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Section One

Community Cohesion

1

Governing the Social and the Problem of the 'Stranger'

Gordon Hughes

Introduction

The specific focus of this chapter is on the changing governance of the stranger in the context of the conjunction of international, national and local strategies where attempts simultaneously to regulate asylum seeking and migration, and to promote community safety and social cohesion, collide in uneasy and uncertain ways. There is, of course, a growing body of important research and expert commentary on the connections between repressive policing and detention and the broader conditions for the criminalisation and securitisation of forced migration and asylum seeking (see, for example, Bauman, 2004a; Welsh and Schuster, 2005). These dominant tendencies may be said to be attempts to 'subordinate the social' (Clarke, 2007a) and threaten in their wake anti-social consequences. However, there has been much less analysis of, and commentary on, how the issues of asylum seeking and forced migration relate to and provoke new questions about what may constitute the social and how 'it' may be governed. These issues are related specifically to policies and governmental strategies around community safety and social cohesion in the increasingly diverse and unequal localities of the affluent world. This chapter seeks to make a small contribution to opening up this area of both social scientific research and empirical inquiry, and politico-normative intervention.[1]

It is now almost sociological commonsense to point to the growing diversity and insecurity in the ever-more globally inter-connected world with all its criminogenic and insecurity-inducing consequences. Sparks, for example, contends that 'the sense of exactly where our bodies lie and how they can feasibly be defended and by whom remains increasingly unclear' (2003, p. 152). Again according to Sparks (2003), the dangers and contagions of this endemically uncertain world are expressed in a growing obsession, at the multiple levels of the person, locality, region and nation, with 'dangers on the borders', and, I would add, those associated with 'border-crossings'. It is to these apparent dangers, real and imagined, and their

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challenges for governing the social, that this chapter is addressed. It is evident that the problem of the 'dangerous/criminal' immigrant stranger is not a new phenomenon. Rather it has been a significant one for public discourses on law and order historically – in the case of the UK, for example, from the case of the Irish immigrant in the 19th century (Curtin, 1971) to that of Afro-Caribbean youth in the 1970s and beyond (Leas and Young, 1984). Nonetheless, this chapter presents an argument as to why the figure of the asylum seeker/refugee needs to be central today in any debate on governing the social and the anti-social due to the iconic role such figures are increasingly occupying in the politics of safety and cohesion ('safer communities') across many late modern societies.

The chapter is organised as follows. It begins by clarifying the key terms employed in the argument, which in turn set up the provocations delineated in the latter parts of the paper. In the sections that follow the discussion outlines in brief the grand, totalising sociological narratives of catastrophe which underpin much critical scholarship on the ways in which migration and asylum seeking have been increasingly subjected to processes of 'securitisation' and 'criminalisation'. The focus then turns in greater depth to a critical evaluation of these grand epochal narratives and relatedly how such narratives have been appropriated by 'critical', sociological, criminological and social policy analysts. In the final section of the chapter, an argument is presented for a more nuanced, and in turn more 'realist' and 'realistic' analysis, together with a discussion of some of the normative and political issues this approach brings into view. Support for these claims is derived from the author's ongoing comparative empirical research into the instabilities and volatilities of governing strategies and practices, in particular geo-historical contexts, associated in this case with local refugee inclusion and community safety policies.

Deciphering the terms of the debate

Much of my work over the last 15 years in the field of multi-agency community safety work has involved me in provocations with other 'critical' scholarship in this field. One such provocation has involved an ongoing and often tortured argument about the nature and consequences of the 'new' local governance of crime and disorder, but also about governing practices, more broadly, around safety and ordering in late modern conditions. In part this is captured by Simon's influential thesis of 'governing through crime' (and of late terror) (see Simon, 2007 and Hughes, 2008b) which I argue is too restricted as a thesis, and which needs to be recoded to also focus on the processes of governing more generally through safety and community as well as crime and terror (Hughes, 2007a). In the process this argument has led me to try and to unsettle the prevalent dystopian accounts of 'critical' commentators, which in turn are generally premised

on epochal sociological narratives of control.[2] Second, I have been engaged in arguing for and attempting to undertake critical realist comparative research into localities and their geo-historical contexts (Edwards and Hughes, 2005; Hughes and Edwards, 2005).[3] Arising out of these concerns to resuscitate a left realist and social democratic criminology, urgent questions emerge not least with regard to what types of evidence and claims to expertise we can draw on as social *scientists* working in the sciences of *the social* – if the word 'science' dare speak its name! More specifically this second provocation calls for greater attention from social scientists to what is now often termed in post-structuralist terminology as the 'extra-discursive' or what we may more accurately term the materially real and messy. In short this may be understood as a plea for sociologists especially and 'governmentalists' (see Rose, 1999) to both get out more and subordinate, but not abandon, the textual in order to research empirically the unfinished and contested business of governing the social in institutional sites, formations and actual practices. In doing so attention needs to be paid to the 'imbrications of rule and resistance' (O'Malley, cited in Wood, 2006) where such different elements as the 'dominant, residual and emergent tendencies' compete and coalesce in dynamic interrelationship with each other (Clarke, 2007a: 983).

Sociological realism and the cultural turn

Some of the arguments presented in this chapter first appeared in the context of a special issue of the journal *Cultural Studies*, entitled *Governing the Social*. This special issue in turn was the product of collective debate and argument among members of the Open University Social Policy (and now Criminology) Department. The polemic underpinning the *Governing The Social* collection sought to highlight the ways in which assumptions underpinning the study of social policy in the UK have been profoundly disrupted in both theory and practice following the unsettling of the social democratic welfare state and consequently since the rise to dominance of the unevenly realised neo-liberal project (Hughes, 1998; Clarke *et al.*, 2000; Clarke, 2004). This 'disordered landscape' to use John Clarke's (2007a) phrase was the backdrop to 'our' collective interest in attempting to rethink and open up new research agendas around governing the social. Furthermore, the ambition of the Open University project was to develop productive relations across the fields of social policy and cultural studies and more hesitantly criminology.[4] What increasingly and especially interests this author is not any simple contrast between the 'speculative theorising' of Cultural Studies and the 'hard-headed realism' of traditional, mainstream Social Policy and Criminology (Clarke, 2007b: 837). Rather it is about the ways in which these tendencies around both theorising and empirical research may result in mutually productive encounters, not least through the lens of critical realism (Hughes, 2007a). Again, this chapter hopes to develop further such encounters across disciplinary borders.

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Let me now attempt to explain the key terms of the debate as captured in the title of the chapter.

Why governing?

The term *governing* captures 'the troubled and turbulent set of relationships, processes and practices that were once rather more comfortably identified as the state' (Clarke, 2007b: 837). In turn it is an agnostic term pointing to the assemblage of processes and practices that help us explore the situated struggles over governance (Clarke, 2007b) whilst also recognising the necessary relations of power dependence and asymmetric relations (Edwards and Hughes, 2008a). All these processes are at play in the work and struggles around asylum seeking but equally so in the struggles over, for example, the governance of anti-social behaviour and urban regeneration (see Hughes, 2007a: chapters 5 and 7).

Why the social?

Again, as Clarke (2007b: 839) notes, 'the social' is a troubled and turbulent concept, once assumed to reside in the 'old' social policy and associated with the positive dimensions of life associated with the personal, the familial, the communal, and slightly less comfortably with class and national belongings. Now the social is also increasingly about 'mapping difference' and how particular sets of distinctions, divisions and identities are ordered and disordered (Clarke, 2007b: 840). Whilst the rise of neo-liberalism may have led some commentators to speak of 'the death of the social' (Rose, 1999), there is strong evidence that the 'old' social refuses 'to go quietly' and it remains 'the site of deep social and cultural attachments' and in turn 'the focus of intense and unsettling desires for security, improvement, success, solidarity and better ways of life (of very different kinds)' (Clarke, 2007a: 982, 984). There is also a powerful conundrum remaining around the social which speaks to both its old and new forms, namely that it is hard to give up on belonging and cohesion and there are no easy answers in debating unity/solidarity alongside difference/diversity. Again these difficult issues are condensed and often viscerally expressed in the debate on asylum seeking and (inward) migration in the UK.

Why community safety?

It is unlikely that the term 'community safety' will ever be adequately or finally pinned down. Indeed community safety's history as a policy idea and set of practices in the last three decades appears to confirm its status as a moving target, oscillating from a criminal policy 'Cinderella' in the 1980s to a policy of 'Belle of the Ball' in the 2000s (Hughes, 2002). Its very capaciousness, like that of 'community cohesion', may in part explain its continued and growing appeal and salience in political and policy circles as well as the different and competing intellectual narratives it is able to accom-

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modate (see Edwards and Hughes, 2008a). Let me nonetheless attempt briefly to clarify what community safety represents as a form and mode of localised or territorialised governing. Firstly I argue that 'community' as object, site, resource and even agency of governance is the new communitarian mantra for politicians across many neo-liberal states. It is routinely expressed in the call for public services to become closer to communities, to respond to community needs, and, more adventurously, to develop the capacity of communities to take responsibility for services once declared the province of the state. With regard to the rise of the specific policy field of 'community safety' across increasing numbers of contemporary states, it is possible to discern a formal, territorialised, 'community-based' preventive and safety infrastructure, epitomised by the governmental technique of the local, multi-agency community safety or preventive partnership. This relatively new preventive and safety sector cuts across the traditional boundaries of crime control and social policy in complex and volatile ways (Hughes, 2008a). Common to the logic of these new institutions and the habitus of the governmental technicians in this sector is the supposed 'mobilisation', 'responsibilisation' and if necessary, communitarian 'remoralisation' of local communities in their own self-governance. For some commentators, these experiments in community governance offer us the possibilities for progressive inventiveness in 'nodal' governance (Johnston and Shearing, 2003). On the other hand, for critics such experiments may be ushering in a new totalitarianism and authoritarianism (Borch, 2005; Scraton, 2002). And for others (this author included) it is a policy terrain of unfinished contestation and unstable governance, the outcomes of which remain uncertain and precariously balanced between progressive and regressive possibilities. One of the acid tests of such contested policies of community safety and cohesion is increasingly linked to the question of what to do about the problem of the 'stranger' and 'outcast' in local communities.

Why the asylum seeker as the stranger?

The use of the word 'stranger' here also needs some discussion given the specific uses of the word in sociological theory, past (Simmel, 1950) and present (Bauman, 2004a), which have been closely linked to questions of estrangement and urbanity. The use of the term 'stranger' in this chapter is also different from the manner in which it is used by Young (1999) and Carson (2003) when it is argued 'we are better described in the main as a society of loosely connected or lightly engaged strangers rather than in terms of the old (and itself questionable) idea of the traditional community' (Carson, 2003: 2). It is hard to dissent from this judgement although there is also a danger in exaggerating the looseness and lightness of our mutual connections, not least in terms of the experiences and material constraints at work on different social classes, movements of people and strata in contemporary diverse and increasingly unequal nations. More

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importantly for the argument here, however, it is contended that 'we' are not all equally regarded as 'mutual strangers'. A key claim made is that the asylum seeker/refugee in countries like the UK remains represented in dominant discourses as the stranger, coded as the dangerous and polluting 'outsider' or 'Other' when compared to the established 'host' communities. This is illustrative of what may be termed 'stranger fetishism' in the politics of othering whereby migrants, in this case, are reduced to essences. The term 'stranger' is thus employed to capture how the outsider and outcast are categorised, managed and controlled, as well as the uncertain contestations of and resistances to such processes by various actors, both by 'strangers' themselves and others engaged in encounters with 'them': in other words the imbrications of rule and resistance.

The specific type of stranger discussed in this paper is thus the ambivalently 'mobile' migrant seeking refugee status and asylum seeker in affluent western localities. In a real sense such people may be understood as being both mythic in part (as the dehumanised subjects of moral panics) and achingly real (as survivors, victims, criminals, strugglers, adaptive 'guests' and so on).[5] Along with the less mobile outcast of the 'anti-social underclass' who may often live 'cheek by jowl' with new immigrants and a range of damaged and vulnerable people (Hughes, 2007a), the master status of the asylum seeker increasingly across 'host' countries has been that of the vilified 'Other' and threat to 'order, safety and civilisation' as 'we' have known it. The recognition of this dominant tendency of often virulent othering appears a necessarily realistic starting point for the development of more progressive interpellation which may be part of the struggle to turn these 'nomads' into 'guests' of late modernity. This dominant tendency has preoccupied the totalising narratives around the 'securitisation of migration' onto which I now turn.

Securitisation of migration and epochal narratives of catastrophe

I have previously chronicled the compelling grand sociological narrative of catastrophic change associated with social theory's seemingly abiding pessimism about the present and by implication the future (Hughes, 2007a). Here I do not wish to discuss the narrative in any depth; instead a brief exposition which highlights its key claims will suffice. In summary the key claims made are associated with the identification of a potent and regressive mix of

- a rampant neo-liberal and globalising marketisation,
- a neo-conservative ideology supported by the 'clash of civilisations' thesis, and

- the institutionalisation of a global politics of terror meets the securitisation and criminalisation of migration emanating from the USA and spreading across western democracies.

Let's unpack the features of both criminalisation and securitisation of migration within the grand narrative (much of which in passing it should be noted provides an accurate portrayal of the dominant tendencies at play).

Here's the story. Across the West the new processes of migration and the formal response to them are placing a heavy overlay of racialisation on local and national criminal control and security systems. More and more migrants are getting caught up in these systems both as perpetrators and as victims. The emotionally labile issues of security and exclusion continue to sweep across the West and add further to the fuelling of what may be termed the West's nightmares over cultural identity. It would appear that the conflation of 'migrant'/'asylum seeker'/ 'terrorist' is fast becoming one of the most striking of all shared western nightmares. Clarke captures the nature of the dominant regressive collective nightmare and nostalgia summoned up by migration as follows:

> Mobility, migration and mixing evoke a (colonial) nostalgia for when peoples knew their places: the land, the climate, the culture and the people in their 'traditional' and proper alignment. This imperative is articulated by governments (as they confront asylum-seekers and migrants), by nationalist and racist political forces as they dream of ethnic/racial purity, and by populist media discourses that persist in eliding race, nation and place. The wish that people would stay 'where they belong' is the primitive geography that informs this conception of how race and place are aligned. (Clarke, 2004: 64)

Across the West a new dominant 'trade' in policy ideas about migration and asylum seeking has been developed associated with what has been termed the 'securitisation of migration' (Huysmans, 2006). Illustrative of this hegemonic new state strategy across the West, the US Immigration and Naturalization Service was reorganised in 2003 as part of the 'Orwellian'-sounding US department of Homeland Security. In this new international policy context, immigration becomes defined and represented ever more powerfully as a matter of security. Such developments are evident across much of Europe in the increasingly harmonised and draconian EU policies on security and the control of terrorism alongside illegal migration. The possibility of a pan-European convergence predicated on 'integration through security' has been highlighted particularly by the critical policy literature. According to Grewcock (2003: 114–115), for example, across the EU the official 'smuggling/trafficking' discourse, with its focus on law enforcement as the core element of border protection, reflects the

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development of a 'European Security Zone' in which the issues of national security and immigration policy are increasingly fused.

It may be suggested that a form of schizophrenia pervades Western responses to asylum seekers and refugees in which great importance is attached to the principle of asylum but enormous efforts are made to ensure that refugees never reach the territory of the state where they could receive its protection (Gibney, 2004: 2). As noted above, this hostile political and policy context has further 'chilled' in the post-9/11 and 7/7 conjuncture where national security is increasingly viewed as being antithetical to asylum-giving. The consensus among Western states, post-9/11 and 7/7, may be described as follows: that refugees constitute as much a threat as an asset; that there are major dangers posed by asylum seekers, related to their increasingly diverse and variegated nature; and that there is a need for international co-operation to deal with these new security risks (Gibney, 2004: 256). Migration is thereby transformed increasingly into a security concern.

Asylum, abolitionism and the 'normative turn'

In the discussion which follows I begin by focusing on the limitations of much of the critical scholarly canon on 'what is to be done', politically, practically and normatively, about asylum seeking and forced migration, before presenting an alternative social democratic and 'left realist' argument in the next section of the chapter.

We saw in the previous section that the powerful and broad thrust of critical scholarship on the contemporary politics of migration is to suggest that it has developed into a socially exclusivist and politically regressive security issue, cynically invoking dangers to public order and stability brought by criminal and terrorist abuses. In turn, it is contended that deterrence has been 'an enabling discourse of a refugee policy in which affluent western democracies pose as beleaguered victim and those in need of protection are positioned as the ultimate deviant' (Pickering and Lambert, 2002: 83). The supposed dangers from migration and asylum seeking allow for the suspension of human rights and at times indefinite imprisonment. Furthermore, it is widely argued that such contemporary trends are part of an emergent globalising technocratic and political surveillance system linked to the militarisation of migration (Yuval-Davis *et al.*, 2005). Commenting on pan-European trends, Green and Grewcock (2002) among others argue that the 'war' against illegal immigration has in fact become part of a deliberate political project to create an exclusive new European identity (after the Cold War) premised on opposition to the Muslim and Third worlds. According to these authors 'the new Europe is not just a fortress, but a bastion of state crime' (Green and Grewcock, 2002: 98). The broader cultural consequences of this trend are viewed as being the rise of 'defensive identity communities' and 'ethnic fundamentalism' to meet the threat

of 'unassimilable strangers, draining state resources' (Yuval-Davis *et al.*, 2005: 516).

The thrust of the claims presented by this burgeoning body of critical scholarship is that of moral and political condemnation – 'critique writ large' – of the Western-wide strategy of exclusion of asylum seekers/ migrants through the fused logics of securitisation and criminalisation. It is less common to see such scholars engage explicitly in normative and political arguments that address what may be both alternative and practical ways of addressing the 'real' problems associated with mass, forced migration from the poor to rich countries. However, Grewcock (2003: 113) does address the political and normative dimension of his critique in arguing for an alternative discourse to that of the simultaneous criminalisation and securitisation of irregular migration based on 'understanding the social dynamics of migration and developing forms of analysis which embrace the right to free movement'. In turn, an abolitionist position is presented:

> To be worthwhile, a critical discourse must locate smuggling/trafficking as a manifestation of state control, rather than a justification for state sanctions; and elevate the rights of the migrant above the illusory permanence of border controls. Suggesting these controls should be abolished – and therefore removing the state's capacity to criminalise all those connected with irregular migration…offers a route through all the contradictions to which the smuggler/trafficker discourse gives rise. (Grewcock, 2003: 132)

The deconstructionist argument offered here is for the abolition of all border controls and for the free movement of all migrants. Unfortunately we do not find out how we get from 'here' (security states and the obsession with borders) to 'there' (a world free of border controls).

Broader intellectual support for this powerful narrative of repression of human rights for migrants alongside a seemingly totalising, convergent movement towards the securitisation of safety and migration across affluent western societies is apparent in the influential writings of the public intellectual, Zygmunt Bauman (1999, 2001, 2004a and b) and, to a lesser extent, others inspired by his dystopian diagnosis of our times, such as Jock Young (1999, 2003). As Bauman dramatically notes:

> A spectre hovers over the planet: the spectre of xenophobia. Old and new, never extinguished and freshly defrosted and warmed up tribal suspicions and animosities have mixed and blended with the brand-new fear for safety distilled from the uncertainties and insecurities of liquid existence…Indeed, throughout the world ruled by democratically elected governments the sentence 'I'll be tough on crime' has turned out to be the trump card that beats all others, but the winning hand is

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> almost invariably a combination of a promise of 'more prisons, more policemen, longer sentences' with an oath of 'no immigration, no asylum rights, no naturalisation'. (2004b: 119)

It is important to note that Bauman's work is of axial importance in opening up a broader public debate on the consequences of the new global mobilities for the politics of safety and for questions of identity, belonging and diversity in late modern societies. At the same time, Bauman's conclusions have tended to be profoundly pessimistic given the totalising narrative presented. Such a grand epochal narrative clearly captures much of the dominant tendencies at play in the politics and policies of asylum control and immigration across many late modern societies. In turn it would be dangerously naïve and optimistic to downplay such potentially globalising processes of victimisation and demonisation of migrants as 'outcasts'. However, such dystopian narratives may dangerously underplay the contested character of these dominant processes and the resistances, both residual and emergent, to them. In such sociological work then, there remains insufficient attention to the policy process, from formulation, to implementation, and outcomes, and crucially the actual practices of governing in specific localities and in varying geo-historical contexts.

Beyond critique and dystopianism

The grand narrative perspective helps us identify the ways in which the new mobilities associated with forced migration flows across the world relate to the dangerously condensed intersection of migration and asylum seeking and new forms of governing the social that centre on policing and exclusivist security strategies. Only a fool would deny the often fatal consequences of these master trends at work. And of course it is evident that crime control, community safety, social cohesion and integration do often become merged in the contemporary politics of law and order. However, whilst recognising the urgency of a critique of currently dominant discourses and practices of state and allied institutions in the management and control of migrant populations, I wish to argue that critique alone is insufficient. New possibilities and spaces for progressive interventions must also be articulated, particularly if commentators such as Crawford are correct in observing that 'what we share is fashioned increasingly by our fears and concerns' (2002: 37).

In making this argument 'beyond critique', I turn briefly to the work of critical realist thinker Andrew Sayer (2000, 2004) whose work opens up the possibility of a radical 'normative turn' in debates on safety and asylum, and belonging and the 'stranger' in contemporary social formations. Sayer has observed that there is a remarkable imbalance between our ability to think about the social world scientifically, as something to be understood

and explained, and our ability to think about it normatively or even how it might be. For all the important work critiquing and deconstructing the processes of criminalisation/securitisation and questioning the legitimacy and legality of state processes, there are few sustained attempts at constructing alternative 'imaginaries' on the solidarity/diversity debate in the existing critical policy literature on asylum seeking and forced migration. This is surprising given the fact that any criticism of existing social relations and institutional forms (unless totally fatalistic) presupposes logically the possibility of a better way of life and improved conditions for human flourishing. As Sayer (2004: 12) notes, 'a "critical" theory that takes no interest in normative implications is a contradiction in terms'. Social scientists wishing to intervene in debates on asylum seeking, crime control and community safety might gain much from looking to the engagement with normative theory by such commentators as the political theorist, Gibney, the human geographer, Robinson and the sociologist of law, Carson. These interventions range from the pragmatic and middle range theorising of Gibney and Robinson to the self-consciously 'utopian' and speculative reimagining of Carson with regard to hospitality (see Hughes, 2007b: 941–943).

Critical social science and the troublesome community

In much contemporary 'critical' criminological commentary any interest in researching the policy and practice of 'community safety' – never mind 'really existing' communities and their potentially progressive (as well as regressive) mobilisation as collective actors in social ordering – has in the last three decades been viewed at best as a somewhat quaint 'modernist' obsession. Furthermore, according to prominent 'cultural' criminologists like Jock Young (2007), this obsession at its worst appears to imply political and normative support for a dangerously exclusive idea which to boot is outmoded sociologically for these liquid times of 'lightly engaged strangers'. That noted, the constant public clamour over community, and its policy ubiquity across late modern societies, are difficult for social scientists to ignore – even if it (community) is interpreted as the stuff of collective fantasies (Clarke, 2005) or top-down mystification and 'sound-bites' (Amin, 2005). Like it or not (and most critical social scientists do not like it), community in policy and political terms is often 'where the action is'. As this author noted in the opening lines of a recent book on the comparative politics of crime and community, 'in contemporary Anglophone countries, it is almost impossible to avoid hearing the word "community" being used in policy and political debates and discourses regarding questions of what is to be done about problems of crime and disorder and concomitant preventive and safety-focused solutions' (Hughes, 2007a: 7). Frequently, the concept of community appears in policy and political discourse as a bulwark against crime and anti-social behaviour and a vital source of social cohesion and unity. 'Community' and 'crime' have thus become co-joined

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as a binary hierarchy, as the promotion of the former is envisioned as a strategy to reduce, or even defeat, the latter. This is often an unhelpful – even though seductive – representation. On the other hand, although 'crime' and 'community' do not exist simply in opposition to one another, it is misleading in turn to assume that the concept of community offers no potential to contemporary efforts to rethink crime or promote strategies in response to it (Hughes and Rowe, 2007: 320).

As noted above, it is evident that crime control and exclusionary forms of community security do often become merged in the contemporary western politics of law and order. Furthermore, in the post-9-11 and Afghanistan and Iraq invasions context, there at times appears little hope of progressive change in debates on law and security. However, it is suggested that such compelling dystopian analyses foreground just one tendency, albeit a powerful and dominant one. In turn it is important to recognise that there are other tendencies and other possibilities with respect to 'community' and the governing technologies associated with 'it'. Other tendencies, residual and emergent, offer other possibilities, including social democratic and anti-despotic arguments and agendas regarding security, justice and policing, alongside the possibilities of a revanchist politics of nativist vengeance and moralising authoritarian communitarianism.

Researching asylum seeking and the local governance of the social

It is contended here that the overall picture with regard to contemporary policies on migration is more complicated and contradictory than a one-way process of exclusionary criminalisation/securitisation. Instead such processes, like that of the local governance of the anti-social (Hughes, 2007a, chapter 5) involve both conditional inclusionary as well as exclusionary practices. For example, Lewis and Neal (2005: 428) note that, in the first decade of the 21st century, many European states attempted to develop policies in the wake of their own ageing and declining populations that simultaneously loosen (in a regulated way) the control of labour migration, tighten the control of asylum and clandestine migration, and establish a framework for the promotion of social cohesion and an inclusive national identity around a set of core or irreducible values. Like many other affluent European states with ageing 'indigenous' populations, the UK government attempted to balance the challenges and what it sees as the economic benefits of globalisation with those of domestic, inter-communal tensions. It is evident that the national government viewed the securing of borders and boundary maintenance as the precondition for harmonious social relations in a multi-cultural UK. Crucially, the work of preserving a national collectivity was viewed as requiring intervention in various forms of cultural practices of established migrants, as well as the policing of those who are allowed to enter and eventually become citizens. 'And so immigration policy in its inclusionary and exclusionary practices acts as the first step in

determining who has the possibility of belonging and becoming a future citizen' (Yuval-Davis *et al.*, 2005: 517).

'Social (or community) cohesion' represents a central motif of contemporary UK government policy for alleviating the conflicts between different ethnic groups in society. It also dovetails closely with the pressure for greater 'civil renewal' that may invigorate the local political engagement of the citizenry. Whilst accepting the dominant trend towards the securitisation and criminalisation of migration, the public debate over belonging, social integration and cohesion between and across diverse ethnic groups – despite undoubted tendencies towards an emphasis on sameness and assimilitionism – is also suggestive of complex, contradictory and uncertain processes and outcomes for governing safety in communities. Much of the critical policy literature on migration and asylum noted above has downplayed these tendencies, yet they remain difficult questions that critical policy analysts cannot easily eschew.

My own research into the work of experts in community safety and youth justice[6] suggests that much of what local practitioners, policy makers, political actors and even researchers 'do' in the field of community safety crosses the increasingly leaky boundaries between social policy and crime control policy. We live in hybrid times with more and more hybridised actors. The policy maelstrom that is the community safety field opens up new challenges that are not easily insulated by legal definitions and institutional barriers. Working with 'communities' on the protection, settlement and integration of refugee and asylum seeker populations, and problem-solving initiatives associated with 'host-newcomer' relations in different localities, represents a key new space for potentially innovative, progressive community safety work.

Looking across the UK in the first years of the 21st century, it is evident that both tactical and strategic policy dilemmas associated with asylum seekers and refugees are unevenly distributed and varyingly articulated in local community safety and community cohesion governmental strategies. Nonetheless it is increasingly common that the problems of both criminalisation and victimisation of asylum seekers, or presumed asylum seekers, are now routinely addressed in many such strategies. Concurrently the broader issues around 'community cohesion' and the integration of such new groups have also now become key and often volatile concerns for those localities with enforced 'dispersed' concentrations of asylum seeker and new migrant communities. It is not uncommon to hear local practitioners describe the situation in many of the most deprived, inner city areas where such concentrations of asylum seeker/refugee peoples have been decanted without much, if any, local consultation as 'tinderboxes'. The political volatility of such local contexts is captured in Stenson's (2005: 278) observation that in many UK urban areas, 'inter-ethnic relations, defined in terms of both visible, racial and cultural markers of difference,

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are the most sensitive bio-political issues for community safety'. On the basis of his research, Stenson (2005: 266) suggests that there are pressing problems and conflicts associated with rising rates of certain crime and anti-social behaviour which are in part related to, or as importantly perceived to be related to, the effects of inward migration on inter-communal relations and social cohesion in poor urban neighbourhoods of an increasingly complex demographic composition. It is, for example, evident that there have been growing conflicts in some of the most deprived localities in Britain around both 'turf wars' over which groups, 'new' and 'established', may control certain illicit markets such as prostitution and drug use. In turn, there have also been conflicts over seemingly more mundane questions of social ordering in localities, such as what is perceived to be appropriate public decency and respect between groups in demographically complex neighbourhoods. 'Hence, complex inter-communal relations, often coded in terms of crime and anti-social behaviour, are the products of struggles over values, beliefs, lifestyle, sexuality and sexual partners, as well as the financially measurable material conditions of life' (Stenson, 2005: 278). And, of course, there have been the ever-present consequences of the racism and hate crimes against new immigrants and refugees.

Such sensitive and all too real 'bio-political issues' (defined as relating to the struggle for sovereign control over populations and territories) point to pressing inter- and intra-communal conflicts and suspicions which cannot be adequately understood as the mere stuff of populist fantasies from the mass media, however much the latter may fan the flames of public anxieties and panics. At the same time these 'bio-political' issues may also generate progressive experiments in local political 'inventiveness' from actors in certain localities. Indeed, reflexive and complex governmental experiments in what may be termed inter-communal 'respect-exchanges' are evident in the local work of some community safety partnerships on the inclusion and settlement of refugee and asylum seeker groups across the UK. To cite one example of local community integration experiments regarding 'host' and 'guest' relations in England which the author researched, the Derby community safety partnership in 2004 took a key role in addressing the threat of inter-communal violence and unrest between the settled and indigenous Pakistani community and the then recently arrived Kurdish (male) asylum seeker community in this city. Reacting in part to a headline story in the national tabloid paper, *The Daily Mail* (entitled 'The New Race Time Bomb', 3/1/04) which predicted that Derby would see great violence and unrest as a result of conflicts between young Kurdish and Pakistani men, a 'Dialogue and Capacity-building Project' was formed which resulted in tangible, if not easily measurable, 'peace-making' achievements. Drawing self-consciously and creatively on the 'New Labour' banner of 'community cohesion', the work in Derby showed the promise of broadening out the 'normal' work of community safety partnerships from that of often short-

term crime and disorder reduction interventions to more ambitious 'pan-harm' reduction and to the promotion of public 'goods' associated in this case with dialogic and mutually respectful inter-communal relations. One tangible form taken by this community safety initiative was the facilitation of the dialogue between Kurdish and Pakistani communities around their shared but also very different relationships to Islam in their respective geo-histories. Relatedly it may be noted that there have also been a growing number of local welcome schemes involving 'receiver' communities and new migrants (see for example, the Welsh Assembly Government's Refugee Inclusion Strategy (WAG, 2008). In turn the development of local mediation schemes across the UK linked to tensions and misperceptions between 'host' and 'guest' communities may go some way to fostering Cantle's call for 'routes across diversity' (Home Office, 2001). Such inventive work under the policy umbrella of community cohesion and community safety may help loosen notions of fixed and permanent difference between groups whilst also recognising that membership of a group 'counts' and is not to be easily dismissed.

Such instances of peace-making work associated with refugee and asylum seeker groups and 'host' communities and pursued by local alliances and political authorities are concrete examples of inclusive, preventive initiatives. They are initiatives that continue to operate in an otherwise hostile and visceral national, mass-mediated context of punitiveness and exclusion towards the stranger. However, they are not adequately explained as 'good' local struggles against a 'bad' national policy strategy that emphasises repression and exclusion. Rather, the policy directives from the Home Office and the Department of Communities and Local Government in Britain on asylum, ethnicity, exclusion and community cohesion are themselves complexly constituted and fissured by ambivalent and unpredictable messages.[7] With the arrival in 2005 of annual 'Local Area Agreements' (LAAs) in England between local authorities and central government, based on four national public service agreements on local outcomes, community safety may be being pushed and pulled in several uneasily reconciled directions with potentially important consequences for issues of community cohesion and the 'problem' of the newcomer/stranger. LAA public service agreements (3) and (4) – respectively 'to improve the standard of life for people in the most disadvantaged neighbourhoods and ensure those services are more responsive to neighbourhood needs and improve service delivery' and 'to empower local people to have greater voice and influence over decision making and delivery of services' – are likely to be vehicles for the articulation of competing demands from both 'established' and 'newcomer/outsider' groups in urban localities. And of course such developments also sit alongside the push for more intrusive, 'hands-on' local policing of 'hard-to-reach' communities in the shadow of the threat of and 'war' against terror from Muslim extremists.

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Deciphering the likely futures of these complexly inter-connected policy issues and the ways in which 'practical actors contest, resist and reconstitute ways of thinking' (Wood, 2006: 224) represents a major challenge for researchers in the field of security in the UK in the first decades of the present century.

It is evident that there is local and regional differentiation in the politics of safety, asylum and migration across the UK. In turn, making sense of these differentiated practices in the politics of safety necessitates the examination of how, for example, local political actors interest others in translating, or problematising, and responding to issues in their preferred terms, enrol supportive coalitions to advance these problematisations, develop the political dynamics of these associations and relate between formal and informal agents of governance (Stenson, 2005: 276). Neither the 'success' nor 'failure' of such translations and coalitions can be guaranteed in advance.

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to construct an encounter between comparative empirical analysis and normative debate on community safety, asylum seeking and migration. It will have achieved its modest goal if it provokes further discussion among both policy analysts and those engaged in the field of social scientific research. In the community governance of crime and safety, it has been argued that there are translations of the 'problem' of asylum seeking and forced migration which may have a solidary potential when conceived in terms of shared suffering and frailty. And yet it remains evident that such inclusive translations of community safety and community cohesion are fragile in character when compared to the allure of excluding and defensive ideologies and movements. This challenge is particularly pressing in the context of post-colonial Europe and is a key feature of what Bauman (2004b) in a moment of rare optimism has termed Europe's 'unfinished adventure' as an inherently unstable compound and as 'homeland of perpetual translation' with 'translation' understood on the broader cultural rather than just the linguistic level.

Notes

1 Earlier versions of some of the arguments made in this chapter can be found in Hughes, 2004; Hughes, 2006, 2007a and b.
2 These narratives of control draw in my view far too reverentially on Foucault via Stanley Cohen (1985) and also on Bauman via Jock Young (1999).
3 For a fuller discussion of the challenges of critical realist criminology and its unfinished project, see Edwards and Hughes, 2005 and 2008a.
4 See in particular, Hughes *et al.*, 2002; Muncie *et al.*, 2003.
5 Most 'irregular workers' in the 'shadow economy' do develop their own complex strategies of resistance and survival (Jordan and Duvell, 2004). This is illustrated graphically in the remark by the character of the Nigerian immigrant in the 2002

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film ‘Dirty Pretty Things’ directed by Stephen Frears: ‘We are the people you never see. We are the ones who drive your cars, clean your rooms and suck your cocks’.

6 This body of research stretches over 15 years. There is a summary of the work in Hughes, 2007a. My current research is focused on the interplay between community safety and youth crime prevention interventions across Wales and is funded by the Welsh Assembly Government (Hughes *et al.*, forthcoming, see also Edwards and Hughes, 2008b).

7 It should also be noted that policy and practice on asylum seekers and their rights to basic services are unfolding in divergent ways across the devolved and partially devolved polities of Scotland and Wales respectively. To take one example of the increasingly complex and uneven picture across the countries of the UK, unlike England both Scotland and Wales by 2008 established the right for asylum seekers to free secondary health care, a right denied to asylum seekers in England.

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