CHAPTER TWELVE: INTEREST GROUPS

12.1 The role of interest groups in liberal democracies: for and against but inevitable anyway (pp. 227-28).

12.2 Classifying interest groups: power of protective groups. Growing influence of promotional groups, especially in USA. Peak associations as federations of protective groups Corporatism as state co-ordination of a hierarchy of groups in highly-organised societies. The decay of corporatism (pp. 228-30).

12.3 Pluralism as a model of state-society relations. Pluralism as rule by the many and the absence of a governing elite. The state as a referee of group competition. The American example. Implications for ideas of majority rule. Critique of pluralism (pp. 231-33).

12.4 From iron triangles (sub-governments) to issue networks (policy communities): who knows what, not just who knows whom (pp. 233-34).

12.5 Channels of influence: direct discussion with the executive, bureaucracy, legislature and courts. Importance of class action suits for the latter. Indirect influence through political parties and, especially for promotional groups, public opinion. Lobbying and its limits (pp. 234-40).

12.6 Conditions of influence: legitimacy, membership (both size and density), resources and sanctions, political more than financial (pp. 240-41).

12.7 Interest groups in authoritarian states: leaders seek either to suppress or to incorporate organised groups, especially unions. Decay of corporate solution in countries such as Mexico. Some limited expression of group interests in later communism, including China (pp. 241-43).

12.8 Illiberal democracies: some orthodox representation for interests in non-controversial areas but political factors override in key sectors. Economic control as a source of patronage for the president. Personalized relationships discourage institutionalization of groups (divide and rule). The politics of ethnicity rather than interests. Weaknesses of civil society in Russia and discouragement of overseas-funded NGOs (pp. 243-45).

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