In order to end armed conflict, and ensure that it does not recur, numerous tactics are used by national governments, the international community, and others engaged in conflict resolution. These tactics include amnesties, financial rewards, offers of inclusion in structures of power, and threats of reprisal and use of force, among myriad others. There is a thriving debate in the literature regarding the appropriate tactics and incentives for peace negotiations, as well as the peacebuilding processes promoted by the international community. This book critically analyzes one key set of negotiation incentives used in peace agreements: inclusion of armed groups in structures of power. Though I loosely term these incentives as 'power-sharing', they are much broader than traditional power-sharing, and rely on explicit institutionalization of the state and the use of state institutions. These negotiation incentives can involve inclusion of previously excluded or outlawed groups as legitimate political parties, sharing of resources with such groups, inclusion of former combatants in reformed military or police forces, and offers of partial or complete autonomy. This approach is largely used to bring non-state armed groups into negotiations, rather than as leverage on governments themselves. The book, drawing upon studies in Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Colombia, demonstrates the limitations and even dangers of using such strategies.
'A thoughtful and well-designed study of a vitally important issue in building a peace after civil war. Should armed groups be included in the postwar settlement and share power? Chandra Sriram explores this challenging question with in-depth case studies of the conflicts in Sri Lanka, Sudan and Colombia. Every specialist and every practitioner would benefit from reading her cautionary words.' - Michael W. Doyle, Harold Brown Professor of International Affairs, Law and Political Science, Columbia University, and co-author of Making War and Building Peace
Introduction: The Promise and Limits of Governance Incentives
Conflict Resolution: Power-Sharing and Other Inclusion Strategies
Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution in Practice
Sri Lanka: The Repeated Failure of Inclusion Incentives
Sudan: The Dangerous Collateral Effects of Inclusion Incentives
Colombia: The Limited Appeal of Inclusion Incentives
Conclusion: The Need for More Nuanced Governance Incentives
CHANDRA LEKHA SRIRAM is Professor of Human Rights at the University of East London, UK. She has previously taught at the University of St. Andrews and the University of Maryland, and worked at the International Peace Academy. She is author of various books and journal articles on international relations, international law, human rights and conflict prevention and peacebuilding. She founded the Centre on Human Rights in Conflict, an interdisciplinary research centre, in 2006.
Description
In order to end armed conflict, and ensure that it does not recur, numerous tactics are used by national governments, the international community, and others engaged in conflict resolution. These tactics include amnesties, financial rewards, offers of inclusion in structures of power, and threats of reprisal and use of force, among myriad others. There is a thriving debate in the literature regarding the appropriate tactics and incentives for peace negotiations, as well as the peacebuilding processes promoted by the international community. This book critically analyzes one key set of negotiation incentives used in peace agreements: inclusion of armed groups in structures of power. Though I loosely term these incentives as 'power-sharing', they are much broader than traditional power-sharing, and rely on explicit institutionalization of the state and the use of state institutions. These negotiation incentives can involve inclusion of previously excluded or outlawed groups as legitimate political parties, sharing of resources with such groups, inclusion of former combatants in reformed military or police forces, and offers of partial or complete autonomy. This approach is largely used to bring non-state armed groups into negotiations, rather than as leverage on governments themselves. The book, drawing upon studies in Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Colombia, demonstrates the limitations and even dangers of using such strategies.
Reviews
'A thoughtful and well-designed study of a vitally important issue in building a peace after civil war. Should armed groups be included in the postwar settlement and share power? Chandra Sriram explores this challenging question with in-depth case studies of the conflicts in Sri Lanka, Sudan and Colombia. Every specialist and every practitioner would benefit from reading her cautionary words.' - Michael W. Doyle, Harold Brown Professor of International Affairs, Law and Political Science, Columbia University, and co-author of Making War and Building Peace
Contents
Introduction: The Promise and Limits of Governance Incentives
Conflict Resolution: Power-Sharing and Other Inclusion Strategies
Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution in Practice
Sri Lanka: The Repeated Failure of Inclusion Incentives
Sudan: The Dangerous Collateral Effects of Inclusion Incentives
Colombia: The Limited Appeal of Inclusion Incentives
Conclusion: The Need for More Nuanced Governance Incentives
Authors
CHANDRA LEKHA SRIRAM is Professor of Human Rights at the University of East London, UK. She has previously taught at the University of St. Andrews and the University of Maryland, and worked at the International Peace Academy. She is author of various books and journal articles on international relations, international law, human rights and conflict prevention and peacebuilding. She founded the Centre on Human Rights in Conflict, an interdisciplinary research centre, in 2006.
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