PROOF

Contents

Acknowledgements viii

1 Islam's Marriage with Neoliberalism 1

2 The Allure of the West 32

3 Turkish Islam: Unthinking Kemalism? 70

4 Reconstituting the State: The Islamic Framing of Neoliberalism 107

5 Kemalist State Feminism and the Islamic Dress Code 137

6 Politics Without Guarantees: The Headscarf Ban 164

7 Headscarf Madness: Narratives of Religious Rights 201

8 Conclusion 239

Notes 253

References 256

Index 280

PROOF

1
Islam's Marriage with Neoliberalism

In 1999 the Helsinki Summit officially positioned Turkey within the European Union (EU) enlargement process. Since then, Turkey has been undergoing an extraordinary political, economic, and cultural transformation. The Copenhagen Summit of 2002 accelerated this process of change when EU leaders decided on the specific date of 17 December 2004 to review Turkey's candidacy. In the light of serious efforts undertaken by successive Turkish governments, EU leaders decided at their December 2004 Summit to begin accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005. These negotiations have been underway since then.

The EU Accession Partnership document adopted in 2000 specifies the programme of change for Turkey. It is based on the implementation of the Copenhagen economic and political criteria – which sets membership requirements as determined by the Copenhagen European Council of 1993. The Copenhagen criteria specifies no fewer than 32 policy areas for political reform and 85 areas of economic reform leading to Turkey's harmonious integration with the EU (Ugur 2004: 75). Since the 1980s Turkey has adopted a number of specific policies to transform its economy from a state-dominated and protectionist model to a market-oriented one, mainly through trade liberalization, privatization, and increasing competitiveness. This has helped Turkey reach the Copenhagen economic objectives. Despite the difficulties in fully implementing EU-induced market-oriented reforms (Faucompret and Konings 2008: 49–150), the European Council sees the most important obstacle to membership in relation to the Copenhagen political criteria. In particular, it urges the government to meet the political objectives of the Copenhagen criteria and institutionalize a west European model of democracy.

Turkey has made important progress with respect to democratization. In 2000 Turkey's coalition government was comprised of the centre-left Democratic Leftist Party (DSP), the far-right National Action Party (MHP), and the centrist Motherland Party. On 18 March 2000, that government announced its commitment to reform in the National Programme for the Adoption of the *Acquis Communautaire* (NPAA) and initiated policy change towards satisfying EU preconditions for membership. After coming to power in 2002, the 'pro-Islamic' Justice and Development Party (AKP) also declared its commitment to EU membership. It moved forcefully to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria as proclaimed in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Negotiating Framework 2005).

The success of the AKP in the national elections of November 2002 was decisive for parliament, enabling the government to act with resolve in meeting EU membership requirements. The AKP received 34.2 per cent of the popular vote and gained 66 per cent of parliamentary seats. It established a single party majority rule for the first time after more than a decade of fragile coalition governments. It also formed the first ever 'pro-Islamic' majority government in Turkish history. The notoriously 'secular' Republican People's Party (CHP) received 19.4 per cent of the popular vote and 34 per cent of parliamentary seats, becoming the only opposition party in parliament. Other political parties failed to pass the 10 per cent threshold for representation in parliament. For Recep Tayyip Erdogan (2002), leader of the AKP, EU membership is the single most important project for Turkey since the establishment of the republic in 1923. To fulfil the requirements of this project, the AKP adopted the Emergency Action Plan in 2003 and revised the NPAA instituted by the previous coalition government (Loewendahl-Ertugal 2005: 38). Under the so-called harmonization laws passed in 2002 and 2003, seven major political reform packages were adopted with the aim of fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria.

In order to satisfy the Copenhagen criteria, the AKP has expended tremendous effort instituting significant legislative changes. The government intensified its resolve after the December 2004 Summit of EU leaders. As a result, in the brief period from October 2004 to July 2005, the AKP-majority parliament succeeded in passing 166 laws. The general assembly convened 125 times, having met for a total of 696 hours and generating 33,049 pages of documentation. Parliamentary commissions worked 1231 hours and recorded 17,200 pages of deliberation (*Turkish Daily News* 21 July 2005). If one includes the reforms adopted by previous governments since 1999, more than a third of the original text of the 1982 Constitution (prepared under the undemocratic conditions

PROOF

of the 1980 military coup) was amended (Ozbudun and Yazici 2004). Significant improvements were realized in the protection of fundamental rights and liberties, including freedom of religion and conscience, freedom of expression, and freedom of association (Denli 2007: 97).

Turkey's traditional secularist elite, most notably the military and judiciary bureaucracy, often views the AKP's pursuit of EU-oriented democratic reforms as an attempt to institutionalize *Islamization-by-stealth*. The AKP is accused of gradually shifting the emphasis in state ideology from Kemalism to Islamism, an accusation which has deepened cultural tension within Turkey. This tension has been partly 'created' by the military and judiciary to justify their frequent interventions in politics in the name of strengthening the Kemalist foundation of the state. Kemalism is the official ideology of the Turkish state, named after the founder of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal. It represents a path taken by ruling civil–military cadres in their institutionalization of national sovereignty through a state-led economic developmentalism and secular nationalism known as *laiklik*. Kemalism has fundamentally shaped the direction of relations between rulers and ruled and continues to frame the particular content of political struggles over inclusion, exclusion, domination, and subordination. With the establishment of the nation-state, civil–military bureaucratic cadres were elevated to a politically dominant position from which they could safeguard that frame (Atasoy 2005: 23–85). Due to the fact that Kemalism formed the state under the tutelage of bureaucratic cadres, the AKP-led reform programme directing Turkey towards the EU also presents a challenge to the power of civil–military bureaucratic cadres. It raises the possibility that Kemalism can be revised to permit political renegotiations around the relations between rulers and ruled. The three most contentious areas in these relations consist of the military's frequent interventions in politics, Muslim women's wearing of the headscarf, and the Kurdish issue. These three issues are closely connected to a transformation in the Kemalist basis of the state which is deeply embedded in the constitution.

Transformation in the Kemalist state

An interesting case in point was the military's opposition to the election of Abdullah Gul, the AKP's candidate for the presidency in 2007, simply because his wife wears the *turban*, a fashionable form of headscarf frequently worn by young Islamic women. General Yasar Buyukanit, then chief of general staff, expressed this opposition in an e-mail hastily posted on the General Staff Website. This has become

PROOF

known as the e-memorandum of 27 April 2007. The note advised that 'the fundamental founding principles of the state of the Republic of Turkey, most importantly the *laiklik* principle' must be protected. *Laiklik* is a form of secular nationalism which refers to the state's control over religious institutions and religious practices. It redirects nationalist sentiments around a singular unifying culture. The result has been an authoritarian concept of national culture that emphasizes homogeneity, political unity, and solidarity (Koker 1995). The General Staff justified its political intervention by declaring that 'the Turkish Armed Forces is one of the parties in *laiklik* discussions and its absolute defender . . . loyalty to the Republican regime must be demonstrated through action, not on the surface but in essence' (Genelkurmay Baskanlıgı 27 April 2007, my translation). The General Staff's warning received strong support from the CHP and the DSP which organized large rallies in Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir in April and May of 2007. Banners carried at the rallies declared the *turban* a 'reactionary flag' and accused the AKP's presidential candidate of being a threat to the '*laik*' republic (Yayla 2007). The Constitutional Court exacerbated the election controversy by re-examining the parliamentary by-laws and related constitutional provisions, and then questioning whether the number of deputies who participated in parliamentary voting was adequate for the session to be legally valid (*Today's Zaman* 28 April 2007). For Ergun Ozbudun (2007), a professor of constitutional law at Bilkent University, the judicial intervention was aimed at disrupting parliamentary procedural process, thereby predisposing parliament to apprehension and doubt in its effort to exercise legislative power.

Both the military's veiled e-coup and the legal manoeuvring by the Constitutional Court served to strengthen accusations of Islamization-by-stealth levelled at the AKP. This in turn reinforced a *politics of Islamic resentment* against the *laik* state bureaucracy. The Islamization-by-stealth accusation was played out in the 22 July 2007 national election and resulted in the AKP securing another five-year term in government.

In the July 2007 election the AKP increased its popular vote to 46.7 per cent, up from 34.28 per cent in the 2002 election. Abdullah Gul became president soon after. The CHP and the DSP, which formed a centre-left coalition, received 20.87 per cent of the vote. The far-right MHP secured 14.3 per cent of the vote. During the elections the AKP adopted a 'liberal' stance, as opposed to the statist, nationalist platform of the centre-left CHP–DSP coalition and the far-right MHP. The position of the CHP–DSP and the MHP in part reflects their opposition to the AKP-led liberalization programmes adopted to fulfil EU Copenhagen

criteria. They argue that the AKP has become acquiescent in the face of EU pressure to adopt specific policies. Central to this argument is the implication that some EU membership requirements may undermine national sovereignty. The CHP–DSP and MHP have also accused the government of not taking a strong stand against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the outlawed Kurdish separatist organization. Most importantly, it remains unacceptable for many on the centre-left that the AKP has an Islam-sensitive perspective on certain policies that outlaw the wearing of the headscarf by university students and state employees, as well as on policies that impose restrictions on religious education in general. However, for the MHP, whose nationalism is more closely tied with Islamic sensibilities, the AKP's Islam-sensitive policy orientation appears acceptable. Regardless of their differences, both the CHP–DSP and the MHP display a strong commitment to Kemalism and favour an interventionist, strong state. The AKP, on the other hand, supports policies that more generally favour limiting the interventionist capacity of the state through liberal–democratic reforms.

While then Chief of General Staff Buyukanit did not dispute the national election results, or the subsequent parliamentary election of President Gul, he insisted on the need to repeat his warning that the Turkish Armed Forces 'do not change [their views] from day to day . . . We are fully behind what we said in April . . .' (Falk 2007: 14). Given the military bureaucracy's continual justification of its warnings by reference to the notion of an Islamic threat, it is not surprising that this has caused citizens to greatly resent the military's portrayal of Islam as a constant threat to the state. This resentment has been further deepened by the military bureaucracy assuming guardianship over civilian politics (Saribay 2007).

The judicial bureaucracy continues to accuse the AKP of Islamization-by-stealth. Only eight months after the AKP's election victory in July 2007 (with approximately 47 per cent of the vote), the Constitutional Court voted unanimously to hear a case calling for the banning of the AKP, and the barring of the prime minister, president, and 69 other party members from active politics. Abdurrahman Yalcinkaya, chief prosecutor of the High Court of Appeals, brought the case to court in March 2008. In an 162-page document, he accused the AKP government of aiming to transform a secular country into an Islamic state, indicating that 'this risk has been increasing every day' (Rainford 2008). In his petition the chief prosecutor claimed that 'the real aim of the party . . . [is] to bring religion into education and into public institutions – and eventually overturn the secular state' (Rainford 2008). This case has come to

PROOF

be known as a 'judicial coup.' The staunchly secular former president Ahmet Necdet Sezer, well-known for using his veto power to undermine the government, appointed eight of the 11 court judges.

The basis for the legal challenge noted above was parliament's approval of a constitutional amendment to lift a ban on wearing the headscarf in university – a ban strictly enforced on campuses since 1997 when the military ousted a democratically elected government by accusing them of being Islamist. The parliamentary vote lifting the ban was carried with 401 in favour and 110 against. It allowed university students to wear the headscarf if tied under the chin but continued to ban more enveloping versions (BBC News 7 February 2008). The self-declared defenders of the *laik* order, including the military and judicial bureaucracy, view lifting the headscarf ban as only a first step in the government's attempt to ultimately Islamize the state.

The accusation by military and judicial bureaucrats that the AKP is engaged in Islamization-by-stealth is based on a belief that the AKP's leadership cadre and founding members have maintained an ideological commitment to the pro-Islamic *national view* movement. To support this claim, the political upbringing of leading AKP members within that movement is often mentioned. Included in this group are Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, President Abdullah Gul, and former Parliamentary Speaker Bulent Arinc. Because of the political background of the AKP's founding members, some critics see the AKP as a reformist extension of the *national view* manifestation of political Islam (Gungor 2002). However, the AKP, as the 6th 'pro-Islamic' party established since the late 1960s, has distanced itself from the *national view* ideology of former pro-Islamic parties.

Under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan for more than 40 years, the *national view* movement has critiqued western imperialism and Turkey's adoption of western modernity as the source of its economic problems, its political–military dependency, and its declining national sovereignty. According to *national view* ideology, structural imbalances generated by western political and military dominance in the operation of the world economy induced powerlessness in the Turkish state and undermined its capacity to produce effective and autonomous social policy. In an attempt to find a remedy, the *national view* positioned Islam as a social–cultural value in its formulation of a non-western route to economic development. A rearrangement of the economy and society required a decoupling from western-dominated structures of power and a rapprochement with Muslim states. From this perspective, Islam was seen as the source of a moral ethos of scientific development and

PROOF

technological achievement. The *national view* upheld a collective identification with Islam as a source of national culture and regarded Islamic ideals and cultural practices as central to spiritual transformation. It also envisaged a politically strong state able to cultivate Islamic moral principles and spirituality in the national consciousness. In short, the *national view* aimed to relate an Islamic ethos to the techno-scientific world, and to re-embed economic activity in social relations governed by Islamic morality (Atasoy 2005: 115–45). Having said this, it must be underscored that the *national view* represented an articulation of the capitalist economy, technology, culture, and Islam within a state-led national economic developmentalism.

The AKP, on the other hand, does not wish to decouple Turkey from western-dominated structures of power. It seeks EU membership as an important step in Turkey's economic and political reconstruction. The AKP represents a gradual movement away from a state-led developmentalism in keeping with EU Copenhagen criteria. It defines itself as a conservative democratic political party which stands for the 'societal centre' (Erdogan 2007). Effectively positioned in a social reconstruction project, the 'societal centre' symbolizes the political mobilization of newly rich Anatolian and Istanbul-based capitalists, small producers, and women with concerns over the headscarf ban, as well as Kurds with ethno-cultural claims. The coalition also includes some members of the CHP–DSP and Islam-sensitive nationalist MHP disheartened over the state-centrism of these political parties. Notable examples from the Left here include former secretary general of the CHP, Ertugrul Gunay, who is currently an elected minister of culture in the AKP government, and DSP founding member Haluk Ozdalga, currently an elected AKP parliamentarian. The AKP is establishing a more inclusive form of politics that incorporates economically, culturally, politically, and regionally divergent groups into a neoliberal political imaginary – all filtered through an EU-inspired process of trans-nationalization. This undermines the pro-Islamic *national view* ideology, which still maintains that western cultural norms and practices have a corrupting influence (Atasoy 2009a: 170). The AKP-led liberalization programme also challenges the bureaucratic–authoritarian implementation of Kemalist state-centric principles.

To be sure, there are clear ideological differences in views on the desired politico–cultural basis for the state. The AKP views the current expression of Kemalism as an embodiment of social control through bureaucratic vigilantism. Grounded in the authoritarian practices of state-ruling civil–military bureaucrats, the Kemalist project created an

PROOF

important cultural hierarchy. It consisted of a privileged few among an unelected bureaucratic elite and secularly oriented bourgeoisie on the one side, and a large segment of the general Muslim population on the other, whom Kemalist bureaucrats have questioned in regard to their cultural suitability for modernity (Atasoy 2007: 122). The AKP's support of policies directed towards Turkey's EU membership has only exacerbated the long-standing tension between a strong bureaucratic adherence to *laik* unitary ideology within the Kemalist interventionist state and a weak commitment to pluralism and divergence in cultural practices outside state authority.

The current surfacing of tension signals a path favoured by the AKP of transferring power through parliamentary negotiation and debate. In its push for EU membership, the AKP raises the possibility of a mutable Kemalist frame which directly confronts the authoritarian bureaucratic base of the state. The April 2008 'judicial coup' is significant here because under the pretence of defending *laiklik* it masked a power struggle over who was to lead state transformation in Turkey. The military and judiciary bureaucratic elites who see themselves as defenders of the *laik* Kemalist order have strategically positioned themselves against a newly empowered group of Muslims who claim to combine their Muslim beliefs with a commitment to secular principles of the state. The AKP's challenge is to ensure the bureaucratic acceptability of certain groups who identify with modes of social experience that transcend traditional Kemalist cultural boundaries of citizenship. Included in these groups are newly wealthy Muslim capitalists, women with concerns over the headscarf ban, and Kurds with ethno-cultural claims.

The *laik*-Islamic antimony tends to correlate with a long continuum of different positions in regard to Turkey's modernity project. This turns in large part on a rethinking of material structures of solidarity and recognition: a transformation wrought through a state-led economic developmentalism which articulated economic policy and growth in national terms, and a *laik* notion of nationalism which constructs the 'nation' as a culturally unified territorial community. Kemalism has been key in ideologically framing a state-centric national developmentalism and *laiklik* as a project of modernity. Defined as a 'collective mobility project' (Sarfatti-Larson 1977), it has been pursued politically by state-ruling bureaucrats generating a support base for the placement of a segment of the population on a 'bourgeoisification trajectory' (King and Szelenyi 2004: 110). This segment has consisted of individuals with urban, highly educated, westernized, and secularized backgrounds. Of course, no political parties have been consistent over time in their commitment to the

PROOF

bureaucratically pursued embourgeoisement project. Nevertheless, it is true that the discursive attachment to Kemalism by both centre-left and far-right political parties is embedded in a dream of national sovereignty to be realized through state-led economic developmentalism.

For the AKP, on the other hand, Kemalism has primarily entailed strong state authority imposing itself on society as a territorial discipline. The AKP has extrapolated the implications of this for a reduction in state interventionist power in the material and cultural dimensions of social life, thus bringing the AKP into conflict with the defenders of the Kemalist state-centrism. Most notably, these defenders are the military and civilian judiciary bureaucrats, as well as centre-left and far-right nationalist political parties. The AKP, in contrast, aims to reconfigure society through a neoliberal discursive synthesis between a Muslim cultural orientation and European standards. It does so through a liberal turn against the nationalist rhetoric of cultural homogeneity, which, it has been assumed, can be achieved through an ideological adherence to *laiklik*.

Interestingly, close inspection of the AKP's official ideological stance, party programme, and political campaign documents reveals that the AKP has never presented an anti-Kemalist, anti-*laik* position, contrary to what secularist propaganda would suggest. Still, the debate is very real because for the AKP the ideological domination of Kemalist state-centrism has strengthened bureaucratic power in the state. This power has been associated with an adherence to statist developmentalism in organizing territorial politics that favours private industrialists but disadvantages large segments of Anatolian population. In contrast, the AKP's policies aim to reorganize the Kemalist state and its privileged political alliance structure by adopting a more liberal–democratic political stance and a neoliberal market-oriented economic model that might be achieved through Turkey's EU membership.

At stake here is the transformation of the Kemalist state. The AKP flourishes in relation to its political renegotiation of the Kemalist political order through an Islamic resignification of cultural issues. It challenges the authoritarian fundamentals of the state, but without being overtly religious and without shattering the *laik* foundation of the modernity project. Nonetheless, it grafts the Kemalist dream of national sovereignty and development onto a trans-nationalized political space. Despite the fact that the AKP upholds dominant Islamic normative standards, its ideological outlook is based on blending a Muslim cultural orientation with Euro-American values. The AKP has declared its commitment to the promotion in Turkish politics of key norms from

PROOF

western liberal thought. These include human rights, individual freedoms, political participation, secularism, and liberal democracy (Duran 2004a: 134).

Clearly differentiated from the *national view* orientation of former pro-Islamic political parties, Erdogan's Islam-sensitive AKP articulates a discourse of culture that resignifies the ideological orientation of Islam through an attachment to liberal democratic principles. Three central areas of concern are deeply implicated in the AKP's Islamic resignification: the military's frequent interventions in politics, Muslim women's wearing of the headscarf in university, and the Kurdish issue. Each of these three contentious areas ties the AKP's Islamism to norms of liberal democracy, personal freedom, and cultural expression. It is these issues that tend to frame a shift in state–citizen relations in Turkey, which the AKP implicitly links to interpretive conflicts within the Kemalist trajectory of state formation. In this way the AKP is gradually reworking the state-centric ethos of Kemalism through a 'neoliberal synthesis' (van der Pijl 2006: 26) between a cultural construction of interpretive meanings and material conflicts over those meanings within the state. What cannot be overstated, however, is that this reconfiguration of the Kemalist state is not opposed to secularism.

Once again the question is: How does an Islamic cultural construction of meanings that is specifically tied to Turkey's EU membership intersect with neoliberal restructuring of the state and the economy?

Islam's adherence to a neoliberal credo

The AKP frames its ideas and policies relating to the attachment of Islam with neoliberalism in the context of Turkey's EU membership. Emphasis is given to some of Islam's moral–ethical and cultural dimensions, which are resignified in conjunction with Euro-American normative categories. Prime Minister Erdogan articulates the intersection of Islamic meanings with neoliberalism as part of a social transformation rooted in '. . . the reproduction of our own *authentic* value systems on the basis of our deeply rooted ideational tradition, along with the *universal standards* adopted within a conservative political orientation' (quoted in Akdogan 2004: 13, my translation and emphasis). Although it unsettles the *national view* perspective, Erdogan's act of resignification locates an Islamic outlook within a binary view that distinguishes between what is authentic and what is universal. It is in conjunction with the implementation of Copenhagen political criteria and associated power relations that Erdogan envisages a reconceptualization of Turkey's 'authentic'

value systems, along with the 'universal' standards. A closer reading of Erdogan's statement, however, reveals that 'authentic' and 'universal' have a meaning far more complicated than is at first apparent.

In his statement, Erdogan views the principles of liberal democracy, individual freedoms, and human rights as categorical expressions of universal standards in which the reproduction of national cultural values should be anchored. Edward Said (1979), Slavoj Žižek (2001: 152), and Immanuel Wallerstein (2006) would argue that this view represents a mode of knowledge that describes *particularities* of European local traditions in universal terms. This comes to mean a 'distorted representation' of universalism. For Žižek (2008: 294), distortion is '*asserted as the site of universality*: universality appears as the distortion of the particular' (emphasis original). Consequently, Erdogan's appeal to the universal is not because of its genuineness or distortions, but because of its representation of categorical meanings for the cultural construction of interpretive expressions. Globalized as a universal, 'norm-setting context, [and] fostering a particular outlook' (van der Pijl 2006: 19), European ways thus become intertwined with an Islamic reframing of interpretive meanings for a social change model. 'The translatability of European particularities to a norm-setting position is clearly not a trans-historical phenomenon' (Atasoy 2009a: 171), but a historically contested negotiation of standards that prevail in the reconfiguration of the state and political economy. Contestation is about the political domination of a mode of knowledge in 'bracketing off the economy from the sphere of political choice' (van der Pijl 2006: 29). An Islamic intersection with European framing of neoliberal practices gains a meaning within this context among the social forces which utilize a distinct neoliberal imaginary in the social and material relations of reconstituting the Kemalist state.

Here, the very idea of the reproduction of authenticity seems to have acquired a broader meaning. It now includes a redefinition of a 'knowledge structure' (Gill 2000), an 'ontology,' which is integral to an understanding of state transformation – and through which political struggle over the renegotiation of standards and recognition of societal differences take place. In Turkey, this helps to reconstitute a broader controversy between '*laiks*' and 'Islamists' – one which has characterized intellectual debate in Turkey since the nineteenth century (Atasoy 2005). Erdogan's search for an authentic culture presents a counterclaim to the ideological dominance of the Kemalist knowledge structure and its explanation of socio-historical reality.

The AKP's struggle to reconfigure the Kemalist state is taking place within the territorial space of the state but is constituted through

PROOF

the incorporation of global processes. Erdogan's resignification of Muslim cultural values and practices through the adoption of European standards subjects national policy making to a particular kind of negotiations that at least partially lifts the 'national encasements' (Sassen 2007b: 50) of policy agendas made by the Kemalist nationalist elite. To the extent that the political negotiations are contingent at the national territorial level on material and cultural tensions and conflicts, a particular restructuring still entails a project of transformation within the state through a process of *transnationalization*, rather than 'the boundary-transcending practices' of a post-nationalist politics (Beck and Grande 2007: 113–14). However, it is difficult to name the resulting form of the national state emerging as a historical outcome of neoliberalism.

To be sure, Erdogan's 'search for an authentic culture through transnationalization' undermines Kemalist epistemology of state-centrism as a specific historical phenomenon of the 1930s. However, Kemalism is constitutionally safeguarded, and, therefore, maintains its enduring political significance as a frame of reference in ideological and material conflicts. Grounded in the political dominance of certain groups, namely state bureaucrats and large private industrial capitalists, Kemalism remains relevant to the political negotiations. Erdogan's search for 'authenticity' and political mobilization of the 'societal centre' represent a shift in the primacy of state-centrism in the cultural, imaginative, and material relations of citizens. This also entails an Islamic 'reworking of the idea of civic nationalism' (Calhoun 2007: 16) away from statist *laiklik*, insofar as the Kemalist knowledge structure in refiguring the state still matters. In order to uncover the 'contingent content' (Wallerstein 2006) of an Islamic state reconstitution project, we must therefore explore the actual events and processes involved in organizing the ruling relations of emergent forms in the context of Turkey's EU membership.

This book pushes the question of a rearticulated discourse of social change further, in a direction that allows us to address the remaking of Islamic politics in terms of the substantial transformations that are taking place within states in relation to the neoliberal restructuring of capitalism. If social theory is to contribute to our understanding of state transformation, it must give us a systematic account of both the opportunities for and constraints on historical possibilities of social change. Such possibilities are not fixed but constantly negotiated within a specific conjuncture of global political economy. My contention is that the material and discursive conditions associated

with both domestic and international power dynamics are expressed in the political reframing of an Islamic project of state transformation. I aim to uncover the 'contingent content' of Islamic resignification against the background of Turkey's EU membership, the very site for the political assertion of universality that naturalizes the neoliberal market economy in Turkey. This demands an exploration of how diverse sets of political orientations, normative standards, and cultural practices are brought together under a disciplinary neoliberal form of capitalism.

In explaining his assertion of universality as the 'distortion of the particular,' as I have also discussed elsewhere (Atasoy 2009a: 171–2), Žižek (2000: 313) argues that in politics, 'universality' is asserted when an agent posits itself as the direct embodiment of universality against all others within the global order. The agent of universality consists not only of international drivers of market-oriented policy reforms, but of publicly invisible members of the 'symbolic class' (Žižek 2000: 322). Empirical research on 'international coercion' – defined as the exertion of international pressures for policy imitation among countries (Campbell 2004; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Henisz, Zelner, and Guillen 2005) – focuses on the role of dominant states (Kogut and Macpherson 2003) and multilateral organizations (Rude 2005) in affecting policy results. I suggest that it is not only the EU, the United States, the IMF, and the World Bank that exert pressure on policy as agents of international coercion. Members of the symbolic class also play a significant role, particularly from within. The symbolic class includes religious groups, academics, scholars, journalists, and others whose domain of work involves the production of a worldview or symbolic universe. In the Turkish context, this includes Sufi orders and religious communities such as the *Fethullahcilar*, Islamic intellectuals, writers, poets, and journalists. These individuals and groups are actively making history by creating cultural repertoires and steering ideological frames of action in a specific direction.

These entanglements have consequences for Islamic reworking of the state. Clearly, there are disagreements among members of various groups within the symbolic class in terms of the actual content of ideas, their construction, and political direction. Therefore, it is important that we uncover how divergent views and political standpoints are brought together in the refiguring of an Islamic stance.

While there are powerful global pressures on governments to adopt particular policies, it is wrong to assume that specific policies adopted under international pressure produce a coherent outcome at the

PROOF

aggregate level. The nationally diverse social conditions in institutional arrangements and social–cultural settings within the global system create multiple possibilities for policy direction (Block 1986). At issue here then is not only that governments respond to coercive pressures but that they conform to and embody the ontological frames of a neoliberal market economy. This further complicates my fundamental question: How does an Islamic political orientation that is tied to Turkey's EU membership articulate with neoliberalism? How are we to answer this? I argue that an exploration of how diverse sets of political orientations, normative standards and practices are brought together should also take into account how a neoliberal policy framework has achieved an epistemic value to be emulated.

It is easy to see why an Islam-sensitive AKP would be pragmatic in emulating neoliberal policy patterns. While it may have an ideological desire to reduce state intervention in the economy, the AKP also tends to adapt to political realities. Given its tendency to conform to the norms and social structure of the EU, the AKP may strengthen its political status and legitimize its efforts to restructure public politics in Turkey. However, while its policies may be consistent with the normative patterns of the EU, these policies must also have coherence within the institutional, social arrangements of the neoliberal global market economy. Thus, an interesting empirical question emerges: In the light of diverse institutional conditions, national differences, and local particularities, how is normative conformity to the EU model mediated by local factors in such a way that both the EU and Islamic standards are reconciled? In other words, in what ways are various intervening factors (such as the headscarf ban and the Kurdish issue) subject to negotiation, reframing, and reinterpretation? An effective, systematic exploration of this question must account for the links between participation in global structures of power and the reproduction of moral claims and symbolic attachments involved in incorporating a given ontological strand.

This book builds on theories that conceptualize the political shaping of the capitalist economy as a historically constructed process (Arrighi 1994; Block 1977; McMichael 2004; Polanyi 1944; Tilly 1990; van der Pijl 1984). Moreover, the present work develops the categories and concepts necessary to uncover the discursive interpretive struggles within the specific processes of current political and economic restructuring. I also expand on the idea that discursive battles offer analytical leverage which sheds light on the moral–emotional–cultural reception of international models (Molnar 2005).

PROOF

The epistemic privilege of globalization and democratization discourses

Both 'globalization' and 'democratization' discourses constitute significant aspects of an ontology for the transnational integration of European political space – through their domestic effects on economic, political, and social change. The dominant policy orientation framing the EU's enlargement criteria has been a large-scale restructuring of member states' national economies along a market-driven neoliberal capitalist economy model and a broader process of state transformation consistent with liberal democratic principles (Keating 2004; Smith and Timmins 2000; Ugur and Canefe 2004; van der Pijl 2006). In this respect, the EU acts as an 'agent of international coercion' (Henisz, Zelner, and Guillen 2005: 875). When membership is conditional on the adoption and implementation of reforms, its coercion is direct. When it influences a shift in domestic coalition politics in favour of a political faction which supports a given policy, the coercion is more indirect. There is also a threat of direct or indirect punishment if reforms are not implemented. In this case, the threat includes the rejection of membership or a long delay in membership negotiations, or the imposition of further reforms which again may alter domestic coalition politics and policy struggles in favour of a specific approach to policy making (Atasoy 2009a: 172).

The AKP-led policy changes adopted to integrate Turkey into the EU have grafted the transformation of the Turkish state and culture onto an EU discursive framework. Although accession negotiations have been underway since 2005, the EU may never grant Turkey full membership status. This conditional status allows the EU to exercise direct coercion on Turkey's policy making, which significantly affects available political options, high-stakes policy orientations, rival positions, and plausible alternatives. By conditioning the historical moment, membership requirements figure in the normative values and political objectives of those competing for power to control the direction of change. Here, the international coerciveness of the EU is indirect. It runs through contentious political positions between the AKP which stands for neoliberalism and the CHP–DSP and the MHP which continue to formulate a nationalist–statist response. Consequently, creating opportunities for a move away from the Kemalist path, EU policy impositions have been the greater source of conflict among various political parties, including the bureaucratic cadres. This is especially evident in terms of the democratization process in Turkey.

PROOF

Neoliberal restructuring of the economy is not a major area of conflict among political parties. A market-based development model has been embraced since the adoption of the *24 January measures* in 1980, and was firmly consolidated after the September 1980 military coup. From that time on, various governments have pursued policies to actually implement neoliberal market capitalism, thus gradually shifting Turkey's economic policy orientation from a state-dominated and protectionist model (Atasoy 2005). Moreover, Turkey has been incorporated into the European free trade system since 1995. The large, secularly oriented business groups organized around *Türk Sanayicilari ve İs Adamları Derneği* (TUSIAD), the pro-Islamic business groups represented by *Müstakil Sanayici ve İş Adamları Derneği* (MUSIAD), and many highly educated technical professionals are all strong supporters of the market economy model (Atasoy 2003/2004).

Virtually all political parties agree on the neoliberal principles of privatization of public corporations, foreign direct investment, liberalization of trade, and entrepreneurship. These are seen as the keys to long-term economic growth and wealth creation for everyone, although disagreements exist over the *correct state polices* to implement them. Still, one should not exaggerate policy differences in regard to their adherence to 'the neo-liberal creed' (Arrighi 2007: 353). According to a survey conducted by *Radikal* (28 July 2007), AKP supporters are more 'tolerant' with respect to foreign ownership of state-owned companies and real estate purchases, but their level of tolerance is not high enough to single them out as staunch supporters of foreign ownership. The disapproval rate for all political party supporters remains a very high 63.5 per cent for foreign ownership of state enterprises, and 59.2 per cent for foreign real estate purchases. Differences emerge in terms of the *degree* of opposition to foreign ownership. The far-right MHP has a very high disapproval level of 80.2 per cent and 78 per cent against foreign ownership of state enterprises and real estate purchases respectively. The centre-left CHP's disapproval also remains at very high levels, 69.3 per cent and 62.9 per cent respectively (*Radikal* 28 July 2007). Nevertheless, both the far-right MHP and the centre-left CHP welcome foreign direct investment for Turkey's economic growth (CHP Bulten Icerikleri 2008; CHP Parti Politikalari 2008; MHP Ozellestirme Raporu 2009).[1] For both political parties, this should be in tandem with a slower pace of neoliberal restructuring and, more generally, greater selective privatization of public companies through a 'dispersed shareholding model' (Sher 2009: 188) rather than the block sales of companies.

A more general area of controversy in Turkey's tangled political terrain involves the actions of the AKP government in generating cultural meanings to frame EU-oriented changes around an 'individual rights and freedoms' discourse. These new meanings are now leading to the transformation of the Kemalist state. Pertinent questions that follow from this include: What are the normative and institutional opportunities and constraints faced in making policy within these larger material and discursive conditions of change? How is EU membership linked to these rival definitions of national culture and state building? As Turkey charts its course for European transnational integration, what kind of state and cultural politics may develop? And how will Islamic sensibilities remain influential in the reshaping of power dynamics? What forms of moral–political life will be configured for individual citizens? And how will individuals be enabled to engage in this new cultural ethos?

This book, then, explores the links between policies related to Turkey's EU membership and the production of moral claims, discursive orientations, and symbolic attachments. These links are contingently centred on the organization of a neoliberal market-based political economy. We know from reading Karl Polanyi's (1944) *The Great Transformation* that liberal knowledge about human nature, and ideas about land, labour, and money as commodities played a crucial role in the constitution of nineteenth-century market society around the 'self-regulating market' principle. Through the 1980s, 1990s, and beyond, neoliberal ideas articulated around 'globalization' and 'democratization' discourses have been immensely powerful in the recreation of what Polanyi calls a market society on a global basis. In terms of EU-integration policies, neoliberal ideas constitute the discursive framework for the transnational integration of European political space. National policy debates are positioned within this context. However, it is not an easy task to explain how an Islamic orientation plays a culturally constitutive role – acting as a cultural engine of change around the neoliberal discursive mode of argument. This book helps explain how an Islamic social change programme is being attached to the EU's neoliberal discursive framework.

Globalization discourse

At present there is no consensual understanding in regard to a single referent for studying globalization (Rossi 2007). Nonetheless, much sociological theorizing centres 'globalization' around the neoliberal principles and policy ideas adopted to restructure capitalism and restore an

PROOF

open world market economy. This is mainly carried out through the liberalization of domestic economies and trade, the privatization of various forms of public property, services, and policy making, entrepreneurship, and new managerial arrangements (Atasoy 2009b: 7). Globalization is a complex political process involving the restructuring of capital and classes, the reorganization of states and political alliances, and the reconfiguration of societies and social life.

There is no doubt that liberalization and privatization policies adopted since the 1980s have altered prevailing ways of exercising power in many countries, although they have not taken hold to the same degree in different countries (Henisz, Zelner, and Guillen 2005: 873). State institutions and practices have been transformed and reconfigured in the process. Beatrice Hibou (2004) defines this as 'privatization of the state.' This process concerns not only the gradual withdrawal of the state from welfare provisions and the privatization of public economic enterprises and services, but the privatization of various state practices in policy, norm, and law-making. It underpins an elaborate process of transforming state institutions and practices to facilitate the exercise of power in the direction of what Colin Leys (2007) has called 'total capitalism.' For Hibou (2004: 1–45), state transformation does not necessarily mean loss of control by the holders of state power in favour of private actors gaining autonomy, because the range of forms of state intervention and political regulation has in fact been widened. What is involved here is the recombining of forms of the public and the private, which Yves Chevrier (2004) coins the refiguring of 'historical paths of the political.'

Somers and Block (2005: 260–1) have used the term 'market fundamentalism' to describe the neoliberal restructuring of capitalism, due to the 'religious-like certitude [on the part of] those who believe in the moral superiority of organizing all dimensions of social life according to market principles.' This is not merely a shift in emphasis, although the precise ways in which the neoliberal reconfiguring of the economy, state forms, and society is occurring remain unclear. Much uncertainty arises from the mutation in the very notions of what is private and what is public, as well as the location of the social and the political as a condition of human activities. Of course, these are not new questions. Hannah Arendt (1958: 22–78) demonstrated that these ideas have never been self-evident and static. What is significant for the purposes of this book is the need to underscore the fact that the state is being reconfigured as the very notion of private and public is being altered.

Under the specific conditions of Turkey, changes in the Kemalist state are transforming the old modalities of public space organized

for state-dominated ways of life, including religion. Private space has long been crafted for the home, family, and faith. The reconfiguring of the Kemalist state is not the unmitigated outcome of various Islamic groups working towards the 'retreat of the state' (Strange 1996). But it does relate to the question of the production of ideas and meanings beyond the framework of the state. As Chevrier (2004: 253) observes in a different context,

> the orientation of social action and the production of meaning pass from the state and state-dominated social and normative patterns to the social – a social . . . [produced as] a multiple entry process . . . In this process the possessor of the most official mark of collective recognition – the state – no longer has a privileged position . . . the state is losing the monopoly of institutionalization of the social.

This is a complex phenomenon which signifies the mutation of the state-based trajectory of what Ulrick Beck (2000) calls the 'first modernity.' And it is occurring through interaction with the historical trajectory of 'globalization.'

For Beck (2000), the first modernity represents an institutional definition of the social as nationally divided territorial space. Kemalist social engineering certainly belongs to the discursive framing of the first modernity, as a historically specific trajectory of territorial containment. The mutation of the Kemalist state modality involves reconfiguring the social and political relations of emergent forms. Here, Islamic discourse seems to have incorporated global dynamics into the reshaping of the current trajectory of the state through its marriage with neoliberalism. A relevant question follows from this: How is EU membership linked to the reconfiguring of the state through an Islamic reshaping of power dynamics?

Neoliberalism reconfigures the social and political around a belief in the ontological primacy of market economic frames of reference as a way of acting within the economy and the state. This belief in the market is embedded in a knowledge culture which Margaret Somers (1995a) calls a 'conceptual network.' It combines assumptions about the creation of a 'market society' around a self-regulating market principle. The logic in the creation of a market society is rooted in the diffusion of certain normative assumptions such as liberalism, the minimum state, and privatization of public enterprises and the economy. Polanyi (1944) has argued that these normative assumptions sustain the idea of a self-regulating market imagined as a unified and coherent

PROOF

economy operating through autonomous price-setting mechanisms of commodity exchange.

The epistemological foundation of neoliberal policy-making lies in a theory of separation between the private sphere of the market economy and the public sphere of the administrative state (Somers 1995b). The market economy is the private, anti-political, de-politicized, naturalized side of the dichotomous formulation of what is private and what is public (Somers 1995a: 114; 1999: 123). The private sphere is assumed to exist with its own laws of the economy and imperatives of profit maximization which 'when untouched by political intervention [,] will tend toward equilibrium and order' (Somers and Block 2005: 271). This is what Ellen Meiksins Wood (1995: 235) defines as the enclosure of the economic sphere from the political.

However, for Polanyi, the emergence of the 'liberal' market economy before the turn of the twentieth century was not a result of the freedom of the economic sphere from government intervention. Polanyi (1944: 1–29) has described such a belief in the idea of a self-regulating market economy as a stark utopia. He is referring here to the desire of economic liberalism to realize a self-regulating market through the fictitious commodities of land, labour, and money. Self-regulation implies that all production is for sale; accordingly, there are markets for labour, land, and money. But labour, land, and money are not commodities. They are not produced for sale on the market. '[L]abour and land are no other than the human beings themselves of which every society consists and the natural surroundings in which it exists . . . [and] actual money, finally, is merely a token of purchasing power which, as a rule, is not produced at all . . .' (Polanyi 1944: 71–2). But the fiction of their being so produced became the organizing principle in society (Polanyi 1944: 75). With the help of this fiction, the state and its policies create the conditions and make the arrangements to construct the self-regulating market to which human society becomes subordinate. What gives the market economy an appearance of disembeddedness, naturalness, and coherence is the continuous and sustained political effort to constitute market capitalism around the fiction of self-regulation. After all, it took over 70 years of active, deliberate state involvement to transform Britain into something approximating a *laissez-faire* market society. This was revealed in the nineteenth-century demolition of the social protective mechanisms of the mercantilist regime in English Poor Law history – a change consistent with the interests of the then rising industrial and financial bourgeoisie (cf. Somers and Block 2005). By extension, behind the current neoliberal façade of economic liberalization, privatization,

PROOF

and minimum state intervention is the reconfiguration of the state as a new political modality that entails constant negotiations between dominant actors and the redrawing of boundaries between the public and private.

The eighteenth-century concept of economic rationality produced a trans-historical meaning for the uniformity of human nature and is the link converting the self-regulating market fiction to a dominant perspective and policy idea. The discourse of the self-regulating market of classical economics was contingent upon earlier interpretations of the independence and freedom of rational individuals from societal constraints. Thinkers like John Locke developed an understanding of society as an aggregate of free actors making rational choices. These discursive traditions provided a conceptual bridge between the nineteenth-century theory of self-regulating markets and contemporary theorizing of 'globalization' (Alexander 1988: 85). For nineteenth-century economic liberals, the idea of economics was equated with the maximization of production and consumption in a world of scarcity. It was argued that the market promotes greater efficiency, and, therefore, was most likely to contribute to the general welfare of the greatest number of individuals (Gill 2000: 50–1).

As argued by Somers and Block (2005), Lockean liberalism is the common cultural legacy for the idea of self-regulating markets free from political interference. This knowledge culture 'embeds markets in a story about how they are self-regulating natural entities' (Somers and Block 2005: 281) and provides a discursive frame for the conversion of nineteenth-century economic liberalism into twenty-first-century neoliberal restructuring of the global political economy. Building continuities with this knowledge structure, present-day neoliberal norms and meanings sustain a vision of a market society by 'privatizing the state.'

Neoliberalism's marriage with particular national trajectories generates context-bound spheres of the *imaginaire* for the social and the political. The implication here is that the concepts of liberalization and privatization blend with different historical and cultural contexts in shaping 'the imagined economies of globalization' (Cameron and Palan 2004). This transforms the sphere of the political by rearticulating norms and actions to be recognized as having a general socio-cultural public value. In connection with privatization and liberalization, the political reworks the relations

> between public power . . . and the nexus of actions, discourses, norms and symbols . . . related to the organization of the community as a

PROOF

> legitimate social entity: a legitimacy whose ultimate claims to existence do not lie in the powers that be, not in religious or moral claims, but in those very relations [that redefine the social].
>
> (Chevrier 2004: 242)

The distinguishing feature of neoliberal restructuring is the de-linking of the political from the sphere of the social, which has occurred since the eighteenth-century enlightenment project of modernity – the first modernity in Beck's definition. This means that a fundamental reformulation of the state is taking place along a mutation of political categories. Neoliberalism becomes more of a discourse on the primacy of market forces in redefining the place of the public sphere, and, hence, in reshaping societies. This entails more than what is implied by concepts such as 'the retreat of the state' (Strange 1996), 'competition state' (Cerny 2000), or 'reduction in the regulatory role of the state' (Brady, Beckfield, and Seeleib-Kaiser 2005). The 'privatization of the state' does not denote a withering of the state, but fundamentally new ways of reconfiguring the social by redefining the space of the political.

As the dominant policy perspective across the global economy (Fiss and Hirsch 2005), neoliberalism provides a frame for a set of ideas and norms about the interpretation and construction of the market economy and the transformation of the state. Nevertheless, this process of giving meaning is subject to political struggles that promote or challenge interpretations of existing social arrangements. The Islamic attachment to neoliberalism as a global policy idea is thus an empirical question of inquiry. Specifically, we must ask how an Islamic orientation to the global market economy is framed? What are the dominant views? What are the points of tension? What is the role of IMF- and World Bank-imposed conditionality agreements and EU-induced reform programmes in bringing about these policy objectives? This book draws attention to the need for closer scrutiny of the interplay between general discursive structures and national interpretive processes in shaping policy outcomes that redefine the boundaries between the private and the public and reformulate the state.

Democratization discourse

'Democratization discourse' articulates an argument for transforming power relations within states through a normative orientation towards liberal democracy. For the implementation of liberal transformative politics, it singles out criteria that prevail in the relations of governing and

political participation in most of western Europe and North America (Macpherson 1977). These criteria consist of the principles of liberty, the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (including freedom of expression, freedom of religion, women's rights, and trade union rights), respect for and protection of minorities against intrusion by the state, as well as the stability of institutions guaranteeing the overall process of democracy (Negotiating Framework 2005).

These principles consist of a shift in citizen–state relations towards greater citizen participation, equalization of participation, enhancing citizens' control over governing, and extending citizen protection from arbitrary action by government (Tilly 2004: 23). Although they neither constitute sufficient conditions for democracy nor aggregate into an idealized model of the democratization process (Tilly 2004: 39), these mechanisms nonetheless indicate a process of change for reconfiguring power relations within the state.

Democratization underlies a political process of reworking the form of the state through struggles for a more limited state (Wood 1995: 225–37). This may enhance citizenship rights within states, but it also expresses the classic antimony of state versus market in the definition of democracy. This essentially redefines democracy by reducing it to liberalism (Wood 1995: 234), reflecting a Lockean emphasis on the emancipation of market forces from the confines of the state as its defining characteristic. Locke's arbitrary separation of the private economic sphere of the market from the public realm of the state allowed liberalism, on its most elementary level, to be understood in terms of 'removing the state's hand from the market, and . . . keeping the state from impinging upon decision making in the social arena' (Wallerstein 1995: 98). For liberalism, the more important criterion is always to uphold the individual as possessor of 'inalienable rights' rather than to significantly affect power dynamics and inequalities within society. This is the viewpoint which unites liberalism and capitalism, defined as liberal democracy.

What is more, the neoliberal redrawing of the boundaries between private and public realms is now manifested in the current context of inequalities stemming from a complex combination of 'accumulation by dispossession' (Harvey 2003) and various forms of privatization that are generated beyond the confines of the state-territorial logic of society. This casts further doubt on the possibility of democracy in terms of criteria framing the process of governing and political participation.

Although it is a highly 'contested' concept (Connolly 1993), democracy has been 'globalized' as a singular 'normative ideal' (Diamond 2000;

PROOF

Nash 2000: 216). Francis Fukuyama's (1992) *The End of History and the Last Man* explains the normative ascendancy of 'liberal democracy' in global politics in relation to the collapse of communism in the late 1980s and 1990s and the rise of a market-driven economic model.

Samuel Huntington shares this view that normatively associates democracy with the capitalist market economy. Huntington (1991) has expressed his ideas on 'democratization in the late twentieth century' in his book *The Third Wave*. For him, the world history of democratization consists of three waves, each with its own distinctive characteristics of growth, consolidation, and reversal. The nineteenth-century experience in western Europe and the United States constituted the first wave, followed by a second wave from the 1950s to the early 1960s that occurred in parts of Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. The third wave occurred in southern Europe in the 1970s and Latin America in the 1980s, with the expectation by Huntington that former Soviet Bloc countries would follow in the 1990s (Atasoy 2009a: 173).

Huntington connects the third wave to a variety of factors which in varying combinations can promote democracy. They are: (1) market economic growth which raises living standards and levels of education, and also increases urbanization, civic expectations, and the ability to express them; (2) the deepening legitimacy problems of authoritarian governments; (3) changes in the Catholic Church which make it more likely to oppose authoritarian regimes; (4) external forces (such as non-governmental organizations (NGO), the EU, and the United States) promoting human rights and democracy; and (5) the general snowballing effect that produces normative emulation. Thus, Huntington's treatment of democracy as waves focuses on patterns of economic development and political culture that might be conducive or inimical to a stable practice of democracy. He describes each wave in terms of a transition from non-democratic to democratic political systems, a consolidation of democracies, and then an ebbing or reversal which produces de-democratization through crisis and breakdown.

Huntington conceptualized the Cold War state system as divided between democratic and non-democratic states. While capitalist states were described as democratic, socialist states were undemocratic. For him, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet military bloc created the material conditions for the worldwide diffusion of democracy. For Huntington (1997: 6), the 'great achievement of the "third wave" has been to ensure the universality of democracy in western civilization and [to] promote its manifestations in other civilizations.' Its future lies in the transformation of electoral democracies into liberal

democracies. This is premised on the political commitment of the elites of non-western civilization to the liberal democratic values of the west (Huntington 1997). Huntington sees Latin America as the natural starting place for the transformation process because Latin American culture resembles western culture, albeit loosely (Huntington 1996: 46). Next in line are the orthodox countries of eastern Europe. According to Huntington, an international association of organizations and movements dedicated to expanding democracy on a global basis and enhancing its performance within countries should act as a vigilant lobby group.

Huntington published *The Clash of Civilizations* in 1996, five years after the publication of *The Third Wave*. Even though he does not make the connection, *The Clash of Civilizations* portrays the reversal of democracy's third wave in the late twentieth century. For all the power of the normative idea of democracy as well as intense international pressure, the *Clash of Civilizations* shows that Huntington is well aware that democracy has not been embraced everywhere in the entire world. Reasons can be found, he suggests, in the remoteness of non-western cultures from western ways and the degree of western cultural influence on non-western societies. Huntington asserts that Muslim countries and parts of East Asia may not experience democracy because of the democracy-inhibiting cultural characteristics of Islam and Confucianism. Islam constitutes an antithesis to the universalist standing of western democracy and is mobilized by actors who wish to challenge western cultural structures and ideas through the instigation of religious conflicts in civilizational terms.

For Huntington, democracy appears to be a fixed set of rules, procedures, patterns, and normative standards which can be characterized as an ideal type. It is a product of western civilization embedded in the ideas of individual liberty, the rule of law, human rights, and cultural freedom that began in western Europe a millennium ago. And the 'third way' contemplates a universal grounding for the adoption and legitimation of the cultural scheme of liberal democracy globally. As such, it does not have room for the incorporation of contestations, conflicts, gaps, or crises into the process of recreating democracies – phenomena which vary from region to region, period to period, and culture to culture (Markoff 1996: xvi). Charles Tilly (2004) has shown that by and large the process of democratization is actually the outcome of rebellions, confrontations, revolutions, and retaliations intertwined across several centuries within the European context. Tilly suggests that liberal democracy does not reside in general laws but has emerged contingently from political struggles within European national histories (Tilly 2004: 8–9).

PROOF

This challenges 'democratization discourse' which assumes a single path to democracy and generates meaning over its replicability across diverse social settings in the world (Atasoy 2009a: 174).

There is no doubt that democratization and globalization discourses have achieved an 'epistemic privilege' (Somers and Block 2005: 265) status in fuelling social transformation in Turkey today. Reforms undertaken by the AKP government to speed up the process of Turkey's EU membership have, to a large extent, focused on the transformation of Kemalist knowledge culture. That culture had embedded a particular path of modernization in Turkey since the early 1930s – a culture of secularism, militarism, statism, and authoritarianism (Keyder 1997; Navaro-Yashin 2002). Globalization and democratization discourses now constitute the backbone of the EU-induced reform programme spelled out in the Copenhagen criteria. They may ultimately triumph over Kemalism and reaffirm Turkey's path on a neoliberal trajectory of social change in its marriage with Islam. Yet, ideas can only achieve a dominant position if they make sense for the lived experience and cultural values of specific social groups (Mahmood 2005). The task, then, is to bring forward the interpretive struggles, competing ideas, public narratives, and explanatory systems that frame Islam's marriage with neoliberalism through its engagement with globalized discursive structures.

The 'sociology of ideas' perspective (Camic 1987; Camic and Gross 2001) is helpful in making a connection between ideas and neoliberal restructuring. Rooted in a recent formulation in social theory which assumes that social science is distinctly evaluative in nature (Alexander 1988: 80), the sociology of ideas perspective questions assumptions made in the 'sociology of knowledge' (Mannheim 1929/1986) about material self-interest based on social-class or market position as a determinant of policy. Rather than conceptualizing ideas in functional terms as mediating structural social-class positions, this perspective takes ideas, public narratives, and explanatory systems that cognitively embed policy outcomes as central to a distinct field of inquiry (Campbell 1998; DiMaggio 1994; Fiss and Hirsch 2005; Somers and Block 2005). How a pro-Islamic orientation blends with neoliberalism is an empirical question that demands close scrutiny of interpretive processes in terms of the actual embodiments of neoliberal discursive frames. But this inquiry should be made without construing a disparate account of the particular at the expense of complex world-historical processes. To be sure, the specific social processes and socio-cultural/intellectual or symbolic settings need to be uncovered to understand how they affect the very

PROOF

connection between the ethical and the political in the imaginary of a social change trajectory. This type of inquiry involves a highly contentious process as various groups struggle for the power to interpret reality, reshape culture, and position themselves in history (Tilly 2004). From this perspective, current political conflicts and discursive tensions in Turkey can be charted as a 'framing contest' over the direction of a social change programme (Gamson and Modigliani 1989, cited in Fiss and Hirsch 2005: 30). These conflicts are being played out over Turkey's integration into the EU and within the world-historical dynamics of neoliberal restructuring.

In this book, I intend to connect the structural and discursive factors that help us better understand how a neoliberal market economy model and liberal principles of democracy are embraced in the reshaping of Islamic political agendas that transform the state. This is an empirical investigation into highly contested terrain. It requires us to place a specific Islamic imaginary within the process of neoliberal restructuring as a particular manifestation of a general process that 'reinvents capitalism' (Bayart 1994) on a global basis. Still, this process refigures an Islamic politico–social imaginary through an epistemology that continues to reproduce a history of 'European universalism' and serve as the basis for a rhetoric of power (Wallerstein 2006).

Organization of the book

The book consists of eight chapters. Each is organized to further our understanding of the historically variable articulation of Islam in Turkey in relation to the exercise of state power. For this purpose, the book also provides an overview of the political and economic changes of the Turkish state, from the late Ottoman period to the present era. By exposing the powerful forces confronting the state, a framework is developed for interpreting the dynamics of Islam within contemporary Turkey. Also illuminated are the historical forms of capital fractions and political interests, including the patterns of elite formation, and their incorporation into the state. Finally, each chapter provides empirical evidence for the articulation of Islam, not only by the political elite, including the military, but also by Muslims confronting changes in their day-to-day activities. We see how Islam becomes a critical, epistemic resource for the state and for Muslims themselves in reconfiguring specific social relations and frames of reference.

An empirical foundation for the book is provided through an analysis of data collected from published documents and interviews. The

PROOF

first type of data is drawn from official statistics, pro-Islamic newspapers, periodicals, research reports, and the literary writings of members of the Muslim symbolic class, including public intellectuals. The textual analysis of these documents facilitates the drawing of a general picture of dominant Islamic views around three highly contentious issues – the military's frequent interventions in politics, Muslim women's wearing of the headscarf, and the Kurdish issue. I weave these distinct areas into individual chapters of the book where appropriate, but particular attention has been given to the repositioning of Islamic capitalists in the economy and Muslim women's wearing of the headscarf. The second type of data consists of interviews with 40 women and men in Ankara, Turkey. This set of data allows us to demonstrate how Islamic ideas are reconfigured in particular around what is arguably one of the single most important issues in Turkish politics today – the wearing of the headscarf by Muslim women. Presentation of this data is essential in order to show how these issues are used to frame the nuanced ways in which EU membership requirements are approached and met.

Muslim women's wearing of the headscarf is an aspect of freedom of religion. The key aspect of freedom of religion is the expectation that the state in a secular context refrains from establishing or promoting a particular religion (Denli 2007: 94). The state is also expected to permit the search for the religious and the spiritual conditions of experience, as one option among many other possibilities of lived experience (Taylor 2007). Of course, differences in and the appropriateness of religious beliefs and experiences must not be a consideration. There are numerous examples of the state's violation of the equal enjoyment of freedom of religion in Turkey. These include: the headscarf ban; difficulties faced by non-Sunni *Alevi-Bektasi* Muslims and non-Muslim minorities in relation to religious education and religious publications (R. Cakir and Bozan 2005; Oran 2004, 2007a; Yannas 2007); the exclusive promotion of *Sunni-Hanefi* Islam by the state through the Directorate of Religious Affairs (R. Cakir and Bozan 2005; Tarhanli 1993); and the closing down of *Imam-Hatip* junior high schools through Law No. 4306 (R. Cakir, Bozan, and Talu 2004; Gunay 2001: 7–9). The same law has also restricted Koran course attendance to children who have graduated from grade eight in secular schools. The law was modified in 1999 to permit children to attend Koran courses after grade five or after they reach an equivalent age (usually 12 years old). These issues add considerable complexity to the unfolding relations of state, society, and religion in Turkey. The present work does not discuss the freedom of religion in general,

PROOF

but incorporates the headscarf ban within a broader discussion of the Kemalist state and its mutation.

Relations between the Turkish state and the Kurdish people have also been problematic for many years. Since the 1980s these relations have become increasingly violent. Although this conflictual relationship predates the republic, the state's denial of the existence of Kurds as a culturally and linguistically distinct category of people, and its treatment of the Kurdish struggle as a national security concern have been contentious issues throughout much of the history of the Kemalist state (R. Cakir 2004; Kirisci and Winrow 2002; Kurban and Yolacan 2008; Olson 1996; Yegen 1999). Despite its significance for state transformation and the pressures applied by the EU, there is still enormous resistance to the Kurdish movement based on the idea of the indivisible territorial unity of the state and the unitary conception of the Turkish nation. This book does not include an extensive discussion of the Kurdish movement but incorporates various pertinent aspects of the subject into a broader discussion of Kemalist state ideology.

Outline

Chapter 1 offers a broad theoretical discussion of Islam's 'marriage' with the epistemically privileged discursive frames of neoliberalism. Chapter 2, 'The Allure of the West,' traces the historically grounded interpretive tensions between Kemalist and Islamic ideational stances from the late Ottoman Empire onward. This is done by unpacking the intertwined stories of liberalism, market capitalism, and *laiklik* deployed as a pedagogical technique of cultural management and citizenship control. The chapter also examines the dominant role of state bureaucrats in the power plays and application of a bureaucratic/statist version of European universality.

Chapter 3, 'Turkish Islam: Unthinking Kemalism?,' focuses on the mutation in the Kemalist modernity project under neoliberalism. State bureaucrats continue to exert direct and indirect influence and ideological control over the social conditions and political dynamics of neoliberalism. A bureaucratic/statist notion of 'Turkish Islam' is anchored to the moral disciplining of Kemalism in refiguring the ethos of sovereignty under neoliberal processes of capital accumulation. The chapter argues that there is a real possibility of *social fascism* emerging in the direction of a militarized form of politico–ethical framing of rule.

Chapter 4, 'Reconstituting the State: The Islamic Framing of Neoliberalism,' explains the political resignification of moral values and ethical

PROOF

standards by Islamic groups in the development of an ethos of Muslim engagement with the market economy. The methodology employed here demonstrates the significance of an epistemological assumption that incorporates ideas and institutional processes into a contextualized understanding of state transformation. The Islamic framing of neoliberalism embodies a dual character: its embeddedness in the epistemically privileged status of both the European ideational programme and the Islamic narrative of 'righteous' individuals and the good society. This points to an interesting dialectic that helps us rethink the multidimensionality of interpretive conflicts being waged in Turkey over the shaping of a public ethos of state sovereignty beyond the Kemalist state and its claims to a territorialized culture.

Chapter 5, 'Kemalist State Feminism and the Islamic Dress Code,' examines the construction of the cultural–political status of women's Islamic clothing practices from the late Ottoman Empire onward. Integral to the nation-state formation processes of the 1930s, educated, urban women from the large cities of Ankara and Istanbul rose to positions of privilege within the Kemalist cultural hierarchy. These women, known as *Ataturkcu*, though silenced within the bureaucratically articulated state feminism, were seen as crucial in the realization of a *laik* 'cultural turn' to 'modernity.' In contrast, women from the Anatolian hinterland who followed an Islamic dress code were seen as culturally ill-suited for that modernity. This chapter shows that it is within the debates over the ethical–political meaning of women's Islamic clothing that an epistemically uncertain concept of Kemalist modernity was framed in which Islamic normative practices are gradually being displaced in the public sphere.

Chapter 6, 'Politics Without Guarantees: The Headscarf Ban,' focuses on the possibility of Islamic 'transformative resistance' directed against Kemalist state practices surrounding the headscarf ban since the 1980s. Islamic 'transformative resistance' includes the political and pedagogical shaping of a general Islamic normative position in refiguring futures. Although without guarantees in producing a coherent transformational outcome outside of the state nationalist position of Turkish Islam, it is clear that Islamic groups have situated their interpretive judgment in a social imagery of individual human rights and freedoms discourse. Some Islamic groups articulate their concern within the discourse of liberal democracy and by reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and EU standards. Others are committed to the notion of ethical–moral universalism and the institution of a more 'comprehensive democracy' understood as a way of human life. This represents

PROOF

an Islamic search for refiguring an ontological base of existence beyond the moral authority imposed by the state. Although difficult and uncertain, this search may help foster a more democratic future with a commitment to global solidarity movements.

Chapter 7, 'Headscarf Madness: Narratives of Religious Rights,' examines the existential resentment of women who wear the headscarf against Kemalist state practices. The chapter illustrates how larger political projects and personal life experiences interact in the making of an Islamic standpoint. By incorporating different views of women and men on the headscarf controversy in Turkey, the chapter considers how the experiences of the headscarf ban have become part of a process of redefining a political–cultural–emotional terrain. A discussion of the Canadian debate on the founding of the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice and the Canadian Supreme Court's decision regarding the religious divorce of an Orthodox Jewish woman helps to further illustrate the arguments made by my respondents on the headscarf issue. Their arguments turn around the question of how to think about civil matters with a religious dimension in such a way that the notion of democracy can be grounded as a way of life in social conditions of 'trust,' 'trustworthiness,' and 'respect.'

Chapter 8, 'Conclusion,' weaves the various summary strands in each chapter together into a general account of the possibility of transformation in the Kemalist state and its practices of sovereignty under neoliberal conditions of economic and political restructuring.

Index

9/11, 195, 220

Abdulhak Hamit, 149
abolition of the caliphate, 60, 66, 157
Abu-Lughod, Lila, 164
access rights, 108
accumulation by dispossession, 23, 77, 79
accumulation of capital, 39, 122
accumulation of power, 242
Afshar, Halef, 142
agricultural exports, consequences for Ottoman society, 40
Ahsap Konak (Kisakurek), 57–8, 98
Ak-Der, 168, 185–9, 195
AKP (Justice and Development Party)
  2002 election success, 2
  accusations of Islamization, 3–6
  adaptive nature, 14
  and foreign ownership of state-owned companies, 16
  and headscarf politics, 3, 10, 167–70, 179–81
  and MUSAID, 116, 118–19
  and neoliberalism, 15, 109–13, 114
  anti-*laik* charges, 167, 170
  closure case, 89, 180
  cultural discourse, 10
  human rights discourse, 10–11, 111
  ideological outlook, 9–10
  presidential candidate, 3
  self-definition, 7
  TUSIAD's support, 116
  view of EU membership, 7–8, 10, 14–15, 26, 111–12, 179
  view of Kemalism, 7–9
  vote share, 4
Ali Suavi, 48
Anadolu Finance House, 121
Anatolian tigers, 117
Anatolian woman, 154–9, 163, 174, 188
Anayasa Icin Kadin Platformu, 184
Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention (1838), 40, 45
Arendt, Hannah, 18, 100, 193, 196, 248
Arinc, Bulent, 6
Arrighi, Giovanni, 14, 16, 39, 40, 78, 242, 243
Asya Finance House, 121
Atasoy, Yıldız, 3, 7–8, 11, 13, 15, 16, 18, 24, 26, 35–6, 45, 47, 52, 57, 64–5, 67, 71, 73, 76–7, 79–80, 100, 105–6, 108, 112, 124–6, 129–30, 132, 154, 158, 240, 245, 250
Ataturk, Mustafa Kemal, 3, 58–60, 66–7, 155–9, 161
Atsiz, Nihal, 102–3
Avrupalilasma, 27, 45–6, 48–9, 74
Aydinlar Ocagi, 94–5, 104

Babacan, Hatice, 140
Balci, Muharrem, 80
Balibar, Etienne, 64
Barbarosoglu, Fatma, 143, 147
Baskent Kadin Platformu, 184
basortusu
  Anatolian associations, 174
  definition, 138
  political status, 139–40, 173
  statistics, 171
  vs *turban*, 141, 173–4, 202–3, 226–36
  see also headscarf; *turban*
Beck, Ulrick, 19, 60, 240
'bellicose Unitarianism', 78, 247
Benli, Fatma, 186, 188
Beth Din, 218–20, 222
Beylerbeyi Palace, 48
Bilgen, Ayhan, 195
biopolitics, 43
Blair, Tony, 109
Block, Fred, 14, 18, 20–1, 26, 43, 107, 248, 251
Bohman, James, 194
Bora, Tanil, 103

PROOF

Bulac, Ali, 169, 175, 196–7, 199
bureaucratic cadres
  assumption of 'class power', 72
  capital growth support, 74
  coalition with secularized intellectuals, 72
  emergence as agent of industrial development, 71
  and the Islamic 'threat', 169
  laiklik management role, 63, 104, 135
  political influence, 3, 75
  sources of conflict, 15
  and women's dress, 154, 168
Bu Ulke (Meric), 49
Buyukanit, Yasar, 3, 5
Buyuk Dogu, 98–101

Cakir, Rusen, 28–9, 63, 176, 183–4
Cakir, Sibel, 147–8, 160, 176
caliphate, abolition, 60, 66, 157
Canada, 217–24
capital, realignment of private, 113, 122
carsaf
  definition, 138
  Fatma Aliye Hanim's view, 147, 149
  increasing popularity, 146
  in political rhetoric, 139
CEDAW (UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women), 177, 184
Cemal, Hasan, 181
Chase-Dunn, Christopher, 192
Chevrier, Yves, 18
CHP (Republican People's Party), 2, 4–5, 7, 15–16, 246
Cile (Kisakurek), 57, 98
Cinar, Alev, 142
Cinar Kadin Platformu, 184
Ciragan Palace, 48
circle of justice principle, 38, 40, 110
Clash of Civilizations, The (Huntington), 25
class ambiguities, 131–5
Clinton, Bill, 109
Coleman, James, 119
comprehensive democracy, 194–5, 214, 217, 244, 252
Connolly, William, 23, 33, 78, 98–9, 134, 165, 178, 247
Constitution
  1876, 41–2, 44, 181
  1924, 61, 65, 181
  1961, 78, 80–1, 84, 86
  1982, 2, 81, 84–7, 92, 173
  amendments for Copenhagen criteria, 86
  and the headscarf issue, 3, 6, 170, 173, 176–7, 179–81, 184
  ideological debate, 180–2
  justification of coercive powers under, 85
  Kemalist principles, 58, 63
  on language, 61, 65
  and military bureaucracy, 81, 181
  reinstatement, 53
  on religious education, 92
  role of liberal knowledge, 17
Copenhagen criteria, 1–2, 10, 26, 86, 111, 116, 118
crisis-management strategies, IMF-induced, 112
cultural turn, 156, 166
culture, constitutive role, 107

Davis, Mike, 108
Dean, Mitchel, 43
debt rescheduling programme, IMF-imposed, 76
Decent Work and the Informal Economy (ILO), 122
deep state, 90–1, 141
DEHAP (Democratic People's Party), 83
deliberative democracy, 197
democracy, Huntington's perspective, 25
democratization
  in AKP programme, 111
  EU-imposed programme, 123, 135, 249
  and EU policy impositions, 15, 17
  and headscarf politics, 165, 200, 221, 223–6
  MUSIAD support, 118

PROOF

democratization – *continued*
progress, 2
TUSIAD support, 116
democratization discourse, 15, 17, 22–7, 110, 118
Deniz Feneri, 133
DHKP/C (Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front), 90
DiMaggio, Paul, 13, 26, 106, 107, 127
Dink, Hrant, 90
Directorate of Religious Affairs, 60, 62–3, 127, 216
discrimination, 44, 71–2, 119, 177, 180, 184–6, 190, 193, 218–19, 223–4
Dogru Yol, 175, 179
Dolmabahce Palace, 48
dominant state, 13
Durkheim, Emile, 54
durust, 132
durustluk, 132

ECHR (European Court of Human Rights), 90, 183, 187, 192, 195–8, 214, 223
economic growth, 16, 24, 111, 131–2
economic rationality, 21, 120, 130, 134
e-coup, 4, 78, 89, 112
education
cultural, 68
and economic growth, 24
and the Kurdish language, 65
Musa Kazim's view of women's, 151
secularization, 47, 61
Tanzimat reforms, 47, 146
Young Ottoman policies, 52
El Saadawi, Nawal, 142, 152
End of History, The (Fukuyama), 24
enlightened Islam, 92, 171
epistemic uncertainty, 141–4
equality principle, 43–4, 153, 176
Eraslan, Sibel, 187
Erbakan, Necmettin, 6, 88, 94
Erdogan, Recep Tayyip, 2, 6, 10–12, 83, 111, 127, 129, 170, 179, 187
Ergenekon, 89–91, 102
Escobar, Arturo, 77, 80
ethical universalism, 55, 193
EU Accession Partnership document, 1
EU membership
AKP perspective, 7–8, 10, 14–15, 26, 111–12, 179
and human rights organizations, 189
IMF-imposed polices, 112
policy orientations, 15
Europeanization (*Avrupalilasma*), 27, 45–6, 48–9, 74
European relations, historical perspective, 41, 47
Evren, Kenan, 93, 171, 174
exclusionary practices, 46, 66, 77–8, 197
existential resentment, 98, 134, 165

Family Finance, 121
Fanon, Frantz, 100
fascism, 70–1, 74, 76–7, 80, 247
Fatma Aliye Hanim, 146–50, 151–4, 157
Fatma Fahrunnisa, 147
Fatma Zehra, 147
Fazilet Partisi, 179
Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi*), 179
Ferguson, James, 250
Fethullahcilar, 13, 54, 56, 96, 108, 122–3, 127–30, 133
fez, 61, 145
first modernity, Beck's definition, 19, 22
five pillars of Islam, 208–9, 230
foreign ownership, disapproval rates for, 16
Foucault, Michel, 43, 107, 119, 141, 248
French Revolution, 42
Fukuyama, Francis, 24

Gandhi, Mahatma, 193, 194
gecekondus, 132
Gendarmerie, 89–90
Genelkurmay Baskanligi, 4, 113
Gill, Stephen, 11, 21, 166, 168, 248
Gokalp, Ziya, 54–6, 59–60, 62–3, 71, 101, 106, 127, 158
Gokkusagi Kadin Platformu, 184
Gole, Nilufer, 160

PROOF

Gourevitch, Peter, 70
Gramsci, Antonio, 46, 107–8, 167–8, 249
Great Depression, 70, 74–5, 241–2
Great Transformation, The (Polanyi), 17
Grey Wolves movement, 91
Gul, Abdullah, 3–6, 89
Gulen, Fethullah, 121, 127–8
Gulen community, 13, 54, 56, 96, 108, 122–3, 127–30, 133
Gunay, Ertugrul, 7, 83
Guneydogu Kadin Platformu, 184
Gursel, Cemal, 92, 139

HADEP (People's Democracy Party), 83
halkevleri, 68
Harvey, David, 77
Hasim, Bayram, 121
hat reform law, *sapka kanunu*, 61, 157
headscarf
  class symbolism, 188–9
  parliamentary vote lifting ban on, 6
  styles of, 173
  see also basortusu; *turban*
headscarf ban
  and the AKP, 3, 10, 167–70, 179–80
  chronology, 166, 171–4, 177–9
  class perspective, 205, 213
  Constitutional amendments, 179–80
  context, 164–6
  democratic perspective, 194–200, 223
  disciplinary measures, 172, 175
  discriminatory perspective, 184–5
  ECHR ruling, 183
  estimates of students affected, 175–6
  Fatma Benli on, 188
  and freedom of religion, 223
  human rights perspective, 167, 178, 182–94, 195
  and Islamic transformative resistance, 166–71
  Kemalist perspective, 163
  legality, 177–8, 183, 186, 188
  Milliyet reports, 171, 174
  NSC recommendations, 178
  and overseas study, 187
  Ozal's modifications, 173
  parliamentary challenges to, 176–7, 179
  political perspective, 137–41, 167–9, 178–9, 188, 225
  in Ramazanoglu's novel, 175
  and women's equality, 116, 177, 179, 225
  and women's politicization, 183–4
  YOK's justification, 178
headscarf study
  context, 201–2
  data sample, 202–3
  goals, 204
  student narratives, 205–17
  turban vs *basortusu*, 202–3, 226–36
Hegel, G.W.F., 247
Helsinki Summit, 1
HEP (People's Labour Party), 82
Hibou, Beatrice, 18
Hirschmann, Albert, 107, 248
Hittites, 67
Hizbullah, 90
Hobbes, Thomas, 35, 50–1
holding companies, 121
Hoodfar, Homa, 142, 164, 177
human capital, 111, 119–20
human rights
  in AKP discourse, 10–11, 111
  Bulac's arguments, 196–7
  in Copenhagen criteria, 116
  in democratization discourse, 23–5
  universality principle, 192–3, 221
  and the veil, 142, 160, 165–7, 178, 183, 185–6, 194–5, 197, 204
  violations, 84, 182, 185, 190, 195
  women's organizational focus, 184, 186, 190–1
human rights violations, 90, 167, 178, 182–3, 185, 187, 190
Huntington, Samuel, 24–5
huzun, 34

Ideolocya Orgusu (Kisakurek), 98–9
Iffet Halim, 162–3
IHD (Human Rights Association), 189–90
Ihlas Finance House, 121
Ikna Odasi (Ramazanoglu), 175
Ilim Yayma Cemiyeti, 95

PROOF

Ilkkaracan, Ipek, 184–5
IMF, 13, 22, 75–6, 112–13, 116, 245
incorporated comparison, 245
informal sector, 77, 109, 112, 120, 122, 129, 131–3
Insel, Ahmet, 181
international coercion
  definition, 13
  EU as agent of, 15
Islam
  AKP discourse, 10
  blending western modernity and, 49–53, 59
  citizens' resentment of the military's portrayal, 5
  cultural role, 92
  five pillars, 208–9, 230
  Gulen's perspective, 128
  Kemalist portrayal, 67–8
  and the national view movement, 7
  as source of morality, 125–6
Islamic banks, 121
Islamic capitalists, 115
Islamic courts, Canadian debate, 218–21
Islamic dress code, *see* women's Islamic clothing
Islamic ethic, 119, 133–4
Islamic groups, and state sovereignty, 135–6
Islamic resentment, 4, 134
Islamic trust networks, 122–3
Istanbullu woman, 157–8, 162
Izmirli, Ismail Hakki, 152–4

JITEM (Intelligence and Anti-Terrorism Unit), 90
'judicial coup', 6, 8

kadi justice, 38
Kadinlara Mahsus Gazete, 147
Kadinlar Dunyasi, 147
Kadioglu, Ayse, 58–9, 68, 157, 160, 177, 190
Karaduman, Senay, 183
KDP (Democratic Party of Turkish Kurdistan), 82
Kemalism
  AKP perspective, 7–9, 11–12
  constitutional considerations, 181–2
  definition, 3
  fascist influences, 70–1
  Gokalp's influence, 62
  Gole on the 'civilizing mission' of, 160
  ideological principles, 181
  indeterminism of, 63
  and *laiklik*, 8
  and modernization, 58
  and Ottoman liberalism, 34
  overview, 32–3
  paradox, 62
  political relevance, 12
  Said Nursi's view, 65
  techno-scientific universalism, 70–1, 75
  and women's Islamic clothing, 137, 139, 154–60
Kemalist woman, 137, 144, 162–3
Keyder, Caglar, 42
Kisakurek, Necip Fazil, 49–50, 56–7, 97–101
Kivrikoglu, Huseyin, 89
Kizil Elma (Atsiz), 103
Kizilhan, Refia, 186
knowledge culture, 19, 21, 26, 77, 92, 100, 135, 204, 247, 249–50
knowledge structure, 11–12, 21, 137, 166, 249
Koc Holding, 114
Kombassan Holding, 121
koruculuk, 86
Kotku, M. Zahit, 124
koy enstituleri, 68
Kurdish activism, 82
Kurdish language, 41, 61, 83, 86, 97
Kurdish nationalism, 41, 64–6, 96
Kurdish political parties, 82–3
Kurdish uprisings, 41, 65–6
Kurds, 7–8, 41, 63–6, 85, 96–7, 246

laiklik
  carsaf in official discourse of, 138
  constitutional requirement, 62
  definition, 3–4, 62
  and Islamism, 11

PROOF

Lausanne Peace Treaty, 64
Lawrence, King, 8, 49, 72, 74–5, 123
liberalism
  key conceptual component of European, 42, *see also* Ottoman liberalism
liberty, Mill's paradox of, 51, 67
loan agreement, conditionality terms, 76
Locke, John, 23, 51
Lockean liberalism, 21
logic of rule, 37, 39, 43

Macleod, A. Elowe, 142
Mahcupyan, Etyen, 169
manto, definition, 138
Mardin, Serif, 38, 50, 51, 65, 69, 72, 123, 148
market capitalism, 43
Maslum-Der, 185, 189–93, 195
McMichael, Philip, 14, 40, 43, 58, 71, 77, 79, 130, 186, 191, 193, 240, 243, 244, 245
Med Zehra, 96–7
Meric, Cemil, 34, 49–50
Merkez Bankasi, T.C., 131
Mernissi, Fatima, 152
Mert, Nuray, 123
MHP (National Action Party)
  coalition, 2, 4, 7
  and EU policy, 15
  and foreign investment, 16
  founder, 101
  Kemalist commitment, 5
  and Kurdish politics, 83
  Turkish-Islamic synthesis, 95, 98, 101, 103–4
militarism, 26, 76, 102
military
  and the AKP, 9, 167, 179, 181
  anti-Islamic campaigns, 89–90
  characteristics, 79
  coercive policies, 85
  and headscarf politics, 6, 172–3, 178, 226–7
  historical perspective, 103
  importance of Ottoman, 39–40
  and MUSIAD members, 117
  non-Muslim eligibility, 37, 44, 47
  opposition to Gul's election, 3
  political interventions, 3, 10, 77–81, 83–4, 86, 104, 169, 224, 237
  portrayal of Islam, 5
  recommendations, 87–8
  and TUSIAD members, 115
military authoritarianism, 71
military regime, emergency legislation, 86
Mill, John Stuart, 51
millet system
  autonomy, 37, 39
  clothing regulations, 145
  and *kadi* justice, 38
  modus operandi, 38
  structure, 37
milli his, 159
Milliyet, 171, 174, 181
modernity, Kemalist understanding of, 58–9
Modern Prince, The (Gramsci), 167
Moghadam, Valentine, 142
moral discipline, 76
moral embeddedness, 194
morality, Islam as source of, 125–6
moral regulation, 79–80, 130, 248
moral universalism, 193–4, 252
MP (Motherland Party), 105
MUSIAD (Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association), 16, 114, 116–20, 122, 133
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, 3, 58–60, 66–7, 155–9, 161
Mustafa Sabri Efendi, 152

Namik Kemal, 48, 50, 56, 97, 149, 153–4
Naqshbandi, 66, 95–6, 108, 122–6
national anthem, 158
national culture, state's preservation role, 93
national developmentalism, 8, 160, 245
nationalism, 3–5, 8, 12, 41–2, 53–4, 56, 58, 60, 62–6, 68, 72, 81, 93–9, 103–5, 182, 243
nationalist parties, 83
national view movement, 6–7, 10, 179

PROOF

neoliberalism
  democratization discourse, 22–6
  globalization discourse, 17–22
  Turkish Islam under, 104–6
neoliberal restructuring, distinguishing features, 22
Nezihe Muhiddin, 160–2
Nisvan'i Osmaniye Imdat Cemiyeti, 147
NSC (National Security Council), 80–1, 87–9, 104, 172, 178–9
NSC Decision Number 406, 87–8
NSP (National Salvation Party), 105
Nurcu cemaati, 65, 96, 108, 122–3, 125–6

Ocalan, Abdullah, 82, 86
'Ode to Joy' (Beethoven), 198–9
ontological insecurity, 77, 130
Origins of Totalitarianism, The (Arendt), 193, 248
OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), 117
Ottomanism, Turkism vs, 56
Ottoman liberalism
  articulation of, 43
  ideology, 36
  Meric's definition, 34
  reasons for adoption of, 35–6
Ozal, Turgut, 95, 105, 173, 177
Ozbudun, Ergun, 4, 180–2
Ozgur-Der, 168, 185

Pamuk, Orhan, 34, 56–7
paradox of liberty, Mill's, 51, 67
pardosu, definition, 138
pedagogies of persuasion, 139
PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party), 5, 82, 88, 90–1
Polanyi, Karl, 17, 19–20, 241
poverty, 109, 132–3, 161
privatization, 1, 16, 18–23, 79, 109, 112–13, 115, 133
public ethos of engagement, 33, 164

Radikal, 16, 90, 170, 180–1
Ramadan, Tariq, 128
Ramazanoglu, Yildiz, 175, 188
reciprocity, 38, 110, 133–4, 252
regime of fear, 84, 86, 97
religious education, state role, 93
Republic of Turkey, founding, 58
respect, 193, 225–6
risk, 225, 229, 252
Rosenberg, Justin, 60, 79, 240

Sabanci Holding, 114
Sabel, Charles, 53, 83, 90
Sabri Efendi, 150–4
Sahin, Leyla, 183, 187, 195
Said, Edward, 11
Said Nursi, 65, 96, 125–7
sapka kanunu, 61, 157
Sassen, Saskia, 12, 41, 240, 243, 251
Schimmel, Annemarie, 124
Scott, David, 119, 165, 167
secularity, Taylor's perspective, 201, 203–4
Self-determination, 193, 195–6, 241
Sennett, Richard, 226
September 11 terrorist attacks, 195, 220
seriat, 37
Sharia law, 125
Sheikh Said Revolt, 65–6
Sinasi, 48
six arrows, 58, 181–2
slow-motion military coup, 169
Smith, Adam, 107, 130, 248
Smith, Dorothy, 204
social change
  and the headscarf ban, 166
  importance of cultural pluralism, 119
  and the Islamic dress code, 142, 154, 159
  MUSIAD's support, 118
  Ottoman programme of, 41–2
  post-coup programme, 75
  Tanzimat model, 45, 52–3
  Turkey's path to, 26, 49
social engineering, 19, 59, 72–4, 76, 79, 118, 134, 154, 160, 249
social fascism, 70, 76–7, 91, 247
soft coup, 78, 88, 115, 117, 121, 177–9, 195
Somers, Margaret, 18, 19, 20, 21, 26, 43, 92, 107, 166, 247, 248

PROOF

sovereignty
  Ong's interpretation of Schmitt's definition, 79
  principle of, 60, 247
  state-led refiguring of the ethos of, 91, 97
state capacity, Tilly's definition, 224
state centrism, 240, 249
state feminism, 136, 137, 139, 141, 143, 145, 147, 149, 151, 153, 155, 157, 159–61, 163
state law, Ottoman, 37–8
state power, reassertion of, 77
state regulation, 62, 79, 94, 115, 145
state sovereignty, Islamic groups and, 135–6
Stein, Janice, 221
structural adjustment programme, World Bank-imposed, 76
substantive autonomy, 38–9, 42, 44, 59, 136
Sumerians, 67
sun-language theory, 67, 95
Susurluk incident, 90–1
swaraj, 94
symbolic class, 13, 168
Szelenyi, Ivan, 8, 49, 72, 74–5, 123
Sztompka, Piotr, 229

Tanzimat
  and European universalism, 45–8
  Gokalp's opposition, 55
  and Islamic dress code, 146, 149
  overview, 43, 45
  purpose and aims, 242, 245
  Young Ottomans' perspective, 49–50
Taylor, Charles, 28, 154–5, 160, 164, 201–4, 215, 217, 240, 243
techno-scientific universality, 74
territorialism, 39
third sense of secularity, 202–3
'Third Way', 25, 109
TIHV (Turkish Human Rights Foundation), 189–90
TIKKO (Turkish Workers and Peasants' Liberation Army), 90
Tilly, Charles, 25, 39, 43, 221, 237
Today's Zaman, 4, 90–1
Topbas, Mustafa, 95
Topkapi Palace, 48
transformative resistance, 166, 168, 203, 248
True Path Party (*Dogru Yol*), 175, 179
trust
  AKP's emphasis on, 110–11, 119
  and headscarf politics, 225–7, 229, 231, 236
  as point of reference, 126
  and reciprocity, 133, 135
  social-symbolic, 214, 216
trust networks, 122–3, 132–3, 225
trustworthiness, 132, 223, 228–9, 252
Tuksal, Hidayet Sefkatli, 142, 184
TUPRAS, 112
turban
  vs *basortusu*, 141, 173–4, 202–3, 226–36
  definition, 141
  political perspective, 174, 231
  and presidential elections, 3–4
  see also basortusu; headscarf
turbanli, 174, 210, 227–8, 231, 236
Turkculuk, 54, 56, 101, 103
Turkes, Alpaslan, 101–3, 139
Turkification, 54–5
Turk Inkilap Tarihi Enstitusu, 157
Turk Insan Haklari Vakfi, 189
Turkish Armed Forces, 4–5, 80, 86, 88–9
Turkish capital, realignment of, 113
Turkish Historical Society, 67
Turkish History Thesis, 67, 95, 102
Turkish-Islamic nationalism, 97
Turkish-Islamic synthesis, 91, 95–8
Turkish Linguistic Society, 67
Turkish Religion Fund, 121
Turkish War of Independence, 64
Turkish Women's Union Association, 138, 160–2
Turkism, vs Ottomanism, 56
Basbakanlik Turkiye Istatistik Kurumu, T.C., 131
Turkiye Ulusal Programi 2008, 111, 113
Turklesmek, Islamlasmak, and *Muasirlasmak*, 54, 106
Turk Ocagi, 101
Turkone, Mumtazer, 53, 83, 90

PROOF

Turk Ulkusu (Atsiz), 102
TUSIAD (Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association), 16, 112, 114–17, 120, 122

UDHR (Universal Declaration of Human Rights), 191–2, 221
ULKER Group, 121
Ulkucu Genclik, 95, 101
Ulkuculer, 56, 101
Ulku Ocaklari, 101, 103–4
Umrandan Uygarliga (Meric), 49
unemployment, 73, 109, 131–3
unequally endowed groups, 33, 108, 249
universality, Zižek's argument, 11, 13
upward social mobility, 120, 188
Uskup, Zafer, 181–2

van der Pijl, Kees, 10, 11, 14, 15, 249
vasudhaiva kutumbakam, 194
vatan, 97–9
veiling
  anti-Western symbolism, 143
  Egyptian model, 142, 177
  Iranian model, 142, 177
  see also basortusu; headscarf; *turban*
Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi*), 179

Wallerstein, Immanuel, 11, 35
war of position, 107–8, 123, 249
Weber, Max, 106, 134
western modernity, Kemalist pursuit, 59
wigs, 172, 175, 207, 209–10, 215
women's associations, 160, 162, 184
women's Islamic clothing
  anti-Western symbolism, 143
  in Fatma Aliye Hanim's writings, 146–50
  garment types, 137–8
  historical perspective, 144, 146
  Ismail Hakki Izmirli's arguments, 152–4
  Kemalist perspective, 137, 139, 154–60
  as moral metaphor, 154–5
  Musa Kazim's reasoning, 150–1
  Ottoman state regulations, 145
  and piety, 139, 140, 174
  political significance, 142
  Sabri Efendi's argument, 151
  and women's agency, 142, 143–4
  and women's associations, 160, 162, 184
  see also basortusu; *carsaf*; headscarf; *turban*
Women's magazines, 146–7
Women's Union Association, 161
WONDER (students' association), 187–8
Wood, M. Ellen, 20
Woods, Ngaire, 245
World Bank, 13, 75–6, 111, 119, 122, 245
WP (Welfare Party), 88, 167, 179, 183–4
WPP (Women's People's Party), 160–1
Wretched of the Earth (Fanon), 100

Yalcinkaya, Abdurrahman, 5
yasmak, 146
YIMPAS (holding company), 121
YOK (Council of Higher Education), 87, 89, 171–4, 176–8, 188, 231
Young Kurds, 64
Young Ottomans, 48–54, 56, 58, 97, 106
Young Turks, 53–4, 56, 59, 67, 106

Zižek, Slavoj, 11, 13, 198–9
Zolberg, R. Aristide, 42