Aristotle argues that the highest good is happiness, because it is the ultimate end – an end in itself and not a means of achieving some other end. But what is happiness? To get a clearer idea he focuses on the ‘functions’ of a human being on the grounds that if we could identify this then happiness could be defined as achieving this function to the best of our abilities. In the following passage he develops his argument. Break the argument down, showing how Aristotle develops it from one point to the next. Then critically assess it: are there assumptions in his argument that you believe cannot be sustained?
‘But no doubt people will say, “To call happiness the highest good is a truism. We want a more distinct account of what it is.” We might arrive at this if we could grasp what is meant by the “function” of a human being. If we take a flautist or a sculptor or any craftsman – in fact any class of men at all who have some special job or profession – we find that his special talent and excellence comes out in that job, and this is his function. The same thing will be true of man simply as man – that is of course if “man” does have a function. But is it likely that joiners and shoemakers have certain functions or specialized activities, while man as such has none but has been left by Nature a functionless being? Seeing that eye and hand and foot and every one of our members has some obvious function, must we not believe that in like manner a human being has a function over and above these particular functions? Then what exactly is it? The mere act of living is not peculiar to man – we find it even in the vegetable kingdom – and what we are looking for is something peculiar to him. We must therefore exclude from our definition the life that manifests itself in mere nurture and growth. A step higher should come the life that is confined to experiencing sensations. But that we see is shared by horses, cows, and the brute creation as a whole. We are left, then, with a life concerning which we can make two statements. First, it belongs to the rational part of man. Secondly, it finds expression in actions. The rational part may be either active or passive: passive in so far as it follows the dictates of reason, active in so far as it possesses and exercises the power of reasoning…Now let us assume for the moment the truth of the following propositions. (a) the function of a man is the exercise of his non-corporeal faculties or “soul” in principle. (b) The function of an individual and of a good individual in the same class – a harp player, for example, and a good harp player, and so through the classes – is generically the same, except that we must add superiority in accomplishment to the function, the function of the harp player being merely to play on the harp, while the function of the good harp player is to play on it well. (c) The function of man is a certain form of life, namely an activity of the soul exercised in combination with a rational principle or reasonable ground of action. (d) The function of a good man is to exert such activity well. (e) A function is performed well when performed in accordance with the excellence proper to it. – If these assumptions are granted, we conclude that the good for man is “an activity of soul in accordance with goodness” or (on the supposition that there may be more than one form of goodness) “in accordance with the best and most complete form of goodness.”’
Taken from:
Thomson, J.A.K. (trans). The Ethics of Aristotle (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1956), pp. 37-9.