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Could there have been Nothing?
 
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Could there have been Nothing?
Against Metaphysical Nihilism
 
 
Palgrave Macmillan
 
 
 
 
 
24 Nov 2010
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£58.00
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9780230573635
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DescriptionContentsAuthors

Could there have been Nothing? This is a fundamental metaphysical question, which has a genuine fascination for many people: most of us wonder why the universe is the way it is, why there is a universe at all? Metaphysical nihilists believe that there could have been no physical universe. Everything that exists could have not existed. It sounds like a plausible enough idea, at first. But what grounds do we have for believing it? Is there a persuasive argument for this view? Or is it merely based on intuition? Maybe there had to be something. Does the nature of possibility itself require the existence of physical (concrete) objects? This book looks at the arguments for and against metaphysical nihilism. It considers the metaphysics of possible worlds; philosophy of mathematics and the nature of concrete objects.


Description

Could there have been Nothing? This is a fundamental metaphysical question, which has a genuine fascination for many people: most of us wonder why the universe is the way it is, why there is a universe at all? Metaphysical nihilists believe that there could have been no physical universe. Everything that exists could have not existed. It sounds like a plausible enough idea, at first. But what grounds do we have for believing it? Is there a persuasive argument for this view? Or is it merely based on intuition? Maybe there had to be something. Does the nature of possibility itself require the existence of physical (concrete) objects? This book looks at the arguments for and against metaphysical nihilism. It considers the metaphysics of possible worlds; philosophy of mathematics and the nature of concrete objects.


Contents

Preface
Could there have been Nothing?
Metaphysical Nihilism and the Subtraction Argument
Possible Worlds
Concreteness
Concreta, Dependence and Anti-Nihilism
The Metaphysics of Subtraction
The Trouble with Metaphysical Nihilism
Notes
Bibliography
Index

 


Authors

GERALDINE COGGINS Lecturer in Philosophy at Keele University, UK. She holds a PhD in contemporary analytic metaphysics from Durham University, as well as Philosophy degrees from the University of St Andrews and Trinity College Dublin. She has previously taught at Aberdeen, York and Durham Universities.