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1

Introduction

The liberal project and realist politics in context

If there is one question that has haunted the discipline of International Relations (IR), it is whether humanity might become a universal political community or whether it will remain fractured by irreducible political differences. Posed more succinctly, the question is whether the value system of liberalism can be universalized, or whether, in fact, the illiberal reality of international politics systematically rules out such a project. This contestation between the liberal project and realist politics is documented in the founding myth of the IR discipline, the ‘first great debate’. Here, a pessimistic and realistic worldview of how things ‘are’ – namely a timeless anarchic world wherein national interest reigns supreme and selfish state interest consistently overrides the formation of a universal community – is purported to have defied an optimistic liberal worldview of how things ‘ought to be’ – namely a project to institutionalize inter-dependency between nations so that the ‘good life’ that individuals enjoy within the state can be universalized progressively across humanity.¹ In effect, the contestation between liberalism and realism has acted as a master framework in which the political–philosophical content of international relations has been arranged into a series of dichotomies that furnish mutually opposing worldviews: ethics versus politics, the universal versus the particular, prescription versus analysis and change versus continuity (Walker 1993; Crawford 2000).

In recent years, there has been increased dissatisfaction with this text book understanding of the mutually exclusive nature of liberal and realist worldviews. These critiques make the case that Realism makes no sense if understood as anti-liberal: it should be more accurately understood as a critique of idealist assumptions about the international

spread of liberal values.² It has been pointed out, for example, that both realist and liberal worldviews were entwined within many analyses of the ‘twenty years crisis’ of the inter-war period, the time when the ‘first great debate’ was said to have taken place (Wilson 1998; Ashworth 1999: 128; Thies 2002; Quirk and Vigneswaran 2005). Some authors have noted that talk of the outright triumph of Realism in the post-war American administration is also somewhat of an exaggeration: during the Cold War, US foreign policy was always guided by a paradoxical ‘utopian Realism’ wherein the national interest was ultimately anchored in the desire to protect and spread domestic liberal values (Donnelly 1995: 184–185; Hill 1989: 325; Kratochwil 1993: 71). In the face of such comments, the ascription of a dichotomous nature to liberal and realist worldviews becomes less common sense and more problematic to maintain.

One can, however, further problematize the mainstream framework of the discipline of IR. Though the word ‘liberal’ is often unproblematically associated with *the* modern condition, its own ethico-political content has by no means been so singular. There are, and have been, many different political philosophies that analytically and ethically investigate the condition of individual freedom in a sympathetic manner (Macpherson 1977; Schechter 2007);³ and it would not be outrageous to include some Realisms within this collection. Can we, therefore, speak of a *general* modern relationship between *the* liberal project and realist politics?

In order to answer this question it is crucial to consider the discrete historical geo-cultural contexts within which this relationship is investigated. Within the discipline of political theory, context has usually been understood as either universal in scope, incorporating the sum of the experiences of human development at a historical point in time (e.g., *the* ‘modern’ experience),⁴ or particular to the development of a bounded political community.⁵ This choice between the universal and the particular as context is replicated in many efforts to contextualize the development of IR itself as a discipline. On the one hand, a number of writers paint this context effectively in generalized terms wherein the dichotomy of liberalism and realism can be made sense of as a problematic of modern political subjectivity *per se* (Ashley 1989; Walker 1993; Campbell and Dillon 1993; George 1994; Der Derian 1995). But it has also been popular, on the other hand, to dwell on the particular American context in which IR has found institutional roots (Hoffman 1977; Krippendorf 1987). Realism, it is noted, bears the imprint of its founding purpose – to furnish the foreign policy of a newly hegemonic

power with the mores and techniques necessary to order a new Cold War world (Ashworth 1999: 122). In this latter perspective, special attention has been given to the institutional peculiarities of the American Academy (Schmidt 1998), and this concern has even been extended to highlight the differences between particular national contexts of knowledge production (Alker Jr and Biersteker 1984; Wæver 1998; Crawford and Jarvis 2001).

Nevertheless, the problem is that if all traditions or bodies of political thought only gain meaning and relevance in particular contexts, then a general theory of international relations is ruled out. But perhaps this choice between the particular and the universal context is, in the discipline of IR above all, a choice between veering toward either Charybdis or Scylla. For, the challenge that we are presented with when we enter into this peculiar discipline that seeks to explain the inter-relation of differentiated societies is precisely that of questioning *universality* in human affairs, but in a way that still allows for a *general* theory that might illuminate *particular* conditions. It seems then that at the most abstract level we must interrogate the international as a dimension of social being existing beyond the particular but before the universal. And it follows that we must interrogate the historical context of political thought on international relations in the same way – as more than the particular, but less than the universal.

To this effect, the argument in this book expands upon a growing body of work that seeks to contextualize political thought in neither particular nor universal terms, but by reference to the *international dimension of knowledge production*.⁶ Recognizing this dimension requires us to re-imagine context as neither bounded to a particular society, nor universal in scope, but rather delineated in and through a specific society's interaction with other, differentially developed societies. Thus, approaching context in this way requires us to imagine that political thought does not develop through internal reference to a particular society, nor does it simply translate perfectly across differentially developed societies. Instead, political thought is generated in and through intellectual engagement with the problem of alterity presented by the socially constituted border of political community. What is more, this intellectual engagement with alterity occurs as part of – and in conversation with – the substantive processes of social transformation themselves generated through the interaction of differentially developed polities. In other words, the international dimension of knowledge production is necessarily linked to a wider international dimension of social transformation.

In this book, I utilize this position in order to re-think and clarify the way in which the theorization of international relations constructs the relationship between ethics and politics, especially as they pertain to the rubric of a realistic tempering of the liberal project. To do so, I pursue two related strategies. First, I show how intellectuals have made sense of the relationship between a liberal project and illiberal politics from within a historical context delineated by the problem of alterity – of the interaction between differentially developed societies. And second, and in order to better clarify the nature of this context of alterity, I explore the substantive effect of this interaction upon processes of modern social transformation encountered and experienced by intellectuals. I investigate this problem of alterity in its manifestation as an experience of *comparative backwardness* concerning the political institutionalization of individual freedom.

In order to speak to some of the core legacies of classical political thought that, in IR, have been mobilized as a canon to frame the liberalism/realism dichotomy, I concentrate on the German experience of backwardness that concerned Immanuel Kant, Georg Hegel, Max Weber and ultimately Hans Morgenthau. This German context, stretching between the French Revolution and the rise of Nazism, is especially instructive because it seems to have produced an inordinate amount of critical theory on the condition of and possibilities for individual freedom in a world of illiberal politics.⁷ Morgenthau, the Godfather of Realism (Hoffmann 1977: 44), bridges this intellectual era and the subsequent takeoff of IR in the New World; but many of the preceding authors in this era have also been given prominence in contemporary IR debates in various ways: Kant and Hegel have been used as exemplars of cosmopolitan and communitarian normative theories, and Weber's vocation of politics informs much of the Realist debates on the nature of ethical foreign policy making.

Specifically, I contextualize the critical engagement of these authors with the condition of individual freedom as arising out of a consciousness of German backwardness that first emerged among the German intellectual stratum during the French Revolution and climaxed in the Weimar era. I investigate how this consciousness of backwardness developed among certain intellectuals through varied investigations of foreign 'advanced' societies – especially republican France and capitalist Britain – wherein individual freedom had been, in comparison to 'illiberal' Germany, politically guaranteed. I argue that in the works of Kant, Hegel, Weber and Morgenthau, one can extract a shifting yet cumulative engagement with the relationship between the project to

politically institutionalize individual freedom and the reality of a world of differentially developed polities. I argue that a consciousness of backwardness played a major role in the fusing by intellectuals of liberal values with the conditions of backward politics thereby producing novel political philosophies of the modern condition of individual freedom.

I make sense of this fusion of ethics and politics by employing a heuristic device, but one nevertheless derived from German Enlightenment thought itself: the notion of *Bildung*. At the most general level, one might say that *Bildung* alludes to an intellectual cultivation of knowledge, an education of the self. However, from the French Revolution onward, *Bildung* was mobilized by various intellectuals to refer specifically to the 'real-world' constitution of the political subject as the free and equal individual. Against the disruptive problem of unrestrained egoism created by the individualization of social bonds, *Bildung* was considered as the potentially progressive side of this process, namely, a self-cultivation of an awareness of the social constitution of one's own political individuality that would lead to an ethical social order rather than to the dissolution of social bonds.

In the following investigation I take the quality of *Bildung* to be counter-posed to an unthinking egoism, thus representing for the intellectual the progressive liberal value to be pursued within the world of politics in order to escape the condition of backwardness. At the same time, I also take *Bildung* to be the intellectual's understanding of his own special political agency, an agency, moreover, that the intellectual believed to be crucial in order to politically institutionalize an ethical individual freedom. Thus stated, my deployment of *Bildung* is not a willful fiction, but rather an emphasis that I make in interpreting the political philosophies of Kant, Hegel, Weber and Morgenthau in such a way that will draw out the framework of their shifting yet cumulatively developed 'liberal' project. Through this strategy I show that their 'liberal' project was not self-referentially 'German', nor passively received from abroad, nor a German derivative of a universally understood Liberal tradition, but rather a specific engagement with modern social transformation generated through the international dimension of knowledge production (manifested through a consciousness of backwardness).⁸

Three major points arise from this investigation, which are of pertinence to current debates in IR that seek to re-interpret the relationship between the liberal project and realist politics.

The first pertains to the practice of historically contextualizing political thought. I show that the interaction of differentially developed

societies is germane to the production of political thought on that development. This problem is obfuscated when the context to which political philosophy speaks is assumed to be either self-referential to a specific society or universal to the community of, or historical stage of, humankind. Therefore, rather than simply as an object of political thought, the 'international' has to be posited far more foundationally as constitutive of the construction of that thought itself. Highlighting the generative nature of the international dimension of knowledge production in this way makes us think more carefully about how we historically account for the similarities and differences between descriptively similar traditions of thought, for example, the many different sympathetic engagements with the condition of individual freedom that have historically developed across the world and that together make up a body of 'liberal' thought. This consideration gains breadth and depth through my investigation of the different kinds of 'liberal' political philosophies constructed by Kant, Hegel, Weber and Morgenthau, and the different ways in which they fused liberal ethics with illiberal politics.

The second point pertains to the project of using historical sociological approaches to account for the international relations of modernity. In this respect, I investigate inter-societal differences not in the abstract, but as constructed in a specific way within modern world development. By investigating the French Revolution and the succeeding development of the German state I argue that the condition of backwardness inaugurated inter-societal comparisons that led to the launching of substitute development projects and the creation of novel social forms and political orders. Thus, rather than conceiving of the 'international' as either an arena of pre-social anarchy, or as simply the extension in thought and practice of a particular form of domestic society, e.g., liberal modernity, I show that by focusing on the paradoxically generative nature of the condition of backwardness we might be able to think of the 'international' as a historical dimension of sociality *in its own right*. In so doing the argument in this book not only places the 'international' within the constitution of political thought but also suggests a narrative to make sense of the modern social substance of the 'international'.

Third, by placing these two related investigations in productive tension I reveal how some of the most influential classical authorities in IR theory engaged with, but at the same time obfuscated, what forms the special mandate of the IR discipline within the social sciences – investigation of the specificities of the social space generated through relations between differentially developed polities. In fine, I show that

Kant, Hegel, Weber and Morgenthau *all* imagined international relations in a way that, paradoxically, *elided an engagement with the international dimension of social transformation*. And the main purpose of this book is to draw out this serious lacuna that runs through this 'liberal' project and all of its historical twists and turns. In various ways the intellectuals associated with this German project were unable to recognize that in engaging with the context of backwardness they themselves were generating *both* the particular political condition *and* the universal criteria by which this condition could be judged to be progressive or backward. Ultimately, they failed to recognize the impossibility of occupying an objective vista from which to view the universal archetype of liberal structure and agency. By making a *faux pas* into universalism, all the intellectuals I investigate, in various ways, failed to recognize the *generative* impact that inter-societal difference had on their relating of an illiberal state of politics to a liberal ethical criterion. Moreover, by presuming the existence of a universal archetype of the political structure and agency of individual freedom, none realized that the condition of backwardness, starting in 1789, had tended to generate *multiple* (but not purely contingent) novel forms of modern political subjectivity, rather than simply facilitating the uni-linear expansion of a *singular* liberal political subject.

Although I would by no means wish to claim that the following enquiry exhausts all contexts in which intellectuals have tempered the liberal project with the reality of illiberal politics, its argument does hold ramifications for the way in which we critique the mainstream understanding of our disciplinary history. This is especially relevant to the way in which much theorization in IR – critical and otherwise – engages with Liberalism and Realism as singular and implicitly universally understood worldviews *even if* by doing so these investigations seek to disrupt the apparently dichotomous relationship between them. I argue that a more serious ambiguity over the relationship between ethics and politics resides in the generative nature that inter-societal difference injects into the development of political thought; and this provides a window onto an often-overlooked international dimension of social transformation that has been constitutive in the making of modern world order. Most importantly, and as I shall conclude, by shifting the problematic in this fashion, new analytical questions and ethical challenges arise regarding the relationship between the individual, the national and the condition of modernity – a relationship that is at the heart of the contestation between liberalism and realism.

In the rest of this introductory chapter, I expand some more on the missing international dimension of knowledge production in approaches that historically contextualize political thought. I then present a method of contextualization that is sensitive to this missing dimension with regards to both knowledge production and substantive social transformation. Finally, I outline the form and substance of the succeeding argument.

The context of knowledge production

In this section I sketch out various approaches to contextualizing political thought. The point of this exercise is to introduce various dimensions of context that have so far been addressed but, while not dismissing these dimensions, to draw attention to the relative absence of attention to the international dimension of knowledge production. As good a place as any to enter the debates over context is still Maurice Mandelbaum's (1965) essay in which he asked this question: is the 'history of ideas' a heuristic exercise meant to better articulate a philosophical position, or is it a social history of the development of that philosophical position?

Certainly, with the rise to prominence of the so-called Cambridge School (led by John Pocock and especially Quentin Skinner), it is the latter approach that has become more fashionable.⁹ According to Skinner, the history of political thought should seek to reveal the historical context surrounding the authors' intentions and the documentation of the actual struggles over formulating the meaning of this intent.¹⁰ Furthermore, social context is important, but not enough in and of itself for a historical reconstruction of intention. For, there is a difference between 'to do' and 'in doing': the former is 'prelocutory' – it provides motivation from outside the text to persuade readers toward a certain course of action; the latter is 'illocutory' – it evinces this motive by manipulating statements within the text. Thus, to expose authorial intention, one must be sensitive to the illocutory dimension of 'speech acts' (Skinner 1969: 42, 45, 1974: 294, 1988: 73).

However, Skinner strikes a note of caution: not every author has a full understanding of his/her own intentions. Therefore to expose intention more clearly than the author could himself/herself do requires the illocutory act to be contextualized within the prevailing conventions of political communication at the time. Only in this way can one decide whether an author is being, for example, ironic, conservative, or revolutionary through his/her statements (Skinner 1974: 283,

1988: 77, 1988a: 94). It is, then, the illocutory dimension of knowledge production that Skinner takes to be crucial to the contextualization of political thought. Skinner's approach is important in that it attempts to link the inter-textual to political context. However, Skinner has little to say on the way in which the conventions of political communication may themselves be framed by a further political context provided by inter-societal relations.

Post-structuralism provides an alternative approach to the relationship between the inter-textual and political, and here I shall focus on one writer, Michel Foucault. This is no arbitrary choice: Foucault (2002: 23, 151–156) himself acknowledged that his archaeological method had developed from a special intimacy to the History-of-Ideas tradition. Fundamentally, Foucault's (1991) method stands against the notion of a meta-physical origin to truth, and the use of history as the expression of a foundational logic. For Foucault (1991b: 148), there is no *logos*, only one more discourse of truth. Moreover, discourse is no neutral activity, but rather always animated by a particular expression of desire – a will to truth. Because truth exists only as an effect of a historical disruption and re-organization of a network of statements (*ibid.*: 144), knowledge can exist only by the support of various historical institutions (Foucault 1991b: 138, 144–146, 2002: 112–116). Knowledge therefore produces institutional experts who decide upon who can or cannot speak this discourse. This means that an author is never simply a discoverer of truth or a carrier of intent, but rather functions as a producer of discourse. The author function retrospectively constructs a recognizable discourse from a discontinuous array of texts that gives unity to the writing, resolves the differences between texts and neutralizes contradictions. Revealing the author function as a crucial dimension of knowledge production requires the investigator to abolish the sovereignty of the signifier and introduce into the history of ideas notions of discontinuity, specificity, chance and exteriority (Foucault 1991a, 1991b: 148–149).

Yet Foucault seems curiously insensitive to the specific national contexts to which political thought is addressed. Working from and within a quintessentially French social science tradition Foucault rather unsatisfactorily attempts to map this onto other national traditions of thought (Said 1983: 183–225; Ghosh 1998). However, he does touch upon the implications that a comparative approach would bring to a study of the mechanisms of knowledge production: in the introduction to *The Order of Things* Foucault (1974) briefly contrasts China's order of things to that of the West. Nevertheless, this flirting with a comparative method only serves to affirm for Foucault the specificity of modern Western terms of

categorization. It does not seek to illuminate an international dimension to the production of the order of things.

Similar problems are to be found in the latest approach in the German academy to conceptual history called *Begriffsgeschichte*, of which Reinhardt Koselleck has been the most influential proponent.¹¹ For Koselleck (1985: 84), a concept is bound to a word, but that word only becomes a concept if a whole politico-social context can be condensed into it. In this respect, the meaning of a concept is variable according to the historical social context, even if the word remains the same. Specifically, *Begriffsgeschichte* focuses on the transformation of concepts during the period between 1750 and 1850 (the *Sattelzeit*), which saw the rapid rise of modernity in Germany (Richter 1986: 252; 1987: 616).

By serving as a heuristic means of accessing past understanding, and also as a critical check on the contemporary reconstruction of political thought traditions, *Begriffsgeschichte* becomes a formidable tool with which to connect concepts deployed within texts to their historical social context. But it is again ultimately lacking with regards to assessing the international dimension of the transformation of concepts. In fact, *Begriffsgeschichte*, as some observers have commented, has an inadequate sensitivity even to the national context: there is a tendency to implicitly conflate the workings of the German '*Sattelzeit*' to that of global modernity in general. What would be the ramifications for the *Begriffsgeschichte* project understanding of a singular modernity, some have asked, if different political communities in the same era witnessed different transformations of the same concept? (Richter 1986: 633–634; Gordon 1999: 25)¹²

Finally, Historical Materialists seek to contextualize knowledge production within socio-economic relations, specifically, class conflict (for example, Wood 1978: 364; Wood and Wood: 1978). In this approach the dominant political ideas of social intercourse are understood as manifestations of ruling class consciousness that have become 'naturalized' and institutionalized as common sense. Proponents of ruling ideology might not recognize their instrumental role in reproducing relations of power (Femia 1981: 132; Morton 2003: 133); yet the political thinker, if not a party hack, still plays a constitutive role in the reproduction of structures of power. Historical Materialism seeks to de-naturalize ruling ideas by contextualizing them from the perspective of the subaltern's position in the relations of production. Indeed, some writers go so far as to claim that the position of exploitation breeds its own language, a form of intercourse that constantly threatens to problematize the common sense of the ruling elite (McNally 1995: 24).

Most Historical Materialist investigations focus on the dialectical interplay of class struggle *within* one historical society when contextualizing an author's political thought. Nevertheless, redolent of Foucault's *Order of Things*, George Comninel (2000) and Ellen Meiksins Wood (1991, 2000) have used a comparative method to draw out the divergent historical trajectories that have produced different ideologies and political theories in different societies. These efforts go some way in addressing the international dimension of knowledge production . . . but not far enough. For, the comparative approach does not seek to systematically explain how the relationship between differentially developed societies might be generative in the production of novel forms of knowledge within discrete societal contexts. In this respect, the international dimension of knowledge production has yet to be factored into a Historical Materialist approach; and I shall return to this challenge presently.

Alternatively, it is possible to discern within humanities and social sciences a growing appreciation of the combination of traditions of thought emanating from differentially developed societal contexts; and this appreciation has been most notably picked up in the nascent field of Comparative Political Thought/Philosophy.¹³ Although it is common in this field to remain at a level of comparative analysis that implicitly takes as its ontological starting point the existence of self-contained societal entities, other works point toward the generative nature of the act of translation.¹⁴ By this way of thinking, the act of translation is not a technical attempt to produce fidelity of comparative meanings, but a moment of political contestation over different meanings of the social. Yet translation, though part of an expression of a political project such as colonialism, is neither simply a process of knowledge domination whereby one society imposes its own meanings on another. Rather, there is a generative effect of this contestation whereby the 'receiving' society transforms its own meanings in novel ways through the enforced act of comparison. In other words, there is a growing recognition that there exists something beyond simply comparison or, indeed, mimicry (Bhabha 1984) in the moment of translating traditions of thought between differentially developed societies.

A framework for interrogating the international dimension of social transformation

The framework that I now build below seeks to address what this 'something extra' might be. The foundation of this framework is Historical

Materialist, even though I draw variously from the approaches outlined above. Because of this foundation the first issue that I address is a general, and of course, contentious one: how can a method based on the concept of a mode of production, be able to shed light on the process of knowledge production? I start, therefore, by unpacking some foundational assumptions and propositions of Historical Materialism.

Production is more a philosophical statement on the conditions of reproducing social life than a technical category of activity. Indeed, for Marx and Engels (1998: 37), the mode of production is, for those who take part, a ‘... definite form of expressing their life, a definite *mode of life* on their part.’ In other words, social intercourse is *itself* part of the productive forces, and therefore transformations in the mode of production are at the same time transformations in the mode of life (Marx 1993: 494). Moreover, any mode of production is the expression of a power relation, namely the control over the means of reproducing society, especially land and labor. The ruling strata that control the means of production do so ultimately by commanding the apparatuses of coercion. And this political authority is constituted through a division of labor, the ultimate point of which is to order the extraction of surplus from producers (Marx 1976a: 927). Surplus can be extracted through rent by those classes that own the means of production, and also through taxation and the obligation of military service demanded by those classes that occupy broader and more centralized apparatuses of political control – for example, offices of state. In addition, the classes that make up political authority, though united in a general exercise of power, might well exhibit friction against each other’s position regarding the pursuit of these multiple aspects of surplus extraction.

A basic aspect of the political nature of the division of labor is that it is never simply an organization of manual labor, but just as much of mental labor. For, as production is a *social* endeavor, it necessarily encompasses the production of subjectivities and inter-subjectivities, aspects of social intercourse that frame notions of association and contestation. Therefore a crucial aspect of reproducing political authority is to encode social beings as *political subjects* through a delineation of rights and duties pertaining to the organization of social reproduction. Historically, there have usually existed an array of relational subject positions under any one political authority, all possessing various rights and duties over social reproduction (crudely, for example, lord and peasant). Capitalism is unique in encoding a singular political subject to be shared by both expropriator and expropriated. Moreover, the political subject should not be treated naturally as an individual. Again, rights

and duties pertaining to the individual are historically specific to the capitalist form of social intercourse. In fact, historically, the sense of self – identity – has overwhelmingly been *corporate* in character (and often more than one corporate self at the same time).

The main point here is that struggles and contestation over the existing articulation of political authority are not purely biological reactions to, for example, a time of dearth. Rather, the reaction to dearth is decided through the sense of political self: to what degree, for example, do the exploited, as particular political subjects, consider that the ruling strata are transgressing existing rights and duties? Similarly, classes engage each other over the struggle to reproduce political authority by contesting how the political subject should be constructed. In short, contestations from above and below are articulated through and over the encoding of the rights and duties of the political subject and are therefore as much ethical in orientation as they are practical in nature. This is why mental labor – or knowledge production – is necessarily an aspect of the reproduction of political authority.

By this reasoning, knowledge production occupies a specific and relatively privileged position in the division of labor. To be clear about this claim, first, the position of the intellectual stratum and its relation to the executors of political authority might vary greatly among societies and also within the historical development of specific societies; and second, one need not necessarily be an official member of the intellectual stratum to perform an intellectual role.¹⁵ But this having been said, not everyone can occupy a platform from which to speak authoritatively on the rights and duties of the political subject.¹⁶ The intellectual's work, for our purposes here, the resulting text, is the encoding of a political philosophy – an analysis of the social world that seeks to orient social beings in a particular way, practically and ethically, toward this world. In times of crisis this activity is especially important: intellectuals often make novel interpretations of the current conventions of social intercourse¹⁷ by which the rights and duties of the political subject are inter-subjectively constructed (Wood and Wood 1978: 3–4). The text of political thought therefore speaks both practically and ethically to the delineation of the political subject, to a set of rights and duties regarding social reproduction, and, ultimately in this way to the moment of surplus extraction.

But placing the intellectual stratum within political authority in this way requires a further sensitivity to the context in which knowledge is produced. General struggles over the structure of social reproduction are not simply mirrored in the texts of political thought. Rather,

intellectuals engage with these struggles by proxy, as it were, as struggles over the various mediating institutions the purpose of which is to decide the legitimate form and content of knowledge production. This is not to say that intellectual struggles over the form and content of knowledge production have a separate logic. The fundamental point is rather that the specific institutional position of the intellectual stratum within political authority is a crucial consideration when painting the context of political thought.¹⁸

Although the majority of intellectuals – and certainly those who are able to effectively disseminate their opinions – are indirectly or directly complicit in the structures that support the ruling strata in general, this relationship is usually fragile. And if the intellectual stratum does not command the means of production directly, their interests might take a shape different from that of all other ruling classes. Crucially, it is the form and content of knowledge production that underwrite the claims to legitimacy of the intellectual stratum regarding their special place within the ruling strata as scribes and mediators of political subjectivity. If wider social struggles seek to qualitatively transform the rights and duties of political subjects, then this struggle directly threatens the existing framework within which the intellectual stratum pursues knowledge production so as to better order social relations.

In other words – and this is an important assumption of the method presented here – struggles over the form and content of knowledge production are the intellectual stratum's proxy engagement with struggles over the rights and duties of social reproduction.¹⁹ In this conflict, divisions within the intellectual stratum over contending projects of political development might be exacerbated; and in addition, non-institutionalized intellectuals might use a general crisis to debate against precisely the form and content of institutionalized knowledge production. Moreover, these contestations are cumulative in nature: the results of prior contestations over knowledge production and social reproduction form the starting framework – political, philosophical and ethical – for future generations of intellectuals.

In this respect, 'context' has to be populated, to some extent at least, by the biography of specific authors (Wood 1978: 349). This is not to claim that there is a primordial motive within the author waiting to be revealed, behind the layers of false interpretation (Foucault 1991: 110). But it *is* necessary to investigate a certain amount of biography in order to place the author and the text more adequately within all these variable and contingent struggles over knowledge production. In other words, the contextualization of knowledge production cannot

posit an agentless intellectual because knowledge production as political philosophy, if not carefree, nevertheless demands agency (and some imagination). Indeed, this is why one must often contextualize an author's intellectual development in terms of his/her engagement with the issues of the day. The author, as I have suggested, is already presented with a legacy of knowledge production, and over a lifetime further transforms this knowledge in relation to contemporaneous experiences. This is why the text, even if spurred on by motive and constructed with intent, *cannot* be interrogated as rational authorial control over the message.²⁰ For, what was intended is itself historically constructed and unfinished in nature and therefore cannot be revealed exclusively through the synchronic structure of language.

So one might construct a general Historical Materialist framework for contextualizing the production of political thought; but what of its international dimension? I shall now outline a framework for achieving this purpose, one heavily influenced by Leon Trotsky's attempt to theorize the international dimension of capitalist development in his notion of uneven and combined development, but one that also draws upon the general sociological literature on comparative backwardness and the literature surrounding the concept of translation.²¹

Geo-political relations are implicated in struggles over social reproduction both inside and between polities. What gives these geo-political relations determinacy in processes of social transformation is their uneven nature: some polities might be 'rising', others 'falling' and some expanding as others are contracting. The uneven character of geo-political contestation can certainly manifest itself in a violent struggle by ruling classes over extending their control over the means of production. But what is just as much prevalent, and tends to be the more 'everyday' form in which geo-political contestation plays out, is the clash over differentially developed modes of life – a clash over forms of social intercourse, subjectivities, and the rights and duties of the political subject. Geo-political contestation can create a demonstration effect; and in this way, it is entirely possible for political subjects to fight each other without taking up arms.

This contest takes place via the act of *comparison*. A geo-political relationship becomes charged with tension when the comparative light it generates exposes qualitative differences in terms of both the legitimacy of the rights and duties polities accord to their subjects, but especially in terms of the capacity of their structures of social reproduction to generate the human and fiscal resources needed for a strong military or policing apparatus. This means that geo-political contestation produces

a dull or sharp impetus toward reform in the now comparatively 'backward' polity. In this sense, the geo-political enemy is at the same time a mentor, demonstrating the kinds of transformations in the structure of social reproduction that would enable a 'catch-up'.

In the struggle over political authority an attempt is often made by certain classes (or elements within these classes) to import aspects of a 'foreign' political subject that are deemed to valorize their own project for reform. But in grafting on this 'alien' political subject, various *substitutions* are required to compensate for the institutions of social reproduction that, present in the 'home' of the 'alien' subject, are missing in this foreign domain. Even the importing of new technologies of production inevitably requires some kind of transformation in the existing social relations of production. Therefore, existing institutions are mobilized to perform novel tasks, and through this process of substitution a novel political subject can be created that articulates a novel encoding of rights and duties. These unintended consequences of the process of substitution might produce political subjects the ethical and practical makeup of which impinges upon other political authorities, including, quite possibly, the once-advanced mentor.

To clarify, social transformation possesses an international dimension in so far as it is prompted by the act of *comparison* (when existing geo-political unevenness becomes problematic to the reproduction of political authority) and enacted through the process of *substitution* (that combines pre-existing and foreign modes of life and production to form a new political subject). In sum, the processes of comparison and substitution are what I take to constitute the international dimension of social transformation. And what is more, this international dimension, at a general level of abstraction, has the propensity to produce novel political structures and social agencies, and therefore tends to give world development a *multi-linear* character that consists of relational, yet differential, trajectories.

Knowledge production has to be understood as deriving from more general processes associated with the international dimension of social transformation. However, and in keeping with the above discussion, the intellectual stratum experiences external pressure on the structure of social reproduction in a mediated form. In other words, the challenges of geo-political contestation are intricately woven into existing struggles over the status of the intellectual stratum in the ruling strata and the tasks of knowledge production. In this way, the international dimension of social transformation is necessarily debated in the language of philosophy and ethics, and not, narrowly, of politics.

The act of intellectual comparison takes place as an awareness of comparative backwardness. Here, the existing mode of life is problematized by the impinging foreign polity and therefore so, too, is the existing framework through which the intellectual stratum debates rights and duties in general, and knowledge production in particular, and through these debates, the legitimizing of its position within the ruling strata. With a growing consciousness of backwardness, intellectuals who believe that an engagement with the qualities of the foreign political subject is at least necessary – even desirable – tend to prescribe substitute processes in order to overcome comparative backwardness. Certain domestic agents and institutions are argued to be most suitable to carry forward a substitute social transformation for the ‘original’ transformation that produced the superior political subject.

However, as I have noted, the act of importing aspects of a foreign political subject can undermine the political position of those whom the act is supposed to protect. And for the intellectual stratum this danger arises in its prescriptions of substitution processes. The substitute agent must be deemed able to exercise his/her transformative agency in such a way that re-legitimizes the standing of the intellectual stratum within the proposed new political order. It is in this way that various concepts employed in existing political philosophies are imbued with new meanings.

Hence, comparison and substitution come to foundationally motivate the development of political philosophy, and this means that a consciousness of backwardness forms a framework within which transformations of political rights and duties are investigated. In other words, the consciousness of backwardness (that can sometimes verge on an anxiety over escaping backwardness) can often form a core motivating force for the development of political philosophy to the extent that this development is framed by the practical and ethical challenges of negotiating a multi-linear geo-political milieu. And these processes of comparison and substitution can even generate novel political philosophies.

Finally, this consciousness of backwardness must be understood in historically cumulative terms. The promotion of political philosophies to escape backwardness engenders reactions from various discordant elements in the ruling classes that impact (often negatively) the position of the intellectual stratum as well as the politics of knowledge production. And these ramifications form the starting framework of contestation for the next generation of intellectuals who seek to confront and negotiate the condition of backwardness and its effect on the social structure in

general and the intellectual stratum in particular. Thus, for the purposes of the present argument, *I contextualize knowledge production in its international dimension by exposing the shifting yet cumulative consciousness of backwardness at work in the production of political philosophies of modern social transformation.*

In the following investigation, some aspects of the above method of contextualization will be more or less important than others, in various chapters. But in general I seek to illuminate a number of aspects in the German context of backwardness. For the present investigation, these aspects include

- The historical accumulation of the effects of geo-political contestation on the general viability of an existing political authority;
- The historical accumulation of comparisons drawn from the geo-political contestation between forms of political authority, especially in terms of their relative encoding of the rights and duties of the political subject;
- The cumulative effects of struggles by various ruling classes (or elements within these classes) over the very question of, and, if relevant, method of substitution (This process of substitution, or just as importantly as we shall see, the avoidance of such a process, addresses the way in which struggles within the ruling strata embrace or avoid the international dimension of social transformation);
- The historical accumulation of intellectual responses (if any) to comparative backwardness, and the way in which these come to affect the intellectual stratum's legitimacy within the ruling strata and thus the politics of knowledge production; and
- The specific position of the author under investigation within the intellectual stratum in relation to the above aspects. This biographical detail, which includes the interrogation of key texts, charts the development of tensions over the possibilities of social transformation emanating from a growing consciousness of backwardness, tensions manifested in analytical comparisons and prescriptive substitutions.

German backwardness in context

I operationalize the above framework to investigate German backwardness from the French Revolution onward. To do this necessitates an abstraction of the peculiarly modern character of the international

dimension of social transformation and the concomitant form of multi-linearity it produces in world development. At this maximal level of abstraction, I take modernity to be defined by the quality of *impersonality* in the mode of production and associated form of social intercourse.

My main argument is that the processes of comparison and substitution associated with the French Revolution set in motion a specific multi-linear character of modern world development.²² Whereas pre-existent political authorities organized social reproduction through sets of rights and duties that were personalized in nature, a political subject that was impersonal in nature first arose in the capitalist transformation of English agriculture wherein the right to own and dispose of private property unencumbered with wider social duties replaced personalized, directly communal rights and duties over property. I call this political subject of capitalism the 'impersonalized individual'.

I then argue that the geo-political contestation between Bourbon Absolutism and British capitalism gave rise to the French Revolution. Guided by a sense of comparative backwardness developed amongst the French ruling strata during the colonial wars, the revolutionary deputies attempted to import the rights of the British impersonalized individual into an existing absolutist corporate political subject – the Third Estate – which effectively acted as a substitute for the formal political equality found within British civil society. Through this process of comparison and substitution a novel political subject was produced: the 'impersonal collective'. For reasons that will become clearer in Chapter 2, I concentrate on the Jacobin manifestation of this political subject. The Jacobin subject distinguishes itself from the capitalist subject in that it affirms the rights of the impersonalized individual – political freedom and equality – but sets those rights in friction with a duty of all such individuals to secure the 'general will' – the social welfare of an impersonal whole. Crucially, this general will became militarized in the course of the Revolution, so that the Jacobin subject impinged most forcefully on the rest of the world, including capitalist Britain, in the form of the 'citizen-soldier', a process that culminated in the Napoleonic wars.

By this reasoning, modernity cannot be understood to have been driven forward by a singular logic of struggle over the impersonalization of rights and duties of social reproduction; rather, its dynamic is to be understood as a cumulative tension between two intimately related yet contesting development projects regarding (a) the rights of the impersonalized individual and (b) the duties toward securing the welfare of an impersonal social whole. In other words, the multi-linear character of modern world development can be conceptualized, at the

most general level, as driven by a pressure generated by two frictionally related meta-subjects – the impersonalized individual and the impersonal collective, both of which at the same time came to impinge upon existing personalized and corporatized systems of social reproduction. The effect of these pressures on any society can only be made sense of by a detailed analysis of its specific historical legacies. And in this particular case I focus on the way in which these pressures impacted Germany in general, and, before unification, Prussia especially.

The martial integrity of an army raised through the personalized corporate set of political subjects that made up German political authorities was put under pressure by the ‘national’ French revolutionary (and then Napoleonic) army. Prussian reforms were designed to emulate the qualitative and quantitative superiority of this citizen-soldier army by re-organizing the hierarchical corporate constitution of the Prussian military with reference to universalized and impersonalized martial rights and duties. However, though intended to defend the existing ruling strata, reform necessarily threatened to dissolve the personalized and corporate mode of life through which the ruling classes derived their authority. Contributing further to this paradox was the concomitant attempt to emulate the success of the British tax base, rooted in agrarian capitalism; the drive toward free trade dissolved Prussian corporate life even further, opening it up to the vagaries of the (British dominated) world market.

The need to graft the rights and duties of impersonalized political subjects onto the existing Prussian structure of social reproduction gave rise to a specific fear among the ruling strata – the *Pöbel*, a politicized and autonomous rabble. This rabble, though produced largely by reforms designed to emulate British capitalism, was nevertheless perceived in terms of a French Jacobin-like threat, especially in light of the prior military reforms that had sought to turn peasants into defenders of their own rights. Imported into Germany at large, the Jacobin impersonal collective was translated into the political subject of the *Volk*, with its accompanying discourse of *Deutschtum* (German-ness). The fear of a French-like revolution of the (especially urban) masses from below drastically impacted the desire of even ‘progressive’ elements of the ruling strata to finish reform by launching a substitution process. However, by the end of the century, the *Volk* was being mobilized even by conservative elements to set the pace and direction of German development. The substantive narrative of the book therefore charts the creation and transformation of the meaning of this Jacobin threat within the ruling strata up to the Weimar era, and how this German-Jacobin subject

was implicated in various attempts to initiate (or offset) substitute development projects.

This substantive historical investigation is not designed to provide an exhaustive account of German state development but rather to furnish the context in which I make sense of the cultivation of a consciousness of backwardness among the Prussia-German intellectual stratum and the development of a 'liberal' project. As I have discussed above, I am primarily concerned with those intellectuals who attempted to negotiate the problem of comparative backwardness in modern world development by consistently re-formulating *Bildung* as the political agency of the intellectual designed to progressively resolve the negative social effects of impersonalized individualism. And I do this through investigating four episodes of crisis that plagued the German intellectual stratum from the French Revolution to the Weimar era.

The first episode that forms Kant's context is centered upon the impact of the French Revolution on the German Enlightenment (*Aufklärung*). Prior to the French Revolution, Kant's political philosophy promoted a non-modern reform of the Prussian estates system. Kant posited that the Reason of the free individual existed noumenally; however, between this ideal realm and the phenomenal realm of politics there existed a chasm. It was the intellectual's task to guide progressive reform of the corporate political order by reference to a universal history that, in telling the story of the coming to being of individual freedom, attempted to regulate political action by reference to ideal standards. By posing this regulative history, the intellectual was exercising *Bildung*. Yet because of the incommensurability of Reason and experience, the exercise of *Bildung* was not supposed to lead to a radical transformation of the corporate political world toward one that encoded the equality and freedom of the individual. Rather, Kant's political philosophy was one of enlightened corporate *reform*.

The French Revolution threatened all this by manifesting the bearer of Reason – the impersonalized individual – within a political constitution. And the constitution produced in Kant a consciousness of backwardness regarding the (minimal) tangible results of his own corporate enlightenment within Prussia. Kant attempted to save the legitimacy of his existing corporate reform project by interpreting the effect of the French Revolution in such a way that it could be said to prove the existence of individual Reason ideally, but not the manifestation of the free and equal individual phenomenally in the world of politics. Kant approached this task by exploring the ethical and political relationship between the individual, the state and humanity. In this way a

consciousness of backwardness structured Kant's most famous writings on international relations.

Therefore, Kant's political philosophy constructed both the particular possibility for German development out of backwardness – a continuation of the corporate Enlightenment – and the universal archetype of liberal agency against which such possibilities were measured and illuminated – a resolutely noumenal (and not phenomenal) Reason. The experience of German backwardness did not so much make Kant take a *faux pas* into universalism; rather, he refused to step out of the noumenal realm of universal Reason into the phenomenal realm of multi-linear world politics.

The next episode I document is a continuation of the above crisis. Unlike Kant, Hegel accepted and dwelled upon the radical and phenomenal difference between France and Germany. Furthermore, the Napoleonic imperialistic turn now cast France as a direct threat to the integrity of the German Reich. And with the comparative backwardness between the two societies sharpened, Hegel produced a political philosophy that sought to guide Germany out of backwardness through an international dimension of social transformation, a dimension he conceptualized through the movement of *Aufhebung*.

Specifically, Hegel sought to find a way to import French impersonalized individualism into a traditional German communal social base, in so doing introduced individual freedom but in such a way that it would not lead to social dissolution. Hegel believed that the Terror and the Napoleonic turn were a result of structuring the public sphere solely through the principle of unrestrained egoism. To achieve this, Hegel gave the intellectual's political agency of *Bildung* a radically new meaning and scope: in its capacity to spread self-awareness of the social basis of individual freedom *Bildung* was to be the progressive other to the egoism of impersonalized individualism. This dialectic played out through the institution of *Geist*, the 'liberal spirit' that directed modern world development. In effect, the German intellectual stratum, in exercising *Bildung*, had now become integral in the movement of *Geist* by launching, in Germany, a substitute revolution for the French variant – a revolution of Philosophy.

Therefore, Hegel's political philosophy constructed both the particular possibility for German development out of backwardness – a revolution of Philosophy – and the universal archetype of liberal agency against which such possibilities were measured and illuminated – *Geist*. Moreover, the German intellectual's political agency of *Bildung* would now, for Hegel, be integral to the progression of a singular world

historical movement spreading an ethical individual freedom. In this way, *Geist*, a manifestation of Hegel's consciousness of backwardness, led him to take a *faux pas* into universalism. And this universalism depended upon a historical narrative that exhausted the meaning of the French Revolution as the political constitutionalizing of impersonalized individualism. In fact, Hegel was opposed to the fledgling nationalist movement in Prussia because he believed that the pursuit of German-ness (*Deutschtum*) would essentialize and stratify political identity into an impersonal collectivist form, thus leaving Germany backward by placing its political community outside of the dialectic of impersonalized individualism that drove *Geist*.

The third episode starts with a new crisis brought on by the failure of the 1848 revolutions. In order to make sense of this extremely complex period of German intellectual history, I use the figure of Max Weber. The 1848 defeat of the 'middle classes' by the nobility and aristocracy accompanied, paradoxically, the modern process of industrialization. The post-1848 era therefore seemed to inaugurate a 'special path' for Germany (*Sonderweg*), one that stubbornly mixed traditional and modern social forces, and one that refuted the Hegelian claims to a universalizing liberal *Geist*. What compounded this challenge to the Hegelian 'liberal' project was the increasing mobilization of the French Jacobin subject *within* Germany, across the ruling strata, as an alternative referent for struggles over the peculiar German 'modernization' of political rights and duties. The general will of the *Volk* and its associated quality of *Deutschtum* invoked the moral supremacy of the rights and duties of an impersonal collective.

To address these unforeseen developments, Weber used a Nietzschean and neo-Kantian standpoint to refute the Hegelian assumption that one could mount value comparisons across differentially developed cultural systems. Rather, each system had to be critically appreciated by its own standards. Narratives of historical 'progress', for Weber, were by and large fictions to be mobilized to make more sense of the geo-cultural peculiarity of current German ways of thinking about the truth of human existence. Indeed, any claims to the existence of collective harmonies or of universal rapprochement of human societies were, for Weber, ideologies that facilitated the will to power of individuals. Thus Weber reformulated the political agency of *Bildung*: though still spreading a self-awareness of the social basis of individual freedom, this self-awareness now had to address itself to the national limits of this condition, rather than its universal reach. And for this purpose, Weber

documented his particular fusion of an ethics and politics of limits through his writings on the vocations of science and politics.

Yet Weber did not simply use these vocations to produce an ethico-political standpoint on inter-societal difference as an object of enquiry. In fact, Weber's vocations were built upon a value comparison made across cultural systems. Specifically, Weber saw exemplified in the historical rise of the English middle classes the universal archetype of liberal political agency. Comparing the German *Sonderweg* with this English history, Weber judged the German middle classes to be suffering an arrested development owing to the fact that they pursued their own interests through promoting the collectivist ideology of the atavistic nobility – the *Volk* and the discourse of *Deutschtum*. In this way Weber therefore re-imagined and re-defined *both* the particular political condition *and* the universal criteria by which this condition could be judged to be progressive or backward.

Weber then prescribed a substitute agent for the arrested development of the German middle classes – the demagogic politician. By influencing the actions of this politician through their agency of *Bildung*, the German intellectual would steer the *Sonderweg* toward an ethical engagement with the modern condition. Illiberal political means would lead to liberal ends, and this was Weber's political philosophy of 'practical politics' – *Realpolitik*. However, by the end of the Great War, Weber believed that this German 'liberal' project was the last best hope for humanity as a whole, and here he made a *faux pas* into universalism. Furthermore, the ontological basis that allowed for this *faux pas* was one ultimately inherited from the German intellectual engagement with modernity through the French Revolution. For, both analytically and ethically, Weber assumed the problem of modern social transformation to be exhausted by the struggle over the negative and positive aspects of a singular political subject – the impersonalized individual.

The fourth episode takes place in the crisis era of the Weimar Republic: the rise of Nazism, and the capture and containment of the German *Sonderweg* at Versailles by outside forces – and liberal ones at that. In the Weimar intellectual context the differential development between Germany and all other political communities became existentialized into a life/death binary rather than a backward/advanced model. Traveling from this founding intellectual context across the Atlantic, Morgenthau attempted to re-legitimize Weber's 'liberal' project for post-liberal times in the halls of American foreign policy making.

Morgenthau judged the existential crisis of humanity to be an outcome of a uni-linear world-historical development driven by the internal dialectic of the singular modern subject. Specifically, the liberal ideology that posited liberal politics as a consensus of individual wills created a collective will to power that mistook its own interests to be universal truth. In short, the political institutionalization of the impersonalized individual led, tragically, to an impersonalized collectivist delusion of 'nationalistic universalism'. To reformulate the intellectual 'liberal' project Morgenthau compared a decadent modern middle class with a self-aware pre-modern aristocracy. And for this decadent middle classes, he substituted a policy-making elite wielding *Bildung* through what were once aristocratic political tools. In this way, Morgenthau quarantined the agency of *Bildung* to a policy-making elite institutionally buffered from direct political responsibility to follow the will of the masses. Presenting the fate of Liberalism as tragic in its own world-historical unfolding is therefore what ultimately gave Morgenthau's reformulated 'liberal' project its conservative quality.

Yet Morgenthau's tragic narrative retained the world-historical framework, constructed by Hegel's revolution of Philosophy, of a universal and singular liberal project driven by the dialectic of egoism and *Bildung*. Crucially, Morgenthau inherited Hegel's conjoining of the progressive liberal value of *Bildung* with the political agency of the intellectual. Furthermore, by using Weber's neo-Kantian/Nietzschean epistemology of multi-linearity as irreconcilable difference, Morgenthau filtered the Hegelian inheritance through the ethical limitations that Weber had placed on the political agency of *Bildung*. It was from this historical-philosophical baseline that he made sense of a putative existential crisis of Liberalism. And from this basis, Morgenthau then proceeded to analyze and prescribe the purpose of American politics in a new world order.

Courtesy of the cumulative universal *faux pas* that these intellectuals made, their liberal project effectively documented a rise and fall of *Bildung*. In other words, the rise and fall of the reach and penetration of progressive liberal agency into the world of politics was a contour sketched out by variously judging the historical possibilities of German development by reference to a singular world-historical Liberal project. Initially, Kant refused to associate *Bildung* with the modern condition. Hegel in the aftermath of the French Revolution took *Bildung* to be a determining aspect of the universalizing *Geist* of individual freedom. Through his vocations of science and politics, Weber, in the post-Bismarck reactionary period and amid increasing geo-political

friction within Europe, placed national limits on the presumed universal reach of *Bildung*. And Morgenthau denied *Bildung* even a full national reach: speaking to the collapse of Germany at Versailles, and the following Nazi abuse of reforming the *Volk*, *Bildung* could only be retained to work within the circles of policy-making elites – hence, his conservative liberalism.

However, this story of a rise and tragic fall of the ethical promises of the impersonalized individual is *not* the full story of the international relations of modernity. In fact, it is a partial story, and one that could only be written through a continual inability to engage with the international dimension of modern social transformation and its generative result – a multi-linear developmental relation concerning two meta-political subjects, the impersonalized individual *and* the impersonal collective. For, at all times, and especially in the writings of Hegel, Weber and Morgenthau, the Jacobin impersonal collective, in the guise of the *Volk* and its related discourse of *Deutschtum*, was a political subject deemed to be unmodern, then anti-modern, and then a tragic *internal* effect of the characteristics of the impersonalized individual. By conceptually flattening the multi-linear dialectic of modern social transformation into a uni-linear struggle *internal* to *the* liberal modern subject, namely the impersonalized individual, the consciousness of backwardness has a major part to play: this consciousness was both the motivating force for political philosophies of modern development and the accumulated political-philosophical framework through which to judge the trajectory of this development.

The argument proceeds in the following steps:

In the remainder of Part I (i.e., Chapter 2), I explore how the international dimension of the French Revolution produced a novel subject, the Jacobin citizen of the nation, intimately related to, but profoundly different from, the British capitalist subject. This chapter sets up and makes sense of the relationship between two differential political subjects, the impersonalized individual and the impersonal collective, the effect of which would pressure Prussia-Germany to embark on reforms. In the four chapters of Part II I relate each author to a specific moment in Prussia-German reform and modernization and examine how each author's political philosophy spoke to, and re-assessed, the German consciousness of backwardness. In Chapter 3 I position Kant in the first decade of the French Revolution as it impacted the then existing Prussian state and the German enlightenment. In this context I discuss Kant's tripartite relationship between the individual, the state and humanity. In Chapter 4 I place Hegel within the Napoleonic period and

the proceeding German and Prussian reforms. In this context I discuss Hegel's revolution of Philosophy and especially his notion of *Aufhebung* and *Geist*. In an interlude I document the lead-up to the 1848 revolution. Then, in Chapter 6, I position Weber in the post-1848 climate, and especially in the post-Bismarck era. In this context I discuss Weber's vocations of science and politics and the way that they fused into his political philosophy of *Realpolitik*. In Part III I sketch out in an epilogue the end point of the German *Sonderweg*: the rise of National Socialism during the Weimar era. I position Morgenthau in this context, document his critical conversation with these accumulated concrete and intellectual developments, and reveal how they underwrote the Americanization of his political thought.

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