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Rules-Based Fiscal Policy in Emerging Markets
Background, Analysis and Prospects
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Inspired by the experience of some advanced economies and to enhance creditworthiness, recently a number of emerging market economies adopted rules limiting government deficits, expenditures, or indebtedness. The volume consists of 15 chapters - written by distinguished policy analysts and academicians - that focus on the potential usefulness of fiscal rules for these economies and highlight their brief experience with rules. Grouped under three parts, all chapters have a practical orientation, though with conceptual grounding. The first part sets the stage for the rest of the volume with an analysis of fiscal policy under large macroeconomic volatility and high capital mobility, with close attention to political determinants. The second part examines design options at the national level, including on the basis of experience in Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela and Central Europe. The third part is devoted to design issues at the subnational level, focusing mainly on Argentina and India. In each part, lessons from advanced economies are discussed.
Overview of Fiscal Policy Rules in Emerging Markets; G.Kopits
PART I: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND MACROECONOMIC SETTING
Fiscal Rules from a Political Economy Perspective; A.Drazen
Good Debt Ratios, Bad Credit Ratings: The Role of Debt Structure; R.Hausmann
Can Fiscal Rules Help Reduce Macroeconomic Volatility?; G.Perry
Fiscal Policy and High Capital Mobility; G.Kopits
Fiscal Institutions Versus Political Will; A.Schick
PART II: DESIGN ISSUES AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL
EMU Fiscal Rules: What Can and Cannot Be Exported; M.Buti & G.Giudice
Fiscal Rules and Debt Sustainability in Brazil; I.Goldfajn & E.R.Guardia
Fiscal Rules in Mexico: Evolution and Prospects; A.Conesa, M.J.Schwartz, A.Somuano & J.A.Tijerina
Fiscal Rules on the Road to an Enlarged European Union; F.Coricelli & V.Ercolani
Fiscal Rules for Economies with Nonrenewable Resources: Norway and Venezuela; O.Bjerkholt & I.Niculescu
PART III: DESIGN ISSUES AT THE SUBNATIONAL LEVEL
Subnational Fiscal Rules: A Game Theoretic Approach; M.Braun & M.Tommasi
Rules-Based Adjustment in a Highly Decentralized Context: The Case of India; K.Kochhar & C.Purfield
Fiscal Rules for Subnational Governments: Lessons from the EMU; F.Balassone, D.Franco & S.Zotteri
Rules for Stabilizing Intergovernmental Transfers in Latin America; C.Y.Gonzalez, D.Rosenblatt & S.B.Webb
GEORGE KOPITS, Assistant Director of the fiscal affairs department at the International Monetary Fund, has provided technical advice on fiscal policy issues in Asia, Latin America and Europe. He has published and lectured extensively in this area. Previously he was with the US Treasury Department.
Description
Inspired by the experience of some advanced economies and to enhance creditworthiness, recently a number of emerging market economies adopted rules limiting government deficits, expenditures, or indebtedness. The volume consists of 15 chapters - written by distinguished policy analysts and academicians - that focus on the potential usefulness of fiscal rules for these economies and highlight their brief experience with rules. Grouped under three parts, all chapters have a practical orientation, though with conceptual grounding. The first part sets the stage for the rest of the volume with an analysis of fiscal policy under large macroeconomic volatility and high capital mobility, with close attention to political determinants. The second part examines design options at the national level, including on the basis of experience in Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela and Central Europe. The third part is devoted to design issues at the subnational level, focusing mainly on Argentina and India. In each part, lessons from advanced economies are discussed.
Contents
Overview of Fiscal Policy Rules in Emerging Markets; G.Kopits
PART I: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND MACROECONOMIC SETTING
Fiscal Rules from a Political Economy Perspective; A.Drazen
Good Debt Ratios, Bad Credit Ratings: The Role of Debt Structure; R.Hausmann
Can Fiscal Rules Help Reduce Macroeconomic Volatility?; G.Perry
Fiscal Policy and High Capital Mobility; G.Kopits
Fiscal Institutions Versus Political Will; A.Schick
PART II: DESIGN ISSUES AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL
EMU Fiscal Rules: What Can and Cannot Be Exported; M.Buti & G.Giudice
Fiscal Rules and Debt Sustainability in Brazil; I.Goldfajn & E.R.Guardia
Fiscal Rules in Mexico: Evolution and Prospects; A.Conesa, M.J.Schwartz, A.Somuano & J.A.Tijerina
Fiscal Rules on the Road to an Enlarged European Union; F.Coricelli & V.Ercolani
Fiscal Rules for Economies with Nonrenewable Resources: Norway and Venezuela; O.Bjerkholt & I.Niculescu
PART III: DESIGN ISSUES AT THE SUBNATIONAL LEVEL
Subnational Fiscal Rules: A Game Theoretic Approach; M.Braun & M.Tommasi
Rules-Based Adjustment in a Highly Decentralized Context: The Case of India; K.Kochhar & C.Purfield
Fiscal Rules for Subnational Governments: Lessons from the EMU; F.Balassone, D.Franco & S.Zotteri
Rules for Stabilizing Intergovernmental Transfers in Latin America; C.Y.Gonzalez, D.Rosenblatt & S.B.Webb
Authors
GEORGE KOPITS, Assistant Director of the fiscal affairs department at the International Monetary Fund, has provided technical advice on fiscal policy issues in Asia, Latin America and Europe. He has published and lectured extensively in this area. Previously he was with the US Treasury Department.
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