British Military Planning for the Defence of Germany 1945–50

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-xi

   PDF

2. Introduction

   • Paul Cornish

   Pages 1-6

3. Threat Perceptions, 1945–50

   • Paul Cornish

   Pages 7-32

4. The Defence Budget, 1945–50

   • Paul Cornish

   Pages 33-70

5. The ‘No War Rule’

   • Paul Cornish

   Pages 71-85

6. Fragile Logic: Strategic Plans, 1945–47

   • Paul Cornish

   Pages 86-103

7. Consolidation of the Cold War: Strategic Plans, 1947–48

   • Paul Cornish

   Pages 104-129

8. Token Forces: Strategic Plans, 1949–50

   • Paul Cornish

   Pages 130-163

9. Conclusion

   • Paul Cornish

   Pages 164-169

10. Back Matter

    Pages 170-211

    PDF

Using recently released archive material, British Military Planning for the Defence of Germany, 1945-50, reassesses Britain's strategy for the defence of Germany up to the outbreak of the Korean War. Convinced of the capabilities of strategic air power with atomic weapons, and convinced that the defence of the Middle East should be the first call on British planning, Britain's military chiefs made a series of token gestures designed to boost French morale and consistently refused to make a genuine 'continental commitment' of operational troops.

• bibliography
• Britain
• cold war
• design
• French
• German
• Germany
• Great Britain
• knowledge
• Middle East
• perception
• planning

• International Security Programme, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, UK

  Paul Cornish

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