Britain and European Monetary Cooperation, 1964-1979

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-xiii

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2. Introduction

   1. Introduction

      • Kiyoshi Hirowatari

      Pages 1-24

3. The Conservatives and European Monetary Cooperation

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 25-25

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   2. The Conservatives and European Monetary Cooperation

      • Kiyoshi Hirowatari

      Pages 27-51

   3. The Conservatives and Monetary Sovereignty

      • Kiyoshi Hirowatari

      Pages 53-64

   4. The Heath Government and External Economic Policy

      • Kiyoshi Hirowatari

      Pages 65-80

   5. Summary of Part I

      • Kiyoshi Hirowatari

      Pages 81-82

4. Labour and European Monetary Cooperation

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 83-83

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   2. Labour and Sterling

      • Kiyoshi Hirowatari

      Pages 85-104

   3. Harold Wilson, the 1964–66 Sterling Crisis and ‘The Second Try’

      • Kiyoshi Hirowatari

      Pages 105-135

   4. The European Approach versus Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy

      • Kiyoshi Hirowatari

      Pages 137-150

   5. The 1976 IMF Crisis and Its Aftermath

      • Kiyoshi Hirowatari

      Pages 151-174

   6. Summary of Part II

      • Kiyoshi Hirowatari

      Pages 175-177

5. Conclusion

   1. Conclusion

      • Kiyoshi Hirowatari

      Pages 179-185

6. Back Matter

   Pages 187-276

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The collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s resulted in a transition to fluctuating rather than fixed currency system. This brought sterling into the turmoil of the world currency markets, and by the end of the 1970s, sterling had quietly ended its role as an international currency. Sterling-dollar diplomacy collapsed, bringing to an end what had hitherto been considered Britain's prime relationship. Britain and European Monetary Cooperation, 1964-1979 provides a unique perspective on these events, shedding light on the complexities of the historical context of British monetary diplomacy and exploring the country's attempt at a European approach to sterling in the 1960s and '70s. The book describes the political and economic approach Britain took at the turn of the 1970s, and explains how the country became restricted by the burden of the sterling balances. In this book, the author illustrates how these developments offered opportunity for both cooperation and conflict in the light of monetary diplomacy. He demonstrates how Britain's struggle to achieve exchange rate stability, twinned with controversy over European Economic Community membership, finally prompted serious reconsideration of economic policy-making. This book challenges the commonly-held perception of the decline of sterling, and explains that, although Britain's attempt at a European approach failed, the decline of the currency was more complicated than a 'managed decline'.

• crisis
• economic policy
• policy-making

Kiyoshi Hirowatari teaches History of International Trade, International Finance and Globalization at Hirao School of Management, Konan University, Japan. He studied at both Kyoto and Cambridge Universities, obtaining a PhD in History from Cambridge University. He is a Research Associate at the Centre for Financial History at Darwin College, Cambridge and a member of the Economic and Social History University academic staff. He is a member of the Socio-Economic History Society of Japan, and has held professional positions at the Bank of Tokyo. Kiyoshi Hirowatari's research interests lie in monetary diplomacy between Britain and Europe.

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