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## 1

## Introduction

*Michael Baun and Dan Marek*

Cohesion policy is one of the European Union's (EU) most important activities, currently accounting for more than a third of the EU budget. Through the structural funds – the main financial instruments of cohesion policy – the EU seeks to reduce economic and social disparities in Europe by providing assistance to disadvantaged regions and localities. Cohesion policy is not only important for what it does but for how it does it. Structural funds are provided to EU member states on a regionalized basis to help fund multiannual development programmes. These Operational Programmes (OPs) are planned and implemented according to the principle of 'partnership', which requires the European Commission and national governments to cooperate with appropriate subnational (regional and local) and nongovernmental actors. Because of the partnership principle and its emphasis on decentralization and subsidiarity, some scholars have argued that EU cohesion policy has promoted the development of multilevel governance in Europe (Bache, 2008).

Both because of what it is – a programme to provide development assistance to poorer regions and countries that is redistributive in effect – and its budgetary status, cohesion policy was bound to be affected by the 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the EU.<sup>1</sup> Most of the new member states are relatively poor Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), with per capita incomes far below the EU average. Thus, economic disparities within the EU have grown considerably as a result of enlargement. In 2004 the wealthiest member state, Luxembourg, had a per capita GDP that was 226 per cent of the EU average, while the poorest (at that time prospective) member states, Bulgaria and Romania, had per capita incomes that were only around 30 per cent of the EU norm (European Commission, 2006a). The gap between the wealthiest and

poorest regions, most of which are in the CEECs, has also grown as a result of enlargement, while many of the new member states also feature sharp internal disparities between rapidly-growing and more prosperous capital-city metropolises and poorer outlying regions. Enlargement, therefore, has made the traditional cohesion policy task of reducing economic and social disparities even more necessary and important. However, because of the reluctance of wealthier member states to increase the size of the EU budget and their own contributions, enlargement has not been accompanied by a corresponding expansion of funding for cohesion policy; in fact, cohesion policy spending is declining as a percentage of EU GDP, from a high of about 46 per cent in 1999 to a projected 35 per cent in 2013 (European Commission, 2007a, pp. 173–4). One consequence has been a reduction of cohesion policy allocations for relatively wealthier countries that were member states before 2004.

Enlargement has also coincided with a profound thematic re-orientation of cohesion policy. In March 2005 the European Council decided to relaunch the stagnant ‘Lisbon Agenda’ to promote economic growth and competitiveness in the EU and it accorded cohesion policy a key role in achieving the Lisbon goals. The decision to link cohesion policy to achievement of the Lisbon goals (and the ‘Gothenburg’ goal of environmental sustainability) was subsequently confirmed by the European Council in December 2005 and incorporated into the new Regulation governing the structural and cohesion funds that was approved by the Council in July 2006 (OJEU, 2006a). As a consequence, a certain percentage of EU funding under each of the main objectives of cohesion policy – ‘Convergence’ and ‘Regional Competitiveness and Employment’ – must now be used for projects which contribute to achievement of the Lisbon goals. While the Lisbon ‘earmarking’ requirements have been waived for new member states in the 2007–13 programming period, they are nevertheless expected to adhere to them on a voluntary basis. The 2006 cohesion policy reform also makes some important changes to programming and implementation procedures, most notably the drafting of strategic frameworks at both the EU and national levels and provisions for further simplification and decentralization of cohesion policy.

Both enlargement and ‘Lisbonization’ raise important questions about the implementation of cohesion policy in a larger and more diverse EU. Some of these questions pertain specifically to old or new member states: How have reduced levels of funding after 2006 affected the implementation of cohesion policy in old member states? How have new member states performed in implementing cohesion policy? Have their administrative and institutional structures been up to the task?

What has been the impact of cohesion policy on multilevel governance in the new members? Other questions pertain to all member states in common: How have member states, both old and new, responded to the Lisbonization of cohesion policy? What impact have the new implementation rules and policy governance requirements for cohesion policy introduced in 2006 had on multilevel governance? Are there significant differences between member states in implementing cohesion policy, and if so, how can these be explained?

These are some of the key questions which this book seeks to answer. Before proceeding to the country case studies which make up the core of this book, however, the remainder of this chapter discusses these questions in greater detail. The next section examines specific questions for old and new member states when it comes to implementing EU cohesion policy, followed by a discussion of the challenges posed for all member states by Lisbonization and the 2006 cohesion policy reform. The chapter then briefly discusses the literature on Europeanization, drawing from this to identify various 'domestic mediating factors' which might affect the implementation of cohesion policy in different national settings.

### **Old and new member states: different challenges and questions**

The distinction between old and new member states will undoubtedly fade and eventually disappear, as it has following previous enlargements. For the moment, however, these two groups of countries face very different challenges when it comes to implementing cohesion policy that result from their different economic and political situations.

A challenge for most old member states is dealing with reduced levels of cohesion policy funding, the inevitable consequence of the accession of relatively poor CEECs who are needier claimants for a limited amount of EU assistance. It also results from the 'statistical effect' of enlargement, which has lowered the average per capita GDP of the EU and raised many of the original 15 member states' (EU15) regions and countries above the eligibility thresholds for structural and cohesion fund assistance.

Most of the EU15 began dealing with the problem of reduced funding before the 2004 enlargement. The March 1999 'Agenda 2000' agreement aimed at consolidating structural funds spending and concentrating it on fewer, more needy regions and priority areas. As a result, the proportion of the EU population receiving structural funds assistance

in 2000–06 fell from 51 to 42 per cent. Generous transitional arrangements and financial packages for regions losing EU assistance were agreed to as compensation, however (European Council, 1999; OJEC, 1999).

The December 2005 European Council agreement on the financial perspective for 2007–13 saw a major shift of cohesion policy spending in favour of the new member states; in the current programming period these countries will receive about 51 per cent of all cohesion policy spending, even though they account for less than one-third of the total EU population. The shift of cohesion policy spending eastwards would have been even greater if not for the efforts of major EU15 beneficiaries to maximize their share of funding and the agreement to generous transitional arrangements for regions losing assistance because of enlargement.

Each of the old member states examined in this book faces a significant loss or reduction of EU assistance. In the current programming period relatively wealthy Ireland will receive 80 per cent less than in 2000–06, while the United Kingdom (46 per cent) and Germany (19 per cent) will also see a decline in cohesion policy funding. Spain also suffered a sharp drop in funding (42 per cent), in fact the largest in absolute terms (€23 billion) of the EU15, but all of its regions will continue receiving cohesion policy support in 2007–13. Relatively poor Greece suffered a 26 per cent reduction of funding, but remains a major beneficiary of the structural and cohesion funds for now.<sup>2</sup>

The reduction of EU funding raises a number of important questions for old member states regarding the impact on cohesion policy implementation: What is the impact of diminished funding on structural programming in these countries – has it led to an increased concentration of resources and an emphasis on certain types of projects and priorities? How has reduced funding affected implementation and management structures for cohesion policy – has it resulted in the rationalization or centralization of implementation systems? How has reduced funding affected application of the partnership principle – has it increased or decreased the importance of partnership, and what kinds of partners and partnership arrangements does it favour? And, finally, what is the impact of reduced funding on the relationship between EU cohesion policy and national regional policies – has it led to a closer alignment or a decoupling of EU and domestic policies?

New member states face a very different set of problems and questions. Chief among these is whether they will be able to effectively utilize and absorb increased amounts of EU assistance. As a precondition of

accession, each of the candidate states had to create the institutional and administrative capacity to effectively manage cohesion policy, including mechanisms for inter-ministerial coordination at the national level, regionalized administrative structures, and systems for financial monitoring and control. As evidenced by the Commission's criticisms in its annual progress reports for each country, however, this was an aspect of pre-accession preparations that proved problematic for most of the CEECs. Considerable doubts about the institutional and administrative capacity of the CEECs remained even as these countries were formally admitted to the EU in 2004 and 2007.

How have the institutional and administrative structures of the new member states – at both the national and regional levels – performed since accession? Have they been adequate to the task of implementing and managing cohesion policy? Have they functioned well enough to allow the full use of available EU assistance, or have there been major problems and inefficiencies that have limited the 'absorption capacity' of the CEECs? If there have been problems, what is their source or nature, and what steps have been taken to deal with them? Problems with institutional and administrative capacity were behind the European Council's decision in December 2005 to modify the 'automatic de-commitment' rule for the new member states, giving them an additional year to use EU funds; however, this step provides only a temporary respite, with the usual 'n+2' rule applying from 2010 (European Council, 2005, p. 22).

Also affecting absorption capacity is the ability of new member states to provide adequate co-financing for EU-funded projects. On this score too, the European Council approved some temporary concessions for the new member states in 2007–13, allowing VAT to be counted as part of national contributions to funding EU-supported projects, and increasing the percentage of EU-funded projects that can be co-financed by the structural funds from 75 to 85 per cent (European Council, 2005, pp. 20–2). These conditions did not apply in 2004–06, however. Even with these concessions, have new member states been able to provide the necessary co-financing for EU-funded projects in the current programming period?

Another set of questions concerns the impact of EU cohesion policy on multilevel governance in the new member states. The concept of multilevel governance has attracted growing scholarly attention in recent years, since being initially applied to analyses of EU regional policy in the early 1990s (Bache and Flinders, 2004). At its core, it describes how decision-making authority is increasingly diffused and exercised

jointly by governmental and private actors at different territorial levels, with the boundaries between state and society becoming increasingly blurred as a result. The initial focus of the multilevel governance literature was on territorial governance, with some scholars asserting that the partnership requirement of EU cohesion policy was mobilizing regional actors and empowering them (and supranational actors) at the expense of national governments, leading to the emergence of a 'Europe of the regions' (Marks, 1992, 1993; Jones and Keating, 1995; Caporaso, 1996; Hooghe, ed., 1996; Kohler-Koch, 1996; Marks et al., 1996; Hooghe and Marks, 2001). Others disputed this assertion, however, pointing to the 'gate-keeping' capacity of national governments and the role of national political conditions and constitutional arrangements in limiting or mediating the governance effects of EU policies (Pollack, 1995; Jeffery, ed., 1997; Börzel, 1999; Benz and Eberlein, 1999; Laffan, 2004; Allen, 2005).

More recently, the concept of multilevel governance has been refined to incorporate a non-territorial dimension. Thus, Marks and Hooghe (2004) define two main types of multilevel governance: type I, which refers to the dispersion of decision-making authority among different territorial levels of government; and type II, which refers to the exercise of public authority within 'task-specific jurisdictions' with intersecting memberships that may operate at numerous territorial levels. In other words, type I multilevel governance concerns the 'vertical' redistribution of power between different governmental levels (in the EU context: supranational, national, regional and local), while type II multilevel governance concerns the 'horizontal' transfer of state authority to functional governmental arrangements involving non-governmental or private actors. According to Bache (2008, 2007), the governance effect of EU cohesion policy can perhaps best be seen in its promotion of type II multilevel governance in many member states, including those which have been more successful in limiting its impact on territorial governance.

The debate about cohesion policy and multilevel governance generated considerable scholarly interest in the impact of EU conditionality on territorial governance in the CEECs, with many studies focusing on the adaptation of these countries to EU cohesion policy requirements and the administration of EU structural assistance in the pre-accession period. What these studies found was that before 2004 most CEECs administered EU pre-accession assistance in a very centralized manner, allowing only limited participation by regional and local actors; indeed, this was the case even for those countries – Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia – that

had created new structures for regional self-governance after the end of communism. This pattern of centralized administration reflected many factors, including long traditions of centralized government and the weakness of new regional institutions. Also playing a role was the attitude of the Commission, which after 2000 abandoned its previous emphasis on decentralization and instead encouraged the centralized administration of EU assistance by the CEECs in order to ensure the efficient utilization of allocated funds. In this manner, the accession process appears to have reinforced centralized government in the CEECs rather than encouraging decentralization and regionalization as some advocates of devolution may have hoped (Brusis, 2001a, 2001b, 2003; Grabbe, 2001; Hughes, Sasse and Gordon, 2001, 2003, 2004a, 2004b; Marek and Baun, 2002; Keating, 2003; Jacoby, 2004).

How has cohesion policy been implemented since accession, however? Have the new member states continued with centralized systems for administering EU structural funds, or have they decentralized the implementation and management of cohesion policy to any significant degree, thereby giving a greater role to regional and local actors? What has been the impact on implementation systems of both increased experience with cohesion policy (at all territorial levels) and increased levels of funding after 2006? Is there a notable difference, for example, in the way that cohesion policy is being implemented in 2007–13 compared to the first years after accession? In addition to regional and local authorities, how successful have governments in the new member states been in involving nongovernmental and civil society actors in cohesion policy implementation? What kinds of ‘vertical’ (territorial) and ‘horizontal’ (involving nongovernmental, private sector and civil society actors) partnership arrangements have been established in these countries and how effective and influential have they been? In other words, is there any evidence that EU cohesion policy has contributed to the growth of multilevel governance – both types I and II – in the new member states, even though their experience with EU membership is relatively brief?

### **Lisbonization and the 2006 reform**

In December 2005 the European Council approved far-reaching changes to EU cohesion policy, including a redefinition of the main objectives of the structural funds. Among the three new objectives – Convergence, Regional Competitiveness and Employment, and European Territorial Cooperation – it allocated the great majority (81.5 per cent) of cohesion

policy funding for 2007–13 to the Convergence objective, with most of this money going to regions meeting the old Objective 1 criterion of per capita GDP less than 75 per cent of the EU average, or to ‘Phasing-out’ regions in old member states that slightly exceeded the 75 per cent threshold because of the statistical effect of enlargement. Special allocations were also made under the Competitiveness objective for ‘Phasing-in’ regions which formerly held Objective 1 status (European Council, 2005; OJEU, 2006a).

EU leaders also approved a fundamental thematic re-orientation of cohesion policy by linking cohesion policy spending to achievement of the Lisbon Agenda goals. Accordingly, they agreed that 60 per cent of spending under the new Convergence objective in 2007–13, and 75 per cent under the Competitiveness objective, should be ‘earmarked’ for programmes which contribute to achievement of the Lisbon goals. In recognition of their economic situation and development needs, new member states were exempted from these earmarking requirements (European Council, 2005, p. 7). The first ‘Community Strategic Guidelines on Cohesion’ (CSG), drafted by the Commission and approved by the Council in October 2006, further specified that cohesion policy spending should be targeted at the following Lisbon-oriented objectives: improving the attractiveness of member states, regions and cities; encouraging innovation, entrepreneurship and the growth of the knowledge economy; and creating more and better jobs (OJEU, 2006b, p. 14).

The 2006 reform of cohesion policy, so-called because the new structural funds Regulation was approved in July 2006, also introduced significant changes in implementation rules and procedures, including the requirement that governments draft National Strategic Reference Frameworks (NSRFs) in line with the Community Strategic Guidelines to guide the use of EU assistance in the seven-year programming period. Governments are also now required to make annual and three-year reports on the contribution of EU-financed programmes to the achievement of cohesion policy and Lisbon goals (OJEU, 2006a, p. 44). The 2006 reform also introduced new measures to ensure greater ‘simplification’ (reduced number of objectives, single-fund OPs, streamlined eligibility rules for expenses, etc.) and ‘decentralization’ (strengthened subsidiarity, greater involvement of regional and local actors in the selection and preparation of OPs) of cohesion policy, and it extended the definition of partnership to place even greater emphasis on the role of nongovernmental and civil society actors and ‘horizontal’ partnership arrangements (OJEU, 2006a).

The Lisbonization of cohesion policy presents a significant challenge for both old and new member states, prompting some important questions: What has been the impact of Lisbonization on structural programming in the member states? How successful have they been in meeting the new Lisbon earmarking requirements in their NSRFs and OPs for 2007–13? To what extent does structural programming for 2007–13 reflect the new growth and competitiveness approach of the Lisbon Agenda, with its focus on developing human resources and the knowledge economy, rather than the more traditional ‘equity’ approach to economic development aimed at alleviating regional disparities and focused on large-scale infrastructure projects? Have the new earmarking requirements affected the ability of governments to deal with specific national and regional needs? In this regard, has Lisbonization affected relatively wealthy and poor member states differently? For the latter in particular, it could require a major shift in spending priorities from the previous programming period, from infrastructure and regional development to education, employment and other human-capital projects.

While new member states are not formally bound by the new earmarking requirements, they are expected to adhere to them on a voluntary basis. Thus, to what extent have these countries incorporated the Lisbon goals into their structural programming? Have the new member states welcomed or resisted the Lisbonization of cohesion policy, and how has Lisbonization affected their views on national economic development planning?

Another set of questions concerns the new strategic planning requirements of cohesion policy, including the preparation of NSRFs in alignment with the Community Strategic Guidelines: How have member states responded to these new requirements? What has been the impact of strategic planning for cohesion policy on national economic planning more broadly? What processes were put in place in different countries to prepare the NSRFs, and how was the partnership principle applied in drafting these documents? While the new strategic orientation of cohesion policy affects all member states, it is perhaps of special relevance for the new members. In the rush to accession most of these countries emphasized meeting the basic requirements of EU membership and fully utilizing available EU assistance within a short period of time (the remaining two-plus years of the 2000–06 programming period for the 2004 entrants); the focus, therefore, was very much on the short term. Has the new strategic orientation of cohesion policy, along with increased EU funding over a longer period of time, enabled the new

member states to begin thinking more strategically about national economic development?

A final set of questions concerns the impact of the new policy governance requirements of cohesion policy. The 2006 reform extends the definition of partnership to emphasize the role of 'horizontal' partners (nongovernmental, private and civil society actors), and it places even greater emphasis on decentralization and subsidiarity in the implementation of cohesion policy, including the selection and preparation of programmes. What has been the impact of these changes on cohesion policy implementation and multilevel governance in the member states? Have the new requirements led to increased decentralization and the greater involvement of nongovernmental and local actors in cohesion policy implementation? What impact has the thematic re-orientation of cohesion policy towards the Lisbon goals had on partnership networks and arrangements? To what extent, in other words, have Lisbonization and the new governance requirements of cohesion policy promoted the further development of multilevel governance in the EU, and in what directions?

### **Europeanization and 'domestic mediating factors'**

As the previous discussion makes clear, all member states, whether old or new, face difficult challenges in adjusting to Lisbonization and the new requirements of cohesion policy introduced in 2006. Old and new member states also face similar challenges when it comes to dealing with reduced levels of funding or absorbing and utilizing EU funds, as the case may be. If past experience is any guide, we can expect considerable variation in how member states deal with these challenges and adapt to new EU policy requirements. To the extent that we find such variation among the countries examined in this book, how can we explain it?

Explaining differential adaptation to EU processes and requirements is a key focus of the literature on Europeanization, which generally deals with the EU's impact on domestic policies, politics and institutions.<sup>3</sup> Recent years have seen a veritable flood of Europeanization studies examining the impact of EU integration on different national policies, domestic institutions and aspects of politics, most of them adopting a 'top-down' perspective.<sup>4</sup> Among the key findings of this literature is that Europeanization does not necessarily lead to convergence across member states or even within countries across different aspects

of politics and policy areas; instead we find a complex pattern of differential adaptation, or what Risse, Cowles and Caporaso (2001, p. 1) refer to as 'domestic adaptation with national colors'.

A key concept in Europeanization studies is the 'goodness of fit' between EU policy requirements and domestic institutions and practices; the better the 'goodness of fit', the weaker the adaptational pressures faced by national institutional structures and *vice versa* (Börzel, 1999, 2002; Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 2001). Differences in 'goodness of fit' thus help account for the varying need for and extent of policy and institutional change in different national settings, although as Paraskevopoulos and Leonardi (2004, pp. 316–7) point out high adaptational pressure is not by itself a sufficient condition for bringing about such change. A good place to start when comparing the implementation of cohesion policy in different member states, therefore, is how well national institutions and practices fit with EU requirements and expectations.

Beyond 'goodness of fit' the Europeanization literature also emphasizes the role of other domestic factors in shaping national adaptation to EU policies. Thus, in step three of their three-step approach for studying Europeanization (step one identifies the relevant Europeanization processes implying the need for domestic change; and step two the 'goodness of fit' between EU policy requirements and national arrangements) Risse, Cowles and Caporaso (2001, pp. 6–12) identify the key 'domestic mediating factors' that intervene to shape or affect the pattern of domestic change: multiple veto points, facilitating institutions, political and organizational cultures, the differential empowerment of domestic actors, and learning (defined as the capacity of Europeanization to promote fundamental changes in the preferences and interests, even identities, of domestic actors). Borrowing from this approach, we can identify several domestic mediating factors that might affect the implementation of EU cohesion policy in different member states.

One such factor is *established governmental structures and arrangements*, which previous studies have found to be a key factor explaining variation in the impact of cohesion policy on territorial (type I) multilevel governance in EU countries. These studies have found that subnational governmental actors are generally more fully involved in structural funds implementation in federal or decentralized political systems, such as Germany, Belgium and Spain, while in more centralized systems, such as France or Greece, their role is more limited (Hooghe, ed., 1996; Marks, 1996; Bache, 1998). There are interesting exceptions to this rule, however, for example the role of local actors in cohesion policy

implementation in centralized Ireland (Adshead, 2002), and studies have also shown variation in the level of regional engagement within countries like Italy and France (Smyrl, 1997) and Spain (Bache and Jones, 2000) in accordance with differing regional capacities.

*Governmental and administrative traditions* are another factor affecting cohesion policy implementation, especially when it comes to applying the partnership principle. As Bache (2008, pp. 55–85) has argued, countries with consensual political styles (e.g., Ireland and Sweden) are more amenable to the horizontal partnership requirements of cohesion policy than those with highly statist governmental traditions, such as Greece or the CEECs, and are thus more likely to involve nongovernmental and civil society actors in cohesion policy implementation. In another example of how governmental traditions can affect cohesion policy implementation, previous studies of cohesion policy implementation in Germany have shown that the national tradition of ‘cooperative federalism’, featuring close cooperation between the federal government and the governments of the 16 *Länder*, has inhibited the inclusion of sub-regional and nongovernmental actors in cohesion policy management (Kelleher, Batterbury and Stern, 1999; Thielemann, 2000; Bache, 2008, pp. 63–5).

*Political-cultural values* also affect cohesion policy implementation. For instance, Paraskevopoulos et al. (2006) argue that the depth of social capital in a country, including levels of social and political trust, affects not only the strength and functioning of partnership networks but also the learning capacity of domestic governance structures. High levels of social capital are also linked to strong civil societies, which are required to provide governmental actors with competent social and nongovernmental partners.

*Domestic politics and partisan contestation* is another important factor, which Bache (2008, pp. 16–17) argues can greatly affect the Europeanization process in particular countries even though its impact is often neglected in Europeanization studies. In the case of cohesion policy, the potential for domestic politics to play a role would seem to be greatest in countries with severe regional disparities or strong regional identities and territorially-based ethnic cleavages. Regional actors in such cases are more likely to mobilize and contest the national management of cohesion policy, in the effort to gain a larger share of resources or more decision-making power. New member states, where political systems are still developing or consolidating, could also offer opportunities for political actors to exploit regional issues. We might also expect that cohesion policy is more likely to become a political issue in less

wealthy countries, where EU assistance is relatively more important. In all member states, of course, the temptation for political actors to favour more highly-visible 'hard' projects (e.g., roads and other basic infrastructure), which are more objectively measured and show shorter-term results, over 'soft' investments such as education and human-resource development, which strengthen the conditions for future economic growth and competitiveness yet take longer to yield demonstrable results, will play a role. The partisan composition of government could also affect cohesion policy implementation in countries where political parties hold divergent views on decentralization and the inclusion of nongovernmental actors in public policymaking.

While it is easy to identify the domestic factors affecting cohesion policy implementation, it is more difficult to explain just *how* they do so, and how such factors interact with EU-level processes and non-EU factors (e.g., globalization) to produce policy outcomes and institutional change. It is much more difficult, in other words, to establish causality. Indeed, this is an area of Europeanization theory that remains relatively weak and underdeveloped (although see Börzel and Risse, 2003). Particularly in cases of 'good fit' between national practices and EU requirements, it is often difficult to determine the extent to which domestic political change reflects mainly national policies, practices and preferences rather than EU-level processes. Disentangling the relative impact of national and EU factors in the implementation of cohesion policy will be a key challenge in the country case studies which follow.

In this chapter we have discussed some of the main questions concerning the implementation of EU cohesion policy after enlargement and the 2006 reform. We also discussed a number of 'domestic mediating factors' that might affect the way that member states implement EU cohesion policy and address the challenges posed by Lisbonization and new cohesion policy requirements. In the following chapters, these questions will guide our examination of cohesion policy implementation in the ten countries we have selected as case studies. First, however, we take a closer look at the recent development of EU cohesion policy and the debate about cohesion policy reform in the context of enlargement.

## Notes

1. In May 2004 ten countries acceded to the EU: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. In January 2007, Bulgaria and Romania joined.
2. Calculated from European Commission (2006d-g) and CEC (2006a).

3. In contrast to this essentially 'top-down' definition, Europeanization can also be viewed from a 'bottom-up' perspective, as the process by which member states seek to 'upload' their policy preferences to the EU level, with domestic politics being a factor promoting EU-level change (Bache and Jordan, 2006, p. 14; Bulmer and Radaelli, 2005, p. 340). For a discussion of the various meanings and definitions of Europeanization, see Bache and Jordan (2006, pp. 17–33); also Olsen (2002) and Radaelli (2000).
4. For prominent examples of Europeanization studies adopting this approach, see Cowles, Caporaso and Risse eds (2001); Goetz and Hix, eds (2001); Héritier et al. (2001); Knill, ed (2001); Anderson (2002); Börzel (2002a); Featherstone and Radaelli, eds (2003); and Bulmer and Lequesne (2005).

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