Britain, the United States and the Mediterranean War 1942-44

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-x

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2. Introduction

   • Matthew Jones

   Pages 1-24

3. Strategy and Command, from ‘Torch’ to the Sicilian Campaign, 1942–43

   • Matthew Jones

   Pages 25-64

4. Civil Affairs and AFHQ, from ‘Torch’ to the Sicilian Campaign, 1942–43

   • Matthew Jones

   Pages 65-96

5. The Mediterranean Command and Unification, September 1943–June 1944

   • Matthew Jones

   Pages 97-137

6. Strategy and Command: The Italian Campaign and the ‘Anvil’ Controversy, from ‘Trident’ to the Fall of Rome, 1943–44

   • Matthew Jones

   Pages 138-180

7. The Crisis of the Mediterranean Command, June–December 1944

   • Matthew Jones

   Pages 181-225

8. Conclusions and Perspectives: The End of the War in the Mediterranean, Greece, and British Perceptions of Status, 1945–47

   • Matthew Jones

   Pages 226-242

9. Back Matter

   Pages 243-293

   PDF

An examination of the controversies and disputes produced between Britain and the United States by their joint involvement in the Mediterranean theatre during the Second World War. Analysis of the evolution of Allied strategy toward the Mediterranean is put alongside a consideration of the conduct of military campaigns and the command structures that accompanied them. The political tensions permeating Anglo-American relations, and the important role played here by Harold Macmillan, are also discussed to provide a full picture of the problems faced by the alliance.

• Anglo-American
• Britain
• Greece
• USA

• Royal Holloway, University of London, UK

  Matthew Jones

Policies and ethics