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1

Introduction

Immigration and European integration

This book seeks to account for the developments whereby immigrants into the EU have acquired the politically salient status of 'risky' and 'dangerous' when only a few decades ago they were considered a peripheral question to the project of European integration. It asks how it is possible that the issue of immigration has been increasingly rendered visible as a security issue on the level of the EU and not as, say, a humanitarian or economic issue.

At first sight, this puzzle does not appear a puzzle at all. Politicians, policy-makers and the media often explain the view of immigrants as a source of insecurity by pointing out the increased number of immigrants and asylum-seekers during the early 1990s. However, such numbers prove little by themselves and there is no obvious connection between the number of immigrants and the frame of security. During the 1950s and the 1960s, for example, Western European states recruited large numbers of immigrants for economic purposes without triggering any of the security concerns that characterize the current debate on immigration. To the contrary, in Western European countries such as France, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium, the policy-making elites considered foreign labour a useful means to promote economic development and socio-political stability.

Interestingly, the undocumented status of immigrants was of minor concern only. Whereas today the 'fight' against 'illegal' immigration is one of the spear points of EU immigration policy, for a long time the issue of legality was subordinate to concerns about labour market

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gaps. Actually, the unregulated status of immigrants was viewed as an opportunity to exploit immigrant labour. As the former French Minister for Social Affairs, Jean Marie Jeanney, argued in 1966: 'Illegal immigration has its uses, for if we rightly adhere to the regulations and international agreements we would perhaps be short of labour' (cited in Geddes 2003: 53). In France, therefore, a residence permit could be obtained without a work permit and foreign labour was mainly recruited by the private sector outside the influence of public authorities. Furthermore, many immigrants living in France during the 1950s and 1960s did so without the appropriate identity documents (Hollifield 1994: 146). Although countries such as Germany and the Netherlands were generally more inclined to regulate the status of immigrants through the signing of recruitment agreements, these usually merely formalized and regulated the flows of immigrants that were already arriving in these countries before such agreements were concluded.¹

Within the context of European integration, the question of third country immigration was not a topic of heated policy debate either. For a long time immigration was considered to be a national matter and the EU only had an indirect impact on immigration policies through the promotion of free movement of member states nationals. For example, Council Regulation 1612/68 on free movement within the EU distinguishes explicitly between EU-nationals and non-EU nationals, stating that vacancies should only be offered to third country nationals if no EU-nationals could fill those vacancies (for a discussion, see Ugur 1995: 976). While the 1968 Regulation certainly was discriminatory in origin, this was not part of a deliberate attempt to 'fight' immigration.² Rather, immigration remained a peripheral question which was only 'considered in the context of social and economic rights and the construction of an integrated labour market in which workers could freely move between Member States' (Huysmans 2000a: 755). Indeed, until the early 1980s European cooperation on immigration was mainly channelled through the United Nations (UN) and the Council of Europe rather than the EU (Lavenex 2001).

This changed dramatically during the 1980s and 1990s, when immigration policy became increasingly Europeanized as part of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) which has played a crucial role in the development of the EU as an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). Immigration is predominantly framed and managed as a high-ranking security issue to the Union, the internal market and the freedom enjoyed by

EU-citizens. The current securitization of immigration in the EU provides an intriguing lens through which to explore the constitution of a European polity. Since immigration generally invokes thorny political questions of identity, loyalty, access and voice, what does it mean to interpret immigration as a security problem? How does the invocation of 'security' structure social relations within the EU, between the EU and its external environment? And how does it impact upon the distinction between EU-citizens and third country nationals? In which ways do security practices draw the boundaries of the EU?

These are the central questions of this book. More specifically, it pursues three related objectives. First, it unpacks the political and bureaucratic processes and struggles that drove the process by means of which immigration and asylum arose as security questions in the European integration process. In addition, this book draws out the specific governmental logic of insecurity – i.e. liberal risk administration – which these bureaucratic and political processes inscribed in European migration policy (and other justice and home affairs policy areas) in the European Union. The governmental logic of liberal risk management can help us understand the paradoxical existence of the EU as a liberal polity on the one hand and the renewed importance of exceptional and security practices in this polity on the other. Finally, this book explores forms of belonging that do not rely on the exclusionary measures of security around which the EU is constituted as an area of freedom, security and justice.

The securitization of immigration in the EU

In an attempt to show how immigration has been rendered visible as a security issue on the level of the EU (and not as, say, a humanitarian or economic issue), this book introduces some of the conceptual debates that are taking place within security studies into the discipline of European integration. This aims to introduce a constructivist agenda of threat construction into EU Studies. While constructivism is of course not an unknown species within the field of European integration (see Jørgensen 1997; Christiansen, Jørgensen et al. 2001; Walters and Haahr 2005), European integration theory has nevertheless tended to explain the emergence of a European politics of internal security as an objective response to sources of insecurity (Knelangen 2001; Mitsilegas, Monar et al. 2003; Müller 2003; Occhipinti 2003).

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As a result, European integration theories have been unable to account for the Europeanization of immigration as a security issue. For instance, the liberal intergovernmentalist understanding of the EU as a two-level game of national preference formation and international bargaining does not take us far in explaining the shift towards a more security-oriented understanding of immigration. In fact, such theories would have us expect the opposite. As Geddes puts it, 'tendencies towards expansive immigration policies are actually a structural characteristic of liberal states because the advocates of expansion, such as business interests, are better organised and have the ear of government, compared with the opponents of immigration, who are not and do not' (see also Hollifield 1992; Freeman 1995; Geddes 2000: 23).³ Despite the expectation that liberal polities tend to opt for expansive immigration policies, the EU has however developed an increasingly restrictive regime.

Also analyses that rely upon functionalist arguments of spill-over have a hard time accounting for the security framing of immigration. According to this theory, the abolition of internal borders for economic reasons requires cooperation in the field of security as open borders were thought to also facilitate criminal and illegal movement.⁴ Although, intuitively, this argument may sound appealing, its logic is seriously flawed. First, there is no statistical evidence to support the thesis that the abolishment of internal borders increases outside pressures.⁵ Second, this explanation puts too much emphasis on the border. On the one hand, it wrongly assumes that people only decide to move when borders are abolished. On the other, it greatly overestimates the effectiveness of border as a control instrument.⁶

Third, the view that security measures cover security deficits created by economic cooperation fits uncomfortably with the insight that important compensatory measures such as Schengen temporally *preceded* the large inflow of asylum-seekers in the early 1990s.⁷ Crucially, this reverses the claim that compensatory measures were a *reaction* to outside pressures (see Chapter 2 for a more detailed analysis). Finally, and most importantly, the spill-over argument does not tell us why immigration should be included as a threat alongside terrorism, organized crime and drugs trafficking. More generally, the specific form, scope and extent of security cooperation cannot be adequately accounted for by functionalist reasoning. Just how much security is needed? Which actors should do the securing? Which procedures,

actors and institutions should be established to deal with threats? And who decides what kinds of threats require responses in the first place?

Despite the prevalence of functionalist arguments in European integration theory, the connection between free movement and internal security is thus far than self-explanatory. This book suggests that the constructivist focus on the bureaucratic and political processes of threat construction is a more suitable framework for analysis. Building upon the Copenhagen School's theoretical framework of securitization, this book proposes to explore the process of securitization as the interplay between bureaucratic framing and political negotiations. Where the security literature often analyses the political level as simply legitimating what happens in bureaucratic processes, this book points out that politics can also open up bureaucratic sedimentation.

In its broadest sense, the concept of securitization implies that threats are not out there but constructed by social actors. Drawing on the linguistic theory of Austin and Searle, the Copenhagen School defines security as a speech act:

'Security' is thus a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue – not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat ... The process of security is what in language theory is called a speech act. It is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real; it is the utterance itself that is the act. By saying the words, something is done (like betting, giving a promise, naming a ship) (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998: 24, 26).

The 'securityness' of immigration cannot be assessed outside its discursive production. But from which authoritative position can security legitimately be enunciated? Bigo (1996, 2001) has suggested that the capacity to speak security should be located in the practices of bureaucratic experts. In modern Western societies the locus of security decisions is not the property of individual political actors, but located within the expert regimes of bureaucratic systems. To privilege the speech of political actors therefore risks ignoring the more mundane and routine-like processes of securitization which take place on an every-day basis.

Integrating empirical analysis of the securitization of migration in the European Union with theoretical interventions in the literature on

European integration, this book also contributes to conceptual developments in security studies. Considering the political and bureaucratic level as mutually constitutive, this book proposes a slightly different position than the one suggested by Bigo and his colleagues. On the one hand, it agrees with Bigo and his colleagues that the capacity to speak security is often located in specific institutionalized environments. Security experts make sense of and interact with the world on the basis of their professional self-understanding as those responsible for the regulation and management of dangers in society. In this sense, the term 'risk', with its institutional and bureaucratic connotations of management, seems more appropriate than the more dramatic notion of security.

On the other hand, this study shows it would be wrong to focus on the bureaucratic level alone. While Bigo may be right that the political power to take decisions is not terribly interesting if it is considered in isolation from the security professionals' power to determine the security agenda, political decision-making is still relevant in as far as it translates bureaucratic discourses into budgets, institution-building and decision-making. Some sort of interplay between the bureaucratic level of risk management and the political level of security-speak is always present. Although the main security dynamics are located at the bureaucratic level, the focus on bureaucratic practices alone risks ending up with a somewhat conspiratorial understanding of security as the increasing colonization of everyday life by security professionals such as the police, military and intelligence services. This 'doom scenario' of security experts taking over the world is reflected, for example, in Aradau's (Aradau 2001: 5) somewhat deterministic statement that we today live in a 'society at the mercy of a bureaucratized network which thrives on unsolvable security issues'. As I will show in Chapters 3 to 5, the political level often plays an important role in either authorizing, legitimizing, justifying, thwarting, dislocating or upsetting the enunciations of security professionals (see Figure 1.1).

Within the context of the EU, the intergovernmental conferences in particular are important elements in the securitization process because of their potential to introduce a sense of contingency in the routine practices and discourses that are played out on the EU-level. In intergovernmental conferences (as in elections), the normal or regular way of doing things is, at least to a certain degree, suspended. Intergovernmental bargains have the potential to open up




Figure 1.1 Securitization: The bureaucratic and political level

the reality of bureaucratic routines, while creating room for manoeuvre for bureaucratic agents to articulate and mobilize new discourses and knowledges. Political negotiations can relocate the authority to govern and manage immigration to professional contexts that are not concerned with threat management, such as development workers, foreign affairs officials or labour market experts. Thus, even if not everybody agrees with the view that intergovernmental negotiations represent the ‘constitutional moments’, ‘grand bargains’ or ‘big bangs’ of the integration process, few would claim that they do not matter at all.

In sum, by arguing that the functional sector of security and threat management is connected to the intergovernmental process of political bargaining, this book seeks to explain the securitization of immigration from a combined bureaucratic-politics perspective.

Security and the political: Liberalism, mobility, abjection

A second reason for bringing the concept of securitization into European Studies concerns the relation between security and the political. The framing of immigration in terms of security has a profound impact upon central political issues such as EU-citizenship, the relationship between EU-nationals with third country nationals and the ways in which the EU relates to its external environment. As Huysmans (2006: 13) rightly notes, ‘securitization in both its discursive and technocratic dimensions bears upon the more general question of the political identity of the EU.’ Unfortunately,

within European Studies, the constitutive relationship between security and the political is generally ignored. The EU is regarded as a pre-constituted entity with the capability to deploy a range of means and instruments to attain security. Yet, this ignores that the management of a security situation is at the same time also a founding practice for the community. Practices of security produce internal order by distributing trust between members of the community while relegating indeterminacy, fear and anarchy outside the social order. The risk management of immigration is a particular politics of belonging that distributes trust and fear.

Generally, within security studies, security has been understood as a *realist* practice that constitutes the political through the staging of an existential threat that is claimed to threaten the survival of a community.⁸ The realist understanding of security as a practice that integrates individuals according to the friend/enemy distinction also defines the Copenhagen School's speech act theory. According to the Copenhagen school, a securitizing act can be defined in the following way: 'If by means of an argument about the priority and urgency of an existential threat the securitizing actor has managed to break free of procedures or rules he or she would otherwise be bound by, we are witnessing a case of securitization' (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998: 25). Through a securitizing act an actor thus tries to elevate an issue from the realm of low politics (bounded by democratic rules and decision-making procedures) to the realm of high politics, war and national security. It is through the move towards this war-like opposition that actors establish their identity vis-à-vis an existential enemy (Schmitt 1996: 39). Embedded within a vision of the political as an exceptional domain, the Copenhagen School thus understands security as a binary, zero-sum game of identity-formation that establishes an intense and particularly forceful relationship between two opposing groups (Huysmans 1998; Williams 2003).

Yet, the securitization of immigration in the EU does not operate according to the sovereign *logic of war* that brings death into play through the staging of an existential threat. It does not seek to integrate free individuals into a political community according to the principle of Schmittian realism, but integrates EU citizens within the EU-order through the promotion of freedom qua mobility. While Huysmans (2006: 102) has suggested that the relationship between freedom and security is at the heart of all modern politics, this book

argues that 'governing through freedom' is better understood as a specific *liberal* mode of governing. Only within a liberal rationality is freedom viewed as an indispensable element in administering a population. As Gordon argues: 'Liberty is the circumambient medium of governmental action: disrespect of liberty is not simply an illegitimate violation of rights, but an ignorance of how to govern' (Gordon 1991: 20). Freedom is to be promoted, encouraged, harnessed and guided.

Within the governmental rationality of the EU, individuals are therefore not only free to move, they are also expected to do so – hence the great importance the EU attaches to harmonization, which basically is a process of deterritorialization with the aim of ensuring that the mobility of capital, goods and persons within the EU is unimpeded by national economic, political or social constraints (Barry 2001). Crucially, however, the exercise of mobility within the EU does not just depend upon facilitating measures that seek to establish the optimal conditions under which individuals actively start governing their own conduct of freedom; it also depends on the governance of what Huysmans has called the improper and irresponsible exercise of freedom (see Huysmans 2004a; van Munster and Sterkx 2005). Taking point of departure in the independent, autonomous liberal self as the norm against which the behavioural habits of individuals and groups is measured, calculated and, when necessary, corrected (Dean 2002), liberal governance divides between autonomous subjects and deviant, abject beings. As Hindess argues, in liberalism

we should also expect to find the development of routines for dealing with deviant cases: those families thought to provide a poor environment for the care and, especially, the socialization of children, immigrants who may not know the language, long-term unemployed people in danger of losing the habits of discipline required for regular employment, unemployed youth who may never have learned those habits, and so on . . . In place of the pervasive effects of discipline, an equally pervasive government of freedom is invoked, to similar effect (Hindess 1996: 130, 131).

Freedom, then, is not just something to be let loose and canalized in the internal market; it is also something to be managed through the

constant monitoring of activities that are identified as undermining mobility. Within the liberal rationality of governing security reappears as a technique for regulating the deviant conduct of freedom (Huysmans 2006). Figure 1.2 summarizes the differences between a political realist understanding of security and a liberal logic of security.

<i>Representation of threat</i>	<i>Political realism</i> Friend/enemy opposition; personification of the enemy	<i>Liberalism</i> Friend/enemy continuum; impersonal correlation of factors liable to produce risk
<i>Measures/strategy</i>	Exceptional measures that bypass normal political procedures; measures counteract existential threat	Normal measures such as surveillance and risk profiling; measures contribute to the social control of larger populations
<i>Objective</i>	Elimination of threat; the elimination of a threat secures the collective survival of a socio- political order	Freedom; management of risks secures the circulation of goods, persons and capital

Figure 1.2 Two logics of security: Political realism v. liberalism

The focus on the governmental logic of liberalism does not imply that the realist logic of war has no validity at all for understanding how security operates in the EU. A brief glance at the metaphors deployed in discourses on immigration – the ‘war’ or ‘fight’ against immigration; ‘Fortress’ Europe; the ‘combating’ of immigration; ‘flanking’ measures; ‘frontline’ states – all bear witness to the continuing importance of the language game of war in structuring social relations between the EU and third country nationals. Nevertheless, on the level of practices (rather than speech) security has become more and more de-dramatized and integrated within administrative security apparatuses whose function is not to wage a battle against an enemy but to regulate mobility within and into the EU. Within a liberal rationality, security is not so much about the staging of an existential threat as about a form of ‘targeted governance’ (Valverde and Mopas 2004) aimed at groups deemed unqualified for the autonomous exercise of freedom and mobility.

Considering the liberal logic in more detail, this book empirically examines an array of initiatives developed to manage mobility and immigration risk, ranging from remote control, knowledge-based border management and camps to the involvement of private actors in the risk-driven population management. By examining how security practices in the EU constitute the political, this book seeks to account for the apparent paradox that the EU, a liberal regime concerned with the promotion of cross-border mobility, increasingly relies on exclusionary and illiberal practices of security.

Abject mobility and the unmaking of security

The paradoxical coexistence of the Union's focus on free movement on the one hand and its increasing reliance upon practices of security on the other can be understood within the context of a liberal governance of freedom, where groups are made amenable to forms of intervention that are increasingly punitive and exclusionary. Although risk management under liberal conditions of governance may seem more benign than the exceptional practices identified with the realist paradigm of national security and war, risk performs an exclusionary function with pernicious political effects. The governance of freedom in the EU introduces a break in life between forms of life that are described as responsible and those that are considered bogus. It fragments populations into different categories which are subjected to different forms of power, regulation and control. Following Rose, risk management is best described as an act of abjection:

Abjection is an act of force. This force may not be violence, but it entails the recurrent operation of energies that initiate and sustain this casting off or a casting down, this demotion from a mode of existence, this 'becoming abject'. Abjection is a matter of the energies, the practices, the works of division that act upon persons and collectivities such that some ways of being, some forms of existence are cast into a zone of shame, disgrace or debasement, rendered beyond the limits of the liveable, denied the warrant of tolerability, accorded purely a negative value (Rose 1999: 253).

The abjection of immigrants, especially so-called illegal immigrants, in the EU is apparent. Risk technologies such as camps, airport holding

zones, visa requirements and expulsion seek to regulate a form of abject mobility. Here, the identification of the liberal self takes place ‘through a repudiation which produces a domain of abjection’, the “‘unliveable” and “uninhabitable” zones of social life’ designed for ‘those who do not enjoy the status of the subject’ (Butler 2003: 3). The abject, as Aradau (2007: 60) rightly notes, thus only exists as the limit to the domain of subjectivity, i.e. the cast offs of the liberal order. As a consequence, immigrant voices are often not considered as political voices engaged in a struggle. Securitized as illegal immigrants and bogus refugees, their political agency is denied (Aradau 2004).

For example, acts of resistance (hunger strikes, the sewing of lips and eyes, and even suicide) by rejected asylum-seekers are seen as irresponsible choices made by free individuals aimed at manipulating society. Thus former Belgian Interior Minister Patrick Dewael described a hunger strike by 300 Afghans threatened with expulsion as a form of ‘blackmail’ (The Guardian 2003), while the former Dutch Minister for Integration, Rita Verdonk, complained that the ‘media hype’ about asylum-seekers’ protests against her plan to expel 26,000 undocumented asylum-seekers would merely cause these asylum-seekers ‘to believe that they can simply overturn the process by self-mutilation’ (cited in Institute of Race Relations 2004).

Equally, undocumented immigrants that cannot be expelled to their country of origin are often detained in exit centres with the aim of ‘convincing’ them that return is the best way to exercise their freedom. Dorn Andras, director of Bern police, explains the function of exit centres in the management of undocumented immigrants in Switzerland, a signatory of the Schengen agreements, as follows:

The asylum-seekers we bring up here are ones that should leave Switzerland. By putting them in the (exit centres), they will not feel comfortable and they will realise Switzerland doesn’t want them anymore – so they will have to accept the decision and leave ... The accommodation we provide for refugees is already very basic. So for rejected asylum-seekers I had to find something of an even lower standard, and that meant it had to go underground (cited in Fekete 2005).

Furthermore, risk management tends to promote a technical discussion of immigration that suppresses a more fundamental political

debate about who should be allowed access to the social fabric of society.

In an attempt to unmake the relations of power that turn immigrants into risky populations, the final aim of this book is to argue in favour of a form of belonging that is not organized around the mediation of risk and fear. Instead of viewing the actions of migrants as dangerous to the EU, the struggle of immigrants could also be regarded as a strategic, political practice that is *constitutive* of community, EU-citizenship and freedom. In particular, Chapter 6 suggests that there is much to gain from thinking of the abject as a political category. Rather than repressing the other as the abject that makes freedom impossible, we should rethink our political community from the standpoint of those that are rendered abject. As Balibar puts it: '[W]e must attack the obsessive question of collective insecurity by beginning precisely with the situation of the most 'insecure', the nomadic populations who are the source of and target of the obsession with law and order that is so closely intertwined with the obsession with identity' (Balibar 2004: 177).

Drawing on the work of Rancière and Balibar and its uptake in security studies, this book points at the possibility of reinventing European belonging from the standpoint of the abject. It does so by considering the struggle in which the *sans-papiers* (undocumented immigrants) movement in France has been involved. While abject populations often remain out of sight, relegated to spaces of exclusion that renders them invisible, recounting their actual struggles against security brings the agency of the abject into vision (Nyers 2003). It bears witness to the reasons for which immigrants risk expulsion and exclusion in their refusal to be governed as abject populations. The struggle of the *sans-papiers* movement exemplifies that universal forms of belonging around the right to free movement depend on the verification, demonstration and re-inscription of that right. They acknowledge that the rights of free movement are simultaneously present (as written inscriptions and in discursive statements on EU-citizenship) and non-present (not enacted). The *aporia* of rights as both present and absent functions as the necessary background condition for forging new forms of belonging (rights are out there to be taken). In the EU, then, political belonging and questions of European citizenship necessarily unfold through arguments, struggles, verifications and denials about the already existing rights of freedom and mobility.

EU-citizenship is not just a status; it is a practice that unfolds in the space between members and outsiders.

The content of this book

This book consists of five chapters. The first three are dedicated to the institutional dynamics of threat construction and examine how immigration has been interpreted as a security issue at the expense of other discourses. In doing so, they trace security discourses and analyze to which degree these are reflected and rooted in treaties, decision-making structures, policies and budgets. Chapter 2 begins by scrutinizing the specific institutional configuration of cooperation in the field of immigration and examines how security professionals working in the area of internal security have managed to frame immigration as a security issue. Because much cooperation in the pre-Maastricht years took place on an informal, even secretive, basis, Chapter 2 makes use of the accounts of actors involved in the decision-making process such as representatives from national ministries (Rupperecht 1989; Rupperecht and Hellenthal 1992; Rupperecht 1993; Nanz 1995), the European Commission (de Lobkowicz 1994; Fortescue 1995; de Lobkowicz 2002; Fortescue 2002), the European Parliament (Esders 1995), security professionals (Wrench 1996), the Schengen/Benelux secretariat (Kruijtbosch 1993; van de Rijt 1998) and NGO representatives (Busch 1989; Bunyan 1991). Besides these accounts, I have also benefited from earlier studies on European police cooperation, especially those undertaken by Bigo (1996) and the Edinburgh school of police studies (Benyon, Turnbull et al. 1993; Benyon, Turnbull et al. 1994; Benyon 1996).

Chapters 3 and 4 focus upon the intergovernmental conferences (IGC) of Maastricht and Amsterdam respectively.⁹ These IGCs are conceptualized as institutionalized 'moments of openness' with potentially disrupting effects on the security framing of immigration. Reading these IGCs as political interferences in the bureaucratic procedures and routines, I ask in which ways they have reinforced, reified, uprooted or displaced the interpretation of immigration as a security issue. Despite the commonsensical understanding of immigration as a security issue, the discussion of the Maastricht and Amsterdam IGCs aims to show that there is nothing natural or self-evident about the security nature of immigration.

These chapters also illustrate the liberal logic of security at work. Whereas Maastricht institutionalized the connection between free movement and security, the Amsterdam treaty in particular has given rise to targeted interventions to manage immigration risk. Moving somewhat away from the institutional dynamics of threat construction, Chapter 5 shows that post-Amsterdam security has become a question of targeting risky spaces (airports, third countries), populations (asylum-seekers, undocumented immigrants) and activities (travel, human trafficking) involving an array of interdependent practices such as visa-policy, carrier sanctions, liaison officers, the camp and knowledge-based border management. Finally, Chapter 6 seeks to resist the security frame and calls for the unmaking of security. Whereas the security frame can be resisted on different grounds, this chapter argues that, ultimately, security can only be unmade when we accept that politics is the setting up of a dispute where the abject confront society with a claim to be recognized as equal.

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