The Political Economy of International Tax Governance deals with an issue that has so far received little attention in the study of the international political economy: the fate of the 'power to tax', one of the key attributes of the modern nation state, in an era of globalization. It shows that tax sovereignty is shaped and constrained in important ways by the international tax regime.

The author presents a theory-driven empirical account of the establishment, institutional form and transformation of international tax governance, from the 1920s, when it was solely concerned with the avoidance of double taxation, up to the present era of international tax competition. The book opens up a new field of research for Political Scientists and Political Economists and offers experts in international taxation a fresh perspective on their subject. At the same time, it relates to current debates on international institutions and global governance.

Introduction
PART I. INTERNATIONAL TAX GOVERNANCE: THE ISSUES
Research Question and Approach
A Baseline Model of Tax Cooperation
PART II. THE EMPIRICAL RECORD OF GLOBAL TAX GOVERNANCE
The Institutional Setup of International Taxation
Eradicating the 'Evils of Double Taxation'
The Struggle against Under-Taxation
PART III. EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE AND DEVELOPMENT
Institutional Choice in the Avoidance of Double Taxation
Institutional Development in the Avoidance of Double Non-Taxation
Conclusion

Political scientist and economist THOMAS RIXEN is currently a research fellow at the Social Science Research Center Berlin, Germany. From 2003 to 2007 he was a research associate at the Collaborative Research Center, 'Transformations of the State', at Jacobs University Bremen. His research interests include (International) Political Economy, Public Finance and Institutional Theory.