In this timely publication, Mark E. Duckenfield examines the attitudes and activities of business associations in Germany and the United Kingdom towards the single European currency in the 1980s. This work challenges standard theories of comparative and international political economy and argues that businesses follow, rather than lead, public debates on important macroeconomic issues such as monetary union. Drawing upon extensive archival research, interviews with policy makers and the leaders of business associations, he makes the provocative argument that business associations are not mere transmission belts for their members' economic interests, rather, they are political entities in their own right. Consequently they act strategically in order to promote their members specific interests and are particularly attentive to the configuration of partisan political forces in their national legislatures. These arguments are developed through a comparison of the politics of EMU in the German Bundestag, the British Parliament and among business associations in both countries.

'This is an interesting subject and Duckenfield has amassed some rich empirical material from interviews on the way that business associations in Germany and the United Kingdom responded to the national debates in each country.' - Helen Thompson, Political Studies Review

PART ONE: INTRODUCTION: BUSINESS AND EMU
The Puzzle
The Literature
Internationalization and Domestic Politics
Collective Action
Conventional Explanation: Economic Interest
Alternative Explanation: Public Opinion
The Argument
The Associational Arena: Structuring Interests
The Political Arena: Structuring Interests
Research Design and Case Selection
Summary
PART TWO: GERMANY AND THE POLITICS OF EMU
Political Institutions
The Government and Bundesbank
The Bundestag and Bundesrat
Parties
The Delors Report
German Unification and the Maastricht Treaty
The Politics of Convergence
The (Growth and) Stability Pact
The March 1996 Landtag Elections
The Gold Revaluation Crisis
EMU Membership
Conclusions
PART THREE: GERMAN BUSINESS
Organisation of the Associational Arena
The Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI)
Deutscher Industrie und Handelstag (DIHT)
Verband der Chemischen Industrie (VCI)
Bundesverband der Deutschen Süßwarenindustrie (BDSI)
Hauptverband der Deutschen Bauindustrie (BI)
Economic and Monetary Union
Conclusions
PART FOUR: BRITAIN AND THE POLITICS OF EMU
Political Institutions
The Government and the Bank of England
Parliament
Parties
The ERM (1990-92)
Margaret Thatcher and the ERM
John Major and Maastricht
The Maastricht Crisis
Informal Inflation-Targeting (1992-94)
Formal Inflation-Targeting (1994-97)
The 1997 General Election
Central Bank Independence (1997-Present)
Conclusion
PART FIVE: BRITISH BUSINESS
Organisation of the Associational Arena
The Confederation of British Industry (CBI)
Federation of Small Businesses (FSB)
Institute of Directors (IoD)
London Investment Bankers Associations (LIBA)
National Farmers Union (NFU)
Business Strategies: Membership in the ERM
The Maastricht Treaty
Economic and Monetary Union
Conclusions
PART SIX: CONCLUSIONS

MARK E. DUCKENFIELD is currently Lecturer in the Politics of the World Economy at the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK, having previously held positions at University College London, UK and Harvard University, USA. He has published numerous articles on German and British politics and was previously editor of The Monetary History of Gold.