questioning techniques of this sort added significantly to the ability of therapy to *construct* rather than merely *discover* the patient's presenting problems. Indirect patterns of enquiry proved in this respect to be commonplace in unearthing emotional disturbances and in consolidating a 'problem focus'. In probing for aetiological and diagnostic information, therapists very seldom asked outright or blunt questions, but approached the characterization of problem areas more obliquely, picking up on certain trends and tendencies already mentioned by the patient. Various other forms of indirection, such as juxtaposing placid and provocative enquiries or obvious with investigative questions, were also apparent. In this respect, the researcher found it difficult to determine whether psychotherapy was a probing process of discovery, or a 'calling into being' of certain working problems. Two conclusions evolved out of the study: (1) psychodynamic therapeutic dialogue is notably 'problem-centric', it must, as a condition of its own ongoing viability, establish a substantive problem area, a strong working focus for the therapy, (2) psychodynamic therapists have at their disposal a variety of questioning tactics and rhetorical manoeuvres, which, taken in conjunction with their ability to reconstruct patients' own accounts of certain events, provides them with a broad constructive latitude within the therapy.

Certainly a fundamental factor in the therapists' warrant to make 'problem attributions' was the ambiguity and instability of reconstructed emotions. The general murkiness of emotions, and the ease with which they are distorted, meant that emotional constructions featured prominently in therapists' attempts to probe for, and then solidify, psychological problems within patients. A series of related tactics were identified in this respect, most prominent of which were the identification of ostensibly latent emotions and the amplification of emotional descriptions. Whether by offering a pinpointing emotional term that carried a powerful resonance, or by the introduction of a *new* term with a different weighting of meaning altogether, therapists appeared to play an active role in co-constructing the meaning of the therapeutic narrative. A brief example illustrates such an emotional attribution and its role in the construction of a larger presenting problem:

Pt. Dr... sent me here for these headaches. He thinks it might be mental. I don't think it was necessary for me to come.

Th. Do you believe it's mental?

Pt. Good Lord, No! I think I need something that will ease this pain, I've been told a million different things of what's wrong.

Th. Perhaps you are right. It may be entirely physical. What examinations have you had?

Pt. *(Patient details the consultations he has had, maintaining his position that his problem is physiological).*

Th. Then it perhaps made you angry to come here?

Pt. I was angry. Not now though. Do you think you can help this headache?

Th. I'm not sure; but if you tell me about the trouble from the beginning, I might be able to help you with any emotional factors that can stir up a headache.

Pt. How can that do it? I know I have been emotional about it (Wolberg, 1977, p. 398).

Noteworthy here is the way in which the therapist has asserted an emotional problem, if not as the fundamental complaint, then as undeniably attached to the presenting complaint. An additional conclusion of the research : psychodynamic therapists maintain a *powerful latitude in identifying the strength and appropriateness of feelings within patients; this latitude of emotional attributions plays a crucial part in ascertaining – indeed, in constructing – a working problem focus for the therapy.*

Confessional subjects

Despite the emphasis in *Discipline and Punish* on the optics of power, one should bear in mind that not all information-gathering instruments of disciplinary take on an exclusively visual form. Elsewhere Foucault (1978a, 2003b) focuses more on verbal modes of assessment, indeed, on that longstanding mechanism of power whereby subjects are induced to speak the secret of their guilt, to make apparent those sins, fantasies and hidden pleasures that disciplinary agents would not otherwise be able to access. The confessional, in short, must be seen as a crucial disciplinary instrument. As Butchart advances, this is a technique of intimate surveillance 'through which the most confidential ideas and private secrets... are amplified to audibility and lifted into socio-medical spaces as devices of disciplinary subjectification' (1997, p. 107). Butchart views psychology and its associated 'culture of disclosure' as playing a particularly important role here: departing from the predominant point of access in medical technologies – the gaze, the visual inspection of the

sick body – psychology came to prioritize a disciplinary technology of *listening*.

Foucault's historical engagements with confessional procedures are not limited to the era of disciplinary modernity. He makes it clear – that voluntary confessing requires the participation of a soliciting agent who is always more than a silent interlocutor. Despite a range of differing historical utilizations, Foucault (1987) isolates a basic logic underlying the mechanism of confession: the more one speaks, the freer one will be. The impetus to confess is hence always wrapped up in goals of salvation, liberation and well-being.

It is worth emphasizing that confessional processes do not simply extend or translate the visual tactics of surveillance into an auditory form. There is an additional factor at work here; the reflexivity involved in this type of self-exposition involves an extended turning of self into discourse, a kind of narrative subjectivization not necessarily present in the dynamics of Panoptic surveillance. This is a mode of power in which the speaking subject is also the subject of their own speaking. (The ambiguities of this term serves us well here: the speaking subject is both *subject to* their own speaking and the *subject of* what is spoken about, in addition to being that subject *that is speaking* – a reflexive looping of self into discourse that epitomizes the subjectivization discussed above.) Rose (1996a) helpfully expands on this point: the therapeutic performance of depicting one's self in speech, the truthful speaking of who one is and what one does, is, at the same time, an identifying and a subjectifying act. It both constructs a self in terms of given norms of identity, and it scaffolds this self within an array of authoritative constructs that it will need make recourse to in order to attain insight, understandings of the self. Twin processes of subjectification and subjectivization are thus in evidence. In the technical form of therapeutic processes, says Rose (1996a), the confessing subject is identified: 'The "I" that speaks is to be . . . identical with the "I" whose feelings, wishes, anxieties, and fears are articulated' (p. 96). Here then, the folding of disciplinary subjects locked into reflexive patterns of self-production and self-awareness, is the process of subjectivization. Of course, in the very act of becoming the subject of one's own narrative, one becomes 'attached to the work of constructing an identity'; by being affiliated to an identity project one is 'bound to the language and norms of psychological expertise' (Rose, p. 96), a positioning I understand as subjectification.

Not only do procedures of confession extend professionally prescribed categories and projects of identity, not only are they actively subjectivizing, but they also consolidate and extend the authority of experts. As

Foucault (1978a) insists, it is increasingly only through the mediation of expert interpreters – doctors, psychologists, psychiatrists and counsellors – that the individual can properly know the truth of their own internal nature.

Normalization and the generation of deviance

Having emphasized the generalizability of disciplinary technologies, along with the fact of the ‘psychological depth’ that they are able to generate, it seems important now to ask what overarching objective might unite all these diverse systems of discipline. What is it that all moral orthopaedic projects lean towards; what might be the ultimate goal of a culture of disciplinarity? For Foucault, all interventions of this sort are taken to share the same basic objective: normalization, that is, the generation of productive, docile self-regulatory souls and the progressive elimination of social and psychological irregularities. It helps here to make a clarification: what is produced in the corrective attentions of disciplinarity is not only the singular differentiation of individual subjects, but also a broad comparative domain – a mass of scores, indicators and averages – which forms the backdrop against which individualization becomes possible. Put differently, individualization takes place in relation to the production of populations – the individual and the population are for Foucault coterminous inventions – it is beneath the production of a disciplined population (be it one of learning, labour, psychological wellness, obedience) that one finds such effects of individualizing fragmentation. What I have referred to as progressive individualization necessarily involves recourse to a set of classifications, to hierarchical arrangements, categorizations of ability, skill and deficiency: an ‘accumulation of documents... the organization of comparative fields’ makes it possible ‘to classify... categories, determine averages, fix norms’ (Foucault, 1977a, p. 190).

Comparisons of this sort, hierarchies of performance and ability – never merely taxonomical, always arranged according to the valued productivities of a given society – quickly become a preoccupation of modern disciplinary culture. The fact of such a comparative basis, epitomized for Foucault in sets of *norms*, helped to unify the operations of disciplinary power, enabling a kind of ‘normalizing judgement’ to spread throughout society. Importantly, a *norm* is not to be understood as the mid-point of a binary division of pass/fail, but rather as a point on a graduated scale. Not only do we have an average then rather than a steadfast rule – an average which gives us the zero-degree of conformity,

the minimum score beneath which everything is punishable – we have also a quantitative hierarchization of the ‘nature’ of individuals, a ‘value-giving’ measure ‘of individuals themselves . . . their potentialities’ (1977a, p. 181). This is a type of evaluation which ensures that attributions of abnormality are not only socially significant and forceful, but essentializing also, inseparably tied to what individuals *are*.

It is the nature of the norm that every aspect of ‘the human’ can be assigned a value in relation to an average position. This means that not only a far greater variety of human qualities can now be assessed – not all human capacities are easily accorded a ‘right’/‘wrong’ judgement; all may be accorded a description relative to a norm – it also means that a wider system of gradation is enabled than is the case in crude binary distinctions. This leads to a downward saturation of disciplinary values, a spectrum of penalization as one might put it, an ‘infra-penalty’ wherever more capillary aspects of social and psychological life become potentially punishable. Foucault (1977a) is unequivocal: the slightest deviances from a norm are now punishable; every quality, every facet of human life is now locked into a perpetual relation to the standard of the norm. Why this is such a boost to the culture of disciplinarity is that a mass of behaviours previously difficult to isolate and punish – time-wasting, low rates of productivity, minor disobediences of dress, speech and posture – now became highly visible and punishable. Disciplinary mechanisms thus could be said to secrete ‘a “penalty of the norm”, which is irreducible in its principles and functioning to the traditional penalty of the law’ (1977a, p. 183).

In speaking of normalization then we are not merely concerned with the homogenizing effects of certain standards of conformity, or the moralizing implication of the hierarchical judgement of subjects *themselves*, we are concerned also with a set of exclusionary principles, with the production of deviance. This stands to reason: the normalizing assessments of disciplinarity permit not only for degrees of upward achievement, they also make possible a set of roles and categories of under-performance. There were no deserters, observes Foucault (2006), prior to the historical emergence of disciplined armies. Similarly, the designation of the ‘feeble-minded’ only appears once a system of school discipline is implemented. Rather than viewing disciplinary institutions as the result of various problematic individuals within society who need to be cared for and protected, such individuals should rather be seen as the outcome of the installation of disciplinary systems. Disciplinarity hence may be said to engender its own deviance, thereby enabling and

justifying its own recovery systems. There is a kind of reverse logic at work here: technologies of normalization are themselves integral to the systematic classification and control of anomalies within a given social body. It is true thus to say that normalizing power succeeds all the more for its shortcoming. The real goal of rehabilitative and punitive endeavours is thus not the complete elimination of deviances and transgressions, but rather the tactical use, the strategic deployment of such problems as a means of justification for ever greater schedules of control and surveillance.

Discussion 1.7: Family as switch-point between disciplinary and sovereignty

Although the 'psy-disciplines' clearly play a key role in the schema of disciplinary power, we need to understand their role in relation to an additional factor, the familial domain. By making reference to the structures of family power, Foucault is able to offer an account of what he terms the 'Psy-function'. Doing so proves crucial, it enables Foucault to speak of how certain measures of sovereign power *persist* within disciplinary eras – something for which he is often criticized for neglecting in his alleged overgeneralization of the model of disciplinary (McNay, 1994).

The operation of power within the family, he insists, resembles more closely the shape of sovereignty than that of disciplinary, a fact which is particularly true of how individualization works within family structures. As opposed to the anonymity of power and an ascending order of individualization, the patriarchal family exhibits a kind of 'maximum individualization' on the part of the father, whom, as a bearer of certain prerogatives and familial rights, returns us to the pattern of sovereign authority. This is not to suggest that the family is an outmoded 'diagram' of power and that its particular arrangements will simply be assimilated by disciplinary measures. It neither suggests that supervision and surveillance or related disciplinary mechanisms cannot be applied here; it is not the case that the micro-sovereignty of the family works against disciplinary. Quite to the contrary, this non-disciplinary unit makes an invaluable contribution to the viability of disciplinary systems. It is precisely because arrangements and structures of family power cannot be wholly assimilated into disciplinary, precisely this 'standing outside' which means that they can ensure the system's solidity.

Families, Foucault (2006) suggests, are instrumental in allocating appropriate disciplinary locations to subjects; registration in disciplinary institutions is largely the function of the family's system of commitments, obligations and responsibilities. There is a degree of reciprocation here: family structures are

required to take up the discards of disciplinary interventions; disciplinary institutions are called upon to fulfil neglected familial responsibilities – types of nurturance, moral care and guidance – when the family unit has collapsed. As a result, Foucault treats the family as a relay between disciplinary sites; it is a point of transfer that connects the school and the military, the military and the workforce, an intersection between educational and clinical locations. When individuals are not adequately bettered by a given disciplinary system, they need to be redirected; the family is the non-disciplinary switch-point that makes such redirection of interventions possible.

Foucault maintains that it is precisely because arrangements and structures of family power cannot be wholly assimilated into disciplinarity that they can ensure the system's solidity. The heterogeneity between these two domains makes for a functional complementarity of forces: the only way disciplinary mechanisms are able to 'get a grip with maximum intensity and effectiveness' on individuals is if 'this cell of sovereignty constituted by the family' works alongside them (2006, p. 84). This exchange enables power not only because it disrupts the predictability of monotonous disciplinary mechanisms, but also makes possible a series of novel and spontaneous effects like the emergence of the 'Psy-function'. Foucault has in mind here those aspects of the psy-disciplines which make their appearance precisely as disciplinary substitutes for the family. The 'Psy-function' must thus be understood as the quasi-familial mode of disciplinarity, a refamiliarization of deviant individuals.

The new order of individualization

What Foucault's genealogical history of punishment enables us to do is to link the disciplinary sites of the school, the clinic, the consulting room back to far starker disciplinary contexts: the prison, the factory floor, the military base. The normalizing objectives of the human science disciplines – whether we have in mind here psychology, criminology, social work, pedagogy or psychiatry – have no doubt taken on far more refined, far more sophisticated and distinctive technological means, but at basis they share the same recuperative, rehabilitative or corrective objectives as these austere disciplinary institutions. The fundamental task of all disciplinary interventions is to rehabilitate subject-positions that have failed, to (re)institute normalizing souls that entail a fundamental structure of observant, reflexive and judgemental relations to self; hence, Foucault's (1977a) reference to psychologists as 'servants of moral orthopaedics'.

As Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) insist, it is in this attempt to eliminate behavioural social and psychological deviances of all sort that various disciplinary technologies have broken fundamentally

with neither the aim nor the methods of the prison. Furthermore, as long as the human sciences continue the search for deep human truths – an order of meaning they claim to have privileged access to – and so long as they insist that the truths they uncover lie outside the sphere of power, ‘these sciences remain vital strategies of disciplinary power, despite the privileged externality they would pretend’ (1982, p. 181).

The disciplinary institutions that Foucault mentions are not, of course, one and the same; there are evident differences of practice and crucial analytical distinctions separating the asylum from the barracks, the classroom from the hospital. Foucault’s point is not that these zones of moral orthopaedic intervention are simply homogenous; it is rather the case that in the carceral network of the disciplinary city, these institutions work together. Many of the newer disciplinary modalities may be said to do something tantamount to the work of prisons, albeit in a preventative capacity:

In the subtle gradation of the apparatuses of discipline...the prison does not at all represent the unleashing of a different kind of power... [b]etween the latest institution of ‘rehabilitation’, where one is taken to avoid prison, and the prison...the difference is (and must be) scarcely perceptible... Prison continues, on those who are entrusted to it, a work begun elsewhere, which the whole of society pursues on each individual through innumerable mechanisms of discipline.

(1977a, pp. 302–303)

All of the human sciences and their associated practices emerged first from disciplinary institutions, from the context of relations of power through practices of exclusion, surveillance, objectification and confinement, and are as such, according to Foucault (1977a), rightly called ‘disciplines’. From such institutional bases they have grown to new levels of refinement and specialization, attaining their own rules of evidence, modes of recruitment and exclusion, refined their own particular practices, their own unique languages of control and have done so within the template of a general disciplinary technology. The psychological, pedagogical, sociological and criminological disciplines continue to contribute to the innovation and extension of new techniques of power. Institutions like the asylum, the school, the clinic and the therapeutic arena have functioned, and still do – to paraphrase Best and Kellner (1991) – as laboratories for experimentation

with correctional techniques and the acquisition of knowledge for social control. These institutions are the places where individuals – with increasingly detailed case-studies and personal histories – are simultaneously the level of observation and intervention, the font of ever further knowledge production, and the raw materials of a continually expanding and continually refined systems of diagnosis and categorization.

As discussed earlier, individualization was once apparent only where the rights of sovereignty were exercised, only as one approached the spectacular apex of a pyramidal hierarchy of power. This was an ascending order of individualization, a mode of individualization which remained ‘below the threshold of description’ for the vast majority. In disciplinary eras, individualization is, in Foucault’s terms, compulsory and descending; all subjects are caught in its regimes of visibility and normalization. Those on whom power is most concentrated are the most individualized, while power itself tends to anonymity. Individualization, perhaps the strongest instrument-effect of these goals, is hence characterized – paraphrasing Foucault (1977a) – by an inversion of invisibility into an intensive gaze of power, a gaze, furthermore, that subjects often come to bear upon themselves. Turning this insight to the ‘psycho’ sciences, Foucault contends

All the sciences, analyses or practices employing the root ‘psycho-’ have their origin in this historical reversal of the procedures of individualization. The moment that saw the transition of historico-ritual mechanisms for the formation of individuality to the scientifico-disciplinary mechanisms, when the normal took over from the ancestral and measurement from status... that [was the] moment when a new technology of power... [came to be] implemented.

(Foucault, 1977a, p. 193)

It is at this moment that power and knowledge become inseparably intertwined; it is here that the vast proliferation of knowledge on individuals and populations coincides with the continuous flourishing of new areas of research *and* the concurrent refinement of disciplinary techniques for observing and transforming subjects. So, to reiterate, for Foucault (1977a), it has only been through the variously articulated marriages of observation and technique, of investigation and intervention, knowledge and method, that the ‘man’ – that is, the distinctive psychological individual – of modern humanism, the subject/object of

social science was born in the first place. Subsequently, one might assert that this psychological individual is inseparable from the forces of disciplinary technology that come to have an increasing bearing upon their nature, on what they most essentially are, will, may be or eventually become.

Discussion 1.8: Crossings of family and discipline: The 'Psy-function'

The Psy-function performs a disciplining role on those who could not be otherwise disciplined. As a result it soon achieves a place at the top order of disciplinary mechanisms; it becomes, indeed, something akin to a supra-disciplinary element which would be relied upon when other disciplinary measures fail:

The Psy-function became both the discourse and the control of all the disciplinary systems. The Psy-function was . . . the establishment of all other schemas for the individualization, normalization, and subjection of individuals within disciplinary systems.

(Foucault, 2006, p. 86)

The psy-disciplines have a privileged role to play here, their applied and clinical forms of treatment make them an exemplary case of para-familial disciplinary. Indeed, psychology, inasmuch as it may be thought of as representative of the Psy-function, could be said to be the master component within the operations of disciplinary culture, a fact which tells us something about the authority and popularity of psychological discourse and expertise today. This alerts us to the importance of a Foucauldian analytics for how we think 'the psychological'. Moreover, it signals the role of this mode of power-knowledge in investigations of even the broadest structures and dynamics of social power. Foucault is emphatic in this respect:

psychological discourse, the psychological institution, and psychological man [*sic*] are connected up to *this* [Psy] *function*. Psychology as institution, as body of the individual, and as discourse will endlessly control the disciplinary apparatuses on the one hand, and, on the other, refer back to familial sovereignty as the authority of truth.

(Foucault, 2006, p. 87, emphasis added)

Hence for Foucault the importance of interrogations of the psychology of work, of psycho-pedagogy, psycho-criminology and the discourse of psychopathology as applied in clinical and penal institutions. We have here an enquiring sensibility,

a predicative, explanatory and interventionist set of discourses – which is to say nothing of their diagnostic and prognostic components – always interwoven with their own dynamics of practice, with regimes of subjectivization (i.e. the ‘identity-function’ of such discourses).

If we are to adequately understand this game of cross-reference between sovereignty and disciplinarity we need to appreciate more than the *familial content* of much psychological discourse. The potency of the Psy-function is not simply about the prevalence of ‘family discourse’ as a favoured trope within clinical settings. The potency of the Psy-function is about how an aspect of familial sovereignty may be introduced into disciplinarity, and about how aspects of disciplinarity are introduced into a ‘familial’ environment. In the case of the former, we might provide the example of the clinical authority of psychotherapists, their prerogative to set boundaries and the rules of intervention; in the case of the latter, we might give thought to how effects of discipline are pursued within the setting of a significant emotional bond, the fact of transference dynamics explored to corrective ends. Foucault makes a series of passing remarks in this respect, eluding to ‘the investment of the family function in the clinic [as] . . . the effective agency of the cure’, as well as to the ‘activation of canonical types of family feelings’ (2006, p. 113), and to the pseudo-familial organization of the therapeutic domain.

While it is true that the particular modality of power that Foucault is driving at here probably receives its definitive treatment in the notion of the *pastorate* (see Chapter 6), it may help to provide a brief illustration in the form of the ‘contrabond’. The *contrabond*, as discussed by Van Zyl (2003), stands in contrast both to the legalistic binding of formal, *contractual relations*, and to the affective commitments that underwrite the sentimental attachments of *bonds*. A *contrabond* – as evidenced in relations between teachers and students, doctors and patients and therapists and clients – represents something of a compromise-formation between these incompatible types of relation, an awkward balancing of facets of both. This mode of relation means that it is acceptable to provide emotional guidance and to feel real bonds of attachment within the frame of a professional relationship. It also means, of course, that instances may occur when the agent of discipline is obliged to compromise this affective bond by higher order contractual requirements (the rule of confidentiality can be broken, for example, if a crime could be prevented). Such formalized affective relations provide an elementary example of the Psy-function; this is an example which illustrates the inter-penetration of disciplinarity and sovereignty, and which also emphasizes the extension of certain professional psychological instruments (or modes of relating) into diverse types of disciplinary life.

III

The elision of the psychological

In what has gone above, I have called attention to Foucault's conceptualization of the 'souls' of disciplinary power and intimated that tactical reference to a variety of psychological concepts may usefully aid us in tracking the operations of power. I also suggested that the disciplinary folding of subjects – the induction of powerful subjectifying relations of self-reflexivity and self-scrutiny – was not the outcome exclusively of structural factors. My position was that the effects of 'panopticism' – continual self-surveillance, linkings of self to potentiality, the relation of one's present situation to the possibility future action, and indeed, the learning of certain self-implementing patterns of behaviours – assumed a degree of psychological complexity, and more than this, an order of psychological mediation not fully accounted for by reference to ingenious material, spatial, bodily technologies and arrangements of power.

It is not the case, I would argue, that disciplinary power is the exclusive principle, the over-riding factor, in the production of psychological individuality; it cannot completely account for the 'individuality effects' of sharply distinguished subjects. Nor is it the case that disciplinary power alone is able to induce the set of psychological reality-effects suggested by Foucault (the need, for example, to establish a reference point of reflexivity, to consolidate an individual 'identity' designating one's action and location relative to power or to assume a consciousness of the norm, of what about the self needs to be improved upon). What also needs to be considered here is the possibility that disciplinary power involves a number of *psychological prerequisites* for the achievement of disciplinary effects; such preconditions may stand as absolute preconditions that need to be attained if this particular power of 'mind over mind' is to be at all possible.

One might, in this respect, make recourse to the materialist, constructivist psychology of Lev Vygotsky. This is a psychology which is highly sensitive to the determining role of material, structural, socio-historical and cultural factors; such factors are taken to influence not only the contents, but also the historically specific structures of mental processing (Rieber and Robinson, 2004; Vygotsky, 1978; Wertsch, 1985). Vygotskian psychology places particular emphasis on a series of 'higher mental functions', which it understands as the unique capacity of human cognition. Focussed attention and deliberate symbolic memory make for two

cases in point, two examples of an order of cognition that Vygotsky opposes to the reactive attention and associative memory evidenced in lower mental functioning. Symbolic rather than purely motor-sensory thought makes for the crucial distinction here. Turning our attentions for the moment to Vygotsky's developmental account: by assuming the 'psychological tools' of language and other related symbolic, numerical and mnemonic skills – all of which are, importantly, culturally mediated – means that the child makes massive strides in learning, in the ability to take on a reflexive relation to one's own history and prospective future. Similarly crucial is the fact of a consolidated 'I' function which allows for a set of *culturally mediated* rather than predominantly instinctual responses to environmental stimuli. The lower mental functioning of animals is understood as lacking the same degree of self-consciousness, the same ability to learn, to internalize cultural and symbolic instruments, to assimilate and respond to the standards and norms of a given society.

Although I am unable to discuss here in any detail the further differences and prospective overlaps between Foucault and Vygotsky – a point of intersection which may represent one of the most promising means of extending Foucault into psychology, and psychology into Foucault – my point with this brief allusion to Vygotsky is clear. Higher mental functioning is what ensures that human subjects can be disciplined in a symbolic and self-automating manner; indeed, this is what ensures that humans can be disciplined at a qualitatively different level (entailing developed properties of self-reflexivity and mediation) than animals.⁶ The psychological apparatus constituted by this set of higher mental functions presumably thus counts as something of a condition of possibility for panopticism to function.

Here we might link to an argument Judith Butler advances apropos the body in Foucault. On occasion, she notes, Foucault wants to refute the possibility of a body that is not produced through power-relations, yet 'sometimes his explanations require a body to maintain a materiality ontologically distinct from the power relations that take it as a site of investment' (1997, pp. 89–90). This is a problem which also seems to apply to the production of psychological subjectivity in Foucault. The fact of the latter's production through the activation of power begs the question of what factor of the subject, what capacity or faculty first does the receiving; what is it, we might ask, that manages the integration of an awareness of power *into a reflexive turn* which becomes subject-instituting? So the question that Butler asks of the body in Foucault – does it require 'a materiality ontologically distinct from

the power relations that take it as a site of investment' – we might adapt and ask of Foucault's treatment of psychological subjectivity.⁷ Does Foucault's understanding require a mode of psychological operation that is ontologically distinct from the humanist, individualizing and subjectivizing psychology he takes issue with? If so, does this not weaken his claims about the formation of individualizing psychological subjectivity? If this is the case, if Foucault's argument is obliged, at points, to assume an implicitly psychological type of explanation, then it seems he lets through the back-door aspects of the individual psychological subjectivity his account of disciplinary appears to account for.

What of the psychological exceeds the soul?

Surely there is a possibility – by virtue of the complexity of the psychological operations mentioned above – that power is differently received by subjects, that it is differentially assimilated and relayed? Despite Foucault's argument about the differential production of individuality, it would seem that not all subjects are inducted as self-monitoring individuals in precisely the same way. There must be some variation in the induction of reflexivity; how else do we understand relations of resistance as arising in some subjects rather than others? Is it not the case then that we need make allowance for variation in how power is initially *affected*, and surely such variation can be explained not merely as an outcome of a productive power, but as, at least in part, a result of a differential 'uptake', a differential response *in subjects* to its effecting aims? If we overlook this factor, we surely overlook also the possibility of meaningful resistance. Peter Dews offers apposite critique in this respect. Foucault, he says, offers a haunting evocation of the solitude and powerlessness of the individual in contemporary society. However,

his peremptory equation of subjectification and subjection erases the distinction between the enforcement of compliance with a determinate set of norms, and the formation of a reflexive consciousness which may subsequently be directed in a critical manner against the existing system of norms.

(Dews, 1984, p. 95)

Although articulated in very different theoretical terms, Butler (1997) expresses a similar concern. She draws attention to the psychoanalytic distinction between subject and psyche. Whatever resists the normative demand by which subjects are instituted, she argues – we have discussed above the ego-ideal as the ideal against which the ego is

measured – necessarily remains unconscious. For this reason, the psyche, which includes the unconscious, must be seen as very different from the subject:

the psyche is precisely what exceeds the imprisoning effects of the discursive demand to inhabit a coherent identity... the psyche is what resists the regularization that Foucault ascribes to normalizing discourses.

(p. 86)

Essentially then, as Butler puts it, the psyche is what exceeds and confounds the injunctions of normalization. Foucault thus appears to have reduced the notion of the psyche to the operations of an externally framing and normalizing ideal. Foucault again seems to miss something here; once more there is something to psychological subjectivity – understood in broad meta-theoretical terms – that exceeds his account. Furthermore, to quote Butler (1997) once again:

Does the reduction of the psychoanalytically rich notion of the psyche to that of the imprisoning soul eliminate the possibility of resistance to normalization and to subject formation, a resistance that emerges precisely from the incommensurability between the psyche and the subject...?

(p. 87)

Dews' (1984) problem is thus recast: if Foucault understands all of the psyche as an imprisoning effect in the service of normalization, then how might one account for resistance to normalization?⁸

A vacuum of psychological individuality?

This talk of resistance and individualization raises a related issue: the fact that power can be differentially assimilated and relayed seems to imply that there is a modicum of individual difference – and indeed, a modicum of psychological activity – that pre-exists power and is not wholly produced by it. To take this question up in a different way, if there is no significant psychological individuality *prior to* that affected by power, then surely all subjects would react in a largely similar way to the implementation of its effects? Or, in the terms of a related issue: if the various factors of differing life experience – to slip for a moment into psychological discourse – are not enough to produce meaningful

individual psychological differences between subjects, then why should the factors of disciplinary power be sufficient?

The Foucauldian response here is of course to insist that it is precisely through the productions of discipline that individual differences become historically apparent and operational; it is not so much a case of the *differential assimilation* of power as of the differentiation *produced by* power. Furthermore, to continue a Foucauldian retort, the above questions make a category error: they confuse the *practical implementation and conceptualization of a political type of psychological individualization* with *the experiencings, the 'lived psychologization' of subjects on the other*. The former makes for an appropriate Foucauldian problematic; the latter does not. (One might in fact view this as a failure to properly distinguish between processes of *subjectification* and *subjectivization*.) A distinction of this sort, to continue, would seemingly account for the fact that a degree of psychological difference appears to *precede* the fact of its disciplinary activation, when in fact the latter is the historical condition of possibility for the former.⁹

As useful as such retorts are, they beg a series of further questions. First, if we understand Foucault's notions of disciplinary individualization and psychologization in a total way – thus not buying into the distinction between different orders of individualization posed above – then are we not led to presume a degree of 'psychological' homogenization prior to power? In other words, does Foucault's argument about the diverse and differential production of psychological individualism not oblige him to presume that subjects were undifferentiated and unindividualized before its effects, and not simply conceptually, but practically also? Not just the case then that no 'psychological' differences had been rendered in the terms of human science knowledge as political categories, but that none existed at all, even within the relatively non-conceptual terms of everyday interaction or experience. This implies that 'pre-individualized individuals' – if the term is to be excused – were tantamount to automatons, devoid of any significant psychological life, wholly undifferentiated in psychological functioning. This, clearly, is a difficult position to defend. It is easier, surely, to concede that there is some prior differentiation between subjects – of experiencings or 'lived psychologization' as opposed to the conceptual, political and historical category of 'psychological individualism' that Foucault has in mind. This though would seem to be exactly the kind of distinction that Foucault cannot make inasmuch as it leaves in place a kind of 'natural' psychology prior to or outside of those disciplinary systems, which Foucault claims effectively brings them into being. Drawing such a distinction seems to

rely on a prior separation between the political and the subjective, a fact which would mean that Foucault ends up relying on a kind of residual psychologism.

Butler's problem with Foucault – the idea that productive power both *wholly produces* its objects and yet sometimes occupies a position ontologically distinct from its powers of production – manifests also as an epistemological concern. What, we might ask, is it that underwrites certain constructions, which makes them effective and possible? So, assuming that power *is* able to produce difference and individualization – politically, conceptually, practically or otherwise – out of an undifferentiated mass, then what is its principle of 'differential implementation'; on what basis are some individuals brought into a heightened relations of disciplinary surveillance and inspection rather than others? Not all subjects can be equally constructed as savants, as delinquents, as prodigies, surely? Put differently, what is it that 'allows' the subject to be constructed in some ways and not others? What is it that initially grabs power's attention; what is the 'reality-reference' that allows the productive energies of disciplinarity some verifiable basis upon which to construct a significant subject-category of power-knowledge? The 'somatic singularity' that comes before the constructions of disciplinarity is not, presumably, simply hollow?

Ardent Foucauldians might object at this point that we have not as yet stepped outside of the discourse of individualizing psychological humanism to appreciate the point at hand. These subject-objects of power, the savant, the imbecile, the delinquent, the pervert and so on do not exist outside the parameters of disciplinary knowledge, or beyond its network of technologies, institutions and interventions. The existence of such subject-categories as robust categories is, after all, precisely testimony to the productive force of such disciplinary apparatuses. This is a crucial point: it directs our attention to the energies of consolidation and amplification whereby particular object- and subject-categories are continuously reiterated, made practicable, formed into robust categories of expertise and treatment. However, we may concede as much while still objecting that this argument begs the question: what was it that power latched onto, its initial point of interest, the subsequent target of its productive energies? The paradox of this situation is that surely some quality, some degree of *differentiability* is a precondition for disciplinary/discursive productions of difference.¹⁰ Or to develop a parallel argument: surely some degree of psychological operation must be a precondition for the disciplinary functioning (or panopticism) that is

said to produce aspects of psychological individualism (consciousness of self before power and so on). The instantaneous subjectivization of panopticism surely begs the question of the platforms in place, the psychological operations and structures that guarantee that aims of power are adequately assimilated? If this is the case, if there is a minimal degree of psychological functioning in place, then Foucault leaves open the possibility for a type of individual difference that disciplinarity *builds upon*, animates and extends, rather than producing from the ground up in a total or originating manner.¹¹

Discussion 1.9: Problems in construction

This is a recurring problem for many constructionist types of analysis (particularly those maintaining a narrow definition of the discursive): if a mode of socio-historical construction has 'brought into being' certain significant political difference where previously none had existed, or to alter the terms somewhat, if certain objects have been effectively invented where nothing previously existed in their place, then what was the anchoring-point that makes such differentiations, such inventions viable? My point, rather than to discredit constructionist approaches, is to suggest that at moments like this it is often helpful to draw on an additional mode of explanation, so that we may be able to make reference to the logic of capital, histories of imperialist conflict, the tenacity of affective structures – to offer a very unFoucauldian set of examples – to explain why certain constructed social distinctions have been so historically potent, and have taken on the tenacity, the recalcitrance, the 'essentiality' that they have. One is hence better placed to understand what motivates such distinctions, what brings them into visibility in the first place.

There is also a second consideration here, an awareness of the limitations of attempting to apply constructionist accounts as total explanations. There may be aspects of the object of analysis that seemingly exceed a historical, political, discursive frame of analysis; as I have argued above, not all facets of psychological functioning can be explained as after-effects of the implementation of discipline. Importantly, none of this is to suggest that constructionist critiques necessarily make reference to a mode of realism – this would seem anathema to Foucauldian approaches, especially where the realism in question is linked to the epistemology of humanism. The point of my argument is to suggest that constructionist accounts often work best in conjunctions of the sort I have hinted at above, such that discursive constructions of a given subject-category are cross-referenced with a different order of explanation (say that of physical/bodily practices, material arrangements and historical contingency, as in the case of Foucault's genealogies). It is also, furthermore, to suggest that constructionist accounts may require

the supplementation of a different order of explanation, that certain strategic articulations with other types of theory may advance the project of critique. These are important issues, I think, because discursive constructionist accounts do sometimes risk becoming overly self-referential in the answers they provide, implicitly treating their own opening assumptions – that is the constructed nature of the world – as also the essential ‘whys’ and ‘hows’ of power, without adequate attention to additional possible explanatory terms. A somewhat similar type of problem sometimes threatens to emerge in Foucault, where disciplinarity sometimes seems its own sufficient or self-evident principle of motivation. A question to pose to Foucault: Is enough attention always paid to those mechanisms, instruments and modes of power that are themselves not strictly disciplinary but that profit from and impel the functioning of disciplinary power?

The Foucauldian response to the issue, the ‘anchoring-point’ that precedes a given construction and that seemingly makes it viable is simply to argue that *nothing* needs exist before the problematizing energies of disciplinarity; such energies are capable of generating an issue, a deviance, a lack of health in the very act of ‘discovering’ it. Here, again, the Foucauldian retort would be to guard against the impulse to locate a realist set of objects or attributes that exist somehow outside the domain of the discursive; the warning, once again, would be to emphasize the remarkable generativity of disciplinary power. As prudent as such a cautioning may prove in respect of the analysis of power – this is a methodological point I take up in more detail in the following chapter – it remains a somewhat unsatisfactory response in relation to present concerns, especially so if it means we are obliged to accept that there is something tantamount to a vacuum at the site of the individual psychological subject prior to the activation of disciplinary methods.

Surely there is a middle road here? Can we not accept that modern psychological individuals are produced in considerable conceptual and practicable ‘psychological’ detail, without accepting that there was something tantamount to a psychological void – an absence of operations of mediation, reflexivity or conscience – existing before the implementation of a disciplinary subjectivization. Perhaps the project then is not so much the investigation of an absolute zero-point or the origin, in particular disciplinary apparatuses, of the self, the psyche, the soul, but rather to mount an investigation of how various heightened forms of psychological life – which do appear genuinely unprecedented – are activated, animated and pressed into the service of varying goals of power. Moreover, might such ‘activations’ be linked, via various historical technologies of control, to roughly equivalent ‘psychological’ form-

ations in other eras of power? And might such linkages lessen what is taken to be so distinctive of disciplinary modernity, which perhaps does not own the soul-function of 'psychological individuality' in quite such exclusive terms as Foucault seems to imply?

'Psychological formations'

A last defence of Foucault, it seems, is called for at this point, a defence which requires us to return to and insist upon a basic distinction introduced above, which clarifies the ambit and focus of a properly Foucauldian or genealogical critique. In speaking of 'the psychological' we need to differentiate between psychology as *a discipline*, an institutionalized system of power and knowledge – indeed, as an entire discursive network of functional constructs – and psychology as *a set of human capacities*.¹² Or, differently put, we need to discern between psychology as *the means through which the subjectivity of modern individuals is formed* (the higher mental functions of basic cognitive operations, the awareness of self relative to the ideals of normalizing disciplinaryity, types of learning that internalize effects of power and so on), and *the formidable cultural and historical apparatus of 'the psychological'* through which a whole series of related concepts, modes of practice and formations of experience unfold.

This is a potentially crucial distinction between two adjoined ontologies of 'the psychological'; it is on this basis that one can assert that Foucault is not arguing for a complete absence of psychological life prior to the advent of disciplinary power. So, on the one hand, the defence of Foucault against many of the argument offered above relies on such a distinction. However, before assuming that these two adjoined ontologies of 'the psychological' are easily or necessarily separable we need to turn back to Foucault's descriptions of disciplinary effects. We should be clear here that – for this is perhaps Foucault's most strident critique of psychology – the historical constructions of the disciplinary psy-industries include the reality-effects of disciplinary subjectivization, that is, the effective activation of certain psychological properties in, for example, everyday modes of self-reflection and self-evaluation. Such productions possess an actively psychologizing force; they may be said to lead to certain 'psychological formations' of which 'identity' itself may be considered an example.¹³

There is something compelling about this description: in effect it breaks down the subjectivization/subjectification distinction – all subjectivization here *is subjectification* – insisting that all 'natural' psychology (psychology as human capacity, as the stuff of subjectivity) must be seen in the light of the disciplinary instrumentalization from

which it can never be completely separated. In retrospect, is it not exactly this distinction that the theory of disciplinarity calls into question – to refer to such a difference is to pose a false dichotomy, a humanist abstraction, a myth – that it attacks and collapses? This point of collapse lies at the heart of what in Foucault is most useful to a reassessment of psychology; it is precisely this which causes us to distrust innocent appeals to interiority. This, I would argue, is where Foucault offers his most radical critique of psychology: in problematizing the routine application of a series of untroubled ‘soul’ concepts which are deployed in the absence of any interrogation of how their utilization may extend technologies of control and governmentality to which they may not seem to be obviously linked.

So although there are moments where Foucault’s argument is implicitly obliged to make the distinction in question – for example, in escaping the contention that a psychological vacuum exists prior to disciplinarization – there are also moments when such a distinction is rendered untenable. Another exemplification of Butler’s problem: two different and opposed ontologies must be set side-by-side if this type of explanation is to work. On the one hand the psyche is understood as simply *produced* by disciplinary discourses and institutions. On the other hand, Foucault requires a forerunner of sorts – a ‘proto-psychological’ reference point – which we might equally understand as the psyche – upon which power can be applied.

Discussion 1.10: The ‘subject-function’ of the soul: Unprecedented entity or recurring historical object?

The account offered in *Discipline and Punish* wants to insist on the absolute historicity of the soul, indeed, even more so, on the historical contingency of the notions of ‘the psyche’, ‘the self’, and so on. Foucault has in mind here the ‘core of virtualities’, that is, the subject-function as it comes to be fastened to the ‘somatic singularity’ of individuals, the psyche – or indeed, ‘body-psyche’ – as it comes to be produced as an extension of techniques of political power (Foucault, 2006).

Foucault is most certainly right to insist on the absolute historical contingency of particular configurations of power-knowledge in this respect. It is vital to point out the specificity of the objects and subjective ‘reality-effects’ induced by the practice of psychoanalysis, as opposed to those induced by earlier governments of souls within the apparatuses of Christianity (2003b), and these in turn from the technologies of self entailed by Senecan self-examination or Oriental modes of contemplation and self-obedience (Foucault, 1988a). However, do these diverse

historical moments not all share, even at the most rudimentary level, a similar axis of implementation? Is there a methodological inconsistency here, a disparity between the rule of absolute historicization and a kind of historical regularity? In Foucault's later works, particularly in his conceptualization of technologies of the self, we evidence this tension, the regular historical reoccurrence of something like a soul, accorded a set of distinctive yet similar mechanisms in each case. Here we have a sense – contrary to Foucault's strong historicizing instincts – of a model of political operations, indeed, of a general template of how then 'body-psyche' is fastened to power, reappearing (albeit with differences) in different historical eras (see also Foucault, 2003b).

Is a kind of historical regularity thus being smuggled into an ostensibly radical historical analysis? It seems puzzling that this vehicle – disciplinary self-examination, awareness of self apropos the rules of power and the soul-function of power – is such a constant historical figure. If disciplinarity is as much of a revolutionary advance in the history, power as Foucault implies, then surely we would expect less a degree of this historical regularity, and, indeed, more evidence of those eras of power evidencing no 'soul function' whatsoever?

As I will discuss in later sections of this book, the body, in spite of many reinventions, and in spite of dramatic transformations in the historical apparatuses of control, remains a point of constant fascination for Foucault, indeed, a priority for genealogical analysis. In returning to this contingent object of the body, this construction – never to be approached as a universal category – the objective is not to extract the body from the flux of historical transformations and eventualities, but rather to trace its different operationalizations by diverse modes of power which, after all, need to return to the body as an irreducible anchoring-point of political effects. Can we not then ask whether something akin to the 'subject-function' of the soul must not also, necessarily, be a returning focus of analysis; moreover, whether this operation of the folding of the soul as induced by techniques of power – what we might refer to as the psychological functioning of power – attains a similar degree of historical reoccurrence to that of the body? Just as the body provides an indispensable set of reference points for power (singular physicality in space and time), so the soul, surely, provides a vital set of subject-functions (automated, self-reflexive, self-knowing, self-disciplining functions fastening the body-psyche to power)? This would give us grounds not to overturn the Foucauldian schema of disciplinarity, but to question the degree to which it functions as a wholly unprecedented paradigm of power.¹⁴

Is it enough, given the historical regularity evidenced by the body, to merely historicize it? Furthermore, given the historical reoccurrence of the soul function – which, like the body seems resistant to the rule of absolute historicization – is it enough for us to rely in this respect upon a predominantly historicizing sort of criticism? If various 'psychological' relations, mechanisms

and modes of reflexivity are not simply exhausted by this mode of critique, if they persist and reoccur in varying forms beyond the horizon of this type of enquiry, then surely we need engage with them in another way also, in the terms, for example, of a psychological language of analysis? To pose a related question: perhaps the critical use of psychological concepts should not be limited to an exercise in historical contextualization. Perhaps there is more to be done with these concepts than simply consigning them to a position along a familiar trajectory of power-knowledge; indeed, might they not enable a new mode of scrutiny to various historicized psychological relations of power?

Delimiting critique

We are thus able to point to what Foucault cannot speak about, but must nevertheless presume, namely the psychological functionality of the subject that potentially exists before the implementation of disciplinary power. The concern voiced above returns: what – speaking psychologically for the moment – might be the mechanisms that ensure that disciplinary procedures ‘catch’, what are the predominant factors that enable them to become self-activating or, alternatively, what psychological qualities play a role in barring their hold, in disrupting their functioning? Butler gives this line of questioning a psychoanalytic inflection: how is it that disciplinary apparatuses that attempt to produce and totalize identity become an abiding object of passionate attachment in subjects? Or in a variation of Mladen Dolar’s (1999) argument (discussed below): what psychological effects of the positioning of the human subject in a cultural-symbolic milieu enable Foucault’s system of panoptic awareness to ‘take’, to assume such a potent imaginative and unconscious dimension? In his unwillingness to discuss an extra-disciplinary dimension to psychological life, indeed, in his implicit refusal of such a dimension, Foucault unnecessarily delimits possibilities for critique.

My point in bringing together the various arguments gathered above – some of which take aim less at Foucault himself than at positions that may be derived from his work – is simply this: it would seem that there is a more complex order of human psychological functioning than the Foucauldian schema of disciplinary power will allow for. This, surely, is an order of functioning that we cannot ignore; indeed, we must engage it if we are to further an understanding of the internalized workings of power, of subjectivization in all its complexity.

Inasmuch as the subject is an epistemological entity and a political object, and, in addition, the target of subjectifying political forces¹⁵ – then Foucault’s argument about the disciplinary invention

and production of individuals is hard to refute, indeed, dangerous to ignore. My response to such an argument – while not wishing at all to diminish the impact of the claims thus made – is that this is not all there is to subjects, to subjectivization or, indeed, to psychological individuality. It is not, to my mind, the case that power fully exceeds or exhausts that which is circumscribed within the area of the subject. To offer such a retort to Foucault is not necessarily to provide a foothold for humanism, nor is it to pose that the domain of subjectivity represents an ‘outside’ of power. (Individual psychological functioning may indeed be inseparably linked to power, may never in fact be free of its influence and conditioning *without being in effect reducible to it*.) To offer such a retort is not to make the case for a heroic form of individualism, or to assert an agency of creative subjects able to make themselves in the terms of their own choosing. Furthermore, the attempt to make descriptive recourse to a psychological lexicon – and, indeed, the querying of a domain of psychological functions not reducible to disciplinary – is not necessarily to slip into the language and epistemology of humanism.

The possibility that is thus opened up is that certain of the terms and concepts of the ‘psy-disciplines’ – and the anti-humanism of much psychoanalysis makes it one of the best candidates in this respect – provides us with a set of descriptive tools which might bring certain facets of subjectivization into greater critical visibility. Here it is tempting to suggest that one read Fanon’s *Black Skin, White Masks* against Foucault’s *Discipline and Punish*. Although Fanon (1986) is strongly vigilant regards the tacit political dimension of much psychological discourse – aware indeed of its potential in the colonial world as a means of racist subjectification (Bulhan, 1985) – he is willing nevertheless to make strategic use of psychoanalytic terms in order to build a ‘psychopolitical’ critique of white racism (Hook, 2005a). Clearly these texts represent two very different intellectual projects, but the question posed by the juxtaposition stands: what critical opportunities are made possible for reading the mechanics of subjectification, subjectivization and indeed of resistance by means of recourse to fragments of psychological discourse? Is it possible, following Fanon, that certain psychological concepts may be extracted from a depoliticizing context and put to the work of political critique, while other facets of the discipline need be shown up, their formative and constructive powers, their role in disciplinarily exposed?

Discussion 1.11: Power and the Other

Dolar (1999) offers a sympathetic critique of Foucault via the Lacanian notion of the Other. The Other, he notes, 'is the hypothetical authority that upholds the structure and supposed addressee of any act of speech, beyond interlocution or intersubjectivity, the third in any dialogue' (p. 87). The Other emerges whenever a subject is confronted with the symbolic structure, it is a point of appeal, a point of intelligibility beyond the subjective interpretative frames of each communicator, that ultimately makes language and symbolic exchange work. In slightly more accessible terms: we may understand the Other as the sum total of the symbolic domain, that is, the entirety of symbolic processes, language, laws and social structure, as it is particularized for each subject (Evans, 1996). The Other hence supplies the reference points, the co-ordinates for how we are situated in the matrix of social relations of which we are a part.

For Lacanian psychoanalysis, the assumption is that the Other is always already there and that it plays a crucial role in accounting for certain mechanisms of power, certainly inasmuch as it sets in place a certain structure of reflexivity (*How am I seen by the Other? What does the Other want from me? What are the social values it holds most dear?*). As Dolar (1999) puts it: that the Other emerges at all, the supposition that such a point of appeal 'makes sense', or that *there is even sense to be made*, that there is knowledge, a Truth that the Other knows – this is the kernel of both power and knowledge.

Foucault, it is safe to assume, would not accept such an assumption. Not only does the notion of the Other re-centre a kind of final authority, exactly the figure of sovereignty that he wishes to escape from – who after all is the Other but *the* figure of symbolic law, the point of appeal and truth? – it also begs the question: if there is a set of effects stemming from 'the Other', then where does 'the Other' itself come from, surely it must itself be explained as an effect of sorts, something produced by relations of power, for it cannot, surely, be seen as a 'transcendental structure', as an automatic dimension of human existence.

Dolar questions whether Foucault's work at points does effectively rely, even if rather covertly, on something akin to such a notion of the Other, 'not just as an effect produced by the mechanisms, but as something that itself produces effects' (p. 87). In *Discipline and Punish*, he claims, Foucault makes assumptions that cannot be covered by his methodological injunctions; furthermore, it seems certain assumptions about the structure of subjectivity are at work in the model of disciplinary power which appear to run counter to the notion of subject as only effect (outcome) of power. Dolar points particularly to the discrepancy between Foucault's methodological proclamations (regards specificity of instruments and locations of power) and the generalizability of the results of his analysis of disciplinary power. Despite that there may well be a diversity of procedures and

tactics in the disciplinary domain, the diagram of the Panopticon – which Foucault often treats as paradigmatic of modern power – easily unites these facets into a common pattern. It is astonishing, ventures Dolar

that the multiplicity of dispersed and heterogenous micro-relations converges into one single image of power which is entirely imbued with the figure of the Other . . . doesn't Foucault's strategy of dispersed micro-relations eventually converge in a much more massive presence of the Other than psychoanalysis would ever dream of?

(1999, p. 88)

Of course, Dolar is by no means suggesting that we reject the importance of Foucault's analytics of power, just as he is not suggesting we do away with Foucault's theorizing of modern disciplinary power. What he is arguing – and why his critique is of importance to those of us wishing to explore the promise of Foucauldian analytics vis-à-vis ostensibly 'psychological' dimensions of power – is that we undercut the efficacy of our own analyses if we do not take seriously the possibility of something like the Other, as a point of appeal and authority able to anchor subjects in the social-symbolic matrix of relations without itself being reduced to a secondary effect of power. As he puts it, 'without the Other, there is no 'effect' of power nor the 'psychic economy' that makes it possible . . . Power works only if and as long as we assume the Other' (p. 92).

Conclusion

In the course of *Psychiatric Power*, Foucault provides a concise description of individualizing disciplinarily, a description which I think provides a synopsis of much of the foregoing chapter:

Disciplinary power is individualizing because it fastens the subject-function to the somatic singularity by means of a system of supervision-writing, or by a system of pangraphic panopticism, which behind the somatic singularity projects, as its extension or its beginning, a core of virtualities, a psyche, and which further establishes the norm as the principle of division and normalization, as the universal prescription for all individuals constituted in this way.

(Foucault, 2006, p. 55)

As I hope is apparent, my intention is by no means to dismiss Foucault's arguments in relation to the dynamics, instruments and

productive efficacy of disciplinary technologies. The Foucauldian argument concerning the disciplinary production of psychological individuality is crucial, it helps emphasize the extent to which virtually all of the psychological (as it is lived, practiced and rendered subject to knowledge) falls within the ambit of power. Certain rudimentary psychological operations may have been greatly extended and elaborated in this way, been given a particular historical nature, a pressing political dimension so distinctive that they may appear to have been given an 'inaugural existence', at this distinctive point of disciplinary modernity. This does not mean however that the fullest range of such prospective 'psy-functions' are reducible to such an origin, or that we cannot tentatively compare different versions of similar subject-functions in different historical eras (i.e. varying and complex modes of self-mediation, reflexivity and self-prediction). Nor does this necessarily mean that a suitable analysis of these psychological operations – as *psychological operations* – would not further our understanding of the tenacity and efficacy of disciplinary production.

If a double ontology is what is required here – which, in effect, is what I am arguing – then is one complimentary 'ontology' to the work of genealogical discursive critique not, paradoxically, a provisional reference to 'the psychological'? This need not capsize the Foucauldian endeavour; indeed one might argue that the possibility of such an unlikely collaboration depends upon the mode of critical psychological discourse one makes reference to. We know that for Foucault psychoanalysis escapes many of the trappings of humanism even while its clinical forms often succumb to a mode of normalizing disciplinarity (although this is perhaps less true of Lacanian applications (see for example the accounts of Fink, 1995; Parker, 2004)). We also know that constructivist types of psychology do not over-ride considerations of historical and cultural specificity with an emphasis on a set of universal psychological structures of the individual which necessarily transcend time and place (see Kozulin, 1990).

Might it be the case that facets of such non-humanistic modes of psychological analysis could be tactically employed, not in an unconditional or totalizing but rather in an *exploratory* manner, so as to suggest novel possibilities for critique? Select psychological notions might serve as 'scaffold concepts', that is, as a means of spurring a new collaborative analytics, the generation of novel sets of critical tools, even if these concepts would subsequently need be re-theorized, taken apart, such that the systems of thought – of which they are components – are themselves subject to historical scrutiny of genealogy.

Just as the vocabulary of the psychological is often superseded by the terms of a Foucauldian analytics eager to play up the historical and political dimension of its practical concepts and how they are deployed in the world of power, so it is also the case that aspects of this vocabulary are able at points to supersede Foucault's analytical frame. This is by no means to dismiss the critical utility of Foucault, which is of paramount importance to a rethinking of the structures of a neutral, universal psychological subjectivity, which, as his work makes us aware, can never be fully divorced from the realm of power. What the above conclusion does point us towards is the rather paradoxical possibility that certain rudimentary psychological concepts – and perhaps Vygotsky's strongly socio-cultural brand of constructivist psychology provides us with the safest ground here – might enable us to fill in the blanks in an exegesis and contestation of a psychological form of power – referring here to the effects of disciplinarily – one of whose most prominent and effective components is the discourse and practice of the discipline of psychology itself.

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