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## 1

# Subjective Affects: Surveying with Husserl, Shakespeare, and Derrida into the Twenty-first Century

*Bryan Reynolds (with additional dialogue by George Light & Bryan Reynolds)*

Why *subjects*? Why should writing be another name for the constitution of *subjects* and, so to speak, of *constitution* itself? of a subject, that is to say of an individual held responsible (for) himself in front of a law and by the same token subject to that law?

Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology* (281)

The history of Western critical theory has been preoccupied with questions regarding subjectivities and subjects, about what constitutes and accounts for them: whether individual or collective consciousness, presence, embodiment, perspective, authority, simulacra, and so on; whether they are singularities within multiplicities, or vice versa, or some multidimensional combination: events, amalgams, or articulations. Concepts of subjectivity typically pertain to individuals, respectively, even if generally applied to all people, and are linked to theories of inwardness, selfhood, personal agency, and identity formation and maintenance; yet they often suggest or extend to something collective or indicative of a group. Accordingly, inquiries into subjectivity correspond with specific areas of investigation and experience; in other words, with subjects of critical inquiry and philosophy as well as of societies and cultures. These include the subject matters of psychology, sociology, phenomenology, metaphysics, neuroscience, and consciousness studies, but also of literary, cultural, theater, and performance studies. Perspectives on subjectivity within and among these areas are commonly divided, generally speaking, between humanist/essentialist and post-humanist/constructivist idea-fields. While defining and explaining

2 *Transversal Subjects*

subjectivity have been primary to the objectives of various, often competing, discourses on the human condition, it is an argument of this book that subjectivity persists fugitively, enabling the condition to remain unfettered and subjective affects to be generative.

In this book, with my collaborators, I move freely across humanist/essentialist and post-humanist/constructivist idea-fields to hypothesize that subjectivity, as a composite of multifarious perceptions and identifications, is itself transversal to subjects inasmuch as reflexive-consciousness, awareness of experiencing while experiencing, is requisite to its crystallizations, even if only fleeting or as passage to transcendence, ecstasy, or death (see Glossary of Transversal Terms for elaboration on concepts discussed throughout the book).<sup>1</sup> Hence, subjectivity always actively reconfigures away from the delimiting procedures and pressures of subjectivation, even if absolute or sustained emancipation never occurs. Put differently, subjectivity emerges and is productively agential when a person or group is meta-aware and capable, exponentially by degree and kind, of: (1) willful subjunctivity in the modes of theorizing the “as-ifs” and “what-ifs” of past, present, and future events; (2) becomings-other identities, states, and things through deliberately initiated expansions and transformations; (3) negotiating and surmounting “the proper,” thereby trailblazing and mapping trajectories of maneuverability away from circumscription, reduction, and stasis; and (4) intentional transversality *vis-à-vis* forces of subjectivation and coherence: by wanderings, departures, and metamorphoses contrary to totalizing mechanisms and outside of conventions and systems.

Subjectivity supersedes its foundational conditions irreducibly when a person or group negotiates, inspires, or engages in transversal movements beyond the margins and parameters of subjective territories, whether their own or those of others. As a multidimensional product of the society in which a person develops, subjective territory is the conceptual, emotional, and physical scope through which a person experiences. Transversal movements drive subjectivities in directions alternative to those aligned with prescribed subjective territories. In effect, the parameters of subjective territories expand and reconfigure along with those of the official territories they comprise and of which they are essential constituents. Official territories are organized singular but interrelated commonalities (qualia, values, beliefs, etc.) that together make up a society and culture that both support and constrain the subjective territories that in turn encompass the society's infrastructure. Operating like subjective and official territories insofar as it coalesces singularities, but always both emergent and ephemeral as

well as transversal to the subject, subjectivity itself is an amalgamating multiplicity of singularities, taking such forms as performance, feeling, and thought events, that often relationally connects to singularities comprising the presence and subjectivities of others. It achieves irreducibility and transcendence regardless of how it involutes, actualizes, and demonstrates, whether occupationally, ideationally, sensitively, neurologically, biologically, materially, and so forth. Subjectivity, and therefore the personal agency it can engender, is a processual fusion of various phenomena within, beyond, and irreducible to both official and subjective territories and the state machinery and societies to which they reciprocally contribute.

Since antiquity, theories that define subjectivity idiosyncratically, statically, reducibly, or negatively through logics or taxonomies of antagonism, difference, absence, or as predicated on lack have dominated Western intellectual history. Alternative to this tradition, an overarching argument of this book is that subjectivity can be positively defined and experienced as a manifestation of ongoing relations among affecters and enablers of transversality for which there is a discernible, but not exclusive, mappable history of expression in the interstices, if not across the surfaces, of Western philosophical and critical discourses. Notwithstanding that this history, itself difficult to categorize, includes countless influential junctures that can be purposefully charted and delineated, my collaborators and I have identified several that we believe are significant to critical theory today, tomorrow, and so on, even if radically fugitive to the intellectual and social histories with which they are most commonly associated. Simply put, concepts central to these junctures that pertain to subjectivity and subjects that we discuss include the following: affects, reception, proper names (this Chapter); desire, well-being, expression (Chapter 2); cartography, space, travel (Chapter 3); play, education, theatricality (Chapter 4); and compassion, literacy, human rights (Chapter 5). From the influential junctures into which we hopscotch investigative-expansively throughout the following pages – in mobile pursuit of leads and connections across historical periods, cultures, literary genres, performance modes, and research fields – we offer the theory and methodology of transversal poetics as both byproducts and compasses by which to situate constructively the junctures themselves.

The present chapter begins with a survey of twentieth-century Western philosophical and critical discourses in which conceptions of subjectivity and subjects are particularly significant to the ways these terms are currently used. Whereas the discourses themselves may not deal with subjectivity and subjects primarily or explicitly, they have been crucial

genealogically to recent investigations that concentrate on these topics. Given that everyday conversations in cafes and classrooms, at beaches and malls, and on playgrounds and tennis courts, etc. engage countless thinkers – from celebrities to philosophers to friends – representative of ideas about subjectivity, I chose to discuss thinkers most immediately relevant to both transversal poetics' conceptual inheritance and to its continuing and future developments. As such, I found it unnecessary to account for every historical line of influence from Immanuel Kant, René Descartes, etc. all the way to antiquity. My intention in the first section, and throughout this chapter, is twofold: (1) to provide both background and contexts for the interventions my collaborators and I propose in the subsequent chapters; and (2) to provide expressions of transversal poetics as the discussion evokes its theories and interpretative modes. In the next section via analysis of the phenomena of Shakespeare's enduring popularity, I extend the survey beyond the parameters of the philosophical and critical discourses to recent work in cognitive neuroscience and other fields outside the humanities. From here, I streamline the survey into a discussion on subjectivity through an analysis of Jacques Derrida's treatment of the proper name. This leads to the chapter's second Shakespearean excursion, an account of the proper name as it relates to the history of both the subject and subjectivity that I have been discussing up until that point. It is from here that the remainder of the book progresses.

### **Key twentieth-century contributions briefly described: subjectivity and reading**

Critical discussions on what is commonly referred to as "human identity," a continuous state of being both oneself and human, have been predominantly psychodynamic or sociological and informed or intertwined by ideas often associated with subjectivity and subject position. The primary contributors to psychodynamic views on identity formation, also major influences on twentieth-century critical theory, are Sigmund Freud, Carl Jung, Melanie Klein, Jacques Lacan, D. W. Winnicott, Erik Erikson, and Nancy Chodorow.<sup>2</sup> With varying perspectives and methodologies these theorists concentrate on the means by which people develop a cognitive sense of themselves as separate from the environments through which they experience, relate, and organize their lives. For any one person, until that divisional process begins, there is no subject-object distinction. This is to say that for the infant the world "out there" is indistinguishable from the world "in here." The psychodynamic approaches of these theorists call for analyses of the processes by which

subject-object separation and individuation occur—typically in structural, diachronic, and hierarchical terms – and define human identity as the privileged point from which the infant recognizes or understands the differences, both physically and mentally, between herself and other objects and people, especially the mother or primary caretaker. Each phase in the separation corresponds with a developmental stage (Freud’s genital stage, Lacan’s mirror stage, Winnicott’s transitional object, Erikson’s play age, etc.) in what the theorists posit as the natural course of identity formation, a course that normally culminates with the establishment of a self-conscious, self-governing social identity with individuated subjectivity.

Sociological discussions on identity are usually informed by an understanding of human development that Herbert Blumer termed “symbolic interactionism.”<sup>3</sup> Although not all of them refer to the approach by this name, other seminal proponents of symbolic interactionism are Charles Cooley, George Herbert Mead, John Dewey, Peter Berger, and Erving Goffman.<sup>3,4</sup> For these theorists, definition of an individual and, by extension, distinct social identities are fashioned interactively with one’s environment, so that the relationship with one’s environment and not the individual in isolation is the measure for understanding. Cooley and Mead describe a process of identity formation whereby the “I,” which is a kind of seer or knower, operates as the subjective, creative, and unknowable observer, while the “Me” is a known, knowable, social self in an interactive relationship with the “I” in conjunction with the environment. For Goffman and Berger, a sense of self, the “I,” and the socially-engaged “Me” are combined in a symbolic, performed, and socially-constructed entity. This “contingent individual” (my term) is what literary, cultural, and critical theorists, particularly those strongly influenced by Marxist-oriented intellectual, aesthetic, or political traditions, often mean when they talk about the “subject.”

Beginning in the first half of the twentieth-century when Marxist philosophy achieved prominence in arts and academic circles, “subject” became a term favored by literary and cultural critics and theorists, particularly structuralists, as an alternative to “person,” “individual” or “agent.” In general, the work of important Marxist critics of the 1920s and 1930s, such as Granville Hicks and V.F. Calverton and those associated with the Frankfurt School, especially Max Horkheimer and Theodore Adorno, shares the goals of uncovering both tenets of Marxism in art and literature and a materialist history of social life whereby art and literature, derived from material conditions and consciousness of them, reflects the conditions and the consciousnesses they influence, in other words, the production of subjects.<sup>5</sup> For many structuralists,

and later poststructuralists in the second half of the twentieth century (Fredric Jameson, Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe),<sup>6</sup> use of the term subject indicates a disavowal of the humanist/essentialist perspective that the human condition is absolute or universal and therefore humans universally endorse the same interests and values. Instead, these Marxist-influenced theorists maintain that human experience and ideology are relative to the subject's position *vis-à-vis* the deep underlying structures of a given society's social hierarchy, which are always culturally and historically determined. In conjunction, "subjectivity" refers to the experience-as-experienced by the socially-constructed subject. The location and formation of the subject, then, is based on how material relations and modes of production produce specific kinds of subjects, such as those that support a particular ideology and those that resist or rebel against it, even though these categories are not seen as mutually exclusive. Subject production and its manifestations reflect and uphold class differentials in a systematic dialectic that involves processes of struggle, disruption, transformation, and consolidation. The subject in all its exteriorizations is always determined by modes of production, material relations, and the societal need to maintain class divisions. This is because meaning, subjectivity, subject formation, performance, and identity are rooted in the socioeconomic structure that mutually creates these determinations and the ideology used to rationalize and enforce them. As a result, subject determinations and their specific symptoms and consequences are causally grounded in the relationships between humans and the physical properties through and by which they define and sustain themselves.<sup>7</sup>

The establishment in higher education of this reductive delineation of art and literature to manifestations of ideologically-informed socioeconomic conditions by early twentieth-century Marxists precipitated a great backlash in the literary-critical movement of the New Critics. Led by John Crowe Ransom, R.P. Blackmur, T.S. Eliot, I.A. Richards, Cleanth Brooks, Robert Penn Warren, William K. Wimsatt, Monroe C. Beardsley, René Wellek, and several others,<sup>8</sup> the New Critics dominated critical literary practice and pedagogy from the 1930s through the 1960s, effectively institutionalizing their approach at every level of education from middle school to doctoral study. In contrast to Marxists, the New Critics declare their interpretive approach apolitical and objective; also, in reaction to impressionistic and neo-humanist criticism, they maintain that literary analysis must treat a work of literature as a self-sufficient organic entity completely independent and decontextualized from the environments from which it emerged and through which it travels, that

is, without reference to history, culture, economics, authorial intention, biography, the sensibilities or subject position of the reader, or any factors outside the text. Wimsatt and Beardsley famously termed emphasis on an author's intentions the "intentional fallacy" and emphasis on a reader's (or spectator's) perspective and visceral response in the deduction of meaning or quality of literature (and art) the "affective fallacy."<sup>9</sup> Thus, New Criticism is problematic for the concept of the subject because it insists that subjectivity does not determine meaning; meaning lives not in a subject position, whether of the author or reader, but in the objective "truth" of the text, which is deemed an aesthetic object in and of itself (an idea reminiscent of Walter Pater's use of the slogan "art for art's sake" to dismiss any connection between art and morality). For New Critics, meaning can only be accessed by the skilled reader through the "close-reading" of the ambiguities, paradoxes, and ironies revealed in the words, images, symbols, and themes within the text rather than in its views, characters, or narrative. Although the reader with the analytic wherewithal to reveal the meaning of a text is privileged in the process of explication, a process that for some New Critics (like Harold Bloom) can only ever achieve an approximation of the true meaning because there is no perfect reader,<sup>10</sup> both the subject engaging the text as the reader and the subject emergent through the text are not privileged. Instead, they are merely two among numerous horizontal variables adding up to an interpretation of the text's meaning but are not themselves intrinsic to its actual meaning.

The approach of the New Critics is similar to that of the Russian formalists, such as the Opoyaz Group (Viktor Shklovsky, Boris Eichenbaum, Yury Tynyanov, Boris Tomashevsky) and the Moscow Linguistic Circle (Roman Jakobson, Osip Brik, Grigory Vinokur), who also distinguish themselves from what they see as the "extrinsic" work of Marxist and social critics of literature.<sup>11</sup> Russian formalists focus on literary objects as autonomous, thoroughly enclosed systems of signs. As with the New Critics, the meaning of a text derives from the form rather than, say, the reader's reactions or author's intentions. Formalists want to establish an autonomous ontological status for literature, especially poetry, as a unique form of language. Formalist methodology, like that of the New Critics, does not privilege the subject or subjectivity as an overriding or dominant variable in the interpretive enterprise. Early Marxist literary critics, like Leon Trotsky, defined their critical positions via their challenges to formalism.<sup>12</sup> Trotsky espoused the political potential of art and demanded that its connection to the material conditions under which it is produced and interpreted be recognized and employed in

terms of ideology and politics. Later Marxist critics associated with the Bakhtin School took similarly predictable positions against Russian formalism, arguing that formalists leave too much important stuff out of their analyses of literary texts.

For Mikhail Bakhtin, language is ideologically-informed material praxis; whether spoken or written, it is the means by which subjects are constituted relationally with other subjects and through which they articulate themselves (to others) in a continual struggle between monologic and heteroglossic forces in language, discourse, and the societies they serve that manifests in people's expressions and experiences. The monologic forces work to singularize and totalize and the heteroglossic work to diversify and pluralize (Bakhtin 260–75). Moreover, for Bakhtinians, language can neither exist in a vacuum nor be judiciously considered or understood when relegated to a point exterior to culture and society. This is because language, like all speech acts, is invariably a social mechanism. It reflects interactions between monologic and heteroglossic constituents and pressures. It is always at least dialogic, grounded and created from a history, and therefore the proper subject of sociology.<sup>13</sup> Hence, like phenomenologists, Bakhtin argues for the agency and centrality of the subject not only in the interpretation of art and literature but also for comprehending the dialogic/dialectic that informs the human condition for different people in different eras and cultures.

Edmund Husserl's philosophical–phenomenological project was to investigate and uproot the “essence” of the “natural world” as a means by which to uncover the rational structures of experience and the “transcendent” attributes that are “constituted” in consciousness through perceiving them. To do this, he argues for holding at bay (“bracketing”) assumptions and experience of an objective and fully present “fact-world” (“the natural standpoint”). Husserl explains this succinctly:

*We put out of action the general thesis which belongs to the essence of the natural standpoint, we place in brackets whatever it includes respecting the nature of Being: this entire natural world therefore, which is continually “there for us,” “present to our hand,” and will ever remain there, is a “fact-world” of which we continue to be conscious, even though it pleases us to put it in brackets. (99–100)*

This bracketing is done so that the attributes can stand out from the intersubjective experience that relies on them as phenomenological meeting points and gateways to the empathetic relations between

subjects that allow differentiated subjective perspectives to be achieved and explained. Put differently, the experiencing subject is reciprocally linked with outside objects and subjects insofar as a person's subjectivity depends on interactions with objects and intersubjectivity through empathetic relations with other subjects to which we ascribe an intentional point of view that we must bracket to access objective reality. This is because, for Husserl, like many phenomenologists and theorists of consciousness after him, including in recent years Daniel Dennet, John Searle, and Peter Carruthers in their own ways,<sup>14</sup> consciousness is an intentional (directed at) act; that is, to be conscious is to be conscious of some thing or person, an object: the world "out there" and the world "in here" are connected and crystallize in and as consciousness. Thus, Husserl's phenomenological method of inquiry into Being and the ontological status of things-in-themselves insists on the subject's role in determining existence and significance as a manifestation of consciousness. Consciousness is a spatiotemporal realm occupied by the subject; the subject is located in consciousness; and consciousness is comprised of "units" of intentional action directed outward into the world. For Husserl, removing the subject from the process of interpretation is not an option; it is subjects and the intersubjectivity they generate that enables the possibility of meaning and thus purpose (intentionality), and, in turn, the constitution of subjects.

After Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Roman Ingarden, respectively, developed and spread the goals and methods of phenomenology beyond philosophy through the social sciences and literary criticism.<sup>15</sup> Making a major impact as early as the 1930s, Ingarden was the most influential theorist of this movement during the early stages of phenomenological literary studies. He adapted the phenomenological method to a theory of literary criticism whereby the reader may "get at" the consciousness (the intentionality) of an author through the work. Whereas they all pursue access into the consciousness of the author, other phenomenologists further developed and expanded the phenomenological enterprise in their own ways. Among the more important are Paul Brodtkorb, William Spanos, Ihab Hassan, and those associated with the Geneva School, including J. Hillis Miller, Marcel Raymond, Albert Béguin, Georges Poulet, Jean Rousset, Jean-Pierre Richard, and Jean Starobinski. The Geneva School's project, unlike that of the New Critics, although both interpretive approaches focus on the texts themselves without reference to anything historical, cultural, or biographical, etc. outside the texts, was neither disinterested nor detached.<sup>16</sup> It moved beyond the phenomenological emphasis on

the location and formation of the subject in a literary work as a means by which to access the consciousness of the author to a kind of transcendent identification.

This is an occasion in which transversal theory should be discussed directly, since the Geneva School's idea of accessing the consciousness of the author anticipates processes, material and/or abstract, that transversal theory seeks to explain. For instance, such transcendent identification would require the critic to both – in transversal terms – become and come-to-be at one with the consciousness of the author. The former refers to an agential process of *becomings-x* whereby the subject willfully aspires to embodiment or occupation of the real or imaginary properties and subjective territory of another person or thing. The latter refers to an involuntary process of *comings-to-be-x*, which often occurs when the properties of another's subjective territory or chemical/molecular composition are too powerful to resist. *Comings-to-be* happen frequently as a symptom of *becomings-other* when one loses control of their subjectivity through processes of identification, empathy, and emulation and, in effect, the parameters of their own subjective territory significantly reconfigure. Accordingly, for the critics of the Geneva School, the subjectivities of the author and reader are of primary importance because intersubjectivity – and not simply subjunctive engagement – with the author is their goal. This is achieved predominantly through empathetic identification of thought-feeling structures of the author's consciousness as projected into the work, which is to say, through the *becomings-the-author* and *comings-to-be-the-author* that deep engagement with the intricacies of the work can accomplish. In other words, the objective of the Geneva School was for the reader to go on a journey with the author, to get as much inside the motivations, ideals, background, and foreground of an author as possible. This enables the literary critic to project the author, as a channel for the author, into her own writing. In short, for the Geneva School critics the ultimate goal of the critic is to become the author – who they often heralded as a creative genius beyond their own capabilities – through a mutual *comings-to-be-with* this privileged subject in order to be able to write from the special phenomenological meeting point of one's own subjectivity and the subjectivity of the author.<sup>17</sup>

In the 1960s, Hans-Georg Gadamer, who was influenced more by Heidegger than Husserl (he was Heidegger's student), morphed phenomenological approaches into hermeneutic analysis, borrowing a conjoining emphasis on language and experience from Wilhelm Dilthey and his formulation, following Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher, of

the “hermeneutic circle” in the study of lived experience.<sup>18</sup> For Dilthey, one can only objectively apprehend the whole of an experience, whether a single linguistic expression, affective response, or physical action, by having an understanding of its parts; yet one can only have an understanding of the parts by having a sense of the meaning to the whole. Following this reasoning, parts and whole are circularly collocated *vis-à-vis* identified environmental structures for which the experience was preconditioned by referential “attitudinal stances”; the “inner” significance of an experience is accessed through investigation of “outer” – psychically external, objectively directed – sensory phenomena in light of established biases toward outside factors by “re-experiencing” the whole through a developing, progressive understanding of the parts that goes “forward” with current lived experience, in effect making historical knowledge possible (200–300 *passim*). One of Gadamer’s most influential students, Wolfgang Iser, eloquently sums up Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics in terms that highlight the literary-critical foundations to Gadamer’s method which made it especially appealing to critics looking for a non-Marxist or non-socially oriented way out of the dehumanizing, purportedly disinterested aesthetics of the New Criticism:

The circle of interlinking part/whole, grammar/psychology, and divination/comparison is the hallmark of hermeneutics. It highlights the fact that there is no longer a given authority that can validate what interpretation sets out to achieve. Furthermore, there is no authority dwelling in the text itself; therefore understanding is to be arrived at from within the text by means of manifold circular operations that provide a way of correcting and monitoring understanding. . . . The circle initiates an ever-widening coupling between parts and whole, not least as the whole is not given prior to the parts but has to be visualized through them. The notion of the whole is always relative and is expanded by the circle through multiple interconnections with ever-new features of the parts, and this expansion in turn throws new light on the understanding of the parts involved. It is this broadening out of the circular movement that permits a controlled approximation to understanding. (*The Range of Interpretation* 53–4)

Both moving away from Schleiermacher’s focus on individuals and extending his language-centered paradigm together with Dilthey’s focus on experience to consideration of Being and understanding of human phenomena in general, Gadamer argues that experience – all thought and feeling – consists in the coming into language as the horizon of

both human ontology and the hermeneutics necessary to describe it: "Language is not its elaborated conventionalism, not the burden of pre-schematization with which it loads us, but the generative and creative power to unceasingly make this whole again fluent" (549). Hence, according to Gadamer, "Our starting point was that understanding is inseparable from language and that language is related to reason of every kind, and we can now see how the whole of our investigation is subsumed under this rubric" (474).<sup>19</sup> Gadamer embarked on the dialectical undertaking of critically dissecting and strategically repositioning features of the hermeneutic tradition to formulate his own method in ways that heavily impacted literary theory over the next twenty years, especially through the emergence of derivative approaches.

Driving Gadamer's overarching philosophical project was his belief that certain forms of consciousness, inherited and acquired historically through our education in society, alienate us from our true historical being. This differs from Marx's historical determinism, where false consciousness is a result of alienation from oneself through participation in capitalist modes of production. For Gadamer, the worst offenders are "aesthetic consciousness," which encourages us to evaluate and thus experience art in light of questions overdetermined by interest in authorial intention rather than as pure expression, neither positively or negatively measured, and therefore received without adulteration or bias; and "historical consciousness," also disallowing pure reception and true experience, which is epitomized by our ability to maintain a critical distance when encountering and digesting remnants and testimonies to the past life of others. Responding to this "problem," Gadamer sought to discover if objective understanding was at all possible, particularly with regard to the relationship between an author's intention (in the sense of will) and the meaning of a text. For Gadamer, the answer cannot be found in subjects or subjectivity, but in language where knowledge is possible: "Language is a medium where I and world meet or, rather, manifest their original belonging together," and therefore the ontological state of "*Being that can be understood is language. . . . For man's relation to the world is absolutely and fundamentally verbal in nature, and hence intelligible*" (474–6). Following this logic, one can easily see how the subject was eventually subsumed by emphases on discourse in subsequent poststructuralist theory: as Gadamer puts it, "The hermeneutical reduction to the author's meaning is just as inappropriate as the reduction of historical events to the intentions of their protagonists" (373).

In the late 1960s, E. D. Hirsch, although a critic of Gadamer,<sup>20</sup> helped to popularize the fundamental topics of Gadamerian phenomenological

hermeneutics in the study of literature in the United States. His vehement critique of the New Criticism became a breeding ground for lively debate and alternative thinking. Most influential of Hirsch's contributions is the distinction he made between "meaning" and "significance":

*Meaning* is that which is represented by a text; it is what the author meant by his use of a particular sign sequence; it is what the signs represent. *Significance*, on the other hand, names a relationship between that meaning and a person, or a conception, or situation, or indeed anything imaginable. Authors, who like everyone else change their attitudes, feelings, opinions, and value criteria in the course of time, will obviously in the course of time tend to view their own work in different contexts. Clearly what changes for them is not the meaning of the work, but rather their relationship to that meaning. Significance always implies a relationship, and one constant, unchanging pole of that relationship is what the text means. (8)

In a neo-humanist move emphasizing human subjects as well as the texts themselves in the determination of meaning, Hirsch argues that the probable authorial meaning, while always indeterminable, is a matter of will, an exercise of agency by author and reader that must preside over interpretation:

Almost any word sequence can, under the conventions of language, legitimately represent more than one complex of meaning. A word sequence means nothing in particular until somebody either means something by it or understands something from it. There is no magic land of meanings outside human consciousness. (4)

Nevertheless, for Hirsch, the responsible pursuit of meaning finally stops with the author; an author wills the meaning in an exercise of subjective agency: "To banish the original author as the determiner of meaning was to reject the only compelling normative principle that could lend validity to an interpretation" (5). Despite Hirsch's efforts, as we move into the 1970s, the focus of debate shifts even further away from authors and/or the immediate text as the privileged sources of meaning, that is, from the text that is the primary subject matter under investigation, to develop more complexly in relation to both the reader's subject position and the text's relationships to factors – textual, cultural, historical, and so on – beyond the text's local borders. Contexts, situatedness, and positionality for expression and interpretation, particularly in terms of the power

associations and differentials that constrain them, came to supersede emphases on individual subjects and subjectivity in favor of discourses on the establishment and maintenance of meanings and authority.<sup>21</sup> Although this battle was rigorously fought during what is commonly referred to as the “theory wars” of the 1970s, it became abundantly clear throughout the decade that there is plenty of room in literary studies for multiple approaches and that emphasis on authorial intention was not going to lose favor insofar as individual humans continue to hold each other accountable for their actions, whether rewarded or punished, in all modern societies.

Much of this book discusses theory considered structuralist, post-structuralist, and post-Marxist with regard to concepts of the subject and subjectivity, so I will not summarize the different positions here. Instead, I want to conclude this section with an account of the influential juncture between approaches usually termed “reception theory” and “reader-response criticism,” both of which are in the tradition of Gadamer’s phenomenological hermeneutics and anticipate developments in transversal poetics. I do this as a means by which to move investigative-expansively into the example of Shakespeare to consider what some recent groundbreaking work in the fields of consciousness studies and cognitive neuroscience might have to offer theories of interpretation and their positions with regard to the subject and subject matters. Initially associated with the Constance School of Reception Aesthetics and with the work of two of its founding members in particular, Hans Robert Jauss and Wolfgang Iser, the phenomenological-hermeneutic shift in focus from texts to readers carved out a significant space in the academy. Although with much variation among their approaches, many literary critics became proponents of reception aesthetics in the United States, including David Bleich, Stephen Booth, Wayne Booth, Jonathan Culler, Paul de Man, Stanley Fish, Norman Holland, Wolfgang Iser, Walter Slatoff, Richard Palmer, Mary Louise Pratt, Michael Riffaterre, and William Spanos, with Fish and Iser becoming the most influential in regard to reception/reader-response criticism throughout the 1970s and beyond.<sup>22</sup>

For Fish, like Iser, meaning comes from a subjective interaction between text and reader. The reader, not the writer, is ultimately the author of the text. The form of the text is the form of the experience of a reader creating meaning while engaging with the text. That is, the text has no form independent of a reader’s experience of it. However, readers do not exist independently from a social world. They are always embedded in a community of interpreters which has its own predetermined

set of interpretive, experiential strategies and histories of interpretation against which it disagrees and defines itself in the persistent interest of formulating and asserting new “facts” and the new “real point” (Fish 338–55):

The discovery of the “real point” is always what is claimed whenever a new interpretation is advanced, but the claim makes sense only in relation to a point (or points) that had previously been considered the real one. This means that the space in which a critic works has been marked out for him by his predecessors, even though he is obliged by the conventions of the institution to dislodge them. . . . This dependency, the reverse of the anxiety of influence, is reflected in the unwritten requirement that an interpretation present itself as remedying a deficiency in the interpretations that have come before it. (Fish 350)

According to Fish, meanings are always shaped and accepted by and within an “interpretive community to constitute the objects upon which its members (also and simultaneously constituted) can then agree” (338). Interpretive authority rests with the dominant reading strategies of the community, strategies that when commonly applied with respect to the strategies and readings of its counter-positioned predecessors should produce similar if not identical results. In other words, meaning is not fixed within the text independent of a reader; the reader is always “constrained” within at least one interpretive community, which limits the number and quality of possible meanings; a particular interpretation will be legitimated or found illegitimate by the community.<sup>23</sup> The subject is central in Fish’s formulation, yet never an autonomous, meaning-giving agent: “Once one realizes that the conceptions that fill consciousness, including any conception of its own status, are culturally derived, the very notion of an unconstrained self, of a consciousness wholly and dangerously free, becomes incomprehensible” (335). Meaning for the subject is always determined according to evaluative rules and regulations set down by an interpretive community and the culture it mutually supports.

Fish’s contribution marks one of the influential junctures whereby transversal poetics finds productive expression. In transversal terms, interpretive communities are byproducts of laminated commonalities – overlapping and thus reinforced shared sensibilities, beliefs, values, etc. – within subjective territories in the accumulated, exponential form of sociopolitical conductors: familial, educational, legal, religious, and

governmental structures and their proxies and representatives. These operate under the hermeneutic jurisdiction of the corresponding official territories that are themselves the results of such lamination. In turn, these official territories are constituents of larger and overlapping official territories, also with strategies established through commonalities in perspectives across and cross-referencing types of social, cultural, ideological, and political investments. Official territories are caught up in state machinery, a networked web of the sociopolitical conductors operating under common rubrics and auspices which are fueled by state power, which is to say, the drive and power of coherence and sense-making for any variables within any environment. Put differently, sociopolitical conductors, whether individuals or groups, achieve authority through the reciprocal establishment of a self-serving interpretive community and the particular subjects, and therefore the subjective territories, that constitute the community's phenomenological-hermeneutic infrastructure. This happens in the form of official territories that are organized through authoritative strategies, tactics, and laws – and the attendant feelings of joy, pride, guilt, shame, and anxiety that correspond with a subject and her prescribed subjective territory – to constrain, channel, and manufacture meanings proper to the sustainability of the official territories themselves.

Nevertheless, contrary to Fish's understanding of interpretive communities, transversal theory maintains that consciousness can break free of subjective and cognitive constraints. Such liberation can occur through consciousness's suspension (paused consciousness), which can produce and further affect transversal movements inasmuch as mechanisms of surveillance and control are temporally shut down and such phenomena as becomings and comings-to-be are able to occur. More commonly, however inspired, transversal movements can enable reflexive-consciousness so as to advance emergences of subjectivity through efforts to regain stability and anchor subjective territory. Moreover, by uninterrupted extension, the reactive efforts to immobilize and prevent transversal movements through the crystallization and grounding of subjectivity can advance reflexive-consciousness itself to the vanishing point of pure referential equivalences (see discussion on simulacra in Chapter 2); that is, they can simultaneously stratify and destratify layers of consciousness, a positive feedback loop of reflexive-consciousness: an ongoing phenomenological transcendence. This brings us to Iser's version of reception phenomenology. Even though Iser defines his theory through concepts of lack and negation, it comes closer than Fish's as a positive predecessor to transversal poetics.

Iser maintains that in order for a reader to connect “intersubjectively [with] verifiable characteristics” with a work of literature through engaged “ideational activity,” that is, to have an experience of a signification process that draws the reader “inescapably into the world of the text” so that its meaning translates into the reader’s consciousness, the reader must become familiar with certain codes integral to the structure of the given text (*The Act of Reading* 36):

In literary works, however, the message is transmitted in two ways, in that the reader “receives” it by composing it. There is no common code – at best one could say that a common code may arise in the course of the process. Starting with this assumption, we must search for structures that will enable us to describe basic conditions of interaction, for only then shall we be able to gain some insight into the potential effects inherent in the work. These structures must be of a complex nature, for although they are contained in the text, they do not fulfill their function until they have affected the reader. Practically every discernible structure in fiction has this two-sidedness: it is verbal and affective. The verbal aspect guides the reaction and prevents it from being arbitrary; the affective aspect is the fulfillment of that which has been prestructured by the language of the text. Any description of the interaction between the two must therefore incorporate both the structure of effects (the text) and that of response (the reader). (21)

Concretizations of aesthetic comprehension result from convergences of textual structures with structured acts of reading: that is, while reading, “The text itself simply offers ‘schematized aspects’ through which the subject matter of the work can be produced, while the actual production takes place through an act of concretization” (*The Act of Reading* 21). The text “concretizes” as readers use familiar literary and social conventions to achieve a sense of meaning by filling in “gaps” or “blanks” in the narrative or thematic structure of a text, but also through the resolution of “negations which arise in the course of the reading” (*Prospecting* 34):

Blanks and negations both control the process of communication in their own different ways: The blanks leave open the connection between textual perspectives, and so spur the reader into coordinating these perspectives and patterns – in other words, they induce the reader to perform basic operations *within* the text. The various types of negation invoke familiar and determinate elements or knowledge

only to cancel them out. What is canceled, however, remains in view, and thus brings about modifications in the reader's attitude toward what is familiar or determinate – that is, he is guided to adopt a position *in relation* to the text. (*Prospecting* 34)

For Iser, following Husserl, this process allows for the emergences of both the aesthetic object and the subject:

The reader fills in the blank in the text, thereby bringing about a referential field; the blank arising in turn out of the referential field is filled in by way of the theme-and-background structure; and the vacancy arising from the juxtaposed themes in backgrounds is occupied by the reader's standpoint, from which the various reciprocal transformations lead to the emergence of the aesthetic object. . . . If the blank is largely responsible for the activities described, then participation means that the reader is not simply called upon to "internalize" the positions given in the text, but he is induced to make them act upon and so transform each other, as a result of which the aesthetic object begins to emerge. The structure of the blank organizes this participation, revealing simultaneously the intimate connection between the structure and the reading subject. This interconnection completely conforms to a remark made by Piaget: "In a word, the subject is there and alive, because the basic quality of each structure is the structuring process itself." The blank in the fictional text appears to be a paradigmatic structure; its function consists in initiating structured operations in the reader, the execution of which transmits the reciprocal interaction of textual positions into consciousness. (*Prospecting* 40)

According to Iser, the best literature disallows, through the strategic imposition of blanks and negations, a smooth fit between signifying codes and their application; ideally, the more deeply we engage with the text's structure, the more it challenges coding conventions and problematizes our relationships to them: "The more the reader is drawn into the proceedings by playing the game of the text, the more he or she is also played *by* the text" (*Prospecting* 258). Here, if we follow Iser's logic apparently beyond the rewarding challenge he accounts for in the relationship between text and reader, he identifies a proposition of transversal theory that I elaborate on in the next section: that people *enjoy* transversal movement, even if they fear it, resist it, or suffer as a result of the conditions under which it occurs; although transversal movement is often perpetuating, it is rarely identical to its catalyst. Iser asks of literature that

it displaces us from prescribed interpretive stances within our subjective territory, that it disturbs our everyday modes of interpretation, and compels us to pursue embedded unity within the structural embroidery of the text through fulfilling exploration and of its narrative, thematic, signifying, etc. vacancies. Yet for Iser, not surprisingly because of his stress on blanks and negations, the reader's hermeneutic enterprises are, in the final analysis, inspired by deprivation and deficiency: "The interplay between the fictional and imaginary provides the necessary heuristics for such an exploration. In its boundary-crossing capacity fictionality is first and foremost an extension of humankind which, like all operations of consciousness, is nothing but a pointer toward something other than itself. Basically it is devoid of any content and hence cries out to be filled" (*Prospecting* 283). Alternatively, transversal poetics welcomes affective presence, positively construed and situated, of readers, spectators, authors, actors, performances, texts, etc. as a premise from which to engage subjects and subject matters.

### Shakespearean excursion I: why we can't get enough

I would very much like to read and write in a space or heritage of Shakespeare, in relation to whom I have infinite admiration and gratitude; I would like to become (alas, it's pretty late) a "Shakespeare expert"; I know that everything is in Shakespeare: everything and the rest, so everything or nearly.

Jacques Derrida, "Interview" (67)

At this point, I want to turn briefly to the controversial topic of Shakespeare's enduring and extraordinary popularity. This enables me to expand our discussion on subjects and subjectivity into areas of research not explicitly following in the critical traditions considered so far. Specifically, I want to turn to neurochemistry, memetics, and cognitive neuroscience to see if there are productive correlates to their predecessors in reception theory and phenomenology. In doing this, I want to see if a satisfactory explanation for Shakespeare's status might indeed emerge, perhaps as a Husserlian aesthetic object, along with the reader/spectator-subject. Overall, I intend this excursion to be a vehicle for discussing reception phenomenology and aesthetics more generally, to continue with Iser's concern with what people desire or hope to achieve by engaging with literary fiction, and, for my purposes, with theater and performance.<sup>24</sup> I begin with the example of *The Most Excellent and Lamentable Tragedy of Romeo and Juliet* since it is commonly considered not only Shakespeare's most romantic play, but also the most

romantic play of all time. The long traditions of psychoanalytic and psychological approaches in literary criticism from Freud and A.C. Bradley to the present, and to some extent in phenomenological approaches as well (as in the work of Norman Holland and Paul Brodtkorb),<sup>25</sup> have treated characters, Romeo and Juliet in this case, *as if* they are real flesh-and-blood humans with normally functioning bodies and brains. I also do this, but primarily to explore the empathetic relationships readers and audiences famously have with them, and thus, in conjunction, to extend discussions of narrative, representation, and consciousness that are fundamental to the literary-critical traditions I am following to consider material, chemical, and neural variables that have been less attended to or completely elided in these traditions.

### We've got chemistry

A hapless Romeo is struck by the sight of Juliet: "What lady's that which doth enrich the hand / Of yonder knight?" (1.5.41–2).<sup>26</sup> With testosterone and adrenalin already darting through his veins because of the anticipated violent confrontation that would occur if discovered by the Capulets at their ball, as well as some molecular bonding hormones like oxytocin already released during his "love be rough" exchange with his longtime dear friend Mercutio on the way to the ball (1.1.27), Romeo's body is highly predisposed to physiological changes that produce the sensation of "love." This ready biochemical predisposition is further enhanced by the desperate "woes" symptomatic of his unrequited "love" of Rosaline (2.2.62–74), the love-obsession that leads him to crash the Capulet ball in the first place. Such love-obsession is a byproduct of depression combined with irrational behavior, both characteristic of abnormally low levels of serotonin in the bloodstream. Causing an explosion of phenylethylamine in Romeo's brain, a chemical with pharmacological properties similar to amphetamine that speeds up the flow of information between nerve cells that is naturally released when anxious or sexually stimulated, Juliet's astonishing image, indeed her extraordinary affective presence (the combined material, symbolic, and imaginary existence of a concept/object/subject/event and its multiplicities) fires up with tremendous impact a group of neurotransmitters (chemical messengers), called monoamines, which are necessary for the "chemistry" of love, the captivation, energy, and euphoria associated with "falling in love."

These monoamines are dopamine, which produces pleasurable feelings, especially as its release heightens motivation as a result of greater reward-anticipation (Romeo's desires might be required, even

consummated); norepinephrine, also known as adrenalin, which activates the sympathetic nervous system to increase heart rate, dopamine transmission, and focused attention; and serotonin, which plays an important role in the everyday regulation of mood, sleep, sexuality, and appetite. Moreover, when serotonin is released from brain cells in high doses so that it occupies the synapses longer, thereby delaying reuptake back into the nerves, it induces a general and possibly extraordinary sense of openness, empathy, energy, euphoria, and well-being. For comparison, consider that these effects occur when people ingest the popular recreational drug MDMA (3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine), commonly referred to as Ecstasy, E, and X, which is molecularly similar to the stimulant methamphetamine and the hallucinogen mescaline. (See Baz Luhrmann's 1996 cinematic adaptation of *Romeo and Juliet* for an example of a pharmacological approach to love at first sight.)

Hence, Romeo's diminished serotonin production is suddenly superboosted, consequently infusing his receptors and synapses with serotonin, forging powerful, ineluctable connections, and therefore unforgettable memories. But this remarkable event intensifies. Romeo's heart races, sweat crowds his pores, and he produces and secretes seductive chemicals called pheromones that send off enticing molecular messages to other humans, typically detected by the olfactory system, but also by the vomeronasal (chemoreceptor) organ, located in the vomer facial bone between the nose and the mouth. As these pheromones gush into the air, they are no less readily absorbed by Juliet than her presence captivated Romeo. As a result, similar biochemical fireworks overwhelm Juliet. The mutual effects are so great, so excessive, that they both reel transversally, which is to say, wildly beyond accepted subjective and societal parameters. Symbolic of this departure and indicative of their similar cognitive states, the shared concept of "sin" becomes a common ground by which they attempt to measure and control the ultimately uncontrollable phenomena that inspires them to transgress, and keep transgressing against mounting and unconquerable adversity, the social, moral, legal, and spiritual codes of the official society of Verona. Recall how their beautiful dialogue concludes:

ROMEO: Then move not, while my prayer's effect I take.

[He kisses her.]

Thus from my lips, by thine, my sin is purg'd.

JULIET: Then have my lips the sin that they have took.

ROMEO: Sin from my lips? O trespass sweetly urg'd.

Give me my sin again. [He kisses her.] (1.5.105-9)

Dramatic increases in serotonin levels often precipitate schizothymic, schizoid or schizophrenic experiences, with hallucinations persistently superseding rationality (see Chapter 2 on schizoanalytic reading of Rousseau). To be sure, I can easily imagine a lover of Shakespeare's poetry spending literally hundreds of sleep, food, and human-contact deprived hours investigating the meaning of a phrase like, "To be, or not to be," without hope of this undertaking leading to prosperity of any kind, financial, societal, or otherwise, much less absolute knowledge or salvation. Recent studies, most notably by Donatella Marazziti and her collaborators, using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to compare brain activity and levels of monoamines and hormones in people during the first few months of falling in love with those of people diagnosed with Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) have revealed comparable cognitive processes and neurochemistry.<sup>27</sup> This is in connection with similar obsessive-compulsive behavior in their everyday lives, such as repetitive, distressing, intrusive thoughts and related compulsions, tasks, and rituals (think of that article you just have to write). Whereas this similarity suggests a firm correlation between the neurochemistry of people falling in love and those with OCD, it may be the product of convergent evolution or processes; there being one observable outcome but more than one way of getting there. Nevertheless, I want to explore a potentially corresponding "disorder" of sorts in terms of subject-to-subject-matter relations during reception-privileged experiences. The "disorder," of course, is people's sometimes obsessive, compulsive, excessive, devoted, tortured, blissful, idolatrous, spiritual, and so on, relationships to the cultural icon Shakespeare.

In various ways, Shakespeareans (fans, aficionados, devoted students, scholars, directors, actors, theatergoers, etc.) share initiation into discourses commonly associated with Shakespeare (on authorship, poetry, love, sex, theatricality, philosophy, history, war, etc.) as well as degrees of expertise in their common interest-areas and subfields. Evidenced by the abundant space, time, and energy Shakespeareans commit to Shakespeare in their conversations, classrooms, research, writings, offices, homes, theater-going, theater-making, movie-going, vacations, purchasing of books and chotskies, etc. (some even like to dress up as Shakespeare), there is significant commonality and overlap among their relationships to Shakespeare. In effect, they comprise laminations of investment in aspects and ideas of what they believe, consciously or not, Shakespeare is or does. These laminations generate and necessitate institutions and discourses that protect their investments

and what they deem to be “legitimate” relationships to Shakespeare, the kinds of relationships that should be emulated in the interest of supporting the ideology of an official culture that “appropriately” values Shakespeare. The ideology, in turn, reinforces the official culture’s self-supporting subjective territories, the prescribed emotional, conceptual, and material positions occupied by individuals living within a given society. In this case, the subjective territories incorporate within the specific societies that couch such a legitimated, officialized culture of Shakespearean appreciation. Nevertheless, all of this goes much deeper and wider.

Whether in theater, music, film, literature, or all of these in the Shakespeare industry, the specific results of performing, experiencing, thinking, reading, and/or writing about any culturally dominant iconic subject and its myriad permutations are ambiguous. However, such interfacing with emulative authority engenders more profound willful becomings and inadvertent comings-to-be of alternative identities and their experiences than the quotidian activities of life without iconic contacts.<sup>28</sup> As discussed above, becomings are desiring processes by which people purposely transform – physically, conceptually, and/or emotionally – into something or something different; and comings-to-be happen when people lose control and transform into more of/or something else than expected or preferred. If someone wants to become a Shakespeare scholar, she might memorize much of Shakespeare’s poetry in the process of writing her dissertation on Shakespeare as an active means by which to connect profoundly with her subject matter. Nevertheless, if she were to begin speaking, intentionally or otherwise, in Shakespearean verse (quoting lines from Shakespeare, perhaps in an Elizabethan dialect) during an interview for an academic job without both making her audience aware of the frame for this performance, and thereby keying the audience into the fact that they are observing a performance, she might seem crazy because of her apparent attempts to emulate Shakespeare in a context not appropriately framed for such unusual behavior. Her desire to become a Shakespeare scholar would likely be superseded and undermined by her more powerful and authentic comings-to-be Shakespearean.<sup>29</sup>

Curiously, the effects of neither memorization of texts nor the performative recitation in speech, writing, and/or other embodied expression and representation of memorized texts have been subjects of concern for reader-response and reception theorists, even when their focus is a work of dramatic literature. Is there something about the projected staging, if not the live performance itself, that causes reader-response and

reception theorists to shy away from dramatic literature and, by extension, theater and performance? Perhaps this has to do with their idea of convergence – comings-to-be – with an author’s consciousness that is vastly complicated by the inclusion of multiple other authorial elements (directors, actors, designers, producers, etc.). The reason for this might relate to a Platonic notion of distance/removal from “truth” through degrees of separation via mediation and representation or additional hermeneutic challenges presented as a consequence of structural complexities specific to performance modes. Either way, this choice raises a crucial question that might be presuppositional to their apparent resistance to drama (and preference for prose fiction): What induces or permits comings-to-be to transpire?

People both become and come-to-be situated as participants within articulatory spaces when they encounter or embody any media conceptually and/or materially imbued or manifested by an icon’s or iconic event’s affective presence. Articulatory spaces are where expressions and signs merge, layer, and blend in line with prominent themes in ways structurally similar to how subjective territories and their elements (conceptual, emotional, physical) are contained within other subjective territories. These are, in turn, contained within official territories with elements (subjective territories, sociopolitical conductors, state machinery) which are contained by other official territories, either partially or entirely, and so forth. Put differently, articulatory spaces, like subjective and official territories, can be understood in terms of subsets and their elements in mathematical set theories that allow the elements of a set (set A) to be simultaneously contained within another set (set B) or sets (B, C, D, etc.) even though all of the elements of set A are not necessarily contained within any of the other sets of which some number of its elements are constituent. In short, elemental containment within different articulatory spaces is not essentially mutually exclusive and can be partial and concurrent.<sup>30</sup> For instance, powerfully employed by the sociopolitical conductors of various official territories, Shakespeare’s emulative authority and affective presence as – among other celebrated things – marvelous poet, cultural icon, and ideological symbol enables and affects our engagement with the phenomena of Shakespace. This is an articulatory space that encompasses the plurality of Shakespeare-related articulatory spaces and formations (such as theaterspace, lovespace, humanismespace, as well as the more specific Freudspace, Marxspace, and Hamletspace) and the time, speed, and force at which these articulatory spaces transmit, replicate, and reconfigure through places, cultures, and eras.<sup>31</sup>

### Can you say what you meme?

In my last book, *Transversal Enterprises in the Drama of Shakespeare and his Contemporaries: Fugitive Explorations*, I explain that assimilation into articulatory spaces, like those within, passing through, and surrounding a famous work of literature or art, typically requires at least ideational engagement in conjunction with intentional or unintentional observation, imitation, and/or emulation, that is, becomings and comings-to-be. This requires conceptual-emotional, cognitive, and/or material infusion of certain units of information, cultural substances, or, perhaps, what zoologist Richard Dawkins calls “memes” (192).<sup>32</sup> I want to return to Dawkins’s neologism and theory here to continue my discussion on becomings and comings-to-be in relation to subjective affects that I explore with my collaborators in *Transversal Enterprises*. For Dawkins, “meme” is an amalgam of the words “memory,” “imitation,” and “gene,” and he gives as examples of memes, “tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes fashions, ways of making pots or building arches” (192). According to Dawkins, “Just as genes propagate themselves in the gene pool by leaping from body to body via sperms or eggs, so memes propagate themselves in the meme pool by leaping from brain to brain via a process which, in the broad sense, can be called imitation” (192). He explains that “imitation” refers to copy as in genetic “replication,” but as a result of cultural rather than natural selection: “If a scientist hears, or reads about, a good idea, he passes it onto his colleagues and students. . . . If the idea catches on, it can be said to propagate itself, spreading from brain to brain” (192). As a concrete example, Dawkins asks his readers to consider “the idea of God”:

How does it replicate itself? By the spoken and written word, aided by great music and great art. Why does it have such high survival value? Remember that “survival value” here does not mean value for a gene in a gene pool, but value for a meme in a meme pool. The question really means: What is it about the idea of a god that gives it its stability and penetrance in the cultural environment? The survival value of the god meme in the meme pool results from its great psychological appeal. It provides a superficially plausible answer to deep and troubling questions about existence. . . . God exists, if only in the form of a meme with high survival value, or infective power, in the environment provided by human culture. (192–3)<sup>33</sup>

Like genes within a given population’s evolutionary process, memes thrive or perish insofar as their qualities are advantageous and superior to other competing memes within a particular culture and societal

environment. With far-reaching implications across a number of fields, Dawkins's theory of memes as replicators residing in people's brains that are able to replicate themselves in effect of socialization during information transmission through any media – whether reading novels or attending theater performances – between individuals offers an explanation for cultural evolution, or rather, the gene-meme co-evolutionary process. It could also elucidate how subjective and official territories become and come-to-be; how state power, manifesting in ideas and their steady articulation, achieves predominance in given fields; and how transversal power, which fuels transformations and expansions that exceed the limits of subjective and official territories, may emerge in the fields as the result of subversive memetic interventions.<sup>34</sup> As we move along, I want to explore the question of Shakespeare's affective presence in terms similar to Dawkins's about God: However comprehended or experienced as subjective singularities within multiplicities or as phenomenological or hermeneutic conundrum (replete with narrative, grammatical, or semantic "blanks") or organic or universalizing totality, why does "Shakespeare" have such high survival value? Why is Shakespeare – his poetry, plays, philosophy, mind, biography, image – so tremendously and persistently popular?

The field of "memetics" proliferated since Dawkins launched his theory in 1976, and has become divided into the "meme-as-germ" and the "meme-as-gene" camps.<sup>35</sup> In the first camp are the memeticists, like Aaron Lynch and Richard Brodie, who take an epidemiological approach and see memes as cultural microbes that disseminate information as "mind viruses" (Dawkins' term) or "idea viruses" that get "sneezed" by people through various media into the brains of other people.<sup>36</sup> They exist parasitically on human hosts, making them act in ways conducive to getting copies of their information into the brains of others. Curiously, while writing this chapter I sneezed (a sort of self-muffled sneeze as I was trying to not wake up my sleeping one year old son Zephyr), and it was during that sneeze that I realized that sneezes – like mine – often sound like the utterance "Shakespeare." Thus, when people hear sneezes they may be hearing, consciously or not, the word Shakespeare too, and this may be contributing, especially logocentrically, to the widespread awareness of, if not familiarity with, Shakespeare. Moreover, given that sneezing usually involves the involuntary release of bodily fluid (mucus), it is curious that in West Bengal, India, as I learned at a Shakespeare conference in Calcutta in 2007, people pronounce Shakespeare "Sexspeare," and so Shakespeare's popularity there may have something to do with the titillation inspired by uttering his name as well. Simply put, whether

we are talking about thoughts and feelings associated with his name or cultural codes, etc. linked to Shakespace, following Dawkins, the Shakespeare meme is literally sneezed into or onto people. Alternative to the virus model, memeticists belonging to the meme-as-gene camp, like Daniel Dennett and Susan Blackmore, argue that memes, as gene-like replicators, account for a process of cultural evolution. For them, memes account for the ways by which humans use language and media to circulate information that networks and substantiates societies as they develop cultural traits ever more rapidly and complexly that go beyond the common understanding of what genes are capable of doing.<sup>37</sup>

According to Dennett and Blackmore, the spread of ideas and memes, and therefore the occurrence of comings-to-be, are usually more powerful and less controllable the higher the level of the activity involved, whether through performance or cognition. This theory agrees, generally speaking, with phenomenological and reception theorists of the Geneva and Constance Schools who maintain that the reader can converge with the consciousness of the author or text, respectively, through achieving a profound understanding of the sophisticated patterns and codes of the text. The understanding enables the reader to experience intersubjectivity with the author (Geneva theorists) or subject-producing interiority in relation to the text (Constance theorists) and thereby articulate the text's meaning. In Dennett's and Blackmore's terms, awareness of how to do something – knowledge of technique, instructions, patterns, and codes (such as those necessary to construct a Shakespearean sonnet) – is more deeply assimilated and more capable of programming behavior, thought, and feeling than simply copying the action. Learning how to act in the process of becoming a theater actor, for example, would likely instigate comings-to-be of a nature perhaps altogether different from how people commonly perceive the lifestyle of an actor insofar as the kinds of somatic knowledge required of actors may be beneficial to people in other fields, such as surfing or physics. Along these lines, circumstances may motivate someone to pursue a given activity for adaptive purposes that have little to do with the immediate or local benefits of the activity, but rather because knowledge of the codes requisite to the activity bestow advantages of greater value for other applications, such as for purposes of pleasure or survival. For memeticists, this scenario is ordinary and the obvious work of memes. Taking this back to issues of reception, consider that while attending a performance of a Shakespeare play a scholar or aficionado of Shakespeare will have, consciously or not, more intense engagement with Shakespearean codes and consequently deeper assimilation with greater personal significance than

someone who only occasionally attends performances of Shakespeare's plays. Because of their different prior relationships with the subject matter, and thus different investments in it, they will have substantially different sets of expectations for and responses to encounters with Shakespace.

### **The neurons made me do it**

This theory, that past relationships to stimuli directly influence present ones despite any etiological awareness, has found support in recent research in cognitive neuroscience by researchers studying mimicry, perception-behavioral links, and neurological modeling. There is also research in these studies showing that people react unintentionally and automatically to stimuli in similar ways notwithstanding the absence of related individual or shared experiences. Together, this research provides some very compelling explanations for the phenomena of empathy, comings-to-be, and intersubjectivity, and is suggestive of a number of strategies for becoming that individuals and groups may perform. I want to begin with the preponderance of data from research conducted over the last fifty years showing both that people unconsciously mimic others when observing them, whether for purposes of communication, bonding, survival, or for no apparent reason, and that the findings are often the same for people observing people in photographs, on television, when overheard, or in person. The ways in which unintentional mimicry occurs are numerous: facial expressions from the time people are born and throughout life (Field, Woodson, Greenberg, and Cohen 1982; Meltzoff and Moore 1977a,b, 1979, 1983), including joy and sadness (Terminé and Izard 1988) and wincing because of pain (Bavelas *et al.* 1986, 1987); verbal, including rhythm and rate of speech, duration of pauses, and interruptions (Cappella and Panalp 1981; Webb 1969, 1972), words, clauses, and grammar (Bock 1986, 1989; Levelt and Kelter 1982), tones of voice (Neumann and Strack 2000), accents (Giles and Powesland 1975), laughing (Bush *et al.* 1989; Provine 1992), yawning (Provine 1986); and body movements, including mother-child posturing (Bernieri 1988), ducking (Bavelas *et al.* 1988), and various posturing that is influenced by the degree of rapport and liking between parties, in other words, emulative authority (Bernieri 1988; Charney 1966; Dabbs 1969; LaFrance 1982; LaFrance and Broadbent 1976; Maurer and Tindall 1983; Schefflen 1964). Unintentionally performed, whether functional or adaptive, all of the types of mimicry referenced here suggest non-conscious, impartial, non-forceful mechanisms involved in both becoming and

comings-to-be.<sup>38</sup> Nonetheless, affects of rapport and liking on occurrences of mimicry indicates that social, cognitive, and subjective factors requiring higher levels of engagement are at work (such as during the collaborative processes of writing this book); that is, there are apparent emotional and conceptual as well as other neurophysiological variables encouraging, discouraging, and/or determining kinds and qualities of mimetic responses.

According to Christopher Hsee *et al.*, mimicry influences people through what they call “emotional contagion,” which is “the tendency to mimic the verbal, physiological, and/or behavioural aspects of another person’s emotional experience/expression, and thus to experience/express the same emotions oneself”; people “catch” the emotions of others through observation and the corresponding mimicry (328), which enables and affects occurrences of intersubjectivity. With much corroborating documentation from related research, Elaine Hatfield *et al.*, elaborate on this idea in their book on the topic:

*Emotional contagion*, we believe, is best conceptualized as a multiple determined family of psychophysiological, behavioral, and social phenomena. Because emotional contagion can be produced by innate stimulus features (e.g., a mother’s nurturing expressions and actions toward an infant), acquired stimulus features, and/or mental stimulations or emotional imagery, we say it is *multiple determined*. Because it can manifest as responses that are either similar (e.g., as when smiles elicit smiles) or complementary (e.g., as when a fist raised in anger causes a timid person to shrink back in fear, a process sometimes called *countercontagion*), it represents a family of phenomena. Emotional contagion is also a *multilevel phenomenon*: The precipitating stimuli arise from one individual, act upon (i.e., are perceived and interpreted by) one or more other individuals, and yield corresponding or complementary emotions (conversant awareness; facial, vocal, and postural expression; neurophysiological and automatic nervous system activity; and gross emotional behavioral responses) in these individuals. Thus, an important consequence of emotional contagion is an attentional, emotional, and behavioral synchrony that has the same adaptive utility (and drawbacks) for social entities (dyads, groups) as has emotion for the individual. (4–5)

In support of emotional contagion, subsequent research made possible by primarily functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), but also by position emission tomography (PET) and more recently

magnetoencephalography (MEG), has shown a neurological link between performing an action and simply imagining the performance of that action. In fact, several studies have shown that the same neurological activity occurs when someone imagines complex actions, such as communicating with words and gestures, as when performing them (Paus, *et al.* 1993; Decety *et al.* 1991; Jeannerod, 1994, 1997). Other studies have demonstrated that the same neuron firing among brain cells called “mirror neurons” occurs when someone observes or thinks about an action, even a simple action like grabbing a glass, without actually performing the action herself (Di Pellegrino *et al.* 1992; Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998).<sup>39</sup>

According to one of the pioneers of this research, Vittorio Gallese, such neurological mirroring happens because of what he calls “embodied simulation” and “intentional attunement”; the former accounts for neural underpinnings and the latter for neurological mappings:

The mirror neuron system for action is activated both by transitive, object-related and intransitive, communicative actions, regardless of the effectors performing them. When a given action is planned, its expected motor consequences are forecast. This means that when we are going to execute a given action we can also predict its consequences. The action model enables this prediction. Given the shared sub-personal neural mapping between what is acted and what is perceived – constituted by mirror neurons – the action model can also be used to predict the consequences of actions performed by others. Both predictions (of our actions and of others’ actions) are instantiations of embodied simulation, that is, modeling processes. . . . The same functional logic that presides over self-modeling is employed also to model the behavior of others: to perceive an action is equivalent to internally simulating it. This enables the observer to use her/his own resources to experientially penetrate the world of the other by means of a direct, automatic, and unconscious process of simulation. (“Intentional Attunement” 1)

Unlike most of the other cognitive neuroscientists conducting research on non-conscious mimicry, Gallese theorizes his findings. Following Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, who “emphasize the role of the acting body in perceiving,” he hypothesizes that since the mirror neuron system provides people with the ability to access the neurophysiological worlds of others, it is also the phenomenological mechanism that

enables both empathy and intersubjectivity ("The 'Shared Manifold' Hypothesis" 41–4).<sup>40</sup> As a conceptual tool for analyzing these phenomena, he offers the "*shared manifold* of intersubjectivity," whereby "we recognize other human beings as similar to us. It is just because of the shared manifold that intersubjective communication and mind-reading become possible" ("The 'Shared Manifold' Hypothesis" 45). Gallese's work has significant implications for our understanding of the subjective, empathetic, and intersubjective processes involved in both becomings and comings-to-be, and, by extension, in the development, maintenance, and changeability of subjective territories.

Gallese's hypothesis is strongly supported by the research of Tanya Chartrand, William Maddux, and Jessica Lakin and others working on perception-behavioral links who argue for adaptive functions and/or agential corollaries of non-conscious mimicry. Moreover, also consistent with Gallese's hypothesis, Tanya Chartrand, *et al.* claim that thinking about a behavior (as neurologically modeled) leads to performing it:

Today, we still carry the torch of our ancestral heritage. Merely perceiving another person saying, feeling, or doing something makes us more likely to say, feel, and do the same thing. Even in minimal circumstances, there is substantial evidence that social perception leads to automatic social behavior. . . . Having the same facial expressions, speech patterns, moods, emotions, and behaviors of others expresses similarity, which in turn builds empathy, liking, rapport, and affiliation. Accordingly, there are variables that serve to increase or decrease the amount of mimicry engaged in at any given time, such as rapport, individual differences in perspective taking, and attentional focus. . . . We also have presented preliminary evidence that having a goal to affiliate with others can increase non-conscious mimicry. This occurs regardless of whether the goal is temporary or chronic, consciously pursued or nonconsciously primed. . . . Although mimicking another person's mannerisms may be a direct result of the perception-behavior link, we believe that the existence of motivational moderators of this tendency makes this a powerful tool in a person's repertoire of affiliative behaviors. (356–7)

In the cases of research on mirror neurons and perception-behavioral links, there is a causal emphasis placed on previous experiences, through their impact on neurological patterning, with regard to present and subsequent responses, regardless of their conscious or non-conscious

qualities. In other words, the intensity of neuron firing along axons and through synapses, and therefore the neurochemical experience, differs depending on already established pathways for neuron firing specific to each individual. These pathways, and the patterns they form, are the result of the individual's prior knowledge and experience with the action.<sup>41</sup> Generally, an individual's familiarity with the action corresponds to the rate and potency of neuron firing: the more familiar, the greater the rate and potency. But this does not account for why people pursue the unfamiliar; why they want to encounter the "blanks" so important to reception theorists; why they like to be surprised; why they want deviation from the commonplace patterns to their lives, whether at the simplest level, such as through humor (joking requires disruption of a recognized narrative or semiotic frame), or in potentially life-changing ways (new romance, travel to foreign cultures, etc.). If rate and potency of neuronal activity, but only according to the same patterns, corresponded with enjoyment, people would prefer regular, habitual engagement and experience. And some people do. However, as the overlapping research of several fields demonstrates, most people gravitate toward novelty and surprise.<sup>42</sup>

Computer scientists Laurent Itti and Pierre Baldi have developed a computational model for quantifying surprise based on the Bayesian principle that a state of knowledge reflects belief (formed through prior experiences). Their research shows that people both prefer surprising situations and that surprise facilitates adaptive learning:

The concept of surprise is central to sensory processing, adaptation, learning, and attention. Yet, no widely-accepted mathematical theory currently exists to quantitatively characterize surprise elicited by a stimulus or event, for observers that range from single neurons to complex natural or engineered systems. We describe a formal Bayesian definition of surprise that is the only consistent formulation under minimal axiomatic assumptions. Surprise quantifies how data affects a natural or artificial observer, by measuring the difference between posterior and prior beliefs of the observer. Using this framework we measure the extent to which humans direct their gaze towards surprising items while watching television and video games. We find that subjects are strongly attracted towards surprising locations, with 72% of all human gaze shifts directed towards locations more surprising than the average, a figure which rises to 84% when considering only gaze targets simultaneously selected by all subjects. The resulting theory of surprise is applicable across different spatio-temporal

scales, modalities, and levels of abstraction. . . . Life is full of surprises, ranging from a great christmas gift or a new magic trick, to wardrobe malfunctions, reckless drivers, terrorist attacks, and tsunami waves. Key to survival is our ability to rapidly attend to, identify, and learn from surprising events, to decide on present and future courses of action. (1)

According to Itti and Baldi, experiences of surprise are adaptive and advantageous. They teach people about situation coding, prediction error, and subjective recovery. Indeed, it is through experiences of surprise that people become equipped to deal with the unpredictable and changing world. But, surely, most people do not pursue surprises for these reasons, at least not intentionally. Typically, people feel exhilarated by surprise, and this is what motivates their novelty-seeking behavior. Great stories, whether told through prose, film or theater, always contain surprises, if not in the plot of the story itself, then as part of the language and structure of its expression. For a work in any of these creative media to be identified, for instance by readers or critics, as predictable is among the harshest of criticisms, right up there with, and usually connected to, unoriginal and boring. Not surprisingly, given the increasing interest in novelty-seeking behavior and surprise since the development of certain new technologies for the observation of brain activity (fMRI, PET, MEG), cognitive neuroscience offers valuable contributions to exploration of the exhilaration factor through its attempts to comprehend the neurochemistry involved.

Further to the adaptive function of surprise delineated by Itti and Baldi, Hongjoo Lee *et al.*, have discovered that “associative learning” accomplished through experiences of surprise releases dopamine. This means that people enjoy pleasurable euphoria (they “get high” as through drug use) as well as become smarter from experiences of surprise; or it is learning that induces pleasurable euphoria, and all learning involves an element of surprise:

Coding of prediction error by midbrain dopamine neurons has been examined extensively in the framework of associative learning theory. Most of this research has focused on the role of prediction error in determining the reinforcement value of unconditioned stimuli: poorly predicted (“surprising”) outcomes are more effective reinforcers and produce a greater dopamine response than well predicted outcomes. However, surprise also enhances attention to cues that signal poorly predicted outcomes. (1)

In terms of affinity with a premise to transversal theory, that people desire to undergo transversal movements (although they sometimes suffer from them), the scientific research we have been discussing suggests that people often expose themselves to stimuli with unfamiliar and unpredictable variables so that comings-to-be and transversality (continuous surprise) may occur. Whether this happens through encounters with “blanks,” meme transmission, mimicry, and/or neurological modeling, transversal movements are a primary outcome of novelty-seeking behavior and surprise, regardless of their duration. Moreover, because people can experience confusion, anxiety, and/or pleasure when neurons fire in drastically atypical or random ways, that is, when common thought patterns yaw or rupture, the quest for surprise can also be masochistic, cathartic, and ecstatic, a potentially monoamine-overload producing activity with a very appealing ratio of investment-to-pleasure: one only has to sit back and relax. Of course, thrill-seeking behavior (dangerous sports, illicit relationships, criminal activity, recreational drug use, etc.), might considerably up the ante, and certainly the risk of bodily harm to oneself and others increases even if neurochemical responses are similar while observing such behavior in others, whether virtually or actually.

Hence, despite the specific medium of expression (prose, film, theater, visual art) and genre frame (comedy, tragedy, history, romance, post-drama, abstract, impressionist, and so on), the experience of art is most enjoyed or disliked when it exceeds our expectations, when it is more of something – “worse,” “better,” or “weirder” – than anticipated. Such excessive experience is most likely to prompt subjunctivity, comings-to-be, and transversal movements. Of course, a production’s context and frame contribute directly to the construction of our expectations and the conditions for their failings or successes. For instance, when Shakespeareans attend a production of a Shakespeare play, their expectations are simultaneously very low and very high. They are low because most productions cannot “live up to” – that is, satisfy – the inflated neurochemical needs of the Shakespearean, the Shakespearean who has “seen that, done that,” and knows the texts “like the palm of her hand” and “better” than most people. Their expectations are also very high because they know all too well how wonderful they can feel if Shakespeare is “done right,” or better, if done in such a way that they will feel the exuberance of lightning-fast neuron firings down familiar routes. But even better, more excessive, would be if the neuron firing rocket-ships down familiar routes, but then deviates, fracturing, scattering, burning down untapped axons, overloading synapses, creating new

connections, establishing powerful memories, stimulating never before experienced or imagined neurochemical activity. In other words, like in much of human life, people expect to yawn, but hope to yaw, and when they yaw, they are exhilarated and elated. And if people yaw, I want to add, so that phenylethylamine lets loose a flood of the falling-in-love monoamines (dopamine, norepinephrine, and serotonin), they are also made vulnerable, moving transversally, becoming and coming-to-be alternative identities and things; they are magnificently, ecstatically alive at the heart of why we can't get enough of Shakespeare.

### No, it was the Devil, or worse

Just as this phenomenon is no secret to Shakespearians today, and the desire for surprise that motivates it may be no surprise (on some level) to everyone else, audiences of Shakespeare's plays in early modern England pursued "the yaw," or a particular kind of yaw, perhaps a secret yaw, no less diligently. This is a secret whose effects are the lifeblood of theater, and only the modes of theater and the drama (the scripts) from which it emerges that have persevered most powerfully across history and cultures can be said to contain the ingredients requisite to its manifestation. Early modern England's scholars of theater who were most aware of its influence were those most vehemently against the public theater. Although they could not name it, or were afraid to name it, these antitheatricalists—early modern reception theorists or empiricists—identified what I call the "ineffable sexiness" that can be so inescapably strong in theater, and is for Shakespearians so essential to Shakespeare's poetry—the Shakespearean G-spot—that they obsessively-compulsively, even co-dependently, maintain relationships with Shakespeare, and consequently live and die in Shakespace.

Three passages, which figure prominently in my early works on transversal poetics ("The Devil's House 'or worse'" and *Becoming Criminal*) and are commonly discussed in studies of sexual-gender issues in early modern England, significantly reflect the ineffable sexiness.<sup>43</sup> Specifically, my exploration of the implications to these passages on cognition, identity formation, and social performance was fundamental to my development of the transversal theory of subjectivity and subjects elaborated on throughout this book. Published over a thirty-two year period, the passages are from three representative antitheatricalist polemics: cultural chronicler Phillip Stubbes's *The Anatomie of Abuses* (1583), renowned Oxford scholar John Rainoldes's *Th' Overthrow of Stage-Playes* (1600), and Cambridge scholar John Greene's *A Refutation of the Apology for Actors* (1615). The remarkable similarity between the

passages of Stubbes and Greene, though Greene probably plagiarized from Stubbes, indicates the enduring topicality and pertinence of their assertions. Stubbes:

Then, these goodly pageants being done, euery mate sorts to his mate, euery one bringes another homeward of their way verye freendly, and in their secret conclaues (couertly) they play *the Sodomits*, or worse. And these be the fruits of plays and Enterluds for the most part. (144–5)<sup>44</sup>

For Rainoldes, stage-plays must be “cutt off” “sooner” than later because they are,

the means and occasions whereby men are transformed into dogges, the sooner, to cutt off all incitementes to that beastlie filthines, or rather more than beastlie. (11)

Greene:

Then these goodly pageants being done, euery one sorteth to his mate, each bring another home-ward of their way: then begin they to repeate the lasciuious acts and speeches they haue heard, and thereby infect their minde with wicked passions, so that in their secret conclaues they play the *Sodomite*, or worse. And these for the most part are the fruits of Plays. (61)

The “or worse” and “or rather more than beastlie,” allegedly produced by the *seeing*, *hearing*, and *feeling* of “lasciuious acts and speeches” that “infect their minde with wicked passions,” point to the dangerous possibility of other immoral, heretical, or supernatural opportunities, opportunities so reprehensible, scary, or otherworldly that they apparently could not be given a proper name.

In effect, the “or worse” and “or rather more than beastlie” signify one or more possible practices or identities alternative to those identifiable and namable, all of which are likely to be inspired by theater, whether as a result of memetic transmission, non-conscious mimicry, emotional contagion, neurochemical reactions, and/or something else. That something else is what I call transversal power: any force, whether physical, material, ideological, aesthetic, emotional, and/or conceptual, etc. that precipitates fugitive deviations from the norms and encodings of subjective and official territories and, by nature of the radicality to its interventions,

can generate subjectivities. For early modern England's antitheatricalists, that something else, perhaps ideologically *de facto vis-à-vis* its incomprehensibility or ineffability, is the Devil. John Greene's *A Refutation of the Apology for Actors* (1615), which rebuts playwright Thomas Heywood's *An Apology for Actors* (1612), is representative of this antitheatricalist position. Greene presents an amazing account of "a Christian woman [who] went into the Theater to behold the plaies":

She entered in well and sound, but she returned and came forth possessed of the Diuell. Wherevpon certaine Godly brethren demanded Sathan how he durst be so bould, as to enter into her a Christian. Whereto he answered, that *hee found her in his owne house*, and therefore took possession of her as his own. (44)

The "well and sound" Christian, exposed to a virulent iconoclastic force, was "enter[ed]" and "possessed of the Diuell." If the church is the house of God, the public theater is the Devil's "*owne house*": it's "Sathans Synagogue" (43). Like the Church, the Devil's theater has its pulpits, priests, ceremonies, and congregations. Greene insists, "God hath set his holy Word and Ministers to instruct vs in the way of Life: the Diuell instituted Plaies and Actors to seduce vs into the way of Death" (60).<sup>45</sup> Nevertheless, whatever the source of theater's transversal power, the theatrical experiences most focused on, which have been the most successfully marketed in theater from the Greeks to the present, as exemplified by the popularity of *Romeo and Juliet* across history and cultures, are those that are both erotic and invoke the mysterious sensations of fear and falling in love. The neurochemical conditions for fear and falling in love are remarkably similar: what fear lacks in oxytocin it makes up with adrenalin, and what falling in love lacks in adrenalin, it makes up with serotonin, another chemical that makes people feel good, and possibly crazy. Once eroticism infuses these conditions, the neurochemical dynamic becomes, as arousal increases, exponentially complex and exciting.

### Jonesing for transversality

I want to conclude this first Shakespearean excursion with another example from one of Shakespeare's most beloved and frequently produced plays, *Henry V*. Unlike the case of Romeo and Juliet's sudden falling in love, although more related to their subsequent downfall because their love exceeds the parameters of the official territory in which they live, this example perhaps penetrates further into the psychic source of people's quest for excess, if not to yaw, in ways that may have little to do with

surprise. Even though surprise is always excessive until posterior absorption through reconfiguration of consciousness occurs, excess does not always involve surprise, and may offer different or related explanations for Shakespeare's staying power. In our essay, "'A little touch of Harry in the night': Translucency and Projective Transversality in the Sexual and National Politics of *Henry V*,"<sup>46</sup> Donald Hedrick and I argue that Shakespeare's Princess Catherine potentially undermines King Henry's fantasized domination of her during sex by occupying antithetically the conceptual-emotional spacetime of Catherine's blindness by "winking" (5.2.262), which means by closing the eyes (OED). This opportunity is created in Henry's fantasy – that he shares with Burgundy – of Catherine closing her eyes during sex ("Yet they do wink and yield, as love is blind and enforces" [5.2.259]) so that he can enter her from behind ("and so I shall catch the fly, your cousin [Catherine], in the latter end, and she must be blind too" [5.2.270–1]). In the logic to which he imagines Catherine unawares and therefore accessible, Henry inadvertently makes room for Catherine, in her imagination because her eyes are closed, to disappear and thereby deceive Henry while sexually engaged with him.

From the perspective of Henry's fantasy, sex-without-seeing indicates a trajectory of male and national domination. But a transversal reading, focusing on winking, suggests a different possibility altogether, a key to the scene, if not to the entire play: by closing one's eyes, one can "disappear" the other, or even transform the other into someone or something else, an excessive inclusion fantastically implemented. Instead of transversality as a becomings-other of one's own subjectivity, becoming what one is not, transversality might be thought of in terms of transforming the other outside herself, a projective transversality which instigates comings-to-be, such as of the "or worse" and "or rather more than bestial," the unnamable. What Hedrick and I suggest is that transversality and translucency may act as mechanisms with an entirely different outcome or purpose for Catherine than for Henry in his performance of himself. Moreover, I want to suggest here that they serve us, the audience, differently as well. In Henry's fantasy of anal sex with Catherine, with Catherine capable of fantasizing about having sex or not with someone or something else (or others), we become aligned not with Henry, but with Catherine. Shakespeare creates a powerful counter-hegemonic gateway, indeed a mobile Iserian "blank," through which our own fantasies can be excited, exhilarated, manifested, and, perhaps most importantly, legitimated, sanctioned, even spiritualized insofar as they can be excessive without limits, because they are condoned in Shakespace. It is in these nitty-gritty nooks and crannies of perversity – the dramaturgical

“gaps” from which reception theorists normally shy away – that Shakespeare prepares for us what we perhaps know as Shakespeare’s greatest gift. But this gift comes not without cost. It is a gift that our Shakespeare-loving culture must keep unwrapping – in classroom after classroom, critical essay after critical essay, book after book, and performance after performance – for we depend on it for a certain “fix.”

### **Key twentieth-century contributions briefly continued: différance and the proper name**

We can only prohibit that which we can name.

George Steiner, *After Babel* (40)

Early modern England’s antitheatricalists eventually prohibited what they could not name, that is, what I call the transversal power of theater, and what for them fell under the equivocal categories of the “or worse” and “or rather more than beastlie,” the ultimately unspeakable and unnamable. Although they were unable to name it, as noted above, they did decide, conveniently, on a name for its source, the Devil, with the public theater being “Sathans Synagogue.” This familiar referent made the mysterious identifiable and gave them the justification for closing the public theaters from 1642 to 1660, while their political party maintained control of the realm. We have seen that the relationship between subjective affects, like Shakespeare’s ineffable sexiness, and people’s ability to successfully articulate the phenomena through language, often endeavored via employment of a proper name that makes the name bearer – the thing – a subject of discourse, has been a primary concern of phenomenological hermeneutics, and especially of the Geneva School, inasmuch as a particular author (known by name) is identified as possessing the consciousness the reader aspires to converge with, share or co-inhabit. But this relationship, and the utility to naming, has not been a primary concern of twentieth-century literary criticism in general insofar as authorial intentions and affective responses have been deemphasized in the pursuit of meaning, such as by the New Critics, but even more radically by structuralists, whose influence has spanned a number of disciplines, including literary studies, history, cultural anthropology, linguistics, and sociology.

Although their analyses of sociocultural systems and structures are often implicit or explicit in political inflection, structuralists typically share the New Critics’ disinterest in the material conditions under which art and literature are produced and consumed, but are paradoxically

both more anti-humanist/essentialist and more interested in sociocultural determinants (in terms of semiotics rather than material means of production) than are the New Critics. Unlike the New Critics, structuralists insist that art and literature can only be properly understood as reflecting the communication and meaning-making systems of culture, and not the consciousness, intentions, sensibilities, or beliefs of individual authors. This is because art and literature are collectively produced, products of culture and society, and not the creative, willful expressions of nameable individuals (authors, designers, etc.). Like New Critics, however, structuralists perform “close-readings” of texts that involve comparing and contrasting linguistic, rhetorical, and poetic elements. But structuralism takes the interpretive enterprise much “deeper” and broader, especially as it “contextualizes” synchronically (but rarely also diachronically) and often relationally across cultures as well as within a given culture. This can be explained best in comparison with reception theory, which was developmentally contemporaneous to structuralism and comparably influential.

Whereas reception theory addresses issues of articulation in the tradition of phenomenological hermeneutics, in which experiences abstractly cognized – for instance, intersubjectivity or comings-to-be-one with an author – are perfectly viable for legitimate interpretation, structuralism pursues explanation in terms of patterns, frameworks, and systems of rules and codes. For instance, unlike approaches that consider literature a medium for communication between authors and readers, structuralists would locate Shakespeare’s ineffable sexiness as a byproduct of an underlying relational system of cultural semiotic coding that Shakespeare’s poetry manipulates to significant effect. The author, or “subject,” is simply a constructed medium, a product of sociopolitical conduction, through which cultural grammar embroiders a text; and the ideal reader is an impersonal, non-affected decipherer of a text’s codes and deep, rather than immediate, structures. As Husserl maintains that we must “bracket” objective reality in order to better access the consciousness that relates to it, structuralists bracket off the referent from its signifier to better access the ideational foundations behind it; what is “obvious” invariably has a more profound register, such as in a narrative (a description of person drinking water may have more to do with an idea of removing fluid from the universe in the interest of solidifying meaning than with quenching that person’s thirst) or in a simple referential construction (the assembly of letters “tree,” which on the surface indicate plant with wooden trunk and branches, may tell us more about the cultural significance of the utterance “me” with which it rhymes). Structuralists

analyze the structure to the signifier itself, which is arbitrary, in comparison with other signifiers and the codes that guide their meanings. The sources of the codes and structures are integral to the culture and society that produces the text, and so the structuralist reader analyzes the text in light of these codes and structures, but also disinters the underlying sociocultural network of codes and structures through the text.

Thus, like literary texts, which are never merely the expressions of people through written language, meaning (of a text, for instance) is always a matter of differential relations between codes within a system of signification by which definitions are determined. Further to the point, meaning is a construct of sociocultural context just like a person, what structuralists refer to as the “subject.” For structuralists, subjects, subjectivity, and the relationally determined behavior of subjects are epiphenomena, the exterior, non-determinant manifestation of underlying structures. Just as it makes no sense, according to structuralism, to speak of an author’s agency in relationship to the content and function of literature, it is the same for the concept of “self”; this is never the willful product of an individual or subject. Not only is agency, as experienced, a linguistic construct, but the thing itself – “agency” – is a fictive product of clever linguistic relations. We might ask, if authors, like meaning, are merely culturally constructed, and their expressions merely effects of a culture’s semiotic-semantic system, and even their proper names are arbitrarily established, who is responsible for their actions, and how might this person, people, or culture be identified?

Structuralism’s roots are in the early twentieth-century linguistic theory of Ferdinand de Saussure, anthropological works of Claude Lévi-Strauss, and cultural semiotics of Roland Barthes.<sup>47</sup> Its continued popularity from the 1960s into the 1980s can be credited to, among others, Jonathan Culler, Roman Jakobson, Gerald Prince, Yuri Lotman, Samuel Levin, Robert Scholes, and Michael Riffaterre.<sup>48</sup> The increasing popularity and dissemination of reception theory in the 1960s and 1970s happened alongside the emergence and growth of structuralism and semiotics until a new movement, poststructuralism, significantly derailed both. Although varied in its manifestations, a specific mode of poststructuralism, deconstruction, accumulated a large number of influential proponents as it came to pervade literary-critical discourse by the mid-1970s and into 1980s. Influential deconstructionist critics include its founder, Jacques Derrida, and Harold Bloom, Eugenio Donato, Paul de Man, Geoffrey Hartman, J. Hillis Miller, and Joseph Riddel.<sup>49</sup> During the mid and later 1970s, a group of younger critics emerged on the scene, including Shoshana Felman, Barbara Johnson, Jeffrey Mehlman, and

Gayatri Spivak.<sup>50</sup> The key player throughout its ascent to prominence has been Derrida, and it is his discussion of the proper name in the 1980s that I am most concerned with here; specifically, I want to consider the phenomenological, hermeneutic, and ethical relationships between the concepts of the proper name and the subject. But first it is important to provide context for this issue.

In 1966, Derrida delivered a sharp critique of structuralism at a conference dedicated to structuralism at Johns Hopkins University. His purpose was to debunk or “decenter” core-underlying principles of structuralism. The following year, in France, he published three decisive books, *Of Grammatology*, *Speech and Phenomena*, and *Writing and Difference*, the last of which includes a version of the lecture he presented at Johns Hopkins.<sup>51</sup> In the United States, however, deconstruction did not take off until the 1970s due to the unavailability of translations of Derrida’s written work. By the 1980s, deconstruction’s influence could be seen, significantly, across a number of fields, including literary studies, politics, theology, and pedagogy.<sup>52</sup>

According to Derrida, the Western philosophical, literary-critical, and linguistic traditions have been dominated by *logos*, or presence, and thus a logocentric system of thought, whereby speech is the exterior, extension of thought, and writing a further extension of the same (see Chapter 5 on *logos*). In effect of its immediacy, speech has been privileged over writing, with writing seen as a representation of speech that is external to it; the phonocentrism contributing directly to the logocentrism. In other words, according to the discourses Derrida identifies as logocentric, speech has stronger affective presence, is a more convincing mode of meaning-making; possibly because of the liveness to its performance, it enables more opportunities for improvisation in direct response to changing conditions of reception. In contrast, writing has less affective presence because the conditions to its expression and reception, especially with regard to the distance between author and reader, is usually more tenuous, more remote, delayed by time and space. Nevertheless, for Derrida, this is actually a false distinction: speech and writing can be more, less, or mutually interior and exterior to each other because meaning, whether articulated through speech or writing, is always indeterminate, subject to the “play” of disparities. People “agree” on meaning through a slippery process of deferral and difference, concepts he combines into his famous coinage, “différance”: as Derrida puts it, “What we note as ‘différance’ will thus be the movement of play that ‘produces’ (and not by something that is simply an activity) these differences, these effects of difference” (*Speech and Phenomena* 141).

Therefore, unlike in Saussurean linguistics, where meaning is determined relationally and through negation (we know that the word “tree” refers to a type of plant because it does not refer to a cat, dog, car, and so on), for Derrida the defining process is intrinsically indefinite inasmuch as there is always interpretive play (also referred to as “space”) through which alternative significations and meanings are disseminated; this is the case for differences between both phonetic and written signifiers. Thus, within a given semiotic-semantic system, people are only able to decide (to agree), and only ever temporally, on the relationship between signifier and signified through the assertion of an overarching, grounding, indeed centering referent, what he calls a “transcendental signified,” which is usually taken for granted and implicit within societies and cultures because it is inculcated and naturalized through socialization. Common examples of such signifieds are ideas of an omniscient or omnipotent beings (like gods), determination (like biological determinism: “anatomy is destiny”), predestination (as in Calvinism), historical *telos* (as in Hegelianism and Marxism), or purpose (as in capitalism, the educational industry, or missionary work). Moreover, following Derrida’s logic, the author of a text or a performance, if authors are believed to be autonomous, self-conscious individuals or coherent subjects with identifiable intentions or free will, can also function as a transcendental or grounding signified under certain conditions, such as in discourse on artistic expression, within literary analysis, and in a court of law. Generally speaking, for Derrida, the author or “subject,” while often a meaning-giving entity under these conditions, is nonetheless just one of many structural elements within a logocentric system.

According to Derrida, transcendental signifieds work to center discourse and interpretive play, providing a sense of cogency to semiotic, philosophical, or political (logocentric) systems, but they are only ever provisional, like all meanings. This is because the transcendental signified is itself a construct, and therefore replaceable by another one, through a process of “supplementarity”: each system, or structure, depends on an operative, conceptual/definitional center through which it is apparently grounded, but the center is only a supplement, itself constructed on the premises of other structures, which are themselves equally dependent on supplements. In this paradigm, there is no pure or absolute presence. There are only assertions of presence – continuums of supplements – predicated on “traces” of the alleged origin to that given “presence.” Hence, as an alternative to philosophy and critical theories and methodologies based on what Derrida famously – and ironically – calls the “metaphysics of presence” (*Of Grammatology* 49),

his deconstructionist approach focuses on absent presences, the traces, since the underlying process of differences and deferrals that are typically employed to assert meaning are never fully present to us. Instead, this process is always absent, identifiable through traces, leaving an ineluctable space for play and consequently an undecidable, unresolvable, plurality of possible interpretations. In short, there are no past, present, or future concrete structures, whether textual, ideational, or subjective, to which we can turn for articulatable, interpretive stability or absolute meaning; all semiotic-semantic structures are constructed such that when put under the pressure of deconstructive analysis they come apart, or rather, work to take themselves apart.

So far, I have summarized Derrida's intervention with regard to structuralism and other theories he considers logocentric, phenomenological hermeneutics being among them. At this point, I want to turn to implications of deconstruction on our understanding of subjectivity and consciousness, which are also primary concerns of phenomenological hermeneutics, especially in reception theory and aesthetics, as a means by which to contextualize further and more specifically my subsequent discussion of the proper name (see Chapter 3 for discussion on the proper name and cartography). Derrida's response to Husserl's phenomenology, in particular, is the launch pad from which his critique of structuralism evolves, but it also constitutes crucial subject matter to which his theorization of the proper name in many ways importantly returns as his own critical response to his earlier work. I want to highlight an influential juncture in a trajectory of Derrida's work that exemplifies his own reflexive-consciousness *vis-à-vis* certain ethical reflections with regard to his roles as a philosopher and educator.

For Husserl, as discussed above, consciousness requires the presence of an object, even if that object exists only in the mind, whether a product of imagination or hallucination; in other words, the existence of the material object in the world, outside of consciousness itself, is not essential or necessary to the presence of the object in consciousness; it does not need to be empirically identifiable. To be conscious, one must be conscious of something (an image, idea – an object); it is one's intentional stance towards this object-of-consciousness through which consciousness constitutes itself relationally in the process of making the object present in consciousness. To "get at" our pure consciousness, we must "bracket out" our assumptions and dependence on empirical evidence for reality (the realm of tangible objects) so that we can understand that the only "real" objects are those present to consciousness, within consciousness, despite the existence of objects

outside of consciousness, such as in everyday communication or simply in the world. In substantiation of this phenomenon, Husserl identifies two modes of articulation: (1) "expression," which enables direct access to the object-of-consciousness since it is present to consciousness without mediation (such as through language); and (2) "indication," which refers to an object different from itself, as a signifier indicates a signified. The latter amounts to a substitution of the former, since expression refers to that present object-of-consciousness that is inaccessible in its pure form outside of consciousness because it is always absent to someone else; it is impossible to articulate the object-of-consciousness purely and thus it can only be referred to, that is, indicated through the language used to represent it. Hence, for Husserl, all language is indicative, and works by substitution, because it can only ever approximate through representation the pure idea or object present in consciousness. The expressive mode of communication occurs within consciousness; it is speaking to oneself not with words, but through imagination of them, as they surface in response to intentional acts of consciousness toward its given objects (images, ideas).

For Derrida, the problem lies not just in the logocentrism of Husserl's philosophy, but especially in the distinction between the expressive and indicative modes. He argues that imagining words is the same as using them, therefore there is no difference between the modes; they are both languages, both indicative, and both based, ultimately, on absence, a trace, of what they refer and do not refer to. In this respect, there can never be a pure relationship between consciousness and its object insofar as expression is repeatable, when imagined words are reused, drawn from the imaginary dictionary. The relationship is always contaminated by what are not there, the traces of its origins, the similarities with and differences from the words or symbols not chosen. This follows the logic outlined above, by which definition or agreement is provisionally reached through a relational, combinatory process of difference and deferral, with all the associations informing the process, both residual and persistent in the continuous play-space of signification. When this concept is extended to all meaning, as Derrida implies, there can be not only no determinate or absolute meaning, but also no presence of an object without traces of absence, and therefore no purely positive presence, consciousness, or being. As Derrida puts it,

The unheard difference between the appearing and the appearance [*l'apparaissant et l'apparaître*] (between the "world" and "lived experience") is the condition of all other differences, of all other

traces, and it is already a trace. . . . The trace is in fact the absolute origin of sense in general. Which amounts to saying once again that there is no absolute origin of sense in general. The trace is the difference which opens appearance [*l'apparaître*] and signification. Articulating the living upon the nonliving in general, origin of all repetition, origin of ideality, the trace is not more ideal than real, not more intelligible than sensible, not more a transparent signification than an opaque energy and no concept of metaphysics can describe it. (*Of Grammatology* 65)

The traces that the differences between objects, signs, images, etc. constitute reveal the spaces between the differences, what allows for the play. For Derrida, it is precisely these spaces that Husserl's phenomenology cannot account for and that comprise the conditions for presence through absence; they are the nothings from which somethings arise, by which objects, via indication, become present to consciousness, and thus subjectivity establishes in relation to or in effect of reference and representation.

In an important discussion of Derrida's understanding of the proper name in light of the controversy around his introductory text, titled "Racism's Last Word," for an exhibition held in 1983 by the Association of Artists of the World against Apartheid, David Schalkwyk, in passing, succinctly brings this intervention of Derrida's to bear on the concept of subjectivity:

This spacing, which is both a certain spatial *distance* and a temporal *process* informing both signs and experience, is what necessarily splits the interior of consciousness by an exteriority, and ensures that subjectivity is itself constituted through representation. This is because (1) language as spacing always pre-exists any individual speaker, and (2) spacing – being absolutely prior to all distinctions whatsoever – cannot be an object of consciousness. Consequently, no activity of consciousness can occur prior to its effects or command it. (74–5)

It is precisely this concept of spacing, as Schalkwyk points out, that has been often overlooked or misunderstood both by people who have adopted Derrida's theories and methodologies and by people who have responded critically to them with accusations of sophistry or nihilism, that is, that for Derrida nothing (no subject) can matter – everything is meaningless – because nothing (no meaning) is sustainable: we endlessly spin in a progressive quagmire of deferral and difference. The confusion around Derrida's concepts of spacing and *différance*, however, seems to

be symptomatic of the concepts themselves, his meanings slipping into the indeterminacy but also the potentialities they describe and advance. Nevertheless, there is another apparently problematic aspect to his use of these concepts in his critique of Husserl's phenomenology: according to Derrida, "'Différance' is the nonfull, nonsimple 'origin'; it is the structured and differing origin of differences" (*Speech and Phenomena* 141) and "*Spacing* designates *nothing*, nothing that is, no presence at a distance; it is the index of an irreducible exterior, and at the same time of a *movement*, a displacement that indicates an irreducible alterity" (*Positions* 81). The problematic aspect, reflected in these passages, to which I am referring, is that Derrida wants to have it both ways, absence/trace on the one hand, and originary/irreducible quality on the other hand; in other words, his term, "metaphysics of presence," might aptly apply to his own approach. Nevertheless, I am far from the first person to recognize this, and I have nothing new to add to Jean-Louis Houdebine's astute treatment of it in a 1971 issue of *diacritics*.<sup>53</sup> Instead, my purpose here is to connect this fugitive element, this trace, common in discourses on Derrida and deconstruction, to Derrida's position on the proper name, especially as articulated in his response to the critique of his consideration of the word *apartheid* as a proper name.

When Derrida asserted, in a non-characteristically deconstructionist move, that the word *apartheid* can forever and uniquely serve, because of its nature as "untranslatable idiom" and "singularity" (there are no equivalences), the combined purpose of protesting against and remembering racism ("Racism's Last Word" 292–3), Anne McClintock and Rob Nixon accused him, in light of his theory of *différance*, of reducing real historical atrocity to mere play in language, in effect reifying the word *apartheid* with "spurious autonomy and agency" (140). Rather than repeat the debate here,<sup>54</sup> I turn to Derrida's cogent response:

Historical reality, dear comrades is that in spite of all the lexicological contortions you point out, those in power in South Africa have not managed to convince the world [that *apartheid* is "separate development" or "plural democracy"], and first of all because, still today, they have refused to change the real, effective, fundamental meaning of their watchword: *apartheid*. . . . The South Africans in power wanted to keep the concept and the reality while effacing the word, an evil word, *their* word. They have managed to do so in *their* official discourse, that's all. Everywhere else in the world, and first of all among black South Africans, people have continued to think the word was indissolubly – and legitimately – welded to the concept and the reality.

And if you're going to struggle against this *historical* reality, well, then you've got to call a thing by its name." ("But, beyond" 163)

Derrida's commitment, under certain circumstances, to calling "a thing by its name," might seem, at first glance, to contradict the main tenets of deconstruction. This is why his detractors were unable to comprehend the explicitly stated gist to his account of the word *apartheid* in "Racism's Last Word." The circumstances for declaring such an appellation, for Derrida, are both ethical and extreme, in this case because of "a violent arrest of the mark" ("Racism's Last Word" 292); as he explains in his response to McClintock and Nixon:

It was not a thesis on the genealogy of the word but an appeal, a call to action, as you put it, and first of all an ethical appeal, as indicated by that which, in both ethics and politics, passes by way of memory and promising, and thus by way of language and denomination. Besides (and here I am speaking as a historian, that is, in the *indicative*), whatever efforts the ideologues and official representatives of South Africa may have made to efface this embarrassing word from *their* discourse, whatever efforts *you* may make to keep track of their efforts, the failure is not in doubt and historians can attest to it: the word *apartheid* remains and, as I hope or expect, it will remain the "unique appellation" of this monstrous, unique, and unambiguous thing. ("But, beyond" 159)

Derrida also emphasizes that such assertions of proper names (unique appellations), "in politics," is what sociopolitical conductors do all the time to assert their ideology and consolidate their power: "a 'watchword' is not limited to a lexicon" ("But, beyond" 163). It is precisely this employment and reliance, especially within the logocentrism of Western culture, that deconstruction works to unhinge. This awareness on the part of Derrida takes on particular purport through his exploration of the proper name in relation to Shakespeare's play *Romeo and Juliet* that extends well beyond its focus.

In this exploration, Derrida theorizes how the proper name, when assigned to people, functions to consolidate, in terms similar to that of sociopolitical conductors generally, the subjective territories of individuals within a given society, that is, within an official culture, in this case that of the patriarchal state of Verona: "The terrible lucidity of Juliet. She knows the two bonds of the law, the *double bind*, which ties a son to the name of his father" ("Aphorism Countertime" 430). Derrida's focus

is what he refers to as Juliet's "analysis" of Romeo's proper name as the singular and "inhuman" obstacle standing between her and the person she loves:

Romeo, Romeo, wherefore art thou Romeo?  
Deny thy father and refuse thy name. . .  
"Tis but thy name that is my enemy:  
Thou art thyself, though not a Montague.  
What's a Montague? It is nor hand nor foot  
Nor arm nor face nor any other part  
Belonging to a man. O be some other name.  
What's in a name? That which we call a rose  
By any other word would smell as sweet;  
So Romeo would were he not Romeo call'd,  
Retain that dear perfection which he owes  
Without that title. Romeo, doff thy name,  
And for thy name, which is no part of thee,  
Take all myself. (2.2.33–49)

According to Derrida,

This analysis is implacable for it announces or denounces the inhumanity or ahumanity of the name. A proper name does not name anything which is human, which belongs to the human body, a human spirit, an essence of man. And yet this relation to the inhuman only befalls man, for him, to him, in the name of man. He alone gives himself this inhuman name. And Romeo would not be what he is, a stranger to his name, without his name. Juliet, then, pursues her analysis: the names of things do not belong to the things any more than the names of men belong to men, and yet they are quite differently separable. ("Aphorism Countertime" 427)

Through her analysis, Juliet discovers that while Romeo's name is not an inherent property of its bearer ("It is nor hand nor foot / Nor arm nor face nor any other part / Belonging to a man"), it is impossible for him to "doff" it. Schalkwyk sums up Juliet's discovery: "One can call (to) someone in his absence only because the name is not a part of him. On the other hand, that one can call to *him* is an indication of the inseparability of his name from himself – not his hand or foot or face, but as a social human being" (99). Social humans, as members of a society, are named, and Romeo's name, "Romeo Montague," is integral to the subjective

territory prescribed for him by society through his father and made absolute in his title. Put differently, this is an example of what Louis Althusser describes as interpellation, the process of identification by which an individual is made a “concrete subject” of ideology, in this case Romeo is subjectified by Verona’s official society and ideology (174–5). He cannot escape his name, even while, as Derrida puts it, he is “a stranger to his name”: whereas, “A rose remains what it is without its name, Romeo is no longer what he is without his name” (“Aphorism Countertime” 427). This idea is exemplified in the play itself, at its conclusion, when Romeo’s father promises to memorialize Juliet: “For I will raise her statue in pure gold, / That whiles Verona by that name is known, / There shall no figure at such rate be set / As that of true and faithful Juliet” (5.3.297–301). In name, as a singularity that remains in history, despite Juliet’s death, Juliet lives on.

Of paramount importance here, for the purposes of this book, is the relationship between the name, as indicator of subjectivation, and the possibility, if not the inevitability, of one’s estrangement from it, that is, through emergences of subjectivity and intersubjectivity, the kinds of which ride on the waves of the transversality of love. These emergences can become symptomatic in ways associated with Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, manifest in dissidence and suicide, or develop into sustainable joy or ecstasy, and so on. Neither Romeo nor Juliet can adhere, respectively, to his or her subjective territory, the singularity within it inseparable from his or her name, because “Romeo and Juliet,” the bi-univocal (two-into-one) love-driven assemblage, the articulatory formation they are together in Shakespace, what Janna Segal and I have termed “R&Jspace,”<sup>55</sup> must transcend or reconfigure state machinery to survive within the world of the play and beyond. On this point, with regard to Romeo, Derrida explains:

He can only live if he asserts himself in a singular fashion, without his inherited name. But the writing of his name, which he has not written himself (“Had I it written, I would tear the word” [2.2.57]), constitutes him in his very being, without naming anything of him, and by denying it he can only wipe himself out. In sum, at the very most he can deny it, renounce it, he can neither efface it nor tear it up. (“Aphorism Countertime” 430)

In this early modern English example, the text of *Romeo and Juliet*, we have seen an awareness of logocentrism, but also of Derrida’s notion of “absent presences” (Juliet’s invocation of Romeo in his absence,

articulated in his name); awareness of societal investment in names and their practical relationship to the establishment and maintenance of subjective territories, but also of the subjective affects for which names can be facilitating as well as delimiting (Romeo can “neither efface” his name “nor tear it up” because it is a property imposed on him, preceding him, and signifying in spite of him); and, perhaps most significantly, we have seen in Juliet’s analysis not just such areas of awareness, but also, when the above points are combined, a phenomenologically inflected theory of signification with regard to the function of the name.

In an interview with Derrida, about Derrida’s reading of *Romeo and Juliet*, Derek Attridge asks, “Does a literary work as historically and culturally distant as this one pose any problems for your reading of it?” (“Interview” 62). To which Derrida responds, “Yes,” and states: “It would be necessary to reconstitute in the most informed and intelligible way, if necessary against the usual history of the historians, the historical element in a play like this,” that historical element being, in this case, the proper name (“Interview” 63). He continues: “I wanted to say that *Romeo and Juliet* is not the only example but that it’s a very good example. . . . And what goes for one work, one proper name, evidently goes for any work, in other words for any singularity and any proper name” (“Interview” 65). In the next and final section to this chapter, George Light and I pursue the historical reading Derrida requests. In doing so, as suggested by Juliet, we hope to show that certain signature theoretical contributions of structuralism and poststructuralism have definite precursors in the early modern English understanding of the proper name with regard to both semiotic-semantic systems and subject formation. Moreover, another aim of this final section is to establish more explicitly the historical trajectory of this book, which moves investigative-expansively between the premodern and the modern to graph the various lines of critical inquiry into subjects, subjectivity, and subject matters that inform the transversal theory and research methodologies demonstrated throughout its pages.

## Shakespearean excursion II: what’s in a name?

The survival of a theatrical work implies that, theatrically, it is saying something about theater itself, about its essential possibility. And that it does so, theatrically, then, through the play of uniqueness and repetition, by giving rise every time to the chance of an absolutely singular event as it does to the untranslatable idiom of a proper name,

to its fatality (the “enemy” that “I hate”), to the fatality of the date and of a rendezvous [as in *Romeo and Juliet*].”

Derrida, “Aphorism Countertime” (419)

Shakespeare’s second historical tetralogy (*1 Henry IV*, *2 Henry IV*, *Henry V*, and *Richard II*) provides a “legitimate” touchstone – “legitimate” within a number of interpretive communities because it comes from Shakespeare – for discussions of sociopolitical division and hierarchy in Western history. This is exemplified from the tetralogy’s inauspicious beginnings in a royal deposition and its muddled but programmatic nationalism that starts with John of Gaunt’s “this England” yet concludes with Henry V’s reconstituted, polyvocal Anglo-Norman empire to *1 Henry IV*’s class boundaries apparently dissipated in the Boar’s Head Tavern. In this section, with an investigation of sociopolitical structuring, we want to examine that singular element which lies behind the snobbery of the titled, their proper names, although here we focus on Christian names rather than family or geographical appellations because they are typically employed, and more importantly, often strategically *deployed*, independently of surnames in everyday social situations. Specifically, we examine how Hal’s obsession with getting his name “right,” calculated through his reflexive-consciousness with regard to his own sociopolitical positioning and aspirations, depicts clearly early modern concerns about order and degree, and implicitly conveys an understanding of the relationship between subjectivation and social identity that is fugitive and potentially transversal through deployments of the proper name.<sup>56</sup>

### **The man who knew too much: the name of the game**

Better to rule than be ruled by the route.

William Camden, *Remains* (304)

In *1 Henry IV*, Hal proposes a leadership based upon his familiarity with both the proper “Christian names” of commoners and mastery of tavern language and performance:

Sirrah, I am a sworn brother to a  
 leash of drawers, and can call them all by their Christian  
 names, as Tom, Dick, and Francis. They take it already  
 upon their salvation that, though I be but Prince of  
 Wales, yet I am king of courtesy, and tell me flatly I

am no proud Jack like Falstaff, . . .  
 when I am king of England I shall command all the good  
 lads in Eastcheap. (*1 Henry IV* 2.4.6–14)

In this passage, our princely sociologist reinscribes the same problematic that Derrida in his 1966 Johns Hopkins lecture, “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” locates in Lévi-Strauss’s “double intention: to preserve as an instrument something whose truth value he criticizes” (284), pointing out that what Lévi-Strauss terms “*bricolage*” – “the continual reconstruction from the same materials, [in which] it is always earlier ends which are called upon to play the part of means: the signified changes into the signifying and vice versa” (Lévi-Strauss 21) – is after all a “mythopoetical virtue”: “In effect, what appears most fascinating in this critical search for a new status of discourse is a stated abandonment of all reference to a *center*, to a *subject*, to a privileged *reference*, to an origin, or to an absolute *archia*” (Derrida, “Structure” 286). In other words, Hal may not favor the drawers’ mode of existence, but, with wherewithal at social performance akin to Lévi-Strauss’s “*bricoleur*” (“someone who works with his hands and uses devious means compared to those of a craftsman” [16]), he recognizes its instrumentality as a means by which to consolidate his “command.” One of the ironies of the passage is that Hal’s cronies fail to understand the tension between play and language: that Hal is the true proud fellow and Falstaff simply plays at his pretentiousness; Jack is merely an egotist, the Prince an egotist. At Eastcheap, Hal boasts of his assimilation in a statement whose ulterior purpose is to proudly confess – for the more savvy audiences on and off the stage – his becomings-bricoleur: “To conclude, I am so good a proficient in one quarter of an hour that I can drink with any tinker in his own language during my life” (2.4.16–18). In his rejection of Falstaff, he claims to have changed: “Presume not that I am the thing I was; / For God doth know, so shall the world perceive, / That I have turn’d away my former self” (*2 Henry IV* 5.5.56–8); and yet as king in moments of need he will resort to his old alehouse habits of playacting in a disguise and mingling with the common soldiers, where he wryly asserts, “I think the king is but a man. . . . His ceremonies laid by, in his nakedness he appears but a man” (*Henry V* 4.1.99–103). The legal ceremonies at the end of *2 Henry IV* may require the banishment of indecorous individuals, but, as Hal knows too well, the potential leavening qualities of popular culture have much use-value: the Boar’s Head Tavern is not closed.

Nevertheless, with the crown nearer to his head, Hal becomes wary of his personal associations with this tavern world:

PRINCE: Before God I am exceeding weary.

POINS: Is't come to that? I had thought weariness durst  
not have attached one of so high blood.

PRINCE: Faith it does me, though it discolours the  
complexion of my greatness to acknowledge it. Doth it  
not show vilely in me to desire small beer? (*2 Henry IV* 2.2.1–6)

Hal parrots the class arrogance expressed by Queen Isabel about his own father in *Richard II*, where Bolingbroke becomes “an alehouse guest” as contrasted to Richard’s “most beauteous inn” (5.1.13–15).<sup>57</sup> These fears represent the “populist energy” that Leonard Tennenhouse notes when claiming that “the various confrontations between licit and illicit authority comprising the *Henriad* more firmly draw the distinction between aristocracy and populace even as they appear to overturn this primary categorical distinction” (83). Yet, a notorious commoner trumps Hal in this respect. In *2 Henry VI*, Jack Cade, parodying Thomas More’s *Utopia*, states,

your captain is brave, and vows  
reformation. There shall be in England seven half-  
penny loaves sold for a penny; the three-hoop’d pot  
shall have ten hoops; and I will make it a felony to  
drink small beer. All the realm shall be in common,  
and in Cheapside shall my palfrey go to grass and  
when I am king, as king I will be. (4.2.61–7)

Cade despises the common touch that demarcates his role in the social order, seeking rather to ascend to the monarchy. Conversely, Hal despises the common touch that makes his success possible. Thus, his clever turn of phrase, “Tom, Dick, and Francis,” attempts to place his own base-ness as a common Harry under erasure, perhaps explaining the unusual diminutive Hal as well (*1 Henry IV* 2.4.8).<sup>58</sup> Ironically this forced familiarity also marks his role as an upper class gallant, for Thomas Dekker proposes in his self-help book for gallants, *The Gvl’s Horne-booke*, that the “first compliment” of a gallant in a tavern “shall be to grow most inwardly acquainted with the drawers, to learn their names, as Iack, and

Will, and Tom" (33). Having demonstrated that Hal is concerned with his position in the social hierarchy, we want to investigate further to what end Hal reconstitutes the familiar proverb "Tom, Dick, and Harry" as "Tom, Dick, and Francis." Or to frame the issue as a question, just what is Hal's trouble with being Harry?

### Notorious: the game of the name

HENRY, ger. in Latine *Henricus*. A name so famous since the yeare 920, when *Henry* the first was Emperour, that there have beene 7 Emperours, 8 Kings of *England*, 4 Kings of *France*, as many of *Spaine* of that name. . . . Howsoever it hath been an ominous good name in all respects of signification.

Camden, *Remains* (56–7)

Throughout the second tetralogy, the character who would become Henry V is called at least three different proper names: Henry, the familiar Harry, and the diminutive Hal.<sup>59</sup> He is alluded to in *Richard II* but not mentioned by name. In *1 Henry IV*, he is called Hal 37 times and in *2 Henry IV* so named 5 times; the appellation does not appear in *Henry V*. Hence, Kristen Poole is not precisely correct in stating that "it is only through Falstaff that the audience comes to know the prince familiarly as 'Hal'" (70); however, the only people who call him Hal are Falstaff and his cronies, specifically Poins (*1 Henry IV* 2.2.106; 2.4.3).<sup>60</sup> By having Falstaff use both Hal and Harry, Shakespeare seems to be making a point about the social distinctions and implications informing each sobriquet. Falstaff calls his lordship Hal 40 times and Harry 8 times. In *1 Henry IV*, Falstaff's choice of Harry cluster around the lines in 2.4 where he and Henry alternatively play king and prince, that is King Henry says Harry and so too does Falstaff in playing the role (378–463); just prior to this banter, Falstaff calls the prince Hal (354), and he almost immediately returns to it after the "scene" ends (473). Moreover, only when Hal is on the verge of being crowned Henry V does Falstaff really dub him "Prince Harry" twice (*2 Henry IV* 4.3.115–16; 5.1.76). After the coronation, Falstaff reverts to his waggish ways, calling the new sovereign "thy grace, King Hal, my royal Hal!" (5.5.41); given Hal's obsession with the power of proper naming to demarcate a subject, this affront to the royal dignity alone might be enough to garner banishment. Throughout the entire second tetralogy, the more common appellation for Henry actually is Harry: 60 citations to 42. Only the "vulgar company" use Hal (*1 Henry IV* 3.2.41).

In substituting Francis for Harry in the proverb, "Tom, Dick, and Harry" (Apperson, 637), Hal clearly intends to deny the commonness

associated with his name, the metaphysical meanness, as evidenced by his taste for “small beer,” from which he fears to suffer. In *1 Henry IV*, Hal only speaks the name Harry once when role-playing his father at the Boar’s Head (2.4.424). In *2 Henry VI*, Hal speaks the name once when reading a letter from Falstaff (2.2.114), but takes it up wholeheartedly only in his first public appearance as Harry the Fifth in order to claim his patrimonial right to the throne through patronymical relations (5.2.49 ff.). As a divine right monarch assured of his special status, Henry V finally accepts Harry for its hegemonic power over the common people, especially after he returns Harry (Henri) to its etymological roots in Normandy on the eve of St. Crispin’s Day: “Cry, ‘God for Harry! England and St. George!’” (*Henry V* 3.1.34). Here, he summons the troops to interpellate him as Harry in reverse Althusserian terms, reverse because it is the authority requiring the hailing of him by subjects and not the other way around. This confirms their subjectivation and affirms his subject position and affective presence. One irony, however, of the young and future Henry V’s earlier denial of Harry is that what is now considered to be the familiar or a “mere pet-form of *Henry*” was “the usual English form of the name until the 17th c,” as the French *Henri* “in English pronunciation became *Henry* or *Harry*” (Withycombe 149). This is a matter of pronunciation rather than translation, for as Derrida notes, “a proper name as such remains forever untranslatable, a fact that may lead one to conclude that it does not strictly belong, for the same reason as the other words, to the language, to the system of the language” (“Des Tours de Babel” 171). Along these lines, Charlotte Yonge goes so far as to propose a nationalist preference: “Its right native shape is Harry; the other form [Henry] is only an imitation of French spelling” (309). Conversely, Hal has always been the pet-form of Henry, following the standard substitution of -l for -r as in such derivatives as Tel for Terry (for example, El Tel of Barcelona and English national football fame and Tottenham Hotspur infamy) or Sally from Sarah (Hanks and Hodges 147).

Hal’s denial of Harryness may mask deeper anxieties not so much about his commonness but rather his aristocratic nature; the affective presence of his name demonstrates how his subjective territory limits his opportunities for becomings. Calling himself Harry links him with not only with his father, “Harry of Herford, Lancaster, and Derby” (*Richard II* 1.3.35), but also with his nemesis, “young Harry Percy” (*Richard II* 2.2.53). He is caught between two undesirable forces of comings-to-be, both with strong emulative authority for others. Thus, the erasure of Harry can be seen as an act of both fratricidal and patricidal name-dropping in the most literal sense. But what exactly does this Harry have against

those Harrys, and why does he so insistently seek to distinguish himself from them? There are two basic answers: one negative in connotation, the other positive. In the negative sense, Hal's disavowal of his "other" name displays a hatred of Henry IV's disapproval and frequent odious comparisons to Hotspur:

Whilst I, by looking on the praise of him,  
 See riot and dishonour stain the brow  
 Of my young Harry. O that it could be proved  
 That some night-tripping fairy had exchanged  
 In cradle-clothes our children where they lay,  
 And called mine Percy, his Plantagenet!  
 Then would I have his Harry, and he mine. (*1 Henry IV* 1.1.83–9)

Similarly, Hal despises Percy's martial gallantry that contrasts "his vile participation" in the tavern world (3.2.87). In this manner, Hal is the petulant spoiled brat who gets away with everything but wants more. Nevertheless, in the positive sense, his disdain for those other Harrys also demonstrates his profound insight into their flawed characters. He understands that his own position as a future king will be undermined by how Henry IV achieved the throne, and he cannot forgive his father their illegitimacy brought on by vaunting ambition; recall his father's deployment through formal invocation the consecrating power of a proper name with which he wants his own name to be legitimately endowed: "In God's name, I'll ascend the regal throne" (*Richard II* 4.1.113). Hal also understands that what makes Hotspur such a glorious warrior would make him a horrible ruler: "Percy is but my factor, good my lord, / To engross up glorious deeds on my behalf" (*1 Henry IV* 3.2.147–8). With namesakes like these, who would want to be a Harry?

In terms of history, Henry's renaming of his own character is much like Gary Taylor's editorial substitution of Oldcastle for Falstaff (330–1); Henry as Hal is equally guilty of stopping "history in the *logos*," of failing "to remark the improprieties of the proper name" (Goldberg 83; 76). Unlike Taylor, however, Hal is critically successful: how often have you heard a Shakespearean speak of Harry when not directly quoting the plays? More to the point, Henry deploys the power of the proper name to navigate and transform his social identity; by extension, the proper name is his gateway for subjective becomings. The agential mode of identity construction and performance Henry demonstrates through the deployment of proper names is therefore very different from Stephen Greenblatt's idea of "English Renaissance self-fashioning,"

which “involves submission to an absolute power or authority situated at least partially outside the self – God, a sacred book, an institution such as church, court, colonial or military administration” (*Renaissance Self-Fashioning* 9). Indeed, Hal blatantly defies or appropriates all such authorities, and since Harry apparently carries such a host of negative connotations for the future king, being the both crafty and powerful Hal means never having to say you are sorry, as Falstaff discovers to his rue. Having determined the trouble with Harry, we want to turn to the advantages and disadvantages of Francis.

### Spellbound: a little touch of Harry at the bar

Harry, v.: 4. To worry, goad, torment, harass; to maltreat, ill-use, persecute; to worry mentally.

*Oxford English Dictionary*

Much of the difficulty in standard interpretations of *1 Henry IV* lies with accepting either Falstaff or Hal as a legitimate voice for the alternative society of the tavern. These readings overlook the fact that their social class or “degree” in the play makes both of them outsiders to the tavern world. In this way, *1 Henry IV* illustrates the difficulties involved both in representing a primarily oral popular culture in the early modern period, when literacy rates for the masses were low, and in recuperating this culture for later periods.<sup>61</sup> Thus, we turn to the trace of that culture in the material and linguistic. Yet even here we have problems, as evinced in the Francis scene where Hal’s superior linguistic abilities render the tapster incapable of any response. Bakhtin’s notion of *heteroglossia* as “an intense ideological battle” (470–1) models the problematic relationship of Hal, in his linguistic virtuosity, to the tavern world and uncovers an ideological struggle which continues throughout his royal career. The *locus classicus* for discussing this topic remains Hal and Poins’ wordplay with the “under-skinker” Francis. Greenblatt claims: “Hal, with the connivance of Poins, reduces the puny tapster Francis to the mechanical repetition of the word ‘Anon’” (“Invisible Bullets” 31). Unwilling to reduce Hal’s character, he later concludes that “we are permitted for much of the play to take pleasure at least in Hal’s surprising skill, the proficiency he rightly celebrates in himself” (36). However, Greenblatt misses the point that Francis himself has at least two languages: everyday London vernacular (“O Lord, sir, who do you mean?” [2.4.69]) and the curiously concise cant of his commercial trade (“Anon”).<sup>62</sup> Hal’s trick in effect ridicules the latter without ever silencing effectively the former. What concerns Hal the most is the power of the new urban commercial order, as he

complains of such a phrase as “Eight shillings and sixpence” (23–4). His proposal that Francis “play the coward” with his indenture and “show it a fair pair of heels and run from it” (45–6) need not be read as a revolution against authority, but rather as a replacement of one authority by another: appropriated by Hal, the older monarchical order reasserts itself against the newer commercial classes. Francis could follow Hal both at the Boar’s Head and in Westminster. Of course, as a “revolted” tapster he is more likely to be pressed by Sir John. Therefore, we would qualify Steven Mullaney’s reading of this passage, in which he recommends reference to “country proverbs” and “idiomatic expressions drawn from local dialects” to make sense of it, by giving class differences pride of place over cultural or geographical difference (82).

### Family plot: what’s in a name

Then since the names are in conflict, and some of them claim that *they* are like the truth, and others that *they* are, how can we decide, and upon what shall we base our decision.

Plato, *Cratylus* (438D)

The historically normative purpose of names and naming has been to establish social identity for an individual (Alford, Ewen, Yonge); however, as temporal poststructuralists, regardless of our own personal critical predilections, we realize that a crucial aporia lies between signifier and signified: as Derrida discusses with regard to Juliet’s analysis of Romeo’s name (“Aphorism Countertime” 427), while the name can stand in for the person, there is not some ontologically prior connection between them. We want to note that this insight is not an early twentieth-century creation of theorists in Paris or the Balkans, but has been made at least implicitly since Ancient Greece and Plato’s *Cratylus*, which provides this section’s epigraph and the two traditional naming philosophies: Cratylitic naturalism and Hermogenean nominalism (Barton 7–15; Ferry 73). In fact, such Hermogenean beliefs appear in the plays under consideration here. Lord Bardolph confides to his fellow conspirators: “We fortify in paper and in figures, / Using the names of men instead of men” (2 *Henry IV* 2.3.56–7). In other words, they do not fortify at all. If we can no longer think of names as valid markers of a singular identity, just what are they good for? Henry has already answered this question: the proper name is not just an instrument of stability within a semiotic-semantic system and therefore an instrument for the manufacturing and maintenance of subjects. It can also be a vehicle by which subjectivity can escape subjective territory in the interest or process of becomings-x.

The *OED* definitions of “name” indicate that many connotations cluster around the paired terms “reputation” and “fame.” Whereas names might not have a one-to-one correspondence with the physical body to which they are attached, they still might provide some measure of relative rather than specific value to an individual. This sense of name as title of rank or dignity (*OED*, X, 2b, 201) can be seen in one of Shakespeare’s sources, Edward Hall’s *Chronicle of Henry V*, which mentions Charles the Dauphin being deprived “of all honores, names, dignities and prehem-inences, whiche he then had” (Fol. 75v). Sir Thomas Smith goes so far as to find the etymological root of “Gentlemen” in the Roman name: “The Etimologie of the name serveth the efficacie. *Gens* in Latine betokeneth the race and surname” (26); however, the sense of belonging to a “good” family is really only added by later modern romance languages (*OED*, VI, “gentle” etymology, 450). This particular transition from specific to relative value, from natural relations to linguistic correspondence, is an example of Jean-Joseph Goux’s symbolic economy (or social exchange) as a semiotic representation of values created through replacement (9). Taking off from Goux, Linda Charnes notes that “the fetish of the name circulates in a symbolic economy” (158). She continues to posit “fetishizing names” (206) as a postmodern condition, and yet both Hal and Falstaff, like Juliet, seem perfectly adept at it. For instance, in *1 Henry IV* 2.4 alone Hal “identifies” Falstaff as the following commodities: “woolsack,” “greasy tallow-keech,” “a tun of man,” “that huge bombard of sack,” and “that roasted Manningtree Ox.” What then accounts for this early or premodern dexterity with a supposedly postmodern phenomenon?

Although names circulate in the symbolic economy, they have a fiscal reality as well, something that dates back at least to the early modern period in England.<sup>63</sup> Shakespeare himself engaged upon literally purchasing a name not soon after completing *1 Henry IV* (Scott-Giles 27–41). His father, John Shakespeare, is granted his coat of arms because he is propertied: he has “Landes & tenementes of good wealth, & substance 500<sup>li</sup>” (Chambers, II, 20), and because he displays the properties or natural characteristics of a gentleman in the guise of having held the offices of “justice of the peace and bailiff, and a Queen’s officer” and having married the daughter of an “esquire” (Schoenbaum 228). Falstaff alludes to this economy: “I would to God thou and I knew where a commodity of good names were to be bought” (*1 Henry IV* 1.2.79–80). Given their “rude society” (3.2.14), Hal and Falstaff must purchase their reputation in the form of “good names” before reentering the world of court; or in a slight twist, they would purchase names to stand in for themselves

and continue their “vile participation” elsewhere. Moreover, with this statement, Falstaff may be mirroring Bardolph’s previously mentioned strategy; as one of the only other two times he uses the word commodity (in something more like its modern sense of useful products rather than the specific Renaissance denotation of a usurer’s swindle), he refers specifically to filling up a roll or regiment of troops: “I press me none but . . . such a commodity of warm slaves as had as lief hear the devil as a drum” (*1 Henry IV* 4.2.14–18). To be sure, the significance of names here is confirmed when he actually fills his roll in *2 Henry IV* (3.2); “names” in the form of the gentry have bought themselves out of service to be replaced by more common names like “Feeble,” “Mouldy,” “Shadow,” and “Wart”; “a commodity of good names” has been replaced literally by a “commodity of warm slaves.”

In distinguishing proper naming in early modern England as a practice within a semiotic system based in cultural *materia* from its modern counterpart where signifier and signified are split, we want to propose, following Foucault, a “naming-function” by which to both comprehend proper naming and demonstrate how the potentialities of proper naming have and can be productively realized.<sup>64</sup> Where Foucault replaces the outmoded category of the author with that of an “author-function” (102) which operates in certain discourses, we want to replace the problematic term “name” which typically evokes the aforementioned philosophical-linguistic debate with the naming-function, an adaptive and advantageous navigational mechanism that can be mobilized to transverse social, cultural, political, and economic registers and stratification. In the early modern period, we locate this within primarily a class bias.<sup>65</sup> For instance, the naming-function encodes, eludes, and scrambles power relationships among the aristocracy much as the author-function admits ownership of texts yet obscures the state’s punishment of their transgressions. More precisely, the naming-function has a material base that is grounded in the possession of property. Here we follow the post-medieval belief that “economics constitutes a metalanguage to which even linguistics is subordinate” (Bloch 165). Some people’s names account and count for more than others, the monarch’s for the most and thus its fetishization as a singular Christian name.<sup>66</sup> In this distribution within a divine-right power structure, however, we refer to a specific segment of the population, what Sir Thomas Smith so usefully calls “Gentlemen” (70), in a specific historical period. In England, we see this effect continuing into the early nineteenth century as the dominant naming paradigm (the modern paradigm emerges with Locke’s philosophy of human understanding) and identify its descent

into the residual with either the Reform Bill of 1832, which eviscerated some of the propertied elite's power by eliminating infamous "rotten boroughs" like Old Sarum, or the institution of universal suffrage in 1928.<sup>67</sup>

Through our examination of the cultural material basis of this naming-function in English history, we offer an intervention into the totalizing isomorphisms of post-Marxist theorists like Jean Baudrillard and Goux who seek to find a sign-exchange value instead of an actual economy in the sign. In the synchronic instance that is our focus, there is a specifically economic foundation that is often literally grounded, as in the line, "Old John of Gaunt, time-honoured Lancaster" (*Richard II* 1.1.1). Gentry names are often tied to the land in a way that specifies status; for example, Michel de Montaigne complains, "it is an ill custome . . . to call every man by the name of his Towne, Mannor, Hamlet or Lordship" (150).<sup>68</sup> Consider that upon his return from banishment, to Berkeley's address, "My lord of Herford" (2.3.69), Bolingbroke responds:

My lord, my answer is – to Lancaster,  
And I am come to seek that name in England,  
And I must find that title in your tongue,  
Before I make reply to aught you say. (2.3.70–3)

Bolingbroke's concern here is to be called by what he perceives to be his proper name in order to guarantee his rightful patrimony, possibly an effect of his proper name functioning as a meme working to ensure its survival. Often such proper names are surnames, but just as often in the early modern period, especially – as previously mentioned – in the case of the monarch, they are Christian names. Either way, the proper names are deployed to secure socioeconomic position.

In discourse on the subject today, the classic philosophical text for proper names remains Locke's *An Essay on Human Understanding* notwithstanding the fact that concerns over what constitutes a proper name are prominent in Renaissance etymologies, grammars, and poesies.<sup>69</sup> In his *Grammar*, William Lily's standard explains the distinction: "A Noun Substantive either is proper to the thinge it betokeneth: as *Eduardus* is my propre name, or else is common to mo: as *Homo*, is a common name to all men" (Avr). With regard to the phrase *Cato est homo*, Thomas Wilson explains: "Cato is the nowne propre which belongeth to one man only, and man, is the kinde, whiche is more large, and comprehendeth all men" (B<sup>v</sup>v).<sup>70</sup> Hence George Puttenham, when describing "*Catechresis*,

or the Figure of abuse,” notes that for “lacke of a naturall or proper terme or worde we take another” (190). In the early modern period, the term “proper” as used here had two connotations: one denoting property as physical possession, the other as defining group characteristics. In his obsession with names, Hal displays both. He is worried about Harry defining him characteristically as a common man. At the same time, patronymically, the name Henry reveals his monarchical destiny. Moreover, whereas moderns view names as revealing personal identity, in the early modern period the naming-function revealed power relations. Rather than knowing who someone is, one knew who they could rule. The name itself, fetishistically, was invested with power; thus the ritualized battle scene where combatants ask each other’s name as if to test their worthiness as an opponent. Consider the following examples from just the texts we have been discussing: “Marshal, demand of yonder champion / The cause of his arrival here in arms. / Ask him his name, and orderly proceed / To swear him in the justice of his cause” (*Richard II* 1.3.7–10); “What is thy name? And wherefore com’st thou hither” (*Richard II* 1.3.31); “What is thy name, that in the battle thus / Thou crossest me?” (*1 Henry IV* 5.3.1–2); “Thou speak’st as if I would deny my name” (*1 Henry IV* 5.4.59); “What’s your name, sir? Of what condition are you, and of what place?” (*2 Henry IV* 4.3.1–2); “Is thy name Coleville?” (*2 Henry IV* 4.3.59); “What is thy name? I know thy quality” (*Henry V* 3.6.136); “Art thou a gentleman? What is thy name? Discuss” (*Henry V* 4.4.5).

The early modern naming-function not only differs greatly from the ways proper names are used today, but it is also very different from the medieval period, especially as depicted in romances, where names are not disclosed until after a battle or duel has been completed. For example, from Chrétien de Troyes, *Yvain or, The Knight with the Lion* (twelfth century):

“Alas! What a tragedy! We’ve fought this combat in appalling ignorance, through not recognizing one another. . . . – “What?” says my lord Gawain. “Who are you, then?” – “I’m Yvain.” (366)

From *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight* (fourteenth century):

“How runs your right name? – and let the rest go.”  
 “That shall I give you gladly,” said the Green Knight then;  
 “Bercilak de Hautdesert this barony I hold.” (*Gawain* 2443–5)

From Sir Thomas Malory, *Le Morte D'Arthur* (fifteenth century):

Then said Balin le Savage, "What knight art thou? For or now I found never no knight that matched me."

"My name is," said he, "Balan brother unto the good knight, Balin."

"Alas," said Balin, "that ever I should see this day." (I, 88)

For these texts, it is knowledge of the name and not the name itself that emanates power.

In this final section, we have seen that the assertion of proper names (Henry, Harry, Romeo, etc.) works to define and reinforce social identities, subjective territories, and societal structures. In contrast, we have seen that subjects can also deploy proper names via the naming-function to achieve agency and furnish themselves mobility of identity, thereby exposing the uncontainable nature of the subject *vis-à-vis* taxonomies that serve state machinery and for which proper naming is fundamental. These two operations of the proper name can be interpreted, perhaps more precisely, in phenomenological terms. Following Husserl's philosophy, the proper name – the image or idea, and not a person or thing to which it refers – might function as the object, whether self-chosen or not, of an individual's conscious reflection, that is, as the object of consciousness's intentional stance in relation to which consciousness constitutes itself. Yet, following both Derrida's critique of Husserl and his theory of the proper name, exemplified in his assertion that the proper name, as "untranslatable idiom," exceeds grammar and thus does not belong like other words to the system of language, proper naming might also function to provide mobility to consciousness, thereby allowing for willful self-interpellation and consequently increased personal agency. For instance, one need only to name oneself in contradistinction to one's social identity, publically change one's name, or present a false name to others within a given society and culture to initiate becomings-other, a becomings-x, and/or comings-to-be-other through mobilizations of semiotic-semantic traces and spaces from which alternative identitarian properties can emerge, develop, and express. Deployments of proper names do not merely short-circuit the interpellative processes of state machinery when contrary to its objectives of order and transparency. Rather, they generate a massive feedback with the potential to shoot through society, enabling and affecting subjective singularities in conjunction with occurrences of proper naming, the naming-function becoming the catalysts for emergences of

subjectivity and transversal movements. As a re-appropriation of proper naming from the linear agenda of state machinery, the naming-function thus demonstrates that interpellation does not operate simply in one direction, from sociopolitical conductors of state power to subjects, but also in reverse, differently, multi-directionally, and multi-dimensionally; interpellation does not just demarcate; it also liberates and mobilizes. Ironically, state machinery gives subjects a tool, the naming-function, that they can use to undermine and escape its semiotic-semantic systems and organizational structures.

## Notes

1. Please see the Glossary of Transversal Terms at the end of this book for concise definitions of terms that have been coined to enable the development of the combined critical theory, performance aesthetics, and research methodology of transversal poetics. Since I have not highlighted them in any way to avoid clutter, confusion, and repetition (they are not italicized, in bold, marked by an asterisk, endnoted, etc.), I hope that their connection with transversal poetics will be clear from the contexts in which they are used. Also, for more elaborate definitions of the terms and other examples of their employment, see Bryan Reynolds, *Becoming Criminal: Transversal Performance and Cultural Dissidence in Early Modern England* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), *Performing Transversally: Reimagining Shakespeare and the Critical Future* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), and *Transversal Enterprises in the Drama of Shakespeare and his Contemporaries: Fugitive Explorations* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
2. See Sigmund Freud, *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*. Trans. James Strachey (New York: Basic Books, 1962); Carl Jung, *Psychiatric Studies. The Collected Works of C. G. Jung* Vol. 1. eds Michael Fordham (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1953); Jacques Lacan, *Ecrits: A Selection*. Trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997); D.W. Winnicott, *Playing and Reality* (New York: Routledge, 2005); Melanie Klein, *Contributions to Psychoanalysis. 1921–1945*. (London: Hogarth Press, 1948); Erik Erikson, *Childhood and Society* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1963); and Nancy J. Chodorow, *The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).
3. See Herbert Blumer, *Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969).
4. See Charles Horton Cooley, *Social Organization: A Study of the Larger Mind* (Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1956) and *Human Nature and the Social Order* (New York: Schocken, 1964); John Dewey, *The School and Society & The Child and the Curriculum* (New York: Dover Publications, 2001) and *On Education: Selected Writings* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974); George Herbert Mead, *Mind, Self and Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934); Peter Berger, *Invitation to Sociology* (New York: Anchor Books, 1963); and

Erving Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (London: Penguin Books, 1990) and *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1986).

5. For these Marxists, as they interrogate the movement, impact, history, and accountability of large social systems, debate often revolves around the locations of art and the responsibilities of art production in the base/superstructure relationship. Subscribing to the base/superstructure dichotomy, Calverton argues that art emerges from a material base, but that social conditions are not frozen in material, bourgeois ideology. Rather, producers of art have a moral obligation to organize artistic creation around the revolutionary task of shifting social and economic structures to benefit the oppressed. Hicks holds that art comes from economics so thoroughly that there is no need to explore individual artistry or aesthetic agency. His focus is sociohistorical, focusing on economic, class, and political positions in the production of art and literature. The Frankfurt School followed Leon Trotsky in at least believing that art could produce social change. Later Marxists, such as Louis Althusser, argue that the ideological components of a society (religious, legal, political) are interrelated and have some autonomy; the power of the people to change social structures exists in material relations and not in collections of individuals. See Leon Trotsky, *Literature and Revolution* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1957); Granville Hicks, *The Great Tradition: An Interpretation of American Literature Since the Civil War* (New York: Macmillan, 1933); Leah Levenson and Jerry Natterstad, *Granville Hicks: The Intellectual in Mass Society* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993); V.F. Calverton, *The Liberation of American Literature* (New York: Scribner, 1932) and *The Newer Spirit: A Sociological Criticism of Literature* (New York: Boni and Livenight, 1925); Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2002); Theodor Adorno, *Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life* (New York: Verso, 2006); Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research 1923–1950* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); and Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes toward an Investigation)” in *Lenin and Philosophy, and Other Essays*. (London: New Left Books, 1971): 127–86.
6. See, for example, the following groundbreaking books by Fredric Jameson: *Marxism and Form: Twentieth Century Dialectical Theories of Literature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), *The Prison-House of Language: A Critical Account of Structuralism and Russian Formalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), and *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981). Chapter 3 in this book engages with some of Jameson’s later work. See also Ernesto Laclau, *New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time* (London and New York: Verso, 1990); and Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialistic Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (London and New York: Verso, 1985).
7. If these early Marxist critics were to consider the terms of transversal poetics, they would say that performance of identity, subjective territories, official territories, and transversal movements can all be explained materially with regard to power differentials and an ideology that they work ultimately to maintain. The subjective territory of an individual, however alienated from

the individual's awareness, is an interpretive and experiential realm grounded in material consciousness. Subjective territories and the official territories of which it is constituent are superstructural manifestations of relations among modes of production and the ideology behind it. Thus, subjective territory and the transversal movements through which subjectivity evades, compromises, and reconfigures its parameters are always appropriated and adapted to legitimize the interests of the ruling socioeconomic class. This model was adopted in the 1980s by critics identified or who self-identified with the literary-cultural approach known as the new historicism and its "subversion/containment paradigm," which holds that official, state power encourages subversive or dissident activity only so that it can later suppress it in the interest of demonstrating its repressive power and thereby further consolidating its hegemonic government. For more on this, see Reynolds, *Becoming Criminal and Performing Transversally*.

8. See Cleanth Brooks, *The Well-Wrought Urn* (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1947) and Brooks and Robert Penn Warren, eds, *Understanding Poetry* (New York: Holt, 1938); William Wimsatt, Jr, *The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry* (Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1954) and Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley, *The Verbal Icon* (Lexington: University of Kentucky press, 1954); William Empson, *Seven Types of Ambiguity* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1963); John Crowe Ransom, *The New Criticism* (New York: New Directions, 1941); I. A. Richards, *Practical Criticism: A Study of Literary Judgment* (London: Routledge & Paul, 1964); R. P. Blackmur, *Lectures on Criticism* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1949) and *Form and Value in Modern Poetry* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1952); and Murray Krieger, *The New Apologists for Poetry* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956).
9. W.K. Wimsatt, Jr. and Monroe Beardsley, "The Intentional Fallacy" and "The Affective Fallacy" *Sewanee Review* 1946, 1949, respectively; later published in Wimsatt, *The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1954).
10. Harold Bloom, *The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry* (London; New York: Oxford University Press, 1975) and *A Map of Misreading* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975).
11. See Roman Jakobson, "A Postscript to the Discussion on Grammar of Poetry" in *diacritics* 10:1 (1980): 21–35 and *Language in Literature* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 1987); Boris Eichenbaum, *Lermontov: A Study in Literary–Historical Evaluation*, trans. Ray Parrott and Harry Weber (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1981); Osip Maksimovič Brik, *Two Essays On Poetic Language* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1964).
12. See Leon Trotsky, *Literature and Revolution* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1957).
13. See Pavel N. Medvedev/Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin (authorship unclear: people believe that Bahktin published a book under the name of his friend Medvedev to avoid censorship), *The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship: A Critical Introduction to Sociological Poetics*. trans. Albert J. Wehrelle (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), especially 140–55.
14. See Peter Carruthers, *Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2000), *Nature of the Mind: An Introduction* (London: Routledge, 2004), *Consciousness: Essays from a Higher-Order*

- Perspective* (London: Oxford University Press, 2005), and *The Architecture of the Mind: Massive Modularity and the Flexibility of Thought* (London: Oxford University Press, 2006); Daniel Dennett, *Darwin's Dangerous Idea*. (London: Penguin, 1995) and *Consciousness Explained* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1991); and John Searle, *Minds, Brains and Science* (Cambridge: Harbord University Press, 1984), *The Construction of Social Reality* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), and *The Mystery of Consciousness* (New York: A New York Review Book, 1997).
15. Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, Trans. George G. Grabowicz (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1973) and *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, Trans. Ruth Ann Crowley and Kenneth R. Olson (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1973); Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962) and *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Trans. by Albert Hofstadter. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982); and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, Trans. Colin Smith (London and New York: Routledge, 1996) and *The Visible and the Invisible* (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1968).
  16. See J. Hillis Miller, "The Antitheses of Criticism: Reflections on the Yale Colloquium" in *Modern Language Notes* LXXXI (1966), 557–71, *The Disappearance of God: Five Nineteenth-Century Writers* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), "Geneva or Paris? The Recent Work of Georges Poulet" in *University of Toronto Quarterly* 39 (1970). 212–28, and "The Geneva School: The Criticism of Marcel Raymond, Albert Beguin, Georges Poulet, Jean Rousset, Jean-Pierre Richard, and Jean Starobinski" in *The Critical Quarterly* VIII (1966): 302–21; George Poulet, *The Interior Distance*. Trans. Elliott Coleman (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1964), "The Dream of Descartes" in *Studies in Human Time*, Trans. Elliott Coleman (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1956), and *The Metamorphoses of the Circle*. Trans. Carley Dawson and Elliott Coleman (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967); and Sarah Lawall, *Critics of Consciousness* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968).
  17. Paul Brodtkorb, David Halliburton, Geoffrey Hartman, and Joseph Riddel, among others, broadened phenomenological inquiry differently but in ways similar to each other; they shifted the focus of the analysis from studying an author's entire oeuvre to one particular, representative work. Representative of their common ground, Brodtkorb appropriated phenomenology to formalism by focusing on the work itself, and concentrates on revealing meaning, subjectivity, and consciousness by studying character rather than author. See Paul Brodtkorb, Jr, *Ishmael's White World: A Phenomenological Reading of Moby Dick* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965); David Halliburton *Edgar Allan Poe: A Phenomenological View* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), *Poetic Thinking: An Approach to Heidegger* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), and *The Color of the Sky: A Study of Stephen Crane* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Geoffrey Hartman, *Beyond Formalism; Literary Essays, 1958–1970* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), *Criticism in the Wilderness: The Study of Literature Today* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), and *A Critic's Journey: Literary Reflections, 1958–1998* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999); and Joseph Riddel,

*The Clairvoyant Eye; The Poetry and Poetics of Wallace Stevens* (Baton Rouge Louisiana State University Press, 1965).

18. In addition to *The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences* (cited in the text), see Wilhelm Dilthey, *Pattern and Meaning in History: Thoughts on History and Society* (New York: Harper & Row, 1961). Also, for Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher's more literary-critical approach, see his *Hermeneutics: The Hand-written Manuscripts*, Trans. James Duke and Jack Forstman, eds Heinz Kimmerle (Missoula: Scholars Press, 1977).
19. In addition to *Truth and Method*, see Hans-Georg Gadamer, "The Phenomenological Movement (1963)," in *Philosophical Hermeneutics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976): 130–81.
20. See E. D. Hirsch, Jr, "Gadamer's Theory of Interpretation" in *Validity in Interpretation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967): 245–64.
21. Another influential follower of Heideggerian phenomenology and student of Gadamer, Richard Palmer, argues in the 1970s that the New Critics made important errors where they held history at abeyance, separating subject (reader) and object (text). For Palmer, a dependency on intentionality is vital for meaning; understanding, rather than objective knowledge, is the goal of criticism. An important account of hermeneutics also shows up in Richard Rorty. Responding particularly to Gadamer, Rorty's hermeneutics focuses on a "willingness to view inquiry as muddling through, rather than conforming to canons of rationality, coping with people and things rather than corresponding to reality by discovering essences" (7). Influenced by Gadamer, Rorty's hermeneutics eschews objective or impartial critique because it renders the subject into an ahistorical, non-agentic being. See Richard Palmer, *Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969) and Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).
22. For some well-known examples not discussed here, see, David Bleich, *Readings and Feelings: An Introduction to Subjective Criticism* (Urbana, Illinois: National Council of Teachers of English, 1975); Stephen Booth, *An Essay on Shakespeare's Sonnets* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969); Wayne Booth, *Critical Understanding: The Powers and Limits of Pluralism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979); Jonathan Culler, *The Pursuit of Signs: Semiotics, Literature, Deconstruction* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1981); Norman Holland, *5 Readers Reading* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975); Mary Louise Pratt, *Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977); Michael Riffaterre, *Semiotics of Poetry*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978); William Spanos, *Heidegger and Criticism: Retrieving the Cultural Politics of Destruction* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).
23. See Fish, *Surprised by Sin: The Reader in Paradise Lost* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), *Self-Consuming Artifacts: The Experience of Seventeenth-Century Literature* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), and *Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980).
24. In the section "Text Play" and in the epilogue "Mimesis and Performance" to *The Fictive and the Imaginary: Charting Literary Anthropology* (Baltimore: Johns

Hopkins University Press, 1993): 247–73; 281–303, Wolfgang Iser discussions of what he calls “play,” “text games,” and “staging” in literary fiction invoke issues related to performance both on and off the stage but he does not address them directly. For the most part, he limits his theories and claims to relationships between humans and literature, as represented in this passage:

If representation is phantasmic figuration, it becomes a means of staging that gives appearance to something that by nature is intangible. This applies above all to the decentered position of human beings, who are but do not “have” themselves. However, even such a split does not seem to be a well-established feature of the human condition merely to be taken up by literature. For if human beings cannot become present to themselves, this does not necessarily mean that they are driven to “have” themselves. Indeed, the insurmountable distance between “being” and “having” oneself is one of the discoveries of literature, highlighted by its explorations of the space between.” (296)

25. See A.C. Bradley, *Shakespearean Tragedy: Lectures on Hamlet, Othello, King Lear, Macbeth* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1992) and Norman Holland, *Psychoanalysis and Shakespeare* (New York: Octagon Books, 1976). See note 16 for works by Paul Brodtkorb.
26. William Shakespeare, *Romeo and Juliet*. eds Brian Gibbons (London: Arden, 1980). All citations from this edition.
27. See Marazziti D., Akiskal H.S., Rossi A., Cassano G.B., “Alteration of the Serotonin Transporter in Romantic Love” in *Psychological Medicine* 29 (1999): 741–45; Marazziti D., Rucci P., Di Nasso E., Masala I., Baroni S., Rossi A., Giannaccini G., Mengali F., Lucachini A., Jealousy and Subthreshold Psychopathology: a Serotonergic Link” in *Neuropsychobiology* 47 (2003): 2003; Marazziti D., Di Nasso E., Masala I., Baroni S., Abelli M., Mengali F., Mungai F., Rucci P., “Normal and Obsessional Jealousy: a Study of a Population of Young Adults” in *European Psychiatry* 18 (2003): 106–111; and Marazziti D., Canale D., “Hormonal Changes When Falling in Love” in *Psychoneuroendocrinology* 29 (2004): 931–6. Donatella Marazziti summarizes in an email correspondence with me:

A lower functionality of the serotonin transporter, as reflected by the decreased number of the transporter proteins themselves, is generally considered an index of reduced functionality of presynaptic serotonergic neurons, perhaps due to lower levels of intrasynaptic serotonin concentrations. The relationship between OCD and falling in love is mainly at cognitive level. The type of thought, which is obsessive, is shared by the two conditions, although it is egodistonic in the first and egosyntonic in the second. When the serotonin system does not work properly, given the fact that it is spread everywhere in the brain and controls different functions, a lot of disorders may emerge, even “irrationality” and falling in love. (31 August 2006)

See also Eric Hollander, *Current Insights in Obsessive Compulsive Disorder* (London: John Wiley & Sons Inc, 1995) and *Obsessive–Compulsive Disorders: Diagnosis, Etiology, Treatment* (New York: Informa Healthcare, 1997).

28. For more on emulative authority, see Reynolds, *Transversal Enterprises*, 1–26 and Reynolds and Henry Turner, “From *Homo Academicus* to *Poeta Publicus*: Celebrity and Transversal Knowledge in Robert Greene’s *Friar Bacon and Friar Bungay* (c. 1589),” in *Writing Robert Greene: Essays on England’s First Notorious Professional Writer*, Eds Edward Gieskes and Kirk Melnikoff (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate Press, 2008): 73–94.
29. To give a common example, consider that when someone in undergoing becomings-gang member and finds himself, surprisingly, affectionately addressing his mother as “homie,” “dawg,” or “bitch.”
30. See Reynolds, *Becoming Criminal*, 1–22; and *Performing Transversally*, 1–28.
31. See Donald Hedrick and Bryan Reynolds, “Shakespace and Transversal Power,” *Shakespeare Without Class: Misappropriations of Cultural Capital*, eds Hedrick and Reynolds (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000): 3–47; and Reynolds, *Performing Transversally*, 1–28.
32. For an analysis of the major theories on memes, see Robert Aunger, *The Electric Meme: A New Theory of How We Think* (New York: The Free Press, 2002).
33. On the “God meme” see also Pascal Boyer, *Religion Explained* (New York: Basic Books, 2001).
34. On “state power” and “transversal power,” see Reynolds, *Becoming Criminal*, 1–22; *Performing Transversally*, 1–28; and *Transversal Enterprises*, 1–26.
35. For more on the two camps, see Aunger, 21.
36. See Richard Brodie, *Virus of the Mind: The New Science of the Meme* (Seattle: Integral Press, 1996); Aaron Lynch, *Thought Contagion: How Belief Spreads Through Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1996); and Seth Godin, *Unleashing the Ideavirus* (New York: Do You Zoom, 2000). For an analysis of their positions, see Aunger, 7–32. Building on the two camps, Aunger, echoing Dawkins’s original position (Dawkins 323), offers a third, “electric” view on how replication of information may be both neurological and social. Aunger posits a model of what might be the physical properties of the as yet unobservable memes, which may give his theory more provable potential than those of the others.
37. See Daniel Dennett, *Consciousness Explained* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1991), and Susan Blackmore, *The Meme Machine* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). For an analysis of their views, see Aungar, 7–23.
38. In an early modern English antitheatrical tract, *Playes Confuted in Five Actions* (1582), Stephan Gosson argues that “*Stage Plaies are not to be suffred in a Christian comon weale*” because they “are the doctrine and inuention of the Deuill” (B3). He concludes his argument with a representative (“daily bred by plaies”) account of a stage-play that was so moving that it compelled its audience to imitate automatically what they saw on the stage:

When Bacchus rose up, tenderly lifting Ariadne from her seate, no small store of curtesie passing betwene them, the beholders rose up, every man stoode on tippe toe, and seemed to hover over the play. When they sware, the company sware, when they departed to bedde; the company presently was set on fire, they that were married posted home to their wives; they that were single, vowed very solemnly, to be wedded. (G5)

If Gosson's account is true, this is a fascinating example of the power of theater to stimulate automatic mimicry. If untrue, it is a fascinating example of what people during Shakespeare's time might have imagined as the power of theater.

39. In addition to Vittorio Gallese, "Intentional Attunement. The Mirror Neuron system and its role in interpersonal relations," in *Interdisciplines* (European Science Foundation), <http://www.interdisciplines.org/mirror/papers/1>, see also Maksim Stamenov and Vittorio Gallese, eds, *Mirror Neurons in the Evolution of Brain and Language* (London: John Benjamins Publishing, 2002); Gallese *et al.*, "Hearing Sounds, Understanding Actions: Action Representation in Mirror Neurons," *Science* 297 (2002): 846–8; and B. Calvo-Merino, D.E. Glaser, J. Grezes, R.E. Passingham, and P. Haggard, "Action observation and acquired motor skills: an fMRI study with expert dancers" in *Cerebral Cortex* (forthcoming).
40. In the *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty describes the intersubjective aspect of action observation in similar terms:

The sense of the gestures is not given, but understood, that is, recaptured by an act on the spectator's part. The whole difficulty is to conceive this act clearly without confusing it with a cognitive operation. The communication or comprehension of gestures come about through the reciprocity of my intentions and the gestures of others, of my gestures and intentions discernible in the conduct of other people. It is as if the other person's intention inhabited my body and mine his. (185)

41. Alternatively, or concurrently, this may have to do with the institution of what Antonio Damasio calls "somatic markers," which are emotion-generated mental markers that influence our decisions. See Damasio, *Descartes' Error* (New York: Putnam, 1994) and *The Feeling of What Happens* (New York: Harcourt, 2000).
42. Ranganath, C., and G. Rainer. "Neural mechanisms for detecting and remembering novel events." *National Review Neuroscience* 4, no. 3 (March 2003): 193–202.
43. For analysis of these passages and similar ones with regard to antitheatricality, transvestism, and the transversal power of theater, see Bryan Reynolds, "The Devil's House, 'or worse': Transversal Power and Antitheatrical Discourse in Early Modern England," *Theatre Journal* 49.2 (1997): 143–67 and *Becoming Criminal: Transversal Performance and Cultural Dissidence in Early Modern England* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002): 125–55.
44. For an almost identical passage, see John Greene, *A Refutation of the Apology for Actors* (London, 1615), 61.
45. In *The Anatomie of Abuses*, Phillip Stubbes also refers to the theater as "Sathan's Synagogue" (143) and in *A Second and Third Blast of Retrait from Plaies and Theatres* (London: 1580), Anthony Munday calls "the Theater" "the chappel of Satan" (quoted in Stubbes 302).
46. *Performing Transversally*, 175.
47. See Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics* (London : P. Owen, 1961); Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology* (New York: Basic Books, 1963); and Roland Barthes, *Image–Music–Text* (New York: Hill, 1977).

48. See Jonathan Culler, *Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, Linguistics and the Study of Literature*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975); Robert Scholes, *Structuralism in Literature: An Introduction* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974); Michael Riffaterre, *Semiotics of Poetry* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1978); Roman Jakobson, "Linguistics and Poetics" in Thomas Sebeok eds, *Style in Language* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1960); Gerald Prince, *A Grammar of Stories: An Introduction* (The Hague: Mouton, 1973); Yuri Lotman, *Analysis of the Poetic Text* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1976); and Samuel Levin, *Linguistic Structures in Poetry* (The Hague: Mouton, 1962).
49. See Eugenio Donato, *The Script of Decadence: Essays on the Fictions of Flaubert and the Poetics of Romanticism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Joseph Riddel, *The Turning Word: American Literary Modernism and Continental Theory* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996); Paul de Man, *Blindness & Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1971); and Geoffrey Hartman, *The Fate of Reading and Other Essays* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975).
50. Barbara Johnson, *The Critical Difference: Essays in the Contemporary Rhetoric of Reading* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985); Shoshana Felman, *What Does a Woman Want?: Reading and Sexual Difference* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); and Jeffrey Mehlman, *Revolution and Repetition: Marx, Hugo, Balzac* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).
51. Jacques Derrida. "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences," in *Writing and Difference* (London: Routledge, 1978).
52. See Jonathan Culler, *On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism After Structuralism* (Princeton: Cornell University Press, 1983); Christopher Norris, *Deconstruction: Theory and Practice* (London: New Accents, 1982); Michael Ryan, *Marxism and Deconstruction* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982); Jonathan Arac et al. (ed), *The Yale Critics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1983); Christopher Butler, *Interpretation, Deconstruction, and Ideology* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); Howard Felperin, *Beyond Deconstruction: The Uses and Abuses of Literary Power* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Michael Fischer, *Does Deconstruction Make Any Difference: Poststructuralism and the Defense of Poetry in Modern Criticism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985); Mark Taylor, *Deconstruction and Theology* (New York: Scholars Press, 1982); Douglas Atkins, *Reading Deconstruction/Deconstructive Reading* (Lexington: University of Kentucky, 1983); Gregory Ulmer, *Applied Grammatology: Post(e)-Pedagogy from Jacques Derrida to Joseph Beuys* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985); and Douglas Atkins and Michael Johnson eds, *Writing and Reading Differently: Deconstruction and the Teaching of Composition and Literature* (Kansas City: University Press of Kansas, 1985).
53. Jean-Louis Houdebine and Jacques Derrida, "Response," in *diacritics*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Summer, 1973): 57–9. For an elaborate discussion of this issue that provides much of its critical history up until 2005, see Doreen Massey, *For Space* (London: Sage Publications, 2005): 49–54. See also Jeff Noonan, *Critical Humanism and the Politics of Difference* (Montréal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003).
54. See Schalkwyk for analysis of the debate.

55. See Bryan Reynolds and Janna Segal, "Fugitive Explorations in *Romeo and Juliet*: Searching for Transversality inside the Goldmine of R&Jspace," in *Transversal Enterprises*: 124–67.
56. Candido notices the same preoccupation, but rather than placing it in the context of contemporary concerns over the social order he links it to Hal's "sense of the past, . . . its belief in the reality of universals, where a king's name denotes him truly" (61).
57. The metaphorical contrast between Richard and Bolingbroke operates on two levels: class and drink. The inn was at the top of the hierarchy of drinking establishments; the alehouse the bottom. One of the key distinctions was that the former served ale, beer, and wine, the preferred drink of the aristocracy, while the latter served only ale and beer. Furthermore, the alehouse also was a site of material production, as its product generally was brewed *in situ*, implying the very economic relationships which would challenge traditional monarchical authority. For more on the tripartite distinction of inns, taverns, and alehouses, see "The returnes of the Innes, Alehouses and Taverns with in several shires in the realme 1577" (PRO, SP 12/96, f 405r). See also Clark, 5 and SP 12/98, 12/141/55, and 12/215 for returns from individual counties.
58. The early modern English alternate version of this proverbial phrase, "Tom, Dick and Will (Jack)" (Tilley, 673, T376), works equally well for our analysis. Here Shakespeare, a socially ambitious playwright, who had just purchased a coat of arms for his *paterfamilias* and would soon buy the second largest house in his hometown, perhaps anxious about his baser nature, writes his own name out of the equation. The late sixteenth century was a period of much social upheaval; new men were made and long-established families failed. See Stone, 11, 36–40, and Wrightson, *English Society* 59–60, 130–1, 142, 149, 223.
59. Numerical information in this section was garnered using the Academic Text Service's Searcher Software and the Oxford CD-rom Shakespeare (Reid). As Yonge states, "On the whole this [Henry] is one of the most universal of Tuetonic names and one of the most English in use, although not Anglian in origin" (311). Barton is mistaken when she claims that the "diminutive 'Harry' had . . . been employed, without any particular historical justification" (110); see Withycombe, 149. For more on the uncommon commonness of Henry, see Montaigne's "Of Names," where he notes "that in the genealogies of Princes, there are certaine names fatally affected as . . . *Henries in England*" (149).
60. This mistake is common; see Macisaac, 417. We cannot agree with Barton that Poins' uses of "Hal" are either "glancing" or "parodic," but she gets the numbers right (110). The first instance appears to point at Falstaff whom Poins almost immediately calls "Monsieur Remorse" (1.2.112); however, Jack has not yet arrived in 2.4 when Ned responds to Hal's "lend me thy hand to laugh a little" (2).
61. For early modern literacy, see Cressy, 47, 72–5, 128–9 and Watt, 7, 260, 269; for recuperating oral cultures, see Burke, 1978, 1–89; Burke, 1984; Pris; and Sharpe.
62. In *The Dialogic Imagination*, Bakhtin notes: "At any given moment of its evolution, language is stratified not only into linguistic dialects in the strict sense of the word (according to formal linguistic markers, especially phonetic), but

- also – and for us this is the essential – into languages that are socio-ideological: languages of social groups, ‘professional’ and ‘generic’ languages, languages of generations and so forth” (272). On cant, see Reynolds, *Becoming Criminal*.
63. This early modern sense of “name(s)” continues to the present day. For a modern instance of the same, think of Lloyd’s of London’s “names,” so-called more for their ready capital than for their inherent social standing: “Starting in the mid-nineteen-seventies the graph of membership went Himalayan. . . . Both the nature of the members and the nature of the recruitment changed” (Barnes 78).
  64. Recall that Foucault begins his discussion of the problem of “the author” with the following statement: “the author’s name is a proper name, and therefore it raises the problems common to all proper names” (105).
  65. We understand the fraught nature of the term “class” with respect to early modern England; however, we follow Thompson in accepting the possibility of class “as a heuristic or analytic category to organize historical evidence which has very much less direct correspondence” (148). Furthermore, we find contemporary alternatives such as “degree,” “estate,” “order,” “rank,” or “sort” unsuitable for our discussion. For more on the problematic nature of discussing the English social order, see, respectively, Cressy and Wrightson, “Estates, Degrees.” For more on “class,” see Williams, 60–9.
  66. For modern examples of this phenomenon, consider celebrities such as Princess Diana, Elvis Presley, and Marilyn Monroe.
  67. Actually, according to Smith, there are three categories above “Gentlemen” including “Nobilitas major,” “Nobilitas minor,” and “Esquiers”; however, we take advantage of the fact that Smith also uses “Gentlemen” generally as in “the first part of gentlemen of englande called *Nobilitas major*” (20) and “the second sort of gentlemen which may be called *Nobilitas minor*” (21). We borrow the terminology, dominant, emergent, and residual, from Williams.
  68. For the importance of land to social standing, see Stone, 39–41, and Wrightson, *English Society*, 25, 27, 30.
  69. In this section, we draw heavily on Barton, Ferry, 69–70, Parker, 155–8, and 161–72. See also Jameson, 126–9. A standard starting point for the linguistic connections between proper and property is Marx’s *The German Ideology*, especially 79–81; 97–103.
  70. Unlike in modern grammars, Renaissance definitions of “proper names” focused on Christian rather than family names: Cato and Eduardus as opposed to say Douglas and Lincoln.

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