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Update 4 (March 2005):

Rapprochement and Realism: 
Europe and the USA 

When Colin Powell was replaced as US Secretary of State by President Bush's National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, many European commentators feared the worst. Dr Rice was seen as a 'neo-Conservative'. Neo-conservatives do more than think the US should act in its own best interests - a 'realist' position that may sometimes mean unilateral action but can also encompass multilateralism, as well as the willingness to work with unpalatable overseas governments). They also think that those interests are best served by maintaining a permanent campaign to remove and democratize those regimes perceived as a direct or indirect threat, notwithstanding the views of 'the international community' or even the constraints of international law as commonly (or at least traditionally) understood. Dr Rice was also infamous for her recommendation that, in the aftermath of the Iraq war, the US should 'forgive Russia, ignore Germany and punish France'.

However, no sooner had Dr Rice taken up her post than she was off to Europe (indeed, France of all places!) on what was widely interpreted as something of a charm offensive designed to mend fences with 'old Europe' - something made easier perhaps by the realisation among initially sceptical European politicians that the January 2005 elections in Iraq had gone surprisingly well and that prospects for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process were looking up.

Yet, although the 'mood music' was much improved by Rice's visit (the focus should shift, she suggested from 'our old disagreements' to 'our new achievements'), her keynote speech at the prestigious Sciences-Po in Paris provided little tangible evidence that the US intends to row back from what some have called the neo-conservative 'transformational diplomacy, first signalled by President Bush's second inaugural speech and restated by him on his own sweep through Europe in February 2005. Certainly, the hint of obligation inherent in Dr Rice's assurances that 'America stands ready to work with Europe on our common agenda and Europe must stand ready to work with America' concerned those who feel that no such agenda actually exists or else will take a lot of work.

Some signs look good. The supposed scourge of 'old Europe', US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, attended (also in France!) an informal meeting of his NATO counterparts in February 2005, at which European states promised more active involvement in its mission in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the US gave up its attempts to prevent Europe lifting its embargo on arms sales to China - something Washington felt might increase the threat to its Asian ally, Taiwan at the same time as boosting US firms' European defence competitors. Possibly as some kind of indirect quid pro quo, those European states most involved in the attempt to contain nuclear development in Iran by peaceful means, namely France, Germany and the UK, seemed to harden their stance, suggesting to many that Europe and the US are prepared to work together as 'good cop' and 'bad cop' on the issue.

Yet the underlying tensions in the relationship remain. These relate not only to the question of how to deal with so-called 'rogue states', but also on the much more nitty-gritty issues of trade and global warming. Indeed, European environmentalists were shocked when, at the beginning of 2005, the European Commission announced its reluctance to set targets for greenhouse gas reductions once the first stage of the Kyoto protocol is completed in 2012 - presumably because European governments are tiring of making the running on the issue when other countries (most notably of course the US) seem content to do so little.

And of course, there is Russia. While the US did send clear signals to Moscow over what seemed to be the stealing of the election in Ukraine by the pro-Russian presidential candidate, it was clear that the main pressure for a re-run came from Europe itself. Particularly interesting was the active role played by an EU strengthened, of course, by governments of Central and Eastern European countries that were formally part of the Soviet bloc. While anxious to maintain good relations with Russia, such governments are equally determined to ensure that Europe's necessary tolerance of its potentially powerful neighbour does not allow it carte blanche.

Ultimately, however, the presumption must be that the US - underneath Dr Rice's rhetoric about the need to move beyond 'a partnership based on common threats' toward a focus on 'common opportunities beyond the transatlantic community' - still shares that view. Why else, some ask, would it maintain what one assessment claims are as many as 480 nuclear weapons in Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, the UK and Germany?

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