Is is possible to make sense of moral praise and blame when a person's life is a tangled web of factors outside of his control? Cases of moral luck bring to the forefront the perplexing idea that we can be held responsible for what is, essentially, a matter of chance. This book offers a systematic and in-depth account of two major normative theories and their responses to the possibility of moral luck. Aristotle attempts to recognize the vulnerability of the good life and reconcile morality with luck, whereas the Kantian ambition is to make morality immune to luck while maintaining a plausible understanding of human nature. Using the questions raised by the problem of moral luck, this book critically assesses the most recent developments by virtue ethicists and neo-Kantians, and examines how these different theories understand concepts such as 'character' and 'virtue'.
'... [a] subtle and systematic exploration of the concept of moral luck and the important challenges it raises... [her] insightful, constructive readings of Aristotle, the Stoics, and Kant uncover points of departure as well as common ground between these important thinkers in the history of ethics.' - Dr Anne Margaret Baxley, Department of Philosophy, Virginia Tech, Virginia, USA
Acknowledgements
Abbreviations, Sources and Translations
Introduction
PART 1: MORAL LUCK
Introduction
Luck
Moral Luck: Examples
Moral Luck: A Definition?
Conclusion
A Note on Style
PART 2: ARISTOTLE ON CONSTITUTIVE LUCK
Preliminaries
Constitutive Luck
The Case of Bill Budd and Claggart
Natural Tendencies and Cultivated Dispositions
Conclusion
PART 3: ARISTOTLE ON DEVELOPMENTAL, SITUATIONAL AND RESULTANT LUCK
Introduction
The Case of Askolnikov
Developmental, Situational and Resultant Luck
Conclusion
PART 4: ARISTOTLE AND REASON
Introduction
Immunity to Luck
Reason
Choice and Voluntary
Conclusion
PART 5: THE STOICS
Introduction
On the Passions and the Self-sufficiency of the Moral Life
On Nature and Fatalism
A Solution to the Problem of Moral Luck?
Conclusion
PART 6: KANT ON LUCK
Introduction
Kantian Immunity from Luck
The Intelligible World
Interpreting Kant on the Intelligible/Sensible Distinction
PART 7: KANT ON VIRTUE
Kantian Virtue
Habit and Moral Examples
The Doctrine of the Mean
Virtue, Vice and Weakness of Will
The Role of Inclinations
Kantian Character
Conclusion
PART 8: VIRTUE ETHICS AND NEO-KANTIANS: SLOTE, HURSTHOUSE AND HERMAN
Introduction
Virtue Ethics
Slote
Slote on Luck
Critique of Slote
Hursthouse
Hursthouse on Luck
Hursthouse on Reason
Modern Kantian Ethics: Herman
Critique of Herman
Conclusion
PART 9: CONCLUSION
Moral Luck
From Aristotle or Kant to Aristotle and Kant
Two Pictures of Human Life
A Further Distinction
Responsibility
Conclusion
Bibliography
NAFSIKA ATHANASSOULIS is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Leeds, UK, where she teaches moral and practical philosophy. Her research interests include the problem of moral luck, virtue ethics, Aristotle and Kant. She has published in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Res Publica and is Editor of a forthcoming volume on medical ethics.
Description
Is is possible to make sense of moral praise and blame when a person's life is a tangled web of factors outside of his control? Cases of moral luck bring to the forefront the perplexing idea that we can be held responsible for what is, essentially, a matter of chance. This book offers a systematic and in-depth account of two major normative theories and their responses to the possibility of moral luck. Aristotle attempts to recognize the vulnerability of the good life and reconcile morality with luck, whereas the Kantian ambition is to make morality immune to luck while maintaining a plausible understanding of human nature. Using the questions raised by the problem of moral luck, this book critically assesses the most recent developments by virtue ethicists and neo-Kantians, and examines how these different theories understand concepts such as 'character' and 'virtue'.
Reviews
'... [a] subtle and systematic exploration of the concept of moral luck and the important challenges it raises... [her] insightful, constructive readings of Aristotle, the Stoics, and Kant uncover points of departure as well as common ground between these important thinkers in the history of ethics.' - Dr Anne Margaret Baxley, Department of Philosophy, Virginia Tech, Virginia, USA
Contents
Acknowledgements
Abbreviations, Sources and Translations
Introduction
PART 1: MORAL LUCK
Introduction
Luck
Moral Luck: Examples
Moral Luck: A Definition?
Conclusion
A Note on Style
PART 2: ARISTOTLE ON CONSTITUTIVE LUCK
Preliminaries
Constitutive Luck
The Case of Bill Budd and Claggart
Natural Tendencies and Cultivated Dispositions
Conclusion
PART 3: ARISTOTLE ON DEVELOPMENTAL, SITUATIONAL AND RESULTANT LUCK
Introduction
The Case of Askolnikov
Developmental, Situational and Resultant Luck
Conclusion
PART 4: ARISTOTLE AND REASON
Introduction
Immunity to Luck
Reason
Choice and Voluntary
Conclusion
PART 5: THE STOICS
Introduction
On the Passions and the Self-sufficiency of the Moral Life
On Nature and Fatalism
A Solution to the Problem of Moral Luck?
Conclusion
PART 6: KANT ON LUCK
Introduction
Kantian Immunity from Luck
The Intelligible World
Interpreting Kant on the Intelligible/Sensible Distinction
PART 7: KANT ON VIRTUE
Kantian Virtue
Habit and Moral Examples
The Doctrine of the Mean
Virtue, Vice and Weakness of Will
The Role of Inclinations
Kantian Character
Conclusion
PART 8: VIRTUE ETHICS AND NEO-KANTIANS: SLOTE, HURSTHOUSE AND HERMAN
Introduction
Virtue Ethics
Slote
Slote on Luck
Critique of Slote
Hursthouse
Hursthouse on Luck
Hursthouse on Reason
Modern Kantian Ethics: Herman
Critique of Herman
Conclusion
PART 9: CONCLUSION
Moral Luck
From Aristotle or Kant to Aristotle and Kant
Two Pictures of Human Life
A Further Distinction
Responsibility
Conclusion
Bibliography
Authors
NAFSIKA ATHANASSOULIS is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Leeds, UK, where she teaches moral and practical philosophy. Her research interests include the problem of moral luck, virtue ethics, Aristotle and Kant. She has published in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Res Publica and is Editor of a forthcoming volume on medical ethics.
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