

# Contents

<i>Acknowledgements</i>	ix
<i>Maps</i>	xi
<i>Abbreviations</i>	xiv
<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>1 Defeating Japan</b>	<b>5</b>
Searching for a strategy	5
Securing Moscow's co-operation	13
British forces for an invasion of Japan	17
<b>2 Post-War Planning in Wartime</b>	<b>26</b>
The post-war planning apparatus	27
Planning for post-war China	29
Planning for Korea	35
Planning for an occupation of Japan	39
<b>3 Japan Surrenders</b>	<b>46</b>
Staking claims	47
Priorities in the post-war world	52
Returning to China	54
The control of Japan	58
Korea and trusteeship	62
The Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers	64
<b>4 Occupation and Civil War</b>	<b>67</b>
Defence planning	68
The occupation of Japan	70
The Commonwealth, Japan and regional defence	73
The occupation of Korea	77
Civil war in China	82
<b>5 Questioning Engagement</b>	<b>88</b>
Assessing the dangers	89
The policy of non-interference	92
Japan and a peace treaty	101
Korean solutions	105
<b>6 Going into Reverse</b>	<b>114</b>
Priorities, strategy and intelligence	115

The Commonwealth and Korea	119
China perceptions	126
Japan and the next phase of the occupation	135
<b>7 The Road to War</b>	<b>145</b>
Regional collaboration and defence	146
Peace treaty stalemate	149
Discord in China	153
Instability in Korea	163
The drift towards regional conflict	167
<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>175</b>
<i>Notes</i>	182
<i>Select Bibliography</i>	231
<i>Index</i>	242

## 1

## Defeating Japan

In 1942 the outlook for a continued British presence in the Far East looked grim: Japanese victories in East and Southeast Asia had pushed the British Empire's multi-national forces back to the Burmese-Indian frontier. In the absence of British help, the dominions of Australia and New Zealand had to rely on their own limited defence capabilities and the retreating forces of the United States, who had also been reeling from a series of defeats in the Pacific at the hands of the Japanese.<sup>1</sup> Before Britain could re-build its empire in the Far East, which remained, despite the disasters of 1941–2, a clear aim of Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, it first had to defeat Germany and Italy. In a global conflict where Britain was fighting for survival in Europe, while conducting campaigns in the Middle East and the Mediterranean (its second strategic priority), constructing a strategy for beating Japan was unlikely to be a foremost concern.

Franklin D. Roosevelt, the American president, agreed to the British strategic concept of 'Europe-first' while Churchill showed no objection to the United States, after its humiliation at Pearl Harbor, securing complete control over Pacific operations. Pearl Harbor had become a symbol of revenge for the American people, just as Dunkirk had acted as a 'watchword' and 'tocsin' for British society. Both setbacks captured the popular imagination and imbued a determination to defeat their enemies. Yet the reverses in the Far East and defeat at Singapore were 'a reminder of shame and ineptitude' to the British. Dunkirk and the war against Germany and Italy 'was fought on behalf of *being*', Singapore and the war against Japan 'on behalf of *having*, and the difference marked the entire war'.<sup>2</sup> The principal task for Anglo-American war leaders, nevertheless, was to win the war in Europe first and then work out how to beat Japan.

### Searching for a strategy

The bulk of British interests in the Far East lay in Southeast Asia. Britain could not rebuild its position there without the active co-operation of its

powerful ally, the United States, which had moved from a position of pre-war isolation towards what amounted to rabid ‘anti-imperialism’. Welding the United States to a Europe-first strategy required the British to promise that they would help beat Japan, despite the lack of a clear plan to achieve this, once Germany had been defeated. At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, Churchill was prepared to give such an assurance by supporting Roosevelt in his call for the unconditional surrender of both Germany *and* Japan. This pledge reinforced the US commitment to the European front but it tied an economically devastated Britain to undefined potential long-term military operations in the Far East.<sup>3</sup>

In devising plans for the deployment of forces against the Japanese, British strategists had to take into account a variety of issues: the Europe-first strategy, an increasing dearth of resources, relations with the United States, the remoteness of Far Eastern territories and a general apathy both in Parliament and amongst the public towards the war in the East. The dilemma for Britain was how best to use its meagre resources in a fight that lacked popular support and barely merited attention in the American psyche.<sup>4</sup> The dilemma proved difficult to solve and reminded Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Foreign Office’s acid-tongued permanent under-secretary, of ‘a blind man searching for a black cat in a dark room’.<sup>5</sup> General Hastings Ismay, Churchill’s resilient and shrewd chief of staff known as ‘Pug’, also thought that when history came to be written the ‘waffling’ over the question of British strategy for the defeat of Japan would be ‘one of the black spots’ in the record of the conduct of the war.<sup>6</sup>

The exasperation of Britain’s most senior diplomat and one of its top soldiers sprang from an inability to decide upon whether the concentration of British forces should be deployed in Southeast Asia or the Pacific. With unlimited resources, British planners would have no doubt sent substantial forces to both theatres to contribute to Japan’s defeat. This option was not available and what emerged were rather elaborate plans from proponents of opposing strategies (the Pacific or Southeast Asian drive) to pursue each course vigorously without necessarily taking into account the resource implications and military realities on the ground. One reason was the intense British dislike of fighting the Japanese in the dense jungles of Burma, which conflicted with the American desire to re-open the Burma Road and supply China by land rather than hazardously and inefficiently by air. But plans to short circuit this strategy by carrying out amphibious operations towards Rangoon such as *Buccaneer* (a projected attack on the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal south of Burma) were clearly beyond allied resources, while China’s importance began to decrease after late 1943 when the Soviet Union declared its intention to join the conflict against Japan.<sup>7</sup>

Operation *Buccaneer* had been the brainchild of the charismatic and energetic Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, appointed Supreme Allied Commander of South East Asia Command (SEAC) at the first Quebec Conference

in August 1943. The appointment, which Mountbatten took up in October, had been designed to demonstrate Britain's commitment to the war against Japan but he was a controversial choice and had many critics.<sup>8</sup> SEAC's aims were to clear the Japanese from British territory in the region and re-open the Burma Road but the Americans who joined Mountbatten's command felt uncomfortable being associated with re-conquering British colonial territory. As planning for *Buccaneer* fell apart, Mountbatten looked at re-working a previous plan, operation *Culverin*, a proposed amphibious attack against north Sumatra, which would eventually allow for a push towards Malaya and Singapore. Lacking the requisite large-scale amphibious and naval forces or American support, Britain's ability to carry out *Culverin* before Germany's defeat was highly questionable. The idea, nevertheless, attracted Churchill, a firm advocate of restoring Britain's imperial position in Southeast Asia, who hoped that if the inhabitants of these territories saw the British as liberators, the disasters of 1941–2 could be erased and British power reinvigorated. Churchill's maxim throughout the war was 'Hands off the British Empire', but his rigid conservatism on colonial issues antagonised many Americans.<sup>9</sup>

The Chiefs of Staff, and in particular Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, were wholly unconvinced by *Culverin* and pushed instead for a role in the main Pacific operations against Japan. In his private diary, the uncompromising Brooke was damning of Churchill who, suffering from ill health, consistently tried to get *Culverin* accepted.<sup>10</sup> Operation *Culverin*, which depended on American resources, added little to the poor impression the United States had of the British effort in the Far East. From Washington, Lord Halifax, the former foreign secretary and now Britain's ambassador, told the Foreign Office that US criticism of Britain's war effort against the Japanese was intense. American opinion was convinced that British operations in Burma were 'a minor contribution' to the strategy of General Joseph Stilwell, the commander of American forces in the China–Burma–India Theatre, and 'not very effectively conducted at that'.<sup>11</sup> Stilwell's Anglophobia and misanthropy are well known. He was highly critical of Mountbatten and considered his planning sessions 'cock-eyed' and 'sad'.<sup>12</sup> Mountbatten's push for *Culverin* (like *Buccaneer*) tended to reinforce the US belief that the British had little concern for China's fate, and that they were more interested in regaining Malaya and Singapore.<sup>13</sup> The American assumption was largely accurate. From a British point of view, a determination to secure their interests first, especially prized colonial possessions that could help re-establish Britain's power in the Far East, was understandable.

Brooke, nevertheless, accused Mountbatten of egging on Churchill, 'determined to do something to justify his supreme existence' by backing an unworkable plan (*Culverin*), both encouraging each other with periodic personal telegrams.<sup>14</sup> Brooke's opposition was sound enough in terms of military realities but his solution, which revolved around a British effort in the Pacific, did not face up to some potential difficulties either. Halifax reminded

London that 'some' US naval and military circles were reluctant to facilitate a major British role in the war against Japan, seeing it as playing nothing more than 'the most subordinate of roles in the campaigns in the Pacific'.<sup>15</sup> Halifax's reference to opposition within naval circles was an allusion to Admiral Ernest King, the US chief of naval operations, who was adamantly opposed to the Royal Navy's participation in the Pacific. The British had long been aware of his sentiments and were sure that King was 'determined to keep the North and Central Pacific an American Ocean'.<sup>16</sup> In March 1944, however, even Roosevelt told Churchill that a British presence in the Pacific was unnecessary for the foreseeable future unless the Americans suffered 'unexpected bad luck'.<sup>17</sup> So, what was the reasoning behind Brooke's insistence on the British playing a larger part in the Pacific rather than Southeast Asia, which at one point in 1944 led the Chiefs of Staff to contemplate their resignation if they did not get their way?<sup>18</sup>

The Chiefs of Staff, like their US military counterparts, were animated by a desire to shorten the war, recognising the Pacific as the decisive theatre. They told Churchill that Roosevelt, in expressing the view that the addition of British units in the Pacific would be superfluous, had not 'fully seized' the scope of the task that lay ahead in beating Japan. The Chiefs of Staff knew full well Roosevelt would have sought military advice on this issue. Trying to claim this was the president's personal view seems rather disingenuous on the part of the Chiefs of Staff. The latter were certainly not to be deterred however. They felt a Pacific strategy, where several scenarios had been debated, would help solidify Britain's relations with Australia and New Zealand (damaged since the Singapore debacle) and see the continuation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff into the post-war period. The Chiefs of Staff ultimately saw a need to work closely with the US military, and were prepared to argue that Britain's colonial possessions could be recovered after the war. The ability of Australia to support a large British presence in the Pacific was not altogether clear and began to face opposition from General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Allied Commander in the Southwest Pacific Area, who was fearful of a threat to his position. The American general was not necessarily 'anti-British, just pro-MacArthur', but Brooke soon became convinced that MacArthur had John Curtin, the Australian prime minister, in his pocket, even though there appeared to be 'a great desire on the part of the Australians generally for British co-operation'.<sup>19</sup> The evidence for Brooke's last statement is very unclear especially as many Australians had embraced the Americans after Britain's failure to protect them in 1942, while the dominion was also suffering from what can only be described as industrial anarchy.<sup>20</sup>

Curtin's cautious attitude was displayed in May 1944, when he arrived in London for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting. Upon hearing Ernest Bevin, the minister for Labour and National Service, explain Britain would reallocate manpower resources after the defeat of Germany, Curtin

pointed out Australia was afforded no such luxury as its effort was directed solely in the Pacific, where the end was not in sight.<sup>21</sup> Curtin told Churchill after the conference that he 'warmly' welcomed the idea of basing British forces on Australia (he could hardly have said otherwise) but went on at some considerable length to explain the difficulties of such an enterprise. A shortage of manpower was the main problem, the supply of which he noted had 'long since been exhausted' due to the commitments involved in supporting MacArthur's Southwest Pacific area, the Empire Air Training Scheme and the manning of certain ships for the Royal Navy. Furthermore, Curtin wanted to reduce the strength of the army and the numbers in munitions and aircraft production. Resources (especially foodstuffs) from the allied nations would therefore be required to support additional British forces in the Pacific. Finally, he pointed out the Australians were under MacArthur's command and a decision by the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be needed to alter this situation.<sup>22</sup> In short, Australia was not an untapped reservoir of material resources ready to support full-scale British operations in the Pacific.

Behind the scenes, Admiral King stepped into the ring deliberately to stoke MacArthur's anxieties about the possible presence of the British in his theatre. A divided US command in the Pacific and competition for resources between MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz, the commander-in-chief of the US Pacific Fleet, had long since placed a strain on US decision-making, and now it appeared the British might complicate matters further. After his visit to London in June 1944, King informed MacArthur that the Chiefs of Staff were considering operations that would take over a large part of the Southwest Pacific (including the Dutch East Indies and Borneo) after the projected fall of the Philippines.<sup>23</sup> This unwelcome news brought out the worst in MacArthur, a prima donna not known for sharing the fruits of victory or the role of others in his campaigns. Assuming from King's letter the British wanted an independent command, MacArthur replied violently that he was 'completely opposed' to the proposition. 'The British have contributed nothing to this campaign', he argued, but 'now propose to enter this theatre at the moment when victory lies clearly before us in order to reap the benefits of our successes'. MacArthur worried the British would draw Australian and New Zealand troops away from his command, while the Americans would be forced to provide logistic support through lend-lease over existing supply lines in the Pacific. He was suspicious of British motives, as were he claimed, the Dutch and the Australians – the assumption being (without any evidence) that Britain aimed to secure more colonial territory in the Far East. MacArthur then rather dramatically claimed that the whole idea would be 'destructive of American prestige' and damage their commercial prospects in the Far East.<sup>24</sup>

General George Marshall, the US army chief of staff, set out to reassure MacArthur, quoting a recent paper from the Chiefs of Staff suggesting that

if a British fleet could not operate in the central Pacific – ‘our distinct preference’ – they would be willing to operate a Commonwealth task force under his command.<sup>25</sup> MacArthur remained suspicious fired up by Curtin who asserted he was under intense pressure in London to put his forces in an independent British command and had repeatedly to bat the proposition away. MacArthur presumed Curtin’s refusal to give into British bullying no doubt accounted for the alleged change of heart reported by Marshall. MacArthur nevertheless set out his objections again to Washington in case the Chiefs of Staff tried to implement the idea of a British command later. Any form of ‘appeasement’ on this matter, he argued, would result in a ‘deterioration’ of ‘British–American’ relationships.<sup>26</sup> MacArthur’s colourful and dramatic tone has to be treated with caution. Its use was down to a desire to protect his position at any cost. As one commentator has remarked, the general ‘did not understand the British or their interests’. He was ‘profoundly confused and often contradictory about international politics’ and ‘personalized everything’.<sup>27</sup> It was clear, however, that King, MacArthur and Curtin all for differing reasons were less than enthusiastic about the deployment of British forces in the Pacific.

Some British officials also saw few long-term benefits accruing from a Pacific strategy. Mountbatten’s caustic political adviser, Esler (later Sir Esler) Denning, argued that despite US efforts to defeat the Japanese single-handedly, no American could state the extent to which the United States was willing and able to shoulder the burden of post-war Far Eastern security. Mountbatten considered Denning the Foreign Office’s ‘greatest expert on Japan and the Far East’. Born and raised in Japan, Denning had worked across a range of posts in the East Asia during the inter-war years, before being posted to Washington in 1941 and then joining SEAC. Broad, and stocky, the slow-speaking Denning was a stolid ‘imperialist’ in outlook and convinced that the British Empire would be an ‘essential factor’ in the maintenance of Far Eastern peace. ‘A purely Pacific strategy’, he told London, ‘can have no political repercussions in vital areas commensurate with the attainment of its military objectives’. Denning argued that the Asian people, including the Japanese, were ‘little interested’ in the fate of Pacific Islands. Of more concern to the British, he asserted, a strategy that left the Japanese ‘unassailed’ in Southeast Asia would ‘cast a considerable strain upon the already stretched endurance of the occupied territories’ and could ‘materially retard their rehabilitation upon recovery’. At the very minimum, Denning concluded, a strategy for Southeast Asia had to complement a Pacific strategy.<sup>28</sup>

These views resonated with political and diplomatic figures such as Churchill, Eden, Cadogan, John Sterndale Bennett, the head of the Foreign Office’s Far Eastern Department, and later Bevin, as Labour foreign secretary.<sup>29</sup> Their position stemmed from a fear that the United States, to use Denning’s words, sought to ‘eliminate’ Britain from the post-war Far Eastern order.<sup>30</sup> There is evidence to suggest that Roosevelt was thinking of creating a post-war Sino-Soviet-American ‘entente’ in Asia to the exclusion of

Britain, and the immediate policy discrepancies were at their worst in areas like British India and China, where Anglo-American forces together with a variety of intelligence agencies were operating to achieve what seemed to be entirely different objectives: for the British, the restoration of colonial rule and, for the Americans, the liberation of the Asian peoples from oppression.<sup>31</sup> Sir Horace Seymour, who worked as Britain's ambassador to China where economic and political rivalry was intense, informed Cadogan that for some Americans it was almost 'an article of faith' that British and American policy in the Far East was so different as to be 'irreconcilable'.<sup>32</sup>

Dening, Seymour and Sterndale Bennett had all worked in the Far Eastern Department at the beginning of the war and knew each other well, with the latter relying on the advice of his former colleagues when returning to the department as its head in 1944 after two years in Turkey as minister. Caution, however, needs to be ascribed to the language used by officials (and particularly Dening) responsible for British policy in the Far East, an environment that senior Foreign Office figures and the Chiefs of Staff felt sometimes got the better of them.<sup>33</sup> Indeed, although British ministers and diplomats worried about diverting limited resources away from Southeast Asia, some began to assess the political importance of being seen to be fighting alongside the Americans in the main assaults against Japan. Could not such a policy strengthen Anglo-American relations, raise Britain's fighting profile, and cement the British role in Far Eastern peacemaking? Clement Attlee, the deputy prime minister, and Eden, who never quite trusted the Americans, recognised these arguments.<sup>34</sup> The difficulty was to assess whether the forces Britain might contribute would actually make a difference militarily and whether the effort would have the hoped-for beneficial and influential effect on the post-war Anglo-American relationship.

Americans such as Cordell Hull, the US secretary of state, John Winant, the US ambassador to Britain, and Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's presidential adviser, realised that notwithstanding the military difficulties, if they refused the British offer of providing forces to operate in the Pacific, which could save American lives, it might create long-standing resentment between the two powers.<sup>35</sup> Even at the height of his furious objections to British 'independent' participation in the Pacific, MacArthur left the door open, telling King 'the addition of British means to the Southwest Pacific Area would be most welcome', as long as they were under American 'leadership'. In competition with Nimitz for resources, MacArthur was aware a British fleet that would include escort carriers could prove useful to him as he might be starved of carrier protection once the US Pacific fleet headed north after the Philippine campaign.<sup>36</sup> In September 1944, a message from Churchill to MacArthur also eased the tension when the prime minister stated, 'I never had the slightest idea of diminishing your command' and he hoped the British would work 'hand in hand' with him.<sup>37</sup> Flattered, MacArthur's response was more than cordial, referring to 'informal sources' and 'wrong inferences' disseminating incorrect information with 'harmful results'. 'Beyond anything else', the

general stressed, 'friction between the two Governments should not arise to imperil the future'.<sup>38</sup> On 8 September, faced with British proposals for the deployment of forces in the Pacific, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provisionally accepted the formation of an Empire task force headed by a British commander under MacArthur's control.<sup>39</sup> Where all the troops, aircraft and ships to create such a force were to come from was not discussed in any detail.

Could not the Americans have refused the proposal as unworkable or unnecessary? As Marshall explained to MacArthur, 'for our government to put itself on record as having refused agreement to the use of additional British and Dominion resources in the Pacific or Southwest Pacific area was unthinkable'.<sup>40</sup> Marshall's words suggest that the United States could adopt no other response to the British request. What began to emerge were political gestures to cement the Anglo-American relationship that both sides were in no position to refuse or backtrack from, which had little grounding in military necessity. At the second Quebec Conference in September 1944, Churchill could not fail to appreciate the impact of offering the services of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force (RAF) to take part in the main operations against Japan under American command. Roosevelt now accepted the concept of a British fleet in the Pacific on 13 September. He could hardly have said no yet King did his best to repudiate the decision. The admiral's position has been put down to a mixture of Anglophobia and also genuine concern over the Royal Navy's potential lack of experience of Pacific operations and the serious logistical difficulties required in supporting such a fleet. These latter points were not unreasonable but were arguments deliberately glossed over by Churchill.

King found little backing from Marshall, Admiral William Leahy, Roosevelt's chief of staff, or General Henry 'Hap' Arnold, the commanding general of the US army air forces. All three men recognised the political fall out if they rejected the British advance outright and, as one War Department official noted, King suffered 'a major reverse'. On the question of RAF participation in the Pacific, Arnold, nevertheless, was equivocal and felt a definite answer could 'not be given now', but Marshall asked the British for a paper on possible estimates and availability. The idea of an Empire task force operating under MacArthur was quietly dropped, the British Chiefs of Staff realising that such a force was way beyond British capabilities at this stage of the war.<sup>41</sup> The Australians, meanwhile, were becoming increasingly miffed at the fact that Pacific strategy was being discussed at all in their absence.<sup>42</sup> The British also still had a campaign to fight in north and central Burma (operation *Capital*) that was far from being won despite recent victories at Imphal and Kohima. In searching for speedy ways to liberate Burma, the British proposed a landing at Rangoon (operation *Dracula*) for March 1945, although Churchill would press Mountbatten to make the bill as low as possible. As it stood *Dracula* would require seven divisions, six of which

would have to be found outside SEAC, their release dependent on the course of the war in Europe.<sup>43</sup>

The possibilities and timings of all Britain's future operations in the Far East still depended on events in Europe and the release of resources. At Quebec, the Combined Chiefs of Staff estimated it would take at least 18 months after Germany's defeat to secure Japan's 'unconditional' surrender. The overall strategy to achieve this aim was first to lower 'Japan's ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength'; and secondly to invade and seize objectives in the 'industrial heart of Japan'. Marshall knew this formula was designed to allow for an invasion of the Japanese home islands. It also committed both powers to a long and costly struggle against Japan that would strain British resources to the maximum. But what these calculations had not accounted for was a currently neutral Soviet Union entering the conflict in the Far East.<sup>44</sup>

### Securing Moscow's co-operation

The United States, adopting a notably mixed response to British gestures to take part in the main assaults against Japan, initially acted very differently when it came to trying to secure Soviet help. The Soviet Union possessed the potential to transfer substantial forces to the Far East but would not consider such a course until it was sure Germany would be beaten. In this respect, the German army's defeat at Kursk in the summer of 1943, which forced the Germans onto the defensive on the Eastern Front, allowed the Soviets to contemplate an involvement in the war against Japan. Although the Soviet Union had signed a non-aggression pact with Japan in April 1941, Joseph Stalin, the Soviet leader, and Vyacheslav Molotov, his foreign minister, began to intimate to US officials at the Moscow Conference in September 1943 their intention to join the conflict in the Far East.<sup>45</sup> Anticipating the prospect of Soviet participation being raised at Moscow, Ashley Clarke, then head of the Foreign Office's Far Eastern Department, told Eden that the principal inducement for the Soviet Union to enter the war against Japan was 'to stake out claims' to territory.<sup>46</sup>

In late November 1943, outside the plenary sessions of the Tehran Conference, Stalin informally pledged to join the war against Japan – after successfully securing Anglo-American agreement for a second front to be opened in Europe in May 1944 – and raised the price for Soviet intervention. No official record exists of Stalin's demands, but Averell Harriman, the recently appointed US ambassador in Moscow, recalled Stalin made it clear he wanted to tear up the Treaty of Portsmouth imposed upon Russia in 1905 by Japan. The use of Manchurian ports and railroads would also need to be discussed and Churchill, according to Harriman, thought the Soviet Union's legitimate needs should certainly be satisfied.<sup>47</sup> For the prime

minister, such concessions represented no threat to British interests and they were to be encouraged because, if China accepted them, they would have little basis upon which to oppose Britain's recovery of Hong Kong.<sup>48</sup> Churchill also realised the opening of a Soviet front in Manchuria against the Japanese could accelerate the defeat of Japan. If this subsequently led to a collapse of Japan's Far Eastern empire, then Britain's colonial possessions in Southeast Asia and its position in China could be re-established earlier than anticipated, reducing already over-stretched financial and manpower burdens.<sup>49</sup>

It was not until late September 1944 that the Soviets raised the subject again, when Sir Archibald Clerk Kerr, Britain's ambassador in Moscow, together with Harriman, met Stalin to report on the second Quebec Conference. Concerned that the Quebec timetable had not included Soviet participation, Stalin enquired if Churchill and Roosevelt still desired Soviet entry in the war against Japan. Both ambassadors replied in the affirmative but required Stalin to initiate discussions and clarify his intentions. He appeared to begin this process that October when Churchill visited Moscow. It was a trip dominated by European questions but on 14 October, five days into Churchill's visit, the war against Japan was raised with Stalin in the presence of the prime minister by Major-General John Deane, the head of the US military mission in Moscow. On that occasion Stalin replied in rather vague terms as to when the Soviets might enter the conflict. The following evening at the Kremlin, a more in-depth discussion took place about Japan. In place of an ill Churchill, Eden attended the meeting along with Brooke, Harriman, the respective heads of the British and US military missions and General Alexi Antonov, the Soviet army chief of staff.<sup>50</sup> Antonov estimated some 60 divisions would take part in a Manchurian offensive to deal with the 45 Japanese divisions they expected. Brooke considered the meeting a success and had never doubted the Soviet desire to enter the war as soon as they could, although he recorded that Stalin wanted to know what his country would get for its help.<sup>51</sup>

It was agreed that the Americans and the Soviets should continue to meet for more detailed discussions but Stalin's demands, based loosely on what had transpired at Tehran, would not be formalised until the Yalta Conference of February 1945. Demonstrating Britain's waning power, it was excluded from these political consultations, but the prime minister was prepared to accept this state of affairs as he considered the Northeast Asian region an area of secondary importance to British interests.<sup>52</sup> In their view, the Chiefs of Staff, the Foreign Office and the Joint Intelligence Subcommittee (JIC) all agreed that the Soviet Union did not pose a direct threat to Britain's strategic sea routes and colonial possessions in Southeast Asia. One Foreign Office memorandum argued that if Britain adopted an understanding attitude towards Soviet desires in Northeast Asia, 'she seems unlikely to make trouble for us in the southern regions where our interests lie'.<sup>53</sup> Stalin, for

his part, was concerned that the United States might attempt to negotiate a peace with Tokyo that would leave Japan strong enough to challenge the Soviet Union. Security rather than historical claims dictated Soviet involvement in the war, which could also help them lay a claim to the formulation of the terms of peace and provide insurance against Japan's revival.<sup>54</sup>

The JIC, in a report commended by Eden, anticipated that the Soviet Union would at least try to 'experiment' in a policy of collaboration with Britain and the United States. Within this framework and not a broader world security organisation, the JIC argued that the Soviets would hope to build a system of security outside their frontiers and settle any differences.<sup>55</sup> The assessment was sound: Stalin had little time for a United Nations (UN) organisation, and wanted to achieve his security goals – the dismemberment of Germany, Japan's defeat, and the securing of territory around his frontiers, particularly in Poland – through great power negotiation. The Soviet Union needed to rebuild its shattered war economy and could not afford to fall out with its wartime allies or enter another conflict. Roosevelt and Churchill also felt it was possible to build a lasting partnership with Stalin. The president was prepared to go to considerable lengths to achieve this as long as it did not antagonise US opinion.<sup>56</sup> Some sounded notes of warning, however. General Deane, for example, told Marshall on 2 December that although everyone agreed on collaboration with Soviet Russia, it would not 'be worth a hoot' unless based on mutual respect and made to 'work both ways'. Deane vividly described the Soviet suspicion of foreigners and felt the Americans were making too many concessions for little in return, arguing 'we should stop pushing ourselves on them and make the Soviet authorities come to us' but 'be friendly and co-operative when they do so'. Marshall sent Deane's observations to Roosevelt.<sup>57</sup>

As the war dragged on in Europe the timetable for defeating Japan was once again disrupted, highlighting the allied need for Soviet help. The Western allies had hoped to start moving resources to the Far East and the Pacific by the end of 1944 but with the failure of operation *Market Garden* at Arnhem in September, stiff resistance on the Italian front and the Ardennes offensive in December, it was accepted that Germany would not be beaten before the spring of 1945.<sup>58</sup> The setback at Arnhem immediately removed resources from *Dracula* forcing its postponement. Mountbatten complained of the damage to British prestige in the Far East but Churchill reminded him his priority was Europe.<sup>59</sup> Even the Joint Chiefs of Staff found it necessary to divert to Europe two infantry divisions, which had been originally intended for the Pacific in May 1945.<sup>60</sup> The potential of the atomic bomb was also still unknown. All these facts left Marshall firm in the belief of the need for Soviet assistance.<sup>61</sup> Roosevelt was therefore prepared to accept, in part, Stalin's demands in Northeast Asia to secure his goodwill and Soviet entry into the war against Japan. These concessions were thrashed out at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, when Stalin and Roosevelt agreed

to Soviet control over southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles, the internationalisation of the commercial port of Dairen (Dalian), a Soviet lease over Port Arthur (Lüshun), the joint Sino-Soviet management of Manchurian railroads and the maintenance of the *status quo* in Outer Mongolia. Roosevelt insisted, however, that these concessions would have to be approved by Nationalist China through some form of treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union.<sup>62</sup>

Britain was barred from these discussions and Churchill was not consulted, but he put his signature to the terms, arguing (as he had before) that the problem was 'remote and secondary'. Eden, together with Cadogan, who had served in China during the 1930s, urged Churchill not to sign, concerned about British exclusion from the negotiations. At Malta, the foreign secretary had told Edward Stettinius, the new US secretary of state, that a deal should not be done, as the Soviets would enter the conflict regardless. At the very least 'a good return' should be obtained for any offer made. Churchill argued that Britain was in no position to bargain: Soviet entry could 'save us many thousands of millions of pounds' by shortening the war while 'the *quid pro quo* far out values anything we are likely to get out of China'. Both arguments had their merits but it is unrealistic to assume, in the spirit of co-operation the two leaders were trying to achieve, that they would not have put some sort of deal before Stalin. There is also much to be said for Roosevelt's assertion that it was better to have an agreement limiting potential Soviet gains than not.<sup>63</sup> One can nevertheless detect uneasiness on Churchill's part regarding his role in this episode when he told Eden that he was 'shocked' to see the Foreign Office had produced eight copies of the secret Yalta protocol. 'They ought not to be circulated except in a locked box', Churchill fumed, and there was also 'no need whatever to inform the Dominions or to show the document to anyone who was not cognizant of it'.<sup>64</sup>

The dilemma for both Churchill and Roosevelt was to restrain Soviet ambitions in Northeast Asia and at the same time maintain a co-operative relationship consistent with the interests of the Western allies that would help defeat Japan and ensure post-war regional stability. During the bitter battle for Okinawa between March and June 1945, which indicated that an invasion of Japan would be extremely costly,<sup>65</sup> Henry Stimson, the United States secretary of war, and Marshall were convinced that Soviet entry would have a profound military impact and save US lives. At this stage, these persuasive arguments, which overestimated the strength of the Japanese army in Manchuria, were a reason why Harry Truman, who succeeded Roosevelt in April 1945, and Stimson rejected attempts by Joseph Grew, the under-secretary of state at the State Department, to revise the Yalta accords. Truman, who felt it important to honour agreements already made with the Soviets, was not experienced in international diplomacy and relied heavily on advisers such as Stimson, Harriman and Grew. Their views had certainly hardened towards the Soviet Union and its projected penetration of Northeast Asia, but often fluctuated, and US armed service ministers, for

example, still remained unsure of the potential Soviet danger and wondered if Japan or Germany might pose the greater post-war threat.<sup>66</sup>

### **British forces for an invasion of Japan**

As a result of the second Quebec Conference, the British now had to spread their resources across two theatres (Southeast Asia and the Pacific). On a tactical level, the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and agents in its south China coast-watching organisation had already helped the Americans launch successful strikes on Japanese naval forces during the battle of the Philippines, which had started in October 1944. The intelligence was well received despite rivalries on the ground in China between the various British and American intelligence agencies.<sup>67</sup> The question of moving larger resources to the Pacific theatre, however, left Britain confronting a number of problems. First, the impact of deploying a Pacific fleet to operate from Australia (which had now become a reality) worried the Australian government, who felt that the British did not realise (or worse did not care) about the seriousness of their manpower problems. In November 1944, Curtin instructed Stanley Bruce, the Australian high commissioner in London, to tell A. V. Alexander, Britain's First Lord of the Admiralty, that as of 30 June 1945 Australia would have a shortfall of 50,000 manpower units.<sup>68</sup> Alexander expressed sympathy and told Bruce that the Admiralty fully realised Australia's difficulties but he was sure a solution could be easily reached. Sir Frederick Shedden, secretary of the Australian Department of Defence (who travelled with Curtin to London in May and was responsible for re-shaping Australia's war effort), thought Alexander's reply either 'stupid' or 'cunning', convinced that the British were attempting to offload their own manpower problems on the Australians.

As the British pressed ahead, the result was serious friction between the Australian government and Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, the commander of the British Pacific Fleet. When the Royal Navy was informed that there was no prospect of Australia making any labour contribution towards the request of 5,000 men for the repair of British warships and as labour strikes continued, Fraser became exasperated. He thought the Australians were slow in tackling these problems and made a very public statement in April 1945 about the delays in docking British shipping. Jack Beasley, the acting minister of defence, enquired vigorously of Fraser what authority he had to undermine a self-governing dominion in such a manner. Unmoved, Fraser thought the Australian attitude 'deplorable', and argued incorrectly that as they had asked for a British Pacific Fleet they should have been striving at all costs to meet its needs. The Australians felt Fraser had 'no conception' of their domestic problems and Shedden saw remarks by both Churchill and Fraser about the 'prestige of the British Commonwealth being at stake' as 'rather unrealistic Imperialist rhetoric'.<sup>69</sup>

Despite these difficulties, the British Pacific Fleet managed to take part with varying degrees of success in battles off Okinawa in March 1945, enjoying good tactical and operational relations with the United States Navy.<sup>70</sup> Whether the British presence really made a substantial difference to the outcome of the campaign is rather more questionable.<sup>71</sup> Nevertheless, as the war against Germany came to an end and US preparations were made for an invasion of Japan, the Chiefs of Staff set out to reinforce the British Pacific Fleet and build up a strategic bombing force for operations against the Japanese mainland.<sup>72</sup> The Chiefs of Staff had secured US agreement to the deployment of a very long-range bombing force in the summer of 1945 when the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after lengthy discussions, approved plans to offer the RAF a base at Okinawa for ten largely self-supporting heavy bomber squadrons to be under US command. The original British proposal had been for 40 squadrons (20 as bombers and 20 as tankers) and the Cagayan Valley on northern Luzon in the Philippines was allocated as a potential base but MacArthur deemed the area impracticable due to the huge logistical effort required. Throughout these discussions, where the Americans privately questioned the utility of British bomber forces, the Chiefs of Staff maintained that a British role in the bombing of Japan could help secure an influential voice at the Far Eastern peace table while reassuring the United States that Britain was prepared to share in the heavy cost of an invasion of Japan.<sup>73</sup>

Yet would the Americans have listened to the British any less at the peace table just because they failed to commit what, in comparison to the US effort, were very small resources to the Pacific? The Americans were not depending on British resources to make a decisive impact on the Pacific campaign. In one paper before the offer of air bases at Okinawa, the Joint Staff Planners wrote that the United States had 'more than sufficient air strength available for employment in the Pacific' and 'all needs for strategical or tactical air forces in the Pacific can be filled entirely from U.S. resources'. The planners did recognise that RAF units could permit a reduction in American air force units to be deployed to the Pacific but the situation was hardly critical. It took the Americans eight months to reach a definite decision (indicating their indifference) much to the concern of Sir Charles Portal, the British Chief of Air Staff and Marshal of the RAF, who was 'anxious' to make preparations for the deployment of engineers to Okinawa. Meanwhile, it was proving more than a headache for the Americans to try and squeeze the British onto Okinawa when space was at a premium.<sup>74</sup>

As the British tried to make an impact on Pacific operations they remained heavily committed to operations in Southeast Asia. Even when they reached Rangoon in early May 1945, successfully executing a scaled-down version of *Dracula*, SEAC's planning was set for the long term. An amphibious assault on the west coast of Malaya (operation *Zipper*) was scheduled for September while the follow-up assault on Singapore (operation *Mailfist*) would not be launched until December or January 1946. Planning was not helped by the

dissolution of the British coalition government on 23 May 1945 in preparation for a general election in July. The fight for political advantage led the intervening caretaker government to announce the release of long-service combat personnel while the War Office reduced the length of its overseas tour by four months to three and a quarter years. These measures removed two divisions from SEAC and damaged the morale of British personnel in the Far East who feared that by the time they returned home there would be a shortage of jobs.<sup>75</sup>

To offset these problems, the Chiefs of Staff argued in May that once Singapore had been captured priority should be given to the creation of a Commonwealth invasion force, because the occupation of Japan itself would lead to the speedy collapse of resistance in the outer areas. The Chiefs of Staff did not want to divert resources for morale-sapping mopping-up operations in Southeast Asia.<sup>76</sup> These arguments took on greater force when US plans for an invasion of Japan were set in motion on 18 June, with Truman approving Marshall's plan for a two-phase assault on the southern mainland, attacking Kyushu in November 1945 (operation *Olympic*) and Honshu four months later (operation *Coronet*). Marshall was convinced that an invasion combined with Soviet entry into the war 'may well be the decisive action levering them [the Japanese] into capitulation'. In the same breath, Marshall noted that the British might raise the question of combined command and thought this would immediately increase difficulties with the Soviets and the Nationalist Chinese. More critically, he argued, 'the obvious inefficiencies of combined command may directly result in increased costs in resources and American lives'. Later in the discussion Marshall returned to British participation, warning the president he would find Churchill 'very articulate'. 'He is interested', Marshall argued, 'in showing that the British Government has played a full part in the defeat of Japan'. Marshall was 'glad to have any real help or any assistance that would result in striking a real blow' but thought in reality 'British participation in some ways would constitute an embarrassment'.<sup>77</sup>

Had the British known Marshall's views, one wonders whether their attitude towards participating in the Pacific would have been different? His criticism was damning but not without foundation. Unaware of this yet informed of general plans for the invasion by the Joint Chiefs of Staff before Truman's announcement,<sup>78</sup> the British military soon proposed the building of a Commonwealth force of three to five divisions to take part in *Coronet*. Rather tenuously but as Marshall predicted, the British suggested the setting up of a Combined Chiefs of Staff system in the East once the Straits of Malacca had been opened. The Joint Planning Staff also argued that Britain should stake a claim to a share in the final occupation of Japan. British participation in *Coronet*, however, was completely dependent upon the punctual capture of Singapore and any delay would prevent the release of forces for operations in Japan. Once deployed for *Coronet*, the need to support the

invasion force would also inevitably curtail operations in SEAC (Britain's primary area of interest) through a lack of troopships and administrative personnel.<sup>79</sup>

In the Foreign Office's Far Eastern Department, Sterndale Bennett studied these proposals. While recognising that there might be political dividends, he wondered if involvement in *Coronet* was the most rapid way of bringing the war to an end for Britain. He feared that 'after the main excitement was over' the British would be left with a difficult and prolonged mopping-up process in Southeast Asia where Britain's material interests were 'greatest'. There was unlikely to be any US support for such mopping-up while delays could have an unfavourable impact on British prestige. He was also deeply concerned over the evolution of American ideas for the occupation of Japan, which he thought were 'likely to end in failure'. This being the case, was it therefore wise for Britain to lobby for anything more than a token participation? Influenced by recent arguments from Dening, who still had major doubts about Pacific operations, Sterndale Bennett concluded, 'ocular evidence of the defeat of the Japanese in the areas which directly affect them will have more effect than hearsay evidence that British troops have taken part in the attack on Japan proper'. Indeed, by 1945, world grain was already in short supply and with Burma, French Indo-China and Thailand (Siam) forming the main rice-producing areas of the world, averaging a pre-war exportable surplus of some six million tons, the control of rice supplies would be a fundamental stabilising influence throughout the Far East. A continued disruptive Japanese presence in Southeast Asia would be disastrous if the return of the British was associated with post-war famine.<sup>80</sup>

Despite Sterndale Bennett's fears about British participation, he took a step back from suggesting that Britain should play no part in the enterprise, even though his arguments were damning of the whole concept. When Sterndale Bennett's thoughts were sent to Halifax, the ambassador rounded on the conclusions, and particularly on a further suggestion that it would make little real difference to US public opinion if Britain did not take part on the assault of Japan. Non-participation, the ambassador argued, would damage future Anglo-American relations and convince the detractors that Britain was only interested in recovering its colonial possessions. He continued:

Over and above this there would be a general feeling common to our friends as well as to our critics that the British had quit when the boar was at bay whereas the United States had seen it through in Europe. Even if British participation were of necessity small or comparatively so, there would be an overwhelming difference between this and total absence . . . . [I]f British troops are to be absent from the final assault on Japan, it would be much better for us that this should be the result of a refusal by the United States of a British offer of participation than of failure to make an offer. If we offered and the United States persisted in refusing I should

be strongly in favour of our letting this be known at once whether by newspaper or failing that by a suitable leakage.<sup>81</sup>

This broadside disturbed Sterndale Bennett, who told the Chiefs of Staff that Halifax had 'misinterpreted' current Foreign Office thought. The latter was not suggesting non-participation in the final assaults, but merely pointing out 'it was probably illusory to expect that participation . . . would earn much positive credit' in the United States or alter the American belief that their arms had won the war against Japan. The solution to this problem already suggested by Halifax and endorsed by Eden was to attach as many US correspondents as possible to British forces to maximise publicity.<sup>82</sup> Faced with arguments deployed by such a powerful figure in Halifax it was never likely that Sterndale Bennett would dare move to override the ambassador's advice.

On 4 July, both Churchill and Truman signed up independently to further Anglo-American co-operation in the Pacific. Truman, after a discussion with close aides, advisers and friends, agreed to the full participation of Britain in the Pacific,<sup>83</sup> while Churchill was prepared to accept the Chiefs of Staff's plan for a British Commonwealth invasion force for Japan.<sup>84</sup> Now committed to a Pacific strategy, Churchill told Curtin the day before the Australian prime minister died that such a force would 'form a striking demonstration of Commonwealth solidarity' and that it was 'important' to share with the United States the burden of the assault on Japan.<sup>85</sup> That burden looked increasingly more onerous after Sir John Anderson, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, had told the cabinet in June that it would be 'impossible' both to maintain the scale of effort in the Far East 'as at present planned' and to meet minimum civilian needs at home. Lord Cherwell, the paymaster general and close friend of the prime minister, expanded these arguments in July, informing Churchill that Britain now needed extra manpower to begin the revival of British exports, otherwise the outlook for the civilian during the coming winter would become 'most serious'. It therefore seemed 'quite out of the question' to consider any expansion of Far Eastern commitments without a genuine guarantee from the armed services that this would not inflate still further their manpower demands. Cherwell concluded, 'It is utterly impossible, I am sure, to expect the civilian to put up with heavier burdens now that the German war is won.'<sup>86</sup> Churchill's argument for Commonwealth solidarity also looked slightly less convincing when the British learnt the Canadians had already independently offered a division for use in the invasion and that the Americans had accepted this.<sup>87</sup>

Churchill's decision to embrace a Pacific strategy remained influenced by the continuing need to show solidarity and secure American post-war friendship, especially in the face of an increasingly unpredictable Soviet Russia. There is little evidence, however, to suggest that the United States viewed a British land contribution as critical or that they would have issued a rebuke if Britain had not stumped up forces for the invasion. In fact, Marshall told

MacArthur (who sought his views on the matter) that British divisions would merely replace American divisions like for like. But he hoped this would meet with 'public approval' by lessening the requirements for US soldiers and quieten Britain's detractors and those who attacked the Truman administration over the non-participation of allies in the conquest of Japan.<sup>88</sup> In the realm of military realities these considerations made little impact upon MacArthur, who again objected, this time in his new capacity as the commander-in-chief of United States Army Forces in the Pacific. As with the British Pacific Fleet and the long-range bombing force, American doubts carried the day. When the three great powers of the Grand Alliance met at Potsdam in July and August 1945, in bilateral discussions, the US military forwarded MacArthur's reservations to the British, ruling out the Commonwealth force's employment in a separate sector along national lines. He also wanted it re-equipped with US matériel, dismissed the use of a British Indian division due to language complications, worried about the availability of assault lift, and felt it was 'not practicable' to plan for the use of forces whose availability was contingent upon the conclusion of other major operations (*Zipper* and *Mailfist*).<sup>89</sup>

In MacArthur's defence, the outcome of *Zipper* and *Mailfist* was quite uncertain,<sup>90</sup> and considering the wide discrepancies in the forces to be deployed, Britain's rather ambitious claims for a quarter-share in the control of Pacific operations not surprisingly hit a brick wall at Potsdam. The United States was prepared to discuss strategy but the final decisions would rest with them. Marshall, however, agreed in principle to a Commonwealth land force for *Coronet* and promised to 'make room' for British troops.<sup>91</sup> The balance of power in the Pacific, as in 'Tube Alloys' (the codename for the British nuclear programme), lay with the United States and it was for them to make the main strategic decisions.<sup>92</sup> The discrepancies in forces available to the United States and Britain were clear for all to see. The Joint Staff Planners estimated that the Americans would have 36 divisions available for the main assaults on Japan; the British Commonwealth force would initially comprise three divisions for *Coronet* (a division each from Britain, Australia and Canada). The British Pacific Fleet was only equivalent in strength to a task force within the US Fifth Fleet and estimates suggested that Britain's strength in first-line aircraft would be about 8 per cent of the American total.<sup>93</sup>

Despite the imposed limitations on British forces, at Potsdam, Truman made it 'perfectly plain' to both Churchill and Stalin that 'my first interest is the USA, then I want the Jap War won and I want 'em both in it'.<sup>94</sup> Truman's main concern was to save American lives, even with the atomic weapons card in his hand (now a reality), which had so excited both Churchill and the US Secretary of State James Byrnes in the realm of bargaining power with the Soviets. Byrnes, a democrat from South Carolina of Irish-American extraction, had been a firm friend of Roosevelt, the latter taking him to Yalta to negotiate with the Soviets. Byrnes had also been a mentor to Truman during

his days in the Senate. Truman relied heavily on his counsel and Byrnes, a firm advocate of using the atomic bomb, felt Soviet intervention could now be dispensed with. Churchill picked up on Byrnes's stance towards Soviet participation, reporting it to Eden. But Byrnes did not reflect the complex and wide-ranging US views on the subject. There was no certainty that the dropping of the atomic bomb would guarantee Japan's surrender, which was a view Marshall tended to lean towards. Truman therefore accepted the need to secure Soviet, and to a lesser extent British, military help. Soviet entry and the use of the atomic bomb were not either/or strategies: both were necessary to help shorten the war against Japan. It was also impracticable to prevent the Soviets from joining the war. The allies had courted them since 1943 and it was almost certain they would enter the conflict regardless of any actions the United States might attempt to initiate.<sup>95</sup>

Truman's form of words – 'I want 'em both in it' – was, however, unfortunate, as it tended to suggest that Britain was not in the war against Japan in the first place, an unintentional slip of the pen one hopes but unsurprising considering the continual downplaying of the British war effort by the US press and the poor exposure the British Pacific Fleet had received.<sup>96</sup> MacArthur had also shown he was prepared to disregard allies, witnessed by his refusal to use Australian troops in the battle for the Philippines.<sup>97</sup> Despite these disquieting trends, Attlee, who returned to Potsdam on 27 July after becoming prime minister in the new Labour government, maintained the policy of sending British forces to fight in *Coronet*. On 31 July, he told Ben Chifley, the new Australian prime minister, that the necessity for taking part in Pacific operations was 'premised on the belief that the defeat of the enemy's armed forces in the Japanese homeland is a pre-requisite to unconditional surrender, and that such a defeat will establish the optimum prospect of capitulation by Japanese forces outside the main Japanese islands'.<sup>98</sup> The Chiefs of Staff would therefore accept MacArthur's proposals as they stood.<sup>99</sup>

On 8 August, the day that the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan and its forces advanced into northern parts of China and Korea, the British Defence Committee met to discuss planning for the Japanese war. During the previous month, Dening had continually bombarded the Foreign Office about how a Commonwealth invasion force would halt all SEAC operations after *Mailfist* and delay the liberation of Southeast Asian territories by up to two years, which would be nothing short of a political disaster for British power in the region.<sup>100</sup> These views found the receptive ear of Bevin, the new foreign secretary. At the Defence Committee, he stated his concerns about mopping-up operations in Southeast Asia while maintaining the identity of the small-sized Commonwealth Corps, especially as it was being equipped with US resources. Bevin also reiterated that 'the magnitude of our effort in South-East Asia has never been realised in the United States'. Attlee was equally unsure as to whether Japanese garrisons in the outer areas would

surrender if Japan was invaded or its central government collapsed, but he thought the Chiefs of Staff's proposals remained 'the best that could be done under the circumstances' (hardly a ringing endorsement), confirming the enterprise remained an important political gesture.<sup>101</sup>

For a prime minister who would challenge many of Britain's strategic commitments in the post-war period, his reluctance to reverse Britain's pledges in the Pacific at a time of economic hardship can only be put down to a fear of the bad impression it would make upon the Americans. But one wonders whether Attlee would have or should have changed his government's mind if he had read a memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 9 August. This paper began 'to question very seriously the feasibility of utilizing any British forces requiring both U.S. equipment and amphibious training in an assault role'. The Joint Chiefs were unconvinced by the information furnished so far by the British regarding the amount of time it would take to train men for amphibious assault operations for an invasion. The Joint Chiefs also wanted to be able to reassure MacArthur, which they presently felt unable to do, that any troops deployed would be ready for battle and adequately maintained and what the impact would be on SEAC with regard to assault shipping, 'a critical item in this problem'.<sup>102</sup> The Australians, too, were worried that the British would not be ready to take part. The dominion did not want to be left on the sidelines (as in the Philippines) during an event of 'paramount' importance that could affect Australia's standing in the region after the war.<sup>103</sup>

On 15 August 1945 Japan surrendered, a result of the psychological blows of two atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima (6 August) and Nagasaki (9 August), combined with the Soviet declaration of war. At the Far Eastern Department, where there had been no knowledge of the atomic bomb, the terrible effects inflicted by the weapon on the Japanese population led the department to believe that untold damage would be done to the allied cause. There were also still complaints that the United States did not recognise the extent of the British effort in the Far East or the Pacific. One Foreign Office official sought an authoritative ministerial statement about what

the Far Eastern War has meant to this country – of how we have mortgaged our future and piled up an immense external debt to see it through, of what it has meant in economic, and social and human terms as well as what has been accomplished in terms of campaigns and armies and ships.<sup>104</sup>

It is, of course, open to speculation whether the British decision to send combined land, sea and air forces to the Pacific might have made a difference to the popular US perception of Britain's role in the East, but the initial signs were not encouraging while questions have also been raised about the ability of the British Pacific Fleet to maintain itself into 1946, which lends

some justification to King's opposition towards the whole idea.<sup>105</sup> On 16 August, Mountbatten told MacArthur that he was 'most grateful' for the way he had handled the British Commonwealth participation in *Coronet*, convinced that the general's doubts were justified while stressing how the invasion force would have wrecked his (Mountbatten's) ability to carry out SEAC's continuing operations.<sup>106</sup>

This chapter has shown that it was the British who pressed for their own role in the Pacific rather than the Americans wanting them there. In approaching the Americans, the British hoped to derive 'political' benefits, such as strengthening the Anglo-American relationship, having a greater say in the region and dampening criticism about their 'imperialist' motives in the war against Japan. For the sake of unity, the Americans could not realistically decline British offers but the following chapters will show the perceived benefits on the part of Britain never really materialised. That the British decision to send forces to the Pacific for noble reasons and kinship were genuine is not in doubt but it was never very realistic to assume the dividends would amount to much, as Sterndale Bennett intimated. Only substantial forces, like those possessed by the Soviet Union, would have made such an impact. What occurred instead was a dilution of British resources, which should have been more profitably concentrated on securing Britain's key interests in Southeast Asia, such as Malaya and Singapore. This may have alienated Congress and popular US opinion but their suspicion of British imperialism was deep-rooted and the sending of land, sea and air forces to the Pacific to be merely dwarfed by American and subsequently Soviet arms was unlikely to change this view nor did it do much to impress the nascent superpowers or the peoples of Asia.

## Index

- Acheson, Dean, 89, 101–2, 106, 108,  
145–6, 151, 153, 161, 162,  
167–72, 180
- Alexander, A.V., 17, 69, 88–9, 160
- Allison, John, 109–10, 119
- America, *see* United States
- Anderson, Major-General A. V., 40
- Anderson, Sir John, 21, 33
- Antonov, General Alexi, 14
- Arnold, General Henry, 12
- Ashida, Dr Hitoshi, 71
- Acheson, George, 59
- Attlee, Clement  
as deputy prime minister, 11  
as prime minister, 23–4, 51, 52, 64, 70,  
74, 75, 92, 96, 117, 136, 142, 169,  
174, 175
- Australia, 3, 27, 41, 44, 72, 73, 116, 123,  
139, 142, 144, 145, 174  
exclusion from Pacific strategy, 12  
and its post-war role, 47  
and a Japanese peace treaty, 102,  
104, 171  
and the occupation of Japan, 45, 51–2,  
59–60  
and post-war Korea, 62–4, 78, 106,  
108, 111–12, 116, 121–5  
and regional defence, 73–4, 103,  
148–9, 161  
relations with Britain, 3, 17, 51, 66,  
74–5, 103, 109, 111, 177–8  
relations with the United States, 8,  
103, 137, 139–40, 151, 168–9  
role in Pacific War, 9, 11, 22, 24
- Badger, Admiral Oscar, 130–1
- Balfour, Jock, 53
- Beasley, Jack, 17
- Beckett, Sir Eric, 154
- Benninghoff, H. Merrell, 63
- Bevin, Ernest  
as foreign secretary, 10, 23, 35, 45,  
48–9, 53, 55, 58, 60, 61, 63, 64–6,  
70, 72, 74, 75, 84, 103, 104, 106,  
115, 117, 121, 135, 136, 141,  
145–6, 149, 153, 161–2, 167–9,  
174, 175, 180  
as minister for Labour and National  
Service, 8  
and post-war China, 92, 93, 95–6, 99,  
133, 134, 155, 159, 160,  
162–3, 170  
and post-war Japan, 90–1, 117, 138,  
143, 171–2  
and post-war Korea, 90, 91, 125, 167  
on regional Far Eastern co-operation,  
116, 139  
and the UN, 53–4
- Bishop, Max, 150–1, 163
- Blake, George, 119
- Blakeslee, Dr George, 27, 40
- Bond, Niles, 163
- Borneo, 9
- Borton, Dr Hugh, 40, 102–3
- Boyd, Admiral Sir Denis, 91, 92
- Bradley, General Omar, 131, 171
- Bridges, Sir Edward, 27
- Brind, Admiral Sir Patrick, 152, 159
- Britain  
and an occupation force for Japan,  
51–2, 59–60  
and an occupation force for Korea, 52  
assessment of US policy in East Asia,  
178–9  
attitude to China during war, 7, 31  
attitude to Korea during war, 38–9  
attitude towards a Soviet role in the  
war against Japan, 2, 14, 18–19  
and the Chinese Civil War, 84  
and the Chinese Nationalist blockade,  
159–60, 170, 180

- commercial competition with the United States in China, 32–4, 35, 99, 176
- dependence on US financial support, 68, 141
- and HMS *Amethyst* incident, 158, 160
- moving resources to the Pacific, 17, 19–20
- and plans for post-war Japan, 39–45, 59–62
- and policy for post-war China, 82–6, 91, 92–101, 127–34, 153–63
- and policy for post-war Japan, 70–3, 101–5, 135–44, 149–53
- and policy for post-war Korea, 62–4, 77–81, 106–12, 119–26, 163–7
- and post-war control mechanisms for Japan, 61, 75
- and post-war global strategy, 69–70, 89–90, 91
- and the recognition of Communist China, 169–70, 180
- relations with Australia, 3, 17, 51, 62–4, 66, 74–5, 103, 109, 111, 177–8
- and the return to China, 54–8, 85
- role in post-war Far East, 69, 88, 91, 116, 146–9
- trade with China, 1–2, 31–2, 33, 128, 146, 155–6, 157–8
- trade with Korea, 35, 107, 120, 173
- and unconditional surrender, 44
- view of China as a world power, 29
- view of post-war China, 56
- view of US post-war policy for Japan, 138–44, 150, 151–2
- British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 59
- British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF), 59, 60, 65, 73, 74, 75, 76, 89, 103, 139, 140, 177–8
- British India, 1, 11, 27, 29, 40, 46, 51, 54, 55, 65, 73, 87, 88, 90
- British Pacific Fleet, 17, 18, 22, 23, 24–5, 49, 54, 55, 91, 98
- Brooke, Field Marshal Sir Alan, 7–8, 14, 29, 75
- Bruce, Stanley, 17
- Burdett, Scott, 154–5
- Burgess, Guy, 118–19, 139, 148, 156, 159
- Burma, 6, 12, 20, 30, 46, 47, 86, 88, 103, 116, 146, 161
- Burma Road, 6, 7
- Burton, Dr John, 139–40
- Butler, Neville, 28, 38
- Butterfield & Swire, 31, 135, 155, 160
- Butterworth, W. Walton, 86, 117, 125, 129–30, 131, 134, 140–1, 167–8, 179–80
- Byrnes, James, 22–3, 28, 38, 44, 47, 56, 60, 61, 64–6, 80, 83
- Cabot, John, 132, 158
- Cadogan, Sir Alexander, 6, 10, 11, 16, 42, 48, 65–6
- on post-war control mechanisms for Japan, 61–2
- on post-war Korea, 63
- on post-war planning, 28
- Cairo Conference (1943), 36
- Cairo Declaration (1943), 2, 36–7, 54, 62, 63, 78, 109, 110
- Canada, 21, 22, 51, 63, 73, 96, 112, 121, 123, 124, 125, 139, 142, 143, 174
- Carton de Wiart, Lieutenant-General Adrian, 49, 92
- Casablanca Conference (1943), 6
- Cavendish-Bentinck, Victor, 26, 32, 40–1
- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 89, 118, 139, 155–6, 164
- Ceylon, 88, 103, 161, 171
- Cherwell, Lord, 21
- Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo, 31, 46, 50, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 65, 82, 83, 84, 86, 90, 92, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 105, 118, 127, 131, 133, 147, 155, 160, 179
- and *China's Destiny* (1943), 129
- moves to Formosa, 153, 161
- relations with Churchill, 29
- view of Hong Kong, 48
- Chiefs of Staff, 21, 23, 40, 44, 48–9, 53, 75, 84, 88, 92, 141, 148, 174
- and occupation force for Japan, 52, 89
- and post-war global strategy, 70, 74, 91, 149
- press for Pacific strategy, 8, 9, 12, 18, 19
- Chifley, Ben, 23, 51, 52, 73, 74, 75, 103, 139, 142, 169

- China, 1, 2, 3, 6, 11, 13, 16, 17, 23, 26, 27, 29, 33, 45, 46, 54, 89, 98, 101, 103, 110, 111, 112, 113, 116, 125, 127, 133, 134, 138, 145, 146
- British trade with, 1–2, 31–2, 33, 128, 146, 155–6, 157–8
- and HMS *Amethyst* incident, 158
- internal conditions, 49, 82, 93, 94, 127
- and a Japanese peace treaty, 102, 104, 136
- and the Kowloon incident, 127
- China Association, 32, 33, 56, 75, 86, 92, 130, 157–9, 170
- Chinese Civil War, 4, 35, 84, 92–3, 96, 100, 132, 133
- Chou En-lai, 82, 156
- Churchill, Winston, 6, 10, 15, 17, 19, 28, 30, 38, 51, 115, 117, 175, 180
- approves operation *Coronet*, 44
- approves study for occupation of Japan, 42
- and the atomic bomb, 22
- attitude towards China, 34
- on Hong Kong, 34
- ‘iron curtain’ speech, 68
- on a Pacific strategy, 21
- pushes for operation *Culverin*, 7
- relations with Chiang Kai-shek, 29
- relations with MacArthur, 11
- relations with Stalin, 15
- on role of Soviet Union in the war against Japan, 13–14, 16
- at second Quebec Conference, 12
- subscribes to Cairo Declaration, 36–7
- and unconditional surrender, 44–5
- view of the British Empire, 5, 7
- at the Yalta Conference, 16, 26, 52
- Clarke, Ashley, 13
- Clerk Kerr, Sir Archibald, *see* Inverchapel, Lord
- Coates, Patrick, 155, 156
- Cohen, Benjamin, 65
- Cooke, Alistair, 117, 132
- Council of Foreign Ministers
- London (1945), 55, 60
- London (1947), 99
- Moscow (1945), 64–6, 67, 77
- Moscow (1947), 93, 105
- Paris (1946), 74
- Craigie, Sir Robert, 67–8
- Cranborne, Lord, 31
- Curtin, John, 8–10, 17, 21
- Dalton, Hugh, 53, 69–70, 88
- Deane, Major General John, 14, 15
- Dening, Sir Esler, 11, 27, 30, 43, 67, 77, 86, 94, 99, 103, 117, 130, 131, 133, 134, 152–3, 156, 159, 162
- on British policy in East Asia, 117–18
- on post-war Korea, 80, 106, 109, 110–11, 126
- on the recognition of Chinese Communists, 128, 154
- on US policy for post-war Japan, 139–42
- view of MacArthur, 48, 102
- view of Pacific strategy, 10, 20
- view of US strategy in post-war Far East, 88, 93, 96, 98, 100, 113, 144, 167–8, 173, 179
- and visit to Canberra and Wellington, 139–40
- Derevyanko, General Kuzma, 75
- Dickover, Erle, 126, 132, 137
- Dixon, Pierson, 48
- Djabi, Zoki, 123
- Dodge, Joseph, 143, 150
- Douglas, Lewis, 104, 123, 146, 162, 172
- Draper, William, 124, 125, 137, 138–9
- Drumright, Everett, 57, 58, 87, 91, 93, 95, 98, 100–1, 106, 117, 165
- Dulles, John Foster, 172
- Dutch East Indies, 9
- see also* Indonesia
- Eden, Anthony, 5, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 21, 23, 30–1, 32, 35–6, 38, 39, 44, 169
- Evatt, Dr Herbert, 51, 59, 60, 63, 65, 74, 75, 78, 102–3, 104, 109, 111, 126, 139–40, 142, 144, 151, 168
- Extraterritoriality agreement (1943), 2, 30, 50, 55
- Field, Brigadier L. F., 92–3, 100, 132
- Foreign Office
- assessment of Soviet post-war aims, 68–9
- assessment of US post-war strength, 68–9

- on planning for post-war Japan, 39–45  
 on planning for post-war Korea, 37–8,  
 62–4  
 and plans to withdraw from China, 98  
 plea for closer consultation with US in  
 China, 86  
 on policy of non-interference in  
 China, 95–6  
 policy for post-war Korea, 106,  
 107–12, 122, 125  
 on post-war planning, 29  
 and the return to China, 49, 85, 86  
 on Soviet policy in China, 57  
 on Soviet policy for Japan, 104  
 on US policy for China, 156–7, 159  
 on US policy for Japan, 137  
 and the US-Soviet Joint Commission  
 for Korea, 78  
 view of Australia, 116  
 view of Britain's role in world, 26,  
 53, 78  
 view of US role in Korea, 81, 121–5  
 and the withdrawal of Soviet troops  
 from Manchuria, 83–4  
 Formosa, 153, 160, 168, 172, 174, 180  
 Forrestal, James, 41, 93–4, 97, 104, 109,  
 131, 138, 148  
 Foster, Andrew, 151  
 France, 27, 51, 112, 124  
 Franks, Sir Oliver, 124, 131, 132–3, 141,  
 150, 151–2, 157, 170–1, 173–4,  
 180–1  
 Fraser, Bruce, 60, 76  
 Fraser, Sir Admiral Bruce, 17, 51, 69  
 French Indo-China, 20, 47, 116, 134,  
 145, 146, 161  
  
 Gairdner, Lieutenant-General Sir  
 Charles, 60, 72, 75, 76, 109, 163  
 Gallman, Waldemar, 84, 122  
 Gascoigne, Alvary, 76, 87, 101, 103,  
 135, 137, 138, 140, 144, 150, 164,  
 171, 180  
 Germany, 5, 7, 8, 13, 15, 17, 18, 27, 40,  
 41, 87, 90, 101–2, 143, 160  
 Goodfellow, M. Preston, 77  
 Graham, Walter, 154  
 Graves, Hubert, 86, 125, 131, 134, 138,  
 140, 144, 157  
  
 Grazebrook, Lieutenant-Colonel  
 Neville, 119  
 Grew, Joseph, 16, 28, 34, 40, 42–3, 44  
  
 Halifax, Lord, 7–8, 20–1, 42, 62, 86, 181  
 Hall, Sir Ronald, 85  
 Hall-Patch, Sir Edmund, 33, 115–16  
 Harcourt, Rear-Admiral Cecil, 49, 54  
 Harriman, Averell, 13, 14, 36, 47, 61,  
 77, 83  
 Harwood, Sir Edmund, 148  
 Hawley, Frank, 72  
 Hayes, Major-General L.C., 35  
 Hilldring, General John, 81–2, 105–6  
 Hirohito, Emperor, 29, 40, 43, 44, 47,  
 72, 104  
 Hodge, Lieutenant-General John R., 63,  
 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 105–6, 108, 120,  
 122, 123  
 Hollis, Major-General Leslie, 44  
 Holt, Captain Vyvyan, 163, 166  
 Hong Kong, 14, 30, 31, 34, 35, 46, 48–9,  
 50, 54, 56, 69, 84, 91, 92, 99, 120,  
 127, 133, 134, 153, 157, 158, 160–1,  
 168, 176, 180  
 Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking  
 Corporation (HSBC), 31, 135  
 Hopkins, Harry, 11, 38, 44, 62  
 Hornbeck, Stanley, 36, 40  
 Hudson, Geoffrey, 29, 36  
 Hull, Cordell, 11, 27  
 Hurley, Major-General Patrick, 31, 34,  
 35, 49, 50, 56, 58  
 Hutchinson, John, 120, 170  
  
 Imphal, 12  
 India, 89, 90, 91, 103, 112, 114, 116,  
 125, 142, 145, 147, 161, 171  
*see also* British India  
 Indonesia, 103, 116, 145, 148  
 Institute of Pacific Relations, 39  
 Inverchapel, Lord, 14, 86, 90, 99, 111,  
 114, 124, 126, 180  
 Ismay, General Hastings, 6, 28, 44  
 Italy, 5  
  
 J. & P. Coats Ltd., 31  
 Jackson, S. H., 121–4  
 Jacob, Major-General Sir Ian, 65  
 Jacobs, Joseph, 108, 121–2, 126

- Jacobs-Larkcom, Colonel Eric, 57
- Japan, 1, 3, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 26, 27, 29, 45, 89, 90, 103, 110, 111, 113, 116, 129, 143  
 allied post-war plans for, 39–45  
 internal conditions, 59, 101, 135  
 non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union (1941), 13  
 and a peace treaty, 74, 76, 77, 89, 99, 101–5, 111, 136, 138, 140, 149–53, 172  
 post-war control mechanisms for, 65–6, 75  
 surrender of, 24, 35  
 and unconditional surrender, 44
- Jardine, Matheson & Co, 31, 160
- Jebb, Gladwyn, 28, 38, 77
- Jessup, Dr Philip, 162
- Johnson, Louis, 164, 171
- Johnston, Percy, 138–9, 143
- John Swire & Sons Ltd., 33–4
- Joint Chiefs of Staff, 15, 19, 51, 52, 61, 97, 110, 120–1, 127, 160, 164  
 on British role in the Pacific, 12, 18, 24  
 and a Japanese peace treaty, 102, 152, 171  
 press for a military advisory group in China, 56, 83  
 and unconditional surrender, 44  
 on withdrawing US Marines from China, 56
- Jowitt, Lord, 91
- Judd, Walter, 117
- Kennan, George, 68, 89, 90, 102, 104, 110, 126, 132, 137–9, 140–1, 147, 152–3, 159
- Kennett, W.B., 33
- Keon, Michael, 156
- Kermode, Derwent, 78, 79, 80, 81, 107–10, 112, 119–20, 122, 123, 124
- Keswick, John, 31, 160
- Keswick, W.J., 130
- Keynes, Lord, 53
- Killearn, Lord, 67, 88
- Killick, John, 109, 111–12
- Kim Il-sung, 36, 77, 108, 118, 119, 125, 166, 172
- Kim Ku, 36, 108, 119, 124
- Kim Kyu-sik, 36, 120, 124
- King, Admiral Ernest, 8, 9, 10, 12, 25, 41
- King, Mackenzie, 121
- Kinkaid, Admiral Thomas, 54
- Kitson, George, 85, 86, 93, 94, 98, 99
- Kohima, 12
- Korea, 1, 3, 23, 26, 27, 29, 45, 54, 89, 105, 113, 116, 138, 146  
 British trade with, 35, 107, 120, 173  
 and the Cairo Declaration, 36–7  
 internal conditions, 63–4, 77, 108, 120, 124, 125, 163–4, 166  
 and trusteeship, 36, 38–9, 62–4, 78, 106, 107, 109  
 US-Soviet Joint Commission, 65, 78–9, 80, 81, 90, 105–6, 107–8, 110
- Korean War, 1, 119, 136, 149, 160, 161, 170, 172–3
- Kurile Islands, 50
- Lamb, Lionel, 128–30, 133
- Langdon, William F., 80
- Leahy, Admiral William, 12, 61
- Limb, Byung Chic, 107
- Li Tsung-jen, 153
- Liu Shao-ch'i, 156
- Lovett, Robert, 89, 121, 132–3, 140–1
- Lucas, Major-General John, 93
- Lury, Lieutenant D. P., 78
- MacArthur, General Douglas, 24, 25, 32, 77, 79, 103, 160, 170, 180  
 and BCOF, 75–6  
 on British role in the Pacific, 8–10, 11, 18, 22, 23  
 immediate post-war priorities, 50  
 and the Japanese surrender, 46, 48–9  
 and post-war Korea, 105, 109, 124, 163–5  
 pushes for a Japanese peace treaty, 101–2, 105, 135  
 relations with Churchill, 11–12  
 as Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP), 48, 51, 52, 59, 60, 61, 70, 72, 77, 87, 89, 90, 104, 118, 122, 135–6, 137, 138, 143, 150, 152, 177  
 view of Macmahon Ball, 74–5
- MacDermot, Dermot, 70–2, 77–8, 101, 106, 112, 122, 126, 136
- MacDonald, Malcolm, 88, 129, 146

- Maclean, Brigadier Fitzroy, 81, 87  
 Macmahon Ball, William, 74–5, 103, 109, 140  
 Makin, Norman, 168  
 Malaya, 7, 25, 48, 86, 89, 103, 116, 134, 146–7, 148, 161, 169  
 Mao Tse-tung, 29, 30, 31, 50, 57, 94–5, 96, 97, 118, 119, 127–30, 133, 134, 154–5, 156, 157, 158, 159, 168, 169–70, 172  
 Mare, Arthur de la, 80–1  
 Marquat, General William, 135  
 Marshall, General George  
     and the Marshall Mission, 58, 82, 83, 84, 87, 88, 129, 177  
     and the Marshall Plan, 90, 147, 167  
     on Soviet role in the war against Japan, 15, 16, 19  
     as US army chief of staff, 9–10, 13, 38  
     as US secretary of state, 89, 93–4, 95, 96, 98, 100, 104, 105, 111, 117, 123, 126, 130, 132, 133, 134, 136, 141  
     view of British role in the Pacific, 12, 19, 21–2  
 Mason, Paul, 83  
 McCarthy, Senator Joe, 170  
 McCloy, John, 56  
 McCoy, General Frank, 135  
 McIntosh, Alastair, 140  
 McNeil, Hector, 117, 118, 130, 136, 141  
 Menon, Kumara, 122–3  
 Merchant, Livingston, 167–8  
 MI6, *see* Secret Intelligence Service (SIS)  
 Molotov, Vyacheslav, 13, 47, 64–6, 106, 109  
 Montgomery, Field Marshal Viscount, 75, 91, 92, 103, 109, 144, 148  
 Moran, Lord, 30  
 Morgenthau, Henry, 41–2  
 Moscow Conference (1943), 13  
 Mountbatten, Admiral Lord Louis, 6–7, 12, 25, 46, 48, 54  
     pushes for operation *Culverin*, 7  
 Muccio, John, 163, 166  
 Nehru, Pandit, 147  
 Netherlands, 27, 51  
 New Zealand, 3, 5, 9, 27, 44, 47, 51, 60, 63, 73, 74, 89, 103, 112, 116, 139–40, 142, 144, 147, 171, 174  
 Nimitz, Admiral Chester, 9, 11  
 Nitze, Paul, 173  
 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), 149, 157, 161  
 Northcott, Lieutenant-General John, 60  
 Officer, Keith, 74  
 Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 49, 118  
 Ogden, Alwyne, 30, 49, 55, 56, 85, 98  
 operations  
     *Buccaneer*, 6, 7  
     *Capital*, 12  
     *Coronet*, 19, 20, 22, 23, 25, 44  
     *Culverin*, 7  
     *Dracula*, 12–13, 15, 18  
     *Mailfist*, 18, 22, 23  
     *Market Garden*, 15  
     *Olympic*, 19  
     *Zipper*, 18, 22  
 Outer Mongolia, 16, 50  
 Pak Hong-yang, 36  
 Pakistan, 89, 90, 91, 103, 116, 142, 161, 171  
 Patterson, George, 121–3  
 Patterson, Robert, 61, 93–4, 105, 106, 109  
 Pauley, Edwin, 79, 80  
 Pearl Harbor, 1  
 Pearson, Lester, 121, 123  
 Peterson, Sir Maurice, 111  
 Philippines, 9, 17, 18, 24, 60, 112  
 Portal, Sir Charles, 18  
 Potsdam Conference (1945), 22, 44, 51  
 Quebec Conference  
     first conference (1943), 6–7  
     second conference (1944), 12–13, 17  
 Quirino, Elpidio, 147  
 Reston, James, 155  
 Rhee, Dr Syngman, 36, 77, 107–8, 112, 118, 119–20, 122, 124, 125, 126, 163, 164, 166, 179  
 Roberts, Frank, 61, 68, 70, 78–9, 110  
 Robertson, Lieutenant-General  
     Horace, 75

- Roosevelt, Franklin, 5, 6, 10, 11, 14, 27, 36, 145, 180  
 attitude towards Hong Kong, 31  
 on British role in the Pacific, 8, 175  
 death of, 42  
 relations with Stalin, 15–16, 26, 38  
 at second Quebec conference, 12  
 view of China, 29
- Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), 28–9
- Royall, Kenneth, 131, 137, 138–9, 144, 150
- St. Laurent, Louis, 161
- Sansom, Sir George, 29, 32, 35, 39, 40, 42–5, 59, 71–2, 81, 101
- Sargent, Sir Orme, 42, 74, 84, 96, 99, 108, 111, 113, 140
- Scarlett, Peter, 128, 131, 132, 133, 154–5, 156
- Scott, Arthur, 95, 98, 127
- Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), 17, 32, 57, 82, 118, 157
- Seymour, Sir Horace, 11, 30, 48–9, 55, 58, 82–3, 85
- Shanghai, 30, 33, 34, 49, 55, 56, 85, 97, 98, 100, 127, 130, 131, 132, 157–8, 160
- Shaw, Patrick, 122
- Shedden, Sir Frederick, 17
- Shidehara, Kijūrō, 71
- Shtikov, General Terentyi, 79, 110
- Siam, *see* Thailand
- Singapore, 5, 7, 25, 48, 69, 91, 119, 169
- Smith, General Walter Bedell, 78, 79, 111–12
- Smyth, Robert, 34
- South East Asia Command (SEAC), 6, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 30, 40, 55, 179  
 Americans terminate involvement, 47  
 post-war boundaries, 47  
 war aims, 7
- Soviet Union, 3, 6, 21, 25, 26, 35, 67, 76, 80, 91, 97, 101, 104, 105, 110, 112, 114, 136, 139, 140, 142, 143, 148, 152, 156, 163, 165  
 and the atomic bomb, 149  
 and entry into the Pacific War, 13–17, 23, 46, 47  
 and a Japanese peace treaty, 102, 104–5  
 Koreans living in, 36  
 non-aggression pact with Japan (1941), 13  
 policy for post-war Korea, 123, 164  
 and post-war strategy, 70  
 role in occupation of Japan, 60–1  
 withdrawal of troops from Korea, 125  
 withdrawal of troops from Manchuria, 83–4
- Special Operations Executive (SOE), 31
- Stalin, Joseph, 44, 50, 68, 82, 90, 104, 108, 114, 119, 148  
 accepts 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel in Korea, 52  
 and post-war Korea, 37–8, 62, 79, 172  
 relationship with Mao, 50, 56, 57, 83, 86, 97, 118, 129–30, 133, 154, 155–6, 157, 168, 169–70  
 relationship with Roosevelt, 15–16, 26, 38  
 role in occupation of Japan, 61  
 on Soviet role in the Pacific War, 13–15  
 view of China, 29, 35  
 view of UN, 15  
 view of US occupation of Japan, 57
- State Department  
 and the Chinese Nationalist blockade, 159–60  
 and evacuation from China, 159, 162  
 and intelligence on China, 118  
 and a Japanese peace treaty, 102  
 and policy towards post-war China, 86, 89, 93, 98, 99, 116, 126–7, 130, 132  
 and policy towards post-war Korea, 110, 125–6, 163–5  
 and post-war planning, 27–8  
 and post-war planning for Korea, 37, 63, 89, 106  
 and post-war thinking on Japan, 40–3, 102, 141  
 view of Hong Kong, 55  
 view of War Department, 93  
 and withdrawal of US forces from China, 131
- Stephenson, Sir John, 52
- Stephenson, William, 32
- Sterndale Bennett, John, 10, 11, 27, 34, 54, 57, 59, 60, 67, 83–4, 180

- on post-war control mechanisms for Japan, 61
- on post-war planning, 28
- on post-war planning for China, 32–3, 35
- on post-war planning for Japan, 40, 42–4
- on post-war planning for Korea, 38
- view on British role in the Pacific, 20–1, 25
- Stettinius, Edward, 16, 43
- Stevens, Francis, 110
- Stevenson, Sir Ralph, 85, 92, 94–5, 98, 100, 127–8, 129–30, 157, 158–9, 162, 168, 180
- Stilwell, General Joseph, 7
- Stimson, Henry, 16, 27, 44
- Strang, Sir William, 150
- Strategic Services Unit (SSU), 79, 118
- Streat, Raymond, 136
- Strike, Clifford, 137
- Stuart, John Leighton, 84, 85–6, 96, 100, 129, 131, 180
- Sturdee, Lieutenant-General V. A. H., 74
- Swire, Jack, 33
- Swire, Warren, 33
- Taiwan, *see* Formosa
- Tehran Conference (1943), 13, 36
- Thailand, 20, 47, 67, 134, 146, 161
- Tito, Marshal, 130, 155, 156
- Tomlinson, Frank, 152, 164, 166, 172
- Toynbee, Arnold, 29
- Treaties
  - Sino-Soviet (1945), 50, 57, 93, 104
  - Treaty of Portsmouth (1905), 13
- Truman, Harry, 16, 19, 35, 44, 50–1, 53, 58, 61, 64, 83, 89, 98, 100, 101, 104, 114, 117, 129, 132, 134, 148, 174
  - on a British role in the Pacific, 21, 22, 23
  - and policy for Formosa, 170
  - and policy for post-war China, 133, 157, 162
  - and policy for post-war Japan, 143, 171–2
  - and policy for post-war Korea, 63, 80, 105, 121, 165
  - relationship with Byrnes, 22, 68
  - relationship with Marshall, 87
  - on Soviet entry into the war against Japan, 23, 38–9
  - and the Truman Doctrine, 90
  - view of MacArthur, 59
- T. V. Soong, 55, 93, 100, 129
- Tyrrell, Gerald, 159
- United Kingdom Liaison Mission (UKLM), 60, 61, 72, 73, 75, 76, 79, 81, 87, 103, 118, 135–6, 138, 150, 177, 180
- United Nations (UN), 15, 34, 53–4, 77, 102, 105, 109, 178
  - and post-war Korea, 110–12
  - and UNCOK, 126, 166–7
  - and UNTCOK, 111–12, 119, 121–6
- United States
  - attitude towards China in war, 6, 30
  - on Britain's role in post-war Korea, 62
  - on Britain's role in war against Japan, 7, 18, 21, 24
  - and commercial competition with Britain in China, 32–4, 35, 99, 176
  - on the control of post-war Japan, 42–3, 104, 115
  - and the control of trade to Communist China, 146, 161
  - and the Japanese surrender, 47–8, 51
  - and joint defence arrangements for Far East, 74
  - policy for occupied Japan, 58–9, 117, 135, 137, 143–4, 146, 149–53, 170–1
  - policy for post-war China, 95, 97–8, 115, 117, 127, 155–6
  - policy for post-war Korea, 80, 81, 90, 105–6, 108–12, 114–15, 117, 120–1, 123–6, 163–7, 180–1
  - and post-war control mechanisms for Japan, 61, 138
  - and post-war war planning, 114–15
  - relations with Australia, 8, 103, 137, 139–40, 151
  - reluctance to talk to Britain on Far Eastern post-war issues, 28, 114, 134, 177
  - view of Britain's role in occupation of Japan, 67
  - view of Britain's role in the world, 53
  - view of imperialism, 6, 116

United States – *continued*

- and withdrawal from China, 161–2
- and withdrawal of Soviet troops from Manchuria, 83–4
- on withdrawal of US forces from China, 130–1

Urquhart, Robert, 156, 157–9

Vandenberg, Senator Arthur, 108

Vansittart, Lord, 67

Vincent, John Carter, 56–7, 62, 80, 83, 84, 86, 93, 96–8, 99, 100, 105, 108, 180

Walker, General Walton, 135

Wallinger, Geoffrey, 32, 83

Wang Shih-chieh (Dr), 83

Ward, Angus, 96, 100, 154

Warner, Christopher, 83

Webster, Professor Charles, 29, 37–8, 39

Wedemeyer, General Albert, 48, 50, 56, 58, 97, 98–9, 104, 110, 131, 155

Wilkinson, Lieutenant-Colonel Gerald, 32

Willoughby, General Charles, 59

Wilson, Harold, 136

Winant, John, 11, 34, 57

Wrong, Hume, 121

Yalta Conference (1945), 14, 15, 22, 28, 38, 41, 43, 44, 50, 52, 57, 62

Yoshida, Shigeru, 71, 150–1

*Zaibatsu*, 42, 59, 72, 101, 138, 150

Zhandov, Andrei, 90