This book defends a form of ethical intuitionism, according to which (i) there are objective moral truths; (ii) we know some of these truths through a kind of immediate, intellectual awareness, or "intuition"; and (iii) our knowledge of moral truths gives us reasons for action independent of our desires. The author confronts the major objections to this theory, arguing that contrary to what has often been assumed, the theory does have the resources to explain moral disagreements and to offer a reasonable approach to resolving some of them. The major alternative theories, including subjectivism, nihilism, and reductionism, are shown to face decisive objections.
'Read this. It is the best book ever written on meta-ethics. Even philosophers who know the field may feel as though they are confronting these issues for the first time. I used to think of ethical intuitionism as a silly, naIve, even ridiculous theory, but Michael Huemer has made an intuitionist out of me.' - Stuart Rachels, Department of Philosophy, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, USA
'Huemer's book may be the best, most comprehensive defense of ethical intuitionism since Moore's Principia Ethica...[it] is an outstanding defense of the view that there are objective moral truths knowable through intuition. Whether or not one agrees with Huemer's conclusions, one cannot ignore the power of his arguments.' - Richard Fumerton, Department of Philosophy, University of Iowa
'A terrific book. Now philosophers will have no excuse for treating ethical intuitionism as if it were a silly and easily-refuted view.' - James W. Nickel, Arizona State University College of Law, USA
'This is among the best books in metaethics, and one of the best defenses of ethical intuitionism, in recent years. It is admirably clear and very thorough, covering a wide range of important metaethical topics and views. While it is well suited for use in advanced ethics classes, it will surely be of interest to anyone working in the field.' - MIND Association Vol 117 466 April 2008
Preface
Introduction
PART I: ALTERNATIVE METAETHICAL THEORIES
Non-Cognitivism
Subjectivism
Reductionism
PART II: ETHICAL INTUITITIONISM
Moral Knowledge
Disagreement and Error
Practical Reasons
Further Objections
Conclusion
Index
MICHAEL HUEMER received his Ph.D. from Rutgers University in 1998 and is presently Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Colorado at Boulder, USA. He is the author of Skepticism and the Veil of Perception as well as more than 20 articles in epistemology, ethics, and other areas of philosophy.
Description
This book defends a form of ethical intuitionism, according to which (i) there are objective moral truths; (ii) we know some of these truths through a kind of immediate, intellectual awareness, or "intuition"; and (iii) our knowledge of moral truths gives us reasons for action independent of our desires. The author confronts the major objections to this theory, arguing that contrary to what has often been assumed, the theory does have the resources to explain moral disagreements and to offer a reasonable approach to resolving some of them. The major alternative theories, including subjectivism, nihilism, and reductionism, are shown to face decisive objections.
Reviews
'Read this. It is the best book ever written on meta-ethics. Even philosophers who know the field may feel as though they are confronting these issues for the first time. I used to think of ethical intuitionism as a silly, naIve, even ridiculous theory, but Michael Huemer has made an intuitionist out of me.' - Stuart Rachels, Department of Philosophy, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, USA
'Huemer's book may be the best, most comprehensive defense of ethical intuitionism since Moore's Principia Ethica...[it] is an outstanding defense of the view that there are objective moral truths knowable through intuition. Whether or not one agrees with Huemer's conclusions, one cannot ignore the power of his arguments.' - Richard Fumerton, Department of Philosophy, University of Iowa
'A terrific book. Now philosophers will have no excuse for treating ethical intuitionism as if it were a silly and easily-refuted view.' - James W. Nickel, Arizona State University College of Law, USA
'This is among the best books in metaethics, and one of the best defenses of ethical intuitionism, in recent years. It is admirably clear and very thorough, covering a wide range of important metaethical topics and views. While it is well suited for use in advanced ethics classes, it will surely be of interest to anyone working in the field.' - MIND Association Vol 117 466 April 2008
Contents
Preface
Introduction
PART I: ALTERNATIVE METAETHICAL THEORIES
Non-Cognitivism
Subjectivism
Reductionism
PART II: ETHICAL INTUITITIONISM
Moral Knowledge
Disagreement and Error
Practical Reasons
Further Objections
Conclusion
Index
Authors
MICHAEL HUEMER received his Ph.D. from Rutgers University in 1998 and is presently Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Colorado at Boulder, USA. He is the author of Skepticism and the Veil of Perception as well as more than 20 articles in epistemology, ethics, and other areas of philosophy.
terte
terte
|