Contemporary British Politics 4th Edition
By Bill Coxall, Lynton Robins, Robert Leach

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The 2005 General Election
by Robert Leach

On 5th May, 2005 the British people went to the polls to elect 646 Members of Parliament at Westminster, and effectively to determine which party should govern Britain for the next four or five years. The outcome was a third successive victory for Blair's Labour Party, but with a much reduced majority. Both the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats made gains at Labour's expense (see table 1).

Table 1 The result of the 2005 General Election

Party	% votes	Number of seats*	% seats
Labour	35.2	356	55
Conservative	32.3	197	30
Liberal Democrats	22.0	62	10
Others**	10.5	30**	5

* The results in 645 seats were declared in May 2005. The poll in Staffordshire South was postponed following the death of one of the candidates in the campaign. (It has since been retained by the Conservatives).
**Those parties that won seats include Northern Ireland parties (18), SNP (6), Plaid Cymru (3), Respect (1), Independents (2)

Labour managed to win 55% of the seats at Westminster and a comfortable overall majority on just 35% of the vote. Of the other parties, the Conservatives gained 30% of the seats on 32% of the vote, while the Liberal Democrats won less than on tenth of the seats on 22% of the vote. Some of the other parties whose strength was concentrated in particular parts of the United Kingdom, such as the nationalist parties, did reasonably well in terms of representation. Other parties like the Greens, the UK Independence Party or the British National Party, whose support was more dispersed, elected no MPs. There is obviously a markedly disproportionate relationship between votes cast and seats won in 2005.

Although some might argue that the case for electoral reform is now stronger following the election of government with a clear majority on just 35% of the vote, the immediate prospects for significant change seem weaker. There are Labour MPs who still favour a more proportionate system, but the majority fear that it would ensure that a majority Labour government would never hold office again. The Conservatives, the main beneficiaries of the first past the post system for most of the 20th century, have been most hostile to reform. (Ironically, they have benefited most from the introduction of the Additional Member System in Scotland and Wales). Yet they still hope to be able to form a majority government at Westminster in the future. Thus the big two retain a vested interest in the existing system. The situation might change in the Liberal Democrats held the balance of power in the House of Commons and made electoral reform a condition of their participation in a coalition government. 


Electoral swings in 2005

The 2005 election confirms the general point that swings are becoming less uniform. In 2005 the average swing from Labour to Conservative of around 3% masked huge variations. Thus there was an 8.7% swing from Labour to Conservative in Enfield Southgate, but some seats registered a small swing to Labour. The statistical swing to the Conservatives masks the point that overall the Conservative vote scarcely increased from 2001. The 'swing' to the Conservatives was a result of the fall in the Labour vote. Some former voters clearly switched to the Liberal Democrats or other parties. There were also some massive swings from Labour to the Liberal Democrats, particularly in seats with a large student population and/or a substantial Muslim population - 21% in Nottingham East, 20.1% in Birmingham Ladywood, 17.3% in Manchester Withington (where the Iraq war and student top-up fees may have been important issues). Overall, however, the anti-Labour swing was larger in and around London than in the rest of Britain.


Factors influencing voters - class and ethnicity

There was a swing to the Conservatives among all social classes, but this was more marked among the working classes than the middle classes, further reducing the association between support for parties and social class. 

Table 2 Voting by social class 2005

	AB	C1	C2	DE
Labour	28	32	40	48
Conservative	37	36	33	25
Liberal Democrat	29	23	19	18
Other	6	9	8	9

(Source: MORI poll, reported in The Observer 8/5/2005).

Table 2 indicates that there is still a correlation between social class and voting. The proportion of votes for Labour still increases, while the Conservative vote decreases, the further one moves down the social scale. Yet the correlation is markedly weaker than it was. The 'AB's, the managerial and professional classes, split three ways with the Conservatives having only a single figure lead over the other two parties. Among 'C1's, white collar workers, the Conservatives have regained a narrow lead (4%) over Labour, and among skilled workers ('C2's) they are again narrowing the gap. Only among the Ds and Es does Labour retain a strong lead. Support for the Liberal Democrats varied substantially less by class than among the two leading parties, although they did rather better among the middle classes. 

The ethnic minority vote has always been substantially for Labour. How far has this changed following the 2005 election? Perhaps not much for Afro-Caribbeans and non-Muslim Asians, although it is clear that the Muslim vote has become much more unpredictable and fragmented. Many older Muslims, particularly those who have become actively involved with Labour, have remained with the party. Indeed 4 Muslim MPs were elected in 2005, all for Labour, twice the number in the previous Parliament. On the other hand it is clear that some younger Muslims have been alienated by the Labour government's war in Iraq, and many clearly deserted Labour MPs who supported the war. The most dramatic example was the defeat of Labour's Oona King, herself the black daughter of an American civil rights leader, at the hands of George Galloway, standing for Respect (after his expulsion from the Labour Party) in Bethnal Green and Bow. By contrast, some Labour MPs fighting seats with a substantial Muslim electorate but who voted against the war, like Ann Cryer in Keighley, survived comfortably. However the pattern is confusing. Clare Short, who resigned from the Cabinet over the Iraq war, had a huge swing against her in Birmingham Ladywood. It will take some time for the complex changes in voting in 2005 among ethnic minorities in general and Muslims in particular to be fully analysed.


Electoral issues

The economy was Labour's trump card in 2005. Brown's established reputation as a prudent and successful manager of the economy drowned out warnings of underlying economic problems and troubles on the horizon. 

It is worth noting that most analysis of voting focuses on the electorate as a whole, understandably, because it is how the mass of voters behave that determines the outcome of elections. Yet particular sections of the electorate may be strongly influenced in their choice of parties by issues that matter to them, and this can make a critical difference in individual constituencies. Thus polls indicated that Iraq was well down the list of most voters concerns in 2005 (14th on one assessment), yet it clearly was the decisive influence in some constituencies with a substantial Muslim population. Similarly, the huge swings from Labour to the Liberal Democrats in constituencies with a large student population seems to reflect opposition to both top-up fees and perhaps the Iraq war also. The issue of immigration and asylum seekers clearly exercised voters in some constituencies, as indicated by the BNP vote, even if the strong Conservative focus on immigration may have alienated many floating voters. More questionably, hunting, an issue that barely surfaced in the 2005 campaign as a whole, mattered rather more in some rural constituencies. There are even (admittedly very rare) occasions when voters were prepared to reject all the main parties over a particular local issue, such as concerns over the Kidderminister hospital in the Wyre Forest constituency in 2001 and again in 2005. Thus voters can show a healthy disregard for scientific forecasts of their behaviour based on the most sophisticated statistical analysis.


Electoral trends: the decline of the two-party system

Fewer people today identify strongly with political parties. As party loyalties have weakened so electoral volatility has increased. More voters are prepared to switch to another party or decide not to vote at all. There has been a more or less steady decline in the percentage of the total vote won in general elections by the Conservative and Labour parties. For example, in 1951 nearly 97 per cent of voters supported either Labour or Conservative. After touching a low point of 72 per cent in 1983, the percentage rose to 78 per cent in 1992, and fell back to 74 per cent in 1997 and 75 per cent in 2001. The combined two party vote reached its lowest level in 2005 - under 68%.

The corollary of the decline in support for the two major parties has been growth in support for the Liberal Democrats, and for other parties, most notably the nationalists. Even with the existing first past the post system which penalises third and smaller parties, particularly those whose support is relatively dispersed, three party politics has clearly arrived in Britain, symbolised by the new three party graphics used by Peter Snow in BBC television coverage of the 2005 election to supplement the old two party 'swingometer.' The Liberal Democrats more than doubled their seats in 1997 and have made further advances in 2001 and 2005. In the earlier elections their advance was largely at the expense of the Conservatives, although in 2005 nearly all their gains came from Labour. They look set to establish themselves as a permanent and sizeable third force at Westminster. 


Tactical voting?

More complex patterns of tactical voting appear to have taken place in 2005, and Labour was no longer the main beneficiary. Several internet sites advised on tactical voting in various interests. Paid newspaper advertisements suggested how those opposed to the Iraq war might reward or punish particular MPs and parties. Liberal Democrats in some areas clearly benefited from former Labour voters switching to them over the war. Yet in constituencies where the Liberal Democrats were challenging Conservatives there was a continued squeeze on the Labour vote regardless of candidates' stands on the war, indicating that many normally Labour supporters were still prepared to 'lend' their votes to the Liberal Democrats to defeat the Tories.

Before the 2005 election result was declared some observers commented that what voters really seemed to want was a Labour government with a smaller majority, to 'send a message' to Blair, but this option was not on the ballot paper. Yet this was what the election achieved, so somehow the electorate had secured the result most of them wanted. This would appear to have happened more by accident than design, but it does seem that some voters at least are more prepared to use their votes with more rational calculation than commentators would give them credit for. Perhaps this is not so surprising. Voters adapt their behaviour to the rules of the game (as Scottish voters in particular have shown with the Additional Member System). If the first past the post system is retained for Westminster elections, tactical voting will continue to thrive. 


The future

Labour's third election win in succession in 2005 was unprecedented, even if it involved a substantial reduction in their previous huge majority. Labour has never before managed to govern for two whole terms, let along three. It could be that Labour has replaced the Conservatives as the natural party of government, set to dominate the politics of 21st century Britain as the Tories dominated the 20th century. Those who consider that Blair had become a liability to his party assume that his replacement (presumably Gordon Brown) will restore the party's fortunes and enable it secure a fourth term, and perhaps an even longer period of political hegemony. 

An alternative scenario suggests that 2005 marks for the Conservatives an equivalent advance to that secured by Labour in 1992, enough to provide a springboard for victory in 2009, say, when a rejuvenated party with a new leader will be well-paced to profit from increased disillusion with Labour. Independent forecasters suggest that Labour's trump card, the economy, may no longer look so impressive in four of five years, particularly if there is prolonged decline in consumer confidence and/or a world recession. A boundary review will inevitably remove some of the in-built Labour associated with current constituency boundaries, and benefit the Conservatives. Thus the political pendulum could swing again. Yet the Conservative share of the vote barely increased in 2005, and they have a long way to go to win enough seats to form a majority government.

The Liberal Democrats still have much further to go if they are to mount an effective challenge to the big two, and break through to become a potential party of government. The 2005 election, with its gains from Labour, present the party with both an opportunity and a dilemma. Until the 2005 election it seemed that the only real prospect for Liberal Democrat advance would be at the expense of the Conservatives, in almost tacit alliance with Labour. Now they have the opportunity to advance on two fronts at the expense of both the other parties. Yet in seeking to do this they may have an image or identity problem. If they pursue the apparent opening to the left, and seek to outflank Labour, they may alienate the voters they have patiently won from the Tories, and risk losing rural and suburban seats to a reviving Conservative party. They may also antagonise Labour supporters, to the extent that these become far less willing to vote tactically for Liberal Democrats as the occasion demands. Behind such tactical considerations, there are ideological divisions within the party that further complicate the debate over the party's future direction (see chapter 6). At some stage or other it is more than possible that the Liberal Democrats will be faced with a more immediate dilemma, what to do if they hold the balance in a hung Parliament. In Scotland they have opted for coalition with Labour. Such a 'progressive alliance' may still seem the more likely outcome if there is a hung House of Commons, but whatever is decided will profoundly affect how voters perceive them thenceforward.