This book is a systematic investigation into the metaphysical foundations of identity over time. The author elaborates and evaluates the most common theory about the persistence of objects through time and change, namely the classical theory of spatio-temporal continuity. He shows how the theory requires an ontology of temporal parts, according to which objects are made up of temporally extended segments or stages. This ontology is criticized as unwarranted by modern space-time physics, and as internally incoherent. The author argues that identity over time should be seen as a primitive or unanalysable phenomenon, and that the so-called puzzle cases and paradoxes of identity can be dealt with without recourse to such an ontology.

Acknowledgements
PART 1: CONTINUITY AS THE CRITERION OF IDENTITY OVER TIME: THE CLASSICAL THEORY OF CONTINUITY
Introduction: Criteria of Identity
Defining Spatio-temporal Continuity
Further Conditions on Continuity: Necessity and Sufficiency
A Note on Concept-responsiveness and Imaginary Cases
PART 2: CONTINUITY AS THE CRITERION OF IDENTITY OVER TIME:CONTINUITY WITHOUT STAGES?
A Basic Question About Continuity
A Via Media?
The Problem of Unity in Plurality: The Inadequacy of a Fregean or Quasi-Fregean Solution
Neutral Counting
The Epistemological Problem
The Ontological Problem
Consequences of the Above Problems
A Note on Personal Identity
PART 3: THE ONTOLOGY STAGES (BEING THE ORTHODOX/HUMEAN THEORY OF IDENTITY)
Preamble: Object-stages as Material Parts of Persistents
An Outline of the Theory of Object-stage (or Temporal Parts of Persistents)
Questions Concerning Individuation and Number
Problems of Predication and Translation
Summary of Discussion So Far
Some Objections Considered
Geometrical parts and the Circularity Objection
PART 4: THE MYTH OF CONTINUITY: WHAT'S WRONG WITH FOUR-DIMENSIONALISM?
Analogies Between Space and Time
The Idea of Four-dimensionalism
Space-time and World-lines
World-lines and Identity
Four-dimensionalism and Temporal Parts
An Ultimate View of Reality?
PART 5: THE MYTH OF CONTINUITY: A COHERENT ONTOLOGY?
Preamble
A Preliminary Diagnosis
The Problem of Translation
The Conceptual Inseparability of Temporal Parts and Life-histories
Further Objections From the Stage Theorist and Their Replies
The Confusion of Essence and Accident
Some Results of the Inquiry
PART 6: SOME PROBLEMS OF IDENTITY OVER TIME CONSIDERED
Preamble
The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics
An Intrinsic Fact?
Vague Identity?
PART 7: FISSION, INTERMITTENCE AND THE PRIMITIVENESS OF IDENTITY
Continuity and the Counter-examples
The Primitiveness of Personal Identity
Fission
Intermittent Existence
Conclusion
Notes and References
Bibliography
Index

DAVID S. ODERBERG is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Reading. He was previously a Lecturer at Trinity and University Colleges, Dublin, and completed his doctorate at Wolfson College, Oxford. He has published articles in philosophical logic and the philosophy of language.