

Contents

<i>Acknowledgements</i>	x
<i>Series Editor's Preface</i>	xi
Introduction	1
1 Analysing Knowledge	3
The project	3
The classical account of knowledge	6
Gettier-style counterexamples	9
No false lemmas	13
External and internal epistemic conditions	15
The epistemological externalism/internalism distinction	17
Further reading	21
2 Anti-Luck Epistemology	22
Anti-luck epistemology and the Gettier problem	22
Formulating the anti-luck condition (I): the sensitivity principle	24
Interlude: possible worlds	25
Back to the sensitivity principle	27
The lottery problem	28
Methods	30
Formulating the anti-luck condition (II): the safety principle	33
Anti-luck epistemology reconsidered	38

viii Contents

Robust anti-luck epistemology	43
Problems with robust anti-luck epistemology (I): necessary propositions	44
Problems with robust anti-luck epistemology (II): the temp case	48
Concluding remarks	50
Further reading	51
3 Virtue Epistemology	52
Problems for process reliabilism	52
From process reliabilism to virtue epistemology	53
Virtue reliabilism <i>versus</i> virtue responsibilism	56
Modest virtue epistemology	59
Robust virtue epistemology	61
Two problems for robust virtue epistemology	63
Concluding remarks	70
Further reading	70
4 Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology	72
Recap	72
Anti-luck virtue epistemology	73
Anti-luck virtue epistemology and knowledge of necessary propositions	76
Interlude: is anti-luck virtue epistemology a reductive theory of knowledge?	78
Diagnosis	80
Concluding remarks	85
Further reading	85
5 Externalism and Internalism about Knowledge	86
Introduction	86
Three internalist theses	87
Classical <i>versus</i> non-classical epistemic internalism	92
Epistemological disjunctivism	94

Reflectively accessible factive reasons	97
Back to the epistemic externalism/internalism distinction	101
Further reading	102
6 Radical Scepticism	103
Introduction	103
The closure-based radical sceptical argument	104
Responding to the closure-based sceptical argument (I): the denial of the closure principle	109
Responding to the closure-based sceptical argument (II): attributer contextualism	113
Responding to the closure-based sceptical argument (III): neo-Mooreanism	119
Concluding remarks	126
Further reading	126
7 Understanding and the Value of Knowledge	128
The value problem for knowledge	128
Knowledge, achievement and final value	132
Understanding and final value	138
Concluding remarks	148
Further reading	149
<i>Bibliography</i>	151
<i>Index</i>	159

Introduction

In keeping with the aims of the series to which this book belongs, I have tried to write a text on contemporary epistemology which presents a coherent narrative arc through some of the key issues in this area. As such, I haven't aimed at offering a broad comprehensive sweep of *all* the issues (which means that I've left out some significant contemporary debates), and I've completely ignored the history of the subject (important though it is). There is a place for gargantuan texts which have these grander designs, but there is also a place for more concise works that cover a fundamental cross-section of pivotal contemporary issues in an area and nothing more. This book falls clearly into the latter category.

One unusual aspect to this book is that I decided to resist the scholarly urge to discuss philosophical *figures* in the main text (except where it is unavoidable), and have opted instead to focus solely on the *ideas*. The rationale for this is that it is the ideas after all that are our primary concern. Moreover, by doing things this way one can offer a cleaner and more straightforward summary of the literature, since one does not need to get bogged down by exploring those nuances which separate one philosopher's view from another's which don't have any significance for the wider philosophical debate. In any case, at the end of each chapter there is a detailed summary of where to look to find out who said what, so the reader will not be missing out on anything.

One final feature of the book that I want to flag is that although I've tried to present the ground covered here in a

2 Knowledge

generally impartial way, I've also not hesitated in making my own views clear at key junctures. My hope is that this will make the book of more interest to the reader; it's certainly true that as a student I found books written in this way more philosophically stimulating than their more coy counterparts. In any case, the people who pick up this book will surely know – or at least ought to know – that they should not defer to authority (to the extent that anyone in philosophy, much less myself, counts as an authority).

A further advantage of writing in this way is that it affords one scope to do more than merely *report* what is happening in the field. Indeed, my goal here is to write an accessible text on contemporary epistemology which actually *contributes* to the area; which *advances* the debate. Only time will tell if I have been successful in this regard, but I can at least say this much: it was surprisingly good fun trying.

Index

- ability intuition 9, 23, 43–4,
52–3, 72–4, 81
- accessibilism 87–102
- achievement 132–49
- anti-luck epistemology xii,
22–51, 72–9, 100, 109–12
- anti-luck intuition 9, 22–3,
43–4, 52, 72–4
- anti-luck virtue epistemology
72–85, 100
- Axtell, G. 51, 71, 151
- Baehr, J. 71, 151
- Black, T. 127, 151
- Chisholm, R. 21, 151
- classical account of
knowledge 6
- closure principle 107–8
- closure-based sceptical
argument 108–26
- Coffman, E. J. 51, 151
- cognitive ability 53–71, 72–6,
79–84, 124–5, 132–3
- Cohen, S. 51, 102, 127, 151, 154
- Conee, E. 102, 151
- content externalism/
internalism 92–102
- contextualism 113–27
- Craig, E. 21, 85, 151
- DeRose, K. 51, 127, 151
- Dretske, F. 51, 126, 151–2
- environmental epistemic
luck 64–70, 143–5
- epistemic disjunctivism
94–102, 124–7
- epistemic externalism/
internalism xii, 15–21,
23, 43, 57–9, 86–102, 122–7,
141–2, 147
- epistemic value xii, 128–50
- epistemic virtue *see* cognitive
ability; virtue reliabilism/
responsibilism
- Feldman, R. 102, 151
- Gettier, E. 6, 9–10, 21, 152
- Gettier-style counterexamples
9–21, 22–3, 52, 60–70, 74–5,
133, 138, 142, 146–7
- Gettier problem *see* Gettier-style
counterexamples
- Ginet, C. 21
- Goldberg, S. 51, 152
- Goldman, A. 21, 70, 152
- Greco, J. 51, 70, 71, 85, 149, 152
- Grice, H. P. 127, 152
- Grimm, S. 150, 152

160 Index

- Haddock, A. 102, 150, 152, 153
 Hawthorne, J. 126, 127, 153
 Hetherington, S. 21, 153
 Hiller, A. 51, 153
- indistinguishabilism 91–102
 infallibilism 106–7, 126
- justification 5, 6–21
- Kaplan, M. 153
 Klein, P. 126, 153
 knowledge-first epistemology
 5, 21
 Kornblith, H. 21, 102, 153
 Kusch, M. 85, 153
 Kvanvig, J. 70, 149, 150, 153
- Lackey, J. 51, 70, 153, 154
 Lau, J. 102, 154
 Lehrer, K. 21, 102, 154
 Lewis, P. 51, 127, 154
 lottery problem 28–30, 35–43,
 51, 75
 Loux, M. 51, 154
 Luck 38–43, 51, 64–70, 83–4
- Macpherson, F. 102, 152, 153
 McDowell, J. 102, 154
 Mentalism 88–102
 Millar, A. 102, 150, 153, 154
 Moore, G. E. 119, 127, 154
- neo-Mooreanism 119–27
 Neta, R. 51, 102, 153, 154
 new evil genius intuition
 90–2, 102
- no false lemmas 13–15, 19, 21
 Nozick, R. 51, 126, 154
- Plantinga, A. 70, 154
 Plato 129, 149, 154
 possible worlds 25–6
 Pritchard, D. H. xii, 21, 51, 71,
 85, 102, 126, 127, 149, 150, 153,
 154–6
- relevant alternatives
 intuition 106–7
 reliabilism 18–21, 52–9, 70
 Riggs, W. 51, 156
 Rysiew, P. 127, 156
- safety principle 33–51, 74–8,
 109, 111–12, 121–2
 sceptical hypotheses 106–26
 scepticism xii, 103–27,
 149–50
 sensitivity principle 24–5,
 27–33, 51, 109–13, 126–7
- Smith, M. 51, 156
 Socrates 129
 Sosa, E. 51, 70, 127, 156
 Stanley, J. 127, 156
 Steup, M. 21, 156
 Stine, G. C. 126, 156
- testimony 68–70, 75–6, 82, 138,
 145–7
- Truncellito, D. 21, 156
- understanding 138–50
 Unger, P. 51, 126, 156

- value, final 131–50
- value, instrumental 131–2
- virtue epistemology xii, 52–71,
73–6, 79, 85, 100, 132–8, 149
- virtue reliabilism/responsibilism
53–62, 70–1, 74–5
- Weatherson, B. 21, 156
- Williams, B. 85, 156
- Williams, M. 127, 156
- Williamson, T. 21, 51, 156
- Zagzebski, L. 21, 70, 150, 157

