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Table of contents (7 chapters)
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Reviews
'The so-called Schelling conjecture, named after Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling, is a key proposition in the applied bargaining literature. This 'paradox of weakness' suggests that the weak negotiator is often more successful than its resourceful and unconstrained counterpart. This volume explores in an exemplary fashion the relevance of the Schelling conjecture and some related hypotheses on how democracies negotiate with other states and how successful they are at the bargaining table. The theoretical and empirical work presented by this truly international research team offers new challenges and is presented with hallmark rigor and sophistication. Their collective tour de force will shape the negotiation and cooperation literature for years to come.' - Gerald Schneider, University of Konstanz, and Executive Editor European Union Politics
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Bibliographic Information
Book Title: Democratic Foreign Policy Making
Book Subtitle: Problems of Divided Government and International Cooperation
Editors: Robert Pahre
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230601444
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan New York
eBook Packages: Palgrave Political & Intern. Studies Collection, Political Science and International Studies (R0)
Copyright Information: Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Nature America Inc. 2006
Hardcover ISBN: 978-1-4039-7457-0Published: 14 March 2008
Softcover ISBN: 978-1-349-53526-2Published: 14 March 2008
eBook ISBN: 978-0-230-60144-4Published: 30 October 2006
Edition Number: 1
Number of Pages: XII, 243
Topics: International Relations, European Union Politics, Political Science, Foreign Policy